CN106908811B - A kind of system-level single-particle monitoring of LEO-based GPS receiver and means of defence - Google Patents
A kind of system-level single-particle monitoring of LEO-based GPS receiver and means of defence Download PDFInfo
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- CN106908811B CN106908811B CN201710103773.6A CN201710103773A CN106908811B CN 106908811 B CN106908811 B CN 106908811B CN 201710103773 A CN201710103773 A CN 201710103773A CN 106908811 B CN106908811 B CN 106908811B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/23—Testing, monitoring, correcting or calibrating of receiver elements
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/03—Cooperating elements; Interaction or communication between different cooperating elements or between cooperating elements and receivers
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- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of monitoring of the system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver and means of defences, spaceborne computer receives after " enabled " state of autonomous monitoring function, monitor the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver, if normal, whether the TIC count value of continuous monitoring (1) LEO-based GPS receiver changes in the first preset time, if there is a change, (2) monitor LEO-based GPS receiver orbit determination data significant notation in the second preset time whether all " effective ", in the case where orbit determination data significant notation " effective ", whether continuous several times show " normal " to the autonomous monitor state of monitoring (3) LEO-based GPS receiver, above-mentioned (1)~(3) any one is unsatisfactory for, then restart LEO-based GPS receiver, eliminate influence of the single-particle inversion to LEO-based GPS receiver.This method improves the measure of LEO-based GPS receiver anti-single particle performance from system-level angle, effectively realizes and the single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver is monitored and protected.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of methods of the system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver monitoring and protection, are particularly suitable for
The LEO-based GPS receiver of low orbit satellite copes with the failure overturned by single-particle.
Background technique
The low rail remote sensing satellite running environment in China is affected by single-particle, and easy occurrence of equipment abnormal work, which can
By being solved to equipment boots.Currently, the monitoring of LEO-based GPS operation of receiver state and safeguard procedures depend on ground
Tracking telemetry and command station is limited to controllable segmental arc.It is limited by low rail remote sensing satellite orbit altitude and tracking telemetry and command station region, controllable segmental arc extremely has
Limit, the failure occurred outside segmental arc can not be monitored and be adopted an effective measure in time；The failure occurred in segmental arc, relies primarily on
The field assay of professional technician and judgement, real-time and validity are limited.It, will utmostly to ensure that satellite works normally
Failure influence minimizes, and needs satellite that can make timely, reliable preliminary judgement to failure, this requires satellites can not
It is limited by ground control station, by independently diagnosing and handling, LEO-based GPS receiver is made to restore to work normally in the shortest time.
" being based on SRAM type FPGA single particle effect propagating channel " (Spacecraft TT&C journal, the 5th phase in 2015) needle
A kind of single-particle integrated protection scheme for low orbit satellite is proposed to the answering machine of SRAM type FPGA, whole star has been sketched and has adopted
Feasibility with control is instructed and from master reset, but without providing detailed control strategy." the anti-side SEU of spaceborne spread spectrum answering machine
Method and verifying " (spacecraft engineering, the 1st phase in 2014) be directed to spaceborne spread spectrum answering machine, describe a kind of system-level monitoring side
Method: if " administrative unit timer clear command " is not received on star always, when administrative unit counter overflow, it is believed that uplink
Road is abnormal, then restarts spread spectrum answering machine and lay equal stress on New count.System-level single-particle safeguard procedures and plan of the above article to answering machine
It is slightly introduced, is not directed to the system-level single-particle monitoring of LEO-based GPS receiver and means of defence.Currently, there has been no patents
It is related to the monitoring of system-level single-particle and the means of defence of LEO-based GPS receiver.
Summary of the invention
Technology of the invention solves the problems, such as: overcoming the shortcomings of existing methods, for low orbit satellite, solves existing device
The monitoring of the single-particle of grade and device level and safeguard procedures influence the limited problem of processing capacity to single-particle, provide a kind of from being
Irrespective of size angle improves the measure of LEO-based GPS receiver anti-single particle performance, effectively realizes the autonomous shutdown to LEO-based GPS receiver
It is operated with boots.
The technical solution of the invention is as follows: a kind of system-level single-particle monitoring of LEO-based GPS receiver and means of defence,
Satellite includes LEO-based GPS receiver and spaceborne computer, and LEO-based GPS receiver and spaceborne computer respectively independently carry out single-particle
Protection, LEO-based GPS receiver includes the channel plate for positioning calculation and the rail joints plate for orbit determination operation, channel plate packet
The FPGA influenced vulnerable to single-particle is included, for generating local zone time TIC；Rail joints plate includes the RAM influenced vulnerable to single-particle,
Orbit determination data are generated for receiving channel plate location data, and using location data；LEO-based GPS receiver is all to spaceborne computer
Phase property sends TIC count value, orbit determination data significant notation, the receiver-autonomous monitor state of LEO-based GPS, and this method is spaceborne calculating
Following steps are executed after the system-level monitoring function of machine " enabled ":
(1), the secondary voltage of spaceborne computer monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver, judges whether the secondary voltage is all larger than
Predeterminated voltage thresholding communicates normally if be all larger than between predeterminated voltage thresholding and LEO-based GPS receiver and spaceborne computer,
Think that the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver is normal, be transferred to step (2), otherwise it is assumed that the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver is different
Often, this step is repeated；
(2), continuously whether the TIC count value of monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver changes in the first preset time, if
It changes, is then transferred to step (3), otherwise, be transferred to step (5)；First preset time is greater than the TIC period；
(3), continuously whether the orbit determination data significant notation of monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver is whole in the second preset time
" effective " is all effectively then transferred to step (4), otherwise, is transferred to step (5)；
(4), the continuous n times of the receiver-autonomous monitor state of LEO-based GPS that monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver is sent, which are shown, " receives
Machine is abnormal ", then step (5) are transferred to, otherwise, enter step (1), N >=1；
(5), spaceborne computer judges the two of LEO-based GPS receiver later to LEO-based GPS receiver sending shutdown command
Whether secondary voltage is less than predeterminated voltage thresholding, if it is less, think that instruction execution state is normal, after waiting for a period of time,
It is transferred to step (6)；
(6), spaceborne computer issues power-on instruction to LEO-based GPS receiver, judges the secondary of LEO-based GPS receiver again
Whether voltage is greater than predeterminated voltage thresholding, if it is greater, then thinking that instruction execution state is normal, later, enters step (7)；
(7), spaceborne computer is real-time by the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver, instruction sending state, instruction execution state
It is filled into telemetry frame, and surface-monitoring equipment is sent to by downlink signal, later, system-level monitoring function is set to
" forbidding ".
" enable/forbidding " state of the system-level monitoring function is by infusing instruction setting on ground.
The predeterminated voltage thresholding is 1~2V.
It is 100ms when the TIC period, the first preset time is 1800~3000 TIC periods in the step (2).
The second preset time is 20min~25min in the step (3).
The receiver-autonomous monitor state of LEO-based GPS is the result that LEO-based GPS receiver itself carries out single-particle monitoring.
N is 5~8 times in the step (4).
A period of time is greater than 2 times of LEO-based GPS computer booting load time in the step (5).
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages that:
(1), working condition of the present invention by spaceborne computer monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver, single particle effect Sensitive Apparatus
Related telemetry intelligence (TELINT), realize and the shutdown of LEO-based GPS receiver and boots operated, in LEO-based GPS receiver by single-particle
It when influence can not independently restore failure, intervenes in time, eliminates exception, increase one of safety measure for single-particle protection.
(2), " enable/forbidding " state of present system grade means of defence can be arranged by infusing instruction on ground, by
Ground controls whether to monitor LEO-based GPS operation of receiver state using the system level policies, so that this method is flexibly controllable.
(3), spaceborne computer of the present invention issues the autonomous executive condition of strategy in the form of telemetering, makes ground monitoring people
Member grasps the utonomous working situation of satellite in time.
(4), it present invention determine that orbit determination data continue the time of " non real-time effective ", is connect greater than LEO-based GPS under normal circumstances
Receipts machine effective time since booting is to orbit determination data eliminates spaceborne computer and LEO-based GPS receiver has just been switched on erroneous judgement
For abnormal situation.
(5), the present invention to LEO-based GPS receiver itself monitor the case where being overturned and restored unsuccessfully by single-particle, adopt
Take system-level recovery measure.
(6), the present invention monitors that telemetering show that " receiver is abnormal " thinks LEO-based GPS receiver exception for continuous 5~8 times,
To exclude the wrong situation of telemetry-acquisition, prevent from judging by accident.
(7), the setting for the shutdown and power-on instruction time interval that the present invention restarts LEO-based GPS receiver is counted greater than GPS
2 times of calculation machine booting load time, to ensure that LEO-based GPS receiver can receive instruction.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is that attached drawing is that the present invention is influenced from system-level monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver by single-particle by spaceborne computer
And carry out the strategic process figure of autonomous control.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments, the present invention is described in detail.
Under normal circumstances, satellite includes LEO-based GPS receiver and spaceborne computer, LEO-based GPS receiver and spaceborne calculating
Machine respectively independently carries out single-particle protection, and LEO-based GPS receiver includes for the channel plate of positioning calculation and for orbit determination operation
Rail joints plate, channel plate be used for navigation calculation, obtain the position and speed information of satellite, and position and speed information is sent out
Rail joints plate is sent, orbit determination operation is carried out in rail joints plate, obtains accurate satellite orbit parameter.In order to reduce single-particle
Influence to receiver, LEO-based GPS receiver is as far as possible using the device not influenced by single-particle, since the state of the art has
Limit, still has some devices single-particle cannot be avoided to influence completely, such as: FPGA, FLASH, SRAM.Therefore, GPS receiver is adopted
With modularized design, navigation calculation function and orbit determination calculation function are realized using the DSP for being not easy to receive single-particle influence, are left
Necessary signal processing function such as: channel related operation generates the local zone time TIC just FPGA that influences vulnerable to single-particle of use
It realizes；Data communication between navigation calculation function and orbit determination calculation function is realized using RAM.
Based on the above GPS receiver framework, the channel plate software synchronization mouth relevant configuration of LEO-based GPS receiver is stored in SRAM
In, so that the communication between plates between channel plate software and rail joints plate software are under the influence of the single-particle of space, there are single-particles
The problem of overturning.It, can be from TIC count value, orbit determination data significant notation, the receiver-autonomous monitoring of LEO-based GPS by ground validation
State reflects influence of the single-particle to LEO-based GPS receiver indirectly.
The present invention provides a kind of monitoring of the system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver and means of defences, pass through spaceborne meter
Calculation machine monitors LEO-based GPS operation of receiver state, and the abnormal work of LEO-based GPS receiver is judged and handled, in time
Restore LEO-based GPS receiver to work normally.The system-level monitoring function of spaceborne computer is controlled by " enable/forbidding " state, institute
" enable/forbidding " state of system-level monitoring function is stated by infusing instruction setting on ground, is defaulted as illegal state.This method is specific
Are as follows:
" enabled " state that spaceborne computer receives autonomous monitoring function executes following steps later:
(1), the secondary voltage of spaceborne computer monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver, judges whether the secondary voltage is all larger than
Predeterminated voltage thresholding communicates normally if be all larger than between predeterminated voltage thresholding and LEO-based GPS receiver and spaceborne computer,
Think that the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver is normal, be transferred to step (2), otherwise it is assumed that the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver is different
Often, this step is repeated；Device of the secondary voltage of LEO-based GPS receiver according to used in it is different and different, usually there is 5V, 3.3V
Deng, therefore, the predeterminated voltage thresholding be 1~2V；When spaceborne computer and LEO-based GPS receiver use 1553B bus communication
When, spaceborne computer passes through 1553B bus cycles property poll LEO-based GPS receiver, record trunk communications status, if A, B bus
Communicate unsuccessful, it is believed that bus communication is abnormal, any bus communication all the way successfully can consider LEO-based GPS receiver with it is spaceborne
It is communicated between computer normal.Only when LEO-based GPS receiver is switched on, its working condition is monitored.
(2), continuously whether the TIC count value of monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver changes in the first preset time, if
It changes, is then transferred to step (3), otherwise, be transferred to step (5)；First preset time is greater than the TIC period；Ordinary circumstance
The lower TIC period are as follows: 100ms, first preset time are 1800~3000 TIC periods.TIC count value is by channel plate FPGA
It generates, after the booting of LEO-based GPS receiver, TIC is counted with regard to linear increment, and the situation of change of TIC count value can be effectively anti-
Whether the working condition for reflecting channel plate software is normal.
(3), continuously whether the orbit determination data significant notation of monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver is whole in the second preset time
" effective " is all effectively then transferred to step (4), otherwise, is transferred to step (5)；Second preset time be 20min~
25min.Orbit determination data significant notation: after GPS booting, channel plate generates location data, and rail joints plate is according to positioning number later
According to orbit determination data are generated, if orbit determination data invalid, it may greatly illustrate communication between plates exception, it therefore, can be with by orbit determination data
Whether SRAM of the verifying for communication between plates be normal.
(4), the continuous n times of the receiver-autonomous monitor state of LEO-based GPS that monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver is sent, which are shown, " receives
Machine is abnormal ", then step (5) are transferred to, otherwise, are entered step (1), spaceborne computer continues to monitor LEO-based GPS operation of receiver shape
State, N >=1.In order to reinforce the reliability of detection, N can be 5~8 times, such as 6 times.The receiver-autonomous monitoring shape of LEO-based GPS
State be LEO-based GPS receiver itself carry out the reason of single-particle monitoring as a result, include whether channel plate normal, communication between plates whether just
Often, whether rail joints plate is normal etc., and any one is abnormal can to predicate " receiver is abnormal ".
(5), spaceborne computer judges the two of LEO-based GPS receiver later to LEO-based GPS receiver sending shutdown command
Whether secondary voltage is less than predeterminated voltage thresholding, if it is less, think that instruction execution state is normal, after waiting for a period of time,
It is transferred to step (6)；The step is greater than 2 times of LEO-based GPS computer booting load time, general LEO-based GPS meter for a period of time
Calculation machine is no more than 10s, and described a period of time can be set to 1min.
(6), spaceborne computer issues power-on instruction to LEO-based GPS receiver, by the way that LEO-based GPS receiver is restarted elimination
Influence of the single-particle inversion to LEO-based GPS receiver, judges whether the secondary voltage of LEO-based GPS receiver is greater than default electricity again
Pressure gate limit, if it is greater, then thinking that instruction execution state is normal, later, enters step (7)；
(7), spaceborne computer is real-time by the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver, instruction sending state, instruction execution state
It is filled into telemetry frame, and surface-monitoring equipment is sent to by downlink signal, later, by making for system-level monitoring function
Energy/illegal state is set to " forbidding ", and telemetering no longer updates.Until note instruction enables the function again on ground, telemetering is reset.
Working condition of the present invention by spaceborne computer monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver, the phase of single particle effect Sensitive Apparatus
Telemetry intelligence (TELINT) is closed, realizes and the shutdown of LEO-based GPS receiver and boots is operated, influenced in LEO-based GPS receiver by single-particle
It when can not independently restore failure, intervenes in time, eliminates exception, increase one of safety measure for single-particle protection；In addition, spaceborne
Computer issues the autonomous executive condition of strategy in the form of telemetering, and ground monitoring personnel is made to grasp the autonomous work of satellite in time
Make situation, " enable/forbidding " state of this method can by infusing instruction setting on ground, controlled whether by ground be using this
Irrespective of size strategy monitors LEO-based GPS operation of receiver state, so that this method is flexibly controllable.
Unspecified part of the present invention belongs to common sense well known to those skilled in the art.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver monitors and means of defence, satellite include LEO-based GPS receiver and star
Computer is carried, LEO-based GPS receiver and spaceborne computer respectively independently carry out single-particle protection, and LEO-based GPS receiver includes using
Channel plate in positioning calculation and the rail joints plate for orbit determination operation, channel plate include the FPGA influenced vulnerable to single-particle,
For generating local zone time TIC；Rail joints plate includes the RAM influenced vulnerable to single-particle, is used for receiving channel plate location data,
And orbit determination data are generated using location data；LEO-based GPS receiver is to spaceborne computer periodicity sending TIC count value, orbit determination
The receiver-autonomous monitor state of data significant notation, LEO-based GPS, it is characterised in that board computer system grade monitoring function " makes
Can " following steps are executed later:
(1), the secondary voltage of spaceborne computer monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver, it is default to judge whether the secondary voltage is all larger than
Voltage threshold communicates normally if be all larger than between predeterminated voltage thresholding and LEO-based GPS receiver and spaceborne computer, then it is assumed that
The working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver is normal, is transferred to step (2), otherwise it is assumed that the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver is abnormal,
Repeat this step；
(2), continuously whether the TIC count value of monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver changes in the first preset time, if it happens
Variation, then be transferred to step (3), otherwise, be transferred to step (5)；First preset time is greater than the TIC period；
(3), continuously whether the orbit determination data significant notation of monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver all " has in the second preset time
Effect " is all effectively then transferred to step (4), otherwise, is transferred to step (5)；
(4), the continuous n times of the receiver-autonomous monitor state of LEO-based GPS that monitoring LEO-based GPS receiver is sent show that " receiver is different
Often ", then step (5) are transferred to, otherwise, enter step (1), N >=1；
(5), spaceborne computer judges the secondary electricity of LEO-based GPS receiver later to LEO-based GPS receiver sending shutdown command
Whether pressure is less than predeterminated voltage thresholding after waiting for a period of time, is transferred to if it is less, thinking that instruction execution state is normal
Step (6)；
(6), spaceborne computer issues power-on instruction to LEO-based GPS receiver, judges the secondary voltage of LEO-based GPS receiver again
Whether it is greater than predeterminated voltage thresholding and later, enters step (7) if it is greater, then thinking that instruction execution state is normal；
(7), spaceborne computer fills the working condition of LEO-based GPS receiver, instruction sending state, instruction execution state in real time
It is sent to surface-monitoring equipment into telemetry frame, and through downlink signal, later, system level function is set to " forbidding ".
2. a kind of system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver according to claim 1 monitors and means of defence, feature
Be: " enable/forbidding " state of the system-level monitoring function is by infusing instruction setting on ground.
3. a kind of system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver according to claim 1 monitors and means of defence, feature
Be: the predeterminated voltage thresholding is 1~2V.
4. a kind of system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver according to claim 1 monitors and means of defence, feature
It is: is 100ms when the TIC period, the first preset time is 1800~3000 TIC periods in the step (2).
5. a kind of system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver according to claim 1 monitors and means of defence, feature
Be: the second preset time is 20min~25min in the step (3).
6. a kind of system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver according to claim 1 monitors and means of defence, feature
Be: the receiver-autonomous monitor state of LEO-based GPS is the result that LEO-based GPS receiver itself carries out single-particle monitoring.
7. a kind of system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver according to claim 1 monitors and means of defence, feature
Be: N is 5~8 times in the step (4).
8. a kind of system-level single-particle of LEO-based GPS receiver according to claim 1 monitors and means of defence, feature
Be: a period of time is greater than 2 times of LEO-based GPS computer booting load time in the step (5).
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| CN109150328B (en) * | 2017-11-02 | 2022-04-12 | 上海华测导航技术股份有限公司 | Automatic detection method for receiver |
| CN108008424B (en) * | 2017-11-27 | 2021-04-02 | 上海航天测控通信研究所 | Method and device for generating pulse per second of satellite navigation receiver |
| CN109001778A (en) * | 2018-05-21 | 2018-12-14 | 北京空间飞行器总体设计部 | A kind of processing method based on satellite-based navigation satellite receiving system single event |
| CN108832990B (en) * | 2018-06-08 | 2021-03-16 | 上海微小卫星工程中心 | Space single event effect instant recovery method for real-time communication equipment |
| CN109104233B (en) * | 2018-06-15 | 2021-11-23 | 上海卫星工程研究所 | Method for preventing double-transponder failure of low-orbit spacecraft |
| CN110380770B (en) * | 2019-06-10 | 2021-07-06 | 浙江大学 | Self-adaptive satellite alignment method for low-orbit mobile satellite communication network |
| CN111381254B (en) * | 2019-12-27 | 2023-03-24 | 上海航天控制技术研究所 | High-reliability navigation sensor single-particle-upset-resisting device based on FPGA |
| CN111413713A (en) * | 2020-03-30 | 2020-07-14 | 中国科学院地质与地球物理研究所 | GNSS ionized layer monitoring device and method for monitoring ionized layer |
| US11493640B2 (en) * | 2020-05-29 | 2022-11-08 | Trimble Inc. | Multi-staged pipelined GNSS receiver |
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