CN105160490A - Cooperative game and DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) based method for sharing fixed cost of power transmission system - Google Patents
Cooperative game and DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) based method for sharing fixed cost of power transmission system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a cooperative game and DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) based method for sharing the fixed cost of a power transmission system. According to the method, a coalitional game model in a DEA framework is established, a method for sharing the fixed cost of the power transmission system with a nucleolus method is proposed based on a cooperative game and DEA from the perspective of multi-attribute decisions, the DEA and coalitional game based sharing of the fixed cost of the power transmission system is calculated under the condition that area constraints are ensured, and an optimal and reasonable weight is calculated within a limited weight range, so that each user obtains a satisfied sharing result and benefit maximization of each user is satisfied.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a fixed cost allocation method of a power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA, in particular to fixed cost allocation under the traditional power generation condition, and belongs to the field of cost allocation.
Background
The mapping relation between the fixed cost of a general power transmission system and the electric quantity of a single load (or power generation) is called as a cost-electric quantity mapping. Research shows that the topological structure of the cost-electric quantity mapping is complex, and the cost-electric quantity mapping has strong non-linearity, discontinuity, high dimension and multi-period characteristics. That is to say that the flow of information between the use or benefit of the fee and the payment of the fee is uncertain and complex. At the same time, for grid operators who are not targeted for profit, their fixed costs must be fairly fair and fully shared among the consumers (fixed cost consumers, including generators and electrical loads).
The fixed cost of the power transmission system has the characteristic of being not decouplable, namely, the generation of the fixed cost and the specific load do not have a one-to-one correspondence relationship. It is not possible to specify which load should be responsible for which fixed cost. This is mainly because the power network is monopolized, all loads and generators must use the same power network at the same time, complex interactions between them together generate fixed costs, and it is not usually possible to distinguish actual interaction responsibilities in reality. Therefore, the problem of the distribution of the fixed cost of the power transmission system is a difficult problem which must be solved.
Currently, in power transmission system operation in countries around the world, fixed costs are generally allocated in proportion to the size of a load. However, the proportional allocation method has obvious disadvantages, which not only easily causes cross subsidy between loads and violates the economic fair market principle, but also, more importantly, cannot provide correct economic incentive signals to promote reasonable distribution of the loads in the whole network so as to achieve the optimization goals of reducing fixed cost and saving social resources.
The opening of the transmission system will provide the electricity generation market and users with a normative, fair, competitive environment that enables electricity trading to use transmission resources or equipment under fair, non-discriminatory conditions. In order to ensure that a power transmission system is opened to normally and orderly proceed, it is very important to make a power transmission pricing system.
The power industry is undergoing significant changes worldwide, and many countries in the world are performing or will perform power industry innovation, i.e., releasing regulations, breaking monopolies, restructuring structures, and establishing competitive market mechanisms. The innovation of the power industry aims to improve the power production efficiency, rationalize the electricity price mechanism, provide safe and high-quality power products and promote the benign development of the power industry so as to obtain better economic benefit and social benefit. At present, the electric power market reform of the countries such as Chilean, Argentina, UK, America, Australia and the like has injected new vitality into the electric power industry thereof and stimulates the electric power market development of other countries in the world. The electricity market is essentially the process by which buyers and sellers of electricity interact to determine their price and quantity of electricity. Specifically, the method adopts an economic means, organizes a management mechanism and an execution system for coordinated operation of members such as power generation, power transmission, power distribution, users and the like in an electric power system according to the principles of fair competition and voluntary mutual benefit. The main goal of electric power market construction is to introduce a competitive mechanism, optimize resource allocation, provide high-quality service, promote the rationalization of electricity price, and promote the sustainable development of the electric power industry, and the most important aspect of electric power market innovation is to implement the opening of a power transmission system, and the opening of the power transmission system brings along the pricing problem of the power transmission system. Before the electric power market is established, the power generation, transmission and distribution systems of the electric power system are not separated, the cost of the transmission system does not need to be charged to a power plant or a user using the transmission line independently, but actually, each user electric charge using electric energy contains the transmission cost. After the electric power market is established, a transmission company and a power generation company are separately accounted, transmission cost and power generation cost are also separately accounted, and at the moment, members using a transmission system comprise a plurality of power plants and users which are connected through an intricate and complex power grid, so how to reasonably calculate and distribute transmission cost becomes an urgent problem to be solved in the electric power market.
The transmission pricing system includes calculation and allocation of transmission costs, which can be viewed as a distribution problem of transmission costs among power plants or users using the transmission line, taking into account the balance of revenue and expenditure and the appropriate profitability of the transmission company. The transmission costs of an electric power system generally consist of two parts: one part reflects the operation cost of a power transmission system, also called variable cost, and mainly comprises the loss cost and the blocking cost of electric energy and the power transmission fixed cost apportionment cost based on the cooperative game kernel solution; the other part reflects the investment construction cost of the power transmission line, which is also called fixed cost, and comprises the cost for constructing the power transmission line, the equipment purchasing cost, the operation management and maintenance cost, the depreciation cost, the return rate of investment cost and the like.
The specific distribution mode of the transmission cost is determined by the electric power law and the stipulation of the electric power market operation, different pricing modes can be implemented on different occasions or for achieving different operation purposes, and correspondingly, different distribution forms can be adopted under different pricing modes. If the complete recovery problem of the investment cost of the power transmission system is required to be met during cost settlement, a comprehensive cost allocation method can be adopted; in order to provide definite system operation state information for users and power plants and promote the benign development of network resources, a marginal cost method can be adopted. However, in any method, the annual balance of the transmission company needs to be guaranteed as much as possible, long-term or short-term economic information can be provided for users and power plants, and feasibility and transparency are provided for complex transmission networks and transaction networks.
Many methods for researching calculation and allocation of power transmission cost at home and abroad are available, and on the whole, various methods can not fairly allocate fixed power transmission cost to each power plant or user using a power transmission network while considering complete recovery of power transmission cost and provision of economic signals, so that a recognized mature theory for a power transmission pricing system has not been formed so far, the methods in various countries are far from each other, and a large difference still exists between the theory and practice.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is as follows: the fixed cost allocation method of the power transmission system based on the cooperative game and the DEA is provided, meets the axioms of effectiveness, additivity, nonnegativity and scale invariance, and is a reasonable fixed cost allocation method.
The invention adopts the following technical scheme for solving the technical problems:
a fixed cost allocation method of a power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA comprises the following steps:
step 1, acquiring the basic situation of each user in a power transmission system, comprising: load season, working system, peak-valley electricity price time interval division, peak-valley level electricity price ratio, electric energy quality and electricity consumption;
step 2, carrying out normalization processing on the basic situation of each user to obtain a standardized index of each user;
step 3, calculating the apportionment proportion of each user by using the DEA alliance game method kernel solution under the constraint of a guaranteed area according to the standardized index data of each user obtained in the step 2;
and 4, multiplying the apportionment proportion of each user obtained in the step 3 by the fixed cost to obtain the cost to be apportioned by each user.
Preferably, the normalization index in step 2 includes: the direct purchase power index, the power quality index and the time-of-use electricity price index.
Preferably, the calculation formula of the time-of-use electricity price index is as follows:j is 1, …, n, wherein DjIs the time-of-use electricity price index of the jth user, n is the total number of the users, l is the typical number of days divided for each user, TaA number of days corresponding to typical day a, αa:1:βaThe peak, average and valley electrovalence ratio t of typical day aja,f、tja,p、tja,gThe peak, average, and trough hours of use by user j on typical day a, respectively.
Preferably, the calculation formula of the DEA alliance game method kernel solution in step 3 is as follows: t isj/ΣTj-yjWherein, Tj＝Djω1+Qjω2+qjω3，Dj、Qj、qjRespectively is the time-of-use electricity price index, the electric energy quality index, the direct purchase electric quantity index, omega of the user j1、ω2、ω3Respectively the weight values y corresponding to the time-of-use electricity price index, the electric energy quality index and the direct purchase power indexjThe apportioned fixed cost ratio can be reduced after the user j joins the alliance.
Preferably, said yjThe calculation method of (A) is a kernel allocation method.
Preferably, said ω is1、ω2、ω3The calculation formula of (2) is as follows:
wherein,(i ═ 1, …, m, j ═ 1, …, N), S is a federation formed by any subset of the set of users N ═ 1, …, N, c (S) is the minimum federation contribution cost of federation S, XijThe value of the ith normalization index of the jth user in the coalition S is shown, m is the number of all normalization indexes, n is the number of all users, and m is 3.
Compared with the prior art, the invention adopting the technical scheme has the following technical effects:
1. the invention adopts a method based on DEA alliance game, so that on the basis of meeting the maximum benefit of each user, by adding AR (guaranteed area) limitation in the DEA alliance game, the optimal and reasonable weight is calculated in a limited weight range, and each user obtains a satisfactory apportionment result.
2. According to the invention, all users (namely users with fixed cost) share the whole power grid, the fixed cost of the power grid is generated by the joint action of all users, the complex interaction between all users generates the fixed cost together, and the actual interaction responsibility to be distinguished is generally difficult to realize in reality. From the perspective of cooperative gaming, however, the users form a factual cooperative relationship. The method based on the DEA alliance game is adopted to solve the problem of fixed cost sharing of the power transmission system, and the method has axiomatic advantages.
3. The invention takes nucleolus solution as the distribution method of the multi-person cooperative game, has the advantages which are not possessed by other methods, and can ensure the stability of alliance.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is an overall flow chart of the fixed cost allocation method of the power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA.
FIG. 2 is an illustration of the apportionment of the fixed cost of a transmission system calculated by the kernel method without AR constraints.
FIG. 3 is an illustration of the apportionment of the fixed cost of a transmission system calculated by the kernel method with AR constraints according to the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a graph comparing the user-to-user ratio of the fixed cost share of the 4 methods (postage stamp method, Shapely value, unconstrained kernel method, constrained kernel method).
Detailed Description
Reference will now be made in detail to embodiments of the present invention, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings, wherein like reference numerals refer to the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar function throughout. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are illustrative only for the purpose of explaining the present invention, and are not to be construed as limiting the present invention.
Cooperative game theory is an important branch of micro-economics. The economics theory has proved that the fixed cost allocation method based on the cooperative game theory satisfies the axiom of effectiveness, additivity, nonnegativity and scale invariance, and is a more reasonable fixed cost allocation method. In fact, economists have successfully applied this allocation method to utility network cost allocation problems, such as allocation of water supply system costs and allocation of operating costs of telecommunications networks, to achieve good allocation. The nucleolus method is one of the methods for solving the cooperative game problem, and is mainly used for distributing the common cost generated by using a certain facility at the same time among cooperative parties.
Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) is a mathematical programming method and is also a widely accepted method for efficiency evaluation. The method quantitatively evaluates the relative effectiveness of departments in a multi-input-multi-output mode by using a multi-target planning theory and a non-parameter method based on the relative performance of input and output. Data envelope analysis methods are commonly used to evaluate the relative efficiency between a set of multiple decision units (DMUs). A decision-making unit may be understood as an entity that invests certain elements in the social, economic and regulatory domains to produce a certain product. In the system, decision units of the same type with the same target, the same external environment and the same input-output index can form a decision unit set. The input-output index data of the decision units are used as evaluation basis, the relative efficiency of each decision unit can be sequenced, and the non-effective decision units are indicated. The input index is used for representing the resource amount consumed by the decision unit in the relevant economic activities; the output index represents the economic output obtained by the decision unit on the premise of investing elements.
For the fixed cost sharing of the power transmission system, there are currently an embedded cost method (also called a comprehensive cost method) and a marginal cost method, wherein the embedded cost method mainly includes a postage stamp method (postestampmethod), a contract path method (contract path method), a boundary tidal current method (boundary tidal flow method), and a MW-km method; the marginal cost method is divided into short-term and long-term marginal cost methods.
Aiming at the running characteristics of a power grid in China, a comprehensive allocation method for the fixed cost of the transportation cost of a multi-factor large user, which comprehensively considers the time-of-use electricity price, the electric energy quality and the electricity purchasing quantity, namely a corrected stamp method is provided, and the problem is well solved. But the difficulty of the transaction is increased because the determination of the weight is determined by the interaction of the power grid and the user.
The method based on the DEA alliance game is a new direction of DEA research, is used for processing the problem of fixed cost allocation, and has a good effect. The method of the DEA alliance game is used, so that on the basis of meeting the maximum benefit of each user, the optimal and reasonable weight is calculated in the limited weight range by adding the limitation of the guaranteed Area (AR) in the DEA alliance game, and each user can obtain a satisfactory apportionment result.
Cooperative gaming refers to a system in which several participants join together to form a coalition (cooperation), cooperate together to obtain the maximum benefit in the coalition, and then distribute the obtained common benefit inside the coalition system. The concept of the cooperative game distribution solution mainly comprises a core (core), a Shapley value (Shapley), a kernel (nucleolus) and the like, and the problem of fixed cost allocation of a power transmission system is mainly solved by adopting a kernel method.
The flow of the fixed cost allocation method of the power transmission system based on the cooperative game and the DEA is shown in fig. 1, and the data adopted in the embodiment based on the flow is shown in table 1. For simplicity, this embodiment directly gives 5 power quality classes: A. b, C, D, E, the corresponding power quality indexes are 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1. First, we want to perform dimensionless normalization on the data, resulting in table 2.
TABLE 1 basic situation for each user
TABLE 2 standardization index for each user
| User name | Direct purchase power index | Electric energy quality index | Time of use price index |
| User A | 0.4223 | 0.1818 | 0.5192 |
| User B | 0.4114 | 0.0909 | 0.2762 |
| User C | 0.0845 | 0.2727 | 0.1440 |
| User D | 0.0819 | 0.4545 | 0.0606 |
Data envelope analysis: let any subset S of the set N ═ 1, …, N of users in the power transmission system form a federation. Such as {1,2}, {1,2,4}, etc. Define the value of federation S as:
wherein, XijThe value of the ith standardization index of the jth user in the alliance S is shown, m is the number of all standardization indexes, n is the number of all users, n is 4, and m is 3.
The purpose of forming federation S is to obtain the minimum federation allocation cost c (S), which can be formulated by solving the following linear programming:
wherein, ω isiIs xi(S) corresponding weight values.
Calculating the comprehensive index of each user according to the following formula: t isj＝Djω1+Qjω2+qjω3Wherein D isj、Qj、qjRespectively is a time-of-use electricity price index, an electric energy quality index and a direct purchase power index.
The apportioned cost for each user can be obtained according to a cost apportionment formula: c'j＝C×Tj/ΣTj。
Kernel method: the federation revenue function is defined as follows:wherein c (S) is a federation feature function.
minz＝y5
s.ty1+y2+y3+y4+y5＝1
y1+y2+y5≥c(A,B)
y1+y3+y5≥c(A,C)
y1+y4+y5≥c(A,D)
y2+y3+y5≥c(B,C)
y2+y4+y5≥c(B,D)
y3+y4+y5≥c(C,D)
y1+y2+y3+y5≥c(A,B,C)
y1+y2+y4+y5≥c(A,B,D)
y1+y3+y4+y5≥c(A,C,D)
y2+y3+y4+y5≥c(B,C,D)
y1+y5≥c(A)
y2+y5≥c(B)
y3+y5≥c(C)
y4+y5≥c(D)
Solving for y using matlab1、y2、y3、y4And the values respectively represent the fixed cost proportion which can be reduced after each user participates in the alliance, and the alliance values in the formula all adopt alliance values under the AR constraint. It can be found that the fixed cost that each user can reduce the burden after the alliance is:
y′j＝yj×C
therefore, the fixed cost that each user needs to share is:
according to the kernel allocation method, the data in the tables 3 and 5 are adopted for calculation, and no AR constraint and AR constraint exist respectively, so that the individual rationality, the cooperation rationality and the overall rationality of the kernel can not be satisfied necessarily according to the information in the table 3, and the kernel does not exist in the alliance game without the AR constraint, which is shown in the table 4. Cores exist in the league game under the constraint of the AR. Results of the league game under AR constraints from the kernel sharing method are shown in table 6. Tables 4 and 6 correspond to fig. 2 and 3, respectively.
TABLE 3 characteristics function of each federation without AR constraints
TABLE 4 values of kernel split without AR constraint
| User name | User A | User B | User C | User D |
| Shapley value | 0.3455 | 0.2404 | 0.1478 | 0.2664 |
TABLE 5 characteristics function of each federation with AR constraints
TABLE 6 values of kernel split under AR constraints
| User name | User A | User B | User C | User D |
| Shapley value | 0.3864 | 0.3299 | 0.0971 | 0.1867 |
As shown in FIG. 4, a comparison graph of the fixed cost share ratios for each user for 4 methods (postage stamp method, Shapely value, unconstrained kernel method, constrained kernel method). The reasonability of the AR-DEA alliance game kernel method is further illustrated by comparing the four methods.
The above embodiments are only for illustrating the technical idea of the present invention, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereby, and any modifications made on the basis of the technical scheme according to the technical idea of the present invention fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. A fixed cost allocation method of a power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
step 1, acquiring the basic situation of each user in a power transmission system, comprising: load season, working system, peak-valley electricity price time interval division, peak-valley level electricity price ratio, electric energy quality and electricity consumption;
step 2, carrying out normalization processing on the basic situation of each user to obtain a standardized index of each user;
step 3, calculating the apportionment proportion of each user by using the DEA alliance game method kernel solution under the constraint of a guaranteed area according to the standardized index data of each user obtained in the step 2;
and 4, multiplying the apportionment proportion of each user obtained in the step 3 by the fixed cost to obtain the cost to be apportioned by each user.
2. The fixed cost allocation method for a power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA as claimed in claim 1, wherein: step 2, the standardized indexes comprise: the direct purchase power index, the power quality index and the time-of-use electricity price index.
3. The fixed cost allocation method for a power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA as claimed in claim 2, wherein: the calculation formula of the time-of-use electricity price index is as follows: <math>
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</math> wherein,Djis the time-of-use electricity price index of the jth user, n is the total number of the users, l is the typical number of days divided for each user, TaA number of days corresponding to typical day a, αa:1:βaThe peak, average and valley electrovalence ratio t of typical day aja,f、tja,p、tja,gThe peak, average, and trough hours of use by user j on typical day a, respectively.
4. The fixed cost allocation method for a power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA as claimed in claim 1, wherein: and 3, the calculation formula of the DEA alliance game method nucleolus solution is as follows: t isj/ΣTj-yjWherein, Tj＝Djω1+Qjω2+qjω3，Dj、Qj、qjRespectively is the time-of-use electricity price index, the electric energy quality index, the direct purchase electric quantity index, omega of the user j1、ω2、ω3Respectively the weight values y corresponding to the time-of-use electricity price index, the electric energy quality index and the direct purchase power indexjThe apportioned fixed cost ratio can be reduced after the user j joins the alliance.
5. The fixed cost allocation method for a power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA as claimed in claim 4, wherein: said yjThe calculation method of (A) is a kernel allocation method.
6. The fixed cost allocation method for a power transmission system based on cooperative game and DEA as claimed in claim 4, wherein: the omega1、ω2、ω3The calculation formula of (2) is as follows:
wherein,(i 1, …, m, j 1, …, N), S is a federation formed by any subset of the set of users N (1,.., N), c (S) is a minimum federation contribution cost of federation S, XijThe value of the ith normalization index of the jth user in the coalition S is shown, m is the number of all normalization indexes, n is the number of all users, and m is 3.
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| CN110896220B (en) * | 2019-12-05 | 2020-12-22 | 国网青海省电力公司经济技术研究院 | Interruptible load optimization control method based on cooperative game kernel method |
| CN110930070A (en) * | 2019-12-11 | 2020-03-27 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司经济技术研究院 | Improved blocking cost distribution method based on Shapley value |
| CN110930070B (en) * | 2019-12-11 | 2022-09-16 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司经济技术研究院 | Improved blocking cost distribution method based on Shapley value |
| CN111080450A (en) * | 2019-12-12 | 2020-04-28 | 国网辽宁省电力有限公司经济技术研究院 | Transaction mode evaluation method based on multi-region interconnected power system |
| CN113554219A (en) * | 2021-07-02 | 2021-10-26 | 国网安徽省电力有限公司电力科学研究院 | Renewable energy power station shared energy storage capacity planning method and device |
| CN113554219B (en) * | 2021-07-02 | 2023-11-07 | 国网安徽省电力有限公司电力科学研究院 | Method and device for planning shared energy storage capacity of renewable energy power station |
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