CN107220547A - Terminal device and its startup method - Google Patents
Terminal device and its startup method Download PDFInfo
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- CN107220547A CN107220547A CN201610159979.6A CN201610159979A CN107220547A CN 107220547 A CN107220547 A CN 107220547A CN 201610159979 A CN201610159979 A CN 201610159979A CN 107220547 A CN107220547 A CN 107220547A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/575—Secure boot
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Abstract
A kind of terminal device and its startup method, methods described include：Operation starts code and run with jumping at the first security code；First security code is run, basic security content is verified；When the basic security content verification by when, run the second security code in the basic security content, verify bootstrap；When the bootstrap is verified, the bootstrap is run；Wherein, first security code is stored in the storage region of the One Time Programmable in non-volatile first memory, the basic security content and the bootstrap are stored in non-volatile first memory, the startup code is stored in read-only second memory, and the first memory is in different chips from the second memory.Such scheme can use the chip for itself not being related to clean boot function to realize the clean boot of terminal device.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to intelligent terminal field, more particularly to a kind of terminal device and its startup method.
Background technology
With the development of mobile terminal intelligence degree, intelligent terminal operation system can provide all kinds of
The prosperity of the running environment of application software, the popularization of intelligent terminal and mobile Internet application causes increasingly
Many users handle all kinds of security sensitive business by intelligent terminal, so that mobile terminal is faced with respectively
Plant security threat.
All invasions to intelligent terminal field are required for changing system for content, and almost all of invasion is all needed
The system file of key is changed, therefore system progress integrality and consistency checking are highly desirable to,
Checking to the integrality and uniformity of system is carried out when intelligent terminal starts, so as to ensure intelligent terminal
Clean boot.Refer to the typical structure of the intelligent terminal chip shown in Fig. 1, chip mainly by be responsible for control,
The processor of calculation function and with read-only storage in nest plate (Read Only Memory, ROM), random
Access the test that memory (Radom Access Memory, RAM), joint test working group are formulated
Interface standard (Joint Test Action Group, JTAG) interface and general input/output port (General
Purpose Input/Out, GPIO) and other functional modules composition.Due to by on-chip memory capacity
Limitation, the main program of intelligent terminal is all placed on the nonvolatile memory (Non-Volatile of outside
Memory, NVM) in.The normal boot process of Major Systems is during external RAM is chip operation：
1st, start since ROM in piece；
2nd, in the internal RAM that bootstrap is moved on into processor from NVM；
3rd, bootstrap is run, external RAM is initialized, code is copied to external RAM from NVM；
4th, program pointer points to external RAM, starts to perform the program in external RAM.
Said process is not verified to code, and code arbitrarily can be modified and crack, it is impossible to ensure
The safety of intelligent terminal, such as locking network and card are easy to be cracked.However, some chips support safety to open
It is dynamic, but some chips do not add the module about clean boot, are not related to clean boot for itself
For the chip of function, security is poor on startup for terminal device.
The content of the invention
Present invention solves the technical problem that being to provide a kind of terminal device and its startup method, do not related in script
And the clean boot of terminal device is realized on the basis of the chip of clean boot function, it is ensured that use this kind of core
The security of the terminal device start-up course of piece.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of startup method of terminal device, bag
Include：
Operation starts code and run with jumping at the first security code；
First security code is run, basic security content is verified；
When the basic security content verification by when, run the second safety in the basic security content
Code, verifies bootstrap；
When the bootstrap is verified, the bootstrap is run；
Wherein, what first security code was stored in non-volatile first memory disposable compiles
The storage region of journey, the basic security content and the bootstrap are stored in described non-volatile
In one memory, it is described startup code be stored in read-only second memory, the first memory with
The second memory is in different chips.
Alternatively, operation first security code, verifies basic security content, including：
First security code is run, to calculate the first Hash digest of the basic security content；
When first Hash digest is identical with the Hash digest pre-saved, the basic security is verified
Content passes through, wherein, the Hash digest pre-saved is stored in the first memory once
In the programmable storage region of property.
Alternatively, the second security code in the operation basic security content, verifies bootstrap,
Including：
The second security code in basic security content is run, the guiding is verified using public key algorithm
Program.
Alternatively, the second security code in the operation basic security content, uses public key algorithm
The bootstrap is verified, including：
Second security code is run, to use the public key in the basic security content to the guiding
The plaintext for obtaining second Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of the second Hash digest in program, and counts
Calculating needs the actual Hash digest of verification portion in the bootstrap；
When need that the actual Hash digest of verification portion obtains with decryption in the bootstrap described second
The plaintext of Hash digest is identical, then verifies that bootstrap passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of second Hash digest is encrypted by the first private key in advance, and described first is private
Key constitutes a group key pair with the public key in the basic security content.
Alternatively, the public key algorithm is asymmetric key algorithm.
Alternatively, the basic security content also includes following one or more：
International mobile equipment identification number, production number, area code and language code.
Alternatively, the second memory with processor is in same crystal grain or is integrated in same physics core
On piece, the first memory is coupled with outside the phy chip piece.
Alternatively, the startup method of the terminal device, in addition to：
When verify the bootstrap by when, run the bootstrap, verify image file；
Wherein, the image file is stored in non-volatile first memory.
Alternatively, the operation bootstrap, verifies image file, including：
The bootstrap is run, so that the public key in the bootstrap is in the image file
The plaintext for obtaining the 3rd Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of three Hash digests, and calculates the image
The actual Hash digest of verification portion is needed in file；
As need that the actual Hash digest of verification portion obtains with decryption in the image file the described 3rd
The plaintext of Hash digest is identical, then verifies that the image file passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of the 3rd Hash digest is encrypted by the second private key in advance, and described second is private
Key constitutes a group key pair with the public key in the bootstrap.
The embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of terminal device, and the terminal device includes：Processor, it is non-easily
The first memory and read-only second memory for the property lost；
The processor, starts code suitable for operation and is run with jumping at the first security code；
Non-volatile first memory, with for storing the disposable of first security code
Programmable storage region, and store basic security content and bootstrap；
The read-only second memory, suitable for storing the startup code；
Wherein, the processor runs first security code, to verify the basic security content；
When verify the basic security content by when, run the second security code in the basic security content,
To verify the bootstrap；When verify the bootstrap by when, run the bootstrap.
Alternatively, the processor is suitable to：
First security code is run, to calculate the first Hash digest of the basic security content；
When first Hash digest is identical with the Hash digest pre-saved, the basic security is verified
Content passes through, wherein, the Hash digest pre-saved is stored in the first memory once
In the programmable storage region of property.
Alternatively, the processor is suitable to the second security code in operation basic security content, uses public affairs
Open key algorithm and verify the bootstrap.
Alternatively, the processor is suitable to：
The second security code in basic security content is run, to use the public affairs in the basic security content
Key is decrypted to the ciphertext of the second Hash digest in the bootstrap and obtains second Hash digest
Plaintext, and calculate the actual Hash digest of verification portion needed in the bootstrap；
When need that the actual Hash digest of verification portion obtains with decryption in the bootstrap described second
The plaintext of Hash digest is identical, then verifies that bootstrap passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of second Hash digest is encrypted by the first private key in advance, and described first is private
Key constitutes a group key pair with the public key in the basic security content.
Alternatively, the public key algorithm is asymmetric key algorithm.
Alternatively, the basic security content also includes following one or more：
International mobile equipment identification number, production number, area code and language code.
Alternatively, the second memory with processor is in same crystal grain or is integrated in same physics core
On piece, the first memory is coupled with outside the phy chip piece.
Alternatively, the processor is further adapted for：
When verify the bootstrap by when, run the bootstrap, verify image file, wherein,
The image file is stored in non-volatile first memory.
Alternatively, the processor is further adapted for：
The bootstrap is run, to use the public key in the bootstrap in the image file
The plaintext for obtaining the 3rd Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of 3rd Hash digest, and is reflected described in calculating
Actual Hash digest as needing verification portion in file；
As need that the actual Hash digest of verification portion obtains with decryption in the image file the described 3rd
The plaintext of Hash digest is identical, then verifies that the image file passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of the 3rd Hash digest is encrypted by the second private key in advance, and described second is private
Key constitutes a group key pair with the public key in the bootstrap.
Compared with prior art, the technical scheme of the embodiment of the present invention has the advantages that：
The embodiment of the present invention starts code to jump to operation at the first security code by running, and runs institute
State the first security code, verify basic security content, when the basic security content verification by when, fortune
The second security code in the row basic security content, verifies bootstrap, when the bootstrap is tested
When card passes through, the bootstrap is run, wherein, first security code is stored in non-volatile
The storage region of One Time Programmable in first memory, the basic security content and the guiding journey
Sequence is stored in non-volatile first memory, and the startup code is stored in read-only second and deposited
In reservoir, the first memory is in different chips from the second memory, so as to ensure basic
The integrality and uniformity of secure content and bootstrap, and then clean boot function is not supported in script
The clean boot of terminal device is realized on the basis of chip.
In addition, the embodiment of the present invention also verifies the integrality and uniformity of image file by bootstrap.
Therefore, although the terminal device chip in the embodiment of the present invention does not have clean boot function, but this in itself
The technical scheme of inventive embodiments by setting up trust chain from bottom to top, with first memory once
Property programmable storage region in code and data as the bottom of trust chain, demonstrate clean boot generation
The integrality and uniformity of code, and then ensure the clean boot of terminal device.
Further, bootstrap and image file are verified by using public key algorithm, so as to ensure
The upgradability of software.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is a kind of structural representation of typical terminal device chip in the prior art；
Fig. 2 is a kind of flow chart of the startup method of terminal device in the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is a kind of structural representation of bootstrap of having signed in the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is the flow chart of the startup method of another terminal device in the embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 5 is a kind of structural representation of terminal device in the embodiment of the present invention.
Embodiment
As background technology is sayed, all invasions to intelligent terminal field are required for changing system for content, several
All invasions are required for the crucial system file of change, therefore carry out integrality and uniformity to system
Checking is highly desirable to, and the checking to the integrality and uniformity of system is carried out when intelligent terminal starts,
So as to ensure intelligent terminal clean boot.At present, some chips support clean boot, but some chips are simultaneously
The module about clean boot is not added, and due to the limitation of each side reason such as storage resource,
It can not add the module of clean boot, for example, integrated basic security content or similar can not be related to safety
The content of startup.For itself is not related to the chip of clean boot function, it is impossible to ensure terminal device
The security of startup.
The embodiment of the present invention starts code to jump to operation at the first security code by running, and runs institute
State the first security code, verify basic security content, when the basic security content verification by when, fortune
The second security code in the row basic security content, verifies bootstrap, when the bootstrap is tested
When card passes through, the bootstrap is run, wherein, first security code is stored in non-volatile
The storage region of One Time Programmable in first memory, the basic security content and the guiding journey
Sequence is stored in non-volatile first memory, and the startup code is stored in read-only second and deposited
In reservoir, the first memory is in different chips from the second memory, so as to ensure basic
The integrality and uniformity of secure content and bootstrap, and then clean boot function is not supported in script
The clean boot of terminal device is realized on the basis of chip.
In addition, the embodiment of the present invention also verifies the integrality and uniformity of image file by bootstrap.
Therefore, although the terminal device chip in the embodiment of the present invention does not have clean boot function, but this in itself
The technical scheme of inventive embodiments by setting up trust chain from bottom to top, with first memory once
Property programmable storage region in code and data as the bottom of trust chain, demonstrate clean boot generation
The integrality and uniformity of code, and then ensure the clean boot of terminal device.
It is understandable to enable above-mentioned purpose, feature and beneficial effect of the invention to become apparent, with reference to
Accompanying drawing is described in detail to the specific embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a kind of flow chart of the startup method of terminal device in the embodiment of the present invention.Such as Fig. 2 institutes
The startup method of the terminal device shown, may include steps of：
Step S201：Operation starts code and run with jumping at the first security code；
Step S202：First security code is run, basic security content is verified；
Step S203：When the basic security content verification by when, run in the basic security content
The second security code, verify bootstrap；
Step S204：When the bootstrap is verified, the bootstrap is run.
Wherein, what first security code was stored in non-volatile first memory disposable compiles
The storage region of journey, the basic security content and the bootstrap are stored in described non-volatile
In one memory, it is described startup code be stored in read-only second memory, the first memory with
The second memory is in different chips (die).
In specific implementation, the second memory with processor is in same crystal grain or is integrated in same
On phy chip, the second memory is read-only type, the first memory and the described second storage
Device is in different chips.
In step S201 specific implementation, the function of starting code and the work(of conventional startup code
Can be the same, the function of clean boot is not related to.After chip power-up, system is at read-only second memory
Start to perform the startup code, then jump at first security code and run automatically.
In step S202 specific implementation, basic security content (Basal Secure Content, BSC)
Be made up of user data, user data comprising client public key and user want to add it is not upgradeable any
Information, BSC is stored in non-volatile first memory, and non-volatile first memory can
To be flash memory (FLASH) and embedded multi-media card (Embedded Multi Media Card, EMMC).
First security code is stored in the One Time Programmable memory block in the first memory
In domain (One-Time-Programmable Memory, OTP), first security code is run, can
To verify the integrality of basic security content, in specific implementation, it can verify described by hash algorithm
Basic security content.Specifically, by running first security code, it can calculate described basic
First Hash digest of secure content, when first Hash digest actually calculated is with pre-saving
Hash digest it is identical when, BSC is verified.Wherein, the Hash digest pre-saved is stored in
In the OTP of the first memory.
The storage region of the One Time Programmable can be that micro- electric fuse etc. has One Time Programmable function
Module.The storage region of the One Time Programmable cannot be changed once be programmed, disposably
Programmable storage region can also store this terminal device chip unique mark (Unique Identifier,
UID), the UID of chip is the unique unduplicated numbering of product, and UID writes before product export, right
User-readable, it is ensured that UID is not tampered with.In specific implementation, the memory block of the One Time Programmable
The Hash digest pre-saved in domain can account for 256 bits, and UID accounts for 128 bits.
The Hash digest pre-saved needs just to can determine that after the determination of basic security content, basic to pacify
The information such as international mobile equipment identification number are had in complete, each terminal can be different, therefore deposited using OTP
The need for the Hash digest pre-saved described in storage can be met by device customizing.
In specific implementation, the change of any basic security content is actually calculated after all causing start
The first Hash digest change, when first Hash digest actually calculated and it is described once
Property programmable storage region in the Hash digest that pre-saves it is inconsistent when, stop start, if calculated
The Hash digest pre-saved in the first Hash digest and the storage region of the One Time Programmable out
Unanimously, then basic security content intact and consistent, so that it is guaranteed that basic security content has not changed as,
Improve the security that terminal device starts.
In step S203 specific implementation, when the basic security content verification by when, namely substantially
When secure content is complete and consistent with original state, start to verify bootstrap.It can run described basic
The second security code in secure content, the bootstrap is verified using public key algorithm.
Specifically, when program runs to checking bootstrap, second security code is run, is read
The second Hash digest in bootstrap is stored in, using the public key in the basic security content to described
The plaintext for obtaining second Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of the second Hash digest in bootstrap,
And calculate the actual Hash digest of verification portion is needed in the bootstrap.Fig. 3 is refer to, has signed and has drawn
Helical pitch sequence is by digital signature, signature section and part composition of unsigning, and the signature section is bootstrap
In need verification portion, the digital signature includes positional information, the length of the bootstrap signature section
Information and the Hash digest with private key signature are spent, wherein length information is the length for the bootstrap that need to be verified,
The actual Hash digest of the bootstrap of this length can be calculated according to length information.
When need that the actual Hash digest of verification portion obtains with decryption in the bootstrap described second
The plaintext of Hash digest is identical, then verifies that bootstrap passes through.Wherein, second Hash digest is close
Text is encrypted by the first private key in advance, first private key and the public key structure in the basic security content
Into a group key pair.It is imperfect or inconsistent can all cause actual meter caused by the variation of any bootstrap
The Hash digest calculated changes, so that the second Hash digest decrypted with public key algorithm
Plaintext it is inconsistent, program then stops start, and only both consistent just represent are verified, terminal device
It is just normal to start, so as to ensure that the security that terminal device starts.
In specific implementation, the public key algorithm is asymmetric key algorithm, for example, can be RSA
Algorithm or elliptic curve.
In specific implementation, the basic security content can also include following one or more：The world is moved
Dynamic EIC equipment identification code, production number, area code and language code.
The embodiment of the present invention starts code to jump to operation at the first security code by running, and runs institute
State the first security code, verify basic security content, when the basic security content verification by when, fortune
The second security code in the row basic security content, verifies bootstrap, when the bootstrap is tested
When card passes through, the bootstrap is run, wherein, first security code is stored in non-volatile
The storage region of One Time Programmable in first memory, the basic security content and the guiding journey
Sequence is stored in non-volatile first memory, and the startup code is stored in read-only second and deposited
In reservoir, so as to ensure the integrality and uniformity of basic security content and bootstrap, described first deposits
Reservoir is in different chips from the second memory, and then does not support clean boot function in script
The clean boot of terminal device is realized on the basis of chip.In addition, the embodiment of the present invention also passes through guiding
The integrality and uniformity of program verification image file.Therefore, although the terminal in the embodiment of the present invention is set
Standby chip does not have clean boot function in itself, but the technical scheme of the embodiment of the present invention passes through under foundation certainly
And on trust chain, made with the code in the One Time Programmable storage region in first memory and data
For the bottom of trust chain, the integrality and uniformity of clean boot code are demonstrated, and then ensures terminal
The clean boot of equipment.
Further, bootstrap is verified by using public key algorithm, so as to ensure rising for software
Level property.
Fig. 4 is the flow chart of the startup method of another terminal device in the embodiment of the present invention.Such as Fig. 4
The startup method of shown terminal device, may comprise steps of：
Step S401：Operation starts code and run with jumping at the first security code；
Step S402：First security code is run, basic security content is verified；
Step S403：When the basic security content verification by when, run in the basic security content
The second security code, verify bootstrap；
Step S404：When the bootstrap is verified, the bootstrap is run；
Step S405：When verify the bootstrap by when, run the bootstrap, verify image
File, wherein, the image file is stored in non-volatile first memory.
In above-mentioned steps, similarly, the startup code is stored in read-only second memory, described
First security code is stored in the storage region of the One Time Programmable in non-volatile first memory,
The basic security content and the bootstrap are stored in non-volatile first memory, institute
State first memory and be in different chips from the second memory.
In specific implementation, the second memory and processor in same crystal grain or can be integrated in same
On one phy chip, the first memory is coupled with outside the phy chip piece.
In specific implementation, step S401 to step S404 explanation can be to should refer to step S201 to step
Rapid S203 description, will not be repeated here.
In specific implementation, during checking image file, it can equally be verified using public key algorithm,
The bootstrap can be run, so that the public key in the bootstrap is in the image file
The plaintext for obtaining the 3rd Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of three Hash digests, and calculates the image
The actual Hash digest of verification portion is needed in file, when needing the reality of verification portion in the image file
Border Hash digest is identical with the plaintext for decrypting obtained the 3rd Hash digest, then verifies the image text
Part passes through.Wherein, the ciphertext of the 3rd Hash digest is encrypted by the second private key in advance, and described
Two private keys constitute a group key pair with the public key in the bootstrap.
Specifically, when programming jump to bootstrap, bootstrap reading and saving is signed in image file numeral
Hash digest in name, using the public key decryptions preserved in bootstrap in advance by the of the second private key encryption
The ciphertext of three Hash digests, the plaintext of the 3rd Hash digest after being decrypted.Bootstrap is run to read
The check length preserved in image file digital signature, the reality of image file is calculated according to the check length
The Hash digest of verification portion is needed, when actual Hash digest and solution that verification portion is needed in image file
The plaintext of close obtained the 3rd Hash digest is identical, then verifies that the image file passes through.It is any to reflect
As the variation of file can all cause the actual Hash digest actually calculated to compare the 3rd Hash digest
Plaintext change, then program stop start, whereas if the actual Hash digest calculated with
The plaintext for decrypting the 3rd obtained Hash digest is identical, then program performs normal boot-strap flow, so as to ensure
The integrality and uniformity of image file.
The present embodiment verifies image file on the basis of bootstrap is by checking by bootstrap
Integrality and uniformity.Therefore, the present embodiment realizes that checking starts by the trust chain set up from bottom to top
The integrality and uniformity of code, the bottom are the code sums preserved in the OTP of the first memory
According to top is system application.Though the terminal device chip in the embodiment of the present invention does not have in itself
Clean boot function, but the embodiment of the present invention verifies clean boot by setting up trust chain from bottom to top
The integrality and uniformity of code, and then ensure the clean boot of terminal device.
Further, bootstrap and image file are verified by using public key algorithm, so as to ensure
The upgradability of software.
It is pointed out that those skilled in the art can based on the present embodiment inventive concept carry out etc.
With change, the bootstrap and image file are for example distinguished, through the in the basic security content
The bootstrap that two Secure code Authentications pass through, equally can use public key algorithm to verify next guiding
Program, first in the first memory is verified by last bootstrap using public key algorithm
Individual image file, then next image file is verified by image file above, so as to realize using trust
The faith mechanism step by step of chain, a kind of safety of terminal device is provided not to be related to the chip of clean boot function
The solution of startup.
Fig. 5 is a kind of structural representation of terminal device in the embodiment of the present invention.End as shown in Figure 5
End equipment 50, can include：Processor 501, non-volatile first memory 502, read-only second
The storage region 504 of memory 503 and One Time Programmable.Wherein：
The processor 501, starts code suitable for operation and is run with jumping at the first security code；
Non-volatile first memory 502, with for storing first security code once
The programmable storage region of property, and store basic security content and bootstrap；
The read-only second memory 503, suitable for storing the startup code；
The storage region 504 of the One Time Programmable, suitable for storing the Hash digest pre-saved.
Wherein, the processor 501 runs first security code, to verify in the basic security
Hold；When verify the basic security content by when, run the second safety in the basic security content
Code, to verify the bootstrap；When verify the bootstrap by when, run the guiding journey
Sequence.
Refer to Fig. 5, first security code be stored in the first memory 502 it is disposable can
The storage region 504 of programming, the basic security content and the bootstrap are stored in first storage
In device 502, the startup code is stored in read-only second memory 503.
In specific implementation, the processor 501 can include basic security content verification unit and guiding
Program verification unit.
The basic security content verification unit, suitable for running first security code, to calculate
State the first Hash digest of basic security content；When first Hash digest and the Hash that pre-saves are plucked
When wanting identical, verify that the basic security content passes through, wherein, the Hash digest pre-saved is deposited
In the storage region 504 for the One Time Programmable being stored in the first memory.
In specific implementation, the storage region 504 of the One Time Programmable can be that micro- electric fuse etc. has
The module of One Time Programmable function.
The bootstrap authentication unit, suitable for the second security code in operation basic security content, makes
The bootstrap is verified with public key algorithm.
In specific implementation, the bootstrap authentication unit, suitable for the in operation basic security content
Two security codes, to be breathed out using the public key in the basic security content to second in the bootstrap
The plaintext for obtaining second Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of uncommon summary, and calculates the bootstrap
It is middle to need the actual Hash digest of verification portion；When needing the actual Kazakhstan of verification portion in the bootstrap
Uncommon summary is identical with the plaintext for decrypting obtained second Hash digest, then verifies that bootstrap passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of second Hash digest is encrypted by the first private key in advance, first private key with
Public key in the basic security content constitutes a group key pair.
In specific implementation, the public key algorithm is asymmetric key algorithm, for example, can be RSA
Algorithm or elliptic curve.
In specific implementation, the basic security content can also include international mobile equipment identification number, production
One or more of Article Number, area code and language code.
In specific implementation, the second memory with processor is in same crystal grain or is integrated in same
On phy chip, the first memory is coupled with outside the phy chip piece.
In specific implementation, the processor 501 be further adapted for when verify the bootstrap by when, fortune
The row bootstrap, verifies image file；Wherein, the image file is stored in described non-volatile
First memory 502 in.
In specific implementation, the processor 501 can also include image file authentication unit, suitable for fortune
The row bootstrap, to be breathed out using the public key in the bootstrap to the 3rd in the image file
The plaintext for obtaining the 3rd Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of uncommon summary, and calculates the image file
It is middle to need the actual Hash digest of verification portion；When needing the actual Kazakhstan of verification portion in the image file
Uncommon summary is identical with the plaintext for decrypting obtained the 3rd Hash digest, then verifies that the image file leads to
Cross；Wherein, the ciphertext of the 3rd Hash digest is encrypted by the second private key in advance, and described second is private
Key constitutes a group key pair with the public key in the bootstrap.
The embodiment of the present invention starts code to jump to operation at the first security code by running, and runs institute
State the first security code, verify basic security content, when the basic security content verification by when, fortune
The second security code in the row basic security content, verifies bootstrap, when the bootstrap is tested
When card passes through, the bootstrap is run, wherein, first security code is stored in non-volatile
The storage region of One Time Programmable in first memory, the basic security content and the guiding journey
Sequence is stored in non-volatile first memory, and the startup code is stored in read-only second and deposited
In reservoir, the first memory is in different chips from the second memory, so as to ensure basic
The integrality and uniformity of secure content and bootstrap, and then clean boot function is not supported in script
The clean boot of terminal device is realized on the basis of chip.In addition, the embodiment of the present invention also passes through guiding
The integrality and uniformity of program verification image file.Therefore, although the terminal in the embodiment of the present invention is set
Standby chip does not have clean boot function in itself, but the technical scheme of the embodiment of the present invention passes through under foundation certainly
And on trust chain, made with the code in the One Time Programmable storage region in first memory and data
For the bottom of trust chain, the integrality and uniformity of clean boot code are demonstrated, and then ensures terminal
The clean boot of equipment.
Further, bootstrap and image file are verified by using public key algorithm, so as to ensure
The upgradability of software.
One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that all or part of step in the various methods of above-described embodiment
Rapid to can be by program to instruct the hardware of correlation to complete, the program can be stored in can with computer
Read in storage medium, storage medium can include：ROM, RAM, disk or CD etc..
Although present disclosure is as above, the present invention is not limited to this.Any those skilled in the art,
Without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, it can make various changes or modifications, therefore the guarantor of the present invention
Shield scope should be defined by claim limited range.
Claims (18)
1. a kind of startup method of terminal device, it is characterised in that including：
Operation starts code and run with jumping at the first security code；
First security code is run, basic security content is verified；
When the basic security content verification by when, run the second safe generation in the basic security content
Code, verifies bootstrap；
When the bootstrap is verified, the bootstrap is run；
Wherein, first security code is stored in the One Time Programmable in non-volatile first memory
Storage region, the basic security content and the bootstrap are stored in described non-volatile
In one memory, the startup code is stored in the read-only second memory of piece, first storage
Device is in different chips from the second memory.
2. the startup method of terminal device according to claim 1, it is characterised in that described in the operation
First security code, verifies basic security content, including：
First security code is run, to calculate the first Hash digest of the basic security content；
When first Hash digest is identical with the Hash digest pre-saved, verify in the basic security
Appearance passes through, wherein, the Hash digest pre-saved is stored in the first memory once
In the programmable storage region of property.
3. the startup method of terminal device according to claim 1, it is characterised in that described in the operation
The second security code in basic security content, verifies bootstrap, including：
The second security code in basic security content is run, the guiding journey is verified using public key algorithm
Sequence.
4. the startup method of terminal device according to claim 3, it is characterised in that the operation is basic
The second security code in secure content, the bootstrap is verified using public key algorithm, including：
Second security code is run, to use the public key in the basic security content to the guiding journey
The plaintext for obtaining second Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of the second Hash digest in sequence, and counts
Calculating needs the actual Hash digest of verification portion in the bootstrap；
When second Kazakhstan for needing the actual Hash digest of verification portion to be obtained with decryption in the bootstrap
The plaintext of uncommon summary is identical, then verifies that bootstrap passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of second Hash digest is encrypted by the first private key in advance, first private key
A group key pair is constituted with the public key in the basic security content.
5. the startup method of terminal device according to claim 3, it is characterised in that the public-key cryptography
Algorithm is asymmetric key algorithm.
6. the startup method of the terminal device according to claim any one of 1-5, it is characterised in that described
Basic security content also includes following one or more：
International mobile equipment identification number, production number, area code and language code.
7. the startup method of terminal device according to claim 6, it is characterised in that second storage
Device with processor is in same crystal grain or is integrated on same phy chip, the first memory with
Coupled outside the phy chip piece.
8. the startup method of terminal device according to claim 1, it is characterised in that also include：
When verify the bootstrap by when, run the bootstrap, verify image file；
Wherein, the image file is stored in non-volatile first memory.
9. the startup method of terminal device according to claim 8, it is characterised in that described in the operation
Bootstrap, verifies image file, including：
The bootstrap is run, so that the public key in the bootstrap is to the 3rd in the image file
The plaintext for obtaining the 3rd Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of Hash digest, and calculates the image
The actual Hash digest of verification portion is needed in file；
When the 3rd Kazakhstan for needing the actual Hash digest of verification portion to be obtained with decryption in the image file
The plaintext of uncommon summary is identical, then verifies that the image file passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of the 3rd Hash digest is encrypted by the second private key in advance, second private key
A group key pair is constituted with the public key in the bootstrap.
10. a kind of terminal device, it is characterised in that including：Processor, non-volatile first memory and only
The second memory of reading；
The processor, starts code suitable for operation and is run with jumping at the first security code；
Non-volatile first memory, with can for storing the disposable of the first security code
The storage region of programming, and store basic security content and bootstrap；
The read-only second memory, suitable for storing the startup code；
Wherein, the first memory is in different chips, the processor fortune from the second memory
Row first security code, to verify the basic security content；When in the checking basic security
When appearance passes through, the second security code in the basic security content is run, to verify the guiding journey
Sequence；When verify the bootstrap by when, run the bootstrap.
11. terminal device according to claim 10, it is characterised in that the processor is suitable to：
First security code is run, to calculate the first Hash digest of the basic security content；
When first Hash digest is identical with the Hash digest pre-saved, verify in the basic security
Appearance passes through, wherein, the Hash digest pre-saved is stored in the first memory once
In the programmable storage region of property.
12. terminal device according to claim 10, it is characterised in that it is basic that the processor is suitable to operation
The second security code in secure content, the bootstrap is verified using public key algorithm.
13. terminal device according to claim 12, it is characterised in that the processor is suitable to：
The second security code in basic security content is run, to use the public key in the basic security content
The ciphertext of the second Hash digest in the bootstrap is decrypted and obtains second Hash digest
Plaintext, and calculate the actual Hash digest of verification portion needed in the bootstrap；
When second Kazakhstan for needing the actual Hash digest of verification portion to be obtained with decryption in the bootstrap
The plaintext of uncommon summary is identical, then verifies that bootstrap passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of second Hash digest is encrypted by the first private key in advance, first private key
A group key pair is constituted with the public key in the basic security content.
14. terminal device according to claim 12, it is characterised in that the public key algorithm is non-right
Claim key algorithm.
15. the terminal device according to claim any one of 10-14, it is characterised in that the basic security
Content also includes following one or more：
International mobile equipment identification number, production number, area code and language code.
16. terminal device according to claim 15, it is characterised in that the second memory and processor
In same crystal grain or it is integrated on same phy chip, the first memory and the physics core
Coupled outside piece piece.
17. terminal device according to claim 16, it is characterised in that the processor is further adapted for：
When verify the bootstrap by when, run the bootstrap, verify image file, wherein,
The image file is stored in non-volatile first memory.
18. terminal device according to claim 17, it is characterised in that the processor is further adapted for：
Run the bootstrap, with using the public key in the bootstrap to the in the image file
The plaintext for obtaining the 3rd Hash digest is decrypted in the ciphertext of three Hash digests, and is reflected described in calculating
Actual Hash digest as needing verification portion in file；
When the 3rd Kazakhstan for needing the actual Hash digest of verification portion to be obtained with decryption in the image file
The plaintext of uncommon summary is identical, then verifies that the image file passes through；
Wherein, the ciphertext of the 3rd Hash digest is encrypted by the second private key in advance, second private key
A group key pair is constituted with the public key in the bootstrap.
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| CN201610159979.6A CN107220547B (en) | 2016-03-21 | 2016-03-21 | Terminal equipment and starting method thereof |
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| CN201610159979.6A CN107220547B (en) | 2016-03-21 | 2016-03-21 | Terminal equipment and starting method thereof |
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| CN109542518A (en) * | 2018-10-09 | 2019-03-29 | 华为技术有限公司 | The method of chip and bootrom |
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| CN111970122A (en) * | 2020-08-06 | 2020-11-20 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Official APP identification method, mobile terminal and application server |
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| CN113254295A (en) * | 2020-02-11 | 2021-08-13 | 瑞昱半导体股份有限公司 | Verification method and system |
| CN114385248A (en) * | 2020-10-22 | 2022-04-22 | 四零四科技股份有限公司 | Computing system and device for processing trust chain |
| CN116775145A (en) * | 2023-05-04 | 2023-09-19 | 合芯科技(苏州)有限公司 | Method, device, equipment and storage medium for starting and recovering server |
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