CN111414618B - Micro-fluidic biochip field-level hardware Trojan horse detection method based on Hamming distance - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to a digital microfluidic biochip field-level hardware Trojan horse detection method based on Hamming distance, which is used for acquiring a biochemical protocol stored in a digital microfluidic biochip platform; assuming that a malicious third party is tampered with, two character strings are given, one is a gold driving sequence sold by a manufacturer and a series of field-level implemented driving sequences, and then the hamming distance is calculated by utilizing the difference in the circulation of each time step from the beginning to the end of the reaction; and in each step cycle, judging whether the calculated Hamming distance is larger than 0 to obtain a key value, namely whether the tampering is suffered. And once the site-level hardware trojan is detected, the operation is stopped immediately, so that larger and larger errors are avoided. And after feedback processing, continuing to circularly execute the program. The invention is low in cost, does not need special detection equipment and is not influenced by noise.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of information security and hardware Trojan detection, in particular to a digital microfluidic biochip field-level hardware Trojan detection method based on Hamming distance.
Background
Microfluidic biochips constitute an emerging technology for biological automation. In recent years, the development of manufacturing techniques has made it possible to develop such techniques. A large number of biological protocols can be processed independently, simultaneously and automatically on a coin-sized microfluidic platform. Microfluidic biochips are mainly divided into two main types: flow pattern and digital (droplet pattern) see fig. 1, 2.
A typical DMFB (digital microfluidic biochip) consists of a two-dimensional (2D) electrode array and peripheral devices such as optical detectors, dispensing ports (that dispense droplets) and control pins (control electrodes). There are two parallel plates on the basic unit of the DMFB, and both surfaces of the bottom and top plates are coated with an insulating layer and a hydrophobic film for smooth droplet driving. A voltage V is applied between the droplet and the electrode while the electrode is switched on, so that the charge changes the free energy on the dielectric surface. Thus, an electric field is generated across the insulator, which reduces the interfacial tension between the liquid and the insulator surface, thereby changing the apparent contact angle θ (V) of the liquid droplet. This phenomenon is called dielectric Electrowetting (EWOD) and refers to a phenomenon in which the wettability of a liquid droplet on a substrate, that is, a contact angle, is changed by changing a voltage between the liquid droplet and an insulating substrate, and the liquid droplet is deformed or displaced.
After the digital biochip is released by the huge company illumina in the field of biochemical analysis, no good persons can obtain illegal profits along with the growth of huge business opportunities, and DMFB (digital microfluidic biochip) is always attacked by the method to achieve the purpose. The main safety issues can be divided into three main categories: hardware trojan problems, copyright protection, and counterfeit problems.
In recent years, researchers have categorized hardware trojans to facilitate research. In the case of the biochip field level hardware trojan horse, it is of interest due to defects in the supply chain and the presence of malicious third parties. For the malicious modification of the driving sequence (signal for the chip to operate) in the field, the digital microfluidic biochip is paralyzed; or modifying the on-chip function of the DMFB to enable the user to obtain a strange result of the name of the user; or attack its availability, causing a disruption of DOS; the reagents on the biochip are generally expensive and sometimes not replaceable, contaminating their surfaces, and if not cleaned, can cause contamination and be unusable as subsequent droplets pass through, at which time the biochip can only be shut down for cleaning. A great deal of investment of money and energy is caused.
Previously, there have been studies on this aspect, which suggest that in the architecture of digital microfluidic biochips, when each control pin can be activated, the degree of freedom of the droplet is too high, and therefore, a limited physical design method of the control pin is proposed, which not only can solve the problem of the sudden increase of the number of control pins currently brought by the technology improvement of the digital microfluidic biochips, but also can reduce the degree of freedom of the droplet. However, after the control pin limitation physical design method is proposed, through analysis, immediately after the control pin is limited, a graph is established by means of a driving sequence, the maximum clique is searched through the knowledge of graph theory, and a control pin capable of being shared is established, namely, under one control pin, the control of a plurality of electrode signals is carried out. However, as shown in fig. 3 (the number represents the control pin corresponding to the electrode), it can be seen that the method has a defect because the method has the phenomenon of activating the redundant electrode, which causes waste, and also causes the unsafe hidden trouble of the digital microfluidic biochip while the redundancy exists, because the degree of freedom of the liquid drop is reduced and is not equal to 0.
Because of the physical design method for the limited control pins, the freedom of liquid drops is reduced, and the effect of hardware trojan on site level is reduced. However, due to the chip architecture, the drop freedom cannot be reduced to zero, and is only controlled by the user. Therefore, the invention starts from a network physical platform of the microfluidic biochip, and considers the problem of solving the hardware trojan at the site level, namely tampering the driving sequence, from a software architecture.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above, the present invention provides a digital microfluidic biochip field-level hardware Trojan horse detection method based on Hamming distance, which is low in cost, does not need special detection equipment, and is not affected by noise.
The invention is realized by adopting the following scheme: a digital microfluidic biochip field-level hardware Trojan horse detection method based on Hamming distance provides a network physical architecture platform of DMFB, and comprises the following steps:
step S1: acquiring a biochemical protocol stored in a digital microfluidic biochip platform, obtaining a path of a liquid drop according to the provided chip layout and a liquid drop routing algorithm, and obtaining a driving sequence of an electrode, namely a signal for driving the digital microfluidic biochip;
step S2: if a malicious third party tampers with the drive sequence when the user uses the drive sequence, two character strings exist, one string is the gold drive sequence sold by the manufacturer
And another series of drive sequences implemented at field level, which are possible to be hacked, i.e. are actually drive sequences for running biochips when implementing biochemical protocols
Wherein,
representing the golden driving sequence, the subscript 1, 2 … t represents each time step from the start of the reaction time to the end of the reaction time of the biochemical protocol, and
it represents the golden driving sequence at each time step during the implementation of the biological protocol;
representing the golden driving sequence, the subscripts 1, 2 … t represent each time step from the start of the reaction time to the end of the reaction time of the biochemical protocol,
represents a possible tamper-resistant drive sequence at each time step during the implementation of the biological protocol; wherein, the two driving sequences are both from the reaction starting time T of the digital microfluidic biochip operating a certain biochemical protocol begin Until the reaction end time T end Corresponding driving sequence T epsilon [ T ] at each time step begin ,T end ]；
Step S3: from the beginning of T begin Until the end of T end Enter into the cycle of each time step with two drivesCalculating the Hamming distance between two driving sequences by the difference between the moving sequences, defining it as D, and using XOR
To calculate the hamming distance between the two drive sequences;
step S4: self-defining a key value B, marking that the driving sequence in the last time step is tampered, and defining the standard of B to be derived from a Hamming distance D, shown in a formula (1); in each time step cycle, judging whether the calculated D is greater than 0, if D is greater than 0, indicating that the two driving sequences have difference, and simultaneously obtaining a key value B, if B is 1, the field-level driving sequence is tampered, and executing step S5; (ii) a Otherwise, D is equal to 0, which means that field-level driver sequence tampering is not received and is safe, the step S2 is continuously and repeatedly executed;
step S5: once the key value B is 1, namely the Hamming distance D between two driving sequences is not 0, which represents that the site-level hardware Trojan horse is detected, the operation is stopped immediately, and the feedback error terminates the operation.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
the invention has low cost, does not need special detection equipment and is not influenced by noise, and the invention has high efficiency and accuracy and has no influence on the use of the digital microfluidic biochip by users.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a digital microfluidic biochip according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a side view of a digital microfluidic biochip according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a defect diagram of a digital microfluidic biochip sharing pin according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of a digital microfluidic biochip network physical platform according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 5 is a flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further explained below with reference to the drawings and the embodiments.
It should be noted that the following detailed description is exemplary and is intended to provide further explanation of the disclosure. Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs.
It is noted that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of example embodiments according to the present application. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, and it should be understood that when the terms "comprises" and/or "comprising" are used in this specification, they specify the presence of stated features, steps, operations, devices, components, and/or combinations thereof, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
As shown in fig. 5, the present embodiment provides a digital microfluidic biochip field-level hardware Trojan horse detection method based on hamming distance, and provides a network physical architecture platform of DMFB, including the following steps:
step S1: acquiring a biochemical protocol stored in a digital microfluidic biochip platform (generally stored in a CAD tool module in a DMFB network architecture platform packaged and sold by a merchant) to obtain a path of a liquid drop according to a provided chip layout and a liquid drop routing algorithm, and accordingly obtaining a driving sequence of an electrode, namely a signal for driving the digital microfluidic biochip;
step S2: assuming that a malicious third party tampers with the drive sequence at the time of use by the user, (this time because the remote party (which may be an internal company employee) has a port for remote attacks and may be interested in or catch up with user sensitive information), there are two strings, one string being the golden drive sequence sold with the manufacturer
(generated by platform CAD tools) and another string of field-level implemented driver sequences that are likely to be tampered with (i.e., likely to be tampered with by field-level driver sequences, or likely to be normal, since we cannot predict the attack time of an attacker, only assume that the driver sequence of each time step has a problem.) that is, when a biochemical protocol is actually implemented, the driver sequence of the biochip is run
Wherein,
representing the golden driving sequence, the subscript 1, 2 … t represents each time step from the start of the reaction time to the end of the reaction time of the biochemical protocol, and
it represents the golden driving sequence at each time step during the implementation of the biological protocol;
representing the golden driving sequence, the subscripts 1, 2 … t represent each time step from the start of the reaction time to the end of the reaction time of the biochemical protocol,
it represents a possible tamper-evident actuation sequence at each time step during the implementation of the biological protocol; wherein, the two driving sequences are both from the reaction starting time T of the digital microfluidic biochip operating a certain biochemical protocol begin Until the reaction end time T end Corresponding driving sequence T epsilon [ T ] at each time step begin ,T end ]；
Step S3: from the beginning of T begin Until T is over end Entering into each time step cycle, calculating Hamming distance between two driving sequences by using difference between two driving sequencesAnd define it as D, use XOR
To calculate the hamming distance between the two driving sequences, D also represents the sum of the number of different codewords at the same position of the two sequences, i.e. the difference between the two;
step S4: a custom key value B, which is used for marking that the driving sequence in the last time step is tampered, wherein the standard for defining B is derived from a Hamming distance D, and is shown in a formula (1); in each time step cycle, judging whether the calculated D is greater than 0, if D is greater than 0, indicating that the two driving sequences have difference, and simultaneously obtaining a key value B, if B is 1, the field-level driving sequence is tampered, and executing step S5; otherwise, D is equal to 0, which means that field-level driver sequence tampering is not received and is safe, the step S2 is continuously and repeatedly executed;
(since each biological protocol is a whole biological reaction, including operations, mixing, separating, etc., as in the specification, what should be done at each step, and for this biological protocol, the driving sequence is generated to have a driving sequence at each time step, since a droplet is moved on the biochip without stopping, the reaction, and the electrodes are changed.)
Step S5: once the key value B is 1, namely the Hamming distance D between two driving sequences is not 0, which represents that the site-level hardware Trojan is detected, the operation is stopped immediately, and the feedback error terminates the operation.
Preferably, in this embodiment, the implementation process of obtaining the droplet paths according to the provided chip layout and the droplet routing algorithm is generally designed, and according to the existing layout and the default routing algorithm, when the biochemical protocol is implemented, the droplets need to be moved, and each module (mixing region, heating region, etc. is found on the chip board for reaction), which is simply a path-finding algorithm, such as a, dijkstra, etc., and the starting point is determined according to the needs of the biochemical protocol, and then the paths are found.
Preferably, in this embodiment, the process of obtaining the motor driving sequence according to the droplet path is described in the background, and it is desired to make the droplet move by means of electrowetting, activate the electrodes, the sequence is 1, and make the droplet deform and move, according to the above calculated path, for example, at this time step, the electrode corresponding to the droplet is activated, and is 1, and at the next time step, the adjacent electrode is activated, and is also 1, the droplet will move with it, and move toward the target step by step. During these time steps, the irrelevant electrodes are not activated, 0.
In this embodiment, the gold driving sequence is usually delivered to the end user after the biochip is sold. In the embodiment, in consideration of the difference between a malicious driving sequence and a golden driving sequence, the field-level hardware Trojan detection can be performed by using the characteristic of sequence error detection of Hamming distance. The protection model has almost no error immediately when detecting the hardware, does not need specific detection equipment, and is not influenced by noise in the detection process.
Moreover, the invention analyzes the time and space complexity of the biochip with low consumption by starting with the software of the network physical architecture of the biochip.
Preferably, in this embodiment, as shown in fig. 4, the network physical architecture platform of the DMFB is composed of a computer, a single board microcontroller or FPGA, a peripheral circuit, and a biochip. The CPU runs biochemical system software consisting of four modules, one of which is a CAD tool module, which generates an actuation sequence that drives the DMFB. It can drive the DMFB in the field, often when a malicious third party is going to do so. The present embodiment is based on the network physical architecture, and the platform is generally attached when the merchant sells the platform, and the present embodiment is based on an open-source digital microfluidic biochip simulation platform. And detecting the hardware trojan in operation. The following is the specific steps of this embodiment, where the driving sequence is the signal for driving the digital microfluidic biochip, and it can be modeled as a machine code sequence due to the on and off of the electrodes.
As shown in fig. 5: in the platform, due to the biochemical protocols already stored in the merchant when selling, the path of the droplet, and hence the drive sequence of the electrodes, can already be derived, given the layout and droplet routing algorithm. Given two strings, one is the golden drive sequence sold by the manufacturer, assuming that a malicious third party has tampered at this time
It is stored in a CAD module of the platform, generates a driving signal when it is to be used, and a series of field-level implemented driving sequences, possibly subject to tampering attacks
The two driving sequences are T from the beginning of the reaction of running a certain biochemical protocol on the biochip begin Until the reaction is finished T end Corresponding driving sequence T epsilon [ T ] at each time step begin ,T end ]。
Then starting from the beginning T begin Until the reaction is finished T end Entering into each time step cycle calculates its Hamming distance D using the difference, where XOR may be used
And in each step cycle, judging whether the calculated D is larger than 0, and calculating a key value B, namely whether the key value B is tampered.
And once the site-level hardware trojan is detected, the operation is stopped immediately, so that larger and larger errors are avoided. And after feedback processing, continuing to circularly execute the program.
Preferably, the following experimental simulation is performed in this embodiment:
this example uses the published digital microfluidic biochip platform from the riverside university, california, simulated on a computer using the C + + language to test the feasibility of the protection model of this example according to the corresponding attacker model previously proposed by the university of duck, usa. The embodiment is based on the program of the open source platform, the hardware trojan detection is performed in the program, and the experiment of the embodiment considers the worst case, that is, the driver sequence may be tampered at each time step, and the detection program is executed at each step. And an evaluation is given based on the present embodiment.
Four biochemical protocols were adopted in this experimental procedure: PCR, InVitro 2X 2, Protein and Protein Split 4. This platform is a digital microfluidic biochip taking the size of a 15 x 19 matrix. The layout adopts a virtual topology, and the liquid drop routing adopts a Roy maze routing algorithm. The benchmark data taken is from this platform.
According to the above experimental procedures, the number of time steps corresponding to each biochemical protocol can be seen from the table. And then simulating a tamper driving sequence according to the attacker mode.
The driver sequence is developed by design engineers in a design company with great effort and can be regarded as essence of a biochemical protocol, so that in the process of tampering the driver sequence, the driver sequence is actually equivalent to the tampering of the biochemical protocol, and as can be seen from table one, under the malicious attack, the time steps of the biochemical protocol are increased. Here, if the user knows the message of the biochemical protocol, it can know that the user is maliciously tampered with through the side channel method. However, as mentioned above, the driving sequence is the one that the design engineers spend their mind developing (stored in the DMFB platform), which is actually the IP core. Therefore, the present embodiment starts from the network physical architecture, and bypasses the self-verification of the user. The correctness of the check can be seen from the key value B of the table one, namely the accuracy of the field level hardware Trojan horse is accurately checked. The feasibility of this example is illustrated.
Of course, by means of software, it is necessary to evaluate its temporal and spatial complexity analysis, as can be seen from Table two, the simulationHas changed the biochemical protocol: all of which are initiated in the operating step. However, each biochemical protocol has been tampered with due to its uniqueness and there are no obvious rules for adding process steps. As can be seen from Table II, the detection time also increases with increasing number of steps. Starting with the fraction of time each test program accounts for the execution of all biochemical protocols. The proportion of each verification procedure is only
According to the data of the researchers, the data can be ignored. Furthermore, as computers have evolved, this time has been negligible.
Watch two
Second, resource assessment, mainly to assess the consumption of droplets (sample, reagents and buffers) during the course of a biological protocol, because these simulated attackers mainly change the degrees of freedom of the original droplets and do not unnecessarily use the sample, which is a perfect situation. The unnecessary use of the sample is perceived by the user without any further perception. As regards the redundant use of the electrodes, it is negligible compared to the use of droplets, as long as it is within its lifetime. In combination with the above results, the present embodiment can be used to perform field level hardware trojan detection with better efficacy.
Preferably, in this embodiment, based on the problem of physical design, the design of the detection method in the design flow is performed through the network physical architecture of the digital microfluidic biochip, and the field-level hardware trojan is detected based on the hamming distance design algorithm. The invention has the advantages of low cost, no need of special detection equipment, no influence of noise, high algorithm efficiency and accuracy and no influence on the use of a digital microfluidic biochip by a user.
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and all equivalent changes and modifications made in accordance with the claims of the present invention should be covered by the present invention.
Claims (1)
1. A digital microfluidic biochip field-level hardware Trojan horse detection method based on Hamming distance is characterized by comprising the following steps: providing a network physical architecture platform of DMFB, comprising the following steps:
step S1: acquiring a biochemical protocol stored in a digital microfluidic biochip platform, obtaining a path of a liquid drop according to the provided chip layout and a liquid drop routing algorithm, and obtaining a driving sequence of an electrode, namely a signal for driving the digital microfluidic biochip;
step S2: if a malicious third party tampers with the drive sequence when the user uses the drive sequence, two character strings exist, one string is the gold drive sequence sold by the manufacturer
And another string of drive sequences implemented for field level
The driver sequence is possible to be attacked by tampering, namely, the driver sequence is really used for operating the biochip when the biochemical protocol is implemented; wherein,
representing the golden driving sequence, the subscript 1, 2 … t represents each time step from the start of the reaction time to the end of the reaction time of the biochemical protocol, and
represents a gold-driven sequence at each time step during the implementation of the biological protocol;
represents a field-level implementation of the driving sequence, and the subscripts 1, 2 … t represent each time step from the start of the biochemical protocol reaction time to the end of the reaction time,
represents a possible tamper-proof driving sequence at each time step during the implementation of the biological protocol; wherein, the two driving sequences are both from the reaction starting time T of the digital microfluidic biochip operating a certain biochemical protocol begin Until the reaction end time T end Corresponding driving sequence T epsilon [ T ] at each time step begin ,T end ]；
Step S3: from the beginning of T begin Until the end of T end The cycle into each time step calculates the Hamming distance between two drive sequences using the difference between the two drive sequences and defines it as D, using XOR
To calculate the hamming distance between the two driving sequences;
step S4: self-defining a key value B, wherein the key value B is used for marking that the driving sequence in the step S3 is tampered, and the standard for defining B is derived from a Hamming distance D, shown in a formula (1); in each time step cycle, judging whether the calculated D is greater than 0, if D is greater than 0, indicating that the two driving sequences have difference, defining a key value B as 1, if B is 1, the field-level driving sequence is tampered, and executing step S5; otherwise, D is equal to 0, which means that field-level driver sequence tampering is not received and is safe, the step S2 is continuously and repeatedly executed;
step S5: once the key value B is 1, namely the Hamming distance D between two driving sequences is not 0, which represents that the site-level hardware Trojan is detected, the operation is stopped immediately, and the feedback error terminates the operation.
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