CN104777493A - Signal generating method for achieving preset track deception and wired test system - Google Patents
Signal generating method for achieving preset track deception and wired test system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN104777493A CN104777493A CN201510222268.4A CN201510222268A CN104777493A CN 104777493 A CN104777493 A CN 104777493A CN 201510222268 A CN201510222268 A CN 201510222268A CN 104777493 A CN104777493 A CN 104777493A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- deception
- signal
- satellite
- receiver
- track
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a signal generating method for achieving preset track deception and provides a deception jamming wired test system. According to the method, by utilizing a true satellite position observed by a receiver at a t moment and the true position of the receiver, a deceiving side can simulate and generate M branches of deception signals through a preset deception track, the M branches of deception signals and a true satellite participate in localization calculation of the receiver simultaneously, and a location result is obtained. By means of the method, the multiple branches of deception signals different from a PRN code of the true satellite can be generated, and a great deception effect can be achieved by only a few branches of deception signals. The deception jamming wired test system can generate N branches of true signals and the M branches of deception signals by setting a true movement track and the deception track of an object, after combining the N branches of true signals and the M branches of deception signals, the deception jamming wired test system transmits the combined signals to a GNSS receiver, and the deception jamming effect can be judged by comparing the location result output by the receiver with the preset deception track in real time. The system is simple in equipment, and the operation process is easy.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to technical field of satellite navigation, particularly the cheating interference signal of field of satellite navigation generates and method of testing, relates to the signal mathematical simulation of a kind of desired guiding trajectory deception more specifically and has wire testing method.
Background technology
GPS (Global Position System) (Global Navigation Satellite System, GNSS) is generally made up of space constellation part, ground monitoring part and customer equipment part.Each GNSS satellite of space constellation part continues to launch navigation Service signal earthward; Ground monitoring part obtains the orbit information of satellite by measuring, and is uploaded to GNSS satellite; Customer equipment part by the signal of process many visible satellites, and then determines the spatial positional information of self.
Because received GNSS signal trusted completely by current navigation neceiver, therefore any tissue, individual can by launching the timing locating information that false cheating interference signal make receiver make mistake, to reach the object of deception.Two kinds can be divided at present: production cheating interference and deceiving jamming to the Deceiving interference of GNSS.
According to the document delivered at present, want intended receivers is located according to default deception track, mainly contain two kinds of methods in theory: one is reconstruct constellation, namely carrys out Reality simulation signal by signal simulator according to the deception track preset, allows intended receivers lock curve completely; Another kind is that intelligence forwards, and namely deception side is by receiving actual signal, and revises signal time delay according to desired guiding trajectory, and the most amended signal is transmitted to intended receivers after amplifying, allows intended receivers lock curve completely.After intelligence forwarding method needs, by certain means, the multi-satellite signal received is carried out separating treatment, to different bringing Selection In property of satellite-signal time delays, wherein the process of Signal separator is quite difficult.In addition, these two kinds of methods want to reach deception effect must receive real satellite-signal by total blockage intended receivers, and receiver is locked onto on curve completely, and generally allowing receiver lose actual signal completely is also a quite difficult job.
Summary of the invention
For prior art exist defect, the object of this invention is to provide a kind of realize desired guiding trajectory deception signal creating method and wired test macro.The signal creating method realizing desired guiding trajectory deception provided by the invention, No. PRN of curve that the method generates is different from No. PRN that synchronization receiver truly receives, finally realizes curve and actual signal and coexists to reach the object that desired guiding trajectory cheats.Provide the wired test macro of a kind of cheating interference, the wired test of the cheating interference for locating based on desired guiding trajectory, this system can cheating interference that is virtually reality like reality be tested, for the research of cheating interference and anti-deception provides verification platform simultaneously.
For achieving the above object, technical scheme of the present invention is:
Realize a signal creating method for desired guiding trajectory deception, it is characterized in that comprising the steps:
Step 1, judge t deception number of satellites M, if M is less than 4, then system can point out warning, warns this result can only draw partially at random, can not draw partially according to projected path;
Step 2, when M is more than or equal to 4, is imitated the track of a modular simulation M satellite by the number of GNSS signal dummy source, require the satellite that M No. PRN of emulation different from No. PRN, t N real satellite, and this M satellite will as deception satellite;
Step 3, according to user's actual position (x that t obtains
r(t), y
r(t), z
r(t), t
r(t)) and preset deception point position (x
s(t), y
s(t), z
s(t), t
s(t)), calculate position deviation Δ (t)=(x
s(t), y
s(t), z
s(t))-(x
r(t), y
r(t), z
r(t));
Step 4, by N real satellite position, M deception satellite position, presets deception point position and position deviation Δ calculates the deception pseudorange ρ that M is cheated satellite
s=(A
s ta
s)
-1a
s tΔ+R
s, wherein A
sbe the matrix of coefficients of M+N satellite position and receiver location correction, Δ is the position deviation obtained in step 3, R
sfor deception satellite is to the distance matrix of initial position;
Step 5, generate M road curve according to the deception satellite position of emulation with the deception pseudorange calculated, the signal generative process of its signal generative process and signal source is identical.
In the present invention: the actual position of t intended receivers and clock correction are (x
r, y
r, z
r, t
r), the deception point position of presetting and the side-play amount of user's actual position are Δ=(Δ x, Δ y, Δ z, Δ t).
The matrix of coefficients of receiver location correction is A, makes (A
ta)
-1a
t=E=[A
ra
s].
Wherein A is the matrix of (N+M) × 4, E is one 4 × and the matrix of (N+M), A
rthe matrix of a 4 × N, A
sit is the matrix of a 4 × M.
According to the deception pseudorange that position deviation is tried to achieve be:
ρ
s＝(A
s TA
s)
-1A
s TΔ+R
s
Wherein R
sfor deception satellite is to the distance matrix of initial position:
The deception pseudorange of accurate Calculation and satellite position are converted into navigation signal by mathematical simulation method, broadcast away after ovennodulation.
The invention provides the wired test macro of a kind of cheating interference, the wired test of the cheating interference for locating based on desired guiding trajectory, this system comprises GNSS signal dummy source, GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module, computing machine and GNSS receiver; GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module is used for arranging generated actual signal and the correlation parameter of curve, and correlation parameter comprises actual signal number, real motion track, curve number and deception track; GNSS signal dummy source is made up of data simulation module and combiner, wherein data simulation module generates N road actual signal and M road curve according to the steering order of GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module, and signal forms final navigation signal through combiner Hou He road; GNSS receiver is by receiving the navigation signal after closing road, and N+M satellite-signal received by utilization positions and resolve, and obtains positioning result; The positioning result of receiver will show on computers in real time, and the positioning result of GNSS receiver and default deception track are compared thus observe deception effect by computing machine.
The signal creating method of desired guiding trajectory deception provided by the invention, the multichannel curve different from No. PRN, real satellite can be produced, step is simple, only need the curve on several road, and do not need just to be reached the reception of actual signal by extra technological means jamming receiver well to cheat effect.
The wired test macro realizing desired guiding trajectory deception provided by the invention, can be simulated by the real motion track of Offered target and deception track and generate N road actual signal and M road curve, and broadcast to GNSS receiver after being closed road, how the positioning result exported by real time contrast's receiver and the deception track preset just can differentiate the effect of cheating interference, this system equipment is simple, operating process is simple and easy, uses more for convenience.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is a kind of principle flow chart realizing the signal creating method of desired guiding trajectory deception provided by the invention;
Fig. 2 is the structural drawing of the wired test macro of a kind of cheating interference provided by the invention.
Embodiment
In order to make technical scheme of the present invention and advantage clearly understand, below in conjunction with drawings and Examples, the present invention is further elaborated.Should be appreciated that specific embodiment described herein only for explaining the present invention, being not intended to limit the present invention.
Fig. 1 is a kind of principle process schematic diagram realizing the signal creating method of desired guiding trajectory deception provided by the invention, as shown in the figure, comprises the following steps:
Step 1, judge t deception number of satellites M, if M is less than 4, then system can point out warning, warns this result can only draw partially at random, can not draw partially according to projected path; ;
Step 2, when M is more than or equal to 4, is imitated the track of a modular simulation M satellite by the number of GNSS signal dummy source, require the satellite that M No. PRN of emulation different from No. PRN, t N real satellite, and this M satellite will as deception satellite;
Step 3, according to user's actual position (x that t obtains
r(t), y
r(t), z
r(t), t
r(t)) and preset deception point position (x
s(t), y
s(t), z
s(t), t
s(t)), calculate position deviation Δ (t)=(x
s(t), y
s(t), z
s(t))-(x
r(t), y
r(t), z
r(t));
Step 4, by N real satellite position, M deception satellite position, presets deception point position and position deviation Δ calculates the deception pseudorange ρ that M is cheated satellite
s=(A
s ta
s)
-1a
s tΔ+R
s, wherein A
sbe the matrix of coefficients of M+N satellite position and receiver location correction, Δ is the position deviation obtained in step 3, R
sfor deception satellite is to the distance matrix of initial position;
Step 5, generate M road curve according to the deception satellite position of emulation with the deception pseudorange calculated, the signal generative process of its signal generative process and signal source is identical.
The curve that the signal creating method that desired guiding trajectory provided by the present invention is cheated produces, only need little a few road (minimum 4 tunnels) curve just can realize target according to preset arbitrary trajectory location deception effect, and do not need to block intended receivers to the reception of actual signal, the effect of desired guiding trajectory Location fraud can be obtained when intended receivers utilizes actual signal and curve to position and resolve simultaneously, owing to not needing to block intended receivers to the reception of real satellite signal, more more hidden than general cheating interference in this way, and only need to utilize less several roads curve just can reach desired guiding trajectory Location fraud effect, in this way less than general cheating interference cost, calculated amount is little and realize easy.
Fig. 2 is the structural drawing of the wired test macro of the present invention's a kind of cheating interference provided by the invention, and as shown in the figure, this system comprises GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module, GNSS signal dummy source, GNSS receiver and computing machine.
Wherein GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module can be used to arrange generated actual signal and the correlation parameter of curve, as: actual signal number, real motion track, curve number, deception track etc.GNSS signal dummy source is made up of data simulation module and combiner, wherein data simulation module generates N road actual signal and M road curve according to the steering order of GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module, and signal forms final navigation signal through combiner Hou He road; GNSS receiver is by receiving the navigation signal after closing road, and N+M satellite-signal received by utilization positions and resolve, and obtains positioning result; The positioning result of receiver will show on computers in real time, and the positioning result of GNSS receiver and default deception track are compared thus observe deception effect by computing machine.
Below by with B1 signal for embodiment specifically explains the whole course of work of the wired test macro of cheating interference provided by the invention:
Suppose to produce 8 road actual signals (PRN 1-8) and 4 road curves (PRN 9-12), real motion track is route A-B, and deception track is route A-S.Now the mathematical simulation module of GNSS signal dummy source will imitate these basic parameters of true control module setting according to GNSS signal, relevant algorithm is utilized to generate the signal of 12 road B1 frequencies, wherein 8 road Reality simulation signals, 4 road simulated deception signals, this 12 road signal closes Lu Chengyi road mixed signal after combiner.GNSS receiver is connected with GNSS signal dummy source signal output part by cable, and after receiving mixed signal, receiver is just caught this signal, follow the tracks of, obtain navigation data line position of going forward side by side resolves, thus obtains positioning result.The positioning result resolved obtained will be sent to computing machine, by real-time monitoring of computer, computing machine also receives the deception track arranged by simulation software simultaneously, and the positioning result resolved and default deception track is contrasted, and observes the quality of deception effect from both side-play amounts.
The wired test macro of cheating interference provided by the present invention can effectively in Reality simulation situation production cheating interference on the impact of receiver, this system can with the deception effect of simple method realization according to desired guiding trajectory location, this system realizes the obstruction of receiver to actual signal without any need for countermeasure set, so this system equipment is simple, process simple to operate is succinct, is very easy to researchist and carries out correlative study.
The foregoing is only preferred embodiments of the present invention, be not limited to the present invention, all any amendments done within the spirit and principles in the present invention, equivalent replacement and improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (2)
1. realize a signal creating method for desired guiding trajectory deception, it is characterized in that comprising the steps:
Step 1, judge t deception number of satellites M, if M is less than 4, then system can point out warning, warns this result can only draw partially at random, can not draw partially according to projected path;
Step 2, when M is more than or equal to 4, is imitated the track of a modular simulation M satellite by the number of GNSS signal dummy source, require the satellite that M No. PRN of emulation different from No. PRN, t N real satellite, and this M satellite will as deception satellite;
Step 3, according to user's actual position (x that t obtains
r(t), y
r(t), z
r(t), t
r(t)) and preset deception point position (x
s(t), y
s(t), z
s(t), t
s(t)), calculate position deviation Δ (t)=(x
s(t), y
s(t), z
s(t))-(x
r(t), y
r(t), z
r(t));
Step 4, by N real satellite position, M deception satellite position, presets deception point position and position deviation Δ calculates the deception pseudorange ρ that M is cheated satellite
s=(A
s ta
s)
-1a
s tΔ+R
s, wherein A
sbe the matrix of coefficients of M+N satellite position and receiver location correction, Δ is the position deviation obtained in step 3, R
sfor deception satellite is to the distance matrix of initial position;
Step 5, generate M road curve according to the deception satellite position of emulation with the deception pseudorange calculated, the signal generative process of its signal generative process and signal source is identical.
2. the wired test macro of cheating interference, this system comprises GNSS signal dummy source, GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module, computing machine and GNSS receiver; GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module is used for arranging generated actual signal and the correlation parameter of curve, and correlation parameter comprises actual signal number, real motion track, curve number and deception track; GNSS signal dummy source is made up of data simulation module and combiner, wherein data simulation module generates N road actual signal and M road curve according to the steering order of GNSS signal dummy source Simulation Control module, and signal forms final navigation signal through combiner Hou He road; GNSS receiver is by receiving the navigation signal after closing road, and N+M satellite-signal received by utilization positions and resolve, and obtains positioning result; The positioning result of receiver will show on computers in real time, and the positioning result of GNSS receiver and default deception track are compared thus observe deception effect by computing machine.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510222268.4A CN104777493B (en) | 2015-05-05 | 2015-05-05 | A kind of signal creating method for realizing desired guiding trajectory deception and wired test system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510222268.4A CN104777493B (en) | 2015-05-05 | 2015-05-05 | A kind of signal creating method for realizing desired guiding trajectory deception and wired test system |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN104777493A true CN104777493A (en) | 2015-07-15 |
| CN104777493B CN104777493B (en) | 2018-04-27 |
Family
ID=53619072
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201510222268.4A Active CN104777493B (en) | 2015-05-05 | 2015-05-05 | A kind of signal creating method for realizing desired guiding trajectory deception and wired test system |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN104777493B (en) |
Cited By (16)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105929417A (en) * | 2016-06-06 | 2016-09-07 | 华东师范大学 | Method for capturing unmanned aerial vehicle |
| CN106353775A (en) * | 2016-08-12 | 2017-01-25 | 华东师范大学 | Method for capturing mobile equipment on basis of satellite navigation systems |
| CN106443724A (en) * | 2016-10-26 | 2017-02-22 | 中国电子产品可靠性与环境试验研究所 | Method and system for testing pseudo-range differential positioning precision of navigation receiver |
| CN106970399A (en) * | 2017-02-22 | 2017-07-21 | 清华大学 | Air navigation aid, terminal, information processing centre and navigation neceiver based on frequency modulation data radio |
| WO2017197939A1 (en) * | 2016-05-19 | 2017-11-23 | 湖南矩阵电子科技有限公司 | Anti-unmanned aerial vehicle method and system |
| CN107607965A (en) * | 2017-08-30 | 2018-01-19 | 桂林电子科技大学 | A kind of black winged Navigation of Pilotless Aircraft deception system and method |
| CN108375778A (en) * | 2017-12-29 | 2018-08-07 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | A kind of methods of exhibiting and device of GPS positioning deception |
| CN110058270A (en) * | 2019-05-27 | 2019-07-26 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Navigation deception signal generation method based on clock error fitting |
| CN110208821A (en) * | 2019-06-11 | 2019-09-06 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | A kind of track decoy method and device for GNSS/IMU pine combination system |
| CN110677215A (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2020-01-10 | 上海移为通信技术股份有限公司 | Positioning processing method and device |
| CN111090108A (en) * | 2019-08-22 | 2020-05-01 | 香港理工大学深圳研究院 | Deception signal generation method and device |
| CN112285746A (en) * | 2020-10-21 | 2021-01-29 | 厦门大学 | Deception detection method and device based on multipath signals |
| CN112325904A (en) * | 2020-10-27 | 2021-02-05 | 北京三快在线科技有限公司 | Testing device, method, medium and electronic equipment |
| CN112904379A (en) * | 2021-01-28 | 2021-06-04 | 中国民航大学 | GNSS induced deception jamming data generation method based on track |
| CN114370789A (en) * | 2021-12-21 | 2022-04-19 | 上海交通大学 | Unmanned system autonomous monitoring and trapping security system and method |
| CN118501905A (en) * | 2024-07-15 | 2024-08-16 | 中国船舶集团有限公司第七〇七研究所 | Dynamic generation method for user track of satellite signal simulation system |
-
2015
- 2015-05-05 CN CN201510222268.4A patent/CN104777493B/en active Active
Non-Patent Citations (5)
| Title |
|---|
| TODD E.HUMPHREYS等: "Assessing the Spoofing Threat：Development of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer", 《PROCEEDING OF ION GNSS》 * |
| 张会锁等: "利用轨迹诱导的欺骗式GPS干扰技术研究", 《弹箭与制导学报》 * |
| 焦逊等: "对GPS接收机实施欺骗式干扰的定位误差研究", 《电子对抗技术》 * |
| 王伟等: "GPS欺骗干扰原理研究与建模仿真", 《火力与指挥控制》 * |
| 王强等: "基于位置矢量分析的卫星导航安全性能评估", 《计算机仿真》 * |
Cited By (21)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2017197939A1 (en) * | 2016-05-19 | 2017-11-23 | 湖南矩阵电子科技有限公司 | Anti-unmanned aerial vehicle method and system |
| CN105929417A (en) * | 2016-06-06 | 2016-09-07 | 华东师范大学 | Method for capturing unmanned aerial vehicle |
| CN106353775A (en) * | 2016-08-12 | 2017-01-25 | 华东师范大学 | Method for capturing mobile equipment on basis of satellite navigation systems |
| CN106443724A (en) * | 2016-10-26 | 2017-02-22 | 中国电子产品可靠性与环境试验研究所 | Method and system for testing pseudo-range differential positioning precision of navigation receiver |
| CN106970399A (en) * | 2017-02-22 | 2017-07-21 | 清华大学 | Air navigation aid, terminal, information processing centre and navigation neceiver based on frequency modulation data radio |
| CN107607965A (en) * | 2017-08-30 | 2018-01-19 | 桂林电子科技大学 | A kind of black winged Navigation of Pilotless Aircraft deception system and method |
| CN107607965B (en) * | 2017-08-30 | 2019-11-08 | 桂林电子科技大学 | The black winged Navigation of Pilotless Aircraft deception system of one kind and method |
| CN108375778A (en) * | 2017-12-29 | 2018-08-07 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | A kind of methods of exhibiting and device of GPS positioning deception |
| CN110058270B (en) * | 2019-05-27 | 2020-10-27 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Navigation deception signal generation method based on clock error fitting |
| CN110058270A (en) * | 2019-05-27 | 2019-07-26 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Navigation deception signal generation method based on clock error fitting |
| CN110208821B (en) * | 2019-06-11 | 2021-03-26 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | Track trapping method and device for GNSS/IMU loose combination system |
| CN110208821A (en) * | 2019-06-11 | 2019-09-06 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | A kind of track decoy method and device for GNSS/IMU pine combination system |
| CN111090108A (en) * | 2019-08-22 | 2020-05-01 | 香港理工大学深圳研究院 | Deception signal generation method and device |
| CN111090108B (en) * | 2019-08-22 | 2022-06-24 | 香港理工大学深圳研究院 | Deception signal generation method and device |
| CN110677215A (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2020-01-10 | 上海移为通信技术股份有限公司 | Positioning processing method and device |
| CN112285746A (en) * | 2020-10-21 | 2021-01-29 | 厦门大学 | Deception detection method and device based on multipath signals |
| CN112285746B (en) * | 2020-10-21 | 2024-02-13 | 厦门大学 | Spoofing detection method and device based on multipath signals |
| CN112325904A (en) * | 2020-10-27 | 2021-02-05 | 北京三快在线科技有限公司 | Testing device, method, medium and electronic equipment |
| CN112904379A (en) * | 2021-01-28 | 2021-06-04 | 中国民航大学 | GNSS induced deception jamming data generation method based on track |
| CN114370789A (en) * | 2021-12-21 | 2022-04-19 | 上海交通大学 | Unmanned system autonomous monitoring and trapping security system and method |
| CN118501905A (en) * | 2024-07-15 | 2024-08-16 | 中国船舶集团有限公司第七〇七研究所 | Dynamic generation method for user track of satellite signal simulation system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN104777493B (en) | 2018-04-27 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN104777493A (en) | Signal generating method for achieving preset track deception and wired test system | |
| CN102830407B (en) | Method and system for automatically testing anti-interference performance of Beidou receiver | |
| CN202794534U (en) | Automatic testing system for interference resistance of Beidou receiver | |
| CN109343089B (en) | Performance test equipment, performance test method and performance test device of positioning equipment | |
| US6127970A (en) | Coupled real time emulation method for positioning and location system | |
| CN106019323A (en) | Satellite navigation receiver simulation testing system | |
| CN102866407A (en) | Satellite navigation anti-interference test simulator and simulation method thereof | |
| KR102265381B1 (en) | Real-time effect analysis device for radio wave interference of unmanned vehicles and method thereof | |
| CN111337954B (en) | Three-dimensional scene satellite shielding and multipath signal simulation method and simulation device | |
| CN108512590A (en) | A kind of joint-trial system and method for satellite attitude and orbit control subsystem and GNSS subsystems | |
| CN112731463B (en) | Synchronous simulation system combining GNSS navigation constellation and receiver | |
| KR100914006B1 (en) | System for review of GPS receving set an indoor and method thereof | |
| Panicciari et al. | Evaluation of a GNSS receiver performance in different multipath environments with a novel real-time multipath simulation system | |
| KR101227911B1 (en) | Simulation signal generating system for localization of jammer | |
| Maier et al. | The GNSS-Transceiver: Using vector-tracking approach to convert a GNSS receiver to a simulator; implementation and verification for signal authentication | |
| KR20150011630A (en) | Simulation system and method for measuring effectiveness of airborne electronic support system | |
| KR102167705B1 (en) | Method and apparatus for selectively spoofing signal of global navigation satellite system | |
| RU134668U1 (en) | SIMULATOR OF RADAR SITUATION OF A SHIP RADAR COMPLEX WITH A FUNCTIONAL CONTROL DEVICE | |
| RU2658509C1 (en) | Method of simulation statistical modeling of locomotive integrated navigation system | |
| KR101993534B1 (en) | Device and method for simulating space environment | |
| Pósfay et al. | First results of a GNSS signal generator using a PC and a digital-to-analog converter | |
| Wolf et al. | GATE-The german galileo test environment | |
| Howell et al. | Virtual flight testing-A versatile approach to evaluate future GPS anti-jam technologies | |
| KR20190139039A (en) | Functional Check System of Identification Friend or Foe | |
| Pollina et al. | Software designed GNSS system emulator |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| EXSB | Decision made by sipo to initiate substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| CP01 | Change in the name or title of a patent holder |
Address after: 410073 Hunan province Changsha Kaifu District, Deya Road No. 109 Patentee after: National University of Defense Technology Address before: 410073 Hunan province Changsha Kaifu District, Deya Road No. 109 Patentee before: NATIONAL University OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY |
|
| CP01 | Change in the name or title of a patent holder | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20220629 Address after: 410000 block a, building 1, Changsha National Security Industrial Park, No. 699 Qingshan Road, Yuelu District, Changsha City, Hunan Province Patentee after: Hunan Institute of advanced technology Address before: 410073 Hunan province Changsha Kaifu District, Deya Road No. 109 Patentee before: National University of Defense Technology |
|
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20221122 Address after: Building 4, Hunan Military civilian Integration Science and Technology Innovation Industrial Park, No. 699, Qingshan Road, Changsha Hi tech Development Zone, 410000, Hunan Patentee after: Hunan Zhongdian Xinghe Electronics Co.,Ltd. Address before: 410000 block a, building 1, Changsha National Security Industrial Park, No. 699 Qingshan Road, Yuelu District, Changsha City, Hunan Province Patentee before: Hunan Institute of advanced technology |
|
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |