CN103618600A - A method and a system for processing mixed secret keys with an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm - Google Patents
A method and a system for processing mixed secret keys with an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm Download PDFInfo
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- CN103618600A CN103618600A CN201310521990.9A CN201310521990A CN103618600A CN 103618600 A CN103618600 A CN 103618600A CN 201310521990 A CN201310521990 A CN 201310521990A CN 103618600 A CN103618600 A CN 103618600A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and a system for processing mixed secret keys with an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. Terminals and access-end devices at access points are treated discriminatively by using the method for processing mixed secret keys. Secret keys using the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and different secret key storing methods are used in order to execute discriminative secret key processing from terminals to the access devices and from the access devices to the terminals, thereby reasonably satisfying requirements of security, efficiency, and space. Discriminative secret key processing is executed according to the different forms of the devices. Therefore, in a weak terminal environment with limited calculation and storage resources, bidirectional security certificate and encryption communication based on secret key processing is achieved and information security in an internet of things or a ubiquitous network is effectively guaranteed.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to Computer Applied Technology field, relate to a kind of processing method and system of hybrid cryptographic key, specifically a kind of hybrid cryptographic key processing method based on rivest, shamir, adelman under weak terminal environments and the design of system.
Background technology
Along with the development and application of Internet of Things and ubiquitous network technology, more and more based on limited calculating storage terminal equipment in each economic field extensive must using, as Industry Control, agricultural modernization, environmental monitoring, goods and materials monitoring etc.Internet of Things needs fail safe in the application in most of fields, and as terminal payment, maintain secrecy monitoring, core industry control etc., the environment of safety can guarantee that these application scenarioss are not subject to external attack, as poisoning intrusion, authentication invasion, spoof attack etc.
In prior art; the realization of fail safe generally can realize by physical protection, two kinds of modes of message protection; but physical protection is a kind of foundation to protect of versatility; the main mode that still adopts message protection; its core that ensures information security is exactly the key management based on cryptosystem, and the safety certification and the coded communication system that form thus.In Internet of Things or ubiquitous network, the weak terminal environments of limited calculating storage resources is very general, wherein weak terminal environments refers to the relatively limited terminal environments of hardware resource such as calculating, storage and network, particularly important for the key management of cryptosystem under this environment.But the general key management based on symmetric encipherment algorithm, owing to using same encryption and decryption key, causes in business application widely and has very large risk.
Summary of the invention
Technical problem to be solved by this invention is a kind of hybrid cryptographic key processing method and the system of rivest, shamir, adelman of providing for the problem of the cipher key processing method existence under weak terminal environments in prior art, and it has safety, efficient feature.
The technical scheme that the present invention solves its technical problem employing is: a kind of hybrid cryptographic key processing method of rivest, shamir, adelman, specifically comprises:
According to equipment form distributed key to or key seed pond, and each trigger condition is set;
According to trigger condition, trigger key updating strategy, carry out key updating;
According to trigger condition, trigger cipher key destruction strategy, carry out cipher key destruction;
According to trigger condition, trigger key recovery, carry out key recovery.
Further, described according to equipment form distributed key to or the key step in key seed pond be:
S11, equipment form are terminal equipments, the access device PKI kind subpool that the private key of key handling system terminal for distributing sign and terminal equipment need to access;
S12, equipment form are the access devices of access point, the private key kind subpool of the access device sign of key handling system distribution access point and the PKI of the Terminal Equipment Identifier that access point can be accessed;
S13, the trigger condition of each key handling system is set.
Further, the trigger condition of described key handling system comprises: the time trigger condition of key distribution trigger condition, key updating, the location triggered condition of key updating, cipher key destruction trigger condition, key recovery trigger condition.
Further, the key step of described key updating is:
S21, according to trigger condition, initiate key updating;
S22, based on existing key to or key seed pond, carry out safety certification and session, then carry out online or off-line and upgrade;
S23, equipment form are terminal equipments, upgrade the private key of its Terminal Equipment Identifier;
S24, equipment form are the access devices of access point, upgrade the PKI of the sign that the terminal equipment of its storage is corresponding.
Further, the key step of described cipher key destruction is:
S31, according to trigger condition, initiate cipher key destruction;
S32, equipment form are terminal equipments, and key handling system is revoked the private key of Terminal Equipment Identifier, and in the access device of access point, remove the sign PKI that terminal equipment is corresponding;
S33, equipment form are the access devices of access point, key handling system is revoked access device, remove this access device and be identified at the whether effective record of the equipment that identifying in key handling system, remove the private key kind subpool of access device sign and sign PKI corresponding to all terminal equipments that this access device allows access simultaneously.
Further, the key step of described key recovery is:
S41, according to trigger condition, initiate key recovery;
S42, equipment form are terminal equipments, and key handling system is recovered the private key of Terminal Equipment Identifier and the access point apparatus PKI kind subpool that terminal equipment need to access;
S43, equipment form are access point access devices, and key handling system is recovered the private key kind subpool of access device sign and allowed the sign PKI corresponding to terminal equipment of access.
For technical solution problem, the present invention also provides a kind of hybrid cryptographic key treatment system of rivest, shamir, adelman, specifically comprise key handling system, key distribution module, key updating module, cipher key destruction module and key recovery module, described key handling system is for arranging the trigger condition of other modules, described key distribution module for according to equipment form distributed key to or key seed pond, described key updating module is for initiating key updating according to trigger condition, described cipher key destruction module is for initiating cipher key destruction according to trigger condition, described key recovery module is for initiating key recovery according to trigger condition.
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: hybrid cryptographic key processing method and the system of a kind of rivest, shamir, adelman of the present invention, by adopting the processing method of hybrid cryptographic key, incoming end equipment to terminal and access point carries out different treating with a certain discrimination, use the key of rivest, shamir, adelman, and use different key storage modes, can to access device, access device, to terminal, implement the key handling of difference to terminal, can rationally meet the requirement in safety, efficiency and space; The key handling of distinguishing according to the difference of equipment form, can realize bidirectional safe authentication and coded communication based on key handling so that under the weak terminal environments of limited calculating storage resources, effectively ensures the information security in Internet of Things or ubiquitous network.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is a kind of hybrid cryptographic key processing method of rivest, shamir, adelman of the embodiment of the present invention network topology schematic diagram under weak terminal environments;
Fig. 2 is the module diagram of hybrid cryptographic key treatment system of a kind of rivest, shamir, adelman of the embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is device storage district key and key seed pond schematic diagram in a kind of hybrid cryptographic key processing method of rivest, shamir, adelman of the embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 4 is location triggered key new schematic diagram more in a kind of hybrid cryptographic key processing method of rivest, shamir, adelman of the embodiment of the present invention.
Embodiment
The network topology schematic diagram of the hybrid cryptographic key processing method that is illustrated in figure 1 a kind of rivest, shamir, adelman of the present invention under weak terminal environments, the method specifically comprises:
According to equipment form distributed key to or key seed pond, and each trigger condition is set;
Wherein, be illustrated in figure 3 device storage district key and key seed pond schematic diagram, described according to equipment form distributed key to or the key step in key seed pond be:
S11, equipment form are terminal equipments, the access device PKI kind subpool that the private key of key handling system terminal for distributing sign and terminal equipment need to access;
S12, equipment form are the access devices of access point, the private key kind subpool of the access device sign of key handling system distribution access point and the PKI of the Terminal Equipment Identifier that access point can be accessed;
S13, the trigger condition of each key handling system is set.
According to trigger condition, trigger key updating strategy, carry out key updating;
Wherein, the key step of described key updating is:
S21, according to trigger condition, initiate key updating;
S22, based on existing key to or key seed pond, carry out safety certification and session, then carry out online or off-line and upgrade;
S23, equipment form are terminal equipments, upgrade the private key of its Terminal Equipment Identifier;
S24, equipment form are the access devices of access point, upgrade the PKI of the sign that the terminal equipment of its storage is corresponding.
According to trigger condition, trigger cipher key destruction strategy, carry out cipher key destruction;
Wherein, the key step of described cipher key destruction is:
S31, according to trigger condition, initiate cipher key destruction;
S32, equipment form are terminal equipments, and key handling system is revoked the private key of Terminal Equipment Identifier, and in the access device of access point, remove the sign PKI that terminal equipment is corresponding;
S33, equipment form are the access devices of access point, key handling system is revoked access device, remove this access device and be identified at the whether effective record of the equipment that identifying in key handling system, remove the private key kind subpool of access device sign and sign PKI corresponding to all terminal equipments that this access device allows access simultaneously;
According to trigger condition, trigger key recovery, carry out key recovery.
Wherein, the key step of described key recovery is:
S41, according to trigger condition, initiate key recovery;
S42, equipment form are terminal equipments, and key handling system is recovered the private key of Terminal Equipment Identifier and the access point apparatus PKI kind subpool that terminal equipment need to access;
S43, equipment form are access point access devices, and key handling system is recovered the private key kind subpool of access device sign and allowed the sign PKI corresponding to terminal equipment of access.
Simultaneously, the present invention also provides a kind of hybrid cryptographic key treatment system of rivest, shamir, adelman, be illustrated in figure 2 its system block diagram, specifically comprise key handling system, key distribution module, key updating module, cipher key destruction module and key recovery module, described key handling system is for arranging the trigger condition of other modules, described key distribution module for according to equipment form distributed key to or key seed pond, described key updating module is for initiating key updating according to trigger condition, described cipher key destruction module is for initiating cipher key destruction according to trigger condition, described key recovery module is for initiating key recovery according to trigger condition.
For those skilled in the art can understand and implement technical solution of the present invention, below in conjunction with the read write line-tag environment of active RFID, be that example is elaborated:
By key handling system, each trigger condition is set, key distribution module according to equipment form distributed key to or key seed pond.In embodiments of the present invention, key handling system is that key modules is unified to the center of processing, it is new equipment application key that key distribution trigger condition is wherein set, and the time trigger condition that key updating is set is that the sign PKI of Terminal Equipment Identifier private key and correspondence thereof and private key kind subpool and the corresponding PKI kind subpool update cycle thereof of access point access device sign are 1 year; The location triggered condition that key updating is set is simultaneously that Terminal Equipment Identifier enters new access point access device scope, is illustrated in figure 4 location triggered key new schematic diagram more, now upgrades terminal iidentification private key and corresponding PKI thereof.It is that system is received key revocation request that cipher key destruction trigger condition is set.It is that key is lost and initiates key recovery request to system that key recovery trigger condition is set.
Wherein, key distribution module can be processed respectively according to the difference of equipment form, for read write line equipment, be designated as R, label is designated as Ti, distributes the sign PKI set of all labels of this read write line read-write scope, be designated as QR, wherein the sign PKI of Qi corresponding label Ti, wherein Qi ∈ QR; The sign private key kind subpool SA that simultaneously distributes read write line.For labeling apparatus, distribute the sign private key of this label; The sign PKI kind subpool SB that simultaneously distributes label.
Wherein, key updating step is initiated key updating according to condition, based on existing key to or key seed pond, carry out safety certification and session, then carry out online or off-line and upgrade; When label enters after new reader read-write scope, reader is found new label, carries out key updating.Reader is initiated step of updating, all carries out safety certification and secured session in reader step of updating simultaneously.
According to 1 year key updating cycle be example, if arrive update time, label or reader are initiated step of updating, all carry out safety certification and secured session in step of updating.
Due to " equipment form is terminal equipment, upgrades the private key of Terminal Equipment Identifier ", relate to the key updating on label, by secured session, obtain new sign private key; Or by secured session, obtain new sign PKI kind subpool SA.
Due to " equipment form is the access device of access point; pass through secured session; upgrade the PKI of the sign that the terminal equipment of access device storage is corresponding ", relate to the key updating of reader, upgrade and newly enter sign PKI corresponding to reader read-write range tag, and obtain the sign PKI set QR of new read-write scope interior label; Or by secured session, obtain new sign private key kind subpool SB.
In cipher key destruction step, according to condition, initiate cipher key destruction; The embodiment of the present invention is to initiate cipher key destruction flow process according to the cipher key destruction request in system.
If equipment form is terminal equipment, in key handling system, revokes the private key of its device identification, and in the access device of related access point, remove the sign PKI that terminal equipment is corresponding; Be specially the cipher key destruction of label, key handling system is revoked the sign private key of label, and by the reader secured session with reading this label, reader is removed sign PKI corresponding to this label on storage area.
If equipment form is the access device of access point, in key handling system, revoke the corresponding record of its device identification, in removing equipment, private key kind subpool and this access device allow the sign PKI corresponding to all terminal equipments of accessing simultaneously; Be specially reader cipher key destruction, key handling system is revoked the sign of reader, removes the private key kind subpool stored in reader and the sign PKI set of label by secured session simultaneously.
In key recovery step, according to condition, initiate key recovery; In the embodiment of the present invention, be by losing because of key, system initiates take the key recovery flow process of key recovery request as triggering.
If equipment form is terminal equipment, in key handling system, recover private key and the PKI kind subpool of its device identification; Be specially, the key recovery of label by security means, as serial ports writes etc., returns to the sign private key of this label of system backup and PKI kind subpool the storage area of label by system.
If equipment form is access point access device, in key handling system, recover the private key kind subpool of its device identification and the sign PKI corresponding to terminal equipment of permission access; Be specially, the key recovery of read write line is returned to the tag identifier PKI set of this reader of system backup and private key kind subpool by security means the storage area of reader by system.
The above embodiment has only been expressed several execution mode of the present invention, and it describes comparatively concrete and detailed, but can not therefore be interpreted as the restriction to the scope of the claims of the present invention.It should be pointed out that for the person of ordinary skill of the art, without departing from the inventive concept of the premise, can also make some distortion and improvement, these all belong to protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. a hybrid cryptographic key processing method for rivest, shamir, adelman, is characterized in that, specifically comprises:
According to equipment form distributed key to or key seed pond, and each trigger condition is set;
According to trigger condition, trigger key updating strategy, carry out key updating;
According to trigger condition, trigger cipher key destruction strategy, carry out cipher key destruction;
According to trigger condition, trigger key recovery, carry out key recovery.
2. the hybrid cryptographic key processing method of a kind of rivest, shamir, adelman as claimed in claim 1, is characterized in that, described according to equipment form distributed key to or the key step in key seed pond be:
S11, equipment form are terminal equipments, the access device PKI kind subpool that the private key of key handling system terminal for distributing sign and terminal equipment need to access;
S12, equipment form are the access devices of access point, the private key kind subpool of the access device sign of key handling system distribution access point and the PKI of the Terminal Equipment Identifier that access point can be accessed;
S13, the trigger condition of each key handling system is set.
3. the hybrid cryptographic key processing method of a kind of rivest, shamir, adelman as claimed in claim 2, it is characterized in that, the trigger condition of described key handling system comprises: the time trigger condition of key distribution trigger condition, key updating, the location triggered condition of key updating, cipher key destruction trigger condition, key recovery trigger condition.
4. the hybrid cryptographic key processing method of a kind of rivest, shamir, adelman as described in claims 1 to 3 any one, is characterized in that, the key step of described key updating is:
S21, according to trigger condition, initiate key updating;
S22, based on existing key to or key seed pond, carry out safety certification and session, then carry out online or off-line and upgrade;
S23, equipment form are terminal equipments, upgrade the private key of its Terminal Equipment Identifier;
S24, equipment form are the access devices of access point, upgrade the PKI of the sign that the terminal equipment of its storage is corresponding.
5. the hybrid cryptographic key processing method of a kind of rivest, shamir, adelman as described in claims 1 to 3 any one, is characterized in that, the key step of described cipher key destruction is:
S31, according to trigger condition, initiate cipher key destruction;
S32, equipment form are terminal equipments, and key handling system is revoked the private key of Terminal Equipment Identifier, and in the access device of access point, remove the sign PKI that terminal equipment is corresponding;
S33, equipment form are the access devices of access point, key handling system is revoked access device, remove this access device and be identified at the whether effective record of the equipment that identifying in key handling system, remove the private key kind subpool of access device sign and sign PKI corresponding to all terminal equipments that this access device allows access simultaneously.
6. the hybrid cryptographic key processing method of a kind of rivest, shamir, adelman as described in claims 1 to 3 any one, is characterized in that, the key step of described key recovery is:
S41, according to trigger condition, initiate key recovery;
S42, equipment form are terminal equipments, and key handling system is recovered the private key of Terminal Equipment Identifier and the access point apparatus PKI kind subpool that terminal equipment need to access;
S43, equipment form are access point access devices, and key handling system is recovered the private key kind subpool of access device sign and allowed the sign PKI corresponding to terminal equipment of access.
7. the hybrid cryptographic key treatment system of a rivest, shamir, adelman, it is characterized in that, specifically comprise key handling system, key distribution module, key updating module, cipher key destruction module and key recovery module, described key handling system is for arranging the trigger condition of other modules, described key distribution module for according to equipment form distributed key to or key seed pond, described key updating module is for initiating key updating according to trigger condition, described cipher key destruction module is for initiating cipher key destruction according to trigger condition, described key recovery module is for initiating key recovery according to trigger condition.
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| CN201310521990.9A CN103618600B (en) | 2013-10-29 | 2013-10-29 | A kind of hybrid cryptographic key processing method of rivest, shamir, adelman |
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| CN109756329A (en) * | 2019-01-15 | 2019-05-14 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti- quantum calculation shared key machinery of consultation and system based on private key pond |
| CN110430044A (en) * | 2019-07-10 | 2019-11-08 | 南京工业大学 | A kind of double layer encryption method based on ElGamal encryption |
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