CN104283673A - Random and dynamic voltage regulation anti-attack method for password circuit system and circuit system - Google Patents
Random and dynamic voltage regulation anti-attack method for password circuit system and circuit system Download PDFInfo
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- CN104283673A CN104283673A CN201410529052.8A CN201410529052A CN104283673A CN 104283673 A CN104283673 A CN 104283673A CN 201410529052 A CN201410529052 A CN 201410529052A CN 104283673 A CN104283673 A CN 104283673A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method used for protecting a password algorithm circuit against power consumption attacks and a circuit system. A method for carrying out random and dynamic voltage regulation on supply voltage of the password circuit is adopted for resisting the power consumption attacks. The whole circuit system comprises a random number generator, a voltage frequency control module, an adjustable voltage stabilizing source, a phase-locked loop and the password circuit. The random and dynamic voltage regulation technology changes the working voltage of the password circuit randomly and dynamically according to a certain strategy, suitable working frequency is matched, even if the same set of cleartexts and secret keys is input in the encryption process, power consumption of the corresponding password circuit is different, and randomness is possessed, so that the statistics law between power consumption information and secret key information is destroyed, and the ability of the password circuit to resist the power consumption attacks is improved.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to information security and integrated circuit (IC) design technical field, particularly cryptochannel and attack resistance method thereof.
Background technology
Along with day by day information-based, digitlization and the networking of modern society, take encryption device as the every aspect that the safety information product of representative has penetrated into national security and people's lives, become the important leverage of the optimum running of entire society.The various cipher circuit based on DES, AES, RSA, ECC and HASH scheduling algorithm obtains researches and develops widely.
In addition, cipher circuit is also faced with various security risk, and wherein the mathematics fail safe of cryptographic algorithm can be ensured by algorithm itself, and assailant is difficult to break through key by the method for exhaustion in finite time.But in recent years with differential power attack (Differential Power Analysis, DPA) be bypass attack (the Side-Channel Attack of representative, SCA, is translated into again " side-channel attack ") stern challenge is proposed to the fail safe of cryptochannel.Bypass attack is that a kind of non-invasive is attacked, assailant can be allowed to pass through to obtain the bypass message (as power consumption information, electromagnetic radiation etc.) revealed when encryption and decryption operates of encryption device, crucial key information is analyzed with statistical processing methods, it is attacked efficiency and attacks high several order of magnitude than traditional mathematics, and implements also easier.For DES algorithm, use differential power attack to not doing the DES encryption device protected, the key carried out needed for assailant conjecture can from 2
56secondaryly be reduced to 2
9secondary, and only need use the simple equipment such as computer, oscilloscope.
Power consumption attack is a kind of effective bypass attack means, by gather encrypted circuit encryption and decryption not isolog time the power consumption information revealed, carry out data prediction and statistical analysis, trickle for inherence between power consumption information and the data of process association is carried out differential amplification, thus analyzes key information.Power consumption attack is topmost attack means at present.Differential power attack (CPA) based on coefficient correlation is attacked because its powerful ability that cracks is widely adopted, it is by carrying out statistical analysis by the hypothesis power consumption information that the true power consumption information collected and mathematical analysis calculate, thus the correlation both obtaining judges true power consumption, wherein need to adopt certain power consumption model the mathematical analysis value without practical significance to be mapped as the hypothesis power consumption number of physical significance.Utilize the correlation between the analog power consumption of different secret key encryption and true power consumption, statistical analysis is carried out to a large amount of random test vector, make coefficient correlation curve chart, occur the then success attack of extreme value at point of attack place, the corresponding correlation curve of extreme value can be inferred and correct key; If there is not extreme value, then attack failure.In order to tackle the challenge that power consumption analysis attack proposes cipher circuit, the cryptochannel of design now must possess anti-power consumption attack ability.
The core of power consumption attack is a large amount of expressly random to encryption device input, gathers corresponding power consumption track and carries out statistical analysis, thus infers and key information.Must make different power consumption tracks on the time point of same operation, align (having identical statistical property at time dimension) during statistical analysis, and also need to ensure to produce (namely having identical statistical property in amplitude dimension) in same electrical pressure in the value of correspondence temporal power consumption point, just can contribute to correct analyzing key information.
The power consumption of digital circuit is divided into dynamic power consumption and quiescent dissipation.The actual motion of dynamic power consumption and circuit is directly related, is also that power consumption attack is paid close attention to the most.Dynamic power consumption is P=α C
lv
dd 2f, wherein α is the upset factor, C
lfor circuit load, V
ddfor supply voltage, f is operating frequency.Therefore, for the circuit determined, the dynamic power consumption of this circuit can be changed by change voltage and frequency.Low-power Technology field is commonly used DVS (dynamic voltage regulation) technology and is reduced power consumption by dynamically reducing circuit voltage.
Summary of the invention
Goal of the invention: for cryptochannel Problems existing and deficiency in security performance, provides a kind of the cryptochannel system and the method for encryption/decryption thereof that adopt stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation to reach opposing power consumption attack object.
Technical scheme: for achieving the above object, the present invention uses for reference stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation (DVS) technology of low-power consumption field maturation, and add randomizer, change operating voltage and the operating frequency of cryptochannel according to certain tactful stochastic and dynamic, resist power consumption attack.Stochastic and dynamic electric voltage frequency regulation technology, from the angle destroying power consumption information statistics rule, with less performance cost, by changing the operating voltage of circuit, makes the amplitude dimension statistical property of power consumption track change; And change cryptochannel frequency, the time dimension statistical property of power consumption track is changed, cuts off and contacting between hiding circuit power consumption track and data processing, thus effectively can strengthen the ability of its anti-power consumption attack.
Concrete technical scheme is as follows:
A kind of cryptochannel system, is characterized in that comprising:
Randomizer, its function is generation random number, and its output signal is connected to the input of electric voltage frequency control module;
Electric voltage frequency control module, its function is the voltage range [Vmin that can normally work according to random number N and the cryptochannel of randomizer generation, Vmax] produce voltage control signal Vc, this voltage control signal is connected to the input of digital and Adjustable; Meanwhile, electric voltage frequency control module also produces the frequency control signal supporting with this voltage control signal, and this frequency control signal is connected to the input of phase-locked loop, and under ensureing this voltage control signal and frequency control signal, cryptochannel can normally work;
Digital and Adjustable, its output signal is connected to the power end of cryptochannel, and function is that the voltage control signal Vc exported according to electric voltage frequency control module produces the supply power voltage VDD specified, for powering to cryptochannel;
Phase-locked loop, its output signal is connected to the clock end of cryptochannel, and function is that the frequency control signal exported according to electric voltage frequency control module produces the frequency F specified, for the operating frequency of setting code circuit;
Cryptochannel, for being encrypted or decryption oprerations input data.
The stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation attack resistance method of cryptochannel system of the present invention, is characterized in that comprising the steps:
Step 1: initialization, resets to modules;
Step 2: randomizer produces a random number N and exports electric voltage frequency control module to;
Step 3: electric voltage frequency control module produces voltage control signal Vc and corresponding frequency control signal according to the voltage range [Vmin, Vmax] that random number N and cryptochannel can normally work, and exports digital and Adjustable and phase-locked loop respectively to;
Step 4: digital and Adjustable produces supply power voltage VDD according to voltage control signal Vc and powers to cryptochannel, and phase-locked loop produces the frequency F specified, by the frequency adjustment of cryptochannel to assigned frequency F according to frequency control signal simultaneously;
Step 5: outer input data and key, waits for that enciphering/deciphering commencing signal is come, and cryptochannel completes enciphering/deciphering operation, and exports enciphering/deciphering result;
Step 6: repeat the operation of step 2 to step 5, until total data is disposed.
The core of power consumption attack is a large amount of expressly random to encryption device input, gathers corresponding power consumption track and carries out statistical analysis, thus infers and key information.Must make during statistical analysis (having identical statistical property in amplitude dimension) that different power consumption tracks produces in same electrical pressure.
The present invention changes the operating voltage of cipher circuit according to certain tactful stochastic and dynamic, and its operating frequency of corresponding change.During each group plain text encryption, voltage is random generation, due to change in voltage, the power consumption track that each group plain text encryption produces is all different, often organize between power consumption mark and not there is identical statistical law, so the power consumption information being difficult to measure according to cryptochannel duration of work is carried out attack and is obtained key by assailant, thus improves the anti-power consumption attack ability of encrypted circuit.
Assailant has two difficult points when the cryptochannel protected the inventive method carries out power consumption attack.Difficult point one: due under different voltage, between cipher circuit deal with data and the power consumption of generation, not there is identical statistical law, assailant is to obtain good result, first need to carry out power consumption preliminary treatment, identical voltage power consumption information will be had and carry out classification extraction, because the design details of cryptochannel and attack resistance method details generally provide to assailant, assailant then cannot screen power consumption mark according to voltage classification.In addition, the amount of information of the power consumption track that assailant obtains is comparatively large, and especially this method makes change in voltage have erratic behavior, makes the preliminary treatment of power consumption very difficult.Difficult point two: even if assailant be realised that the detail (usually unlikely) of chip design and attack resistance method, successfully carry out power consumption preliminary treatment, by different voltage Accurate classification, suppose that enciphering and deciphering algorithm voltage has M kind change at random to combine, so useful power consumption information will only have original 1/M, is equivalent to attack difficulty and at least adds M doubly.Ideally, if can accomplish, voltage can change at random arbitrarily, and when namely M quantity is close to infinity, assailant cannot obtain key by differential power attack.
Beneficial effect:
The present invention adopts the anti-power consumption attack of random voltages regulation technology to have following features:
(1) anti-attack ability is strong: can resist simple power consumption attack, differential power attack, Electromagnetic attack etc., due to the operating voltage of the random dynamic change cipher circuit of the present invention, change power consumption track numerical value, thus destroy the statistics rule of power consumption information.Theoretically, if can accomplish, voltage can change at random arbitrarily, and when namely M quantity is close to infinity, assailant cannot obtain key by differential power attack.
(2) applied range: can be applicable to private key cryptographic (3DES, AES) algorithm circuit or public key cryptography (RSA) algorithm circuit or for the protection of the key component (as byte replaces S box) inside cipher circuit.
(3) power consumption is lower: adopt dynamic voltage regulation technology can reduce power consumption in certain limit, and when voltage and frequency are adjusted to lower than value in routine work situation, the power consumption of circuitry consumes can corresponding reduction.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1: based on the structured flowchart of the cryptochannel system of the anti-power consumption attack of stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation
Fig. 2: the schematic diagram of cryptochannel
Fig. 3: the workflow diagram of the anti-power consumption attack of dynamic voltage regulation
Fig. 4: the complete power consumption mark of cryptochannel in encryption process
Fig. 5: with the CPA power consumption attack coefficient correlation figure of the DES circuit of this method protection
Fig. 6: the CPA power consumption attack coefficient correlation figure not adding the DES circuit of protection
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments, illustrate the present invention further.
As shown in Figure 1, the structured flowchart with the cryptochannel system of the anti-power consumption attack ability of stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation comprises randomizer, electric voltage frequency control module, digital and Adjustable, phase-locked loop, cryptochannel, wherein:
Randomizer, its function is generation random number N, and its output signal is connected to the input of electric voltage frequency control module;
Electric voltage frequency control module, its function is the voltage range [Vmin that can normally work according to random number N and the cryptochannel of randomizer generation, Vmax] produce voltage control signal VC, its voltage control signal exported is connected to the input of digital and Adjustable; Meanwhile, produce the frequency control signal supporting with this voltage, be connected to the input of phase-locked loop, under ensureing this voltage and frequency, cryptochannel can normally work;
Wherein voltage control signal Vc=Vmin+Nmod (Vmax-Vmin), wherein Vmin is the minimum amount of voltage that cryptochannel can normally work, Vmax is the maximum voltage value that cryptochannel can normally work, mod is modulo operation, the defining of span of random number N is determined according to Vmin and Vmax, ensures that voltage control signal Vc is a random number between Vmin and Vmax.
Digital and Adjustable, its function produces according to the output voltage control signal Vc of electric voltage frequency control module the supply power voltage VDD specified, and for powering to cryptochannel, its output signal is connected to the power end of cryptochannel;
Phase-locked loop, its function is that the frequency control signal exported according to electric voltage frequency control module produces the frequency F specified, and for the operating frequency of setting code circuit, output signal is connected to the clock end of cryptochannel.
Cryptochannel, for being encrypted or decryption oprerations input data, is protected object.
As shown in Figure 2, be the circuit block diagram of cryptochannel, comprise input interface, crypto engine, output interface, input interface and output interface meet APB bus specification simultaneously, carry out register read-write by APB bus to input and output interface; The signal that input interface connects comprises data input signal, clock signal, reset signal, enciphering/deciphering commencing signal; The signal of the connection of output interface comprises enciphering/deciphering end signal, data output signal; Crypto engine realizes cryptographic algorithm, and the circuit realizing cryptographic algorithm includes but not limited to DES algorithm circuit, aes algorithm circuit, the enciphering/deciphering circuit such as RSA Algorithm circuit.
As shown in Figure 3, be the anti-power consumption attack flow chart of dynamic voltage regulation, comprise following several step
Step 1: initialization, resets to modules;
Step 2: randomizer produces a random number N and exports electric voltage frequency control module to;
Step 3: the voltage range [Vmin, Vmax] that voltage control module can normally work according to random number N and cryptochannel, produces voltage control signal Vc and corresponding frequency control signal, and exports digital and Adjustable and phase-locked loop respectively to;
Step 4: digital and Adjustable produces supply power voltage VDD according to voltage control signal Vc and powers to cryptochannel, and phase-locked loop produces the frequency F specified, by the frequency adjustment of cryptochannel to assigned frequency F according to frequency control signal simultaneously;
Step 5: outer input data and key, waits for that enciphering/deciphering commencing signal is come, and cryptochannel completes encryption (or deciphering) operation, and exports enciphering/deciphering result.
Step 6: repeat the operation of step 2 to step 5, until total data is disposed.
Figure 4 shows that three the representational power consumption marks of cryptochannel in encryption process, method of measurement enters a small resistor in the voltage source termination of DES circuit, and current conversion when being worked by cryptochannel becomes voltage signal.For the ease of comparing ciphering process, time coordinate is normalization, and according to the encryption period of Article 1 curve, other two curves carry out transverse compression, make ciphering process consistent.Article 1, trace0 is the power consumption mark gathered under normal working voltage VDD=1.8V, and compared with trace1, trace2 of gathering at a lower voltage, three curve encryption processes are similar, but from ordinate, the amplitude of three curves has obvious difference.Therefore, the energy ezpenditure feature of cryptochannel in encryption process has been changed, and the signal to noise ratio that also namely these operations are corresponding is effectively changed, thus reduces the correlation of correct hypothesis key.
Figure 5 shows that the simulation result be applied in the process of the present invention on des encryption circuit is example, illustrate the effect of this method.Under PTPX emulation tool, power consumption emulation is carried out to DES circuit encrypts process, record its power consumption mark, and application is based on the differential power attack of correlation analysis, calculate hypothesis power consumption number with Hamming distance model, calculate all 2
6the coefficient correlation figure of=64 kinds of conjecture keys, as shown in Figure 5.Visible in figure, the coefficient correlation of all power consumption marks is all very little, all remains on less than 0.08, and does not occur obvious peak value, namely cannot tell the power consumption mark (light color represents) that correct key produces from curve a small bundle of straw, etc. for silkworms to spin cocoons on.That is, when guessing that sub-key is identical with true subkey, the coefficient correlation curve of its correspondence is hidden in other coefficient correlation curves completely, does not occur obvious peak value, therefore cannot be guessed by coefficient correlation spike and correct key.
As a comparison, with same attack method, CPA attack is carried out to the DES circuit not adding protection, given all 2 of front 6 keys
6the coefficient correlation figure of=64 kinds of conjecture keys, as shown in Figure 6.Can clearly see by figure, near the point of attack (the about the 12nd power consumption point), there is a spike in coefficient correlation curve, its value is about 0.15.This spike appears at second and takes turns the place that encryption starts, and the point of attack selected is consistent, and sub-key corresponding to this peak is " 101011 ", 6 keys will guessed just.Both contrasts are visible, and the present invention is really to protection differential power attack successful.
Claims (8)
1. a cryptochannel system, is characterized in that comprising:
Randomizer, its function is generation random number N, and its output signal is connected to the input of electric voltage frequency control module;
Electric voltage frequency control module, its function is the voltage range [Vmin that can normally work according to random number N and the cryptochannel of randomizer generation, Vmax] produce voltage control signal Vc, this voltage control signal is connected to the input of digital and Adjustable; Meanwhile, electric voltage frequency control module also produces the frequency control signal supporting with this voltage control signal, and this frequency control signal is connected to the input of phase-locked loop, and under ensureing this voltage control signal and frequency control signal, cryptochannel can normally work;
Digital and Adjustable, its output signal is connected to the power end of cryptochannel, and function is that the voltage control signal Vc exported according to electric voltage frequency control module produces the supply power voltage VDD specified, for powering to cryptochannel;
Phase-locked loop, its output signal is connected to the clock end of cryptochannel, and function is that the frequency control signal exported according to electric voltage frequency control module produces the frequency F specified, for the operating frequency of setting code circuit;
Cryptochannel, for being encrypted or decryption oprerations input data.
2. cryptochannel system according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: when each group input data carries out enciphering/deciphering, supply power voltage VDD is random generation, even if input one group of identical data and key during enciphering/deciphering, the power consumption of the cryptochannel of its correspondence is also different, and has randomness.
3. cryptochannel system according to claim 1, is characterized in that:
Voltage control signal Vc=Vmin+N mod (Vmax-Vmin), wherein Vmin is the minimum amount of voltage that cryptochannel can normally work, Vmax is the maximum voltage value that cryptochannel can normally work, mod is modulo operation, the span of random number N is determined according to Vmin and Vmax, ensures that voltage control signal Vc is a random number between Vmin and Vmax.
4. cryptochannel system according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described cryptochannel comprises input interface, output interface and crypto engine; The signal that input interface connects comprises data input signal, clock signal, reset signal, enciphering/deciphering commencing signal; The signal that output interface connects comprises enciphering/deciphering end signal, data output signal; Crypto engine realizes concrete cryptographic algorithm.
5. a stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation attack resistance method for cryptochannel system, described cryptochannel system comprises randomizer, electric voltage frequency control module, digital and Adjustable, phase-locked loop and cryptochannel, it is characterized in that comprising the steps:
Step 1: initialization, resets to modules;
Step 2: randomizer produces a random number N and exports electric voltage frequency control module to;
Step 3: electric voltage frequency control module produces voltage control signal Vc and corresponding frequency control signal according to the voltage range [Vmin, Vmax] that random number N and cryptochannel can normally work, and exports digital and Adjustable and phase-locked loop respectively to;
Step 4: digital and Adjustable produces supply power voltage VDD according to voltage control signal Vc and powers to cryptochannel, and phase-locked loop produces the frequency F specified, by the frequency adjustment of cryptochannel to assigned frequency F according to frequency control signal simultaneously;
Step 5: outer input data and key, waits for that enciphering/deciphering commencing signal is come, and cryptochannel completes enciphering/deciphering operation, and exports enciphering/deciphering result;
Step 6: repeat the operation of step 2 to step 5, until total data is disposed.
6. stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation attack resistance method according to claim 5, it is characterized in that: can correctly work all the time to make cryptochannel, in step 4, if the supply power voltage VDD of cryptochannel regulates from high voltage to low-voltage, then first regulating frequency F, regulates supply power voltage VDD again after it is stable; Otherwise, if the supply power voltage VDD of cryptochannel regulates from low-voltage to high voltage, then first regulate supply power voltage VDD, regulating frequency F again after it is stable.
7. stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation attack resistance method according to claim 5, it is characterized in that: when each group input data carries out enciphering/deciphering, supply power voltage VDD is random generation, even if input one group of identical data and key during enciphering/deciphering, the power consumption of the cryptochannel of its correspondence is also different, and has randomness.
8. stochastic and dynamic voltage-regulation attack resistance method according to claim 5, it is characterized in that: voltage control signal Vc=Vmin+N mod (Vmax-Vmin), wherein Vmin is the minimum amount of voltage that cryptochannel can normally work, Vmax is the maximum voltage value that cryptochannel can normally work, mod is modulo operation, the span of random number N is determined according to Vmin and Vmax, ensures that voltage control signal Vc is a random number between Vmin and Vmax.
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Application publication date: 20150114 |