CN103647654B - A kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing - Google Patents
A kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN103647654B CN103647654B CN201310726584.6A CN201310726584A CN103647654B CN 103647654 B CN103647654 B CN 103647654B CN 201310726584 A CN201310726584 A CN 201310726584A CN 103647654 B CN103647654 B CN 103647654B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- key
- etm
- distribution terminal
- identity
- sms4
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
- 238000009826 distribution Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 76
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 26
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 12
- 238000003860 storage Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 9
- 206010048669 Terminal state Diseases 0.000 claims abstract description 3
- 230000014759 maintenance of location Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 3
- ODINCKMPIJJUCX-UHFFFAOYSA-N Calcium oxide Chemical compound [Ca]=O ODINCKMPIJJUCX-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 claims 1
- 230000006854 communication Effects 0.000 abstract description 4
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 abstract description 4
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000013500 data storage Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000005457 optimization Methods 0.000 description 2
- BYACHAOCSIPLCM-UHFFFAOYSA-N 2-[2-[bis(2-hydroxyethyl)amino]ethyl-(2-hydroxyethyl)amino]ethanol Chemical group OCCN(CCO)CCN(CCO)CCO BYACHAOCSIPLCM-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- TVZRAEYQIKYCPH-UHFFFAOYSA-N 3-(trimethylsilyl)propane-1-sulfonic acid Chemical compound C[Si](C)(C)CCCS(O)(=O)=O TVZRAEYQIKYCPH-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007175 bidirectional communication Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001010 compromised effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008676 import Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000006872 improvement Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000010181 polygamy Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000007711 solidification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008023 solidification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000009466 transformation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003612 virological effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Landscapes
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing, methods described includes：（1）ETM key structures are built according to distribution terminal；（2）Generate the distribution terminal letter of identity based on ETM keys；（3）Based on ETM key storages and manage distribution terminal data；（4）Distribution terminal state is proved based on ETM secret key remotes.Key involved by distribution terminal of the present invention is stored in electric power trusted module ETM, and ETM provides the protection of hardware-level for key, and the safety of key further ensures the safety of cipher key operation result；The Endpoint integrity state signed based on distribution terminal identity key, can be achieved the identity and context identification of distribution terminal in the communication system of power grids, further enhance communication system of power grids safety.
Description
Technical field
A kind of electric-power system management method of the present invention, in particular to a kind of distribution terminal key pipe based on trust computing
Reason method.
Background technology
As the intelligent grid of following power network development trend, the emphasis of countries in the world development is increasingly becoming, is set up in collection
Into, intelligent grid on the basis of high-speed bidirectional communication network, using passing through advanced sensing and e measurement technology, advanced control
Method processed and advanced DSS technology to realize the reliable of power network, it is safety, economy, efficient, environment-friendly and make
With the target of safety.One valuable feature of intelligent grid is power distribution automation.
Distribution terminal in power distribution automation has the operation function for detecting and monitoring distribution wire.Due to answering for local environment
Polygamy and uncertainty, its safety problem faced are more complicated than PC systems.Distribution terminal may be broken by such as physics
Bad, viral wooden horse is threatened and the security threat from mobile Internet.Therefore, threatened for these, distribution terminal typically has
Following demand for security, such as data integrity, data encryption, non-repudiation etc..In order to lift the safety of distribution terminal, utilize
The method that OpenSSL encryption kits are tested the security protection ability of distribution terminal, and use hash operations and non-
Symmetric cryptosystem realizes order integrity check and the authentication to distribution network master station.Added with distribution terminal using asymmetric
Secret skill art carries out the methods such as unidirectional authentication and message integrity protection to distribution main website, and proposes external safe mould
The thinking of block, to reduce the transformation to distribution terminal equipment.Although above-mentioned safety approach can improve distribution to a certain extent
The safety of terminal, but these schemes all do not account for the safety management of key, once key is compromised or steals, then strong safety
Scheme can not also play a role.
The content of the invention
In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing,
This method devises electric power trusted module ETM（Electrical Trusted Module）, include ETM key structure, and
The generation of distribution terminal letter of identity, data safety storage and context identification based on ETM keys.In the safety management side of key
Face, trust computing is a kind of good solution.Trust computing is a kind of information system security new technology.Its main thought is
Safety chip is introduced on computer hardware platforms framework to improve the security of terminal system.In trust computing, key is
Stored with tree structure, SRK is stored in safety zone, remaining key is by it as one-level key (also referred to as master key)
Directly or indirectly protected, its protected mode is father's key encryption subkey.Trust computing contrasts the excellent of conventional security
Putting is：Outside can not arbitrarily obtain the information in the hardware chip with security function.
The purpose of the present invention is realized using following technical proposals：
A kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing, it is theed improvement is that, methods described includes：
（1）ETM key structures are built according to distribution terminal；
（2）Generate the distribution terminal letter of identity based on ETM keys；
（3）Based on ETM key storages and manage distribution terminal data；
（4）Distribution terminal state is proved based on ETM secret key remotes.
It is preferred that, the step（1）Middle ETM keys solidify ETM key grooves, its key groove storage Binding key handle bag
Include：ETM_IDENTITY_KEY_PRIV- identity key private keys handle, ETM_IDENTITY_KEY_PUB- identity keys public key sentence
Handle, ETM_SMS4_KEY_1-SMS4- symmetric keys handle 1, ETM_SMS4_KEY_2-SMS4- symmetric keys handle 2, ETM_
SMS4_KEY_3-SMS4- symmetric keys handle 3 and ETM_SMS4_KEY_4-SMS4 symmetric keys handle 4.
It is preferred that, the step（2）Identity card including generating distribution terminal safety chip ETM based on electric power CA systems
Book.
Further, the electric power CA systems include three-level authentication model；First layer is that total root CA nets in state；The second layer is state
Two grades of CA that total root CA is signed and issued are netted, for netting provincial unit；Third layer is the three-level CA that two grades of CA are signed and issued, for prefecture-level list
Position.
It is preferred that, the step（2）Including
（2.1）Chip manufacturer produces a pair of public and private keys when producing ETM, and sending certificates constructing to 2 grades of CA registration center please
Ask；
（2.2）ETM Data Enter databases are forwarded certificate request to authentication center by registration center；
（2.3）Digital certificate is signed and issued by encrypting card apparatus using the CA private keys by authentication center；
（2.4）Digital certificate is stored in certificate data library backup by authentication center, and digital certificate is returned to registration center；
（2.5）Registration center returns to digital certificate and the public key certificate of the CA to chip manufacturer；
（2.6）Two certificates that the private key generated before and registration center return are stored in ETM chips by chip manufacturer.
It is preferred that, the step（3）Key and data encrypting and deciphering including storing and managing generation.
Further, the cryptographic algorithm that the key generation includes ETM supports has asymmetric cryptographic algorithm SM2, for body
The generation of part key；With symmetric cryptographic algorithm SMS4, for data encrypting and deciphering.
Further, operation is encrypted and decrypted in chip internal in the data that distribution terminal is related to, for ensuring key
The security of operation.
It is preferred that, the step（4）Including
（4.1）Distribution terminal is signed using identity key to PCR；
（4.2）According to the different CA for signing and issuing letter of identity, the certificate that distribution terminal is sent to remote parties is also different；
（4.3）Remote parties verify letter of identity, and letter of identity is verified, then continuation letter of identity checking PCR signatures,
PCR signature verifications pass through, then are compared PCR value with reference value, unanimously then show that the SOT state of termination is proved successfully；Otherwise prove to lose
Lose, the SOT state of termination is insincere.
Compared with the prior art, beneficial effects of the present invention are：
1）Key involved by distribution terminal is stored in electric power trusted module ETM, and ETM provides hardware-level for key
Protection, the safety of key further ensures the safety of cipher key operation result；
2）ETM use can ensure the malicious act of the integrality of distribution terminal equipment, confrontation Malware and user；
3）The characteristics of ETM is for distribution terminal equipment and design, its using not influenceing the normal function of distribution terminal,
Also big extra load will not be caused to distribution terminal；
4）Letter of identity based on distribution terminal identity key is all signed and issued by state's net CA systems, is realized and existing state
The seamless combination of CA frameworks is netted, is easy to unified plan and management；
5）The Endpoint integrity state signed based on distribution terminal identity key, can be achieved distribution terminal in the communication system of power grids
Identity and context identification, further enhance communication system of power grids safety.
Brief description of the drawings
A kind of power distribution terminal key management method flow chart based on trust computing that Fig. 1 provides for the present invention.
A kind of power distribution terminal key management method letter of identity flow based on trust computing that Fig. 2 provides for the present invention
Figure.
A kind of power distribution terminal key management method remote proving flow based on trust computing that Fig. 3 provides for the present invention
Figure.
Embodiment
The embodiment to the present invention is described in further detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
A kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing of the present invention, it is specific as follows：
（1）Electric power trusted module ETM key structure is designed according to the specific feature of distribution terminal；
In view of applying what in the electric power trusted module ETM of the distribution terminal finiteness and key of key space was used
Simplicity, different from the key management system that TPM/TCM chips are cumbersome, ETM directly solidifies several key grooves, and there is provided corresponding close
The Password Operations such as key generation, encryption and decryption, signature.
Different from TPM/TCM, ETM public key operations are all completed in ETM, therefore ETM needs to provide public key encryption, label
Name checking etc. command operation, and public key certificate import, generation etc. supporting order.
Electric power trusted module ETM be similar to trust computing safety chip TPM/TCM, be deployed in power industry equipment such as with
On electric terminals, chip internal has crypto-operation ability, safe storage capacity, externally provides similar with TPM/TCM credible
Computing function, such as hardware identity mark, integrity measurement and storage, remote proving.
The ETM corresponding key handles of key groove include：ETM_IDENTITY_KEY_PRIV（Identity key private key sentence
Handle）、ETM_IDENTITY_KEY_PUB（Identity key public key handle）、ETM_SMS4_KEY_1（SMS4 symmetric keys handle 1）、
ETM_SMS4_KEY_2（SMS4 symmetric keys handle 2）、ETM_SMS4_KEY_3（SMS4 symmetric keys handle 3）、ETM_SMS4_
KEY_4（SMS4 symmetric keys handle 4）.
（2）The generation and management of distribution terminal letter of identity based on ETM keys；
In order to ensure the safety of higher level and be easy to unified management, all kinds of cards that distribution terminal safety chip ETM is related to
Book is as letter of identity is all based on the generation of electric power CA systems.
Electric power CA systems are based on three-level authentication model.First layer is that total root CA nets in state, and the second layer is to net total root CA label by state
Two grades of CA of hair, for netting provincial unit；Third layer is the three-level CA that two grades of CA are signed and issued, for prefecture-level unit.Power system
State net the source that total root CA is all certificate verifications, therefore, each ETM, can be in the preset total root CA of chip internal when dispatching from the factory
Certificate.
As shown in Fig. 2 the generation of ETM letters of identity depends on chip manufacturer sends corresponding request to electric power CA systems.
According to the difference of distribution terminal suitable environment, the CA for issuing letter of identity is also different.If the distribution terminal is by net provincial company portion
Administration uses, then ETM chips manufacturer needs to send in one's application to 2 grades of CA of power system.
1) chip manufacturer produces a pair of public and private keys when producing ETM using ETM, and certificate is sent to 2 grades of CA registration center
Generation request；
2) ETM Data Enter databases are forwarded certificate request to authentication center by registration center；
3) digital certificate is signed and issued using encrypting card apparatus using the CA private keys by authentication center；
4) digital certificate is stored in certificate data library backup by authentication center, and digital certificate is returned to registration center；
5) registration center returns to digital certificate and the public key certificate of the CA to chip manufacturer；
6) two certificates that the private key generated before and registration center return are stored in ETM chips by chip manufacturer.
（3）Distribution terminal data storage management based on ETM keys；
Distribution terminal data storage management based on ETM keys includes：
1) key is generated, and includes the key generation process of the cryptographic algorithm of ETM internal supports；
2) data encrypting and deciphering, includes the data encrypting and deciphering process of ETM internal supports.
The cryptographic algorithm that ETM is supported has asymmetric cryptographic algorithm SM2 and symmetric cryptographic algorithm SMS4, SM2 key mainly to use
In the generation of identity key, SMS4 keys are used for data encrypting and deciphering.
ETM key generation process is to have four key grooves in ETM inside solidifications, deposits four SMS4 keys, corresponds to respectively
Fixed key handles facilitate application layer to use.When generating key, it is necessary to specify corresponding key handles.Internal hardware is according to connecing
The instruction generation new key received, while it is placed into corresponding key groove with the binding of corresponding key handles.
The advantage of ETM data encrypting and decipherings is can ensure the safety of Password Operations with hardware, and the data that distribution terminal is related to are all
It can only encrypt and decrypt in chip internal.
ETM data encrypting and decipherings process is that the instruction being encrypted using symmetric cryptographic algorithm is sent to ETM chips, specifies and adds
Close key handles, give data to be encrypted, and chip internal completes to return to the data after encryption after encryption.Decryption with etc
Seemingly.
（4）Distribution terminal status remote based on ETM keys is proved；
During distribution terminal startup optimization, ETM platform configuration register PCR（Platform
Configuration Register）The SOT state of termination is have recorded, the PCR signed based on ETM identity keys can be demonstrate,proved to remote parties
The bright SOT state of termination.
ETM PCR storage be terminal it is all operation parts integrity measurement values, according to part startup optimization order according to
It is secondary to add up to extend in PCR, it is impossible to autonomous change, really reflect the running status of terminal.
As shown in figure 3, distribution terminal is signed using identity key to PCR；According to the difference for the CA for signing and issuing letter of identity, match somebody with somebody
The certificate that electric terminals are sent to remote parties is also different, if letter of identity is issued by 2 grades of CA, distribution terminal by letter of identity, 2 grades
CA certificate issues remote parties in the lump in company with the PCR of signature；Remote parties verify letter of identity, if being verified, continue to use identity
Certification authentication PCR is signed, if being verified, PCR value is compared with reference value, shows that the SOT state of termination is proved into if consistent
Work(, otherwise proves failure, and the SOT state of termination is insincere.
Finally it should be noted that：The above embodiments are merely illustrative of the technical solutions of the present invention rather than its limitations, to the greatest extent
The present invention is described in detail with reference to above-described embodiment for pipe, and those of ordinary skill in the art should be understood：Still
The embodiment of the present invention can be modified or equivalent, and without departing from any of spirit and scope of the invention
Modification or equivalent, it all should cover among scope of the presently claimed invention.
Claims (8)
1. a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing, it is characterised in that methods described includes：
(1) electric power trusted module ETM key structures are built according to distribution terminal；
(2) the distribution terminal letter of identity based on ETM keys is generated；
(3) ETM key storages are based on and distribution terminal data are managed；
(4) distribution terminal state is proved based on ETM secret key remotes；
The step (2) includes：
(2.1) a pair of public and private keys are produced during chip manufacturer production ETM, certificates constructing request is sent to two grades of CA registration center；
Two grades of CA net total root CA by state and signed and issued, for netting provincial unit；
(2.2) ETM Data Enter databases are forwarded certificate request to authentication center by registration center；
(2.3) digital certificate is signed and issued by encrypting card apparatus using the CA private keys by authentication center；
(2.4) digital certificate is stored in certificate data library backup by authentication center, and digital certificate is returned to registration center；
(2.5) registration center returns to digital certificate and the public key certificate of the CA to chip manufacturer；
(2.6) two certificates that the private key generated before and registration center return are stored in ETM chips by chip manufacturer.
2. a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that described
ETM keys are solidificated in ETM key grooves in step (1), and its key groove storage Binding key handle includes：ETM_IDENTITY_
KEY_PRIV- identity key private keys handle, ETM_IDENTITY_KEY_PUB- identity key public keys handle, ETM_SMS4_KEY_
1-SMS4- symmetric keys handle 1, ETM_SMS4_KEY_2-SMS4- symmetric keys handle 2, ETM_SMS4_KEY_3-SMS4- pairs
Claim key handles 3 and ETM_SMS4_KEY_4-SMS4 symmetric keys handle 4.
3. a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that described
Step (2) includes generating distribution terminal safety chip ETM letter of identity based on electric power CA systems.
4. a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing as claimed in claim 3, it is characterised in that described
Electric power CA systems include three-level authentication model；First layer is that total root CA nets in state；The second layer is that two grades of CA that total root CA is signed and issued net in state,
For netting provincial unit；Third layer is the three-level CA that two grades of CA are signed and issued, for prefecture-level unit.
5. a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that described
Step (3) includes storing and managing the key and data encrypting and deciphering of generation.
6. a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing as claimed in claim 5, it is characterised in that ETM
The cryptographic algorithm of support has asymmetric cryptographic algorithm SM2 and symmetric cryptographic algorithm SMS4, SM2 to be used for the generation of identity key,
SMS4 is used for data encrypting and deciphering.
7. a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing as claimed in claim 5, it is characterised in that distribution
Operation is encrypted and decrypted in chip internal in the data that terminal is related to, the security for ensuring cipher key operation.
8. a kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing as claimed in claim 1, it is characterised in that described
Step (4) includes：
(4.1) distribution terminal is signed using identity key to platform configuration register PCR；
(4.2) according to the different CA for signing and issuing letter of identity, the certificate that distribution terminal is sent to remote parties is also different；
(4.3) remote parties checking letter of identity, letter of identity is verified, then continuation letter of identity checking PCR signatures, PCR
Signature verification passes through, then is compared PCR value with reference value, unanimously then shows that the SOT state of termination is proved successfully；Otherwise failure is proved, should
The SOT state of termination is insincere.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201310726584.6A CN103647654B (en) | 2013-12-25 | 2013-12-25 | A kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201310726584.6A CN103647654B (en) | 2013-12-25 | 2013-12-25 | A kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN103647654A CN103647654A (en) | 2014-03-19 |
| CN103647654B true CN103647654B (en) | 2017-07-14 |
Family
ID=50252815
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201310726584.6A Active CN103647654B (en) | 2013-12-25 | 2013-12-25 | A kind of power distribution terminal key management method based on trust computing |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN103647654B (en) |
Families Citing this family (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105187453A (en) * | 2015-10-22 | 2015-12-23 | 宁波三星医疗电气股份有限公司 | Security encryption communication method of fault indicator |
| CN114268643B (en) * | 2021-11-26 | 2024-04-16 | 许继集团有限公司 | Active identification technology-based power distribution Internet of things terminal and management method |
Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101216915A (en) * | 2008-01-21 | 2008-07-09 | 深圳市路通网络技术有限公司 | A secured mobile payment method |
| CN101888383A (en) * | 2010-06-30 | 2010-11-17 | 北京交通大学 | Method for implementing extensible trusted SSH |
| CN102035838A (en) * | 2010-12-07 | 2011-04-27 | 中国科学院软件研究所 | Trust service connecting method and trust service system based on platform identity |
| CN102065003A (en) * | 2010-08-24 | 2011-05-18 | 吉林大学 | Method, system and equipment for realizing trusted secure routing of vehicular information system |
| CN102427449A (en) * | 2011-11-04 | 2012-04-25 | 北京工业大学 | Trusted mobile storage method based on security chips |
Family Cites Families (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP4596256B2 (en) * | 2005-08-02 | 2010-12-08 | ソニー株式会社 | Transmission / reception system and method, transmission device and method, reception device and method, and program |
-
2013
- 2013-12-25 CN CN201310726584.6A patent/CN103647654B/en active Active
Patent Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101216915A (en) * | 2008-01-21 | 2008-07-09 | 深圳市路通网络技术有限公司 | A secured mobile payment method |
| CN101888383A (en) * | 2010-06-30 | 2010-11-17 | 北京交通大学 | Method for implementing extensible trusted SSH |
| CN102065003A (en) * | 2010-08-24 | 2011-05-18 | 吉林大学 | Method, system and equipment for realizing trusted secure routing of vehicular information system |
| CN102035838A (en) * | 2010-12-07 | 2011-04-27 | 中国科学院软件研究所 | Trust service connecting method and trust service system based on platform identity |
| CN102427449A (en) * | 2011-11-04 | 2012-04-25 | 北京工业大学 | Trusted mobile storage method based on security chips |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN103647654A (en) | 2014-03-19 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN102111265B (en) | Method for encrypting secure chip of power system acquisition terminal | |
| CN103067160B (en) | A kind of method and system for the dynamic key production for encrypting SD card | |
| CN108880800B (en) | Power distribution and utilization communication system and method based on quantum secret communication | |
| CN102983965B (en) | Transformer station's quantum communications model, quantum key distribution center and model implementation method | |
| US20140270179A1 (en) | Method and system for key generation, backup, and migration based on trusted computing | |
| CN103701757B (en) | Identity authentication method and system for service access | |
| CN103067170B (en) | encrypting method based on EXT2 file system | |
| CN104579679B (en) | Wireless public network data forwarding method for agriculture distribution communication equipment | |
| CN110753344B (en) | NB-IoT-based smart meter secure access system | |
| CN101771699A (en) | Method and system for improving SaaS application security | |
| CN103685323A (en) | Method for realizing intelligent home security networking based on intelligent cloud television gateway | |
| CN111435390B (en) | Safety protection method for operation and maintenance tool of power distribution terminal | |
| CN110050437A (en) | The device and method of distributed certificate registration | |
| CN101610150B (en) | Third-party digital signature method and data transmission system | |
| CN108123795A (en) | Distributing method, application process, publishing platform and the system of quantum key chip | |
| CN107948156A (en) | The closed key management method and system of a kind of identity-based | |
| CN102638568A (en) | Cloud storage system and data management method thereof | |
| WO2012072001A1 (en) | Safe method for card issuing, card issuing device and system | |
| CN107135070A (en) | Method for implanting, framework and the system of RSA key pair and certificate | |
| CN105281910A (en) | Internet of things lock with CA digital certificate serving as network access identity identifier and network access identity identification method | |
| CN104954137A (en) | Method of virtual machine security certification based on domestic password technique | |
| CN105471901A (en) | Industrial information security authentication system | |
| CN104980269A (en) | Secret key sharing method, device and system | |
| CN107911221A (en) | The key management method of solid-state disk data safety storage | |
| CN111435389A (en) | Power distribution terminal operation and maintenance tool safety protection system |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20171020 Address after: 100031 Xicheng District West Chang'an Avenue, No. 86, Beijing Co-patentee after: China Electric Power Research Institute Patentee after: State Grid Corporation of China Co-patentee after: GLOBAL ENERGY INTERCONNECTION RESEARCH INSTITUTE Co-patentee after: Institute of Information Engineering, Gas Co-patentee after: State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Company Address before: 100031 Xicheng District West Chang'an Avenue, No. 86, Beijing Co-patentee before: China Electric Power Research Institute Patentee before: State Grid Corporation of China Co-patentee before: Institute of Information Engineering, Gas Co-patentee before: State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Company |