CN103782346B - Nuclear power facility - Google Patents
Nuclear power facility Download PDFInfo
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- CN103782346B CN103782346B CN201280008045.2A CN201280008045A CN103782346B CN 103782346 B CN103782346 B CN 103782346B CN 201280008045 A CN201280008045 A CN 201280008045A CN 103782346 B CN103782346 B CN 103782346B
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- island
- protection zone
- turbine
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D1/00—Details of nuclear power plant
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
- G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
- G08B13/12—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires
- G08B13/122—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires for a perimeter fence
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Plasma & Fusion (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- High Energy & Nuclear Physics (AREA)
- Buildings Adapted To Withstand Abnormal External Influences (AREA)
- Structure Of Emergency Protection For Nuclear Reactors (AREA)
Abstract
Nuclear island includes at least one nuclear reactor.Turbine island includes at least turbine building, at least one turbine steam-powered that the receiving of turbine building is produced by nuclear reactor.Protection zone has the border protected by least one fence.Isolation area around protection zone and includes intrusion detection device, and this intrusion detection device is configured to detect without permission near protection zone.Nuclear island is arranged in protection zone, and turbine island is arranged on outside protection zone and is spaced apart with protection zone.
Description
This application claims the rights and interests of the U.S. Provisional Application No.61/512,644 of on July 28th, 2011 submission.The application will
The rights and interests of the U.S. Provisional Application No.61/440,545 asking submit to on 2 8th, 2011.The U.S. that on July 28th, 2011 submits to faces
When application No.61/512,644 full text by referring in the way of include herein.The U.S. Provisional Application submitted to on 2 8th, 2011
No.61/440,545 full text by referring in the way of include herein.
Background technology
Below it is related to nuclear power generation field, nuclear power facility field, nuclear reactor facility arrangement field and association area.
Construction nuclear power facility is a wide in range job.The initially general of electric power output is produced by plant design and construction
Thought can exceed 10 years or longer practice, and can spend millions of dollar or more.
Nuclear power facility is designed to harbor.Emergency core cooling system（ECCS）It is designed in cooling in conjunction with nuclear reactor
Agent forfeiture accident（LOCA）, radiator loses under accident conditions or may affect safety shutdown nuclear reaction in the case of safe other
Heap.In addition, nuclear power facility can be attractive target for terrorist, violence tissue etc..Thus, most of states
Family implements measures to ensure that nuclear power facility from external attack.
In the U.S., NRC（NRC）The rules and regulations promulgated guarantee the rule from external attack for the nuclear electricity facility
Then.See, for example, 10C.F.R.Part73（The United States Federal's code volume 10 the 73rd part）{ in http://www.nrc.gov/
Reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/ is visible, on January 28th, 2011 last access).According to NRC method
Rule, define protection zone, and its border is restricted the protection of the physical barrier entering protection zone.10C.F.R.§73.55(e)
(8).Important area including at least reactor control room, spentnuclear fuel pond and some critical alert assemblies is located in protection zone.
10C.F.R.§73.55(e)(9).Area of isolation is maintained at the outdoor area adjacent with protection zone border barrier.10C.F.R.§
73.55(e)(7).The size of isolation area and design allow to observe without barrier and assess on the either side of protection zone barrier
Activity, and with detecting before completing through protection zone border barrier and record attempts or actually cuts through protection zone
The suitable intrusion detection equipment of border barrier is monitored.Ibid.
Although NRC rules and regulations nuclear facilities safety some aspects, it is appreciated that each facility have uniqueness geography,
Landform, facility size and other factorses.Thus, develop specific safety program for each nuclear electricity facility.Generally referring to
C.F.R.Title10Part73 (the United States Federal's code volume 10 the 73rd part).
Beyond the U.S., jurisdiction generally has similar to supervisor NRC, promulgating protection nuclear electricity facility regulation
Structure.
Content of the invention
According to some aspects disclosed herein, a kind of equipment includes：Nuclear island, this nuclear island includes at least one nuclear reactor；
Turbine island, this turbine island includes at least turbine building, the steam that the receiving of turbine building is produced by nuclear reactor
At least one turbine driving；Protection zone, this protection zone has the border protected by least one fence；And isolation
Area, this isolation area around protection zone and includes intrusion detection device, and it is close without permission that intrusion detection device is configured to detection
Protection zone.Nuclear island is arranged in protection zone, and turbine island is arranged on outside protection zone and is spaced apart with protection zone.
According to some aspects disclosed herein, a kind of equipment includes：Nuclear island, this nuclear island includes at least one nuclear reactor；
Turbine building, at least one turbine steam-powered that the receiving of this turbine building is produced by nuclear reactor；Protection
Region, this protection zone has the border protected by least one fence；And isolation area, this isolation area is around protection zone simultaneously
Including intrusion detection device, intrusion detection device is configured to detect without permission near protection zone.Isolation area includes intercepting and capturing sky
Between, intercept and capture space and around protection zone and there is at least 30 feet wide physical barriers fields and sensor array, sensor array
Around intercept and capture space and be configured to detect without permission near intercept and capture space.
According to some aspects disclosed herein, a kind of equipment includes：Nuclear island, this nuclear island includes at least one nuclear reactor；
And turbine island, this turbine island includes at least one turbine steam-powered being produced by nuclear reactor.Nuclear island and whirlpool
Turbine island is spaced apart from each other.Spacing between nuclear island and turbine island is 50 feet in certain embodiments and is more preferably 100
Foot, and better it is 130 feet.In certain embodiments, nuclear island is maintained at the safe class higher than turbine island.
According to some aspects disclosed herein, a kind of equipment includes：At least one nuclear reactor；At least one turbine,
The steam drive that this at least one turbine is produced by nuclear reactor；And super radiator, this super radiator is arranged on ground
Lower and with nuclear reactor operable communication.
The brief description of accompanying drawing
Fig. 1 schematically shows the vertical view of " 2- group " nuclear electricity facility（I.e. plane）Figure, including having two nuclear reactors
Nuclear island.
Fig. 2 schematically shows the vertical view of " 4- group " nuclear electricity facility（I.e. plane）Figure, including having four nuclear reactors
Nuclear island.
Fig. 3 schematically shows the vertical view of nuclear electricity facility（I.e. plane）Figure, wherein condenser are located at outside fence.
Specific embodiment
Nuclear electricity facility is usually specific electrical power output and designs, and it sets nuclear reactor and coherent radiation limits
And emergency core cooling system（ECCS）, the size of one or more power generation turbines etc. and further feature.Reactor is located at envelope
Close in building/containment building, crucial ECCS part and reactor supporting system（I.e. spentnuclear fuel, radwaste）It is located at
Containment interior of building or against containment building, therefore forms " nuclear island ".Including turbine, condenser, distrbution network
（I.e. " switchyard "）In interior remaining part（I.e. " balance of plant "）Near nuclear island positioning.For producing the turbine of electric power
The steam drive that machine is produced by nuclear island, and be contained in the turbine building of nuclear island.This makes to extend to turbine builds
The length of the steam pipe line building thing and the water-supply line that extends to nuclear island is the shortest, therefore make instantaneous heat loss, pipeline condensation and
Parasitic power loss in link（I.e. pump）Minimum, and enable nuclear island and turbine building to constitute the list for security purpose
Individual continuous protection zone.Based on various factors select facility place, such as geographically near power consumer, capital construction
Hold, the availability of shock resistance, cooling water etc..
Facilities design also answers Bindery security, especially for " visual plant ", NRC（NRC）To be " important
Equipment " is defined as that " its fault, damage or release can directly or indirectly jeopardize appointing of publilc health and safety by exposure to radiation
What equipment, system, device or material ".May require that after these faults, damage or release for protecting publilc health and safety
Equipment or system are considered as important.”10C.F.R.§73.2.All visual plants must be positioned in important area, important area
Domain must be positioned in protection zone again.10C.F.R.§73.55(e)(9).Protection zone is by Security Personnel's routine patrols and to be subject to
The restriction access region of physical barriers protection.Referring to 10C.F.R. § 73.55 (e) (8).Protection zone is again by outdoor area
Isolation area is around outdoor area size is set as observing the activity in isolation area and protection zone in the clear, and with automatically
（And record）Invasion-detecting sensor and siren monitor.Beyond the U.S., jurisdiction generally by similar security regulations or refers to
South is managing.
Generally, nuclear electricity facility is built into compact layout, turbine building and against nuclear island form continuous guarantor
The core in shield region.In some facility layouts, the other parts of the balance of plant of such as switchyard and/or condenser
It is also included within protection zone.In order to adapt to the eminence structure of the roof installation cooler being such as used for turbine building,
Appropriate location near the border of protection zone set up guard tower with guarantee Security Officer whole protection zone border is had continuously,
Uncrossed overlapping observation.
As disclosed herein, the conventional method with regard to nuclear electricity facility layout has some shortcomings, and they pass through this paper institute
The improvement disclosing overcomes.
In the existing layout of nuclear electricity facility, run and maintenance cost is all very high.For example, estimate that security expense is annual about
2005 million to three thousand ten thousand dollars.This expense is debatable for compared with small nut electric power facility, the generation of such as proposition
Less than 300 megawatts（Electricity）Small modular reactor（SMR）Design.Additionally, can be problematic using guarding tower, because guarding
The posture of the personnel in tower is that sitting is motionless, and this is unfavorable for the lasting Vigilance needed for Security Personnel.In consideration of it, it is static
Guard posture and ideally should have the rotation about each two hour.As fixed position, the protection tower near border
It is the target of the known and fine delineation of any external attack.
Existing nuclear power plant facility layout also makes structure, maintenance, repair and updating operation complicated.On nuclear island or turbine is built
Building any work that any other place in thing or protection zone carries out must be clear by having to working in protection zone
The personnel's execution understanding.In the case of being operated by contractor or other " outside " personnel, these personnel are in protection zone
Must accompany when interior.Additionally, main upgrading in protection zone, such as increasing to the turbine island in the protection zone of existing utility
Plus new turbine is it may be necessary to the examination of one or more administrative organization and approval.
Further, although existing nuclear electricity facility is compact, substantial amounts of operation part is placed on protection zone by them
In domain.This leads to there are relatively great amount of personnel in compact protection zone, and this has at aspects such as safety, evacuating personnel programs
Problem.
With reference to Fig. 1, improvement nuclear electricity facility disclosed herein is shown in plan view（That is, schematic plan）.Nuclear power
Power facility includes nuclear island and turbine island, and nuclear island includes the containment building 10 accommodating at least one nuclear reactor（Illustrative Fig. 1
Illustrate to accommodate " two groups " of two nuclear reactors 12,14, and also illustrate that spentnuclear fuel pond 16 in containment building 10 with weary combustion
Material stores spentnuclear fuel after reactor takes out）, turbine island includes the turbine building 20 accommodating at least one turbine.One
Individual or multiple nuclear reactors 12,14 may include the substantially any type of nuclear reactor using major loop and steam-return line,
Preferred embodiment includes pressurized water reactor（PWR）.One or more nuclear reactors can be steamed with outside via main coolant loop
Vapour generator（Not shown, but be also accommodated in these embodiments in containment building）It is operatively connected.In illustrative example
In, nuclear reactor 12,14 is " integral type " nuclear reactor, and wherein steam generator is located in reactor vessel.This rear construction
Some examples disclosed in the 16 days December in 2010 of Thome et al. U.S. Publication the 2010/0316181Alth
Illustrate in " Integral Helical Coil Pressurized Water Nuclear Reactor ", the disclosure is complete
Literary composition by referring in the way of include herein, and in http://www.babcock.com/products/modular_nuclear/
（On January 29th, 2011 last access）（B＆W mPower in description exploitationTMIntegral small-sized modularity reactor designs）In
Illustrate.U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2010/0316181Al discloses a kind of integral type PWR, and it is using having spiral
The steam generator of coil pipe；But more generally, integrated steam generator can adopt straight tube, the tubular steam of such as vertical tube is sent out
Raw device（OTSG）Or other pipe construction, and secondary coolant can be in pipe（Tube side）Flowing, Main Coolant moves around pipe flow, or
Secondary coolant can be in the shell around pipe（Shell-side）Flowing, Main Coolant flows through pipe.Integrated steam is either adopted to occur
Device or independent steam generator, the purpose of steam generator is to make the Main Coolant of flowing in reactor（Typically light
Water, but it is also contemplated for the other types of Main Coolant of such as heavy water）With secondary coolant water（" feed water "）Thermal communication, two grades cold
But agent water is thus heated and changes into steam.Although between Main Coolant and secondary coolant, heat connects in steam generator
Logical, but Main Coolant separates with secondary coolant still fluid, there is not mixing between Main Coolant and secondary coolant.
Secondary coolant steam flows to turbine island to drive turbine via steam pipe line from nuclear island（Or, turbine/
Generator assembly）To produce, consumer or the electricity of other terminal use are distributed to by switchyard.In certain embodiments, two grades
Coolant water flows in closed loop path, and wherein steam is in turbine island or condenser 21 condensed back into liquid water（That is, liquid secondary
Coolant water）And flow back to nuclear island via water-supply line.The water-supply line of steam pipe line and apolegamy is via facility tunnel 22 in nuclear island
And turbine passes through between island.
Although it should be understood that schematic Fig. 1 illustrates two nuclear reactors（I.e. " 2- group "）, but more generally, nuclear island may include
One nuclear reactor, two nuclear reactors, three nuclear reactors, four nuclear reactors, five nuclear reactors, six nuclear reactors
Deng.Including during multiple reactor it is considered to nuclear island is divided into two or more non-conterminous protection zones, or alternatively multiple reactors
It is arranged in single continuous protection zone（As illustrative Fig. 1）.Furthermore, it is to be understood that schematic Fig. 1 only illustrates the notable spy of selection
Levy, omit multiple feature known in the art simultaneously.
With continued reference to Fig. 1, protection zone 30 has the border protected by least one fence 32.Isolation area 34 is around protection
Region 30 simultaneously includes being configured to detect the intrusion detection device 36 close to protection zone 30 without permission（In FIG by around guarantor
Shield region 30 dotted line instruction, be also properly termed as " PIDAS " border, wherein abbreviation " PIDAS " expressions " border intrusion detection with
Assessment system（Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System）”）, such as thermal imaging takes the photograph
As head, vibrating sensor, microwave detector, motion detection photographic head nd various combinations thereof etc..It is being envisaged for the embodiment of the U.S.
In, the warning light in the type of physical barriers and quantity, protection zone adopting in the type of sensor and density, isolation area is fitted
When illustrated in the NRC regulation meeting isolation area and protection zone, such as 10C.F.R. § 73.55.
As Fig. 1 it can be noted that nuclear island is arranged in protection zone 30.（If multiple reactors are arranged on multiple continuous
And/or discontinuous nuclear island, protection zone comprises two core of all these continuous and/or discontinuous nuclear island-in illustrative example
Reactor 12,14 is arranged in single continuous protection zone 30）.But, turbine island be arranged on protection zone 30 outer and with guarantor
Shield region 30 is spaced apart.This arrangement is using the such identification made here：（1）Turbine and associated components are not required protecting
Visual plant in shield region, and（2）Turbine and associated components can be relatively distant from nuclear island positioning.
With regard to（1）, turbine island is not key area, because during any emergency recognized, turbine
The fault on machine island, destruction or other damage will not directly or indirectly lead to radiation release, and turbine island does not need for protecting
Shield publilc health and safety.Referring to 10C.F.R. § 73.2.The steam drive that turbine is produced by nuclear island；But drive turbine
Steam is not by the secondary coolant of any radioactive material contamination.Extend to the fracture of the steam pipe line on turbine island from nuclear island
（Or other fault or shutdown）Or the fracture of the water-supply line of nuclear island is extended to from turbine island（Or other fault or shutdown）No
Can cause（Directly or indirectly）The release of active material.At most, to constitute radiator impaired for this fracture or fault or shutdown
The radiator of event, wherein nuclear reactor may be impaired due to the flowing of secondary coolant in steam generator.In closing building
For the emergency core cooling system of reactor setting in thing（ECCS）By close immediately reactor, to by radiator damage cause
Any loss pressure rise decompression and the cooling that starts reactor core and adapt to any radiator and damage event.ECCS
Using shutdown control bar, soluble poison injection, the steam condenser being located in containment building, it is stored in positioned at containment building
The cooling water of interior refueling water storage tank memory storage or other suitably equipment carrying out this shutdown, without as containment building
Any Main Coolant of Environment release（Ratio external environment condition much less）.
With regard to（2）, recognize that turbine and associated components can be relatively distant from nuclear island positioning herein.This arrangement utilizes energy
Enough stages before approval start to build on balance of plant（That is, the structure outside nuclear island）And hereafter use nuclear power plant supporting
Facility supports the parallel construction of nuclear island, thus, it is possible to realize the irrealizable structural advantages of alternate manner.
Generally, turbine positions so that extend to the length of the steam pipe line of turbine building from nuclear island against nuclear island
The shortest.Reason for this is that the steam that steam pipe line is heated by nuclear reactor via steam generator delivery, and therefore longer
Steam pipe line can lead to more thermal loss and reduce efficiency.But, set with other types of such as Fossil fuel facility
The comparison applied shows that this worry is unnecessary and 100 feet of magnitudes or longer steam pipe line are feasible, thermal loss
Will not be problematic.
In certain embodiments, steam pipe line and water-supply line be in ground level or following, and such as in FIG illustrative sets
Apply in tunnel 22.Can carry out more substantial aspect is thermally isolated this can be favourable, thus reducing further in jet chimney
Any heat loss.Bury and put these pipelines the improvement safety of the external attack preventing that target from being these pipelines is also provided.Additional
Ground or alternatively, in certain embodiments, nuclear island is at least partially in underground.In certain embodiments, nuclear island is in below ground, and
Protection zone 30 has the maximum height less than 20 feet.In certain embodiments, nuclear island is in below ground, and protection zone 30
There is the maximum height less than 36 feet.
Although in lower height facility（For example partially or completely in underground）It has been generally acknowledged that being easily subject to from high height
Attack, but it is recognized herein that partially or completely the facility in underground there are in terms of security standpoint some advantages.By partly or completely
Entirely bury and put nuclear island and turbine is placed on outside safety zone, the maximum height step-down of protection zone can be made, such as in some realities
Apply in example and be less than 20 feet, and be less than 10 feet in certain embodiments.This reduction has any obstruction in protection zone and sees
The probability examined.In fact, in certain embodiments it is considered to not guard tower, because they do not need to provide whole protection zone
Without hindrance observation on domain.Underground may also provide the enhancing protection resisting aerial or projectile attack.
In certain embodiments, super radiator（UHS）Both located underground it also is located in nuclear island or the protection against nuclear island
In region.For example, in illustrative Fig. 1, multiple UHS ponds 38 are located in protection zone 30.This arrangement can also reduce external attack
The pipeline that ECCS is connected by cut-out with super radiator is thus damage the probability that ECCS runs.
In fact, as herein disclosed, the safety program for the nuclear electricity facility of Fig. 1 is adopted with nuclear electricity facility routine
Dramatically different.Target is：(1) make the size of protection zone minimum（Even with the cost compared with large population's nuclear electricity facility）；
(2) make the height in protection zone minimum；(3) make delay element maximum；And (4) make operational efficiency highest.
By forming around protection zone 30 and having the intercepting and capturing space of at least 30 feet wide physical barriers fields（Engage empty
Between）40, and dispose around intercepting and capturing space 40 and be configured to detect without permission near the sensor array 36 intercepting and capturing space 40
Realize in the illustrative example of Fig. 1（3）?.Physical barriers field suitably includes ecthoaeum, barb bar or wire gauze and has
Enough width（It is designated as W in FIGpb）Postpone to detect intrusion and this intrusion via the sensor array of surrounding with notable
Border through protection zone 30（Such as fence 32）Between time.Although for this reason, physical barriers field is at least 30 feet wide,
More preferably at least 80 feet at least 100 feet wide widely and better.With this combination, turbine island and protection zone 30（In Fig. 1
It is denoted as " dTurbine”）Between preferably at least 50 feet of spacing, be more preferably at least 100 feet, and better be at least
130 feet.Low clearance protection zone guarantees to enter in this attacker in any attacker with wide combining of physical barriers field
The longer time is exposed after detected before protection zone.The design that this delay normal form is also contained in protection zone 30 is entered
Enter in passage.For example, referring to Fig. 1, towards the road 50 of protection zone 30（It is additional to the safety also executing suitable vehicle search agreement
Army monitors）The movable physical barriers field part 52 being installed on sliding component etc. stops, thus removing from road and allowing to award
Power vehicle is examined and pass through after allowing access into.Similarly, the peace of protection zone 30 is extended to from safe building 56
Guarantor person's access path 54 includes being equipped with the bending part of the deployable prolongation postponing barrier（Dog-leg-like shape）So that via security
Personnel's access path 54 close to safe building 56 and seek entry into protection zone 30 any invader can intercept and capture space 40
Postpone significant period of time.For this reason, Security Personnel's access path 54 is preferably on the ground just and one in protection zone 30
Look at nothing left.
In this secure paradigm, and/or hide oneself in reactor as mobile patrol in protection zone 30 arrangement Security Personnel
In building at the relatively short distance of multiple shellproof protection defence position.In certain embodiments, do not guard tower or other fixing
Guard guard station.By using mobile patrol and multiple defense position, Security Personnel tends to during they frequently move
Maintain vigilance.The lower height of protection zone 30 guarantees to observe whole protection zone 30 and isolation area 34 with not being subject to obstacle, and cuts
The wide physical barriers field obtaining space 40 guarantees to attempt to invade delay significant period of time by any.
With continued reference to Fig. 1, in certain embodiments, limit another secure border 60 outside isolation area/protection zone.This is another
One place of safety is referring herein to security control region 62, and it is around the such as whirlpool of isolation area/protection zone and nuclear electricity facility
Turbine island and the other parts of condenser 21.In the embodiment in figure 1, security control region 62 does not include electric switch station 64；But
In certain embodiments, security control region is around switchyard.Security control region 62 is around nuclear island and turbine island, and has
The safety lower than protection zone 30.In illustrative Fig. 1, security control region 62 includes alarm boundary fence 60 and around peace
At the link entry in the vehicle barrier system of external boundary 60 of full control area 62 and each entrance security control region 62
Vehicle checkpoint 64.In certain embodiments, the beeline from the external boundary 60 in security control region 62 to protection zone 30
More than the burst radius being determined by explosion analysis.In this case, also make cause to damage in protection zone 30 even if can not eliminate
The probability of the bad ignition of the vehicle being mounted with explosive is minimum.Then, in certain embodiments it is considered to nuclear reaction will be used for
The parking lot 66 of heap facility is positioned at outside security control region 62, and is not having any inspection post to the porch in parking lot 66.
But, only check the vehicle entering security control region 62（At the vehicle checkpoint 64 in illustrative Fig. 1）.
Disclosed nuclear electricity facility layout is advantageously given operator's handss and provides increased safety.For example, by
Do not need to check in the vehicle entering parking lot 66（Because these vehicles are maintained at outside the burst radius being determined by explosion analysis）,
Originally it is assigned and check the personnel Ke Dai entering parking lot vehicle and be assigned to and appoint with other of safety, maintenance, equipment inspection etc.
Business.Turbine island is placed on the outer similarly more effectively human resourcess of distribution near turbines and/or the permission in protection zone 30
Some this personnel are re-assigned to nuclear island.
Another advantage of disclosed method is that it is easy to the modularity of nuclear electricity facility and builds.Generally, until whole core
Electric power facility is finally ratified could start to build by NRC or other management entity.Due to improvement layout disclosed herein, can
The other facilities built turbine island and be located at outside protection zone 30 can be started before nuclear island is authorized with final approval.
The illustrative nuclear electricity facility of Fig. 1 be illustrative " two groups " design, wherein containment building 10 be configured to illustrative
Two adjacent containment buildings in single continuous protection zone 30.It is anti-that each containment building accommodates two small modulars
Answer heap（SMR）One of unit 12,14, the output of each SMR unit is less than 300 megawatts（Electric power）.In certain embodiments,
Two SMR units 12,14 are two small modular pressurized water reactors（PWR）.Nuclear island in this embodiment is almost completely on ground
Under, slightly projection only above ground level.Protection zone is allowed together with this placement outside protection zone 30 with turbine island
30 have low clearance profile, give Security Personnel to whole protection zone and adjacent around isolation area accessible observation.
With reference to Fig. 2, the plane graph of another illustrative nuclear electricity facility is shown.Nuclear electricity facility layout shown in Fig. 2 is bag
Include " 4- group " layout of four modularity PWR reactors.The plane of Fig. 2 illustrates two reactor service building things 100, including
Or（It is arranged under ground portion）：Radiation waste disposal facilities, fuel treatment function/equipment, access control, control room, anti-
Answer heap containment building and super radiator.It is suitably that the position of four reactors of SMR is approximately corresponding to four and illustrates
Reactor constructure equipment hatch 102, this hatch provide by reactor service building thing 100 arrive SMR path.Other is said
Bright property feature includes：Two turbine buildings 104；Switchyard 106；Air-cooled condenser 108；And tunnel 110（For example
For through the feedwater nuclear island and turbine island and steam pipe line）.The protections of two groups of designs of protection zone 112 and Fig. 1
Region 30 construction is similar.Intercepting and capturing space 114 around protection zone 112 is equal to the intercepting and capturing space 40 of Fig. 1 embodiment, and includes
The physical barriers of ecthoaeum, barb bar or wire gauze.The array of intrusion detection device or PIDAS116 around intercept and capture space 114 and etc.
It is same as the PIDAS36 of Fig. 1 embodiment.Security control region 118 is equal to the security control region 62 of Fig. 1 embodiment.Enter and protect
The road 120 in shield region is controlled by electronic wire gauze sliding component 122 in intercepting and capturing space 114, provides and is equal to movable physics screen
The entrance that barrier field part 52 is provided controls.Parking lot 124 is similarly positioned in outside security control region 118.
Disclosed improvement nuclear electricity facility is suitable for substantially any type of nuclear electricity facility.Reduce and change with disclosed
Enter the operation of correlation and management cost is less than 300 megawatts for producing（Electricity）Small modular reactor facility situation outstanding
It is useful.
With reference to Fig. 3, an embodiment is shown, it equally includes protection zone 150, protection zone 150 comprises to be enclosed by intercepting and capturing space 152
Around nuclear island 151, intercept and capture space 152 by around PIDAS154 monitoring, most external is security control region 156.As in fact previously
Apply in example like that, turbine island 158 is located at outside protection zone 150, but in security control region 156.But implement in the replacement of Fig. 3
In example, condenser 160 is located at bounded marge（I.e. outside security control region 156）.Switchyard 162 is in the fence of border（Exist
In security control region 156）, the other buildings in the fence of border are arranged in alternative site.
The application has been described with one or more preferred embodiments.Reading and can have after understanding aforementioned detail specificationss
Various remodeling and change.Meaning that the application annotates is including all modifications so far and modification, if these modification and
Modification is in the range of claims and its equivalent.
Claims (30)
1. a kind of equipment, including：
Nuclear island, described nuclear island includes at least one nuclear reactor；
Turbine island, described turbine island includes at least turbine building, and described turbine building accommodates by nuclear reactor
At least one turbine steam-powered producing；
Protection zone, described protection zone has the border protected by least one fence, and at least one fence described includes thing
Reason barrier, described physical barriers are configured to control and enter described protection zone；And
Isolation area, described isolation area around described protection zone and includes intrusion detection device, described intrusion detection device construction
Become to detect unwarranted close towards described protection zone；
Wherein said nuclear island is arranged in described protection zone；And
Wherein said turbine island is arranged on outside described protection zone and is spaced apart with described protection zone.
2. equipment as claimed in claim 1 is it is characterised in that described turbine island is spaced apart at least with described protection zone
100 feet.
3. equipment as claimed in claim 1 is it is characterised in that described isolation area includes：
Intercept and capture space, described intercepting and capturing space around described protection zone and has at least 30 feet wide physical barriers fields；And
Sensor array, described sensor array around described intercepting and capturing space and is configured to detect towards described intercepting and capturing space not
Authorized close.
4. equipment as claimed in claim 3 is it is characterised in that described intercepting and capturing space has at least 80 feet wide physical barriers
?.
5. the equipment as any one of claim 3-4 is it is characterised in that described physical barriers field includes ecthoaeum, barb
Bar or the field of wire gauze.
6. equipment as claimed in claim 1 is it is characterised in that also include：
Security control region, described security control region is around described nuclear island and described turbine island, described security control region
There is the safety lower than described protection zone.
7. equipment as claimed in claim 6 is it is characterised in that described security control region includes：
Fence, described fence is around the external boundary in described security control region；And
Vehicle barrier system, described vehicle barrier system includes the entrance of each road in the described security control region of entrance
Vehicle checkpoint.
8. the equipment as any one of claim 6-7 is it is characterised in that also include：
Parking lot, described parking lot is arranged on outside described security control region, is not having vehicle to the porch in described parking lot
Inspection post.
9. equipment as claimed in claim 6 is it is characterised in that the external boundary from described security control region is to described protection zone
The beeline in domain is more than the burst radius being determined by explosion analysis.
10. equipment as claimed in claim 1 is not it is characterised in that described equipment includes any guarding tower.
11. equipment as claimed in claim 1 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is at least partially in underground.
12. equipment as claimed in claim 1 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is in below ground, and described protection zone has
Maximum height less than 36 feet.
13. equipment as claimed in claim 1 it is characterised in that flow to the steaming on described turbine island by steam from described nuclear island
Steam pipe line is arranged on ground level or following.
14. equipment as claimed in claim 1 are it is characterised in that the operative combination on described nuclear island and described turbine island is volume
The raw mini Mod reactor (SMR) less than 300 megawatt electrics of fixed output quota.
A kind of 15. equipment, including：
Nuclear island, described nuclear island includes at least one nuclear reactor；
Turbine building, at least one whirlpool steam-powered that described turbine building receiving is produced by described nuclear reactor
Turbine；
Protection zone, described protection zone has the border protected by least one fence, and at least one fence described includes thing
Reason barrier, described physical barriers are configured to control and enter described protection zone；And
Isolation area, described isolation area around described protection zone and includes intrusion detection device, described intrusion detection device construction
Become to detect unwarranted close towards described protection zone, described isolation area includes intercepting and capturing space, and described intercepting and capturing space is enclosed
Around described protection zone and have at least 30 feet wide physical barriers fields and sensor array, described sensor array is around institute
State intercepting and capturing space and be configured to unwarranted close towards described intercepting and capturing space,
Wherein said turbine island is arranged on outside described protection zone and is spaced apart with described protection zone.
16. equipment as claimed in claim 15 are it is characterised in that described intercepting and capturing space has at least 100 feet wide physics
Barrier field.
17. equipment as any one of claim 15-16 are not it is characterised in that described equipment includes any guarding tower.
18. equipment as claimed in claim 15 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is in below ground, and described protection zone tool
There is the maximum height less than 36 feet.
A kind of 19. equipment, including：
Nuclear island, described nuclear island includes at least one nuclear reactor, and described nuclear island is arranged in protection zone, described protection zone tool
There is the border protected by least one fence, at least one fence described includes physical barriers, and described physical barriers are configured to
Control and enter described protection zone；
Turbine island, described turbine island includes at least one turbine steam-powered being produced by described nuclear reactor；
Wherein said turbine island is arranged on outside protection zone and described nuclear island and described turbine island are spaced apart from each other.
20. equipment as claimed in claim 19 are it is characterised in that at least two safe floors are by described nuclear island and described turbine
Island is separately.
21. equipment as any one of claim 19-20 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is maintained at than described turbine
The high safe class in machine island.
22. equipment as claimed in claim 19 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is spaced apart at least 50 English with described turbine island
Chi.
23. equipment as claimed in claim 19 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is spaced apart at least 100 with described turbine island
Foot.
24. equipment as claimed in claim 19 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is spaced apart at least 130 with described turbine island
Foot.
25. equipment as claimed in claim 19 it is characterised in that described nuclear island be in more relatively low than described turbine island high
Degree.
26. equipment as claimed in claim 19 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is in underground, and described turbine island is most of
Or it is completely square on the ground.
27. equipment as claimed in claim 19 are it is characterised in that also include：The super radiator in underground and described nuclear island operation
Connection.
28. equipment as claimed in claim 19 it is characterised in that described nuclear island on 2 2nd, 2011 formulate the United States Federal
In the protection zone of code volume 10 the 73rd part definition, and the United States Federal's method that turbine island was not formulated on 2 2nd, 2011
In the protection zone of allusion quotation volume 10 the 73rd part definition.
29. equipment as claimed in claim 19 are it is characterised in that described nuclear island is in protection zone, and described turbine island
Not in protection zone.
A kind of 30. equipment, including：
At least one nuclear reactor, at least one nuclear reactor described is arranged in protection zone, described protection zone have by
The border of at least one fence protection, at least one fence described includes physical barriers, and described physical barriers are configured to control
Enter described protection zone；
At least one turbine, the steam drive that at least one turbine described is produced by described nuclear reactor；Super radiator,
Described super radiator be arranged on underground and with described nuclear reactor operable communication, and
Protection zone, at least one nuclear reactor described is arranged in described protection zone, and at least one turbine described sets
Put outside described protection zone.
Applications Claiming Priority (7)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US201161440547P | 2011-02-08 | 2011-02-08 | |
| US61/440,547 | 2011-02-08 | ||
| US201161512644P | 2011-07-28 | 2011-07-28 | |
| US61/512,644 | 2011-07-28 | ||
| US13/366,909 | 2012-02-06 | ||
| US13/366,909 US20120207261A1 (en) | 2011-02-08 | 2012-02-06 | Nuclear Power Facility |
| PCT/US2012/024170 WO2012109264A2 (en) | 2011-02-08 | 2012-02-07 | Nuclear power facility |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN103782346A CN103782346A (en) | 2014-05-07 |
| CN103782346B true CN103782346B (en) | 2017-03-01 |
Family
ID=46639163
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201280008045.2A Expired - Fee Related CN103782346B (en) | 2011-02-08 | 2012-02-07 | Nuclear power facility |
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| Country | Link |
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| CN (1) | CN103782346B (en) |
Families Citing this family (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EP3422361B1 (en) * | 2016-04-27 | 2020-06-24 | Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems, Ltd. | Turbine building and nuclear power plant |
| CA3136721A1 (en) * | 2019-04-12 | 2020-10-15 | Terrapower, Llc | Nuclear thermal plant with load-following power generation |
Citations (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US3037726A (en) * | 1959-07-02 | 1962-06-05 | Stanray Corp | Engine blast absorbing fence |
| US4304633A (en) * | 1975-10-24 | 1981-12-08 | Hitachi, Ltd. | Nuclear power plant |
| CN1250129A (en) * | 1998-09-14 | 2000-04-12 | 东芝株式会社 | Construction working method for nuclear electric power generation installation |
| CN101689407A (en) * | 2007-05-07 | 2010-03-31 | 大型替代能源责任有限公司 | Super safe and nuclear power plant that can simple and easy dismounting |
Family Cites Families (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US8687759B2 (en) * | 2007-11-15 | 2014-04-01 | The State Of Oregon Acting By And Through The State Board Of Higher Education On Behalf Of Oregon State University | Internal dry containment vessel for a nuclear reactor |
| US20090271207A1 (en) * | 2008-04-29 | 2009-10-29 | Lanigan William P | Facility access management system |
-
2012
- 2012-02-07 CN CN201280008045.2A patent/CN103782346B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US3037726A (en) * | 1959-07-02 | 1962-06-05 | Stanray Corp | Engine blast absorbing fence |
| US4304633A (en) * | 1975-10-24 | 1981-12-08 | Hitachi, Ltd. | Nuclear power plant |
| CN1250129A (en) * | 1998-09-14 | 2000-04-12 | 东芝株式会社 | Construction working method for nuclear electric power generation installation |
| CN101689407A (en) * | 2007-05-07 | 2010-03-31 | 大型替代能源责任有限公司 | Super safe and nuclear power plant that can simple and easy dismounting |
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| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN103782346A (en) | 2014-05-07 |
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