CN107171790A - A kind of safe wireless channel measurement method - Google Patents
A kind of safe wireless channel measurement method Download PDFInfo
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- CN107171790A CN107171790A CN201710286183.1A CN201710286183A CN107171790A CN 107171790 A CN107171790 A CN 107171790A CN 201710286183 A CN201710286183 A CN 201710286183A CN 107171790 A CN107171790 A CN 107171790A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L25/00—Baseband systems
- H04L25/02—Details ; arrangements for supplying electrical power along data transmission lines
- H04L25/0202—Channel estimation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
- H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method, including（1）Choose expectation both sides' certification and the unknown information of unexpected side is as " seed " information for generating channel measurement required input signal；（2）It is the input signal for channel measurement by " seed " information MAP；（3）It is expected that both sides mutually send out input signal, and be respectively completed signal reception, produce the output signal for channel measurement；（4）It is expected that both sides complete channel measurement according to respective input signal and output signal；（5）It is expected that both sides carry out traffic operation or secure processing operations using channel measurement；（6）Update seed information, repeat step（2）Arrive（6）.Using the present invention of above-mentioned technical proposal, the safety of measuring parameters in channels can be effectively ensured.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to channel measurement technical field, more particularly to a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method.
Background technology
For the safety problem of radio communication, rising in recent years by the safety of physical layer technology of support of information theory from nothing
The physical layer feature of line communication is started with, according to the features such as the diversity of wireless channel, time variation, private ownership and reciprocity, to nothing
Line communication security is designed, the study hotspot as secure wireless communication in recent years.Examined as received in wireless communications signal
The bases of the technologies such as survey, demodulation, equilibrium, and safe transmission and the safety of physical layer technology that is generated based on wireless channel key
Basis, wireless channel must be measured by safety and precise in advance.But there is presently no the authentication method for wireless channel measurement.
Channel estimation based on pilot tone needs the auxiliary of other side to complete, and whether auxiliary is legal and with the presence or absence of active attack
It can not then determine.Once active attack person is using active attacks such as identity personation, signal injection, go-between's forwarding and Replay Attacks
During means, the wireless channel measurement result of communicating pair just can be stolen or distorted easily, causes the security and standard of channel measurement
True property can not be guaranteed.Therefore, the reliable wireless channel measurement method of design safety or wireless channel authentication method are compeled in eyebrow
Eyelash.
The content of the invention
The purpose of the present invention, is to provide a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method, prevents passive and active attack person
Using intercepting, identity personation, signal injection, the means such as go-between's forwarding and Replay Attack steal or distort wireless channel measurement
As a result.
The present invention uses following technical scheme：
A kind of safe wireless channel measurement method, including：
(1) choose expectation both sides' certification and the unknown information of unexpected side is as generation channel measurement required input signal
" seed " information；It is described expect both sides refer to will by safeguard protection, carry out wireless channel measurement, implement the double of proper communication
Side, the unexpected side refers to a side or multi-party in addition to both sides are expected, being attacked in intentional or unintentional mode；
(2) it is the input signal for channel measurement by " seed " information MAP；
(3) it is expected that both sides mutually send out input signal, and be respectively completed signal reception, produce the output letter for channel measurement
Number；
(4) it is expected that both sides complete channel measurement according to respective input signal and output signal；
(5) it is expected that both sides carry out traffic operation or secure processing operations using channel measurement；
(6) seed information is updated,
(7) repeat step (2) arrives (6).
" seed " information in the step (1) includes expecting both sides' agreement simultaneously known information, or both sides will in advance
Agreement and known information is by handling the fresh information of generation in advance, or both sides are respectively by secured fashion generation or double
The information that side is transmitted by secured fashion, or the information that trusted third party is distributed and exchanged by secured fashion.
In (2) will " seed " information MAP when being the input signal for channel measurement, the input of mapping is at least wrapped
" seed " information, timestamp information are included, mapping is output as the input signal for carrying out channel measurement, the input signal bag
Include：
(1) it is expected that both sides are used for training sequence signal, the pilot frequency sequence signal of channel parameter estimation；
Or
(2) signal that both sides send to extract shared random number information or key information from output signal is expected.
In step (3), it is expected that both sides are set to A side and B side, sending and receiving for signal is carried out respectively in expectation both sides, produce
During raw output signal：
(1) when transmitting-receiving side is using half duplex techniques：A side sends signal B side and receives signal, then, and B side sends signal A side
Receive signal；Or B side sends signal A side and receives signal, then, A side sends signal B side and receives signal；
(2) when transmitting-receiving side is using full duplex technology：A side and B side send signal and receive signal simultaneously.
The expectation both sides are completed after channel measurement according to respective input signal and output signal, and acquired channel is surveyed
Measuring result is：
(1) channel impulse response parameter, the channel frequency domain response parameter obtained according to input signal and output signal；
And/or
(2) signal characteristic parameter of output signal.
In the step (5), obtain after channel measurement, it is expected that both sides are used to carry out one using channel measurement
Lower one or several kinds of operations：
(1) signal detection, demodulation, equilibrium, preequalization, coding, precoding are completed in communication；
(2) information is extracted from channel parameter, shared random number or key is used as；
(3) information is extracted from measurement output signal, is used as shared random number or key；
(4) complete to prevent the safe transmission of unexpected side's eavesdropping based on channel parameter.
In the step (6), when updating seed information：
(1) expect both sides' agreement or consult the cycle of whether more new seed and more new seed；
(2) it is expected that both sides are updated based on agreement method to seed, use seed different from the past, certification and non-
The unknown information in the side of expectation includes as new " seed " information, described new " seed " information：New certification and unexpected
Fang Weizhi information, the fresh information either generated by conventional seed or both sides are regenerated, simultaneously by secured fashion respectively
Information after being consulted by secured fashion, or the information that trusted third party is distributed and exchanged by secured fashion.
Beneficial effects of the present invention：By by communicating pair certification and the unknown private information of third party is mapped as channel
Input signal needed for measurement, and channel measurement is carried out based on input signal, it is ensured that channel estimation both sides are validated user
And the security of channel measurement process.Due to input signal be secret, certification and continuous renewal, both made actively attack
The person of hitting takes the means such as identity personation, signal injection, amplification forwarding and Replay Attack, can not also steal channel measurement, enter
And ensure the safety of measuring parameters in channels.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is wireless channel measurement method flow diagram.
Fig. 2 is communicating pair channel estimation system illustraton of model.
Fig. 3 is radio channel estimation method flow diagram.
Fig. 4 is the flow chart that key is generated based on channel estimation parameter.
Fig. 5 is based on the flow chart for receiving signal generation key.
Fig. 6 is the flow chart using channel estimation safe transmission.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings 1~6 and embodiment the present invention is described in further detail.
As shown in figure 1, the present invention provides a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method, it includes：
S101：Choose expectation both sides' certification and the unknown information of unexpected side is believed as generation channel measurement required input
Number " seed " information；Expect both sides refer to will by safeguard protection, carry out wireless channel measurement, implement the double of proper communication
Side, unexpected side refer to it is in addition to both sides are expected, implement to intercept in intentional or unintentional mode, forward, disturb, it is counterfeit, usurp
A side or multi-party for one or more attacks such as change, reset；
S102：It is the input signal for channel measurement by " seed " information MAP；Hash algorithm can be used in the mapping.
S103：It is expected that both sides mutually send out input signal, and be respectively completed signal reception, obtain respectively for the defeated of channel measurement
Go out signal；
S104：It is expected that both sides complete channel measurement according to respective input signal and output signal；
S105：It is expected that both sides are communicated or safe handling using measurement result；
S106：Update seed information, repeat step S102 to S106.
In above-mentioned step S101, " seed " information is the information that unexpected side can not be known, i.e. " seed " information can be with
It is set to expect both sides agreement and known information in advance, or both sides will arrange in advance and known information is generated by handling
Fresh information, the processing mode may be selected hash algorithm, or both sides are logical by secured fashion generation or communicating pair respectively
Cross the information of secured fashion transmission, or the information that trusted third party (such as authentication center) is distributed and exchanged by secured fashion.
Wherein, the physical layer key of secured fashion optional safety of the both sides for generating information is generated, and communicating pair
Safety of physical layer transmission may be selected in the secured fashion that transmission information is taken, and trusted third party (such as authentication center) passes through secure side
Traditional key ways of distribution may be selected in the mode for the information that formula is distributed and exchanged.
In step S102, during by " seed " information MAP for input signal for channel measurement, information MAP is carried out
Input at least needs to include " seed " information, can also include the information of other needs, such as timestamp information, and the output of mapping is made
For the input signal for carrying out channel measurement, input signal includes：(1) it is expected that both sides are used for the training sequence of channel parameter estimation
Column signal, pilot frequency sequence signal；Or (2) expect both sides to extract shared random number information or key from measurement output signal
Information and the signal sent.It will can be exported including the information including " seed " information after mapping for being believed
The training sequence signal of road parameter Estimation, pilot frequency sequence signal can also export specific as the input signal of channel measurement
Input signal, input signal output signal output after channel, can extract in output signal shared random number information or
Key information.
In step S103, it is expected that both sides are set to A side and B side, sending and receiving for signal is carried out respectively in expectation both sides, produce
During raw output signal：
(1) if using half duplex techniques using transmitting-receiving side：A side sends signal B side and receives signal, then, and B side sends letter
Number A side receives signal；Or B side sends signal A side and receives signal, then, A side sends signal B side and receives signal；
(2) if using full duplex technology using transmitting-receiving side：A side and B side send signal and receive signal simultaneously.
In S104, it is expected that both sides are completed after channel measurement according to respective input signal and output signal, acquired letter
Road measurement result, that is, the channel measured value obtained is：
(1) channel impulse response parameter, the channel frequency domain response parameter obtained according to input signal and output signal；With/
Or
(2) signal characteristic parameter of output signal, including but not limited to signal intensity, phase, time delay, envelope etc..
In S105, obtain after channel measured value, it is expected that both sides are used to carry out the one of a under type using channel measured value
Plant or several communication or safe handling：
(1) signal detection, demodulation, equilibrium, preequalization, coding, precoding are completed in communication；
(2) information is extracted from channel parameter, shared random number or key is used as；
(3) information is extracted from measurement output signal, is used as shared random number or key；
(4) complete to prevent the safe transmission of unexpected side's eavesdropping based on channel parameter.
In S106, when updating seed information：(1) expect both sides' agreement or consult whether more new seed and more new seed
Cycle；(2) it is expected that both sides are updated based on agreement method to seed, use seed different from the past, certification and non-phase
The unknown information in prestige side includes as new " seed " information, described new " seed " information：New certification and unexpected side
Unknown information, the fresh information either generated by conventional seed or both sides are regenerated and led to by secured fashion respectively
Cross the information after secured fashion is consulted, or the information that trusted third party is distributed and exchanged by secured fashion.
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, it is the channel estimation of the invention based on secret pilot tone as one embodiment of the present of invention
System model figure.In the present invention, by that will expect both sides, i.e. Bob and Alice, the key that certification is produced is inputted as mapping,
The secret pilot tone as input signal is generated, the secret pilot tone is pilot frequency sequence signal.As shown in Fig. 2 validated user Alice and
Bob completes channel parameter estimation by mutually sending out secret pilot tone, and channel parameter estimation is the conventional method of the communications field, is no longer carried out
Statement.
Fig. 3 is the flow chart of channel parameter estimation.The key mapping that validated user Alice and Bob produces certification is private
Close pilot tone, signal transmitting and receiving is completed by mutually sending out secret pilot tone, and carries out channel estimation according to signal is received, and is communicated for communicating pair
Or used during safety operation, then generate consensus information according to the channel strength of estimation is updated to seed information, follows the trail of
The dynamic change of channel.This method comprises the following steps：
S201：" seed " information of the initial key X that legal both sides produce certification as generation secret pilot tone.
S202：Seed information is mapped as the secret pilot tone for channel estimation.Assuming that Alice and Bob are single antenna,
And communicating pair is communicated using single carrier.Alice and Bob channel impulse response sequence length is P, then communicating pair is treated
The channel parameter number of measurement is P, correspondingly, pilot sequence length(wherein [x] is represented not less than x most
Small integer, i.e. [log2 p] represent to be not less than log2 pInteger).Pilot frequency design is tried to achieve according to channel estimation method and pilot length
With optimal pilot characteristic.According to above-mentioned pilot tone characteristic, seed information is mapped as private by communicating pair using property mapping algorithm one by one
Close pilot tone, i.e. s=f (X).Wherein, s is the secret pilot tone of generation.
S203：Communicating pair completes signal transmitting and receiving by mutually sending out secret pilot tone, it is ensured that communicating pair is validated user.Here
Discussed so that Alice hairs Bob is received as an example, with s=[s (0), s (1) ..., s (LP-1)]TRepresent the pilot tone sequence that Alice is sent
Row, according to Fig. 2 channel parameter model, Bob reception signal is represented by：
YB=HABs+nB (1)
Wherein YBRepresent Bob reception signal, nBIt is that zero, variance is for Bob ends averageAdditive white Gaussian noise, HAB
It is Alice to Bob wireless channel gain.Similarity sign has same property below, is not described in detail.
Then, Bob sends out Alice and received and can obtain Alice reception signal and be：
YA=HBAs+nA (2)
YARepresent Alice reception signal, nAIt is that zero, variance is for Bob ends averageAdditive white Gaussian noise, HBAIt is
Bob to Alice wireless channel gain.
S204：Communicating pair carries out channel estimation respectively according to reception signal and secret pilot tone.Connecing according to obtained by S203
Collect mail number, use zero forcing algorithm can obtain Bob channel estimation value for：
The channel estimation that Alice can similarly be obtained is：
Used during for communicating pair communication or safety operation
S205：Communicating pair generates consensus information according to the channel strength of estimation.Alice and Bob are according to quantitative criteria
The channel strength value to estimation quantifies respectively, respective generating quantification sequence, and consensus information is generated through consultation.
S206：The consensus information of communicating pair generation updates seed information, and repeat step S202 to S206 follows the trail of letter
The dynamic change in road, it is ensured that estimate wireless channel safety and precise.
As shown in figure 4, being an alternative embodiment of the invention.In the embodiment, the present invention completes channel estimation first, so
Key is generated according to channel estimation afterwards, while according to seed information of the information of channel estimation intensity generation as renewal.
Fig. 4 generates the flow chart of key for the present invention according to channel estimation.Validated user Alice and Bob is by mutually sending out private
Close pilot tone completes channel estimation, and generates key according to the phase information of channel estimation, while being generated according to channel estimation intensity
Consensus information, as needed using the consensus information of generation as next secret pilot tone seed information.This method is specifically wrapped
Include the following steps：
S301：" seed " information of the key X that legal both sides distribute authentication center as generation secret pilot tone.
S302：It is the secret pilot tone for channel estimation by " seed " information MAP.Under TDD mode of operations, Alice and
Bob is single antenna, and communicated using single carrier.Alice and Bob channel impulse response sequence length is P, then communicates
Both sides' channel parameter number to be measured is P, correspondingly, pilot sequence length(wherein [x] represents to be not less than
X smallest positive integral, i.e. [log2 p] represent to be not less than log2 pInteger).Pilot tone is tried to achieve according to channel estimation method and pilot length
Pattern and optimal pilot characteristic.According to above-mentioned pilot tone characteristic, communicating pair is mapped seed information using property mapping algorithm one by one
For secret pilot tone, i.e. s=f (X).
S303 communicating pairs complete channel estimation by mutually sending out secret pilot tone and timestamp information etc..Communicating pair passes through mutual
Send out pilot tone completion signal hair to receive, and channel estimation is completed based on secret pilot tone and reception signal.Here received with Alice hairs Bob and be
Example is discussed.With s=[s (0), s (1) ..., s (LP-1)]TThe pilot frequency sequence that Alice is sent is represented, is joined according to Fig. 2 channel
Exponential model, Bob reception signal is represented by：
YB=HABs+nB (5)
Wherein YBRepresent Bob reception signal, nBIt is zero for Bob ends average, variance isAdditive white Gaussian noise, HAB
It is Alice to Bob wireless channel gain.Similarity sign has same property below, is not described in detail.
Then, Bob sends out Alice and received and can obtain Alice reception signal and be：
YA=HBAs+nA (6)
Use zero forcing algorithm can obtain Bob channel estimation value for：
The channel estimation that Alice can similarly be obtained is：
S304 communicating pairs generate key according to the phase information of channel estimation.Assuming that communicating pair secret pilot tone is initial
Phase is φ0, the phase after reaching other side through wireless channel is φ, and communicating pair is according to quantitative criteria, the phase of the docking collection of letters number
Position is quantified, generating quantification sequence, after negotiated and secrecy enhancing, generates ex curia key sequence.
S305 communicating pairs generate consensus information according to the frequency domain channel intensity of estimation.According to formula (7) and (8),
Alice and Bob quantify to the channel value of estimation respectively, obtain quantized sequences, negotiated rear generation consensus sequence.
The legal both sides of S306 are updated with the consensus information of generation to seed information, repeat step S302 to S306,
Dynamic updates secret pilot tone, it is ensured that the safety of generation key.
As shown in figure 5, being another embodiment of the present invention.In the embodiment, expect both sides by " seed " information MAP
For the input information rather than training sequence signal or pilot frequency sequence signal needed for generation key, it is not necessary to carry out channel estimation.
Fig. 5 is the present invention according to the flow chart for receiving signal message generation key.Validated user Alice and Bob passes through mutual
Input information needed for occurring into key completes signal transmitting and receiving, and according to reception signal generation key.The embodiment and above-mentioned reality
The difference for applying example is, the embodiment is communicating pair seed information is mapped as generating to input information needed for key and
It is not pilot tone or training sequence, and channel estimation need not be carried out.This method specifically includes the following steps：
S401：Communicating pair regard the X sequences that root key is produced by MD5 algorithms as generation key required input signal
" seed " information.
S402：By " seed " information MAP for the input signal needed for generation key.Under TDD mode of operations, Alice and
Bob is single antenna, and communicated using single carrier.According to key quantification manner and the digit needs of generation key, Alice
The input signal needed for key is generated with Bob.It is close that seed information is mapped as generation by communicating pair using property mapping algorithm one by one
Input signal needed for key, i.e. s=f (X).
S403：Communicating pair completes signal transmitting and receiving using mutually sending out the mode such as input signal and timestamp information above-mentioned.Use s=
[s (0), s (1) ..., s (LP-1)]TThe input signal needed for generation key is represented, is begged for here so that Alice hairs Bob is received as an example
By according to Fig. 2 channel parameter model, Bob reception signal is represented by：
YB=HABs+nB (9)
Wherein YBRepresent Bob reception signal, nBIt is zero for Bob ends average, variance isAdditive white Gaussian noise, HAB
It is Alice to Bob wireless channel gain.Similarity sign has same property below, is not described in detail.
Then, Bob sends out Alice and received and can obtain Alice reception signal and be：
YA=HBAs+nA (10)
YARepresent Alice reception signal, nAIt is that zero, variance is for Bob ends averageAdditive white Gaussian noise, HBAIt is
Bob to Alice wireless channel gain.
S404：Communicating pair generates key according to the phase information for receiving signal.Assuming that input signal s beginning phase is
φ0, after reaching other side through wireless channel, the phase for receiving signal is φ, and communicating pair docks the collection of letters number according to quantitative criteria
Phase is quantified, generating quantification sequence, after negotiated and secrecy enhancing, generates symmetric key sequence.
S405：Communicating pair generates consensus information according to received signal strength.
According to formula (9) and (10), Alice and Bob quantify to received signal strength respectively, obtain quantized sequences,
Generation consensus sequence after negotiated.
S406 communicating pairs are updated with the consensus information of generation to seed information, repeat step S402 to S406,
Based on input signal and wireless channel dynamic generation key, it is ensured that the security of generation key.
As shown in fig. 6, being another embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 6 carries out the flow chart of safe transmission for the present invention according to channel estimation.Validated user Alice and Bob passes through mutual
Send out secret pilot tone and complete channel estimation, and prevented according to channel estimation results in the kernel addition man made noise of validated user
Main passive wiretapping person steals to information.This method specifically includes the following steps：
S501：" seed " information of the initial key X that legal both sides produce certification as generation secret pilot tone.
S502：It is the secret pilot tone for channel estimation by " seed " information MAP.Under TDD mode of operations, Alice and
Bob is equipped with NAAnd NBRoot antenna, and communicated using single carrier.Here discussed so that Alice hairs Bob is received as an example, it is false
If the shock response length of channel is P, communicating pair needs the channel parameter number estimated to be NA× P, correspondingly needs construction
Length isSecret pilot frequency sequence (wherein [x] represent not less than x smallest positive integral).Root
It is believed that channel estimation algorithm and pilot length try to achieve pilot frequency design and optimal pilot characteristic.According to above-mentioned pilot tone characteristic, communicating pair
Seed information is mapped as by secret pilot tone, i.e. s=f (X) using property mapping algorithm one by one.
S503：Communicating pair completes channel estimation by the way of mutually hair secret pilot tone.Communicating pair is by mutually sending out pilot tone
Complete signal hair to receive, and channel estimation is completed with signal is received based on secret pilot tone.With s=[s (0), s (1) ..., s (L-1)]T
The pilot frequency sequence that Alice is sent is represented, according to Fig. 2 channel parameter model, Bob reception signal is represented by：
YB=HABs+nB (11)
Wherein YBRepresent Bob reception signal, nBIt is zero for Bob ends average, variance isAdditive white Gaussian noise, HAB
It is Alice to Bob wireless channel gain.Similarity sign has same property below, is not described in detail.
Then, Bob sends out Alice and received and can obtain Alice reception signal and be：
YA=HBAs+nA (12)
Use zero forcing algorithm can obtain Bob channel estimation value for：
The channel estimation that Alice can similarly be obtained is：
S504：Communicating pair tries to achieve the kernel of wireless channel according to channel estimation value.By estimating to formula (13) and (14)
The wireless channel matrix of meter carries out singular value decomposition, can obtainWithDue to the reciprocity of wireless channel
Property, it can obtainSo the kernel that communicating pair is obtained is identical, UB、VB、UA、VAIt is distributed as channel matrixWith's
Left and right singular value matrix.
S505：Communicating pair sends man made noise while sending signal in kernel.The channel zero tried to achieve according to S604
Space, communicating pair sends man made noise in the kernel of wireless channel, main passive wiretapping person is entered while signal is sent
Row interference, prevents listener-in from being stolen to sending information, it is ensured that the safe transmission of information.
S506：Communicating pair generates consensus information according to the channel strength of estimation.According to formula (13) and (14),
Alice and Bob quantify to the channel value of estimation respectively, obtain quantized sequences, negotiated rear generation consensus sequence.
S507：Legal both sides are updated with the consensus information of generation to seed information, repeat step S502 to S507,
The wireless channel of dynamic tracking communicating pair, it is ensured that information is by safe transmission.
Above in association with embodiment, invention has been described, but the invention is not limited in embodiment disclosed above,
And modification, equivalent combinations that the various essence according to the present invention are carried out etc. should be covered.
Claims (7)
1. a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method, it is characterised in that including：
（1）Choose expectation both sides' certification and the unknown information of unexpected side is as generation channel measurement required input signal
" seed " information；It is described expect both sides refer to will by safeguard protection, carry out wireless channel measurement, implement the double of proper communication
Side, the unexpected side refer to it is in addition to both sides are expected, with a side of intentional or unintentional mode attack or multi-party；
（2）It is the input signal for channel measurement by " seed " information MAP；
（3）It is expected that both sides mutually send out input signal, and be respectively completed signal reception, produce the output signal for channel measurement；
（4）It is expected that both sides complete channel measurement according to respective input signal and output signal；
（5）It is expected that both sides carry out traffic operation or secure processing operations using channel measurement；
（6）Update seed information, repeat step（2）Arrive（6）.
2. a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：The step（1）In
" seed " information include expecting both sides agreement and known information, or both sides will in advance arrange and known information is led in advance
Cross the fresh information of processing generation, or the letter that both sides are generated by secured fashion respectively or both sides are transmitted by secured fashion
Breath, or the information that trusted third party is distributed and exchanged by secured fashion.
3. a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：It is described（2）It is middle " to plant
When son " information MAP is the input signal for channel measurement, the input of mapping at least includes " seed " information, timestamp and believed
Breath, mapping is output as the input signal for carrying out channel measurement, and the input signal includes：
（1）It is expected that both sides are used for training sequence signal, the pilot frequency sequence signal of channel parameter estimation；
Or
（2）Expect the signal that both sides send to extract shared random number information or key information from output signal.
4. a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：Step（3）In, expect
Both sides are set to A side and B side, and sending and receiving for signal is carried out respectively in expectation both sides, when producing output signal：
（1）When transmitting-receiving side is using half duplex techniques：A side sends signal B side and receives signal, then, and B side sends signal A side and received
Signal；Or B side sends signal A side and receives signal, then, A side sends signal B side and receives signal；
（2）When transmitting-receiving side is using full duplex technology：A side and B side send signal and receive signal simultaneously.
5. a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：Expectation both sides' root
Completed according to respective input signal and output signal after channel measurement, acquired channel measurement is：
（1）Channel impulse response parameter, the channel frequency domain response parameter obtained according to input signal and output signal；
And/or
（2）The signal characteristic parameter of output signal.
6. a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method according to claim 5, it is characterised in that：The step（5）In,
Obtain after channel measurement, it is expected that both sides are used to carry out one or several kinds of operations using channel measurement：
（1）Signal detection, demodulation, equilibrium, preequalization, coding, precoding are completed in communication；
（2）Information is extracted from channel parameter, shared random number or key is used as；
（3）Information is extracted from measurement output signal, shared random number or key is used as；
（4）Complete to prevent the safe transmission of unexpected side's eavesdropping based on channel parameter.
7. a kind of safe wireless channel measurement method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：The step（6）In,
When updating seed information：
（1）Expect both sides' agreement or consult the cycle of whether more new seed and more new seed；
（2）It is expected that both sides are updated based on agreement method to seed, use seed different from the past, certification and unexpected
Fang Weizhi information includes as new " seed " information, described new " seed " information：New certification and unexpected Fang Wei
The information known, the fresh information either generated by conventional seed or both sides are regenerated and passed through by secured fashion respectively
Information after secured fashion negotiation, or trusted third party pass through the information that secured fashion is distributed and exchanged.
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| CN109246694A (en) * | 2018-10-19 | 2019-01-18 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | A method of wireless key generation is carried out using satellite channel |
| CN109274493A (en) * | 2018-11-16 | 2019-01-25 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | Authentication method based on channel-aware |
| CN113132086A (en) * | 2019-12-27 | 2021-07-16 | 电子科技大学 | Method for simultaneously realizing key distribution of physical layer in communication process |
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