CN107566128A - A kind of two side's distribution SM9 digital signature generation methods and system - Google Patents
A kind of two side's distribution SM9 digital signature generation methods and system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
Two side's distribution SM9 digital signature generation methods of one kind of the invention and system, KGC is to participate in private key corresponding to communicating pair A, the B generation of SM9 digital signature in the present invention, and after receiving signature key, A sends signature request to B.B selects random number k1,k2∈ [1, q 1], calculateAnd return to A.Now, A randomly chooses k3,k4, first part h of signature is calculated, and return to h '=k4H (modq) gives B.B calculates s using the private key of oneself1,s2And it is sent to A.A receives s1,s2Afterwards, the second part S of signature is calculated using the private key of oneself, in signature verification by rear, A issues complete SM9 digital signature (h, S).The present invention has the advantages that safe, execution efficiency is fast, easily verified, the distributed generation SM9 digital signature of ability in the case where communicating pair participates in jointly must be had by producing the process of digital signature, the forgery stolen with internal participant of the external attacker to sub-key of signing can be effectively prevented, improves security and fairness that two sides participate in the generation of SM9 digital signature.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to field of information security technology, is based particularly on one kind two that two sides produce SM9 digital signature jointly
The distributed SM9 digital signature generation method in side and system.
Background technology
Digital signature is a kind of important cryptography scheme, and it generates message digital signature by certain crypto-operation, carrys out generation
For writing signature or seal.Digital signature is to realize the important tool of certification, is mainly used in the active for preventing attacker to system
Attack, such as pretend, harass.Digital signature can verify that the identity of message sender prevents sender from denying and preventing message
Recipient forges, and can also verify the integrality of message, resist third-party forgery attack.Digital signature is mainly used in differentiating label
The identity of famous person and the legitimacy of information, it is using most universal, technology in current network service, ecommerce, E-Government
A kind of most strong cryptographic technique of most ripe, operability.
In digital signature procedure, the leakage of signature key means the forfeiture of signature scheme security.Privacy sharing is
A kind of cryptographic technique for splitting the secret into storage, it is the important means in information security and data confidentiality, secret mistake can be prevented
In concentration, diversified risks and inbreak-tolerated purpose so as to reach.In (t, n) Threshold Group Signature, digital signature is by one
Group user is produced, rather than is produced by a people, and signature key is divided into n parts, and is distributed to different member's keepings.In order to
An effective signature is produced to message m, at least needs t member to cooperate.The effect of Threshold Group Signature mainly prevents from coming
Attack from internal or external opponent to signature key.In this approach, once signature key is resumed, then attacker can be with
Complete to sign to message alone in the case where other members are not involved in.
SM9 id password algorithms are a kind of id password algorithms based on Bilinear map, and it can be the identity mark of user
Know to generate the public affairs of user, private key pair.SM9 application does not need digital certificate, certificate repository or cipher key store with management, mainly
For digital signature, data encryption, key exchange and authentication etc..The algorithm was issued as national password industry in 2015
Standard (GM/T 0044-2016).
The present invention devises a kind of scheme of distributed SM9 digital signature generation, during this schemes generation is signed, two
Fang Bixu simultaneously participates in the signature that could generate message, while ensures the privacy of signature key.
The content of the invention
The purpose of the present invention is to propose to two communication parties each to possess a part signature key, and communicating pair is not leaking
The signature key of oneself completes the signature to message in the case of can not obtaining complete signature key again.
For the purpose of the present invention, the present invention proposes the scheme that two sides generate SM9 digital signature jointly, given below
Go out to specifically describe.In this programme, key generation centre (KGC) is a trusted third party, and it is mainly responsible for generation system ginseng
Several, main private key and signature key.
A kind of two side's distribution SM9 digital signature generation methods, it is characterised in that including：
Step 1, the generation of key initialization is carried out, key generation centre random selection ks ∈ [1, q-1] are used as main private key,
Calculate Ppub-s=[ks] P2As signature Your Majesty's key；Key generation centre is secret to preserve ks, open Ppub-s；Key generation centre selects
Select and openly with the signature key generating function identifier hid of a byte representation；
Step 2, the identity ID for defining user is the signature key of user, and key generation centre generation communicating pair A and B are signed
Key needed for name, it is specifically：
Step 2.1, key generation centre calculate a temporary variable t1=H1(IDPhid, q)+ks and
Second temporary variableWhereinRepresent t1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,
Step 2.2, key generation centre select a random number d1∈ [1, q-1] is simultaneously calculatedIts
InRepresent d1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,
Step 2.3, key generation centre calculate Part I signature keyIt is used as part public keyAnd the Part II signature key is set to be
Step 2.4, user's handleWithIt is respectively stored into device A and B；
Step 3, it is Bit String m to define message to be signed, in order to obtain the digital signature of message m (h, S), communicating pair
Digital signature of the A and B based on generation carries out following interactive step：
Step 3.1, B select first random number k in set [1, q-1]1With second random number k2, and calculate first
Temporary portion public keyWith second temporary portion public keyB is by μ1And μ2It is sent to A；
Step 3.2, A receive μ1And μ2Afterwards, the 3rd random number k is selected in set [1, q-1]3With the 4th random number k4,
Calculate target temporary public keyAnd first part h=H of signature is calculated by μ2(μPm,q)；A calculates the
One temporary variable h '=k4-h(modq)；K is reselected if h '=03,k4, otherwise A h ' is sent to B；
After step 3.3, B receive h ', second temporary variable s is calculated1=k1·d2And the 3rd temporary variable s (modq)2
=(h '+k2)·d2(modq), and by s1And s2It is sent to A；
Step 3.4, A receive s1And s2Afterwards, the second part of signature is calculatedA checking signatures
Correctness, if being verified, output SM9 signature (h, S).
In the present invention, KGC is that communicating pair A, the B generation for participating in SM9 digital signature corresponds to
Private key, after receiving signature key, A to B send signature request.B selects random number k1,k2∈ [1, q-1], calculateAnd return to A.Now, A randomly chooses k3,k4, first part h of signature is calculated, and return to h '=k4-
H (modq) gives B.B calculates s using the private key of oneself1,s2And it is sent to A.A receives s1,s2Afterwards, label are calculated using the private key of oneself
The second part S of name, in signature verification by rear, A issues complete SM9 digital signature (h, S)
A kind of two side distribution SM9 digital signature generation system, it is characterised in that including：
Key generation centre：For generate main private key, signature Your Majesty key, communicating pair A and B signature needed for signature key with
And communicating pair A and B required digital signature when interacting；The key generation centre specifically includes：
The generation unit of key initialization：Main private key is used as randomly choosing ks ∈ [1, q-1], calculates Ppub-s=[ks]
P2As signature Your Majesty's key；Key generation centre is secret to preserve ks, open Ppub-s；Key generation centre selects and openly with one
The signature key generating function identifier hid of byte representation；
Signature key generation unit：The identity ID for defining user is the signature key of user, and key generation centre generation is logical
Believe key needed for both sides A and B signature；
Digital signature generation unit：It is Bit String m to define message to be signed, when generation communicating pair A and B are interacted
Required digital signature.
System is generated in the above-mentioned side distribution SM9 digital signature of one kind two, the generation unit of the key initialization is held
Following steps are specifically included during row：
Step 3.1, key generation centre calculate a temporary variable t1=H1(IDPhid, q)+ks and second interim change
AmountWhereinRepresent t1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,
Step 3.2, key generation centre select a random number d1∈ [1, q-1], and calculateIts
InRepresent d1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,
Step 3.3, key generation centre calculate Part I signature keyIt is used as part public keyAnd the Part II signature key is set to be
Step 3.4, user's handleWithIt is respectively stored into device A and B.
System is generated in the above-mentioned side distribution SM9 digital signature of one kind two, when the signature key generation unit performs
Specifically include following steps：
Step 4.1, B select first random number k in set [1, q-1]1With second random number k2, and calculate first
Temporary portion public keyWith second temporary portion public keyB is by μ1And μ2It is sent to A；
Step 4.2, A receive μ1And μ2Afterwards, the 3rd random number k is selected in set [1, q-1]3With the 4th random number k4,
Calculate target temporary public keyAnd first part h=H of signature is calculated by μ2(μPm,q)；A calculates the
One temporary variable h '=k4-h(modq)；K is reselected if h '=03,k4, otherwise A h ' is sent to B；
After step 4.3, B receive h ', second temporary variable s is calculated1=k1·d2And the 3rd temporary variable s (modq)2
=(h '+k2)·d2(modq), and by s1And s2It is sent to A；
Step 4.4, A receive s1And s2Afterwards, the second part of signature is calculatedA checking signatures
Correctness, if being verified, output SM9 signature (h, S).
The present invention has the following advantages that compared with prior art and beneficial effect：1st, existing Secret splitting or Threshold Secret
Potential safety hazard all be present in most of secret sharing.For example, being signed the stage in scheme, secret value may be attacked by one or several
Person recovers, so as to which in the case where not needing other members to participate in, completion message is signed.2nd, existing signature scheme needs one
Trusted party generates and distributed shared secret, it is desirable to which signer needs confidential corespondence when exchanging information.3rd, have it is safe, hold
Line efficiency is fast, the advantages that easily verifying, each participant, can be to the sub-key of oneself and its on the premise of sub-key is not leaked
He is verified the sub-key of participant.Producing the process of digital signature must have in the case where communicating pair participates in jointly
Distributed SM9 digital signature can be generated, can effectively prevent external attacker stealing and internal participant to signature sub-key
Forgery, improve security and fairness that two sides participate in the generation of SM9 digital signature.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the method flow schematic diagram that digital signature generates in the present invention.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, the present invention is specifically addressed.
First, symbol and definition
A,B：Communicating pair.
G1,G2：Rank is the addition cyclic group of prime number q.
GT：Rank is the multiplicative cyclic group of prime number q.
e：From G1×G2To GTBilinear map.
gu：Multiplicative group GTMiddle g u power, i.e.,Wherein u is positive integer.
H1(·),H2(·)：By { 0,1 }*ArriveCryptographic Hash function.
IDA：Communication party A mark, communication party A public key can be uniquely determined.
Communication party A signature key.
modq：Mould q computings.For example, 27 (mod5) ≡ 2.
q：Cyclic group G1,G2And GTRank, and q ＞ 2191For prime number.
P1, P2：It is crowd G respectively1And G2Generation member.
[u]P：Module G1,G2U times of middle element P.
xPy：X and y splicing, wherein x and y are Bit String or byte serial.
[x,y]：The set of integer not less than x and no more than y.
In system initialisation phase, KGC random selection ks ∈ [1, q-1] are used as main private key, calculate Ppub-s=[ks] P2Make
For Your Majesty's key of signing.KGC is secret to preserve ks, open Ppub-s.KGC is selected and openly generated with the signature key of a byte representation
Function identifier hid.
2nd, the generation of communicating pair signature key
The identity ID of given user, is the signature key of user, and KGC performs lower column operations：
1) KGC calculates a temporary variable t1=H1(IDPhid, q)+ks and second temporary variableWhereinRepresent t1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,
2) KGC selects a random number d1∈ [1, q-1], and calculateWhereinRepresent d1Mould q
Inverse element, i.e.,
3) KGC calculates Part I signature keyIt is used as part public keyAnd set second
Point signature key is
4) user's handleWithIt is respectively stored into device A and B.
3rd, digital signature generating algorithm
If message to be signed is Bit String m, in order to obtain the digital signature of message m (h, S), communicating pair A and B are carried out
Following interaction：
1) B selects first random number k in set [1, q-1]1With second random number k2, and calculate first interim portion
Divide public keyWith second temporary portion public keyB is by μ1And μ2It is sent to A.
2) A receives μ1And μ2Afterwards, the 3rd random number k is selected in set [1, q-1]3With the 4th random number k4, calculate mesh
Mark temporary public keyAnd first part h=H of signature is calculated by μ2(μPm,q).A calculates first and faced
Variations per hour h '=k4-h(modq).K is reselected if h '=03,k4, otherwise A h ' is sent to B.
3) after B receives h ', second temporary variable s is calculated1=k1·d2And the 3rd temporary variable s (modq)2=(h '+
k2)·d2(modq), and by s1And s2It is sent to A.
4) A receives s1And s2Afterwards, the second part of signature is calculatedA checkings are signed correct
Property, if being verified, output SM9 signatures (h, S).
Specific embodiment described herein is only to spirit explanation for example of the invention.Technology belonging to the present invention is led
The technical staff in domain can be made various modifications or supplement to described specific embodiment or be replaced using similar mode
Generation, but without departing from the spiritual of the present invention or surmount scope defined in appended claims.
Claims (4)
- A kind of 1. two side's distribution SM9 digital signature generation methods, it is characterised in that including：Step 1, the generation of key initialization is carried out, key generation centre random selection ks ∈ [1, q-1] are used as main private key, calculate Ppub-s=[ks] P2As signature Your Majesty's key；Key generation centre is secret to preserve ks, open Ppub-s；Key generation centre selects simultaneously The open signature key generating function identifier hid with a byte representation；Step 2, the identity ID for defining user is the signature key of user, and key generation centre generation communicating pair A and B sign Required key, it is specifically：Step 2.1, key generation centre calculate a temporary variable t1=H1(ID | | hid, q)+ks and second temporary variableWhereinRepresent t1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,Step 2.2, key generation centre select a random number d1∈ [1, q-1], and calculateWhereinRepresent d1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,Step 2.3, key generation centre calculate Part I signature keyIt is used as part public keyAnd Set Part II signature key beStep 2.4, user's handleWithIt is respectively stored into device A and B；Step 3, it is Bit String m to define message to be signed, in order to obtain the digital signature of message m (h, S), communicating pair A Following interactive step is carried out with digital signature of the B based on generation：Step 3.1, B select first random number k in set [1, q-1]1With second random number k2, and calculate first temporarily Part public keyWith second temporary portion public keyB is by μ1And μ2It is sent to A；Step 3.2, A receive μ1And μ2Afterwards, the 3rd random number k is selected in set [1, q-1]3With the 4th random number k4, calculate Target temporary public keyAnd first part h=H of signature is calculated by μ2(μ||m,q)；A calculates first Temporary variable h '=k4-h(modq)；K is reselected if h '=03,k4, otherwise A h ' is sent to B；After step 3.3, B receive h ', second temporary variable s is calculated1=k1·d2And the 3rd temporary variable s (modq)2=(h ' +k2)·d2(modq), and by s1And s2It is sent to A；Step 3.4, A receive s1And s2Afterwards, the second part of signature is calculatedA checkings signature is just True property, if being verified, output SM9 signatures (h, S).
- A kind of 2. two side distribution SM9 digital signature generation system, it is characterised in that including：Key generation centre：For generating main private key, signature Your Majesty key, signature key needed for communicating pair A and B signature and logical Believe digital signature required when both sides A and B interaction；The key generation centre specifically includes：The generation unit of key initialization：Main private key is used as randomly choosing ks ∈ [1, q-1], calculates Ppub-s=[ks] P2Make For Your Majesty's key of signing；Key generation centre is secret to preserve ks, open Ppub-s；Key generation centre selects and openly with a byte The signature key generating function identifier hid of expression；Signature key generation unit：The identity ID for defining user is the signature key of user, and key generation centre generation communication is double Key needed for square A and B signature；Digital signature generation unit：It is Bit String m to define message to be signed, and generation communicating pair A and B are required when interacting Digital signature.
- 3. a kind of two sides distribution SM9 digital signature generation system according to claim 2, it is characterised in that described secret The generation unit of key initialization specifically includes following steps when performing：Step 3.1, key generation centre calculate a temporary variable t1=H1(ID | | hid, q)+ks and second temporary variableWhereinRepresent t1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,Step 3.2, key generation centre select a random number d1∈ [1, q-1], and calculateWhereinRepresent d1Mould q inverse element, i.e.,Step 3.3, key generation centre calculate Part I signature keyIt is used as part public keyAnd Set Part II signature key beStep 3.4, user's handleWithIt is respectively stored into device A and B.
- A kind of 4. two sides distribution SM9 digital signature generation system according to claim 3, it is characterised in that the label Name Key generating unit specifically includes following steps when performing：Step 4.1, B select first random number k in set [1, q-1]1With second random number k2, and calculate first temporarily Part public keyWith second temporary portion public keyB is by μ1And μ2It is sent to A；Step 4.2, A receive μ1And μ2Afterwards, the 3rd random number k is selected in set [1, q-1]3With the 4th random number k4, calculate Target temporary public keyAnd first part h=H of signature is calculated by μ2(μ||m,q)；A calculates first Temporary variable h '=k4-h(modq)；K is reselected if h '=03,k4, otherwise A h ' is sent to B；After step 4.3, B receive h ', second temporary variable s is calculated1=k1·d2And the 3rd temporary variable s (modq)2=(h ' +k2)·d2(modq), and by s1And s2It is sent to A；Step 4.4, A receive s1And s2Afterwards, the second part of signature is calculatedA is signed using SM9 The verification algorithm of algorithm verifies the correctness of signature, if being verified, output SM9 signatures (h, S).
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| CN110855425A (en) * | 2019-10-25 | 2020-02-28 | 武汉大学 | Lightweight multiparty cooperative SM9 key generation and ciphertext decryption method and medium |
| CN110912708A (en) * | 2019-11-26 | 2020-03-24 | 武汉大学 | Ring signature generation method based on SM9 digital signature algorithm |
| WO2021127951A1 (en) * | 2019-12-24 | 2021-07-01 | 云图技术有限公司 | Method and device for generating two-party collaborative eddsa digital signature |
| CN114697001A (en) * | 2020-12-28 | 2022-07-01 | 山东浪潮质量链科技有限公司 | Information encryption transmission method, equipment and medium based on block chain |
| CN112613882A (en) * | 2020-12-29 | 2021-04-06 | 成都知道创宇信息技术有限公司 | Distributed signature system and management method |
| CN112511566A (en) * | 2021-02-02 | 2021-03-16 | 北京信安世纪科技股份有限公司 | SM9 algorithm certificateless mechanism signature key generation method, equipment and storage medium |
| CN112822014B (en) * | 2021-04-22 | 2021-08-31 | 北京信安世纪科技股份有限公司 | Data processing method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN112822014A (en) * | 2021-04-22 | 2021-05-18 | 北京信安世纪科技股份有限公司 | Data processing method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN114650136A (en) * | 2022-05-18 | 2022-06-21 | 杭州天谷信息科技有限公司 | Electronic signature method and device based on hybrid cloud |
| CN115314208A (en) * | 2022-07-04 | 2022-11-08 | 武汉理工大学 | Safe and controllable SM9 digital signature generation method and system |
| CN115314208B (en) * | 2022-07-04 | 2024-04-02 | 武汉理工大学 | Safe and controllable SM9 digital signature generation method and system |
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