CN105528239B - The key management method of virtual credible platform module based on credible root server - Google Patents
The key management method of virtual credible platform module based on credible root server Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN105528239B CN105528239B CN201610028806.0A CN201610028806A CN105528239B CN 105528239 B CN105528239 B CN 105528239B CN 201610028806 A CN201610028806 A CN 201610028806A CN 105528239 B CN105528239 B CN 105528239B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- key
- vtpm
- tpm
- credible
- platform module
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related
Links
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 16
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 17
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 238000003860 storage Methods 0.000 claims description 40
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 claims description 28
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000009826 distribution Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000008676 import Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000010606 normalization Methods 0.000 abstract description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 2
- 241001269238 Data Species 0.000 description 1
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000006872 improvement Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
- G06F9/455—Emulation; Interpretation; Software simulation, e.g. virtualisation or emulation of application or operating system execution engines
- G06F9/45533—Hypervisors; Virtual machine monitors
- G06F9/45558—Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/33—User authentication using certificates
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
- G06F9/455—Emulation; Interpretation; Software simulation, e.g. virtualisation or emulation of application or operating system execution engines
- G06F9/45533—Hypervisors; Virtual machine monitors
- G06F9/45558—Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects
- G06F2009/45587—Isolation or security of virtual machine instances
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention proposes the key management methods of the virtual credible platform module based on credible root server, this method is based on the frame of credible root server, combine the function and key management mechanism of physical trusted platform module, this method had both met the demand of VTPM, in turn ensured the safety of key.In the method, all keys are generated by physics TPM, ensure that normalization and legitimacy that key generates；Key is stored by physics TPM, is managed by key cache mechanism, guarantees the safety of key；Unique subscriber of the virtual credible platform module manager as physics TPM is concentrated and carries out standardized administration to the key of VTPM, and provide cryptographic service to VTPM.
Description
Technical field
The present invention is a kind of key management method of virtual credible platform module based on root server credible in cloud environment,
Belong to information security field.
Background technique
In recent years, cloud computing technology develops rapidly, but the safety problem faced is also increasingly severe.Credible root server
Scheme is a kind of technology that cloud environment safety is ensured using reliable computing technology.The program is by virtual credible root module VTPM from cloud
It separates, is focused on a credible root server in server.Credible root server includes a physics trust computing mould
Block TPM chip generates multiple virtual credible module VTPM then by virtualization technology, externally to provide trusted service.It is each
A VTPM must can provide key management, identity, data protection, complete with physics TPM function having the same for outside
The functions such as whole property storage and report.
Credible root server manages VTPM concentratedly, easy to maintain, easily expands.But at present for trusted root service
The correlative study of device is not also that very much, key management functions are to realize the premise and basis of the various functions of trusted servers, is
Primary solves the problems, such as.
Summary of the invention
The key that the present invention proposes a kind of virtual credible platform module in the environment of credible root server is generated, is stored
It with the method for load, can not only meet the requirement of virtual credible platform module manager, but also can guarantee the safety of key.
To achieve the above object, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is the virtual credible platform mould based on credible root server
The key management method of block, this method based on following steps realize,
1. key generates
1.1 endorsement key EK and Attestation Identity Key AIK
VTPM manager is the unique subscriber of physics TPM in credible root server, be responsible for the monitoring of VTPM order with
Main function to the calling of TPM function, and endorsement key EK is to generate Attestation Identity Key AIK and establish TPM platform
The owner is seldom used in other cases.This method using VTPM manager as the owner of physics TPM platform, by
VTPM manager generates multiple AIK as the VAIK of each VTPM example by calling the function of TPM to use EK.Physics TPM
EK directly as each VTPM example VEK.
1.2 storage key SKs and storage root key SRK
In the method, the storage root key that physics TPM is generated is permanently present inside TPM, for protecting other keys,
Then multiple storage key SKs are generated as the storage root key VSRK of each VTPM example using physics TPM.VSRK by
SRK is encrypted, to guarantee its safety.
1.3 other users class keys
Other User class keys can be generated by TPM, then give VTPM example by the distribution of VTPM manager, can also
To be to import TPM after some VTPM is generated in outside, it is managed by TPM.
2. key storage
In the design of credible root server, unique subscriber of the VTPM manager as credible platform module, have be
VTPM application and the responsibility for distributing key.Since credible platform module TPM ensures the safety of key with cache management mechanism
Storage.Original mechanism that credible platform module is utilized in this method redesigns the structure of key storage tree to save VTPM's
Key.Endorsement key EK and credible root key SRK are stored in inside credible platform module.Credible platform module TPM is each
VTPM generates storage of the storage key SK as the VTPM with key VSRK.Each VSRK is encrypted and is protected by SRK.
The sub-key of VSRK is exactly the key used in each VTPM, including Attestation Identity Key AIK, Binding key Binding
Keys, signature key Signing Keys, derivative key Legacy Keys and authentication key Authentication Keys.
3. key load authorization
In credible root server according to key difference, its load and using when TPM have different authorizations.Physics is credible
The owner of console module is VTPM manager.The load use process of VTPM application key includes the following steps,
(1) VTPM is issued to VTPM manager and is requested.
(2) VTPM manager receives request, the legitimacy of checking request.
(3) VTPM forwards a request to physics TPM and carries out authentication.
(4) it if VTPM manager authentication success, TPM do further operating according to different key requests, returns
Key gives VTPM manager.
(5) if VTPM manager authentication fails, mistake is returned.
(6) VTPM manager returns result to VTPM.
All keys provide protection by physics TPM, and each virtual memory root key VSRK is by being permanently stored in physics TPM
Storage root key encrypt, the key of each VTPM is encrypted by VSRK.
It needs to authorize load when key uses:
(1) owner of physical trusted platform module is VTPM manager, is owned when VTPM is using public key
Person's authorization.
(2) virtual memory master key is used, it is necessary to which the storage master of the authorization, physical trusted platform module of verifying the owner is close
The authorization of key authorization and virtual memory master key.
(3) the storage master key authorization, virtual of physical trusted platform module must be verified using virtual platform identity key
Store authorization and the platform identity key authorization of master key.
(4) using virtual platform encryption key must verify storage master key authorization, the authorization of virtual memory master key and
Platform encryption key authorization.
(5) user key authorization must be verified using Virtual User key.
The present invention is directed to the specific environment of credible root server, has the advantage that compared with prior art
1, the key of each VTPM in the present invention is generated by physical trusted platform module TPM, ensure that key generates
Normalization.
2, key cache administrative mechanism is utilized in the present invention, carries out the storage management of key, each key is by hardware package
Shield, ensure that the safety of key.
3, VTPM needs to verify by VTPM manager when application is licensed in the present invention and physics TPM is authenticated, and keeps away
The unauthorized use of illegal request and key is exempted from.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 VTPM key derivation diagram；
Fig. 2 VTPM key storage tree structure；
Specific embodiment
1. key generting machanism
As shown in Figure 1, there are two key is more special in entire key derivation diagram:
(1) endorsement key EK.Endorsement key in VTPM directlys adopt the endorsement key in physics TPM, generation method
There is similitude with the endorsement key generation method of physics TPM, there are two types of production methods: first is that using TPM command TPM_
CreateEndorsementKeyPair is generated, second is that by key " injection " technology, under the premise of trusting manufacturer, by making
Quotient's generation is made, is then injected into TPM.
(2) storage root key SRK.Unique subscriber of the VTPM manager as physics TPM, storage root key are created in user
Shi Shengcheng manages all key datas of user, only services for physics TPM.
Other keys:
(1) virtual platform body authentication key VAIK.The practical AIK for being physics TPM of VAIK, generation need trusted third party
The support of PCA.PCA requests to generate AIK certificate according to TPM, and returns to TPM.
(2) virtual memory root key VSRK.Physics TPM generate a storage key, as virtual VTPM storage with close
Key VSRK.
(3) other user keys after carrying out legitimacy certification by physics TPM, are generated by TPM and are used for VTPM.
2. cipher key storage mechanism
Key storage management in credible root server uses tree structure, main using key cache administrative mechanism KCM
The resource being limited in TPM is managed, and these mechanism are hidden to application call.Application program can be by being added using KCM
Key is carried into TPM.If all TPM resources are occupied, KCM needs to discharge resource for the key being not frequently used from TPM core
It takes out in piece, often to pass in and out the key vacating space of TPM for those, the key of needs is put into TPM.
As shown in Fig. 2, the structure of storage tree is three layers, the depth of tree is moderate, when being not only convenient for management, but also can reduce load
Between improve key service efficiency.Endorsement key EK and storage root key SRK are stored in inside physical trusted platform module TPM, tool
There is very high safety.The storage root key VSRK that each VTPM is encrypted using the public key of storage root key is stored in outside TPM
Portion, then by the storage root key VSRK of each VTPM to platform identity key VAIK, the signature key Singing in VTPM
Keys, Binding key Binding Keys etc. carry out encryption storage.
3. key load mechanism
In credible root server there are multiple virtual credible platform module VTPM in the case where key load and authorization more
Add complexity:
(1) owner of physical trusted platform module is VTPM manager, is owned when VTPM is using public key
Person's authorization.
(2) virtual memory master key is used, it is necessary to which the storage master of the authorization, physical trusted platform module of verifying the owner is close
The authorization of key authorization and virtual memory master key.
(3) the storage master key authorization, virtual of physical trusted platform module must be verified using virtual platform identity key
Store authorization and the platform identity key authorization of master key.
(4) using virtual platform encryption key must verify storage master key authorization, the authorization of virtual memory master key and
Platform encryption key authorization.
(5) user key authorization must be verified using Virtual User key.
Finally, it should be noted that above example is only to illustrate the present invention and not limits technical side described in the invention
Case；Therefore, although this specification is referring to above-mentioned example, the present invention has been described in detail, this field it is general
It is logical it will be appreciated by the skilled person that still can modify to the present invention or equivalent replacement；And all do not depart from the spirit of invention
With the technical solution and its improvement of range, it is intended to be within the scope of the claims of the invention.
Claims (3)
1. the key management method of the virtual credible platform module based on credible root server, it is characterised in that: this method is based on
Following steps realization,
1. key generates
1.1 endorsement key EK and Attestation Identity Key AIK
Virtual credible platform module VTPM manager is unique use of physical trusted platform module TPM in credible root server
The monitoring to VTPM order and the calling to TPM function are responsible in family, and the main function of endorsement key EK is to generate identity card
Bright key A IK and the owner for establishing TPM platform, are seldom used in other cases；This method using VTPM manager as
The owner of physics TPM platform is used the function of physics TPM by VTPM manager, multiple bodies is generated using endorsement key EK
Part proves that key A IK, the AIK of generation prove key VAIK as the virtual identity of each VTPM example；The endorsement of physics TPM is close
Virtual endorsement key VEK of the key EK directly as each VTPM example；
1.2 storage key SKs and storage root key SRK
In the method, the storage root key SRK that physics TPM is generated is permanently present inside TPM, for protecting other keys,
Then multiple storage key SKs are generated as the virtual memory root key VSRK of each VTPM example using physics TPM；It is empty
Quasi- storage root key VSRK is encrypted by storage root key SRK；
1.3 other users class keys
Other User class keys can be generated by TPM, then give VTPM example by the distribution of VTPM manager, can also be
Outside is to import TPM after some VTPM is generated, and is managed by TPM；
2. key storage
In the design of credible root server, unique subscriber of the VTPM manager as credible platform module, having is the Shen VTPM
Please with distribution key responsibility；The original cache management mechanism of credible platform module is utilized in this method, is redesigned key and is deposited
The structure of Chu Shu saves the key of VTPM；Endorsement key EK and credible root key SRK are stored in inside credible platform module；It can
Believe that console module TPM is that each VTPM generates virtual memory root key VSRK of the storage key SK as the VTPM；Each
VSRK is encrypted and is protected by SRK；The sub-key of VSRK is exactly the key used in each VTPM, including proof of identification is close
Key AIK, Binding key Binding Keys, signature key Signing Keys, derivative key Legacy Keys and authentication key
Authentication Keys；
3. key load authorization
According to the difference of key in credible root server, in its load and in use, TPM has different authorizations；Physics is credible
The owner of console module TPM is VTPM manager；The load use process of VTPM application key includes the following steps,
(1) VTPM is issued to VTPM manager and is requested；
(2) VTPM manager receives request, the legitimacy of checking request；
(3) VTPM forwards a request to physics TPM and carries out authentication；
(4) if VTPM manager authentication success, TPM do further operating, " return " key" according to different key requests
Give VTPM manager；
(5) if VTPM manager authentication fails, mistake is returned；
(6) VTPM manager returns result to VTPM.
2. the key management method of the virtual credible platform module according to claim 1 based on credible root server,
Be characterized in that: all keys provide protection by physics TPM, and each virtual memory root key VSRK is by being permanently stored in physics TPM
In storage root key encrypt, the key of each VTPM is encrypted by VSRK.
3. the key management method of the virtual credible platform module according to claim 1 based on credible root server,
It is characterized in that: needing to authorize load when key uses:
The owner of physical trusted platform module is VTPM manager, needs to carry out owner's authorization when VTPM is using public key.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610028806.0A CN105528239B (en) | 2016-01-15 | 2016-01-15 | The key management method of virtual credible platform module based on credible root server |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610028806.0A CN105528239B (en) | 2016-01-15 | 2016-01-15 | The key management method of virtual credible platform module based on credible root server |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN105528239A CN105528239A (en) | 2016-04-27 |
| CN105528239B true CN105528239B (en) | 2018-12-07 |
Family
ID=55770485
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610028806.0A Expired - Fee Related CN105528239B (en) | 2016-01-15 | 2016-01-15 | The key management method of virtual credible platform module based on credible root server |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN105528239B (en) |
Families Citing this family (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US10218696B2 (en) * | 2016-06-30 | 2019-02-26 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Targeted secure software deployment |
| CN106354550A (en) * | 2016-11-01 | 2017-01-25 | 广东浪潮大数据研究有限公司 | Method, device and system for protecting security of virtual machine |
| US11438155B2 (en) * | 2017-01-24 | 2022-09-06 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Key vault enclave |
| CN107465689B (en) * | 2017-09-08 | 2020-08-04 | 大唐高鸿信安（浙江）信息科技有限公司 | Key management system and method of virtual trusted platform module in cloud environment |
| US10757082B2 (en) | 2018-02-22 | 2020-08-25 | International Business Machines Corporation | Transforming a wrapped key into a protected key |
| CN108572861A (en) * | 2018-04-26 | 2018-09-25 | 浪潮(北京)电子信息产业有限公司 | A kind of guard method, system, equipment and the storage medium of virtual credible root |
| CN109165079B (en) * | 2018-08-07 | 2021-07-27 | 郑州云海信息技术有限公司 | Cloud data center trusted platform based on virtualization and method for building trust chain |
| CN109167785B (en) * | 2018-09-03 | 2022-04-29 | 郑州云海信息技术有限公司 | Calling method of virtual trusted root and service server |
| CN113282910B (en) * | 2021-04-22 | 2023-07-18 | 中国科学院软件研究所 | Root key protection method for trusted computing trust root |
| CN115250189B (en) * | 2021-04-27 | 2023-06-02 | 西门子（中国）有限公司 | Key management method and device for intelligent household equipment |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102427449A (en) * | 2011-11-04 | 2012-04-25 | 北京工业大学 | Trusted mobile storage method based on security chips |
| CN103888251A (en) * | 2014-04-11 | 2014-06-25 | 北京工业大学 | Virtual machine credibility guaranteeing method in cloud environment |
-
2016
- 2016-01-15 CN CN201610028806.0A patent/CN105528239B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102427449A (en) * | 2011-11-04 | 2012-04-25 | 北京工业大学 | Trusted mobile storage method based on security chips |
| CN103888251A (en) * | 2014-04-11 | 2014-06-25 | 北京工业大学 | Virtual machine credibility guaranteeing method in cloud environment |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
| Title |
|---|
| 可信存储的密钥迁移模型及封装方案;王冠 等;《信息网络安全》;20120510(第05期);第17-26页 * |
| 基于TPM的可信存储的双向认证的研究;王冠 等;《2009全国计算机网络与通信学术会议论文集》;20090501;第228-233页 * |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN105528239A (en) | 2016-04-27 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN105528239B (en) | The key management method of virtual credible platform module based on credible root server | |
| US8468361B2 (en) | System and method for securely provisioning and generating one-time-passwords in a remote device | |
| US8140843B2 (en) | Content control method using certificate chains | |
| KR101214497B1 (en) | Memory System with versatile content control | |
| US8266711B2 (en) | Method for controlling information supplied from memory device | |
| US20140270179A1 (en) | Method and system for key generation, backup, and migration based on trusted computing | |
| US20080034440A1 (en) | Content Control System Using Versatile Control Structure | |
| US20080010685A1 (en) | Content Control Method Using Versatile Control Structure | |
| US20070168292A1 (en) | Memory system with versatile content control | |
| US20080010449A1 (en) | Content Control System Using Certificate Chains | |
| US20100138652A1 (en) | Content control method using certificate revocation lists | |
| US20080010451A1 (en) | Content Control Method Using Certificate Revocation Lists | |
| EP2284758A2 (en) | Versatile content control with partitioning | |
| CN104618096B (en) | Protect method, equipment and the TPM key administrative center of key authorization data | |
| US20080022395A1 (en) | System for Controlling Information Supplied From Memory Device | |
| KR20070091349A (en) | System for creating control structure for versatile content control | |
| CN104021335B (en) | Password service method based on extensible password service framework | |
| WO2008008244A2 (en) | Content control system and method using versatile control structure | |
| CN107911221B (en) | Key management method for secure storage of solid-state disk data | |
| WO2006069311A2 (en) | Control structure for versatile content control and method using structure | |
| CN105262590A (en) | Method and system for safely insulating keys in virtual environment | |
| TWI476629B (en) | Data security and security systems and methods | |
| CN106992978B (en) | Network security management method and server | |
| WO2008013656A2 (en) | Content control system and method using certificate chains | |
| WO2008013655A2 (en) | Content control system and method using certificate revocation lists |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| C06 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| C10 | Entry into substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee |
Granted publication date: 20181207 |
|
| CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee |