CN103782346A - Nuclear power facility - Google Patents

Nuclear power facility Download PDF

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Publication number
CN103782346A
CN103782346A CN201280008045.2A CN201280008045A CN103782346A CN 103782346 A CN103782346 A CN 103782346A CN 201280008045 A CN201280008045 A CN 201280008045A CN 103782346 A CN103782346 A CN 103782346A
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China
Prior art keywords
island
turbine
equipment
nuclear
protection zone
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Granted
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CN201280008045.2A
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CN103782346B (en
Inventor
J·L·诺埃尔
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BWXT Nuclear Energy Inc
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Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Energy Inc
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Priority claimed from US13/366,909 external-priority patent/US20120207261A1/en
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
    • G21D1/00—Details of nuclear power plant
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
    • G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
    • G08B13/12—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires
    • G08B13/122—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires for a perimeter fence
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
    • Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Plasma & Fusion (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • High Energy & Nuclear Physics (AREA)
  • Buildings Adapted To Withstand Abnormal External Influences (AREA)
  • Structure Of Emergency Protection For Nuclear Reactors (AREA)

Abstract

A nuclear island includes at least one nuclear reactor. A turbine island includes at least a turbine building housing at least one turbine driven by steam generated by the nuclear reactor. A protected area has a perimeter protected by at least one fence. An isolation zone surrounds the protected area and includes intrusion detection devices configured to detect unauthorized approach toward the protected area. The nuclear island is disposed inside the protected area, and the turbine island is disposed outside of and spaced apart from the protected area.

Description

Nuclear power facility
The application requires the U.S. Provisional Application No.61/512 submitting on July 28th, 2011,644 rights and interests.The application requires the U.S. Provisional Application No.61/440 submitting on February 8th, 2011,545 rights and interests.The U.S. Provisional Application No.61/512 that on July 28th, 2011 submits to, 644 in full with referring to mode include in herein.The U.S. Provisional Application No.61/440 that on February 8th, 2011 submits to, 545 in full with referring to mode include in herein.
Background technology
Below relate to nuclear power generation field, nuclear power facility field, nuclear reactor facility layout field and association area.
Structure nuclear power facility is a wide in range job.Can more than ten year or longer practice with the initial concept that produces electric power output by plant design and structure, and can spend millions of dollar or more.
Nuclear power facility is designed to harbor.Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) syncaryon reactor is designed in coolant loss accident (LOCA), heating radiator is lost under accident conditions maybe may affect safety shutdown nuclear reactor in other safe situation.In addition, nuclear power facility can be attractive target concerning terrorist, violence tissue etc.Thereby most countries takes measures to guarantee that nuclear power facility avoids external attack.
In the U.S., the rules and regulations that NRC (NRC) promulgates guarantee that nuclear electricity facility avoids the rule of external attack.Referring to for example 10C.F.R.Part73(the United States Federal code the 10th volume the 73rd part) at http://, www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/ is visible, last access on January 28th, 2011).According to NRC rules, definition protection zone, its border is restricted the protection of the physical barrier that enters protection zone.10C.F.R.§73.55(e)(8)。Comprise that at least the important area of reactor pulpit, spentnuclear fuel pond and some critical alert assembly is positioned at protection zone.10C.F.R.§73.55(e)(9)。Area of isolation remains on the outdoor area adjacent with border, protection zone barrier.10C.F.R.§73.55(e)(7)。The size of isolated area and design allow to observe without barrier and be evaluated at the activity on the either side of protection zone barrier, and attempt or suitable intrusion detection equipment that reality is passed border, protection zone barrier monitors with surveying before completing through border, protection zone barrier and record.The same.
Although some aspect of NRC rules and regulations nuclear facilities safety, will be appreciated that each facility has unique geography, landform, facility size and other factors.Thereby, for each nuclear electricity facility is developed specific safety program.Always referring to C.F.R.Title10Part73 (the United States Federal's code the 10th volume the 73rd part).
Jurisdiction conventionally has and is similar to management organizations NRC, that promulgate protection nuclear electricity facility rules beyond the U.S..
Summary of the invention
According to some aspect disclosing herein, a kind of equipment comprises: nuclear island, and this nuclear island comprises at least one nuclear reactor; Turbine island, this turbine island comprises at least turbine buildings, turbine buildings holds steam-powered at least one turbine being produced by nuclear reactor; Protection zone, this protection zone has the border of being protected by least one fence; And isolated area, this isolated area is around protection zone and comprise that intrusion detection device, intrusion detection device are configured to survey without permission near protection zone.Nuclear island is arranged in protection zone, and turbine island is arranged on outside protection zone and is spaced apart with protection zone.
According to some aspect disclosing herein, a kind of equipment comprises: nuclear island, and this nuclear island comprises at least one nuclear reactor; Turbine buildings, this turbine buildings holds steam-powered at least one turbine being produced by nuclear reactor; Protection zone, this protection zone has the border of being protected by least one fence; And isolated area, this isolated area is around protection zone and comprise that intrusion detection device, intrusion detection device are configured to survey without permission near protection zone.Isolated area comprises intercepts and captures space, intercepts and captures space around protection zone and has physical barriers field and the sensor array of at least 30 feet wide, and sensor array is around intercepting and capturing space and being configured to survey without permission near intercepting and capturing space.
According to some aspect disclosing herein, a kind of equipment comprises: nuclear island, and this nuclear island comprises at least one nuclear reactor; And turbine island, this turbine island comprises steam-powered at least one turbine being produced by nuclear reactor.Nuclear island and turbine island are spaced apart from each other.Spacing between nuclear island and turbine island is 50 feet in certain embodiments and is more preferably 100 feet, and better be 130 feet.In certain embodiments, nuclear island remains on the safe class higher than turbine island.
According to some aspect disclosing herein, a kind of equipment comprises: at least one nuclear reactor; At least one turbine, the steam driven that this at least one turbine is produced by nuclear reactor; And super heating radiator, this super heating radiator be arranged on underground and with nuclear reactor operable communication.
Brief description of the drawings
Overlook (being plane) of Fig. 1 schematically illustrated " 2-group " nuclear electricity facility schemes, and comprises the nuclear island with two nuclear reactors.
Overlook (being plane) of Fig. 2 schematically illustrated " 4-group " nuclear electricity facility schemes, and comprises the nuclear island with four nuclear reactors.
Overlook (being plane) of the schematically illustrated nuclear electricity facility of Fig. 3 schemes, and wherein condenser is positioned at outside fence.
Embodiment
Nuclear electricity facility is generally specific electric power output and designs, and it has set size and the further feature of nuclear reactor and coherent radiation restriction and emergency core cooling system (ECCS), one or more power generation turbines etc.Reactor is positioned at containment building/containment buildings, and crucial ECCS parts and reactor supporting system (being spentnuclear fuel, radioactive waste) are positioned at containment interior of building or near containment buildings, therefore form " nuclear island ".Remaining part (i.e. " balance of plant ") including turbine, condenser, distrbution network (i.e. " switchyard ") is near nuclear island location.The steam driven producing by nuclear island for generation of the turbine of electric power, and be contained in the turbine buildings near nuclear island.This makes the length of the water-supply line that extends to the vapour line of turbine buildings and extend to nuclear island the shortest; therefore make the parasitic power loss (being pump) in transient heat loss, pipeline condensation and link minimum, and make nuclear island and turbine buildings can be configured for the single continuous protection zone of security purpose.Select facility place based on various factors, such as the availability of the geographically support near power consumer, capital construction, shock resistance, chilled water etc.
Facilities design is also answered Bindery security, especially for " visual plant ", NRC (NRC) is defined as " visual plant " " its fault, damage or release meeting directly or indirectly jeopardize any equipment, system, device or the material of publilc health and safety owing to being exposed to radiation ".After can or discharging in these faults, damage, also think important for the protection of equipment or the system of publilc health and safety.”10C.F.R.§73.2。All visual plants must be positioned at important area, and important area must be positioned at again protection zone.10C.F.R.§73.55(e)(9)。Protection zone is by Security Personnel's routine patrols the limiting access region that is subject to physical barriers protection.Referring to 10C.F.R. § 73.55 (e) (8).Protection zone again by the isolated area in outdoor area around, outdoor area size is set as observing in the clear the activity in isolated area and protection zone, and with automatically (and record) invasion-detecting sensor and warning horn monitor.Beyond the U.S., jurisdiction is managed by similar security regulations or guide conventionally.
Conventionally, nuclear electricity facility is built into has compact layout, turbine buildings and near nuclear island form the core of continuous protection zone.In some facility layout, be also included within protection zone such as the other parts of the balance of plant of switchyard and/or condenser.In order to adapt to install such as the roof for turbine buildings the eminence structure of refrigeratory, near appropriate location foundation border, protection zone is guarded tower, to guarantee Security Officer, border, whole protection zone is had to continuous, uncrossed overlapping observation.
As disclosed herein, there is some shortcoming about the conventional method of nuclear electricity facility layout, they overcome by improvement disclosed herein.
In the existing layout of nuclear electricity facility, operation and maintenance cost is all very high.For example, estimate annual approximately 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 dollars of security expense.This expense, for being debatable compared with small nut electric power facility, is no more than small modular reactor (SMR) design of 300 megawatts (electricity) such as the generation proposing.In addition, use is guarded tower and is had problem, is that sitting is motionless because guard the posture of the personnel in tower, and this is disadvantageous for the required lasting alertness of Security Personnel.Given this, the static posture of guarding should have the rotation of every about two hours ideally.As fixed position, near protection tower border is also the target of the known and fine delineation of any external attack.
Facility layout of existing nuclear power plant also makes structure, maintenance, repair and updating operation complexity.Any work that carry out in any other place on nuclear island or in turbine buildings or protection zone must be by the personnel that are clearly understood that work in protection zone are carried out.In the situation that carrying out work by contractor or other " outside " personnel, these personnel must accompany in protection zone time.In addition, main upgrading in protection zone, increase new turbine such as the turbine island in the protection zone of existing utility, may need examination and the approval of one or more management organizations.
Further, although existing nuclear electricity facility is compact, they are placed on a large amount of operation parts in protection zone.This causes having relatively a large amount of personnel in compact protection zone, and this has problem at aspects such as security, evacuating personnel programs.
With reference to figure 1, at the improvement nuclear electricity facility (, schematic plan) disclosing herein shown in planimetric map.Nuclear electricity facility comprises nuclear island and turbine island, nuclear island comprises that the containment building 10(illustrative Fig. 1 that holds at least one nuclear reactor illustrates " two groups " that hold two nuclear reactors 12,14, and also illustrate that spentnuclear fuel pond 16 in containment building 10 to store spentnuclear fuel from reactor takes out at spentnuclear fuel), turbine island comprises the turbine buildings 20 that holds at least one turbine.One or more nuclear reactors 12,14 can comprise the nuclear reactor of any type substantially of utilizing major loop and steam-return line, comprise pressurized water reactor (PWR) in preferred embodiment.One or more nuclear reactors can operatively connect via main coolant loop and external steam generator (not shown, but be also contained in these embodiments in containment building).In illustrative example, nuclear reactor the 12, the 14th, " integral type " nuclear reactor, wherein steam generator is positioned at reactor vessel.Some example of this rear structure is in the elaboration to some extent in disclosing No. 2010/0316181Al " Integral Helical Coil Pressurized Water Nuclear Reactor " of the disclosed U.S. in the people's such as Thome 16 days Dec in 2010, the disclosure in full with referring to mode include in herein, and in last access on http://www.babcock.com/products/modular_nuclear/(2011 January 29) (the B & W mPower in exploitation is described tMintegral small-sized modularization reactor design) in set forth to some extent.U.S. Patent Application Publication discloses a kind of integral type PWR No. 2010/0316181Al, and it adopts the steam generator with spiral coil; But more generally, integral type steam generator can adopt straight tube, the tubular steam generator of for example vertical tube (OTSG) or other pipe structure, and secondary coolant can (pipe side) flow in pipe, Main Coolant flows around pipe, or secondary coolant can (shell-side) flow in the shell around pipe, and Main Coolant flows through pipe.No matter to adopt integral type steam generator or steam generator independently, the object of steam generator is to make Main Coolant mobile in reactor (normally light-water, but also consider the Main Coolant such as other type of heavy water) and secondary coolant water (i.e. " feedwater ") thermal communication, secondary coolant water is heated and changes into steam thus.Although thermal communication between Main Coolant and secondary coolant in steam generator, Main Coolant separates with secondary coolant still fluid, between Main Coolant and secondary coolant, does not have mixing.
Secondary coolant steam flows to turbine island to drive turbine (or, turbine/generator assembly) to produce the electricity of distributing to consumer or other terminal user by switchyard via vapour line from nuclear island.In certain embodiments, secondary coolant water in closed loop path flow, wherein steam on turbine island or condenser 21 condensations return aqueous water (, liquid secondary coolant water) and flow back to nuclear island via water-supply line.The water-supply line of vapour line and apolegamy passes between nuclear island and turbine island via facility tunnel 22.
Although should be understood that illustrative diagram 1 illustrates two nuclear reactors (i.e. " 2-group "), more generally, nuclear island can comprise a nuclear reactor, two nuclear reactors, three nuclear reactors, four nuclear reactors, five nuclear reactors, six nuclear reactors etc.While comprising multiple reactor, consider that nuclear island is divided into two or more non-conterminous protection zones, or alternatively multiple reactors are arranged on (as illustrative Fig. 1) in single continuous protection zone.In addition, should be understood that illustrative diagram 1 only illustrates the notable feature of selection, omit multiple feature known in the art simultaneously.
Continue with reference to Fig. 1, protection zone 30 has the border of being protected by least one fence 32.Isolated area 34 around protection zone 30 and comprise be configured to survey the intrusion detection device 36(that approaches without permission protection zone 30 in Fig. 1 by indicating around the dotted line of protection zone 30; also suitably be called " PIDAS " border; wherein abbreviation " PIDAS " expression " border intrusion detection and evaluating system (Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System) "), such as thermal imaging camera, vibration transducer, microwave detector, motion detection camera and various combinations thereof etc.At the embodiment intending for the U.S.; warning light in the type of the physical barriers adopting in the type of sensor and density, isolated area and quantity, protection zone suitably meets the NRC rules of isolated area and protection zone, for example, in 10C.F.R. § 73.55, set forth.
As Fig. 1 can find out, nuclear island is arranged in protection zone 30.(if multiple reactors are arranged on multiple continuous and/or discontinuous nuclear islands, protection zone comprise all these continuous and/or discontinuous nuclear islands-in illustrative example, two nuclear reactors 12,14 are arranged in single continuous protection zone 30).But it is outer and spaced apart with protection zone 30 that turbine island is arranged on protection zone 30.Such identification that this arrangement utilizing is made here: (1) turbine and associated components be not must be in protection zone visual plant, and (2) turbine can be located away from nuclear island relatively with associated components.
About (1); turbine island is not critical area; because during any emergency of recognizing, the fault on turbine island, destruction or other damage can directly or indirectly not cause radiation to discharge, and turbine island need to be for the protection of publilc health and safety.Referring to 10C.F.R. § 73.2.The steam driven that turbine is produced by nuclear island; But driving the steam of turbine is not by the secondary coolant of any radioactive material contamination.The fracture (or other fault or shutdown) that extends to the fracture (or other fault or shutdown) of the vapour line on turbine island or extend to the water-supply line of nuclear island from turbine island from nuclear island can not cause the release of (directly or indirectly) radioactive material.At most, this fracture or fault or the meeting of shutdown form the impaired event of heating radiator, and wherein the heating radiator of nuclear reactor is because the mobile of secondary coolant in steam generator may be impaired.The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) arranging for reactor in containment building coolingly adapts to any heating radiator and damages event by the heap of off-response immediately, to what damaged any loss pressure rise decompression causing by heating radiator and start reactor core.Shut down for ECCS control lever, soluble poison inject, be positioned at containment building stram condenser, be stored in the chilled water or other the suitable equipment that are positioned at the storage of containment building refueling water storage tank and carry out this shutdown, and can not discharge any Main Coolant (than external environment condition much less) as containment building environment.
About (2), recognize that turbine can locate away from nuclear island relatively with associated components herein.This arrangement utilizing can start to build (, the structure of nuclear island outside) and after this by the parallel construction of balance of plant supporting nuclear island, can realize thus the irrealizable structural advantages of alternate manner in the approval last stage on balance of plant.
Conventionally, thus the length of vapour line that turbine makes to extend to from nuclear island turbine buildings near nuclear island location is the shortest.The reason of doing is like this that vapour line delivers the steam being heated by nuclear reactor via steam generator, and therefore longer vapour line can cause more thermal loss and lower efficiency.But, with other type facility such as fossil fuel facility relatively show that this worry is unnecessary and 100 feet of magnitudes or longer vapour line are feasible, thermal loss does not have problem.
In certain embodiments, vapour line and water-supply line for example, at ground level or following, in the illustrative facility tunnel 22 in Fig. 1.This can be favourable can carry out aspect more substantial hot isolation, thereby further reduces any thermal loss in jet chimney.Bury and put these pipelines and also provide and prevent that target from being the improvement security of the external attack of these pipelines.Additionally or alternatively, in certain embodiments, nuclear island is at least partially in underground.In certain embodiments, nuclear island is at below ground, and protection zone 30 has the maximum height that is less than 20 feet.In certain embodiments, nuclear island is at below ground, and protection zone 30 has the maximum height that is less than 36 feet.
Although it has been generally acknowledged that at lower height facility (for example, partially or completely underground) attack being easily subject to from high height, think herein and partially or completely see to there is some advantage at underground facility from security standpoint.Put nuclear island and turbine is placed on outside safety zone by partially or completely burying, can make the maximum height step-down of protection zone, for example, being less than in certain embodiments 20 feet, and being less than in certain embodiments 10 feet.This is reduced in the possibility in protection zone with any obstruction observation.In fact, in certain embodiments, consider not guard tower, because they do not need to provide the without hindrance observation on whole protection zone.Underground also can provide the enhancing that opposing is aerial or projectile is attacked protection.
In certain embodiments, super heating radiator (UHS) had both been positioned at underground nuclear island or the protection zone near nuclear island of being also positioned at.For example, in illustrative Fig. 1, multiple UHS pond 38 is positioned at protection zone 30.Thereby can also reducing external attack, this layout cuts off pipeline that ECCS is connected with super heating radiator and damages the possibility of ECCS operation.
In fact, as disclosed herein, for safety program and conventional adopt significantly different of nuclear electricity facility of the nuclear electricity facility of Fig. 1.Target is: (1) makes the size minimum (even with compared with the cost of large population's nuclear electricity facility) of protection zone; (2) make the height minimum in protection zone; (3) make to postpone element maximum; And (4) make operational efficiency the highest.
By forming around protection zone 30 and thering is the intercepting and capturing space (engaging space) 40 of at least 30 feet wide physical barriers fields, and dispose around intercepting and capturing space 40 and being configured to survey without permission near the sensor array 36 of intercepting and capturing space 40 and realize (3) in the illustrative example of Fig. 1.Physical barriers field suitably comprises ecthoaeum, barb bar or entanglement and has enough width and (in Fig. 1, is designated as W pb) for example, significantly to postpone detecting intrusion and the time of this intrusion through the border (fence 32) of protection zone 30 via sensor array around.For this reason, although physical barriers field is at least 30 feet wide, more preferably at least 80 feet wide, and better at least 100 feet wide.Combination therewith, is denoted as " d in turbine island and protection zone 30(Fig. 1 turbine") between spacing be preferably at least 50 feet, be more preferably at least 100 feet, and better be at least 130 feet.The combination of low clearance protection zone and wide physical barriers field guarantees to expose the longer time after any assailant can be detected before this assailant enters protection zone.This delay normal form is also contained in the design admission passage of protection zone 30.For example; with reference to Fig. 1; leading to 30 road, protection zone 50(is additional to the security army that also carries out suitable vehicle search protocol and monitors) the movable physical barriers field part 52 that is installed on sliding component etc. stops, thus remove from road and allow authorised vehicles to pass through after being examined and allowing to enter.Similarly; the Security Personnel's access path 54 that extends to protection zone 30 from secure buildings thing 56 comprises the bending part (dog-leg shape) of the prolongation that is equipped with deployable delay barrier, makes any invader who approaches secure buildings thing 56 and attempt to enter protection zone 30 via Security Personnel's access path 54 to postpone significant period of time intercepting and capturing space 40.For this reason, Security Personnel's access path 54 preferably on the ground side and in protection zone 30, cover all at one glance.
In this secure paradigm, arrange Security Personnel in protection zone 30 as mobile patrol and/or hide oneself and defend position compared with short distance to multiple shellproof protection in reactor constructure.In certain embodiments, do not guard tower or other fixedly guards guard station.By adopting mobile patrol and multiple defense position, Security Personnel often can maintain vigilance during they are frequently mobile.The lower height of protection zone 30 is guaranteed not to be subject to obstacle and is observed whole protection zone 30 and isolated area 34, and the wide physical barriers field in intercepting and capturing space 40 guarantees to attempt to invade delay significant period of time by any.
Continue with reference to Fig. 1, in certain embodiments, outside isolated area/protection zone, limit another secure border 60.This another place of safety refers to security control region 62 herein, and it is around the other parts such as turbine island and condenser 21 of isolated area/protection zone and nuclear electricity facility.In the embodiment in figure 1, security control region 62 does not comprise electric switch station 64; But in certain embodiments, security control region is around switchyard.Security control region 62 is around nuclear island and turbine island, and has the security lower than protection zone 30.In illustrative Fig. 1, security control region 62 comprises alarm border fence 60 and the vehicle barrier system of outer boundary 60 and the vehicle checkpoint 64 of each road porch that enters security control region 62 around security control region 62.In certain embodiments, be greater than from the outer boundary 60 in security control region 62 burst radius of being determined by explosion analysis to the bee-line of protection zone 30.In this case, even if can not eliminate the possibility minimum of the ignition that also makes the vehicle that is mounted with explosive that can cause protection zone 30 interior damages.So, in certain embodiments, consider the parking lot for nuclear reactor facility 66 to be positioned at outside security control region 62, and to the porch in parking lot 66 without any inspection post.But, only check the vehicle (64 places, vehicle checkpoint in illustrative Fig. 1) that enters security control region 62.
The nuclear electricity facility layout disclosing advantageously provides the security of increase for given operator's hand.For example, do not need to check (outer because these vehicles remain on the burst radius determined by explosion analysis) owing to entering the vehicle in parking lot 66, be originally assigned and check and enter the personnel Ke Dai of parking lot vehicle and be assigned to and other tasks of safety, maintenance, equipment inspection etc.Turbine island is placed on outside protection zone 30 more effectively distributes near the human resources of turbine and/or permission that some this personnel is re-assigned to nuclear island similarly.
Another advantage of institute's revealing method is modularization construction that it is convenient to nuclear electricity facility.Conventionally, until whole nuclear electricity facility is finally ratified to start construction by NRC or other management entity.Due to the improvement layout disclosing herein, may be able to before authorizing final approval to nuclear island, start to build turbine island and be positioned at other facility outside protection zone 30.
The illustrative nuclear electricity facility of Fig. 1 is illustrative " two groups " design, and wherein containment building 10 is configured to two adjacent containment buildings in the single continuous protection zone 30 of illustrative.Each containment building holds in two small modular reactors (SMR) unit 12,14, and the output of each SMR unit is no more than 300 megawatts (electric power).In certain embodiments, two SMR unit 12,14 are two small modular pressurized water reactors (PWR).Nuclear island in this embodiment is almost completely underground, only the summary micro-protuberance of plane top.This allows protection zone 30 to have low clearance profile together with the placement of turbine island outside protection zone 30, give Security Personnel to whole protection zone and adjacent around the accessible observation of isolated area.
With reference to Fig. 2, the planimetric map of another illustrative nuclear electricity facility is shown.Nuclear electricity facility layout shown in Fig. 2 is " 4-group " layout that comprises four modularization PWR reactors.The planimetric map of Fig. 2 illustrates two reactor service building things 100, comprises or (being arranged under ground portion): radiation waste disposal facilities, fuel treatment function/equipment, access control, pulpit, reactor containment building and super heating radiator.Suitably, for the position of four reactors of SMR is approximately corresponding to four reactor constructure equipment hatches 102 that illustrate, this hatch provides by the path of reactor service building thing 100 to SMR.Other illustrative aspects comprises: two turbine buildingss 104; Switchyard 106; Air-cooled condenser 108; And tunnel 110(is for example for feedwater and vapour line through nuclear island and turbine island).Protection zone 112 is constructed similar with the protection zone 30 of two groups of designs of Fig. 1.Be equal to the intercepting and capturing space 40 of Fig. 1 embodiment around the intercepting and capturing space 114 of protection zone 112, and comprise the physical barriers of ecthoaeum, barb bar or entanglement.The array of intrusion detection device or PIDAS116 is around intercepting and capturing space 114 and being equal to the PIDAS36 of Fig. 1 embodiment.Security control region 118 is equal to the security control region 62 of Fig. 1 embodiment.The road 120 that enters protection zone is controlled by electronic entanglement sliding component 122 intercepting and capturing in space 114, provides and is equal to the control that enters that movable physical barriers field part 52 provides.Parking lot 124 is positioned at outside security control region 118 equally.
The improvement nuclear electricity facility disclosing is suitable for the nuclear electricity facility of any type substantially.The situation that the operation that reduction is relevant to disclose improvement and handling cost are no more than the small modular reactor facility of 300 megawatts (electricity) for generation is particularly useful.
With reference to Fig. 3, an embodiment is shown, it comprises protected location 150 equally, protected location 150 comprise by intercept and capture space 152 around nuclear island 151, intercept and capture space 152 by around PIDAS154 monitor, most external is security control region 156.In previous embodiment, turbine island 158 is positioned at outside protected location 150, but in security control region 156.But in the alternate embodiment of Fig. 3, condenser 160 is positioned at bounded marge (being that security control region 156 is outer).Switchyard 162 is (in security control region 156) in the fence of border, and other buildings in the fence of border is arranged in alternative site.
This application has is through having described one or more preferred embodiments.Reading and understanding aforementioned detailed description postscript and can have various remodeling and change.Mean that it is all modifications and the modification comprising up to now that the application annotates, as long as these modifications and modification are in the scope of claims and equivalent thereof.

Claims (30)

1. an equipment, comprising:
Nuclear island, described nuclear island comprises at least one nuclear reactor;
Turbine island, described turbine island comprises at least turbine buildings, described turbine buildings holds steam-powered at least one turbine being produced by nuclear reactor;
Protection zone, described protection zone has the border of being protected by least one fence; And
Isolated area, described isolated area is around described protection zone and comprise that intrusion detection device, described intrusion detection device are configured to detection and approach towards the unwarranted of described protection zone;
Wherein said nuclear island is arranged in described protection zone; And
Wherein said turbine island is arranged on outside described protection zone and is spaced apart with described protection zone.
2. equipment as claimed in claim 1, is characterized in that, spaced apart at least 100 feet of described turbine island and described protection zone.
3. the equipment as described in any one in claim 1-2, is characterized in that, described isolated area comprises:
Intercept and capture space, described intercepting and capturing space is around described protection zone and have a physical barriers field of at least 30 feet wide; And
Sensor array, described sensor array around described intercepting and capturing space and be configured to survey towards described intercepting and capturing space unwarranted approach.
4. equipment as claimed in claim 3, is characterized in that, described intercepting and capturing space has the physical barriers field of at least 80 feet wide.
5. the equipment as described in any one in claim 3-4, is characterized in that, described physical barriers field comprises the field of ecthoaeum, barb bar or entanglement.
6. the equipment as described in any one in claim 1-5, is characterized in that, also comprises:
Security control region, described security control region is around described nuclear island and described turbine island, and described security control region has the security lower than described protection zone.
7. equipment as claimed in claim 6, is characterized in that, described security control region comprises:
Fence, described fence is around the outer boundary in described security control region; And
Vehicle barrier system, described vehicle barrier system is included in the vehicle checkpoint of the entrance of the each road that enters described security control region.
8. the equipment as described in any one in claim 6-7, is characterized in that, also comprises:
Parking lot, described parking lot is arranged on outside described security control region, there is no vehicle checkpoint in the porch to described parking lot.
9. the equipment as described in any one in claim 6-8, is characterized in that, is greater than from the outer boundary in described security control region the burst radius of being determined by explosion analysis to the bee-line of described protection zone.
10. equipment as claimed in any one of claims 1-9 wherein, is characterized in that, described equipment does not comprise any tower of guarding.
11. equipment as described in any one in claim 1-10, is characterized in that, described nuclear island is at least partially in underground.
12. equipment as described in any one in claim 1-10, is characterized in that, described nuclear island is at below ground, and described protection zone has the maximum height that is less than 36 feet.
13. equipment as described in any one in claim 1-12, is characterized in that, the vapour line that steam is flow to described turbine island from described nuclear island is arranged on ground level or following.
14. equipment as described in any one in claim 1-13, is characterized in that, the operative combination on described nuclear island and described turbine island is the minimodel reactor (SMR) that specified generation is no more than 300 megawatt electrics.
15. 1 kinds of equipment, comprising:
Nuclear island, described nuclear island comprises at least one nuclear reactor;
Turbine buildings, described turbine buildings holds steam-powered at least one turbine being produced by described nuclear reactor;
Protection zone, described protection zone has the border of being protected by least one fence; And
Isolated area; described isolated area is around described protection zone and comprise intrusion detection device; described intrusion detection device is configured to survey towards the unwarranted of described protection zone and approaches; described isolated area comprises intercepts and captures space; described intercepting and capturing space is around described protection zone and have physical barriers field and a sensor array of at least 30 feet wide, and described sensor array is around described intercepting and capturing space and be configured to approach towards the unwarranted of described intercepting and capturing space.
16. equipment as claimed in claim 15, is characterized in that, described intercepting and capturing space has the physical barriers field of at least 100 feet wide.
17. equipment as described in any one in claim 15-16, is characterized in that, described equipment does not comprise any tower of guarding.
18. equipment as described in any one in claim 15-17, is characterized in that, described nuclear island is at below ground, and described protection zone has the maximum height that is less than 36 feet.
19. 1 kinds of equipment, comprising:
Nuclear island, described nuclear island comprises at least one nuclear reactor;
Turbine island, described turbine island comprises steam-powered at least one turbine being produced by described nuclear reactor;
Wherein said nuclear island and described turbine island are spaced apart from each other.
20. equipment as claimed in claim 19, is characterized in that, at least two safe floors separate described nuclear island and described turbine island.
21. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-20, is characterized in that, described nuclear island remains on than the high safe class in described turbine island.
22. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-21, is characterized in that spaced apart at least 50 feet of described nuclear island and described turbine island.
23. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-21, is characterized in that spaced apart at least 100 feet of described nuclear island and described turbine island.
24. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-21, is characterized in that spaced apart at least 130 feet of described nuclear island and described turbine island.
25. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-24, is characterized in that, described nuclear island is in than the relatively low height in described turbine island.
26. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-24, is characterized in that, described nuclear island is underground, and described turbine island is most of or side completely on the ground.
27. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-26, is characterized in that, also comprise: underground super heating radiator and described nuclear island operable communication.
28. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-27; it is characterized in that; in the protection zone that the United States Federal's code the 10th volume the 73rd part that described nuclear island was formulated on February 2nd, 2011 defines, and in the protection zone that the United States Federal's code the 10th volume the 73rd part that does not formulate on February 2nd, 2011 on turbine island defines.
29. equipment as described in any one in claim 19-27, is characterized in that, described nuclear island is in protection zone, and in Bu protection zone, described turbine island.
30. 1 kinds of equipment, comprising:
At least one nuclear reactor;
At least one turbine, the steam driven that described at least one turbine is produced by described nuclear reactor; And super heating radiator, described super heating radiator be arranged on underground and with described nuclear reactor operable communication.
CN201280008045.2A 2011-02-08 2012-02-07 Nuclear power facility Expired - Fee Related CN103782346B (en)

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US13/366,909 2012-02-06
US13/366,909 US20120207261A1 (en) 2011-02-08 2012-02-06 Nuclear Power Facility
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