CN107370743B - For the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip - Google Patents
For the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip Download PDFInfo
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- CN107370743B CN107370743B CN201710647004.2A CN201710647004A CN107370743B CN 107370743 B CN107370743 B CN 107370743B CN 201710647004 A CN201710647004 A CN 201710647004A CN 107370743 B CN107370743 B CN 107370743B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/145—Countermeasures against malicious traffic the attack involving the propagation of malware through the network, e.g. viruses, trojans or worms
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of for the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip, wherein should include: to be detected to path using detection request packet to the detection method of hardware Trojan horse in many-core chip；Hardware Trojan horse is positioned using detection request packet；The defence method that hardware Trojan horse is coped in many-core chip includes: using Adaptive Minimal Wormhole Routing around hardware Trojan horse；Use steering model deadlock prevention.The present invention can reduce packet loss problem caused by hardware Trojan horse in many-core chip.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to technical field of integrated circuits, and in particular to a kind of malice for altered data packet on many-core chip
The detection of wooden horse and defence method.
Background technique
In the system of data center, mobile computing etc, a challenge very outstanding is information security.In order to meet
The performance requirement of high computing capability, these systems use building module of the multi core chip as them.Multi core chip is dependent on crowd
Means of communication of the core piece (Network-on-Chip, NoC) as its bottom.
In present multi core chip, safety becomes a very crucial challenge.Hardware Trojan horse (hardware
Trojan, HT) serious threat is constituted to multi core chip, the information of chip failure or leakage sensitivity can be caused.Hardware wood
Marko by being embedded in a malice circuit in chip design process to be injected among chip.In order to shorten Time To Market and
Design overhead is reduced, present multi core chip is integrated with many different third parties (third party intellectual
Prop-erty, 3PIP) component, and in these components may include hardware Trojan horse.
Dell/black hole Denial of Service attack is one of the catastrophic attack for many-core chip, and this attack passes through evil
Meaning node attempts to make the many-core resources of chip of prospective users to be disabled.In black hole attack, hardware Trojan horse is injected into road
By in device, making data packet be not forwarded original destination, on the contrary, they are dropped or are forwarded to other malicious nodes.
In dell attack, malicious node attracts neighbouring node by pretending to possess many freebufs under adaptive routing
Data packet.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the present invention is propose a kind of for many-core core for the hardware Trojan horse for being implanted to router altered data packet
The detection of the malice wooden horse of on piece altered data packet and defence method.
The purpose of the present invention can be reached by adopting the following technical scheme that:
It is a kind of to include for the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method, the method on many-core chip
Detecting step and defence step, wherein the detecting step includes path detection sub-step and node locating sub-step, described
Path detection sub-step it is specific as follows:
Global administration person notifies the source node for sending data packet to send detection request packet to destination node, wherein detection request
Each tail addition check code of the packet by general data packet using cyclic redundancy check in data packet is formed；
After data packet reaches destination node, destination node judges the data packet in routing procedure by checking check code
In whether be tampered, if being not tampered with destination node reply source node, if being tampered, destination node will be into many-core system
All suspect nodes issue a repeating transmission request；
Vertex ticks on reverse-path is no wooden horse node by global administration person；
The node locating sub-step is specific as follows:
It is the data packet that the node of repeating transmission request is issued to it that each suspect node, which can send a destination, while again
The data packet format of hair is identical as the data packet format being tampered is detected；
The node for receiving retransmission data packet will successively detect whether each data packet is tampered, and be determined according to routing algorithm
It is implanted into the node location of malice wooden horse；
Wherein, the defence step is specific as follows:
The router of each many-core chip safeguards an adjacent malicious node list, which records the north of the router,
Whether the downstream router in west, south, eastern four direction is implantation wooden horse, when router calculates the output port of a data packet
When, which can check whether calculated output port includes malicious node, if the router will comprising malicious node
Output port is reselected for data packet.
Further, the selection of the suspect node is determined dependent on routing algorithm used in many-core chip, is chosen
To be tampered the node that data packet is passed through in routing procedure.
Further, the node location of malice wooden horse implantation is detected each time, which can all be broadcast to each
Node, each corresponding router of node update the adjacent malicious node list of this node by received broadcast.
Further, detection protocol is executed using detection request packet in the detecting step.
The present invention has the following advantages and effects with respect to the prior art:
The present invention can effectively detect the wooden horse position for the purpose of altered data packet, the case where guaranteeing detection accuracy
Under possess lesser power consumption, it is lower to occupying for all kinds of resources of chip.Experiment on corresponding simulator simultaneously is shown can
To there is very high accuracy to detect, wooden horse position can correctly avoid the malicious node containing wooden horse with stylish data packet.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the path detection scene figure in detection method；
Fig. 2 is the wooden horse positioning scene figure in detection method；
Fig. 3 is the scene figure that the node containing wooden horse is bypassed in defence method；
Fig. 4 is for the process step figure of the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the object, technical scheme and advantages of the embodiment of the invention clearer, below in conjunction with the embodiment of the present invention
In attached drawing, technical scheme in the embodiment of the invention is clearly and completely described, it is clear that described embodiment is
A part of the embodiment of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.Based on the embodiments of the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art
Every other embodiment obtained without making creative work, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Embodiment one
The present embodiment is directed to the hardware Trojan horse for being implanted to router altered data packet, proposes a kind of online detection and defence
Method.Wherein,
Detecting step: the source node for sending data packet can use cyclic redundancy check in data packet before issuing data packet
Each tail add check code.After data packet reaches destination node, destination node judges this by checking check code
Whether data packet is tampered in routing procedure.Once the destination node will be all " suspicious into many-core system it was found that distort
Node " issues a repeating transmission request.The selection of " suspect node " is dependent on specific routing algorithm used in many-core chip, generally
To be tampered the node that data packet is passed through in routing procedure.It is to send out to it that each " suspect node ", which can send a destination,
The data packet of the node of request is retransmitted out, while the data packet format retransmitted is identical as the data packet format being tampered is detected.
The node for receiving the data packet of these repeating transmission will successively detect whether each data packet is tampered, and according to specifically used routing
Algorithm determination implants the node location of wooden horse.
Defence step: the router of each many-core chip can safeguard an adjacent malicious node list, this table record
The north of this router, west, south, whether the downstream router of eastern four direction be to implant wooden horse.Evil is detected each time
The node location that wooden horse of anticipating is implanted into, the position can all be broadcast to each node, and each corresponding router of node passes through this
A little broadcast update the adjacent malicious node list of oneself.When router calculates the output port of a data packet, it can be checked
Whether calculated output port has corresponded to a malicious node, if it is, router will select again for data packet
Select output port.By this mechanism, new data packet can then prevent data packet to avoid by the node for being implanted wooden horse
It is tampered.
Embodiment two
The present embodiment is that global administration person increases detection request packet function and is that network increases detection in 2D-mesh network
Agreement.It is non-minimum routing algorithm that the present embodiment, which modifies algorithm network routing,.Here it is illustrated by taking 3x3 2D-mesh network as an example
The detection of malice wooden horse and defence method disclosed in the present invention.The path detection process of the present embodiment is as shown in Figure 1, global pipe
Reason person G selects node 3 and node 4 as suspect node, then sends detection request packet to them；Node 3 receives request packet simultaneously
Reply global administration person G；Global administration person receives reply, flag node 3 and node 6 as no wooden horse node.
Global administration person does not receive the reply of suspect node 4, is accurately positioned to hardware Trojan horse, process as shown in Fig. 2,
Global administration person G has found that packet loss is requested in the detection to suspect node 4, then the transmission detection of suspect node 8 first on path is asked
Ask packet (1. path tag is).If node 8 is not replied, flag node 8 is malicious node.Otherwise, under G is on path
One suspect node 7 sends detection request packet, checks whether node 7 replys (2. path tag is).
The non-minimum routing defence process of the present embodiment by the data packet that node 1 is sent to node 9 as shown in figure 3, made
With normally route in the case of by node containing wooden horse 3, using non-minimum routing algorithm, in node 2, router is to tentatively tying
Fruit node 3 is verified, and reading wooden horse register discovery node 3 is node containing wooden horse, is given up PRELIMINARY RESULTS and is recalculated newly to go out
Mouth node 5, finally, data packet arrives at the destination node 9 by the path of 1-2-5-6-9.The algorithm turns to mould using north is last
Type, the case where forbidding in the example north-east to turn to, path is such as forbidden to be 4-1-2.
The above embodiment is a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but embodiments of the present invention are not by above-described embodiment
Limitation, other any changes, modifications, substitutions, combinations, simplifications made without departing from the spirit and principles of the present invention,
It should be equivalent substitute mode, be included within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. a kind of for the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip, which is characterized in that described
Method include detecting step and defence step, wherein the detecting step includes path detection sub-step and node locating
Sub-step, the path detection sub-step are specific as follows:
Global administration person notify send data packet source node to destination node send detection request packet, wherein detection request packet by
Each tail addition check code of the general data packet using cyclic redundancy check in data packet is formed；
After data packet reaches destination node, destination node is in routing procedure to judge the data packet by checking check code
No to be tampered, destination node replys source node if being not tampered with, if being tampered, destination node will own into many-core system
Suspect node issue repeatings transmission and request；
Vertex ticks on reverse-path is no wooden horse node by global administration person；
The node locating sub-step is specific as follows:
It is the data packet for retransmitting the node of request to be issued to it, while retransmitting that each suspect node, which can send a destination,
Data packet format is identical as the data packet format being tampered is detected；
The node for receiving retransmission data packet will successively detect whether each data packet is tampered, and be determined and be implanted into according to routing algorithm
The node location of malice wooden horse；
Wherein, the defence step is specific as follows:
The router of each many-core chip safeguards an adjacent malicious node list, which records the north of the router, west,
Whether the downstream router in south, eastern four direction is that implantation wooden horse should when router calculates the output port of a data packet
Router can check whether calculated output port includes malicious node, if the router will be number comprising malicious node
Output port is reselected according to packet.
2. according to claim 1 be directed to the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip,
It is characterized in that, the selection of the suspect node is determined dependent on routing algorithm used in many-core chip, it is chosen for being usurped
Change the node that data packet is passed through in routing procedure.
3. according to claim 1 be directed to the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip,
It is characterized in that, detecting the node location of malice wooden horse implantation each time, which can all be broadcast to each node, often
A corresponding router of node updates the adjacent malicious node list of this node by received broadcast.
4. according to claim 1 be directed to the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip,
It is characterized in that, executing detection protocol using detection request packet in the detecting step.
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| CN201710647004.2A CN107370743B (en) | 2017-08-01 | 2017-08-01 | For the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip |
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| CN201710647004.2A CN107370743B (en) | 2017-08-01 | 2017-08-01 | For the detection of the malice wooden horse of altered data packet and defence method on many-core chip |
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| CN107370743B true CN107370743B (en) | 2019-08-20 |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN111143847B (en) * | 2019-12-30 | 2023-04-21 | 华南理工大学 | Probability-based light-weight data packet tamper Trojan detection method |
| CN111414618B (en) * | 2020-03-16 | 2022-09-02 | 福州大学 | Micro-fluidic biochip field-level hardware Trojan horse detection method based on Hamming distance |
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| CN106357760A (en) * | 2016-09-14 | 2017-01-25 | 芜湖扬展新材料科技服务有限公司 | ZigBee-based vehicular wireless safety communication system |
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| CN1319302C (en) * | 2003-01-31 | 2007-05-30 | 菲尼克斯电气公司 | Method and device for monitoring data packet safety transmission |
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