CN105160490A - Cooperative game and DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) based method for sharing fixed cost of power transmission system - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a cooperative game and DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) based method for sharing the fixed cost of a power transmission system. According to the method, a coalitional game model in a DEA framework is established, a method for sharing the fixed cost of the power transmission system with a nucleolus method is proposed based on a cooperative game and DEA from the perspective of multi-attribute decisions, the DEA and coalitional game based sharing of the fixed cost of the power transmission system is calculated under the condition that area constraints are ensured, and an optimal and reasonable weight is calculated within a limited weight range, so that each user obtains a satisfied sharing result and benefit maximization of each user is satisfied.

Description

A kind of transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method based on cooperative game and DEA

Technical field

The present invention relates to a kind of transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method based on cooperative game and DEA, be specifically related to the transmission fixed cost allocation in a kind of conventional electric power generation situation, belong to cost apportionments field.

Background technology

There are mapping relations between general transmission system fixed cost and single load (or generating) electricity to be referred to as expense-electricity and to map.Research shows, the topological structure that expense-electricity maps is complicated, presents strong nonlinearity, discontinuous, higher-dimension and multi-period feature.That is the use of expense or the information flow between benefit and the payment of expense are uncertain, complicated.Meanwhile, for profit not being the power grid operation person of target, its fixed cost must rationally justice be shared to user's (user of fixed cost comprises generator and electric load) completely.

Transmission system fixed cost has can not the characteristic of decoupling zero, namely there is not relation one to one between the generation of fixed cost and concrete load.People can not explicitly point out, and which load should be responsible for which partial fixing cost.This mainly because, electric power networks is monopolistic, all loads and generator must use same electric power networks simultaneously, and reciprocation complicated between them creates fixed cost jointly, distinguish actual reciprocation responsibility and usually cannot accomplish in reality.Therefore, the Allocation of transmission system fixed cost is a difficulties that must solve.

At present, in the transmission system operation in countries in the world, usually allocated fixed cost is carried out according to the ratio of payload.But, the shortcoming of pro rata distribution method clearly, not only easily cause the alternative subsidy between load, violate the market principle of economical fairness, and the more important thing is, it can not provide correct economic incentives signal, promotes the optimization aim that load reduces fixed cost to reach at the reasonable layout of the whole network, saves social resources.

Transmission Open Access provides a specification, just competitive environment by GENERATION MARKET and user, and it makes electricity transaction can use transmission of electricity resource or equipment under justice, prejudice-free condition.In order to ensure the carrying out that Transmission Open Access is normally orderly, how to formulate Transmission Pricing system and just seeming most important.

Just there is significant change in power industry, many countries are all carrying out the reform maybe will carrying out power industry in the world, namely relax control, break up monopoly, recombination structure, build the market mechanism of competition in worldwide.The target of power industry reform is to improve electrical production efficiency, and Price Mechanisms is rationalized, and provides safety, high-quality power product, promotes the benign development of power industry, to obtain better economic benefit and social benefit.At present, the power market reform of the states such as Chile, Argentina, Britain, the U.S., Australia for its power industry is filled with new vitality, and has encouraged the electricity marketization of other various countries of the world to develop.Electricity market is exactly in fact that the buyer of electric power and the seller interact with the process determining its electricity price and electricity.Adopt economic means concretely, in line with fair competition, voluntary and mutually beneficial principle, to generating in electric system, transmission of electricity, distribution, the administrative mechanism of user Deng Ge member organization coordinated operation and the summation of executive system.The overall goal of Power Market Construction is introduced competition mechanism, optimize allocation of resources, offer high-quality service, impel electricity price to rationalize, promote that the most important aspect of sustainable development power market reform of power industry carries out Transmission Open Access, the pricing problem of transmission system that what Transmission Open Access brought thereupon is exactly.Before electricity market is set up, the generating of electric system, transmission of electricity, distribution system are not separated, the cost of transmission system does not need generating plant or user to using transmission line of electricity to collect separately, but contains this part transmission charges in the demand charge of in fact each use electric energy.After electricity market is set up, transmission of electricity company and genco separate and adjust, transmission charges and generating expense also will be separated and adjusted, and now use the member of transmission system will comprise a lot of generating plant and user, they are by a complicated grid contact, and so how reasonably calculating and sharing transmission charges just becomes electricity market problem demanding prompt solution.

Transmission Pricing system comprises the calculating of transmission charges and shares, and its process can be regarded as under the balance between revenue and expenditure considering transmission of electricity company and suitable profit situation, the assignment problem of transmission charges between the generating plant using transmission line of electricity or user.The transmission charges of electric system is generally made up of two parts: a part is the operating cost of reflection transmission system, also referred to as variable cost, mainly comprises the cost depletions of electric energy, Congestion Relief Cost and the Transmission Fixed overhead cost based on cooperative game kernel solution; Another part is the investment construction expense of reflection transmission line of electricity, be also called fixed cost, comprise the return rate etc. of building transmission line of electricity, the expense of purchase of equipment, Operation, Administration and Maintenance expense, depreciation cost and cost of investment, fixed cost due to transmission system occupies very large proportion in transmission charges, and the methodology of fixed cost of power transmission is equally applicable to sharing of transmission system variable cost (network loss, Congested espense), only for fixed cost of power transmission in the present invention, inquire into allocation of expenditures method.

The concrete allocation scheme of transmission charges is determined by the stipulations of electric power law and Electricity Market Operation, in different occasions or for reaching different operation objects, different pricing models can be carried out, accordingly, under different pricing models, also can adopt different forms of distribution.As the recovery problem completely of demand fulfillment Transmission network investment expense when cost is settled accounts, integrated cost methodology can be adopted; If provide clear and definite system running state information to user and generating plant, promote Internet resources benign development, can marginal costing be adopted.But adopt which kind of method all to need to ensure as much as possible the year balance between revenue and expenditure of transmission of electricity company, can provide long-term or the economic information of short-term for user and generating plant, and have feasibility and the transparency to the power transmission network of complexity with transaction netting gear.

Domestic and international research transmission charges calculates with the method for sharing a lot, in general, various method is owing to all can not reclaim Transmission Cost completely and while providing economic signals taking into account, fair shares each generating plant using power transmission network or user by fixed cost of power transmission, therefore it is theoretical not yet to form generally acknowledged maturation to Transmission Pricing system up to now, the way of various countries differs greatly, and still there is larger gap between theory and practice.

Summary of the invention

Technical matters to be solved by this invention is: provide a kind of transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method based on cooperative game and DEA, meeting validity, additivity, nonnegativity and scale unchangeability axiom, is the more rational transmission fixed cost allocation method of one.

The present invention is for solving the problems of the technologies described above by the following technical solutions:

Based on a transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method of cooperative game and DEA, comprise the steps:

Step 1, obtains the basic condition of each user in transmission system, comprising: load season, working system, time-of-use tariffs Time segments division, peak valley ordinary telegram valency ratio, the quality of power supply and power consumption;

Step 2, is normalized the basic condition of each user, obtains the standardized index of each user;

Step 3, the standardized index data of each user step 2 obtained, under guaranteed range constraint, utilize DEA Game with Coalitions method kernel solution to calculate the amortization ratio of each user;

Step 4, amortization ratio step 3 being obtained each user is multiplied by fixed cost, obtains each user and answers allocated cost.

Preferably, described in step 2, standardized index comprises: straight purchase of electricity index, power quality index and tou power price index.

Preferably, the computing formula of described tou power price index is: j=1 ..., n, wherein, D _jfor the tou power price index of a jth user, n is total number of users, and l is the typical number of days divided for each user, T _afor the number of days that typical case day a is corresponding, α _a: 1: β _afor peak, flat, the paddy electricity price ratio of typical case day a, t _{ja, f}, t _{ja, p}, t _{ja, g}be respectively user j at the peak of typical case day a, flat, paddy utilizes hourage.

Preferably, described in step 3, the computing formula of DEA Game with Coalitions method kernel solution is: T _j/ Σ T _j-y _j, wherein, T _j=D _jω ₁+ Q _jω ₂+ q _jω ₃, D _j, Q _j, q _jbe respectively the tou power price index of user j, power quality index, straight purchase of electricity index, ω ₁, ω ₂, ω ₃be respectively the weighted value that tou power price index, power quality index, straight purchase of electricity index are corresponding, y _jfor the fixed cost ratio of sharing can be reduced after user j participation alliance.

Preferably, described y _jcomputing method be nucleolus.

Preferably, described ω ₁, ω ₂, ω ₃computing formula be:

$c\left(S\right)=\underset{\mathrm{\ω}}{min}\underset{i=1}{\overset{m}{\Σ}}{\mathrm{\ω}}_i{x}_i\left(S\right)$

$s.t.\underset{i=1}{\overset{m}{\mathrm{\Σ}}}{\mathrm{\ω}}_i=1,{\mathrm{\ω}}_i\≥0(\∀i),$

Wherein, (i=1 ..., m, j=1 ..., n), S for user gather N=(1 ..., the alliance that arbitrary subset n) is formed, the minimum alliance overhead cost that c (S) is alliance S, X _ijfor the value of i-th standardized index of a jth user in alliance S, m is the number of all standardized index, and n is the number of all users, m=3.

The present invention adopts above technical scheme compared with prior art, has following technique effect:

1, the present invention adopts the method based on DEA Game with Coalitions, make meeting on the maximized basis of each user benefit, by limiting adding AR (guarantee region) in DEA Game with Coalitions, calculate in the proportion range limited and obtain optimum, rational weight, make each side obtain satisfied sharing result.

2, all users of the present invention (i.e. the user of fixed cost) employ whole electrical network jointly, electrical network fixed cost is that all user's actings in conjunction produce, reciprocation complicated between them creates fixed cost jointly, distinguish actual reciprocation responsibility and usually be difficult to accomplish in reality.But from the angle of cooperative game, between user, constitute actual cooperative relationship.Adopt the method invention transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation problem based on DEA Game with Coalitions, there is axiom advantage.

3, the distribution method of the present invention using kernel solution as multi agent cooperation game, has the advantage not available for additive method, and can ensure that alliance stablizes.

Accompanying drawing explanation

Fig. 1 is the overall flow figure of the transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method that the present invention is based on cooperative game and DEA.

Fig. 2 is the amortization ratio figure retraining the transmission system fixed cost that lower kernel method calculates without AR.

Fig. 3 is that the present invention has AR to retrain the amortization ratio figure of the transmission system fixed cost that lower kernel method calculates.

Fig. 4 is the comparison diagram of each user to 4 kinds of methods (postage stamp method, Shapely value, nothing constraint kernel method, Constrained kernel method) transmission fixed cost allocation ratio.

Embodiment

Be described below in detail embodiments of the present invention, the example of described embodiment is shown in the drawings, and wherein same or similar label represents same or similar element or has element that is identical or similar functions from start to finish.Being exemplary below by the embodiment be described with reference to the drawings, only for explaining the present invention, and can not limitation of the present invention being interpreted as.

Cooperative Game Theory is an important branch of microeconomics.Economic theory is verified, and the transmission fixed cost allocation method based on Cooperative Game Theory meets validity, additivity, nonnegativity and scale unchangeability axiom, is the more rational transmission fixed cost allocation method of one.In fact, economist has successfully used this methodology in public utilities network expense allocation problem, as water system allocation of expenditures and telecommunications network operator allocation of expenditures etc., achieves good rationing effect.Kernel method is one of method solving cooperative game problem, the main distribution of common expense between cooperative parties with using a certain facility to produce at the same time.

DEA (DEA) is a kind of mathematic programming methods, is also a kind of efficiency rating method of extensive accreditation.Its uses multiple objective programming theoretical and based on nonparametric technique of inputoutput relative performance, the quantitatively evaluating relative effectiveness of many inputs-voluminous exit pattern lower gate.DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS METHOD is generally used to the relative efficiency between the multiple decision package (DecisionMakingUnit, DMU) of evaluation one group.Decision package can be understood as and drop into certain key element to produce the entity of certain product in society, Economics and Management field.Within the system, there is same target, same external environment can form a decision package set with the decision package of the same type of identical inputoutput index.Using the inputoutput achievement data of decision package as Appreciation gist, can sort to the relative efficiency of each decision package, and point out non-effective decision package.Wherein, input-occupancy-output analysis is used for representing the stock number that decision package consumes in related economic activity; The economic output that output index expression decision package obtains under the prerequisite of Input Factors.

To transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation, have embedded cost method (also known as embedded cost method) and marginal costing at present, wherein embedded cost method mainly comprises postage stamp method (postagestampmethod), contract path method (contractpathmethod), boundary flow method (boundaryflowmethod), MW-km method; Marginal costing have again short-term and long-run marginal cost method point.

For China's operation of power networks feature, propose a kind of comprehensive methodology considering multifactor large user's transshipment charge fixed cost of tou power price, the quality of power supply and purchase of electricity, the postage stamp method namely revised, solves this problem preferably.But because the determination of its weight is determined by electrical network and user interactions, add the difficulty of transaction.

Method based on DEA Game with Coalitions is a new direction of DEA research, for the treatment of transmission fixed cost allocation problem, has good effect.The present invention uses the method for DEA Game with Coalitions, make meeting on the maximized basis of each user benefit, by ensureing region (AR) restriction to adding in DEA Game with Coalitions, calculate in the proportion range limited and obtain optimum, rational weight, make each side obtain satisfied sharing result.

Cooperative game refers to that in system, several participants are incorporated into enterprises union (coalition), and collaborate obtains the maximum benefit in enterprises union, and then gained common interests is distributed in alliance system inside.Cooperative game distributes the concept of separating and mainly comprises core (core), Charolais cattle (Shapley), kernel (nucleolus) etc., and in the present invention, the main kernel method that adopts solves transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation problem.

The present invention is based on the flow process of the transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method of cooperative game and DEA as shown in Figure 1, the data that the embodiment based on this process flow diagram adopts are as shown in table 1.For simplicity, this embodiment directly gives 5 electric energy quality grade: A, B, C, D, E, and corresponding power quality index is 5,4,3,2,1.First, we will carry out dimensionless normalized to data, obtain table 2.

The each user's basic condition of table 1

The standardized index of each user of table 2

User's name	Straight purchase of electricity index	Power quality index	Tou power price index
				User A	0.4223	0.1818	0.5192
User B	0.4114	0.0909	0.2762
				User C	0.0845	0.2727	0.1440
User D	0.0819	0.4545	0.0606

DEA: establish each user in transmission system set N=(1 ..., arbitrary subset S n) forms an alliance.Such as { 1,2}, { 1,2,4} etc.The value of definition alliance S is:

$x_i\left(S\right)=\underset{j\∈s}{\Σ}{X}_{ij},(i=1,...,m,j=1,...,n),$

Wherein, X _ijfor the value of i-th standardized index of a jth user in alliance S, m is the number of all standardized index, and n is the number of all users, and in the present invention, n gets 4, m and gets 3.

The object of composition alliance S obtains minimum alliance apportioning cost c (S), can pass through to separate following linear programming:

$c\left(S\right)=\underset{\mathrm{\ω}}{\min }\underset{i=1}{\overset{m}{\Σ}}{\mathrm{\ω}}_i{x}_i\left(S\right)$

$s.t.\underset{i=1}{\overset{m}{\mathrm{\Σ}}}{\mathrm{\ω}}_i=1,{\mathrm{\ω}}_i\≥0(\∀i),$

Wherein, ω _ifor x _i(S) corresponding weighted value.

The overall target of each user is calculated: T according to following formula _j=D _jω ₁+ Q _jω ₂+ q _jω ₃, wherein, D _j, Q _j, q _jbe respectively tou power price index, power quality index, straight purchase of electricity index.

The overhead cost of each user can be obtained: C ' according to cost-sharing formula _j=C × T _j/ Σ T _j.

Kernel method: definition alliance revenue function is as follows: wherein c (S) is alliance's fundamental function.

minz＝y ₅

s.ty ₁+y ₂+y ₃+y ₄+y ₅＝1

y ₁+y ₂+y ₅≥c(A,B)

y ₁+y ₃+y ₅≥c(A,C)

y ₁+y ₄+y ₅≥c(A,D)

y ₂+y ₃+y ₅≥c(B,C)

y ₂+y ₄+y ₅≥c(B,D)

y ₃+y ₄+y ₅≥c(C,D)

y ₁+y ₂+y ₃+y ₅≥c(A,B,C)

y ₁+y ₂+y ₄+y ₅≥c(A,B,D)

y ₁+y ₃+y ₄+y ₅≥c(A,C,D)

y ₂+y ₃+y ₄+y ₅≥c(B,C,D)

y ₁+y ₅≥c(A)

y ₂+y ₅≥c(B)

y ₃+y ₅≥c(C)

y ₄+y ₅≥c(D)

Matlab is utilized to solve y ₁, y ₂, y ₃, y ₄the value gone out, they represent after each user participates in alliance respectively can reduce the fixed cost ratio of sharing, the alliance's value under value of coalition all adopts AR to retrain in formula.After can drawing alliance, each user can reduce the fixed cost born and is:

y′ _j＝y _j×C

Therefore, each user needs the fixed cost of sharing to be:

According to nucleolus, data in employing table 3 and table 5 calculate, retrain without AR and have AR to retrain respectively, the known information according to table 3, the individual rationality that core exists, cooperation rationality, overall rationality differ and meet surely, so do not exist, in table 4 without the Game with Coalitions center under AR constraint.Game with Coalitions center under having AR to retrain exists.Nucleolus obtain have AR retrain under Game with Coalitions the results are shown in Table 6.Table 4 and table 6 corresponding diagram 2 and Fig. 3 respectively.

Table 3 is without AR constraint condition Xia Ge alliance fundamental function

Table 4 is without the value of the lower nucleolus of AR constraint

User's name	User A	User B	User C	User D
					Shapley value	0.3455	0.2404	0.1478	0.2664

Table 5 has AR constraint condition Xia Ge alliance fundamental function

Table 6 has AR to retrain the value of lower nucleolus

User's name	User A	User B	User C	User D
					Shapley value	0.3864	0.3299	0.0971	0.1867

As shown in Figure 4, for each user is to the comparison diagram of 4 kinds of methods (postage stamp method, Shapely value, nothing constraint kernel method, Constrained kernel method) transmission fixed cost allocation ratio.By the comparison to four kinds of methods, further description adopts the rationality of AR-DEA Game with Coalitions kernel method.

Above embodiment is only and technological thought of the present invention is described, can not limit protection scope of the present invention with this, and every technological thought proposed according to the present invention, any change that technical scheme basis is done, all falls within scope.

Claims (6)

1., based on a transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method of cooperative game and DEA, it is characterized in that: comprise the steps:

Step 1, obtains the basic condition of each user in transmission system, comprising: load season, working system, time-of-use tariffs Time segments division, peak valley ordinary telegram valency ratio, the quality of power supply and power consumption;

Step 2, is normalized the basic condition of each user, obtains the standardized index of each user;

Step 3, the standardized index data of each user step 2 obtained, under guaranteed range constraint, utilize DEA Game with Coalitions method kernel solution to calculate the amortization ratio of each user;

Step 4, amortization ratio step 3 being obtained each user is multiplied by fixed cost, obtains each user and answers allocated cost.

2. as claimed in claim 1 based on the transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method of cooperative game and DEA, it is characterized in that: described in step 2, standardized index comprises: straight purchase of electricity index, power quality index and tou power price index.

3., as claimed in claim 2 based on the transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method of cooperative game and DEA, it is characterized in that: the computing formula of described tou power price index is: $D_j=\underset{a=1}{\overset{l}{\Σ}}{T}_a({\mathrm{\α}}_a{t}_{ja,f}+t_{ja,p}+{\mathrm{\β}}_a{t}_{ja,g}),j=1,...,n,$ Wherein, D _jfor the tou power price index of a jth user, n is total number of users, and l is the typical number of days divided for each user, T _afor the number of days that typical case day a is corresponding, α _a: 1: β _afor peak, flat, the paddy electricity price ratio of typical case day a, t _{ja, f}, t _{ja, p}, t _{ja, g}be respectively user j at the peak of typical case day a, flat, paddy utilizes hourage.

4., as claimed in claim 1 based on the transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method of cooperative game and DEA, it is characterized in that: described in step 3, the computing formula of DEA Game with Coalitions method kernel solution is: T _j/ Σ T _j-y _j, wherein, T _j=D _jω ₁+ Q _jω ₂+ q _jω ₃, D _j, Q _j, q _jbe respectively the tou power price index of user j, power quality index, straight purchase of electricity index, ω ₁, ω ₂, ω ₃be respectively the weighted value that tou power price index, power quality index, straight purchase of electricity index are corresponding, y _jfor the fixed cost ratio of sharing can be reduced after user j participation alliance.

5., as claimed in claim 4 based on the transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method of cooperative game and DEA, it is characterized in that: described y _jcomputing method be nucleolus.

6., as claimed in claim 4 based on the transmission system transmission fixed cost allocation method of cooperative game and DEA, it is characterized in that: described ω ₁, ω ₂, ω ₃computing formula be:

$c\left(S\right)=\underset{\mathrm{\ω}}{min}\underset{i=1}{\overset{m}{\Σ}}{\mathrm{\ω}}_i{x}_i\left(S\right)$

$\begin{array}{cc}s.t.& \underset{i=1}{\overset{m}{\Σ}}{\mathrm{\ω}}_i=1,{\mathrm{\ω}}_i\≥0(\∀i),\end{array}$

Wherein, (i=1 ..., m, j=1 ..., n), S for user gather N=(1 ..., the alliance that arbitrary subset n) is formed, the minimum alliance overhead cost that c (S) is alliance S, X _ijfor the value of i-th standardized index of a jth user in alliance S, m is the number of all standardized index, and n is the number of all users, m=3.