CN102148054A - Flash memory storage system, controller of flash memory storage system and data falsification preventing method - Google Patents

Flash memory storage system, controller of flash memory storage system and data falsification preventing method Download PDF

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Publication number
CN102148054A
CN102148054A CN201010114010XA CN201010114010A CN102148054A CN 102148054 A CN102148054 A CN 102148054A CN 201010114010X A CN201010114010X A CN 201010114010XA CN 201010114010 A CN201010114010 A CN 201010114010A CN 102148054 A CN102148054 A CN 102148054A
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secure data
stamped signature
flash
chip
eigenwert
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Chinese (zh)
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詹清文
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Phison Electronics Corp
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Phison Electronics Corp
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Priority to CN201010114010XA priority Critical patent/CN102148054A/en
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Abstract

The invention provides a flash memory storage system, a controller of the flash memory storage system and a data falsification preventing method, wherein the flash memory storage system comprises a flash memory controller, a flash memory chip and an intelligent card chip. The flash memory chip is used for storing safe data. The flash memory controller uses unidirectional hashing functions to generate a signature corresponding to the safe data and stores the signature in the intelligent card chip according to private keys and the safe data.

Description

Flash memory system and controller thereof and anti-data tampering method
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of flash memory system, and be particularly related to a kind of have can prevent to be stored in flash memory system and flash controller and the anti-data tampering method that the data in the flash chip are illegally distorted.
Background technology
Digital camera, mobile phone and MP3 are very rapid in growth over the years, make the consumer also increase rapidly the demand of Storage Media.Because flash memory (Flash Memory) has that data are non-volatile, power saving, volume is little and the characteristic of no mechanical structure etc., suitable portable applications, the most suitable being used on the battery-powered product of this class Portable.Memory card is exactly a kind of with the storage device of nand flash memory as Storage Media.Because memory card volume low capacity is big, so be widely used in the storage of individual significant data.Yet the data that are stored in the memory card are to be easy to be modified down without permission.That is to say that the integrality that is stored in the data in the memory card is can't be guaranteed.
For solving this problem, wherein a kind of practice is exactly that stored data are encrypted.For example, stored data are added digital signature.Yet the method but can't be kept out distorting that data duplicate.For example, with memory card (for example as the means of payment of trading activity, the prepayment stored value card in shop) in the example, when user's 1000 yuan of Stored Values and when using this memory card to consume in this memory card, because the flash chip in the memory card is circuit independently, therefore the assailant can carry out hard copy (hard copy) with the data in the memory card before consumption behind the position of the flash chip in confirming memory card, after consumption is finished, again the data of hard copy are returned afterwards and be stored in the memory card Stored Value before answer (refresh) is consumed thus.Because corresponding digital signature is also returned and is stored in the memory card, so system can't verify that the Stored Value in the present memory card is distorted by digital signature.Base this, safety how to guarantee the flash chip internal data is the quite problems of attention of these those skilled in the art with integrality.
Summary of the invention
The invention provides a kind of flash memory system, its data that can prevent to be stored in the flash chip are distorted.
The invention provides a kind of flash controller, its data that can prevent to be stored in the flash chip are distorted.
The invention provides a kind of anti-data tampering method, its data that can prevent to be stored in the flash chip are distorted.
Exemplary embodiment of the present invention proposes a kind of flash memory system, and it comprises flash controller, flash chip and intelligent card chip.Flash controller has a private key.Flash chip is electrically connected to flash controller, and wherein this flash chip stores a secure data.Intelligent card chip is electrically connected to flash controller.The flash controller meeting is used an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding this secure data according to above-mentioned private key with above-mentioned secure data and this stamped signature is stored in the above-mentioned intelligent card chip.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, flash controller reads secure data from flash chip, use above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce a comparison stamped signature of the corresponding secure data that reads according to above-mentioned private key and the secure data that is read, from intelligent card chip, read stamped signature, and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced.And when stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced were inequality, then flash controller was exported an information warning.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned flash controller stores one and has upgraded secure data to replace above-mentioned secure data in above-mentioned flash chip.And flash controller has upgraded secure data therewith according to above-mentioned private key to be used above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce corresponding this to have upgraded that one of secure data has upgraded stamped signature and store this in above-mentioned intelligent card chip has upgraded stamped signature to replace above-mentioned stamped signature.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned intelligent card chip is for meeting Federal Information Processing Standards (Federal Information Processing Standards, FIPS) the above chip of the tertiary gradient of 140-2 or meet the above chip of the tertiary gradient of EMV EL.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned intelligent card chip sees through an interface and is electrically connected to flash controller, and this interface meets ISO 7816 standards.
Exemplary embodiment of the present invention proposes a kind of flash memory system, and it comprises flash controller, flash chip and intelligent card chip.Flash controller has a private key.Flash chip is electrically connected to flash controller, and wherein this flash chip stores a secure data.Intelligent card chip is electrically connected to flash controller.Flash controller produces an eigenwert of corresponding above-mentioned secure data and this eigenwert is stored in the intelligent card chip.In addition, flash controller uses an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding this secure data and eigenwert according to above-mentioned private key, above-mentioned eigenwert with above-mentioned secure data and this stamped signature is stored in the above-mentioned flash chip.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned flash controller reads secure data and stamped signature from flash chip, from intelligent card chip, read above-mentioned eigenwert, use above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce a corresponding comparison stamped signature that reads secure data and eigenwert according to this private key, eigenwert that is read and the secure data that is read, and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced.And when stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced were inequality, then flash controller can be exported an information warning.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned flash controller stores one and has upgraded secure data to replace above-mentioned secure data in above-mentioned flash chip.In addition, flash controller produces corresponding this and has upgraded one of secure data and upgraded eigenwert, and according to above-mentioned private key, this has upgraded eigenwert and has upgraded secure data therewith and use above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce corresponding this to have upgraded secure data and upgraded one of eigenwert therewith and upgraded stamped signature.In addition, flash controller stores this and has upgraded stamped signature replacing above-mentioned stamped signature in above-mentioned flash chip, and stores this upgraded eigenwert to replace above-mentioned eigenwert in above-mentioned intelligent card chip.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned eigenwert is a count value of a random value or corresponding this secure data of a physical address that stores above-mentioned secure data in above-mentioned flash chip, corresponding this secure data.
Exemplary embodiment of the present invention proposes a kind of flash controller, is used for protecting a secure data that is stored in a flash chip.This flash controller comprises: microprocessor unit, flash interface unit, memory management unit and secure data protected location.The flash interface unit is electrically connected to microprocessor unit, and in order to be electrically connected to above-mentioned flash chip.Memory management unit is electrically connected to microprocessor unit.The secure data protected location is electrically connected to microprocessor unit, and has a private key.The meeting of secure data protected location is used an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding this secure data according to above-mentioned private key with above-mentioned secure data and this stamped signature is stored in the intelligent card chip.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment; when memory management unit reads secure data from flash chip; the secure data protected location can read corresponding stamped signature from intelligent card chip; use above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce a comparison stamped signature of the secure data that corresponding above-mentioned memory management unit reads according to above-mentioned private key and the secure data that is read, and whether the stamped signature that judgement is read from intelligent card chip is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced.And when stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced were inequality, then the secure data protected location was exported an information warning.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned memory management unit stores one and has upgraded secure data to replace above-mentioned secure data in above-mentioned flash chip.And the secure data protected location has upgraded secure data therewith according to above-mentioned private key to be used above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce corresponding this to have upgraded that one of secure data has upgraded stamped signature and store this in above-mentioned intelligent card chip has upgraded stamped signature to replace above-mentioned stamped signature.
Exemplary embodiment of the present invention proposes a kind of flash controller, is used for protecting a secure data that is stored in a flash chip.This flash controller comprises: microprocessor unit, flash interface unit, memory management unit and secure data protected location.The flash interface unit is electrically connected to microprocessor unit, and in order to be electrically connected to above-mentioned flash chip.Memory management unit is electrically connected to microprocessor unit.The secure data protected location is electrically connected to microprocessor unit, and has a private key.The secure data protected location produces an eigenwert of corresponding above-mentioned secure data and this eigenwert is stored in the intelligent card chip.The secure data protected location uses an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding this secure data and eigenwert according to above-mentioned private key, eigenwert with secure data and this stamped signature is stored in the flash chip.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment; when memory management unit reads secure data from flash chip; the secure data protected location can read corresponding stamped signature from flash chip; from intelligent card chip, read the characteristic of correspondence value; the secure data that is read according to private key, the eigenwert and the above-mentioned memory management unit that are read uses above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce the corresponding secure data that reads and compares stamped signature with one of eigenwert, and whether the stamped signature that judgement is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced.And when stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced were inequality, then the secure data protected location can be exported an information warning.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned memory management unit stores one and has upgraded secure data to replace above-mentioned secure data in this flash chip.In addition; the secure data protected location produces corresponding this and has upgraded one of secure data and upgraded eigenwert, and according to above-mentioned private key, upgrade eigenwert and upgrade secure data and use above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce corresponding this to have upgraded secure data and upgraded one of eigenwert therewith and upgraded stamped signature.Moreover the secure data protected location stores this and has upgraded stamped signature replacing above-mentioned stamped signature in above-mentioned flash chip, and stores this upgraded eigenwert to replace above-mentioned eigenwert in above-mentioned intelligent card chip.
Exemplary embodiment of the present invention proposes a kind of anti-data tampering method, is used for protecting a secure data of a flash chip that is stored in a flash memory system.This anti-data tampering method is included in configuration one intelligent card chip in this flash memory system, use an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding this secure data according to above-mentioned private key and secure data, and this stamped signature is stored in the above-mentioned intelligent card chip.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, this anti-data tampering method also comprises when reading secure data from above-mentioned flash chip, from above-mentioned intelligent card chip, read corresponding stamped signature, use above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce a comparison stamped signature of the corresponding secure data that reads according to above-mentioned private key and the secure data that is read, and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced from above-mentioned intelligent card chip.This anti-data tampering method comprises that more working as the stamped signature that is read when inequality, is then exported an information warning with the comparison stamped signature that produces.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned anti-data tampering method more comprises: store one and upgraded secure data to replace this secure data in above-mentioned flash chip, upgraded secure data therewith according to above-mentioned private key and used above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce corresponding this to have upgraded one of secure data and upgraded stamped signature, and in above-mentioned intelligent card chip, stored this and upgraded stamped signature to replace above-mentioned stamped signature.
Exemplary embodiment of the present invention proposes a kind of anti-data tampering method, is used for protecting a secure data of a flash chip that is stored in a flash memory system.This anti-data tampering method is included in configuration one intelligent card chip in this flash memory system, produces an eigenwert of corresponding this secure data, and this eigenwert is stored in this intelligent card chip.This anti-data tampering method also comprises according to above-mentioned private key, eigenwert to be used an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding this secure data and eigenwert with secure data and this stamped signature is stored in the above-mentioned flash chip.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, this anti-data tampering method also comprises from above-mentioned flash chip and reads secure data, from above-mentioned flash chip, read corresponding stamped signature, from intelligent card chip, read the characteristic of correspondence value, according to above-mentioned private key, the eigenwert that is read uses above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce a comparison stamped signature of corresponding secure data that reads and eigenwert with the secure data that is read, and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced, this anti-data tampering method comprises that more working as the stamped signature that is read when inequality, is then exported an information warning with the comparison stamped signature that produces.
In the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, above-mentioned anti-data tampering method also comprises: store one and upgraded secure data to replace this secure data in flash chip, corresponding this of generation has upgraded one of secure data and has upgraded eigenwert, according to above-mentioned private key, this has upgraded eigenwert and has upgraded secure data therewith and use above-mentioned One-Way Hash Function to produce corresponding this to have upgraded secure data and upgraded one of eigenwert therewith and upgraded stamped signature, in above-mentioned flash chip, store this and upgraded stamped signature replacing above-mentioned stamped signature, and in above-mentioned intelligent card chip, store this and upgraded eigenwert to replace above-mentioned eigenwert.
Based on above-mentioned, the flash memory system of exemplary embodiment, controller are by store the stamped signature or the eigenwert of corresponding secure data in the intelligent card chip that is disposed with anti-data tampering method according to the present invention, and when from flash chip, reading secure data, come the authenticating security data whether to be distorted, can guarantee the integrality of secure data thus according to stamped signature or eigenwert.
For the above-mentioned feature and advantage of the present invention can be become apparent, embodiment cited below particularly, and cooperate appended graphic being described in detail below.
Description of drawings
Figure 1A is a host computer system of using flash memory according to the present invention illustrated in first exemplary embodiment;
Figure 1B is the synoptic diagram of the illustrated computing machine of exemplary embodiment, input/output device and flash memory according to the present invention;
Fig. 1 C is the synoptic diagram of the illustrated host computer system of another exemplary embodiment and flash memory according to the present invention;
Fig. 2 is the summary calcspar of the flash memory shown in diagram Figure 1A;
Fig. 3 A is the summary calcspar of the illustrated intelligent card chip of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention;
Fig. 3 B is the summary calcspar of the illustrated flash controller of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention;
Fig. 4 is the example of the integrality of the illustrated judgement secure data of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention;
Fig. 5 is another example of the integrality of the illustrated judgement secure data of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention;
Fig. 6 is the process flow diagram of the illustrated anti-data tampering method of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention;
Fig. 7 is the summary calcspar of the illustrated flash memory of second exemplary embodiment according to the present invention;
Fig. 8 is the example of the integrality of the illustrated judgement secure data of second exemplary embodiment according to the present invention;
Fig. 9 is another example of the integrality of the illustrated judgement secure data of second exemplary embodiment according to the present invention;
Figure 10 is the process flow diagram in the illustrated anti-data tampering method of second exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Description of reference numerals:
1000: host computer system; 1100: computing machine;
1102: microprocessor; 1104: random access memory;
1106: input/output device; 1108: system bus;
1110: data transmission interface; 1202: mouse;
1204: keyboard; 1206: display;
1208: printer; 1212: flash disk;
1214: memory card; 1216: solid state hard disc;
1310: digital camera; The 1312:SD card;
The 1314:MMC card; 1316: memory stick;
The 1318:CF card; 1320: embedded storage device;
100: flash memory; 102: connector;
104: flash controller; 106: flash chip;
108: intelligent card chip; 108a: interface;
202: microprocessor unit; 204: memory management unit;
206: host interface unit; 208: the flash interface unit;
210: the secure data protected location; 222: private key;
224: One-Way Hash Function; 252: memory buffer;
254: Power Management Unit; 256: error correction unit;
302: microprocessor; 304: security module;
306: ROM (read-only memory); 308: random access memory;
310: the electronics formula programmable read only memory of erasing; 312: oscillator;
314: the first interface units; 316: the second interface units;
S1, S2, S1 ', S2 ': stamped signature; D1, D2: secure data;
106: the backup flash chip '; 402,404,502,504,506: state;
S601, S603, S605, S607, S609, S611, S613, S615, S617, S619: the step of anti-data tampering;
226: the eigenwert generator; 704: flash controller;
710: the secure data protected location; E1, E2: eigenwert;
802,804,902,904,906: state; 700: flash memory;
CS1, CS2, CS1 ', CS2 ': comparison stamped signature;
S1001, S1003, S1005, S1007, S1009, S1011, S1013, S1015, S1017, S1019, S1021: the step of anti-data tampering.
Embodiment
Generally speaking, flash memory (also claiming flash memory system) comprises flash chip and controller (also claiming control circuit).Usually flash memory can use with host computer system, so that host computer system can write to data flash memory or reading of data from flash memory.In addition, flash memory also being arranged is to comprise embedded flash memory and can be executed on the host computer system with substantially as the software of the controller of this embedded flash memory.
[first exemplary embodiment]
Figure 1A is a host computer system of using flash memory according to the present invention illustrated in first exemplary embodiment.
Please refer to Figure 1A, host computer system 1000 generally comprises computing machine 1100 and I/O (input/output, I/O) device 1106.Computing machine 1100 comprise microprocessor 1102, random access memory (random access memory, RAM) 1104, system bus 1108 and data transmission interface 1110.Input/output device 1106 comprises mouse 1202, keyboard 1204, the display 1206 and printer 1208 as Figure 1B.It must be appreciated, the unrestricted input/output device 1106 of the device shown in Figure 1B, input/output device 1106 also can comprise other device.
Flash memory 100 is to electrically connect by data transmission interface 1110 other assembly with host computer system 1000 in embodiments of the present invention.Data can be write to flash memory 100 or reading of data from flash memory 100 by microprocessor 1102, random access memory 1104 with the processing of input/output device 1106.For example, flash memory 100 can be flash disk 1212, memory card 1214 or solid state hard disc (Solid State Drive, SSD) 1216 shown in Figure 1B.
Generally speaking, but host computer system 1000 can be any system of storage data substantially.Though in this exemplary embodiment, host computer system 1000 is to explain with computer system, yet host computer system 1000 can be systems such as digital camera, video camera, communicator, message player or video signal player in another exemplary embodiment of the present invention.For example, be digital camera (video camera) 1310 o'clock in host computer system, flash memory then is its employed SD card 1312, mmc card 1314, memory stick (memorystick) 1316, CF card 1318 or embedded storage device 1320 (shown in Fig. 1 C).Embedded storage device 1320 comprise the built-in multimedia card (Embedded MMC, eMMC).What deserves to be mentioned is that the built-in multimedia card is directly to be electrically connected on the substrate of host computer system.
Fig. 2 is the summary calcspar of the flash memory shown in diagram Figure 1A.
Please refer to Fig. 2, flash memory 100 comprises connector 102, flash controller 104, flash chip 106 and intelligent card chip 108.
Connector 102 is to be electrically connected to flash controller 104 and in order to be electrically connected to host computer system 1000.In this exemplary embodiment, connector 102 is secure digital (secure digital, SD) interface connector.Yet, it must be appreciated and the invention is not restricted to this, connector 102 also can be advanced annex (the Serial Advanced Technology Attachment of sequence, SATA) connector, parallel advanced annex (Parallel Advanced Technology Attachment, PATA) connector, universal serial bus (Universal Serial Bus, USB) connector, Institute of Electrical and Electric Engineers (Institute ofElectrical and Electronic Engineers, IEEE) 1394 connectors, high-speed peripheral component connecting interface (Peripheral Component Interconnect Express, PCI Express) connector, memory stick (Memory Stick, MS) interface connector, Multi Media Card (Multi Media Card, MMC) interface connector, compact flash (Compact Flash, CF) interface connector, integrated driving electrical interface (Integrated Device Electronics, IDE) connector or other connector that is fit to.
Flash controller 104 can be carried out with hardware pattern or real a plurality of logic locks or the steering order of doing of firmware pattern, and carries out the runnings such as writing, read and erase of data in flash chip 106 according to the instruction of host computer system 1000.Particularly, flash controller 104 is carried out according to an anti-data tampering mechanism of this exemplary embodiment and is distorted with the data that prevent to be stored in the flash chip 106.
Flash chip 106 is to be electrically connected to flash controller 104 and to have a plurality of physical blocks with storage data.For example; in this exemplary embodiment; flash controller 104 is divided into general data storage area and secure data storage area with the physical blocks of flash chip 106, and flash controller 104 can be distorted the data that need protect according to the anti-data tampering mechanism of this exemplary embodiment to avoid the assailant to the data execution that is stored in the secure data storage area.
In this exemplary embodiment, flash chip 106 is multilayer memory cell (Multi Level Cell, a MLC) nand flash memory chip.Yet, the invention is not restricted to this, flash chip 106 is individual layer memory cell (Single Level Cell, SLC) nand flash memory chip also.
Intelligent card chip 108 is to be electrically connected to flash controller 104, carries out encryption and decryption in order to storage data and to stored data.
Fig. 3 A is the summary calcspar of the illustrated intelligent card chip of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Intelligent card chip 108 has microprocessor 302, security module 304, ROM (read-only memory) (Read OnlyMemory, ROM) 306, random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM) 308, electronics erase the formula programmable read only memory (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-OnlyMemory, EEPROM) 310, oscillator 312, first interface unit 314 and second interface unit 316.
Microprocessor 302 is in order to the overall operation of control intelligent card chip 108.Security module 304 is in order to carry out encryption and decryption to the data that are stored in the intelligent card chip 108.Oscillator 312 required frenquency signal when producing intelligent card chip 108 runnings.
Random access memory 308 is in order to the data or the firmware program of temporary computing.Electronics is erased formula programmable read only memory 310 in order to store user's data.ROM (read-only memory) 306 is in order to store the firmware program of intelligent card chip 108.Specifically, when intelligent card chip 108 runnings, the firmware program that microprocessor 302 can be carried out in the ROM (read-only memory) 306 is carried out relevant running.
First interface unit 314 is in order to be electrically connected to flash controller 104.For example, first interface unit 314 is the interfaces that meet ISO 7816 standards.Second interface unit 316 is in order to be electrically connected to a radio-frequency antenna to receive wireless signal.For example, second interface unit 316 is the interfaces that meet ISO 14443 standards.
Particularly, the security module of intelligent card chip 108 can be carried out a security mechanism to prevent to desire to steal the attack that is stored in data stored in the intelligent card chip 108.For example, this attack comprises timing attack (timing attack), single electric power analytical attack (single-power-analysis attack) or difference electric power analytical attack (differential-power-analysis).In addition, intelligent card chip 108 performed security mechanisms are to meet Federal Information Processing Standards (Federal Information Processing Standards, FIPS) tertiary gradient of 140-2 or more high-grade or meet the tertiary gradient of EMV EL or more high-grade.That is to say that intelligent card chip 108 is by the authentication more than the fourth stage of FIPS 140-2 or by the authentication more than the fourth stage of EMV EL.At this, FIPS is that Federal Government is formulated to the government organs except all military establishment and the employed Open Standard of contractor of government, and wherein FIPS140-2 has formulated the grade about data security.In addition, EMV is the international finance industry for smart card and the point of sale that can use chip card (point-of-sale, POS) terminating machine, and institute of banking institution specialty transaction of being formulated and the standard criterions that authenticate such as ATM (Automatic Teller Machine) that extensively are provided with.This standard is at the relevant software and hardware set standard of chip credit card with the geld system (Payment System) of cash card.In this exemplary embodiment, flash controller 104 can be distorted with the data that prevent to be stored in the flash chip 106 by store the information that is used for verifying whether the data that are stored in flash chip 106 have been distorted in intelligent card chip 108.
Fig. 3 B is the summary calcspar of the illustrated flash controller of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Please refer to Fig. 3 B, flash controller 104 comprises microprocessor unit 202, memory management unit 204, host interface unit 206, flash interface unit 208 and secure data protected location 210.
Microprocessor unit 202 is the main control unit of flash controller 104, in order to cooperative cooperatings such as memory management unit 204, host interface unit 206, flash interface unit 208 and secure data protected location 210 to carry out the various runnings of flash memory 100.
Memory management unit 204 is to be electrically connected to microprocessor unit 202, in order to carry out data access mechanism and flash memory management mechanism.For example, memory management unit 204 service logic address-physical address mapping table (logical address-physical address mapping table) concerns with the reflection between management logic address and the physical address.In addition, memory management unit 204 receives that main frames write instruction or main frame reading command and according to the access data in the physical address that the logical address that host computer system 1000 is desired accesses is videoed of the information this logical address-physical address mapping table from host computer system 1000.
Host interface unit 206 is instruction and the data that are electrically connected to microprocessor unit 202 and transmitted in order to reception and identification host computer system 1000.That is to say that instruction that host computer system 1000 is transmitted and data can see through host interface unit 206 and be sent to microprocessor unit 202.In this exemplary embodiment, host interface unit 206 is that corresponding connector 102 is the SD interface.Yet, it must be appreciated to the invention is not restricted to this that host interface unit 206 also can be SATA interface, PATA interface, USB interface, IEEE 1394 interfaces, PCI Express interface, MS interface, MMC interface, CF interface, ide interface or other data transmission interface that is fit to.
Flash interface unit 208 is to be electrically connected to microprocessor unit 202 and in order to access flash chip 106.That is to say that the data of desiring to write to flash chip 106 can be converted to 106 receptible forms of flash chip via flash interface unit 208.
Secure data protected location 210 is to be electrically connected to microprocessor unit 202, in order to carry out the anti-data tampering mechanism according to this exemplary embodiment.In this exemplary embodiment, have a private key 222 and an One-Way Hash Function (One-Way Hash Function) 224 in the secure data protected location 210.For example, this private key 222 is that manufacturer by flash controller 104 produces and is stored in the secure data protected location 210 randomly when flash controller 104 dispatches from the factory.And; when memory management unit 204 writes the data of need protection when (also claiming secure data) in flash chip 106; secure data protected location 210 can be carried out One-Way Hash Function 224 producing the stamped signature of corresponding this secure data according to private key 222 and the secure data that is write, and the stamped signature that is produced is stored in the intelligent card chip 108.For example, memory management unit 204 can see through application data unit (Application Protocol Data Unit, APDU) during the electronics that the stamped signature that is produced is stored to intelligent card chip 108 is erased formula programmable read only memory 310, perhaps from erasing formula programmable read only memory 310, the electronics of intelligent card chip 108 reads stored stamped signature by the application data unit.
In this exemplary embodiment, One-Way Hash Function 224 is to do in fact with SHA-256.Yet, it must be appreciated that the invention is not restricted to this, One-Way Hash Function 224 also can MD5, RIPEMD-160SHA1 in another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, SHA-386, SHA-512 or other function that is fit to do in fact.
In this exemplary embodiment; when memory management unit 204 read the secure data that is before write from flash chip 106, secure data protected location 210 can read corresponding stamped signature and produce a comparison stamped signature of the corresponding secure data that is read according to the secure data that private key 222 and memory management unit 204 are read with One-Way Hash Function 224 from intelligent card chip 108.Particularly, secure data protected location 210 can judge whether the secure data that is read is distorted according to stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced.
Fig. 4 is the example of the integrality of the illustrated judgement secure data of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Please refer to Fig. 4; shown in state 402; when memory management unit 204 write secure data D1 to flash chip 106,210 meetings of secure data protected location produced the stamped signature S1 of corresponding secure data D1 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224 with private key 222 and security document D1.In addition, secure data protected location 210 can be stored in stamped signature S1 in the intelligent card chip 108.
Shown in state 404; when memory management unit 204 write secure data D2 to flash chip 106 when replacing secure data D1, secure data protected location 210 can produce the stamped signature S2 of corresponding secure data D2 with private key 222 and security document D2 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224.In addition, secure data protected location 210 can be stored to stamped signature S2 in the intelligent card chip 108 to replace stamped signature S1.
Particularly, at this moment, when reading secure data if memory management unit 204 receives the main frame reading command from flash chip 106, memory management unit 204 can correctly read secure data D2.Simultaneously, secure data protected location 210 can produce the comparison stamped signature CS1 of corresponding secure data D2 with the secure data D2 that private key 222 and memory management unit 204 are read as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224.In this example, be all identically owing to produce stamped signature S2 and the parameter of comparison stamped signature CS1, so the comparison stamped signature CS1 that is produced must be identical with stamped signature S2 in being stored in intelligent card chip 108.Base this, secure data protected location 210 can judge that the secure data that is read is complete.
Fig. 5 is another example of the integrality of the illustrated judgement secure data of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Please refer to Fig. 5; shown in state 502; when memory management unit 204 writes secure data D1 to flash chip 106 time, secure data protected location 210 can produce the stamped signature S1 of corresponding secure data D1 with private key 222 and security document D1 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224.In addition, secure data protected location 210 can be stored to stamped signature S1 in the intelligent card chip 108.Particularly, at this moment, the person uses the hard copy mode to duplicate data in the whole flash chip 106 (that is, backup flash chip 106 ') without permission.
Shown in state 504; when memory management unit 204 write secure data D2 to flash chip 106 when replacing secure data D1, secure data protected location 210 can produce the stamped signature S2 of corresponding secure data D2 with private key 222 and security document D2 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224.In addition, secure data protected location 210 can be stored to stamped signature S2 in the intelligent card chip 108 to replace stamped signature S1.Particularly, at this moment, without permission the person will back up flash chip 106 ' in data return and deposit to flash chip 106, shown in state 506.
State 506 times, when reading secure data if memory management unit 204 receives the main frame reading command from flash chip 106, because secure data D2 distorted and be secure data D1, so memory management unit 204 can read secure data D1 mistakenly.Simultaneously, secure data protected location 210 can produce the comparison stamped signature CS2 of corresponding secure data D1 with the secure data D1 that private key 222 and memory management unit 204 are read as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224.In this example, because secure data D2 has been distorted and has been secure data D1, therefore the comparison stamped signature CS2 that is produced must be inequality with the stamped signature S2 that is stored in the intelligent card chip 108.Base this, secure data protected location 210 can judge that the secure data that is read is distorted, and exports an information warning.
In above-mentioned example, secure data protected location 210 can be stored in the intelligent card chip 108 for stored secure data generation stamped signature and with the stamped signature that is produced.Owing to be stored in data in the intelligent card chip 108 is to be difficult to be distorted, and therefore, secure data protected location 210 comes the integrality of authenticating security data by being stored in stamped signature in the intelligent card chip 108.
What deserves to be mentioned is, although above-mentioned example be with single secure data storage, upgrade with verifying and explain.Yet; the invention is not restricted to this; in another exemplary embodiment of the present invention; when memory management unit 204 stored many secure datas in flash chip 106, secure data protected location 210 can be stored in the intelligent card chip 108 to be used to verify the integrality of each secure data for the stamped signature of each secure data generation correspondence and with these a little stamped signatures.In addition; when memory management unit 204 stored many secure datas in flash chip 106, secure data protected location 210 also can be stored in the intelligent card chip 108 to be used to verify the integrality of many secure datas to the stamped signature of a correspondence of many secure datas generations and with this stamped signature.
In this exemplary embodiment, memory management unit 204 is to be embodied in the flash controller 104 with a firmware pattern with secure data protected location 210.For example; the memory management unit 204 that will comprise a plurality of steering orders (for example is burned onto a program internal memory; ROM (read-only memory) (Read Only Memory; ROM)) be embedded in the flash controller 104 in and with this program internal memory; when flash memory 100 runnings; the steering order of memory management unit 204 can be carried out finishing according to the data access of embodiment of the invention mechanism and flash memory management mechanism by microprocessor unit 202, and the steering order of secure data protected location 210 can be carried out to finish according to the anti-data of the embodiment of the invention by microprocessor unit 202 and distorts mechanism.
In another exemplary embodiment of the present invention; memory management unit 204 also can the program code pattern be stored in the specific region (for example, being exclusively used in the system region of storage system data in the flash chip) of flash chip 106 with the steering order of secure data protected location 210.Same, when flash memory 100 runnings, memory management unit 204 can be carried out by microprocessor unit 202 with the steering order of secure data protected location 210.In addition, in another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, memory management unit 204 also can a hardware pattern be embodied in the flash controller 104 with secure data protected location 210.
Referring again to Fig. 3 B, in the present invention's one exemplary embodiment, flash controller 104 also comprises memory buffer 252, Power Management Unit 254 and error correction unit 256.
Memory buffer 252 is to be electrically connected to microprocessor unit 202 and in order to the temporary data that come from the data and instruction of host computer system 1000 or come from flash chip 106.
Power Management Unit 254 be electrically connected to microprocessor unit 202 and in order to control flash memory 100 power supply.
Error correction unit 256 is to be electrically connected to microprocessor unit 202 and in order to carry out an error-correcting routine to guarantee the correctness of data.Specifically, when receiving main frame from host computer system 1000, memory management unit 204 writes when instruction, error correction unit 256 can write the bug check and correcting code (the Error Checking and Correcting Code that data produce correspondence that write of instruction for corresponding this main frame, ECC Code), and memory management unit 204 this can be write data and write in the flash chip 106 with corresponding error-correcting code.Afterwards, when memory management unit 204 can read the error-correcting code of this data correspondence during reading of data simultaneously from flash chip 106, and error correction unit 256 can be according to the data execution error correction program of this error-correcting code to being read.
Fig. 6 is the process flow diagram of the illustrated anti-data tampering method of first exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Please refer to Fig. 6, when receiving the host command of desiring the access secure data, memory management unit 204 judges that this host command is that main frame writes instruction or main frame reading command in step S601.
Write when instructing if the host command that is received in step S601 is a main frame, memory management unit 204 upgrades the content of (or writing) secure data in flash chip 106 in step S603.Specifically, when flash memory 100 receives indication when upgrading the main frame of (or writing) secure data and writing instruction from host computer system 1000, memory management unit 204 can write to secure data in the flash chip 106 according to the information in logical address-physical address mapping table.
Then, secure data protected location 210 can use One-Way Hash Function 224 to produce corresponding stamped signature according to the secure data that private key 222 and desire are upgraded in step S605.Then, secure data protected location 210 can be stored to the stamped signature that is produced in the intelligent card chip 108 in step S607.
If when the host command that is received in step S601 is the main frame reading command, then memory management unit 204 reads secure data according to the main frame reading command from flash chip 106 in step S609.
Then, secure data protected location 210 can use One-Way Hash Function 224 to produce the comparison stamped signature according to the secure data that private key 222 and memory management unit 204 are read in step S611.And secure data protected location 210 can read corresponding stamped signature from intelligent card chip 108 in step S613.
Then, secure data protected location 210 can judge whether the comparison stamped signature that is produced is identical with the stamped signature that is read in step S615.If when comparison stamped signature that is produced and the stamped signature that is read are identical, then the secure data that memory management unit 204 outputs are read in step S617 is to host computer system 1000.Otherwise if when the comparison stamped signature that is produced is inequality with the stamped signature that read, then secure data protected location 210 can be given host computer system 1000 by the output information warnings in step S619, is distorted to inform secure data.
[second exemplary embodiment]
The flash memory of the present invention's second exemplary embodiment and host computer system are flash memory and the host computer system that is same as first exemplary embodiment in essence; wherein difference is in second exemplary embodiment when memory management unit upgrades secure data, and the secure data protected location is that the eigenwert of secure data that correspondence is upgraded is stored in the intelligent card chip and comes the integrality of authenticating security data according to this eigenwert.
Fig. 7 is the summary calcspar of the illustrated flash memory of second exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Please refer to Fig. 7, flash memory 700 is that other assembly that sees through data transmission interface 1110 and host computer system 1000 electrically connects.Data can be write to flash memory 700 or reading of data from flash memory 700 by microprocessor 1102, random access memory 1104 with the processing of input/output device 1106.For example, flash memory 700 can be flash disk 1212, memory card 1214 or solid state hard disc (Solid State Drive, SSD) 1216 shown in Figure 1B.
Flash memory 700 comprises connector 102, flash controller 704, flash chip 106 and intelligent card chip 108.
Connector 102, flash chip 106 are to be electrically connected to flash controller 704 with intelligent card chip 108, and wherein intelligent card chip 108 is to be electrically connected to flash controller 704 via interface 108a.Connector 102, flash chip 106 have been described as above with the structure and the function of intelligent card chip 108, are not repeated in this description at this.
Flash controller 704 comprises microprocessor unit 202, memory management unit 204, host interface unit 206, flash interface unit 208 and secure data protected location 710.
Same, microprocessor unit 202, memory management unit 204, host interface unit 206 have been described as above with the structure and the function of flash interface unit 208, are not repeated in this description at this.
Secure data protected location 710 is to be electrically connected to microprocessor unit 202, in order to carry out the anti-data tampering mechanism according to this exemplary embodiment.In this exemplary embodiment, have private key 222, One-Way Hash Function (One-Way Hash Function) 224 and eigenwert generator 226 in the secure data protected location 710.
In this exemplary embodiment, when memory management unit 204 upgraded (or writing) secure data in flash chip 106, eigenwert generator 226 can produce characteristic of correspondence value (Eigenvalue) for the secure data that is upgraded.For example, in this exemplary embodiment, eigenwert generator 226 can be according to being used for the eigenwert of the physical address of storage safe data as this secure data.Specifically, in the running of flash chip, physical address can store the data that host computer system 1000 writes in the mode of rotating in logical address.When secure data was updated, the physical address that stores this secure data can corresponding change.
In addition, in another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, eigenwert generator 226 also can random fashion produces the eigenwert of corresponding secure data.For example, when memory management unit 204 upgraded (or writing) secure data in flash chip 106, eigenwert generator 226 can produce the eigenwert of a random number as corresponding this secure data randomly.Perhaps, in another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, eigenwert generator 226 also can produce the eigenwert of count value as corresponding secure data in order.For example, when memory management unit 204 upgraded (or writing) secure data in flash chip 106, eigenwert generator 226 can be counted this count value (for example, adding 1) with the eigenwert as corresponding this secure data.
In this exemplary embodiment; when memory management unit 204 write the secure data that needs protection in flash chip 106, secure data protected location 710 can produce the stamped signature of corresponding this secure data according to private key 222, eigenwert generator 226 eigenwert that is produced and the secure datas that write with One-Way Hash Function 224.Particularly, secure data protected location 710 can be stored to flash chip 106 with the stamped signature that is produced and the characteristic of correspondence value is stored in the intelligent card chip 108.
In this exemplary embodiment; when memory management unit 204 reads before stored secure data from flash chip 106; secure data protected location 710 can read the characteristic of correspondence value and read corresponding stamped signature from flash chip 106 from intelligent card chip 108, and uses One-Way Hash Function to produce one of the corresponding secure data that reads according to the secure data that private key 222, the eigenwert and the memory management unit 204 that are read are read and compare stamped signature.Particularly, secure data protected location 710 can judge whether the secure data that is read is distorted according to stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced.
Fig. 8 is the example of the integrality of the illustrated judgement secure data of second exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Please refer to Fig. 8; shown in state 802; when memory management unit 204 writes secure data D1 to flash chip 106; eigenwert generator 226 can produce the eigenwert E1 of corresponding secure data D1, and secure data protected location 710 can produce the stamped signature S1 ' of corresponding secure data D1 with private key 222, eigenwert E1 and security document D1 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224.In addition, secure data protected location 710 can be stored in stamped signature S1 ' in the flash chip 106 and with eigenwert E1 and be stored in the intelligent card chip 108.
Shown in state 804; when memory management unit 204 write secure data D2 to flash chip 106 when replacing secure data D1, eigenwert generator 226 can produce the eigenwert E2 of corresponding secure data D2 and secure data protected location 710 can produce corresponding secure data D2 with private key 222, eigenwert E2 and security document D2 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224 stamped signature S2 '.In addition, secure data protected location 710 can be stored to stamped signature S2 ' in the flash chip 106 to replace stamped signature S1 ' and eigenwert E2 is stored in the intelligent card chip 108 to replace eigenwert E1.
At this moment, when reading secure data if memory management unit 204 receives the main frame reading command from flash chip 106, memory management unit 204 can correctly read secure data D2.Simultaneously; secure data protected location 710 can read characteristic of correspondence value E2 and read corresponding stamped signature S2 ' from flash chip 106 from intelligent card chip 108, and produces the comparison stamped signature CS1 ' of corresponding secure data D2 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224 with private key 222, eigenwert E2 and the secure data D2 that memory management unit 204 is read.In this example, be all identically owing to produce stamped signature S2 and the parameter of comparison stamped signature CS1 ', so the comparison stamped signature CS1 ' that is produced must be identical with stamped signature S2 ' in being stored in intelligent flash chip 106.Base this, secure data protected location 710 can judge that the secure data that is read is reliable.
Fig. 9 is another example of the integrality of the illustrated judgement secure data of second exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Please refer to Fig. 9; shown in state 902; when memory management unit 204 writes secure data D1 to flash chip 106 time; eigenwert generator 226 can produce the eigenwert E1 of corresponding secure data D1, and secure data protected location 710 can produce the stamped signature S1 ' of corresponding secure data D1 with private key 222, eigenwert E1 and security document D1 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224.In addition, secure data protected location 710 can be stored to eigenwert E1 in the intelligent card chip 108 and with stamped signature S1 ' and be stored in the flash chip 106.Particularly, at this moment, the person uses the hard copy mode to duplicate data in the whole flash chip 106 (that is, backup flash chip 106 ') without permission.
Shown in state 904; when memory management unit 204 write secure data D2 to flash chip 106 when replacing secure data D1; eigenwert generator 226 can produce the eigenwert E2 of corresponding secure data D2, and secure data protected location 710 produces the stamped signature S2 ' of corresponding secure data D2 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224 with private key 222, eigenwert E2 and security document D2.In addition, secure data protected location 710 can be stored to stamped signature S2 ' in the flash chip 106 to replace stamped signature S1 ' and eigenwert E2 is stored in the intelligent card chip 108 to replace eigenwert E1.Particularly, at this moment, without permission the person will back up flash chip 106 ' in data return and deposit to flash chip 106, shown in state 906.
State 906 times, when reading secure data if memory management unit 204 receives the main frame reading command from flash chip 106, because secure data D2 distorted and be secure data D1, so memory management unit 204 can read secure data D1 mistakenly.Simultaneously; secure data protected location 710 can read characteristic of correspondence value E2 and read stamped signature S1 ' from flash chip 106 from intelligent card chip 108, and produces the comparison stamped signature CS2 ' of corresponding secure data D1 as the input parameter of One-Way Hash Function 224 with private key 222, eigenwert E2 and the secure data D1 that memory management unit 204 is read.In this example,, must be inequality therefore according to eigenwert E2 comparison stamped signature CS2 ' that is produced and the stamped signature S1 ' that is stored in the flash chip 106 because secure data D2 has been distorted and has been secure data D1.Therefore, secure data protected location 710 can judge that the secure data that is read is distorted, and exports an information warning.
In above-mentioned example, secure data protected location 710 can be stored in the intelligent card chip 108 for secure data generation eigenwert and with the eigenwert that is produced.Because the data that are stored in the intelligent card chip 108 are difficult to be distorted, therefore, secure data protected location 710 comes the integrality of authenticating security data by being stored in eigenwert in the intelligent card chip 108.
What deserves to be mentioned is, although above-mentioned example be with single secure data storage, upgrade with verifying and explain.Yet; the invention is not restricted to this; in another exemplary embodiment of the present invention; when memory management unit 204 stored many secure datas in flash chip 106, secure data protected location 710 can be stored in the flash chip 106 to be used to verify the integrality of each secure data for each secure data produces characteristic of correspondence value and stamped signature and these a little eigenwerts are stored in the intelligent card chip 108 and with these a little stamped signatures.In addition; when memory management unit 204 stored many secure datas in flash chip 106, secure data protected location 710 also can produce the stamped signature of a correspondence and eigenwert and this eigenwert is stored in the intelligent card chip 108 and with this stamped signature and be stored in the flash chip 106 to be used to verify the integrality of many secure datas many secure datas.
In this exemplary embodiment, secure data protected location 710 is to be embodied in the flash controller 704 and by microprocessor unit 202 with a firmware pattern to carry out.Yet; the invention is not restricted to this; in another exemplary embodiment of the present invention; the specific region that secure data protected location 710 also can the program code pattern be stored in flash chip 106 (for example; be exclusively used in the system region of storage system data in the flash chip) in and carry out by microprocessor unit 202, perhaps be embodied in the flash controller 704 with a hardware pattern.
Figure 10 is the process flow diagram in the illustrated anti-data tampering method of second exemplary embodiment according to the present invention.
Please refer to Figure 10, when receiving the host command of desiring the access secure data, memory management unit 204 judges that this host command is that main frame writes instruction or main frame reading command in step S1001.
If the host command that is received in step S1001 is a main frame writes when instruction, then memory management unit 204 upgrades the content of (or writing) secure data in flash chip 106 in step S1003.
Then, secure data protected location 710 can produce the eigenwert of corresponding this secure data in step S1005, and produces corresponding stamped signature according to the secure data use One-Way Hash Function 224 that private key 222, the eigenwert that is produced and desire are upgraded.Then, secure data protected location 710 can be stored to the eigenwert that is produced in the intelligent card chip 108 and with the stamped signature that is produced and is stored in the flash chip 106 in step S1007.
If when the host command that is received in step S1001 is the main frame reading command, then memory management unit 204 reads secure data according to the main frame reading command from flash chip 106 in step S1009.
Then, secure data protected location 710 can read the characteristic of correspondence value from intelligent card chip 108 in step S1011.And secure data protected location 710 can use One-Way Hash Function 224 to produce the comparison stamped signature according to the secure data that private key 222, the eigenwert that is read and memory management unit 204 are read in step S1013.And secure data protected location 710 can read corresponding stamped signature from flash chip 106 in step S1015.
Then, secure data protected location 710 can judge whether the comparison stamped signature that is produced is identical with the stamped signature that is read in step S1017.If when comparison stamped signature that is produced and the stamped signature that is read are identical, then the secure data that memory management unit 204 outputs are read in step S1019 is to host computer system 1000.Otherwise if when the comparison stamped signature that is produced is inequality with the stamped signature that read, then secure data protected location 710 can be given host computer system 1000 by the output information warnings in step S1021, is distorted to inform secure data.
In sum, the flash memory of exemplary embodiment of the present invention disposes intelligent card chip, and corresponding stamped signature or the eigenwert that is stored in the secure data in the flash chip is to be stored in the intelligent card chip, and this stamped signature or eigenwert that is stored in the intelligent card chip of base can be used for verifying the integrality that is stored in the secure data in the flash chip.
It should be noted that at last: above embodiment only in order to technical scheme of the present invention to be described, is not intended to limit; Although with reference to previous embodiment the present invention is had been described in detail, those of ordinary skill in the art is to be understood that: it still can be made amendment to the technical scheme that aforementioned each embodiment put down in writing, and perhaps part technical characterictic wherein is equal to replacement; And these modifications or replacement do not make the essence of appropriate technical solution break away from the spirit and scope of various embodiments of the present invention technical scheme.

Claims (20)

1. flash memory system comprises:
One flash controller has a private key;
One flash chip is electrically connected to described flash controller, and wherein said flash chip stores a secure data; And
One intelligent card chip is electrically connected to described flash controller,
Wherein said flash controller uses an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding described secure data according to described private key with described secure data and described stamped signature is stored in the described intelligent card chip.
2. flash memory system according to claim 1,
Wherein said flash controller reads described secure data from described flash chip, use described One-Way Hash Function to produce a comparison stamped signature of the corresponding secure data that reads according to described private key and the secure data that is read, from described intelligent card chip, read described stamped signature, and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced
Wherein work as the stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced when inequality, then described flash controller is exported an information warning.
3. flash memory system according to claim 2, wherein said flash controller store one and have upgraded secure data replacing described secure data in described flash chip,
Wherein said flash controller according to described private key with described upgraded secure data use described One-Way Hash Function produce corresponding described upgraded that one of secure data has upgraded stamped signature and in described intelligent card chip the described stamped signature that upgraded of storage to replace described stamped signature.
4. flash memory system according to claim 1, wherein said intelligent card chip are the above chip of a tertiary gradient that meets the above chip of the tertiary gradient of a Federal Information Processing Standards 140-2 or meet EMV EL.
5. flash memory system according to claim 1, wherein said intelligent card chip sees through an interface and is electrically connected to described flash controller, and described interface meets an ISO 7816 standards.
6. flash memory system comprises:
One flash controller has a private key;
One flash chip is electrically connected to described flash controller, and wherein said flash chip stores a secure data; And
One intelligent card chip is electrically connected to described flash controller,
Wherein said flash controller produces an eigenwert of corresponding described secure data and described eigenwert is stored in the described intelligent card chip,
Wherein said flash controller uses an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding described secure data and described eigenwert according to described private key, described eigenwert with described secure data and described stamped signature is stored in the described flash chip.
7. flash memory system according to claim 6,
Wherein said flash controller reads described secure data and described stamped signature from described flash chip, from described intelligent card chip, read described eigenwert, use described One-Way Hash Function to produce the corresponding secure data that reads according to described private key, eigenwert that is read and the secure data that is read and compare stamped signature with one of the eigenwert that is read, and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced
Wherein work as the stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced when inequality, then described flash controller can be exported an information warning.
8. flash memory system according to claim 7, wherein said flash controller store one and have upgraded secure data replacing described secure data in described flash chip,
Wherein said flash controller produces corresponding described one of the secure data that upgraded and has upgraded eigenwert, and use described One-Way Hash Function to produce correspondingly describedly to have upgraded secure data and described one of the eigenwert of having upgraded has been upgraded stamped signature with the described secure data that upgraded according to described private key, the described eigenwert of having upgraded
Wherein said flash controller stores the described stamped signature that upgraded replacing described stamped signature in described flash chip,
Wherein said flash controller stores the described eigenwert of having upgraded to replace described eigenwert in described intelligent card chip.
9. flash memory system according to claim 6, wherein said eigenwert are a physical address, a random value of corresponding described secure data or a count value of corresponding described secure data that stores described secure data in described flash chip.
10. a flash controller is used for protecting a secure data that is stored in a flash chip, and described flash controller comprises:
One microprocessor unit;
One flash interface unit is electrically connected to described microprocessor unit, in order to being electrically connected to described flash chip,
One memory management unit is electrically connected to described microprocessor unit; And
One secure data protected location is electrically connected to described microprocessor unit, and has a private key,
Wherein said secure data protected location uses an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding described secure data according to described private key with described secure data and described stamped signature is stored in the intelligent card chip.
11. flash controller according to claim 10,
Wherein when described memory management unit reads described secure data from described flash chip; described secure data protected location reads described stamped signature from described intelligent card chip; use described One-Way Hash Function to produce one of secure data that corresponding described memory management unit reads according to described private key and the secure data that is read and compare stamped signature; and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced from described intelligent card chip
Wherein work as the stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced when inequality, then described secure data protected location is exported an information warning.
12. a flash controller is used for protecting a secure data that is stored in a flash chip, described flash controller comprises:
One microprocessor unit;
One flash interface unit is electrically connected to described microprocessor unit, in order to being electrically connected to described flash chip,
One memory management unit is electrically connected to described microprocessor unit; And
One secure data protected location is electrically connected to described microprocessor unit, and has a private key,
Wherein said secure data protected location produces an eigenwert of corresponding described secure data and described eigenwert is stored in the intelligent card chip,
Wherein said secure data protected location is stored in described stamped signature in the described flash chip with a stamped signature and the described secure data protected location that described secure data uses an One-Way Hash Function to produce corresponding described secure data and described eigenwert according to described private key, described eigenwert.
13. flash controller according to claim 12,
When wherein said memory management unit reads described secure data from described flash chip; Described secure data protected location reads described stamped signature from described flash chip; From described intelligent card chip, read described characteristic value; The secure data that the described private key of foundation, the characteristic value and the described memory management unit that read read uses described One-Way Hash Function to produce the corresponding secure data that reads and compares stamped signature with one of the characteristic value that reads; And judge the stamped signature read with produce whether compare stamped signature identical
Wherein work as the stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced when inequality, then described secure data protected location can be exported an information warning.
14. an anti-data tampering method is used for protecting a secure data of a flash chip that is stored in a flash memory system, described anti-data tampering method comprises:
Configuration one intelligent card chip in described flash memory system; And
The described private key of foundation uses an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding described secure data with described secure data and described stamped signature is stored in the described intelligent card chip.
15. anti-data tampering method according to claim 14 also comprises:
When from described flash chip, reading described secure data, from described intelligent card chip, read described stamped signature, use described One-Way Hash Function to produce a comparison stamped signature of the corresponding secure data that reads according to described private key and the secure data that is read, and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced from described intelligent card chip; And
When stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced are inequality, then export an information warning.
16. anti-data tampering method according to claim 15 also comprises:
In described flash chip, store one and upgraded secure data to replace described secure data;
Use described One-Way Hash Function to produce corresponding described one of the secure data that upgraded to have upgraded stamped signature with the described secure data that upgraded according to described private key; And
In described intelligent card chip, store the described stamped signature that upgraded to replace described stamped signature.
17. an anti-data tampering method is used for protecting a secure data of a flash chip that is stored in a flash memory system, described anti-several tampering methods comprise:
Configuration one intelligent card chip in described flash memory system;
Produce an eigenwert of corresponding described secure data and described eigenwert is stored in the described intelligent card chip; And
The described private key of foundation, described eigenwert are used an One-Way Hash Function to produce a stamped signature of corresponding described secure data and described eigenwert with described secure data and described stamped signature are stored in the described flash chip.
18. anti-data tampering method according to claim 17 also comprises:
When from described flash chip, reading described secure data, from described flash chip, read described stamped signature, from described intelligent card chip, read described eigenwert, use described One-Way Hash Function to produce the corresponding secure data that reads according to described private key, eigenwert that is read and the secure data that is read and compare stamped signature, and judge whether the stamped signature that is read is identical with the comparison stamped signature that is produced with one of the eigenwert that is read; And
When stamped signature that is read and the comparison stamped signature that is produced are inequality, then export an information warning.
19. anti-data tampering method according to claim 18 also comprises:
In described flash chip, store one and upgraded secure data to replace described secure data;
Produce corresponding described one of the secure data that upgraded and upgraded eigenwert;
Use described One-Way Hash Function to produce correspondingly describedly to have upgraded secure data and described one of the eigenwert of having upgraded has been upgraded stamped signature with the described secure data that upgraded according to described private key, the described eigenwert of having upgraded;
In described flash chip, store the described stamped signature that upgraded to replace described stamped signature; And
In described intelligent card chip, store the described eigenwert of having upgraded to replace described eigenwert.
20. anti-data tampering method according to claim 17, wherein said eigenwert are a physical address, a random value of corresponding described secure data or a count value of corresponding described secure data that stores described secure data in described flash chip.
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