CN105959113B - For preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack - Google Patents
For preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN105959113B CN105959113B CN201610528535.5A CN201610528535A CN105959113B CN 105959113 B CN105959113 B CN 105959113B CN 201610528535 A CN201610528535 A CN 201610528535A CN 105959113 B CN105959113 B CN 105959113B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- receiving end
- detector
- side channel
- key distribution
- quantum key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
- 238000009826 distribution Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 25
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 21
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 23
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 12
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 claims description 17
- 230000003321 amplification Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000003199 nucleic acid amplification method Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000002360 preparation method Methods 0.000 abstract description 9
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 6
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 239000000523 sample Substances 0.000 description 3
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000006872 improvement Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001427 coherent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012937 correction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000002474 experimental method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000004744 fabric Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000010287 polarization Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000002096 quantum dot Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000009467 reduction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012216 screening Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
Abstract
The present invention relates to for preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack, under conditions of not needing to improve detection device used in existing preparation measurement quantum key distribution scheme, the Quantum Correlation between Alice and Bob is checked by detecting to the receiving end side Bob into row stochastic Bell, so that detecting detector side channel attack whether there is.During preparation measures quantum key distribution, existing detector side channel attack can be effectively detected, detector side channel information leakage problem is solved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to quantum cryptography field, especially a kind of quantum cryptography for preventing detector side channel attack point
Method of completing the square.
Background technique
Preparation measurement quantum key distribution scheme has the advantages that speed is fast, password production rate is high, is easily achieved.However it visits
The attack for surveying device side channel greatly destroys its safety, and listener-in Eve can benefit under conditions of without prejudice to quantum principles
Its invalid information is obtained with the defect of detector, it means that she can eavesdrop communication without being found.Detector side channel is attacked
It hits and very big harm is caused to the safety of quantum key distribution.Therefore larger improvement must be carried out to detector, to avoid detection
The attack of device wing passage.
It takes some measures at present to prevent these attacks, quantum cryptography system for example unrelated with measuring device
System.In this case, the safety of measurement result depends on the monogynous tangled, realize it is increasingly complex, password production rate compared with
It is low.Or it just prevents from attacking using more perfect detector.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of for preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack, to
Solve the problems, such as that existing method dependence is tangled or detector.
To achieve the above object, the solution of the present invention includes：
Step 1: transmitting terminal A selects an information embedded mode at random, random 0 or 1 are incorporated into the quantum state of photon, sent out
Give receiving end B；
Step 2: both of which is arranged in receiving end B：Signal mode and test pattern；Receiving end B is randomly choosed according to probability
One of mode；In the signal mode, it randomly chooses an information reading manner and reads photon carries 0 or 1；Work as receiving end
When B selection signal mode, transmitting terminal A and receiving end B announce their information insertion and reading manner by common signal channel, will believe
Those of consistent with the reading manner bit of embedded mode is ceased as cipher bits；In test pattern, specific information is selected to read
Mode carries out Bell test；When receiving end B selects test pattern, transmitting terminal A and receiving end B calculate S by common signal channelCHSH
Value come announce they base lose selection and measurement result.
Step 3: transmitting terminal A and receiving end B carry out error correcting and privacy amplification to cipher bits after password distribution,
For generating security password；The SCHSHValue for carrying out privacy amplification, according to SCHSHSize and formula (6) judge to be marked
The amount of the information of note number, if the amount of labeled information exceeds preset threshold value, abandon；If in preset threshold value hereinafter,
Mark information can then be eliminated by relevant means.Due to specifically eliminate means and the application inquire into content without
It closes, and the paper in quantum cryptography field relates to more, therefore details are not described herein.
Further, the information embedded mode of the transmitting terminal A includes oblique line baseWith straight line baseLetter
Under number mode, receiving end B basic vector existsWithMiddle random selection.
Further, under test pattern, receiving end B basic vector existsWithIn with
Machine selection；SCHSH≡<A1B1+A1B2+A2B1-A2B2>。
Further, the upper limit of the information content of labeled receiving end B is estimated by following formula：
Wherein H2(x)=- xlog2x-(1-x)log2(1-x) is binary information entropy.
Further, receiving end B is respectively labeled as D in addition to being used to decode 0 and 1 detector0And D1, also there is a spy
Survey device Dt；A time window is arranged in each detector, and detector can effectively detect the signal pulse of entrance in window,
Effective pulse cannot be obtained in window external detector；D0And D1Detection efficient be labeled as η, and DtDetection efficient be ηt, than
Compared with η and ηt, work as ηtWhen > η, detector side channel attack is judged.
According to the habit of this field, transmitting terminal A is Alice, and receiving end B is Bob, listener-in Eve.The present invention is not needing
Under conditions of being improved to detection device used in existing preparation measurement quantum key distribution scheme, by receiving end
The side Bob detects to check the Quantum Correlation between Alice and Bob into row stochastic Bell, attacks to detect detector side channel
Hitting whether there is.During preparation measures quantum key distribution, existing detector side channel attack can be effectively detected, is solved
Detector side channel information leakage problem.Advantages of the present invention further includes：Change preparation measurement quantum key distribution side is not needed
Case (is such as changed to the quantum cryptography system unrelated with measuring device), it is ensured that dispensing rate, password production rate of quantum cryptography etc.
It is unaffected.The efficiency for worrying detector is not had in the program, because photon only labeled in scheme can be used to calculate
CHSH multinomial.The program realizes in preparation measurement quantum key distribution mode, therefore without the concern for tangling.
Specific embodiment
The present invention will be further described in detail below.
Basic ideas of the invention are to be tested in quantum key distribution using preparation-measurement Bell, and basic principle is：
According to the habit of this field, transmitting terminal A is Alice, and receiving end B is Bob, listener-in Eve.If Alice possesses one
A single-photon source (weak coherent light source can be used in actual experiment), she is randomly chosenOrPhoton is prepared with 0 or 1
B, before measuring photon B, the state of photon B remains quantum state prepared by Alice；
Bob is randomly chosen in baseWithUpper measurement enters the photon in laboratory；
Alice and Bob is selected with their base and preparation (measurement) result calculates CHSH multinomial, if CHSH inequality
Classical limit is broken, and illustrates that Quantum Correlation exists, otherwise Quantum Correlation is not present.
If Alice to the base of photon B become estranged value selection be completely random, in SCHSH≡<A1B1+A1B2+
A2B1-A2B2>In it is available
Similarly have,
WithWithTo substitute B1、B2, obtainTherefore available
Quantum theory and local hidden variable theories be it is completely incompatible, the conflict of no loophole Bell inequality means office
Domain hidden variable theory can be excluded.Otherwise, mean that quantum is managed if the conflict that can not obtain no loophole Bell inequality
By being wrong.Recently, the conflict of no loophole Bell inequality has obtained the verification experimental verification of three groups.These important results
Mean that local hidden variable theories are incorrect.Based on the fact that we can pass through a simple effective method
Prevent the attack of preparation-measurement quantum key distribution process detector side channel present in.It is not needing to experimental provision
Under conditions of improving, the amount between Alice and Bob is checked by being tested into row stochastic Bell the receiving end side Bob
Son association, so that detecting detector side channel attack whether there is.
Illustrate method of the invention by taking improved BB84 scheme as an example below, it should be noted that method of the invention is not
It can be only used for BB84 scheme, can be also used for other quantum cryptography allocation plans.
Based on preparation-measurement Bell test BB84 scheme：
Step 1: generating n single photon in the laboratory Alice, Alice is in oblique line baseStraight line baseWith
0, any value in 1 randomly chooses to prepare these photons, and then these photons have been sent to Bob.
Step 2: there are two types of modes by Bob：The probability of his selection signal mode is p, and selecting the probability of test pattern is 1-p
(preferred, only Bob oneself knows the value of p).Basic vector is measured in signal mode to existWithIn select at random
It selects, basic vector is measured in test pattern and is existedWithMiddle random selection.
When Bob selection signal mode, Alice and Bob announce their measurement basic vector by common signal channel, they are him
Measurement result be stored in cipher bits as a filter in identical basic vector.
When Bob selects test pattern, Alice and Bob calculate S by common signal channelCHSHValue announce their base
Lose selection and measurement result.
Step 3: Alice and Bob carry out error correcting and privacy amplification to the cipher bits of screening after password distribution,
If security password can be generated, password distribution task is just completed, and otherwise task just has failed.Above-mentioned error correction process
Related to the result of above-mentioned signal mode, privacy amplification is related to the measurement result of test pattern.Error correcting passes through error code
Rate judges whether there is the process of fatal eavesdropping.
The principle of above scheme is, by increasing a test pattern in password assigning process, to pass through test pattern
As a result privacy amplification is carried out, so as to generate security password.
Specific theory analysis is as follows：Because Alice randomly chooses the basic vector and value of photon B, stateThe preparation of state is consistent under conditions of conjugated radicle loses, Eve
It cannot find out prepared by which state.If she carries out state recognition task to photon, interference just must be introduced into.Not any
Under conditions of loss, it can be assumed that Eve is acted on photon B with a probe.If depending on the phase interaction between probe and photon
It is available with for unitary evolution
Herein | E>The blank state of Eve probe, f and e be respectively photon B polarize constant and polarization be flipped it is general
Rate, e usually also indicate that quantum bit error rate in the information of Eve eavesdropping.Information content H between Alice and Bob2(e) it usually uses
Correct their Bit String mistakes, and binary entropy is H2(x)=- xlog2x-(1-x)log2x。
After under Eve attack,<A2B1>The result recalculated is
Similarly, available
After Eve attack, obtainIn preparation-measurement quantum key distribution, the eavesdropping energy of Eve
Hard to bear collective's attack restricts.The upper limit of the information content of Eve label Bob can be estimated by following formula：
Wherein H2(x)=- xlog2x-(1-x)log2(1-x) is binary information entropy.
If the detector of Bob is simultaneously less perfect, it would be possible that the leakage of detector side channel information can occur.Eve meeting
Detector side channel is attacked using the shortcomings that Bob detector side channel.In the embodiment above, Bob is not needed
The detector of Bob is improved.Further, Bob can also increase the improvement to detector, be described as follows：
If Bob is respectively labeled as D in addition to being used to decode 0 and 1 detector0And D1, he also possesses a detector Dt, it is
The influence of secret mark number is reduced, password generates and often adds time window to each detector in process, in window
Detector can effectively detect the signal pulse of entrance, cannot obtain effective pulse in window external detector, be experimentally
Time window is realized by open and close detector.Assuming that DtPossess and D0And D1The same detection efficient still possesses sufficiently large
Time window come guarantee it is all can be by D0And D1The signal detected can be by DtIt detects.D0And D1Detection efficient be labeled as
η and DtDetection efficient be ηtIf η in the case where without detector side channel attackt=η.Once detector side channel occurs
Attack, it can be found that ηt> η,Therefore Eve is obtained in detector side channel attack process
Information content can effectively be estimated：
Theory analysis is as follows：
Theorem 1：The attack of detector side channel can be carried out successfully, and if only if the bit value for the Alice that Eve is obtained
Measurement result relative to Bob is partially or completely determining.
Eve and photon B interact to obtain Alice to the state of photon B, after Bob measured the photon received,
He and Alice announce their basic vector selection.The entropy reduction of Eve state can make Eve obtain information from Alice to be limited.
IE=Ha priori-Ha posteriori (7)
Under the attack of detector side channel, the task of Eve is to eliminate the uncertainty of Alice state, although the detection of Bob
There are various defects for device, but assume that leakage is necessary not extra information from his laboratory.Otherwise, quantum key distribution
Safety cannot be guaranteed that this illustrates that Eve should be from detector steal information indirectly.If Alice is to the state of photon B
Prepare identical, then Ha priori=1.
In view of Ha posteriori=∑rP (r) H (i | r), the probability that Bob obtains measurement result as r, H (i are represented with P (r)
| r) indicate the probability that the quantum state of Alice when measurement result is r is i.Ideally, the measurement result of Bob should equably divide
Cloth is 0 and 1.If Eve does not interact with photon B, the then H after the base selection that Bob announces hima posteriori=1,
Therefore IE=0, Eve can not steal over there any information from Alice.In order to meet IE> 0, Ha posterior< 1 must expire
Foot, and because ∑ must be met at any timerP (r)=1, then Eve just cannot get H (i | r)=1, this indicates Eve in Bob
It is determined under conditions of acquisition measurement result r to the message part of the quantum state i of Alice or completely.
So if detector side channel attack can successfully be implemented, Eve must control detector D0And D1It generates
Detection efficient is poor, this inefficient is random and can not be found on average by Bob from the time.But this efficiency
Difference can pass through η/ηtIt estimates and is embodied inOn, therefore can be used to estimate that Eve is being detected
Acquired information content in device side-channel attack.
Specific embodiment of the present invention is presented above, but the present invention is not limited to described embodiment.
Under the thinking that the present invention provides, to the skill in above-described embodiment by the way of being readily apparent that those skilled in the art
Art means are converted, are replaced, are modified, and play the role of with the present invention in relevant art means it is essentially identical, realize
Goal of the invention it is also essentially identical, the technical solution formed in this way is to be finely adjusted to be formed to above-described embodiment, this technology
Scheme is still fallen in protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (5)
1. for preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack, which is characterized in that steps are as follows：
Step 1: transmitting terminal A selects an information embedded mode at random, random 0 or 1 are incorporated into the quantum state of photon, issues and connects
Receiving end B；
Step 2: both of which is arranged in receiving end B：Signal mode and test pattern；Receiving end B is randomly choosed wherein according to probability
One mode；In the signal mode, it randomly chooses an information reading manner and reads photon carries 0 or 1；When receiving end B is selected
When selecting signal mode, transmitting terminal A and receiving end B announce their information insertion and reading manner by common signal channel, by information
Those of consistent with the reading manner bit of embedded mode is as cipher bits；In test pattern, specific information reading side is selected
Formula carries out Bell test；When receiving end B selects test pattern, transmitting terminal A and receiving end B calculate S by common signal channelCHSH's
Value come announce they base lose selection and measurement result；
Step 3: transmitting terminal A and receiving end B carry out error correcting and privacy amplification to cipher bits after password distribution, it is used for
Generate security password；The SCHSHValue for carrying out privacy amplification.
2. according to claim 1 for preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack, feature exists
In the information embedded mode of the transmitting terminal A includes oblique line baseWith straight line baseUnder signal mode, receiving end
B basic vector existsWithMiddle random selection.
3. according to claim 2 for preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack, feature exists
In under test pattern, receiving end B basic vector existsWithMiddle random selection；SCHSH≡<
A1B1+A1B2+A2B1-A2B2>。
4. according to claim 3 for preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack, feature exists
In the upper limit of the information content of labeled receiving end B is estimated by following formula：
Wherein H2(x)=- xlog2x-(1-x)log2(1-x) is binary information entropy.
5. according to claim 1 for preventing the quantum key distribution side of detector side channel attack described in any one of -4
Method, which is characterized in that receiving end B is respectively labeled as D in addition to being used to decode 0 and 1 detector0And D1, also there is a detector
Dt；A time window is arranged in each detector, and detector can effectively detect the signal pulse of entrance in window, in window
Mouth external detector cannot obtain effective pulse；D0And D1Detection efficient be labeled as η, and DtDetection efficient be ηt, compare η
And ηt, work as ηtWhen > η, detector side channel attack is judged.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610528535.5A CN105959113B (en) | 2016-07-06 | 2016-07-06 | For preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610528535.5A CN105959113B (en) | 2016-07-06 | 2016-07-06 | For preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN105959113A CN105959113A (en) | 2016-09-21 |
| CN105959113B true CN105959113B (en) | 2018-11-30 |
Family
ID=56899582
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610528535.5A Active CN105959113B (en) | 2016-07-06 | 2016-07-06 | For preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN105959113B (en) |
Families Citing this family (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN107528686B (en) * | 2017-08-30 | 2019-11-22 | 洛阳师范学院 | A kind of generation method of the quantum cryptography unrelated with equipment based on actual detection system |
| US11336462B1 (en) | 2019-09-10 | 2022-05-17 | Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | Systems and methods for post-quantum cryptography optimization |
| US11366897B1 (en) | 2020-01-17 | 2022-06-21 | Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | Systems and methods for layered quantum computing detection |
| US11334667B1 (en) | 2020-01-17 | 2022-05-17 | Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | Systems and methods for disparate quantum computing threat detection |
Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GB2430123A (en) * | 2005-09-09 | 2007-03-14 | Toshiba Res Europ Ltd | A quantum communication system |
| CN1929372A (en) * | 2006-09-22 | 2007-03-14 | 西南大学 | Highly effective quantum key distribution method |
| GB2441364A (en) * | 2006-08-31 | 2008-03-05 | Toshiba Res Europ Ltd | A quantum communication system which selects different protocols on the basis of security |
| CN103199994A (en) * | 2013-02-19 | 2013-07-10 | 华南师范大学 | Active phase compensation method and device of joint scan |
| CN105049200A (en) * | 2015-08-14 | 2015-11-11 | 清华大学 | Data post-processing method of quantum key distribution system |
-
2016
- 2016-07-06 CN CN201610528535.5A patent/CN105959113B/en active Active
Patent Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GB2430123A (en) * | 2005-09-09 | 2007-03-14 | Toshiba Res Europ Ltd | A quantum communication system |
| GB2441364A (en) * | 2006-08-31 | 2008-03-05 | Toshiba Res Europ Ltd | A quantum communication system which selects different protocols on the basis of security |
| CN1929372A (en) * | 2006-09-22 | 2007-03-14 | 西南大学 | Highly effective quantum key distribution method |
| CN103199994A (en) * | 2013-02-19 | 2013-07-10 | 华南师范大学 | Active phase compensation method and device of joint scan |
| CN105049200A (en) * | 2015-08-14 | 2015-11-11 | 清华大学 | Data post-processing method of quantum key distribution system |
Non-Patent Citations (7)
| Title |
|---|
| "Biased Random Number Generator Based on Bell’s Theorem";谭勇刚等;《Chinese Physics Letters》;20160315;第33卷(第3期);正文第9-12页 * |
| "CRYPTOGRAPHY FROM QUANTUM MECHANICAL VIEWPOINT";Minal Lopes等;《International Journal on Cryptography and Information Security (IJCIS)》;20140630;第4卷(第2期);正文第13-23页 * |
| "Quantum key distribution series network protocol with M-classical Bobs";张现周等;《Chinese Physics B》;20090516;第18卷(第6期);正文第2143-2148页 * |
| "Side-channel-free quantum key distribution";Samuel L. Braunstein等;《PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS》;20120330;正文第1-4页 * |
| "The Essence of More Nonlocality with Less Entanglement in Bell Tests";谭勇刚等;《Communications in Theoretical Physics》;20140101(第1期);正文第40-44页 * |
| "一种新型基于完全Bell测量的量子密钥分配协议";李恕海等;《中国密码学会2007年年会》;20071019;正文第257-263页 * |
| Mario Stipčević."Preventing detector blinding attack and other random number generator attacks on quantum cryptography by use of an explicit random number generator".《ResearchGate》.2014,正文第1-3页. * |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN105959113A (en) | 2016-09-21 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN105959113B (en) | For preventing the quantum key distribution method of detector side channel attack | |
| Huber et al. | Weak randomness in device-independent quantum key distribution and the advantage of using high-dimensional entanglement | |
| US10958428B2 (en) | Apparatus for quantum key distribution on a quantum network and method using the same | |
| CN109194479B (en) | Measuring equipment-independent quantum key distribution method based on single photon multiple degrees of freedom | |
| US10848303B2 (en) | Methods and apparatuses for authentication in quantum key distribution and/or quantum data communication | |
| US9306739B1 (en) | Quantum key distribution protocol process | |
| KR101767067B1 (en) | Method and system for improving security of quantum encryption key distribution protocol | |
| Bouda et al. | Weak randomness seriously limits the security of quantum key distribution | |
| Kunz-Jacques et al. | Robust shot-noise measurement for continuous-variable quantum key distribution | |
| Niemiec et al. | The measure of security in quantum cryptography | |
| KR20120071883A (en) | Quantum authentication method and apparatus for quantum secret sharing protocol | |
| CN110635907B (en) | Controlled quantum conversation method with identity authentication function based on GHZ-like state | |
| CN107070643B (en) | Quantum key distribution device and method | |
| CN206341226U (en) | A kind of quantum key distribution device | |
| Yan et al. | Quantum secret sharing between multiparty and multiparty with four states | |
| CN109039603B (en) | Fault-tolerant semi-quantum key distribution method based on decoherence-free subspace | |
| CN109792379B (en) | Information processing method and device | |
| Subramaniam et al. | Limits on detecting eavesdropper in qkd protocols | |
| Usenko et al. | Large-alphabet quantum key distribution with two-mode coherently correlated beams | |
| He | Comment on “Bit-string oblivious transfer based on quantum state computational distinguishability” | |
| Woodhead | Tight asymptotic key rate for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol with local randomization and device imprecisions | |
| Qiao et al. | Simulation of BB84 Quantum Key Distribution in depolarizing channel | |
| RU2730554C1 (en) | Method of detecting an attack on quantum states in a quantum communication channel | |
| Tan et al. | Comment on “Device-independent entanglement-based Bennett 1992 protocol” | |
| Cleve | Introduction to Quantum Information Processing |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20240201 Address after: 1003, 1st Floor, Building 7, No. 2 Wanhong West Street, West Eight Rooms, Dongzhimenwai, Chaoyang District, Beijing, 100015 Patentee after: Regular Quantum (Beijing) Technology Co.,Ltd. Country or region after: China Address before: No. 71 Longmen Road, High tech Development Zone, Luoyang City, Henan Province, 471022 Patentee before: LUOYANG NORMAL University Country or region before: China |