CN102158339B - The system and method that the automatic blacklist that password strengthens manages and performs - Google Patents

The system and method that the automatic blacklist that password strengthens manages and performs Download PDF

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Publication number
CN102158339B
CN102158339B CN201010625151.8A CN201010625151A CN102158339B CN 102158339 B CN102158339 B CN 102158339B CN 201010625151 A CN201010625151 A CN 201010625151A CN 102158339 B CN102158339 B CN 102158339B
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China
Prior art keywords
equipment
unique identifier
adnexa
data
blacklist
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CN102158339A (en
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C·G·林
S·谢赫尔
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Infineon Technologies AG
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Infineon Technologies AG
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Priority claimed from US12/645,062 external-priority patent/US8621212B2/en
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Abstract

The present invention relates to the automatic blacklist management that password strengthens and the system and method performed.System and method that embodiment is forged about management and performing, clone's or the most unverified equipment blacklist.In an embodiment, system includes the adnexa comprising trusted authentication chip, this trusted authentication chip includes the data signed by privately owned authentication secret, these data include the unique identifier relevant to adnexa, and equipment includes that the publicly-owned authentication secret with privately owned authentication secret formation authentication secret pair and identifier list, equipment are configured to from trusted authentication chip reading data, by unique identifier compared with identifier list, if and in identifier list, found unique identifier, then would refuse this adnexa.

Description

The system and method that the automatic blacklist that password strengthens manages and performs
Technical field
The present invention relates generally to and the accessory authentication (accessory authentication) in personal electronic equipments, more The automatic of blacklist in particular to that forge, that clone or the most unverified equipment manages and performs (enforcement)。
Background technology
Encryption is utilized to be authenticated equipment being well-known.Generally, from system or equipment send message or " inquiry (challenge) " is to object to be certified, and is sent and this message phase by this object in reply Close is responsive to this system.Then this response of this system evaluation is to determine this response the most enough this objects of certification.
It is for instance possible to use such method verifies the assembly of system or equipment, including moveable, can generation That replace or after market can assembly.Such as, can the print cartridge of certification ink-jet printer to determine if to be The mandate of special printer and the print cartridge of compatibility.If this print cartridge is authenticated successfully, utilize the general of this print cartridge Printer operation proceed.When attempting using the print cartridge being not successfully authenticated, as recognizing of failure Card process as a result, it is possible to not Authorized operation or the most authorizing limited operation.
But, clone (cloning) by the strength of trusted authentication chip, produced by same trusted authentication chip a large amount of Ostensibly authentic equipment, adulterator can try to evade verification process.In application that is online or that network, Through frequently with pipe off (blacklisting) to detect these clone's product, the equipment wherein piped off Data base can be used for checking.But it is desirable to the many equipment prevented for its certification and/or forgery and clone Not networking, having no chance to compare such data base provides and automatically compares.It is thus possible, for instance in low cost, In high power capacity non-networked equipment, expectation prevents this and other kinds of forgery and the use piped off.
Summary of the invention
That embodiment is forged about management and performing, clone's or the most unverified equipment blacklist be System and method.In an embodiment, system includes the adnexa comprising trusted authentication chip, and this trusted authentication chip includes by private Having the data of (prvate) authentication secret signature (sign), these data include the unique mark relevant to adnexa Symbol, and equipment includes publicly-owned (public) authentication secret with privately owned authentication secret formation authentication secret pair and mark Knowing symbol list, equipment is configured to read data, by unique identifier compared with identifier list from trusted authentication chip Relatively, and if finding unique identifier, then refusal (reject) this adnexa in identifier list.
In another embodiment, method includes: read the data signed from the first equipment by the second equipment, From extracting data unique identifier, compare unique identifier and the unique identifier being stored in the second equipment Blacklist, if unique identifier is found in unique identifier blacklist, then refuses the first equipment and Two equipment are used together, and if in unique identifier blacklist, do not find unique identifier, then connect It is used together by the first equipment and the second equipment, and adds unique identifier to unique identifier blacklist.
In another embodiment, semiconductor chip is suitable to be embedded in the first equipment, and this first equipment includes: Memorizer, comprises the data signed by privately owned authentication secret, and wherein data include relevant to semiconductor chip Unique identifier and the overall blacklist of unique identifier, and privately owned certification key storage is at memorizer Security;And communication interface, it is configured to utilize asymmetric cryptography (asymmetric cryptographic) Technology and the second equipment including publicly-owned authentication secret communicate, wherein communication interface be configured to transmit signed The data of administration give the second equipment.
In another embodiment, microcontroller includes: circuit, is configured to store privately owned certification key, publicly-owned Certification key and the data signed by privately owned authentication secret, these data include unique identifier and overall situation blacklist; And telecommunication circuit, it is configured to transmit publicly-owned certification key and data, receives by the encryption of publicly-owned certification key Inquiry, and transmit the response relevant to the institute's encrypted challenge with privately owned certification secret key decryption (unencrypt).
Accompanying drawing explanation
It is considered in conjunction with the accompanying various embodiments described in detail below of the present invention, can be more fully understood from The present invention, wherein:
Fig. 1 is the block diagram of the equipment according to embodiment:
Fig. 2 is the block diagram of the object including trusted authentication chip according to embodiment;
Fig. 3 is the flow chart of the verification process according to embodiment;
Fig. 4 is the flow chart of the proof procedure according to embodiment;
Fig. 5 is the block diagram of the signature generation process according to embodiment;
Fig. 6 is the block diagram of the proof procedure of the embodiment according to Fig. 5;
Fig. 7 is the block diagram of the equipment according to embodiment;
Fig. 8 is the block diagram of the device memory according to embodiment;
Fig. 9 is the flow chart of the blacklist method according to embodiment;
Figure 10 is the stream of blacklist sum counter checking (counter verification) method according to embodiment Cheng Tu.
And the present invention obeys various amendment and replaceable form, its details has been illustrated by way of example and will be detailed Describe.Should be appreciated that the present invention does not limit the invention to described specific embodiment.On the contrary, this Bright covering falls into all modifications in the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined by the appended claims, equivalence Thing and replaceable form.
Detailed description of the invention
Embodiments of the invention utilize the system and method for asymmetric cryptography accessory authentication, such as 2009 Submission on October 19, in, entitled " SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESSORY AUTHENTICATION ", the commonly owned U.S. special Those described in profit application serial 12/582,362 (it is the most incorporated herein by quoting).? In the discussion of the patent application before mentioned, use the certificate and the most publicly-owned and private cipher key signed Right, it is suitable for the lower cost of the application of Price Sensitive, it is possible to provide adnexa, battery, parts and other objects Safety certification.
Such as, Fig. 1 describes the embodiment of Verification System 100.Verification System 100 includes equipment 102, example Such as mobile phone;Personal digital assistant (PDA);Photographing unit;MP3 player, games system, audio frequency and / or video system, or other amusement equipment;Computer, computer system, network or the equipment of calculating;Print Machine, scanner or other digital imaging apparatus;Armarium or device or diagnosis supply unit (diagnostic supply);Vehicle or Vehicular system;Industrial system;Or some other electronics or computer equipments.Equipment 102 Including: publicly-owned authentication secret 103 (it will be described in more detail below);And object 104, equipment 102 Cooperate therewith operation.In an embodiment, object 104 can include battery;Adnexa, including earphone, wears Monophone, speaker, docking station, game console, charger, mike and other;Ink-cases of printers; Computer or computer system component, the network equipment, peripheral hardware, USB or other storage devices;Vehicle part, Assembly or adnexa;Industrial components or parts;Or some need or expect parts or the assembly of certification. In an embodiment, object 104 is replacement assemblies, such as after market adnexa or battery, but object 104 It can also be primitive part.Object 104 can by the manufacturer identical with equipment 102 or provider, or Some its other party of person provide, the manufacturer such as authorized and/or replacement and after market parts and the distribution of adnexa Business.
Object 104 is described as carrying out operating or operating as one part in equipment 102 in FIG, The most in such embodiments, wherein equipment 102 includes printer and has the object 104 of print cartridge.At it In his embodiment, object 104 in the outside of equipment 102, such as, is mobile phone and object when equipment 102 104 when being wireless headset.These embodiments are only example, and a lot of other equipment/object composition and joining To using in other embodiments.
With reference also to Fig. 2, object 104 comprises trusted authentication chip 106 in an embodiment.In an embodiment, certification Chip 106 includes semiconductor chip and includes memorizer 108.In an embodiment, memorizer 108 be non-easily The property lost memorizer, is configured to store data object, such as, is stored in the private in the security of memorizer 108 There are certification key 110 and publicly-owned certification key 111.Publicly-owned certification key 110 and privately owned certification key 111 shape Become certification double secret key.It is specific that memorizer 108 can also store unique ID of object 104 and/or sequence number, application One or more in data and other information, are represented by data 112.Can be stored in Additional data objects in reservoir 108 includes the unique portion of certification certificate, is described more particularly below.
In an embodiment, function and the feature of trusted authentication chip 106 is embodied as on the chip assembly of object 104 One or more systems, reach cost-effective or size.Such as, object 104 can include that bluetooth is worn Monophone, it is often small size and thus may not accommodate additional chip 106.Instead, feature It is integrated on the existing chip of telephone headset with function, saves space, it is also possible to cost-effective.At this In the embodiment of sample, for example, it is possible to comprised the telephone headset of object 104 or the manufacture of other equipment Business provides and is integrated into the existing of telephone headset or other equipment for substituting discrete trusted authentication chip 106 The VHDL netlist (netlist) of controller or processor, it is in feature, function and the safety thus provided On have the least or not do not change.
With reference to Fig. 3, implementation 300 between equipment 102 and object 104, to determine object 104 whether Certified it be used together with equipment 102 or used by equipment 102.301, equipment 102 is from object 104 Read publicly-owned certification key 111.Equipment 102 now has two Public Keys: publicly-owned authentication secret 103 He Publicly-owned certification key 111.
But, using before publicly-owned certification key 111, equipment 102 determines publicly-owned certification key 111 is whether Empirical tests or the truest.In conventional system, utilize the overall situation of equipment or constant (constant) publicly-owned With private cipher key pair, by simply comparing global secret (the publicly-owned certification key 111 received from object 104) Global secret or its hash (hash) as storage on the device 102 realize checking.But, profit With Public Key, it is impossible to provide the safety of top level because Public Key easily by hacker (hacking) or Other alter the impact of (corruption).The most in certain embodiments, each equipment is used uniquely Publicly-owned and private cipher key, and in other embodiments, Public Key can be reused.Such as, first 1000000 objects 104 can manufacture unique Public Key, and Public Key is repeated thereafter.Real at these Execute in example, use additional unique identifier.It is described more particularly below different embodiment.
302, and after verifying publicly-owned certification key 111, equipment 102 utilizes publicly-owned certification key 111 Encrypted challenge.In an embodiment, inquiry includes random number.In another embodiment, inquiry also includes adding Data.In an embodiment, encryption is performed according to asymmet-ric encryption method (such as elliptic curve cryptography). In another embodiment, rsa cryptosystem algorithm or some other cryptographic algorithms are utilized.
304, transmit the inquiry of encryption to object 104 from equipment 102.In an embodiment, inquiry can nothing Line transmission (such as by radio frequency (RF)), or wired transmission is (such as by electric lines of force or at equipment 102 And other wired connections between object 104).306, object 104 utilizes privately owned certification key 110 to solve The inquiry of the encryption that contiguity receives.308, as response, object 104 sends the inquiry of deciphering to equipment 102, and equipment 102 determines that response the most suitably makes the object 104 can be certified.
After method 300, equipment 102 can retain Public Key 103 and 111, or equipment 102 energy Enough Public Keys 111 deleted from object 104 reading.Retaining two keys can time-consuming and meter in the future Calculate, and delete a key and can discharge memory space.
In an embodiment, and with reference to Fig. 4, credentialing process 400 is used together with process 300, unique to realize Publicly-owned and private cipher key pair is used together with equipment and object.402, certificate agency (certificate authority) Create summary (digest).Certificate agency can be manufacturer, producer, distributor or other are with chip 106 And/or the relevant entity of object 104.Privately owned authentication secret 510 (shown in Fig. 5) is held by certificate agency, And form authentication secret pair with storage Public Key 103 on the device 102.
Certificate agency creates summary and figure 5 illustrates in more detail.First, by cascade (concatenate) Unique device identifier 502 (the such as sequence number or No. ID or code relevant to object 104 and/or chip 106; Publicly-owned certification key 111;With data 112) create message 507.Message 507 is hashed to create summary 508.In an embodiment, use SHA-1 cryptographic Hash algorithms, and utilize other to dissipate in other embodiments Row algorithm and technology, such as SHA-256.
The privately owned authentication secret 510 of certificate of utility holder signs summary 508, to create signature (signature) 512.In an embodiment, utilize elliptic curve cryptography to sign summary 508.Elliptic curve cryptography Advantage include shorter key and the less calculating caused due to shorter key, this is at one-tenth small-sized, low This and/or have smaller part reason ability inline object in be useful.In other embodiments, utilize Rsa cryptosystem algorithm or some other cryptographic algorithms.
With reference to Fig. 4-6,404, signature 512 is stored in the memorizer 108 of object 104.In embodiment In, this is performed by certificate agency.In another embodiment, this by manufacturer or other are relevant to object 104 Entity complete.Certificate agency and manufacturer can be identical or different entities, but usually, carefully Control the access to signature and process, to improve safety.
When object 104 first attempts to be used together with equipment 102, the necessary certification object 104 of equipment 102 is also And checking: any data, information, content, media or other amounts coming from object 104 or object 104 Itself it is legal.Therefore, 406, equipment 102 reads signature 512 and other data from object 104 520.As a part for this reading, as it was previously stated, equipment 102 receives publicly-owned certification key from object 104 111, but equipment 104 not can know that whether Public Key 111 is tampered or has got compromised, and therefore Must verify that this key.
This can utilize signature 512 to complete.First equipment 102 re-create message 507 from data 520, with And according to the identical algorithm created used by summary 508, message 507 is hashed, thus in 408 wounds Build summary ' (508 ').410, utilize publicly-owned authentication secret 103 (its be intended that do not distort or alter) With corresponding to being used for initially creating the privately owned authentication secret 510 of signature 512, equipment 102 is subsequently from signature 512 The former summary of middle extraction 508, this signature 512 reads from object 104.If extracting successfully, 412, equipment 102 compare summary ' (508) and summary 508.If summary 508 and summary (508 ') coupling, equipment 102 Have verified that the data received from object 104 and information are not tampered, and according to process 300, can use from The publicly-owned certification key 111 that object 104 receives is with certification object 104.
As it was previously stated, the possible method of one evading verification process (such as Verification System 100) is that clone is credible Trusted authentication chip 106 and use the clone's thing forged in object.Adulterator realizes the strength of trusted authentication chip 106 The difficult point of clone is that being difficult by cryptographic processes is that each object 104 creates new double secret key and signature card Bright.This is partially due to generate the level of the computing capability required for the certificate signed, and adulterator is unwilling Undertake the object of a large amount of still relatively low cost, such as ink-cases of printers and other equipment and adnexa.But, Signature instead can be obtained by stealing (such as act of espionage), the typically no ability of adulterator or not Can reliably depend on the certificate that acquisition is signed in such a way.Therefore, including the trusted authentication chip of clone Forgery object, although look like believable when checking respectively for or use, but generally all have same Certificate because as clone a part, they are simple copys.
Embodiment relates to detection, prevents the use of these and other fake equipment and blacklist it.Figure 7 another embodiments describing Verification System 900, are similar to system 100.In system 900, equipment 102 include memorizer 902.Referring also to Fig. 8, memorizer 902 includes object identity (ID) list 904 He Unidirectional counter 906.
In an embodiment, when first attempting to be used together equipment 102 with object 104 and equipment 102 is from right When reading data (such as, with reference to Fig. 6 and 8 and data 520) as 104, data 520 include and object 104 relevant unique ID 502.In other embodiments, that of Public Key the most repeated as described above In a little embodiments, data 520 include some other unique identifier.It is to use unique ID 502 or make With unique identifier, all by a part for the data in the certificate by being signed as above, and therefore It is protected from processing.And unique ID 502 of chip 106 or another unique identifier can be according to circumstances Use in different embodiments, for the sake of simplicity, term unique identifier will be used afterwards.
If adulterator clones multiple object, each object will have identical unique identifier.So, in reality Executing in example, it is unique that equipment 102 retains each in the object ID list 904 in being stored in memorizer 902 Identifier.So, when new object 104 attempts to be used together with equipment 102, first equipment 102 examined Check the unique identifier as 104 to be included in object ID list 904.If it did not, object 104 can be certified.If have found unique identifier in list 904, object 104 will be the most certified.
With reference to Fig. 9, non-limiting example method 1000 will be described, relate to printer as equipment 102 and print cartridge As object 104.1002, and front with reference to as described in Fig. 3-8, printer reads data from print cartridge.In reality Executing in example, data are parts for signed certificate, and include unique cartridge identifier.1004, Printer compares from unique cartridge identifier of extracting data and is stored locally in the memorizer of printer ID list, 1006, determine that unique cartridge identifier is whether in ID list.If unique print cartridge mark Know symbol in lists, then 1008, print cartridge is refused by printer.Refusal can include various ways, such as, Printer can not operate until inserting new, believable print cartridge.
Without finding unique cartridge identifier in ID list, 1010, add unique cartridge identifier In ID list, create self study Local Black list, and 1012, just make for certification print cartridge.In reality Executing in example, printer retains multiple or all of nearest unique identifier in lists so that each follow-up ink Box can compare with widely list.The quantity of the unique identifier retained by printer is only limitted to can Memorizer.So, in one embodiment, printer retain attempt use any print cartridge all only One identifier.In other embodiments, printer storage can be limited so that printer only retains A number of nearest unique identifier, such as 50 nearest unique identifiers.
Returning to 1008, refuse print cartridge, unaccepted unique identifier can also send back manufacturer or divide Send out business, in order to increase on overall situation blacklist.Additionally or alternatively, manufacturer can use market feelings Report and other information are set up or increase the overall blacklist being rejected identifier.In an embodiment, and also join Examining Fig. 7, the latest edition of overall situation blacklist may be embodied in the data on trusted authentication chip 106 so that every time When new credible print cartridge attempts to be used together with printer for the first time, it is provided that the encryption version of overall situation blacklist is given This printer.There is provided overall situation blacklist as the part of data for encryption, carry by preventing from distorting blacklist Supply add-on security level.But a shortcoming is the time;Because in the fabrication process early on trusted authentication chip There is provided the overall situation blacklist, when global listings is included on chip 106 with combining the final of chip 106 Time slot is there is, in the meantime, it may be found that additional forgery is only between when object 104 is dealt into market One identifier.In other embodiments, overall situation blacklist can the most maybe can also be stored directly in newly The memorizer 902 of the printer manufactured make each printer by seizure and refuse have this unique identifier Print cartridge attempt use the first example.In an embodiment, printer manufacturer can also self-signing certificate. There is provided overall situation blacklist also have the advantage that make printing function identification quantity increase forgery print cartridge (its When once attempting to be used together with this printer) rather than because the unique identifier of this print cartridge is not in Local Black name Single (object ID list 904) accepts forge print cartridge.The embodiment of these and other can reduce the overall situation Time between offer and the market granting of product of blacklist, thus available up-to-date information is provided.
Embodiment also includes that unidirectional counter 906 (referring again to Fig. 8) is to avoid refusing the unfairness of trusted objects Absolutely.Returning to the example of printer and print cartridge, user is likely to be due to some reasons needs and removes and re-mount credible Print cartridge, such as go dust or dirt from print cartridge or printing mechanism.In this case, and according to method 1000, printer can refuse print cartridge when re-mounting, because unique cartridge identifier can find in ID list, And printer does not knows that (credible) print cartridge is simply removed and reinstalls.But use unidirectional meter Number device 906, can reduce or eliminate the refusal of these mistakes.
The method 1200 of Figure 10 includes such unidirectional counter 906.If 1006, unique print cartridge identifies Symbol does not finds in ID list, just checks unidirectional counter at 1007 printers.Unidirectional counter is permissible Use a lot of form, as long as enumerator is only at single direction (such as, increasing or decreasing, but be not both) Upper counting.In the example of printer and print cartridge, unidirectional counter can be ink level indicator, and it should be passed Subtract counting.In the unidirectional counter 906 of the memorizer 902 that ink level is stored in printer, and if The ink level of 1007 print cartridges is higher than the level being stored in unidirectional counter 906, then refuse this print cartridge 1008. If at 1007 ink level equal to or less than being stored in the level in unidirectional counter 906, at 1012 these ink Box is considered certified.In other embodiments, wherein equipment 102 is electronic equipment and object 104 is in the embodiment of battery, and unidirectional counter 906 can be with the charge level of battery or recharging period longevity Life is relevant.Equipment 102 is armarium and object 104 is to have disappearing of limited access times wherein In the embodiment of the adnexa of consumption, unidirectional counter 906 can be incremented by the consumed access times of counting.? In these and other example embodiment, 1007, unidirectional counter be higher or lower be to forge or true Property instruction, it respectively can be contrary.In certain embodiments, unidirectional counter is the meter of object 104 side Reading or the designator of number device, the most only enumerator are stored in the unidirectional counter 906 of memorizer 906. In other embodiments, unidirectional counter 906 is the enumerator of equipment 102 side.
Blacklist is supplied to equipment 102 by object 104 and as a part for the certificate signed and has wherein Attempt in the embodiment of method 1200 being used together with equipment 102 after having the object 104 of blacklist ID, Equipment 102 will not consider the comparative result of unidirectional counter, and refuses object 104.In further embodiment In, unidirectional counter 906 also prevents from using (piggybacked) incidentally to forge object, such as, work as forgery Object be coupled to trusted objects in case utilize trusted objects with obtain equipment certification time.Wherein unidirectional counter 906 is the enumerator that unidirectional increment or decrement arrange value (set-value), will be considered to when reaching this value of setting Object exhausts, regardless of the existence of incidentally equipment.
Embodiment is suitable for the lower cost of the application of Price Sensitive, it is provided that adnexa, battery, parts and other are right The safety certification of elephant.Additionally, embodiment is piped off by key, provide when hacker or key misapply Recovery action option.So, if it find that the hacker's behavior to Public Key, key can be cancelled or " pipe off " and the overall situation disables rather than must be prevented from each single key in conventional methods where.This Provide the safety of enhancing and more effective key management.Also achieve logistics (logistical) improve and Efficiency because equipment need not be provided with the correct Public Key for special object in advance, because of according to Embodiment extracts this Public Key when using for the first time from the certificate being stored in object.Thus, whole Level of security enhances, it is provided that the certification calculated.Pipe off and direction additionally, local with the overall situation The use of enumerator provides for clone's and other forge the added security of adnexa.
It is described herein the various embodiments of system, equipment and method.These embodiments are only given by example, And it is not intended to limit the scope of the invention.Additionally, it should be recognized that the embodiment having been described above various Feature can be combined to produce multiple additional embodiment in various ways.Although additionally, various material, size, Shape, implantation position etc. have been described as being used together with the disclosed embodiments, it is also possible to utilize except institute is public Outside those opened other and without departing from the scope of the present invention.
It will be appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that the present invention can include than any of above independent embodiment to be retouched The less feature stated.Embodiment described herein is not meant as the various features of the wherein present invention and can combine Method limit propose.Therefore, embodiment is not the mutual exclusion combination of feature;On the contrary, as common in this area It will be understood by the skilled person that the present invention can include the different individual characteristics selected from different separate embodiment Combination.
Any combination quoted of above-mentioned document is limited so that do not combine and contrary master explicitly disclosed herein Topic.Any combination quoted of above-mentioned document or limited so that the claim being contained in document is not It is incorporated herein by reference.Any combination quoted of above-mentioned document or limited so that carry in a document Any definition of confession is not incorporated herein by reference, unless the most clearly comprised.
For explaining the purpose of the claims in the present invention, be clearly intended to never call 35U.S.C. the 6th section, the 112nd The clause of bar, unless set forth particular term " device is used for " or " step is used for " in the claims.

Claims (23)

1. the automatic blacklist management strengthened for password and the system performed, including:
Including the adnexa of trusted authentication chip, including the data signed by privately owned authentication secret, these data include with attached The unique identifier that part is relevant;And
Equipment, including with privately owned authentication secret formed authentication secret pair publicly-owned authentication secret and can be by manufacturing Business or distributor use the identifier list that market intelligence is set up or increased, and this equipment is configured to from certification Chip reads data, by unique identifier compared with identifier list, and if in identifier list Find unique identifier, then refuse this adnexa.
System the most according to claim 1, wherein:
If this equipment is configured to not find this unique identifier in this identifier list, then add this only One identifier is to this identifier list stored in a device and this adnexa of certification.
System the most according to claim 1, wherein, trusted authentication chip is semiconductor chip.
System the most according to claim 1, wherein, equipment includes memorizer, and wherein identifier list Storage is in memory.
System the most according to claim 4, wherein equipment also includes the unidirectional counter stored in memory, If it is and wherein this equipment is configured to find this unique identifier in this identifier list, the most unidirectional Enumerator and adnexa.
System the most according to claim 5, wherein equipment is configured to only unique when finding in identifier list When identifier and unidirectional counter are untrue with the comparison of adnexa instruction, refuse this adnexa.
System the most according to claim 1, wherein these data include the overall blacklist of unique identifier, and And wherein identifier list is updated by overall situation blacklist.
System the most according to claim 1, wherein adds identifier list during manufacture equipment.
System the most according to claim 1, wherein trusted authentication chip also includes privately owned certification key and publicly-owned Certification key, and wherein equipment is configured to read publicly-owned certification key from trusted authentication chip, utilizes publicly-owned testing Card key verify data and publicly-owned certification key, and if empirical tests, use publicly-owned certification double secret key Adnexa is authenticated being used together for equipment.
System the most according to claim 1, wherein equipment and adnexa are from including choosing following group That selects is right: mobile phone and battery;Mobile phone and mobile phone accessary;Printer and ink-cases of printers; Game unit and gaming unit controller;Electronic equipment and battery;Electronic equipment and adnexa;Computer equipment And adnexa;Computer equipment and battery;Computer equipment and ancillary equipment;Network and networked devices;General Universal serial bus (USB) main equipment, is operationally connected to USB device by usb hub;Media Equipment and battery;Media device and adnexa;Armarium and battery;Armarium and adnexa;Individual digital Assistant (PDA) and battery;PDA and adnexa;Industrial system and industrial system assembly;Vehicle and vehicle are attached Part;And Vehicular system and vehicle part.
11. systems according to claim 1, wherein identifier list retains multiple unique identifiers, Each with attempt one of multiple adnexaes of being used together with equipment and be associated.
12. 1 kinds are suitable to embed the semiconductor chip in the first equipment, including:
Memorizer, including the data signed by privately owned authentication secret, wherein data include and semiconductor chip phase The unique identifier closed and the overall blacklist being maintained at outside semiconductor chip of unique identifier, and its In privately owned certification key storage in the security of memorizer;And
Communication interface, is configured to utilize asymmetric cryptographic technique and the second equipment including publicly-owned authentication secret enters Row communication, wherein communication interface is configured to transmit the data signed to the second equipment.
13. 1 kinds of microcontrollers, including:
Circuit, is configured to store privately owned certification key, publicly-owned certification key and is signed by privately owned authentication secret Data, these data include unique identifier and are maintained at the overall blacklist outside microcontroller;And
Telecommunication circuit, is configured to transmit publicly-owned certification key and data, receives by the encryption of publicly-owned certification key Inquiry, and transmit the response relevant to the institute's encrypted challenge by privately owned certification secret key decryption.
14. 1 kinds of automatic blacklist management strengthened for password and the method performed, including:
Read the data signed from the first equipment by the second equipment;
From extracting data unique identifier;
Relatively unique identifier and unique mark that is that be stored in the second equipment and that be maintained at the second device external Know the overall blacklist of symbol;
If finding unique identifier in the overall blacklist of unique identifier, then refuse the first equipment and Two equipment are used together;And
If not finding unique identifier in the overall blacklist of unique identifier, then accept the first equipment It is used together with the second equipment, and adds unique identifier to the unique identifier being stored in the second equipment Overall blacklist.
15. methods according to claim 14, also include configuring first equipment with trusted authentication chip, The data wherein signed are stored in the memorizer of trusted authentication chip.
16. methods according to claim 14, also include using be stored in the second equipment publicly-owned to test Card key verifies signed data, and the data wherein signed are close by being formed together with publicly-owned authentication secret The privately owned authentication secret signature of key pair.
17. methods according to claim 14, the unidirectional counter also including comparing in the second equipment with First equipment, and:
If it is favourable for comparing, then accepts adnexa and be used together with equipment;And
If it is disadvantageous for comparing, then refusal adnexa is used together with equipment.
18. methods according to claim 17, also include being stored in unidirectional counter the second equipment In memorizer.
19. methods according to claim 14, also include:
From the extracting data overall situation blacklist signed;And
The overall blacklist of the unique identifier being more newly stored in the second equipment by overall situation blacklist.
20. methods according to claim 19, also include that the overall blacklist storing unique identifier arrives In the memorizer of the second equipment.
21. methods according to claim 14, also include associated plurality of with multiple first equipment Unique identifier is respectively stored in the overall blacklist of unique identifier.
22. methods according to claim 14, also include the overall blacklist updating unique identifier.
23. methods according to claim 14, the unique mark of storage during being additionally included in production the second equipment Know the overall blacklist of symbol in the memorizer of the second equipment.
CN201010625151.8A 2009-12-22 2010-12-22 The system and method that the automatic blacklist that password strengthens manages and performs Active CN102158339B (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US12/645062 2009-12-22
US12/645,062 US8621212B2 (en) 2009-12-22 2009-12-22 Systems and methods for cryptographically enhanced automatic blacklist management and enforcement

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