CN108847939B - MDI-QKD method based on quantum network - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol, which applies quantum invisible propagation in a quantum network to the traditional unilateral MDI-QKD protocol, on one hand, the advantages of the original MDI-QKD protocol are kept, namely, the independence of a safety protocol on measuring equipment is ensured, and all attacks at a measurer end in a QKD system are effectively avoided; on the other hand, the quantum invisible state in the quantum network can greatly prolong the safety distance of communication; the invention applies the quantum invisible state in the quantum network to the MDI-QKD protocol, thereby greatly increasing the distance of the MDI-QKD protocol while ensuring the communication security.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of quantum communication, and particularly relates to an MDI-QKD protocol based on a quantum network.
Background
Quantum secret communication is based on quantum physics and informatics, the security of the quantum secret communication is ensured by the basic principle of quantum mechanics, and quantum key distribution is the most important content in quantum secret communication and is considered as the encryption mode with the highest security. It enables both parties to generate and share a random, secure key to encrypt and decrypt information. In 1984, Bennett et al proposed the QKD protocol in quantum cryptography, BB84 protocol, for the first time, and then after more than thirty years of development, various new QKD protocols have appeared in succession, such as: cyclic differential phase shift protocols, pulse modulation based QKD protocols, trick mode two-way QKD protocols, and the like. Hoi-KwongLo et al proposed a QKD protocol with higher practicability in 2012, and an MDI-QKD protocol (Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key distribution protocol) protocol Independent of Measurement devices. In the MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob are legal communication users and are only responsible for preparing quantum states, then the prepared quantum states are respectively sent to a third party Charlie operating the protocol, the Charlie completes measurement of the two quantum states, measurement results are published to the Alice and the Bob through a public classical channel, the Alice and the Bob perform subsequent processing on data in hands of the Alice and the Bob according to the measurement results of the Charlie end, and finally a security key is obtained. The MDI-QKD protocol is popular with scientific enthusiasts since the first proposal in 2012, and is intensively researched from both theoretical and experimental aspects.
The quantum network is a novel safe communication network, and brings real safety and qualitative leap in the fields of calculation and science to the network by using quantum entanglement and quantum invisible transmission. The quantum invisible state is also called quantum remote transmission, quantum long-distance transmission and the like, and is a brand new communication technology for transmitting unknown quantum states by using quantum entanglement and some classical physical information. If Alice transmits an unknown quantum state to a receiver Bob, firstly Alice and Bob share an entangled quantum channel, namely an EPR entangled particle pair, then Alice decomposes the original unknown quantum state into classical information and quantum information which are respectively transmitted to Bob through the classical channel and the quantum channel, and Bob restores the unknown quantum state according to the acquired information. The classical information is a measurement result obtained by performing Bell state measurement on an unknown quantum state to be transmitted by a sender Alice, and the quantum information is the rest information which is not acquired by the Alice in the measurement and is related to the unknown quantum state.
In the original MDI-QKD protocol, legal communication users Alice and Bob are not equipped with any measuring device and only take charge of the preparation of the quantum state, and the measurement of the quantum state is carried out by an untrusted third party Charlie. The patent with application number 201510008068.9 discloses a two-node measuring device independent quantum key distribution system, wherein two independent lasers and a measuring device Charlie are both placed on the same node, namely both placed at an Alice end or a Bob end, so as to form the two-node bidirectional transmission quantum key distribution system. The special structure removes the attack of an eavesdropper on the measuring equipment in the operation process of the protocol, ensures the safety of communication, however, the safety communication distance of the protocol is not long enough, and further improvement is needed to prolong the safety communication distance.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an MDI-QKD protocol based on a quantum network aiming at the problems in the prior art, and the quantum invisible transmission is applied to the MDI-QKD protocol, so that on one hand, the independence of a safety protocol on measuring equipment is ensured, and all attacks of a measurer end in a QKD system are effectively avoided; on the other hand, the quantum invisible state in the quantum network can greatly prolong the safety distance of communication; therefore, the MDI-QKD protocol based on the quantum network can realize the effect of greatly prolonging the safe transmission distance while ensuring the safety.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
an MDI-QKD protocol based on a quantum network, comprising the following steps:
s1, the communication user Alice establishes an optimal routing route by the method of quantum routing and the node Alicel in the same quantum network;
s2, communication users Alice and Bob in the same quantum network respectively prepare quantum states, and the communication users Alice transmit the prepared quantum states to a node Alicel in a hidden state transmission mode;
s3, after receiving the quantum state, Alicel sends the two quantum states to third-party quantum measurement equipment Charlie through a quantum channel synchronously with Bob for measurement;
s4, Charlie carries out BELL State Measurement (BSM) on the two received quantum states, and then publishes the measurement result to communication users Alice and Bob through a classical channel; the obtained measurement results are judged by Alice and Bob;
s5, if the measurement result is judged to be wrong, then both Alice and Bob discard the quantum state data sent to Charlie measurement in the communication process; if the measurement result is judged to be correct, then Alice and Bob temporarily reserve the quantum state data, and obtain the screened key data through the base pair operation, and either Alice or Bob performs one-time bit reversal on the own key;
s6, repeating the steps S2 to S5 to obtain a string of natural key bits;
s7, detecting whether the quantum channel has wiretap;
and S8, obtaining the final security key.
Specifically, in step S2, the communication user Alice may lose a certain amount of information during the process of transferring the quantum state, that is, there is a certain fidelity in transferring the quantum state to Alicel by Alice, where the fidelity is expressed as:
wherein x is more than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1, and x represents the weight of the W state in the quantum invisible state; when in use
Then, the W state can be separated; when in use
When the two phases are in the same state, the W state can not be separated; when x is 1, the W state is a pure state; n represents the node number of the quantum invisible state; rhoinAnd ρn-1Density algorithms representing input quantum states and output quantum states of the (n-1) th node, respectively; tr denotes the traces of the matrix.
Specifically, in step S4, the method for Alice and Bob to determine the obtained measurement result includes: respectively selecting and disclosing a part of secret keys by Alice and Bob, calculating the error rate of the secret keys by the Alice and the Bob according to the public secret keys, and judging that the measurement result is wrong if the error rate exceeds a threshold value; and if the error rate is lower than the threshold value, judging that the measurement result is correct.
Specifically, in step S5, the method for obtaining the filtered key data through the base operation includes: and firstly disclosing bases used for preparing each quantum state by Alice and Bob, then reserving key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared by using the same base, and discarding the key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared by using different bases, thereby obtaining the screened key data.
Specifically, in step S7, the method for checking whether there is eavesdropping on the quantum channel is as follows: both Alice and Bob publicly show part of the original secret key, and calculate the error rate of the secret key; if the error rate exceeds the threshold, it shows that there is eavesdropping, abandon the protocol process, if the error rate does not exceed the threshold, then keep the original key not disclosed.
Specifically, in step S8, before the final security key is obtained, the remaining key string needs to be subjected to error correction and secret amplification.
Further, the key rate calculation formula of the protocol is as follows:
wherein Q isrectAnd ErectRepresenting the gain and the quantum bit error rate under the rect base;
f(Erect) H (x) xlog as a function of error correction rate2(x)-(1-x)log2(1-x) is a Shannon entropy function;
represents the error rate of single-photon pulse under the oblique polarization base in MDI-QKD;
indicating the error rate of the optical pulses with the intensity of the horizontal and vertical basis uv, u being the intensity of the optical pulses transmitted by Alice and v being the intensity of the optical pulses transmitted by Bob.
Further, the gain and quantum bit error rate of the protocol are expressed as:
wherein,
the gain represents the gain of the light pulses with the intensity u and v sent by Alice and Bob under rect;
represents the gain at which Alice1 and Bob send optical pulses of intensities u and v on the rect basis;
representing the error rate of sending light pulses with the intensity u and v by Alice and Bob under the rect base;
representing the error rate of Alice1 and Bob sending light pulses of intensities u and v on the rect basis;
representing the error rate of single-photon pulses of an oblique polarization base in a quantum network, wherein the upper right label xx' represents that Alice and Bob use the oblique polarization base simultaneously, and the quantum network comprises an invisible state and MDI-QKD;indicating the error rate of the optical pulse with the intensity uv of the oblique polarization base, and the upper right label xx represents that Alice1 and Bob use the oblique polarization base simultaneously; u is the intensity of the optical pulse transmitted by Alice; v is the intensity of the light pulse sent by Bob; fn represents the fidelity of the quantum states communicated by Alice to Alice 1; under the condition of the same entanglement and key rate, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is gradually reduced along with the increase of the number n of nodes in the invisible transmission state; under the condition that the number n of nodes in the invisible transmission state is the same as the key rate, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is gradually reduced along with the reduction of the entanglement degree of the W state in the invisible transmission state.
Specifically, the quantum network comprises two legal communication users Alice and Bob of a source node of the quantum network and a destination node Alicel of the quantum network.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that: the communication protocol of the invention adopts the MDI-QKD protocol, thereby having the advantages of the original MDI-QKD protocol, namely ensuring the independence of the security protocol on the measuring equipment and effectively avoiding all attacks of the measuring device end in the QKD system; the invention applies the quantum invisible state in the quantum network to the MDI-QKD protocol, thereby greatly increasing the distance of the MDI-QKD protocol while ensuring the communication security.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a quantum network based MDI-QKD protocol of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a communication network of the MDI-QKD protocol based on the quantum network.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions of the present invention will be described clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
As shown in fig. 2, the present embodiment provides an MDI-QKD protocol based on a quantum network, and the protocol of the present embodiment mainly includes four major parts: a legal communication user Alice of a quantum network source node, a destination node Alice1 of a quantum network destination node, a legal communication user Bob and third-party measuring equipment; wherein the source node and the destination node are co-located in the same quantum network. And the source node and the destination node select an optimal communication line in a network routing mode and adopt a quantum invisible transmission mode to carry out quantum state transmission. Because the distance of quantum cryptography communication is limited, the distance between Alice and Bob is far, and quantum cryptography communication cannot be realized. The distance between Alice1 and Bob is short, and quantum cryptography communication independent of the measuring device can be realized. The present embodiment presents how to implement a quantum cryptography communication method between Alice and Bob by means of invisible state techniques.
As shown in fig. 1, the specific flow of the protocol is as follows:
s1, a legal communication user Alice routes an optimal line to an Alice1 node in a quantum network through a quantum intelligent optimization algorithm, n intermediate nodes are arranged between the Alice and the Alice1 node, and quantum states can be transmitted to the Alice1 node between every two nodes in a quantum invisible state transmission mode;
s2, in the process of quantum invisible state transfer, if a legal communication user Alice wants to transfer an unknown quantum state to a node Alice1, firstly, the nodes near Alice and Alice share an entangled quantum channel, namely, an EPR entangled particle pair, then Alice decomposes the original unknown quantum state into classical information and quantum information which are respectively transferred to the intermediate node through the classical channel and the quantum channel, and the node restores the unknown quantum state according to the obtained information;
s3, after obtaining the quantum state transmitted by the Alice terminal, the Alice1 synchronously sends the respective quantum state to a third party Charlie through a quantum channel to carry out Bell state measurement with another legal communication user Bob;
s4, after the measurement is finished, the Charlie publishes the measurement result to Alice and Bob through a public channel, and the Alice and the Bob judge whether the measurement result measured by the Charlie side is a correct result;
s5, if the measurement result is judged to be wrong, then both Alice and Bob discard the quantum state data sent to Charlie measurement in the communication process; if the measurement result is judged to be correct, then Alice and Bob temporarily reserve the quantum state data, and obtain the screened key data through the base pair operation, and either Alice or Bob performs one-time bit reversal on the own key;
s6, repeating steps S2 to S5 until enough original keys are obtained, namely a string of natural key bits is obtained;
s7, detecting whether the quantum channel has wiretap;
and S8, obtaining the final security key.
Specifically, in step S2, the classical information is a measurement result obtained by the sender Alice performing a bayer state measurement on an unknown quantum state to be transmitted, and the quantum information is the rest of information about the unknown quantum state that Alice does not obtain in the measurement. And after repeating the invisible transmission state for n-1 times, transmitting the quantum state prepared by the legal user Alice to the Alicel node.
Further, in step S2, the communication user Alice may lose a certain amount of information in the process of transferring the quantum state, that is, Alice has a certain fidelity in transferring the quantum state to Alicel, where the fidelity is expressed as:
wherein x is more than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1, and x represents the weight of the W state in the quantum invisible state; when in use
Then, the W state can be separated; when in use
When the two phases are in the same state, the W state can not be separated; when x is 1, the W state is a pure state; n represents the node number of the quantum invisible state; rhoinAnd ρn-1Density algorithms representing input quantum states and output quantum states of the (n-1) th node, respectively.
Specifically, in step S4, the method for Alice and Bob to determine the obtained measurement result includes: respectively selecting and disclosing a part of secret keys by Alice and Bob, calculating the error rate of the secret keys by the Alice and the Bob according to the public secret keys, and judging that the measurement result is wrong if the error rate exceeds a threshold value; if the error rate is lower than the threshold value, judging that the measurement result is correct; in the case of single photon transport quantum states, the threshold is 11%.
Specifically, in step S5, the method for obtaining the filtered key data through the base operation includes: and firstly disclosing bases used for preparing each quantum state by Alice and Bob, then reserving key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared by using the same base, and discarding the key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared by using different bases, thereby obtaining the screened key data.
Specifically, in step S7, the method for checking whether there is eavesdropping on the quantum channel is as follows: both Alice and Bob publicly show part of the original secret key, and calculate the error rate of the secret key; if the error rate exceeds the threshold, it shows that there is eavesdropping, abandon the protocol process, if the error rate does not exceed the threshold, then keep the original key not disclosed.
Specifically, in step S8, before the final security key is obtained, the remaining key string needs to be subjected to error correction and secret amplification.
Further, the key rate calculation formula of the original MDI-QKD protocol is:
wherein Q isrectAnd ErectRepresenting the gain and the quantum bit error rate under the rect base;
andits value, f (E), can be estimated by a method of a decoy staterect) > 1 is the error correction rate function, H (x) ═ xlog2(x)-(1-x)log2(1-x) is a Shannon entropy function;
represents the error rate of single-photon pulse under the oblique polarization base in MDI-QKD;
indicating the error rate of the optical pulses with the intensity of the horizontal and vertical basis uv, u being the intensity of the optical pulses transmitted by Alice and v being the intensity of the optical pulses transmitted by Bob.
When Alice1 and Bob prepare Weak Correlation Pulses (WCP) with randomized phases and no eavesdropper is present during the communication, the total gain and QBER can be written as follows:
wherein,
and
indicating the gain in correct and in wrong Bell state measurements, respectively, I0(. is a first-order modified Bessel function, edIs the error rate, pdIs the dark count rate, e0＝1/2，ω＝μηα+νηb，
y＝(1-pd)e-ω/4，ηα＝ηb＝10-αL/10Is the transmission efficiency of the channel.
Further, in combination with the fidelity in the quantum invisible transport process, the gain and quantum bit error rate of the MDI-QKD protocol based on the quantum network can be expressed as:
wherein,
the gain represents the gain of the light pulses with the intensity u and v sent by Alice and Bob under rect;represents the gain at which Alice1 and Bob send optical pulses of intensities u and v on the rect basis;
representing the error rate of sending light pulses with the intensity u and v by Alice and Bob under the rect base;
representing the error rate of Alice1 and Bob sending light pulses of intensities u and v on the rect basis;
error rate of single photon pulse representing oblique polarization base in quantum networkThe upper right label xx' represents that Alice and Bob use oblique polarization bases simultaneously, and the quantum network comprises invisible states and MDI-QKD;
indicating the error rate of the optical pulse with the intensity uv of the oblique polarization base, and the upper right label xx represents that Alice1 and Bob use the oblique polarization base simultaneously; u is the intensity of the optical pulse transmitted by Alice; v is the intensity of the light pulse sent by Bob; fn represents the fidelity of the quantum states communicated by Alice to Alice 1; it can be seen from the above formula that, for the fidelity Fn in the quantum invisible states, the number n of invisible states and the entanglement affect the performance of the protocol. Under the condition of the same entanglement and key rate, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is gradually reduced along with the increase of the number n of nodes in the invisible transmission state; under the condition that the number n of nodes in the invisible transmission state is the same as the key rate, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is gradually reduced along with the reduction of the entanglement degree of the W state in the invisible transmission state.
After the quantum invisible state in the quantum network is applied to the MDI-QKD protocol, the safe communication distance of legal communication users of the MDI-QKD protocol can be greatly increased under the condition of less sacrifice of the secret key rate.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made in these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims (8)
1. An MDI-QKD method based on a quantum network is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, the communication user Alice establishes an optimal routing route by the method of quantum routing and the node Alicel in the same quantum network;
s2, communication users Alice and Bob in the same quantum network respectively prepare quantum states, and the communication users Alice transmit the prepared quantum states to a node Alicel in a hidden state transmission mode;
s3, after receiving the quantum state, Alicel sends the two quantum states to third-party quantum measurement equipment Charlie through a quantum channel synchronously with Bob for measurement;
s4, Charlie carries out BELL state measurement on the two received quantum states, and then publishes the measurement result to communication users Alice and Bob through a classical channel; the obtained measurement results are judged by Alice and Bob;
s5, if the measurement result is judged to be wrong, then both Alice and Bob discard the quantum state data sent to Charlie measurement in the communication process; if the measurement result is judged to be correct, then Alice and Bob temporarily reserve the quantum state data, and obtain the screened key data through the base pair operation, and either Alice or Bob performs one-time bit reversal on the own key;
s6, repeating the steps S2 to S5 to obtain a string of key bits;
s7, detecting whether the quantum channel has wiretap, if yes, abandoning the protocol process; if there is no eavesdropping, go to step S8;
and S8, obtaining the final security key through error correction and secret amplification.
2. The quantum-network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein in step S2, said communication user Alice loses a certain amount of information in the process of transferring quantum states, that is, there is a certain fidelity in transferring quantum states to Alicel by Alice, said fidelity is expressed as:
wherein x is more than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1, and x represents the weight of the W state in the quantum invisible state; when in use
Then, the W state can be separated; when in use
When the temperature of the water is higher than the set temperature,the W state can not be separated; when x is 1, the W state is a pure state; n represents the node number of the quantum invisible state; rhoinAnd ρn-1Density algorithms representing input quantum states and output quantum states of the (n-1) th node, respectively; tr denotes the traces of the matrix.
3. The quantum-network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein in step S4, the method for Alice and Bob to determine the obtained measurement results comprises: respectively selecting and disclosing a part of secret keys by Alice and Bob, calculating the error rate of the secret keys by the Alice and the Bob according to the public secret keys, and judging that the measurement result is wrong if the error rate exceeds a threshold value; and if the error rate is lower than the threshold value, judging that the measurement result is correct.
4. The quantum-network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein in step S5, said method for obtaining the filtered key data by the base-pair operation is: and firstly disclosing bases used for preparing each quantum state by Alice and Bob, then reserving key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared by using the same base, and discarding the key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared by using different bases, thereby obtaining the screened key data.
5. The quantum network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein in step S7, the method for checking whether there is eavesdropping on the quantum channel is: both Alice and Bob publicly show part of the original secret key, and calculate the error rate of the secret key; if the error rate exceeds the threshold, it shows that there is eavesdropping, abandon the protocol process, if the error rate does not exceed the threshold, then keep the original key not disclosed.
6. The quantum-network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein the key rate calculation formula of said protocol is:
wherein Q isrectAnd ErectRepresenting the gain and the quantum bit error rate under the rect base;
f(Erect) H (x) xlog as a function of error correction rate2(x)-(1-x)log2(1-x) is a Shannon entropy function;
represents the error rate of a single-photon pulse under the oblique polarization base in MDI-QKD;indicating the error rate of the optical pulses with the intensity of the horizontal and vertical basis uv, u being the intensity of the optical pulses transmitted by Alice and v being the intensity of the optical pulses transmitted by Bob.
7. The quantum network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein the gain and quantum bit error rate of said protocol are expressed as:
wherein,
represents the sending intensity of Alice and Bob under rect baseThe gain of the optical pulse at u and v;
represents the gain at which Alice1 and Bob send optical pulses of intensities u and v on the rect basis;representing the error rate of sending light pulses with the intensity u and v by Alice and Bob under the rect base;
representing the error rate of Alice1 and Bob sending light pulses of intensities u and v on the rect basis;
representing the error rate of single-photon pulses of an oblique polarization base in a quantum network, wherein the upper right label xx' represents that Alice and Bob use the oblique polarization base simultaneously, and the quantum network comprises an invisible state and MDI-QKD;
indicating the error rate of the optical pulse with the intensity uv of the oblique polarization base, and the upper right label xx represents that Alice1 and Bob use the oblique polarization base simultaneously; u is the intensity of the optical pulse transmitted by Alice; v is the intensity of the light pulse sent by Bob; fn represents the fidelity of the quantum states communicated by Alice to Alice 1; under the condition of the same entanglement and key rate, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is gradually reduced along with the increase of the number n of nodes in the invisible transmission state; under the condition that the number n of nodes in the invisible transmission state is the same as the key rate, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is gradually reduced along with the reduction of the entanglement degree of the W state in the invisible transmission state.
8. The quantum network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein the quantum network comprises two legal communication users Alice and Bob of source nodes of the quantum network and one destination node Alicel of the quantum network.
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| US11258580B2 (en) | 2019-10-04 | 2022-02-22 | Red Hat, Inc. | Instantaneous key invalidation in response to a detected eavesdropper |
| CN110768794A (en) * | 2019-10-30 | 2020-02-07 | 西安邮电大学 | Quantum key distribution method based on label pairing coherent state and quantum storage |
| CN110808835B (en) * | 2019-11-19 | 2021-06-29 | 北京邮电大学 | Quantum key distribution network and quantum key distribution method and device |
| US11423141B2 (en) | 2020-02-10 | 2022-08-23 | Red Hat, Inc. | Intruder detection using quantum key distribution |
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