CN104363586B - Lightweight roaming access authentication method in Internet of vehicles - Google Patents

Lightweight roaming access authentication method in Internet of vehicles Download PDF

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Publication number
CN104363586B
CN104363586B CN201410648538.3A CN201410648538A CN104363586B CN 104363586 B CN104363586 B CN 104363586B CN 201410648538 A CN201410648538 A CN 201410648538A CN 104363586 B CN104363586 B CN 104363586B
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vehicle
roaming
server
hash chain
domain
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CN104363586A (en
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王良民
刘亚伟
罗斌
韩志耕
徐文龙
吴海云
谢莹
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Anhui University
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Anhui University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/02—Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
    • H04W8/08—Mobility data transfer
    • H04W8/12—Mobility data transfer between location registers or mobility servers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H04W4/021—Services related to particular areas, e.g. point of interest [POI] services, venue services or geofences
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H04W4/025—Services making use of location information using location based information parameters
    • H04W4/027—Services making use of location information using location based information parameters using movement velocity, acceleration information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/02—Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0892—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by using authentication-authorization-accounting [AAA] servers or protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H04W4/46—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for vehicle-to-vehicle communication [V2V]

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Traffic Control Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a lightweight roaming access authentication method in an internet of vehicles, which comprises a system initialization protocol and a roaming access authentication protocol, wherein when a vehicle enters an edge critical RSU range covered by a local area server, the vehicle carries out real-time cross-domain roaming judgment on real-time position information, a current driving strategy and a local server coverage range, the vehicle determines whether to request a roaming authentication material from the local server according to a judgment result, and after the vehicle runs into a roaming area, the roaming area server realizes identity authentication of the vehicle through the roaming authentication material provided by the vehicle. The invention can ensure safe anonymous authentication, and only needs to carry out Hash operation in the process of authenticating the vehicle by the FS of the roaming domain server, thereby obviously reducing the system overhead.

Description

Lightweight roaming access authentication method in Internet of vehicles
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of wireless communication, in particular to a lightweight roaming access authentication method for Internet of vehicles.
Background
The vehicle ad hoc networks (VANETs) are applications of traditional mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) on traffic roads, and are special mobile ad hoc networks. In VANET, each vehicle is equipped with an on-board unit OBU, which is primarily responsible for communication with other vehicles or roadside units RSU. The application of the Internet of vehicles can remarkably improve the sharing of traffic information and effectively relieve the phenomena of road traffic jam, traffic accidents and the like. The Internet of vehicles provides an open public service platform for vehicles so as to meet the requirements of different users. However, the internet of vehicles also faces the issue of data security and user privacy protection while providing these services. Roaming techniques allow roaming areas of vehicles outside their registration areas to still be able to use network services, among other things. The underlying roaming service involves a home server, a roaming domain server, and a roaming vehicle. In order to implement the secure roaming service, the roaming domain server needs to authenticate the alien roaming vehicle. Therefore, a safe and efficient authentication mechanism is highly desirable for providing roaming services to vehicles.
Roaming agreements can be divided into two types: the authentication process includes a three-party protocol for the home server and a two-party protocol that does not include the home server. Obviously, the authentication process of the three-party protocol is easily affected by the state of the home server and the state of network communication between the roaming domain server and the home server, which is an obvious defect and a bottleneck of development of the three-party protocol. Two-party protocols, while avoiding these problems, often face the problems of anonymous authentication and high cost.
Vehicles in the internet of vehicles are used as mobile nodes, the resource use of the vehicles is very limited, and the problem of high cost of the vehicles in the internet of vehicles is always valued by people no matter information transmission or identity authentication. Regardless of the symmetric encryption mechanism or the asymmetric encryption mechanism adopted in the process of information transmission or identity authentication, the Hash chain is undoubtedly the best choice when efficient security initialization is required. However, the application of the Hash chain has two defects, which limit the safety and efficiency of the Hash chain, and if the used Hash chain is too long, the calculation overhead and the storage overhead of the system are increased, and if the used Hash chain is too short, the safety time provided for the system is short, and the stability of the system is reduced. The combination of long, short hash chain advantages can be regenerated to provide a more stable and low-cost authentication protocol for the system.
Chen et al propose a light-weight attested safe anonymous authentication protocol, roaming user only need use symmetric encryption algorithm and Hash algorithm to finish roaming authentication in the course of roaming authentication in this protocol, however, although this protocol has achieved the goal of high-efficient authentication through some light-weight algorithms, this protocol is a three-party protocol, need the participation of the hometown server in the course of authentication, every user needs to rely on the present state of the hometown server in the course of roaming authentication, if the communication between roaming domain server and hometown server breaks down, namely the roaming domain server is in the off-line state relative to the hometown server, then roaming user will not carry on roaming authentication.
Han et al propose a high-efficient and high-stability switching authentication scheme based on identity in the wireless network, this scheme belongs to two-party agreement, do not need the participation of hometown service in the course of roaming, the roaming user sends the authentication information to the server of roaming domain in the course of roaming, the roaming user needs to carry on the cryptographic algorithm of elliptic curve and bilinear pair algorithm operation in the course of authenticating, the server of roaming domain needs to carry on the hash operation of chameleon, have increased the expenses compared with scheme that C.Chen et al propose, and this agreement can't guarantee the anonymous authentication.
Disclosure of Invention
The purpose of the invention is as follows: the invention aims to solve the defects in the prior art and provides a lightweight roaming access authentication method in the Internet of vehicles.
The technical scheme is as follows: the invention relates to a lightweight roaming access authentication method in the Internet of vehicles, which comprises the following two steps:
(1) initializing a system:
(1.1) the TA of the trust center initializes the system time T, and the Hash chain element uses the time interval Tc；
(1.2) each regional server creates an initial Hash chain and sends the identification number ID of the local server HS to the foreign server FS relative to the local server HS in the systemHSThe Hash chain to be used and the start time Ts of the corresponding Hash chain;
(2) and (3) roaming access authentication:
(2.1) the vehicle carries out real-time cross-domain roaming judgment through the real-time position information, the current driving strategy and the coverage range parameter of the local server HS, if the judgment result is true, the cross-domain roaming judgment is successful, and the vehicle sends the current judgment result to the local server HS and requests for roaming authentication materials;
(2.2) when the local server HS receives the request of the vehicle, generating an information verification code for the vehicle by combining the current system information, and deleting the registration information of the current vehicle in the local;
(2.3) after the vehicle enters the roaming area, sending identity authentication information to a roaming domain server FS through a roadside infrastructure (RSU); after the foreign server receives the identity authentication information of the vehicle, firstly inquiring a Hash chain corresponding to a home server HS of the current roaming vehicle, detecting the timeliness of an identity authentication material provided by the current vehicle through a time scale provided by a trust center, if the timeliness is within a threshold time, continuing authenticating the identity of the vehicle, verifying the identity of the vehicle through the seed value of the inquired Hash chain by a roaming domain server FS, and if the verification results of the information verification codes are consistent, proving the reliability of the identity of the current vehicle;
the identity authentication information sent by the vehicle to the roaming domain server FS comprises a vehicle home server identity marking number IDHSPseudonym identity PID finally used by vehicle in hometown domainjHash chain elements stored by a vehicle for use when requesting roaming authentication materialAnd the information verification code generated by the vehicle home server HS for the vehicle
(2.4) the roaming domain server FS finds out a previous Hash element of a Hash value provided by the current vehicle through the inquired Hash chain, then sends the found Hash element and confirmation information to the vehicle, the vehicle performs Hash operation after receiving the Hash element, and if the Hash result is equal to the Hash value stored by the vehicle, the vehicle can confirm the identity of the roaming domain server FS;
and (2.5) after the identity authentication between the vehicle and the roaming domain server FS is carried out, the vehicle sends registration materials to the roaming domain server FS, the identity registration in the roaming domain server FS is completed, and the roaming domain server FS is changed into a home server of the vehicle.
Further, the real-time cross-domain roaming judgment in the step (2.1) is as follows:
the boundary RSU of the local server HS sends cross-domain roaming judgment materials to vehicles entering the coverage area of the local server HS, the vehicles carry out cross-domain roaming condition judgment according to the current driving strategy and the current position information in combination with the cross-domain roaming authentication materials, if the judgment result is true, cross-domain roaming judgment is carried out, and the vehicles send cross-domain roaming authentication material applications to the local server.
The cross-domain roaming authentication material in the step (2.1) comprises a cross-domain roaming vector, a use time interval of Hash chain elements, a cross-domain roaming reference distance and roaming-domain reference coordinates;
the roaming domain reference coordinate is a position coordinate of an adjacent roaming domain edge critical RSU corresponding to the local edge critical RSU in a roaming domain server FS coverage range bordering on the local server HS;
the cross-domain roaming vector is a vector from a local edge critical RSU position point to a roaming domain edge critical RSU position point corresponding to the local RSU;
the cross-domain roaming reference distance is as follows:wherein k is a constant value,is a cross-domain roaming vector.
The cross-domain roaming condition determining process in the step (2.2) is as follows:
performing dot product operation on the current driving direction vector of the vehicle and the cross-domain roaming vector, if the result is positive, calculating the distance between the vehicle and the roaming domain RSU according to the current coordinate of the vehicle and the reference coordinate of the roaming domain, and if the distance is smaller than the modulus of the cross-domain roaming vectorAnd if the difference value is smaller than the roaming reference distance, the roaming condition is judged to be true.
The cross-domain roaming judgment process in the step (2.1) is as follows:
firstly, the vehicle calculates the distance s between the current position coordinate and the local RSU position coordinate; secondly, the vehicle judges according to the current running speed v and the use time interval of the Hash chain element as follows:wherein n is a constant; if the judgment result is true, the cross-domain roaming judgment is successful; the vehicle can then make a cross-domain roaming material application to the home server HS.
Further, the use process of the Hash chain comprises the following steps: a Hash chain pre-distribution stage, a Hash chain using stage and a Hash chain self-regeneration stage;
the Hash chain pre-distribution stage is a Hash chain pre-distribution process of the local server HS for the vehicles and the foreign server FS: the local server HS distributes the tail element of the initial Hash chain to the vehicle, and distributes the initial Hash chain to the foreign server FS through the trust center TA;
the Hash chain self-regeneration process comprises the following steps: first, the local server HS chooses an optional time periodAnd randomly generating a new seed value for the next Hash chain to generate a new Hashh chain, where 1. ltoreq. i.ltoreq.nj-2; and then the local server HS randomly selects 3 time periods and sends three messages bound with the new Hash chain information to the vehicle corresponding to the three time periods, thereby realizing the self-regeneration deployment process of the new Hash chain.
Further, the local server HS randomly selects 3 time periods, and sends three messages bound with new Hash chain information to the vehicle corresponding to the three time periods to implement the authentication process as follows:
1) the local server HS randomly selects 3 time periods, respectivelyAndwherein i is less than or equal to f is less than or equal to nj-1，f+1≤s≤nj，s+1≤t≤nj+ 1; i denotes the time period during which the local server HS generates a new hash chainThe subscript of (a) is,representing a new Hash chain Kj+1First time period of
2) Local server HS in time periodBefore the first message bound with the next Hash chain information is sent, the related information calculation is carried out according to the currently used Hash chain and the generated next Hash chain to be used, namely the related information calculation is carried out, namelyAndwherein h is a Hash function,and KtThe local server realizes the self-regeneration deployment process of the Hash chain by sending the message bound with the authentication information for the authentication information associated with the new Hash chain;
3) local server HS in time periodThe content of the first message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
wherein,the message authentication code of the message, the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code, if the vehicle and the foreign server FS pass the message verification, K is savedt；
4) Local server HS in time periodThe content of the second message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
wherein,the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code of the message;
if the vehicle and the foreign server FS pass the message verification, savingThe vehicle and foreign server FS then pass the savedAnd KtComputingAt this time, the vehicle and the foreign server FS already store the Hash value of the new Hash chain tail
5) Local server HS in time periodNamely, it isThe content of the third message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
wherein,the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code of the message;
if the vehicle and foreign server FS verify the messageBy then the vehicle and the foreign server FS utilize the stored Hash value of the new Hash chain tailTo the new Hash chain tail value receivedCarry out the verification ifThe verification is passed, and the vehicle and foreign server FS store the new Hash chain tail valueThus, the local server HS safely realizes the deployment of a new Hash chain self-regeneration process to the vehicle and the foreign server FS.
Further, the process of the local server HS deploying the Hash chain to the foreign server FS relative to the local server HS in the system is as follows:
if the local server HS never deploys the Hash chain to the foreign server FS before, the local server HS sends the Hash chain and the use starting time Ts of the Hash chain to the foreign server FS together through a TA; if the Hash chain is not initially deployed, the local server HS safely deploys the tail element of the Hash chain to the foreign server FS through the Hash chain self-regeneration technology, and then calculates the starting use time Ts + x T of the next Hash chain according to the residual element x of the current Hash and the time reference T provided by the current trust center TAcAnd sending the Hash chain and the start use time Ts of the Hash chain to a foreign server FS together through TA.
Further, in the step (2.2), the process of generating the information verification code for the vehicle by the local server HS is as follows:
the local server HS acquires the seed value of the Hash chain used currentlyThen combined with the pseudonymous PID currently used by the vehicle requesting the roaming authentication materialjLocal server identity indicating number IDHSAnd the Hash chain current element usedGenerating an information verification code
Further, in the step (2.4), the authentication process of the roaming domain server FS for the vehicle roaming authentication information is as follows:
firstly, a roaming domain server FS marks a number ID according to the identity of a vehicle home server in received informationHSRetrieving a currently used Hash chain of a locally stored vehicle home server HS and time Ts corresponding to Hash;
then, counting an element interval delta t between a Hash element used by the received vehicle and the tail part of a Hash chain, namely a time interval between the Hash element and the tail part of the Hash chain, and calculating | t | ═ t-delta t-Ts, wherein t is a time reference in the current TA, and if | t | is within a threshold time, the timeliness of the vehicle roaming authentication information is proved;
then the roaming domain server retrieves the seed value of the Hash chain according to the retrieved seed valueVerification code with informationAnd verifying the identity of the vehicle, and if the verification information is correct, finishing the authentication of the identity information of the vehicle by the roaming domain server.
Has the advantages that: compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
(1) the vehicle carries out real-time cross-domain roaming judgment through the real-time position information, the current driving strategy and the coverage range parameter of the local server HS, and the judgment process is efficiently and accurately realized.
(2) The invention provides a flexible and randomly-reproducible self-reproduction short Hash chain method, which is applied to a roaming protocol of the Internet of vehicles, and the method and the roaming protocol are combined to realize a high-stability, low-cost and safe roaming access authentication protocol suitable for the environment of the Internet of vehicles.
(3) Compared with the prior art, the invention adopts a two-party protocol, does not need the participation of a home server in the authentication process, ensures the stability of the authentication process, only needs Hash operation in the process of authenticating the vehicle by the roaming domain server FS, has relatively lower cost, uses the pseudonym identity issued by the home server of the vehicle in the authentication process, and can ensure safe anonymous authentication.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the system of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a roaming authentication process of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a roaming authentication protocol interaction process according to the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating a vehicle roaming determination process according to the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram illustrating a self-regenerating hash chain new chain deployment interaction process according to the present invention;
FIG. 6 is a graph of computational overhead for an embodiment when a single Hash chain is used by a local server;
fig. 7 is a graph of computational overhead for embodiments in which different length Hash chains are used when the local server employs a self-regenerating Hash chain scheme.
Detailed Description
The technical solution of the present invention is described in detail below, but the scope of the present invention is not limited to the embodiments.
As shown in fig. 1, the car networking authentication architecture is divided into 3 levels in the present invention: the top layer is a national trust center TA which is connected with each regional server, and the regional servers are respectively connected with roadside infrastructures RSUs in the regions. The national trust center TA is a trusted authority, and provides a system time reference, standardizes the use time interval of Hash chain elements and also provides a trust channel for deploying Hash chains among regional servers. The regional server is a trusted authority that can generate a Hash chain for identity authentication in the system and provide random roaming authentication material for the vehicle. The RSU is a roadside unit responsible for providing an access point for vehicles.
When the vehicle needs to carry out cross-domain roaming, real-time cross-domain roaming judgment is carried out through the real-time position information, the current driving strategy and the coverage range parameter of the local server HS, if the judgment result is true, the cross-domain roaming judgment is successful, and the vehicle sends the current judgment result to the local server HS and requests for roaming authentication materials. When the local server HS receives the request of the vehicle, the local server HS generates an information verification code MAC for the vehicle by combining the current system information, and deletes the registration information of the current vehicle in the local. After the vehicle drives into the roaming area, identity authentication information is sent to a roaming domain server FS through a roadside infrastructure RSU; after receiving the identity authentication material of the vehicle, the roaming domain server firstly inquires a Hash chain corresponding to a home server of the current roaming vehicle, detects the timeliness of the identity authentication material provided by the current vehicle through a time scale provided by a trust center, if the timeliness is within a threshold time, the identity of the vehicle is continuously authenticated, the roaming domain server FS verifies the identity of the vehicle through the inquired seed value of the Hash chain, and if the MAC verification result is consistent, the reliability of the identity of the current vehicle is proved. And the roaming domain server FS searches a previous Hash element of a Hash value provided by the current vehicle through the searched Hash chain, then sends the searched Hash element and the confirmation information to the vehicle, the vehicle performs Hash operation on the Hash element after receiving the Hash element, and if the Hash result is equal to the Hash value stored by the vehicle, the vehicle can confirm the identity of the roaming domain server FS. After the identity authentication between the vehicle and the roaming server, the vehicle sends registration material to the foreign server FS, the identity registration in the roaming domain server is completed, and the roaming domain server FS is converted into the home server of the vehicle.
As shown in fig. 2, the roaming agreement authentication method in the present invention includes the following steps:
1. deployment between TA and each regional server in the system:
1) the TA of the trust center initializes the system time T, and the Hash chain element uses the time interval Tc；
2) Each regional server creates an initial Hash chain and sends the identification number ID of the local server HS to the foreign server FS relative to the local server HS in the systemHSIf the initial deployment is carried out, namely the local server deploys the Hash chain from the foreign server before, the local server HS sends the Hash chain and the Hash chain initial use time Ts to the foreign server FS together through TA, and if the initial deployment is not carried out, the local server HS calculates the initial use time Ts of the next Hash chain as T + x T according to the residual elements x of the current Hash and the time reference T provided by the current trust center TA after safely deploying the tail elements of the Hash chain to the foreign server FS through the Hash chain self-regeneration technologycSending the use starting time Ts of the Hash chain and the Hash chain to a foreign server FS together through a TA;
2. the specific process of roaming access authentication protocol information interaction is shown in fig. 3:
1) the boundary RSU of the home server HS sends cross-domain roaming judgment material to the vehicles entering the coverage area of the boundary RSU, wherein the cross-domain roaming judgment material comprises cross-domain roaming vectorsHash chain element usage time interval TcCross-domain roaming reference distance x, roaming domain parameterTest coordinate (x)f，yf). The vehicle is driven according to the current driving strategy and the current position information (x)c，yc) And (3) judging the cross-domain roaming condition by combining the cross-domain roaming authentication material, wherein the judging process is as follows:
wherein k is a constant
If the judgment result is true, cross-domain roaming judgment is carried out, and the judgment process is as follows:
and if the judgment result is true, the vehicle sends a cross-domain roaming authentication material application to the local server.
2) When the local server HS receives the request of the vehicle, the local server HS generates an information verification code for the vehicle by combining the current system informationAnd deletes the registration information of the current vehicle locally.
3) After the vehicle drives into the roaming area, identity authentication information is sent to a roaming domain server FS through a roadside infrastructure RSU:
wherein, IDHSIdentify mark number, PID for vehicle hometown serverjThe last used pseudonym identity of the vehicle in the home domain,The vehicle stores the Hash chain elements it uses when requesting roaming authentication material,the information verification code generated for the vehicle by the vehicle home server HS.
After the roaming domain server FS receives the identity authentication information of the vehicle, firstly, the ID of the identity marking number of the home server of the vehicle in the received information is usedHSRetrieving a currently used Hash chain of a locally stored vehicle home server HS and time Ts corresponding to Hash; then, counting an element interval delta t between a Hash element used by the received vehicle and the tail part of a Hash chain, namely a time interval between the Hash element and the tail part of the Hash chain, and calculating | t | ═ t-delta t-Ts, wherein t is a time reference in the current TA, and if | t | is within a threshold time, the timeliness of the vehicle roaming authentication information is proved; then the roaming domain server retrieves the seed value of the Hash chain according to the retrieved seed valueVerification code with informationAnd verifying the identity of the vehicle, and if the verification information is correct, finishing the authentication of the identity information of the vehicle by the roaming domain server.
4) And the roaming domain server FS searches a previous Hash element of a Hash value provided by the current vehicle through the searched Hash chain, then sends the searched Hash element and the confirmation information to the vehicle, the vehicle performs Hash operation on the Hash element after receiving the Hash element, and if the Hash result is equal to the Hash value stored by the vehicle, the vehicle can confirm the identity of the roaming domain server FS.
5) After the identity authentication between the vehicle and the roaming domain server FS, the vehicle sends registration material to the roaming domain server FS, the identity registration in the roaming domain server FS is completed, and the roaming domain server FS is converted into a home server of the vehicle.
The Hash chain used in the implementation process of the scheme is as follows:
1) local server HS for vehicles and foreign serverAnd (3) carrying out Hash chain pre-distribution process of the FS. The local server HS sends the initial Hash chain tail elementAnd distributing the initial Hash chain to a vehicle, and distributing the initial Hash chain to a foreign server FS through a trust center TA.
2) The Hash chain self-regeneration process and the deployment process are as follows:
a local server HS chooses a time periodWherein the value range of i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to nj-2; a new seed value is randomly generated for the next Hash chain and a new Hash chain is generated.
The local server HS randomly selects 3 time periods and sends three messages bound with new Hash chain information to the vehicle corresponding to the three time periods to realize the self-regeneration deployment process of the new Hash chain, the self-regeneration Hash chain new chain deployment interaction process is shown in FIG. 5, and the specific process is as follows:
21) The local server randomly selects 3 time periods, respectivelyAndwherein f is greater than or equal to i and less than or equal to nj-1, wherein s has a value in the range f + 1. ltoreq. s.ltoreq.njWherein t is in the range of s + 1-nj+1。
Where i denotes the time period during which the local server HS generates a new hash chainThe subscript of (a) is,
and represents a new Hash chain Kj+1First time period of
22) Local server HS in time periodBefore the first message bound with the next Hash chain information is sent, the related information calculation is carried out according to the currently used Hash chain and the generated next Hash chain to be used, namely the related information calculation is carried out, namelyAnd
wherein h is a Hash function,
and KtAnd the local server realizes the self-regeneration deployment process of the Hash chain by sending the message bound with the authentication information for the authentication information associated with the new Hash chain.
23) Local server HS in time periodThe content of the first message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
wherein,the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code of the message.
If the vehicle and the foreign server FS pass the message verification, K is savedt。
24) Local server HS in time periodThe content of the second message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
wherein,the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code of the message.
If the vehicle and the foreign server FS pass the message verification, savingThe vehicle and foreign server FS then pass the savedAnd KtComputingAt this time, the vehicle and the foreign server FS already store the Hash value of the new Hash chain tail
25) Local server HS in time periodNamely, it isThe content of the third message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
wherein,the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code of the message.
If the vehicle and the foreign server FS verify the message, the vehicle and the foreign server FS utilize the stored Hash value at the tail of the new Hash chainTo the new Hash chain tail value receivedCarry out the verification ifThe verification is passed, and the vehicle and foreign server FS store the new Hash chain tail valueTherefore, the local server HS safely realizes the deployment of a new Hash chain self-regeneration process to the vehicle and the foreign server FS.
The invention is explained in detail below by means of a computational overhead analysis of the self-regenerating Hash chain scheme in the examples.
Example (b):
assuming that the total length of the Hash chain is N, the computational overhead of the Hash chain when using a single chain is shown in fig. 6. If the length of the Hash chain used in the protocol is N, and the length of the short chain in the Hash chain is xiAnd the number of the short Hash chains is n. In addition, assume that the single computation overhead of the Hash function is a, and the communication overhead for transmitting the corresponding key is b. Then, in the using process of the whole Hash chain, the sum of the required computation overhead and communication overhead of the broadcasting node is:
wherein, if xiIs equal and x, while N can be evenly divided by x, the above equation becomes:
according to the above formula, when
Namely whenMeanwhile, the value of the minimum cost value of the optimization method based on the Hash chain is only related to the ratio of the communication cost and the calculation cost of the adopted Hash function and is not related to the length of the Hash chain.
If the Hash function used in this embodiment is based on RC5, it is known that the computation overhead of RC5 is equivalent to the overhead of transmitting 1 byte of data, so the key length of each transmission is 8 bytes, because the Hash function is based on RC5And b/a is 8. At this time, we can calculateTherefore, if the Hash function based on RC5 is adopted, when the length of the Hash chain is 6, the calculation cost of the local server HS for deploying the Hash chain is minimum.
Taking the energy of one-time Hash calculation as a unit, the total calculation overhead of short Hash chains with different lengths is shown in fig. 7; as can be seen from fig. 7, as the length of the Hash chain increases, the energy overhead of the local server HS in deploying the Hash chain gradually increases. When a single Hash chain is adopted, the increasing speed of the energy overhead of the local server HS is increased along with the increasing of the length of the Hash chain, and the speed is higher and higher, and the energy overhead of the nodes is basically linear and is maintained at a lower level by adopting a method based on the self-regeneration of the short Hash chain.
In conclusion, the invention can ensure the safe anonymous authentication in the vehicle roaming process, and because the FS authentication of the roaming domain server only needs the Hash operation in the vehicle authentication process, the system overhead is obviously reduced, and the lightweight roaming access authentication process in the Internet of vehicles is realized.

Claims (10)

1. A lightweight roaming access authentication method in the Internet of vehicles is characterized in that: the method comprises the following two steps:
(1) initializing a system:
(1.1) the TA of the trust center initializes the system time T, and the Hash chain element uses the time interval Tc；
(1.2) each regional server creates an initial Hash chain and sends the identification number ID of the local server HS to the foreign server FS relative to the local server HS in the systemHSHash chain to be used and the start of use of the corresponding Hash chainInter Ts；
(2) And (3) roaming access authentication:
(2.1) the vehicle carries out real-time cross-domain roaming judgment through the real-time position information, the current driving strategy and the coverage range parameter of the local server HS, if the judgment result is true, the cross-domain roaming judgment is successful, and the vehicle sends the current judgment result to the local server HS and requests for roaming authentication materials;
(2.2) when the local server HS receives the request of the vehicle, generating an information verification code for the vehicle by combining the current system information, and deleting the registration information of the current vehicle in the local;
(2.3) after the vehicle enters the roaming area, sending identity authentication information to a roaming domain server FS through a roadside infrastructure (RSU); after the foreign server receives the identity authentication information of the vehicle, firstly inquiring a Hash chain corresponding to a home server HS of the current roaming vehicle, detecting the timeliness of an identity authentication material provided by the current vehicle through a time scale provided by a trust center, if the timeliness is within a threshold time, continuing authenticating the identity of the vehicle, verifying the identity of the vehicle through the seed value of the inquired Hash chain by a roaming domain server FS, and if the verification results of the information verification codes are consistent, proving the reliability of the identity of the current vehicle;
the identity authentication information sent by the vehicle to the roaming domain server FS comprises a vehicle home server identity marking number IDHSPseudonym identity PID finally used by vehicle in hometown domainjHash chain elements stored by a vehicle for use when requesting roaming authentication materialAnd the information verification code generated by the vehicle home server HS for the vehicle The seed value of the retrieved Hash chain is used as the seed value;
(2.4) the roaming domain server FS finds out a previous Hash element of a Hash value provided by the current vehicle through the inquired Hash chain, then sends the found Hash element and confirmation information to the vehicle, the vehicle performs Hash operation after receiving the Hash element, and if the Hash result is equal to the Hash value stored by the vehicle, the vehicle can confirm the identity of the roaming domain server FS;
and (2.5) after the identity authentication between the vehicle and the roaming domain server FS is carried out, the vehicle sends registration materials to the roaming domain server FS, the identity registration in the roaming domain server FS is completed, and the roaming domain server FS is changed into a home server of the vehicle.
2. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: the real-time cross-domain roaming judgment process in the step (2.1) is as follows:
the boundary RSU of the local server HS sends cross-domain roaming judgment materials to vehicles entering the coverage area of the local server HS, the vehicles carry out cross-domain roaming condition judgment according to the current driving strategy and the current position information in combination with the cross-domain roaming authentication materials, if the judgment result is true, cross-domain roaming judgment is carried out, and the vehicles send cross-domain roaming authentication material applications to the local server.
3. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: the cross-domain roaming authentication material in the step (2.1) comprises a cross-domain roaming vector, a use time interval of Hash chain elements, a cross-domain roaming reference distance and roaming-domain reference coordinates;
the roaming domain reference coordinate is a position coordinate of an adjacent roaming domain edge critical RSU corresponding to the local edge critical RSU in a roaming domain server FS coverage range bordering on the local server HS;
the cross-domain roaming vector is a vector from a local edge critical RSU position point to a roaming domain edge critical RSU position point corresponding to the local RSU;
the cross-domain roaming reference distance is as follows:wherein k is a constant value,is a cross-domain roaming vector.
4. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that: the cross-domain roaming condition determining process in the step (2.2) is as follows:
performing dot product operation on the current driving direction vector of the vehicle and the cross-domain roaming vector, if the result is positive, calculating the distance between the vehicle and the roaming domain RSU according to the current coordinate of the vehicle and the reference coordinate of the roaming domain, and if the distance is smaller than the modulus of the cross-domain roaming vectorAnd if the difference value is smaller than the roaming reference distance, the roaming condition is judged to be true.
5. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that: the cross-domain roaming judgment process in the step (2.1) is as follows:
firstly, the vehicle calculates the distance s between the current position coordinate and the local RSU position coordinate; secondly, the vehicle judges according to the current running speed v and the use time interval of the Hash chain element as follows:wherein n is a constant; if the judgment result is true, the cross-domain roaming judgment is successful; the vehicle can then make a cross-domain roaming material application to the home server HS.
6. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: the use process of the Hash chain comprises the following steps: a Hash chain pre-distribution stage, a Hash chain using stage and a Hash chain self-regeneration stage;
the Hash chain pre-distribution stage is a Hash chain pre-distribution process of the local server HS for the vehicles and the foreign server FS: the local server HS distributes the tail element of the initial Hash chain to the vehicle, and distributes the initial Hash chain to the foreign server FS through the trust center TA;
the Hash chain self-regeneration process comprises the following steps: first, the local server HS chooses an optional time periodAnd randomly generating a new seed value for the next Hash chain to generate a new Hash chain, wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to nj-2; and then the local server HS randomly selects 3 time periods and sends three messages bound with the new Hash chain information to the vehicle corresponding to the three time periods, thereby realizing the self-regeneration deployment process of the new Hash chain.
7. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 6, wherein: the local server HS randomly selects 3 time periods, and sends three messages bound with new Hash chain information to the vehicle corresponding to the three time periods, wherein the regeneration and deployment process comprises the following steps:
1) the local server HS randomly selects 3 time periods, respectivelyAndwherein i is less than or equal to f is less than or equal to nj-1，f+1≤s≤nj，s+1≤t≤nj+ 1; i denotes the time period during which the local server HS generates a new hash chainThe subscript of (a) is,representing a new Hash chain Kj+1First time period of
2) Local server HS in time periodBefore the first message bound with the next Hash chain information is sent, the related information calculation is carried out according to the currently used Hash chain and the generated next Hash chain to be used, namely the related information calculation is carried out, namelyAndwherein h is a Hash function,k' is authentication information associated with the new Hash chain, and the local server realizes the self-regeneration deployment process of the Hash chain by sending a message bound with the authentication information;
3) local server HS in time periodThe content of the first message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
<mrow> <msubsup> <mi>T</mi> <mi>f</mi> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>|</mo> <mi>f</mi> <mo>|</mo> <msup> <mi>K</mi> <mo>&amp;prime;</mo> </msup> <mo>|</mo> <mi>M</mi> <mi>A</mi> <mi>C</mi> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <msubsup> <mi>K</mi> <mrow> <mi>f</mi> <mo>+</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>,</mo> <msubsup> <mi>Msg</mi> <mi>f</mi> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> <mo>|</mo> <msubsup> <mi>K</mi> <mi>f</mi> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> </mrow>
wherein,the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code which is the message authentication code of the message, and if the vehicle and the foreign server FS pass the message verification, K' is saved;
4) local server HS in time periodThe content of the second message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
<mrow> <msubsup> <mi>T</mi> <mi>s</mi> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>|</mo> <mi>s</mi> <mo>|</mo> <mi>M</mi> <mi>A</mi> <mi>C</mi> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <msubsup> <mi>K</mi> <mrow> <mi>s</mi> <mo>+</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>,</mo> <msubsup> <mi>Msg</mi> <mi>s</mi> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> <mo>|</mo> <msubsup> <mi>K</mi> <mi>s</mi> <mi>j</mi> </msubsup> </mrow>
wherein,the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code of the message;
if the vehicle and the foreign server FS pass the message verification, savingThe vehicle and foreign server FS then pass the savedAnd K' calculationAt this time, the vehicle and the foreign server FS already store the Hash value of the new Hash chain tail
5) Local server HS in time periodNamely, it isThe content of the third message bound with the new Hash chain deployment information sent to the vehicle and the foreign server FS is as follows:
<mrow> <msubsup> <mi>T</mi> <mn>1</mn> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> <mo>+</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msubsup> <mo>|</mo> <mn>1</mn> <mo>|</mo> <mi>M</mi> <mi>A</mi> <mi>C</mi> <mrow> <mo>(</mo> <msubsup> <mi>K</mi> <mn>2</mn> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> <mo>+</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msubsup> <mo>,</mo> <msubsup> <mi>Msg</mi> <mn>1</mn> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> <mo>+</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msubsup> <mo>)</mo> </mrow> <mo>|</mo> <msubsup> <mi>K</mi> <mn>1</mn> <mrow> <mi>j</mi> <mo>+</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msubsup> </mrow>
wherein,the vehicle and the foreign server FS compare and verify the message sent by the local server HS by using the message authentication code of the message;
if the vehicle and the foreign server FS verify the message, the vehicle and the foreign server FS utilize the stored Hash value at the tail of the new Hash chainTo the new Hash chain tail value receivedCarry out the verification ifThe verification is passed, and the vehicle and foreign server FS store the new Hash chain tail valueThus, the local server HS safely realizes the deployment of a new Hash chain self-regeneration process to the vehicle and the foreign server FS.
8. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 7, wherein: the process that the local server HS deploys the Hash chain to the foreign server FS relative to the local server HS in the system is as follows:
if the local server HS never beforeThe foreign server FS deploys the Hash chain, and the local server HS sends the Hash chain and the use starting time Ts of the Hash chain to the foreign server FS together through the TA; if the Hash chain is not initially deployed, the local server HS safely deploys the tail element of the Hash chain to the foreign server FS through the Hash chain self-regeneration technology, and then calculates the starting use time Ts + x T of the next Hash chain according to the residual element x of the current Hash and the time reference T provided by the current trust center TAcAnd sending the Hash chain and the start use time Ts of the Hash chain to a foreign server FS together through TA.
9. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: in the step (2.2), the process of the local server HS generating the information verification code for the vehicle is as follows: the local server HS acquires the seed value of the Hash chain used currentlyThen combined with the pseudonymous PID currently used by the vehicle requesting the roaming authentication materialjLocal server identity indicating number IDHSAnd the Hash chain current element usedGenerating an information verification code
10. The lightweight roaming access authentication method in the internet of vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: in the step (2.4), the authentication process of the roaming domain server FS for the vehicle roaming authentication information is as follows:
firstly, a roaming domain server FS marks a number ID according to the identity of a vehicle home server in received informationHSRetrieving a currently used Hash chain of a locally stored vehicle home server HS and time Ts corresponding to Hash;
then, counting an element interval delta t between a Hash element used by the received vehicle and the tail part of a Hash chain, namely a time interval between the Hash element and the tail part of the Hash chain, and calculating | t | ═ t-delta t-Ts, wherein t is a time reference in the current TA, and if | t | is within a threshold time, the timeliness of the vehicle roaming authentication information is proved;
then the roaming domain server retrieves the seed value of the Hash chain according to the retrieved seed valueVerification code with informationAnd verifying the identity of the vehicle, and if the verification information is correct, finishing the authentication of the identity information of the vehicle by the roaming domain server.
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