CN105871543B - Multiple key cipher text retrieval method under more data owner's backgrounds based on attribute - Google Patents

Multiple key cipher text retrieval method under more data owner's backgrounds based on attribute Download PDF

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CN105871543B
CN105871543B CN201610188151.3A CN201610188151A CN105871543B CN 105871543 B CN105871543 B CN 105871543B CN 201610188151 A CN201610188151 A CN 201610188151A CN 105871543 B CN105871543 B CN 105871543B
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CN105871543A (en
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苗银宾
马建峰
李辉
伍祈应
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Xidian University
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Xidian University
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/045Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds

Abstract

The invention discloses a kind of multiple key cipher text retrieval method under more data owner's backgrounds based on attribute, mainly solve the problems, such as that the prior art only supports the searching ciphertext of single keyword.Its technical solution is: in conjunction with can search for encryption technology and the encryption policy based on ciphertext attribute, under more data owner's scenes, according to the set of keywords of the access structure of data owner and ciphertext, establishing set of keywords index;The trapdoor that data user generates according to key word of the inquiry collection and key word of the inquiry collection;Data user realizes the query on several keys to ciphertext using trapdoor.Present invention alleviates data owner's local datastore and administrative burdens, and data user can be supported to carry out multiple key to ciphertext and accurately inquire, can be used for realizing the safety and efficient retrieval of fine-granularity access control, ciphertext data under cloud storage background.

Description

Multiple key cipher text retrieval method under more data owner's backgrounds based on attribute
Technical field
The invention belongs to technical field of cryptology, and in particular to data encryption, access control and searching ciphertext technology, it can For realizing the safety and efficient retrieval of fine-granularity access control, ciphertext data under cloud storage background.
Background technique
With the prevalence of cloud computing technology, more and more enterprise customers and it is personal by their local datastores to " sincere It is real but curious " cloud server so as to enjoyed from configurable computer resource sharing pond in real time, the application of high quality And service.Therefore, data storage service becomes one of most basic service in cloud computing application, and cloud storage service reduces this The burden of ground storage management avoids the expense in software and hardware facilities and personnel's maintenance, but Cloud Server is rented without normal direction cloud Family confirms it with believable storage capacity.Cloud storage brings huge convenience to cloud tenant, improve data and service can With property and reliability, but the risk for also inevitably bringing data-privacy to reveal simultaneously.
In cloud storage, to guarantee that the privacy of data is not leaked, encryption storage is the method for most original.Cloud tenant is to bright After literary data encryption, cloud server CSP is uploaded to ciphertext form.Although data encryption system can ensure data safety, But the data of ciphertext form hide Sensitive data content while, but also data file loses the ability being retrieved. In this case, if cloud tenant requires to look up some document in ciphertext data set, need to download entire ciphertext data Collect and decrypt, it is clear that this mode will cause great network overhead and computing cost.It is most popular at present for above-mentioned problem What one of solution was namely based on keyword can search for encryption SE technology, and this retrieval technique allows user to have by keyword Data file is selectively retrieved, recall precision is substantially increased.
And the safety that the development of cloud storage is searching ciphertext technology is put forward new requirements, and has evoked the hair of cipher theory Exhibition.It is a kind of that being suggested based on encryption attribute ABE technology for fine-granularity access control may be implemented derived from this.Encryption attribute agreement The encryption attribute agreement CP-ABE of Ciphertext policy and the encryption attribute agreement KP-ABE of key strategy can be divided into.It is defined from the two From the point of view of, CP-ABE agreement is substantially better than KP-ABE agreement, this is because encipherer is without specifying some solution in CP-ABE agreement Close person relies on one group of attribute and an access control policy as unique decryption person, as long as the attribute set of cloud tenant It is able to satisfy specified access control policy, then the private key that cloud tenant can generate according to property set decrypts ciphertext;The agreement simultaneously It, can be in the access privilege control of multi-user scene realization cloud tenant with enough flexibilities.Therefore, searching based on attribute The secrecy that rope encryption technology realizes data is shared and fine-grained access control function.
Although the existing encryption technology that can search for realizes the searching ciphertext of single keyword, this mechanism can generate huge Big computing cost and the incoherent ciphertext of return, to waste a large amount of bandwidth and computing resource.Based on this, design is supported more The searching ciphertext technology of keyword is particularly important.On the one hand, multiple key search statement can be accurately positioned required Document ciphertext;On the other hand good user's search experience is provided for user.And it existing can search for encrypting based on attribute Technology can only support single key search, while not yet consider that there are multiple data owner's scenes.It is more complicated in order to be suitable for Application scenarios and meet the more application demands of cloud tenant, how safely and efficiently to expand to attribute encryption technology can search for It is the key point of cryptographic algorithm design in encipherment scheme.
Summary of the invention
It is an object of the invention to be directed to the defect of above-mentioned prior art, one kind base under more data owner's backgrounds is proposed In the multiple key cipher text retrieval method of attribute, to reduce the calculating of retrieval under more complicated multiple-user retrieval application scenarios Expense accurately carries out multiple key searching ciphertext.
To achieve the above object, the cryptography scheme that the present invention uses includes:
(1) system initialization: third party's trusted servers TTS generates public key pk, master key mk and conventional encryption algorithm Symmetric key Φ;
(2) private key generates: property set S of third party's trusted servers TTS according to data user DU, master key mk, public key The access structure P of pk and data owner DO generates private key sk;
(3) index is established: data owner DO symmetric key Ф encrypted document generates ciphertext C, is then tied according to access Structure P and set of keywords W is that document establishes index I, and ciphertext C and index I are finally uploaded to Cloud Server CSP;
(4) trapdoor generates: data user DU generates trapdoor T according to key word of the inquiry collection W', and trapdoor T is submitted to cloud clothes Be engaged in device CSP;
(5) cipher text searching: Cloud Server CSP matches trapdoor T and index I, and the document for meeting matching condition is close Collected works RC is sent to data user DU.
The present invention has the advantage that
(1) present invention can support query on several keys under the application scenarios of more data owner's shared datas, can be quickly Document ciphertext needed for positioning.
(2) ciphertext index and access structure constructed in the present invention, can mitigate the burden of local datastore management, real Existing fine-granularity access control.
(3) present invention uses the encryption attribute strategy of ciphertext on the basis of can search for encryption technology, can resist keyword Guessing attack and guarantee keyword privacy.
(4) method provided by the invention has feasibility in practical application scene.
To sum up, the present invention uses the encryption attribute strategy of ciphertext on the basis of can search for encryption technology, gathers around in most evidences Under the person's of having scene, data user initiates query on several keys request, can be accurately positioned required ciphertext document, reduces local number According to the expense of storage management, and method can resist keyword guessing attack.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is actual scene figure of the invention;
Fig. 2 is realization general flow chart of the invention;
Fig. 3 is the system initialization sub-process figure in the present invention;
Fig. 4 is the sub-process figure that private key is generated in the present invention;
Fig. 5 is to establish index in the present invention and generate the schematic diagram of ciphertext;
Fig. 6 is the schematic diagram that trapdoor is generated in the present invention;
Fig. 7 is the sub-process figure that ciphertext is searched in the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Referring to Fig.1, for the present invention by taking individual health record PHR storage system as an example, which includes four entities: can Believe third party TTS, Cloud Server CSP, multiple data owner DO and data user DU.Trusted third party TTS generates public key Pk, private key sk and symmetric key Φ;Cloud Server CSP is used to storing data ciphertext;Multiple data owner DO, such as patient It is responsible for encrypted document and creation index;Data user DU, such as doctor may search for ciphertext.
Referring to Fig. 2, multiple key searching ciphertext of the present invention under more data owner's backgrounds based on attribute realizes step Suddenly include the following:
Step 1, system initialization
Referring to Fig. 3, this step is implemented as follows:
Public key pk=is calculated according to global common parameter Q and property set U in (1a) third party trusted servers TTS (G1,G2,e,h1,h2, q, g, X, Y, Z), master key mk=(α, beta, gamma) and symmetric key Φ, symmetric key Φ is to pass through biography System symmetric encipherment algorithm is calculated;Wherein G1It is q rank addition cyclic group, g is G1Generation member, G2It is q rank multiplicative cyclic group, e It is bilinear map G1×G1→G2, h1It indicates that { 0,1 } will be gathered*It is mapped to G1Hash function, h2It indicates that { 0,1 } will be gathered*It reflects It is mapped to ZqHash function, ZqIt is q rank integer item, X indicates the first intermediate variable: X=gα, Y the second intermediate variable of expression: Y=gβ, Z expression third intermediate variable: Z=gγ, α the first random number of expression: α ∈ Zq, the second random number β ∈ Z of β expressionq, γ indicates the Three random numbers: γ ∈ Zq
Public key and symmetric key are sent to data owner and data user by (1b) third party's trusted servers TTS;
(1c) third party's trusted servers TTS locally saves public key and master key.
Step 2, private key is generated
Referring to Fig. 4, this step is accomplished by
(2a) data user DU submits property set S to third party's trusted servers TTS;
(2b) data owner DO is that specify access structure P, access structure P be a kind of tree structure to document D, in tree Each node includes multinomial and threshold value:
(2b1) is that root node r chooses multinomial qr(v) and threshold value kr(v), wherein v is independent variable, as independent variable v=0 When, qr(0)=r2, threshold value kr(v) 1≤k of ranger(v)≤numr, numrIndicate root node r child node number;
(2b2) is that non-leaf nodes x chooses multinomial qx(v) and threshold value kx(v), multinomial qx(v) meet following item Part:
dx(v)=kx(v) -1,
qx(0)=qparent(x)(index(x));
Wherein dx(v) q is indicatedx(v) the degree of polynomial, and as independent variable v=0, qx(0)=qparent(x)(index (x)), parent (x) indicates that the father node of node x, index (x) indicate the sequence of parent (x) child node, threshold value kx(v) 1≤k of rangex(v)≤numx, numxIndicate node x child node number;
(2b3) is that leaf node chooses multinomial qy(v) and threshold value ky(v), wherein multinomial qy(v)=S, threshold value ky(v)=1;
Whether (2c) third party's trusted servers TTS verifying property set S, which meets data owner DO, refers to establishing at index Fixed access structure P:
If not satisfied, then thinking that the data user is illegal, terminate;
If satisfied, then private key will be calculated in third party's trusted servers TTS: sk=(π, { λjj})j∈S
Wherein π indicates the 4th intermediate variable: π=g(αγ-r)/β, λjIndicate the 5th intermediate variable:μjIt indicates 6th intermediate variable:R indicates the 4th random number: r ∈ Zq, rjIndicate the 5th random number: rj∈Zq, attribute j ∈ S;
The data user DU that the private key is sent to by (2d) third party's trusted servers TTS.
Step 3, index is established
Referring to Fig. 5, this step is accomplished by
(3a) data owner DO establishes set of keywords W to every record d in document D respectivelydWith key word index I:
Wd={ w1,...,wi,...,wm,
I={ I1,...,Ii,...,Im};
Wherein wiIndicate set of keywords WdI-th of keyword, i ∈ { 1 ..., m }, m indicate the quantity of set of keywords;IiTable Show corresponding keyword wiIndex, if IiValue be not 0, indicate record d contain keyword wi;Otherwise, it indicates that the pass is not present Key word wi
(3b) data owner DO is with public key pk to set of keywords WdEncryption are as follows:Wherein δiIt indicates with public Key pk encryption keyword wiCiphertext afterwards, Indicate the 7th intermediate variable: It indicates in the 8th Between variable: Indicate the 9th intermediate variable:r1Indicate the 6th random number: r1∈Zq, r2Indicate the 7th with Machine number: r2∈Zq
(3c) data owner DO leaf node attribute in public key encryption access structure P: { δyy}y∈ln, wherein δyTable Show the tenth intermediate variable:θyIndicate the 11st intermediate variable:Att (y) indicates leaf knot The attribute value of point, ln indicate leaf node set, and y indicates the leaf node in ln, qy(0) indicate leaf node multinomial from change Value when measuring 0;
Index I and document ciphertext C is uploaded to Cloud Server CSP by (3d) data owner DO, wherein indexingC=EncΦ(d), wherein EncΦ(d) expression adds record d with symmetric key Φ It is close.
Step 4, trapdoor is generated
Referring to Fig. 6, this step is accomplished by
(4a) data user DU submits key word of the inquiry collection W'={ w1',...,wj',...,wt', wherein wj' indicate be J-th of key word of the inquiry in key word of the inquiry collection W', j ∈ { 1 ..., t }, t indicate W' key word of the inquiry collection quantity;
(4b) data user DU is calculated according to key word of the inquiry collection W', private key sk and property set S generates trapdoor: T=(S, T1,T2,T3,{λj',μj'}j∈S), wherein T1Indicate the 13rd intermediate variable:S indicates the 8th random number: s∈Zq, T2Indicate the 14th intermediate variable: T2=g, T3Indicate the 15th intermediate variable: T3s, λj' indicate among the 16th Variable:μj' indicate the 17th intermediate variable:
(4c) data user DU submits trapdoor T to Cloud Server CSP.
Step 5, cipher text searching
Referring to Fig. 7, this step is accomplished by
(5a) data user submits attribute value S and trapdoor T to give Cloud Server CSP;
Whether the attribute value S of (5b) Cloud Server CSP verify data user meets specified access structure P:
It indicates that user is illegal if being unsatisfactory for, terminates;
If data user's attribute value S meets access structure P, (5c) is thened follow the steps;
(5c) calculates the intermediate quantity D of root node according to recursive algorithmr
(5c1) calculates leaf node intermediate quantity:Wherein qy(0) table Leaf node multinomial q when showing independent variable v=0y(v) value;
(5c2) calculates root node intermediate quantity:If access structure P only has two layers, at this time child node Intermediate quantity DxEqual to leaf node intermediate quantity Dy, can solveTerminate recurrence;Otherwise to DxCalling is passed Pushing-typeContinue to solve, when the father node of recurrence to leaf node, can solveTerminate recurrence;Wherein operatorI table index (x), ψxIndicate x node Random child node set, | ψx|=kx(v), | ψx| indicate set ψxSize, j is set ψxIn element;OperatorX' is the child node of node x, ψx'Indicate the random child node set of x' node, | ψx'|=kx' (v), | ψx'| indicate set ψx'Size;
(5d) is according to the intermediate quantity D of root noderObtain following two expression formulas:
First expression formula:
Second expression formula:
(5e) Cloud Server CSP judges whether trapdoor T and index I match, that is, judgesIt is whether true:
If equation is unequal, terminate;
If equation is equal, Cloud Server CSP sends inquiry ciphertext to the data user for meeting matching condition.
Above description is only example of the present invention, does not constitute any limitation of the invention.Obviously for this It, all may be before without departing substantially from the principle of the invention, structure after understanding the content of present invention and principle for the professional in field It puts, carries out the amendment and improvement of algorithm, but these amendments and improvement based on inventive algorithm are wanted in right of the invention It asks within protection scope.

Claims (6)

  1. Multiple key cipher text retrieval method under the background of data owner more than 1. based on attribute, comprising:
    (1a) system initialization: third party's trusted servers TTS generates public key pk, pair of master key mk and conventional encryption algorithm Claim key Φ;
    (1b) private key generate: third party's trusted servers TTS the property set S according to data user DU, master key mk, public key pk with And the access structure P of data owner DO generates private key sk:
    (1b1) access structure P is a kind of tree structure, and each node in tree includes multinomial and threshold value;For root node r choosing Take multinomial qr(v) and threshold value kr(v), wherein v is independent variable, as independent variable v=0, qr(0)=r2, threshold value kr(v) 1≤k of ranger(v)≤numr, numrIndicate root node r child node number;
    (1b2) is that non-leaf nodes x chooses multinomial qx(v) and threshold value kx(v), multinomial qx(v) meet the following conditions:
    dx(v)=kx(v) -1,
    qx(0)=qparent(x)(index(x));
    Wherein dx(v) q is indicatedx(v) the degree of polynomial, and as independent variable v=0, qx(0)=qparent(x)(index (x)), Parent (x) indicates that the father node of node x, index (x) indicate the sequence of parent (x) child node, threshold value kx(v) model Enclose 1≤kx(v)≤numx, numxIndicate node x child node number;
    (1b3) is that leaf node chooses multinomial qy(v) and threshold value ky(v), wherein multinomial qy(v)=S, threshold value ky(v) =1;
    The expression formula of (1b4) private key is as follows:
    Sk=(π, { λjj})j∈S
    Wherein π indicates the 4th intermediate variable: π=g(αγ-r)/β, λjIndicate the 5th intermediate variable:μjIndicate the 6th Intermediate variable:R indicates the 4th random number: r ∈ Zq, rjIndicate the 5th random number: rj∈Zq, attribute j ∈ S, α indicate the One random number: α ∈ Zq, the second random number β ∈ Z of β expressionq, γ expression third random number: γ ∈ Zq
    (1c) index is established: data owner DO symmetric key Φ encrypted document generates ciphertext C, then according to access structure P It is that document establishes index I with set of keywords W, ciphertext C and index I is finally uploaded into Cloud Server CSP;
    (1d) trapdoor generates: data user DU generates trapdoor T according to key word of the inquiry collection W', and trapdoor T is submitted to cloud service Device CSP;
    (1e) cipher text searching: Cloud Server CSP matches trapdoor T and index I, the document ciphertext collection for meeting matching condition RC is sent to data user DU.
  2. 2. according to the method described in claim 1, wherein public key pk, master key mk are expressed as follows in step (1a):
    Pk=(G1,G2,e,h1,h2, q, g, X, Y, Z),
    Mk=(α, β, γ);
    Wherein G1It is q rank addition cyclic group, g is G1Generation member, G2It is q rank multiplicative cyclic group, e is bilinear map G1×G1→ G2, h1It indicates that { 0,1 } will be gathered*It is mapped to G1Hash function, h2It indicates that { 0,1 } will be gathered*It is mapped to ZqHash function, Zq It is q rank integer item, X indicates the first intermediate variable: X=gα, Y the second intermediate variable of expression: Y=gβ, Z expression third intermediate variable: Z=gγ, α the first random number of expression: α ∈ Zq, the second random number β ∈ Z of β expressionq, γ expression third random number: γ ∈ Zq
  3. 3. according to the method described in claim 1, wherein establish index I in step (1c) and generate ciphertext C, as follows into Row:
    (1c1) data owner DO establishes set of keywords W to every record d in document D respectivelydWith key word index I:
    Wd={ w1,...,wi,...,wm,
    I={ I1,...,Ii,...,Im};
    Wherein wiIndicate set of keywords WdI-th of keyword, i ∈ { 1 ..., m }, m indicate the quantity of set of keywords;IiExpression pair The keyword w answerediIndex, if IiValue be not 0, indicate record d contain keyword wi;Otherwise, it indicates that the keyword is not present wi
    (1c2) data owner DO is with public key pk to set of keywords WdEncryption are as follows:
    Wherein δiIt indicates to use public key pk encryption keyword wiCiphertext afterwards, Indicate the 7th intermediate variable: Indicate the 8th intermediate variable: Indicate the 9th intermediate variable:r1Indicate that the 6th is random Number: r1∈Zq, r2Indicate the 7th random number: r2∈Zq, h2It indicates that { 0,1 } will be gathered*It is mapped to ZqHash function, ZqIt is that q rank is whole Ring of numbers;
    (1c3) data owner DO leaf node attribute in public key encryption access structure P are as follows:
    yy}y∈ln
    Wherein δyIndicate the tenth intermediate variable:θyIndicate the 11st intermediate variable:att (y) indicate that the attribute value of leaf node, ln indicate leaf node set, y indicates the leaf node in ln, qy(0) leaf is indicated Node multinomial independent variable takes value when 0, h1It indicates that { 0,1 } will be gathered*It is mapped to G1Hash function, G1It is q rank addition circulation Group;
    (1c4) data owner DO generates index I:
    The ciphertext C of (1c5) data owner DO encryption is: C=EncΦ(d), wherein EncΦ(d) expression is with symmetric key Φ to note Record d is encrypted.
  4. 4. according to the method described in claim 1, wherein in step (1d) trapdoor T generation, as follows carry out:
    (1d1) data user DU submits key word of the inquiry collection:
    W'={ w1',...,wj',...,wt'};
    Wherein wj' indicating it is j-th of key word of the inquiry in key word of the inquiry collection W', j ∈ { 1 ..., t }, t indicate that W' inquiry is crucial Word collection quantity;
    (1d2) data user DU is calculated according to key word of the inquiry collection W', private key sk and property set S and is generated trapdoor:
    T=(S, T1,T2,T3,{λj',μj'}j∈S);
    Wherein T1Indicate the 13rd intermediate variable:S indicates the 8th random number: s ∈ Zq, α indicate first with Machine number: α ∈ Zq, h2It indicates that { 0,1 } will be gathered*It is mapped to ZqHash function, g is G1Generation member, γ indicate third random number: γ∈Zq, π the 4th intermediate variable of expression, T2Indicate the 14th intermediate variable: T2=g, T3Indicate the 15th intermediate variable: T3= πs, λj' indicate the 16th intermediate variable:μj' indicate the 17th intermediate variable:
  5. 5. according to the method described in claim 1, wherein being matched in step (1e) to trapdoor T and index I, as follows It carries out:
    After (1e1) Cloud Server CSP gets data user's inquiry request, whether the property set S of verify data user, which meets, refers to Fixed access structure P, terminates inquiry if being unsatisfactory for;
    (1e2) calculates the intermediate quantity D of root node according to recursive algorithm if data user's property set S meets access structure Pr:
    Wherein g is G1Generation member, e is bilinear map G1×G1→G2, G1It is q rank addition cyclic group, G2It is q rank multiplication loop Group, s indicate the 8th random number: s ∈ Zq, r2Indicate the 7th random number: r2∈Zq
    (1e3) is according to the intermediate quantity D of root noderObtain following two expression formulas:
    First expression formula:
    Second expression formula:
    Wherein h2It indicates that { 0,1 } will be gathered*It is mapped to ZqHash function, ZqIt is q rank integer item, X indicates the first intermediate variable: X =gα, α the first random number of expression: α ∈ Zq, Y the second intermediate variable of expression: Y=gβ, Z expression third intermediate variable: Z=gγ, β table Show the second random number β ∈ Zq, γ expression third random number: γ ∈ Zq;wiIndicate set of keywords WdI-th of keyword, i ∈ { 1 ..., m }, m indicate the quantity of set of keywords;r1Indicate the 6th random number: r1∈Zq,Indicate the 7th intermediate variable: Indicate the 8th intermediate variable: Indicate the 9th intermediate variable:δiExpression public key pk adds Close keyword wiCiphertext afterwards,r1Indicate the 6th random number: r1∈Zq, r2Indicate the 7th random number: r2∈Zq, wj' indicating it is j-th of key word of the inquiry in key word of the inquiry collection W', j ∈ { 1 ..., t }, t indicate W' key word of the inquiry collection number Amount, T1Indicate the 13rd intermediate variable:S indicates the 8th random number: s ∈ Zq, T3It indicates among the 15th Variable: T3s,
    (1e4) Cloud Server CSP judges trapdoor T=(S, T1,T2,T3,{λj',μj'}j∈S) and indexWhether match, that is, judgesWhether at It is vertical, if equation is unequal, terminate;If equation is equal, Cloud Server CSP sends inquiry to the data user for meeting matching condition Ciphertext;
    Wherein T2Indicate the 14th intermediate variable: T2=g, λj' indicate the 16th intermediate variable:μj' indicate the tenth Seven intermediate variables:
  6. 6. according to the method described in claim 5, the centre of root node is wherein calculated described in step (1e2) by recursive algorithm Measure Dr, it carries out as follows:
    (1e21) calculates leaf node intermediate quantity:Wherein qy(0) it indicates certainly Leaf node multinomial q when variable v=0y(v) value;λj' indicate the 16th intermediate variable:μj' indicate the 17th Intermediate variable:δyIndicate the tenth intermediate variable:θyIndicate the 11st intermediate variable:Att (y) indicates that the attribute value of leaf node, ln indicate leaf node set, and y indicates the leaf in ln Node, qy(0) value when leaf node multinomial independent variable takes 0 is indicated;
    (1e22) calculates root node intermediate quantity:If access structure P only has two layers, at this time in child node Area of a room DxEqual to leaf node intermediate quantity Dy, can solveTerminate recurrence;Otherwise to DxCall recursion FormulaContinue to solve, when the father node of recurrence to leaf node, can solveTerminate recurrence;Wherein operatorI table index (x), ψxIndicate x node Random child node set, | ψx|=kx(v), | ψx| indicate set ψxSize, j is set ψxIn element;OperatorX' is the child node of node x, ψx'Indicate the random child node set of x' node, | ψx'|=kx' (v), | ψx'| indicate set ψx'Size;
    Wherein qx(0) the multinomial q of non-leaf nodes x is indicatedx(v) value when independent variable v takes 0 in.
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