CN100442781C - Fee-based route and relay method for wireless self-organized network - Google Patents
Fee-based route and relay method for wireless self-organized network Download PDFInfo
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- CN100442781C CN100442781C CNB2006100408849A CN200610040884A CN100442781C CN 100442781 C CN100442781 C CN 100442781C CN B2006100408849 A CNB2006100408849 A CN B2006100408849A CN 200610040884 A CN200610040884 A CN 200610040884A CN 100442781 C CN100442781 C CN 100442781C
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Abstract
The invention is a paying-based routing and transmitting method in self-organized wireless network, using VCG mechanism and Vickrey auction to make really displaying overhead for network functions become the optimum policy of Ad hoc node, and on the basis that the node really displays the expenses for routing and packet transmission, selecting the optimum expense path; in the packet transmitting course, explicitly considering different expenses on the optimum path when each node transmits packets. And the designed node compensating solution can prevent various cheating behaviors of nodes. And the method simplifies the policy-making space of nodes, implements global target optimization, and relatively symmetrically solves the excitation problem in the Ad hoc network in the economic mode.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates in wireless self-organization network (Wireless Ad Hoc) based on the route and the retransmission method of paying, belong to the field of improvement in performance and the enhancement techniques and the Principles of Economics cross-application of wireless network in the radio communication.
Background technology
In traditional network, generally comprise two types equipment, first type equipment is infrastructure, and these equipment have been guaranteed the operability of network service, and for example Zhuan Yong repeater, router, gateway and server all belong to the category of infrastructure; Second type equipment is terminal equipment, and these equipment representative of consumer are used networks, for example mobile phone etc.Ad hoc network becomes the focus of research in recent years.This interest mainly be by some military affairs and application commerce (owing to time restriction and under various environment reason such as interim tectonic network resource needed restriction, make and set up network infrastructure and become unactual) promotion, in Ad hoc network without any infrastructure and centralized management, because the radio transmission range of each mobile host is limited, a node may need the help of other nodes so that it is forwarded a packet to the destination.In some military Ad hoc networks, owing to node belongs to same tissue or has common target, so coordination mechanism is inherent.And in the near future, P2P will become very important communication mode.More and more universal along with mobile device disposed more and more may that Ad hoc network becomes in our daily life.But under this scene, the hypothesis that has no reason, the node in the network is cooperated the most at last, because network operation consumption of natural resource (energy, bandwidth or the like).Because whether the autonomous decision of autonomous device cooperates, it is indispensable therefore inducing the external incentive mechanism of cooperating between the autonomous device.
Mobile Ad hoc network N={ V, E, a ω } comprises the set V={v that represents mobile node
1..., v
n, connect directed edge (v apart from two nodes that can reach
i, v
j) set
And with each limit (v
i, v
j) the weights function ω that is associated: E → R, its expression packet is from node v
iTo node v
jExpense during transmission.In the scheme based on ideal money, a problem is exactly that how many compensation node should receive for transmitting grouping, and an answer clearly is that node is transmitted the caused expense of grouping.Transmit the expense of grouping, can define in many ways, as be used to transmit the energy cost of grouping, current factors such as energy rank.Each node v
iAn independent parameter c is arranged
iRepresent its energy cost.If node v
iWith P
EmitTransmit grouping, then must obtain c at least
1* P
EmitCompensation just can remedy its energy loss.And the energy cost parameter can be the function of the complexity of various factors above-mentioned, and for example the battery rank that the energy cost parameter of node may be current with it is inversely proportional to.
The Routing Protocol of an Energy Efficient guarantees that grouping from the source to the destination (may pass through some intermediate nodes) along the most effective path of energy and transmit.The routed path gross energy is the emitted energy sum of source and each intermediate node, and the energy consumption of ignoring other types is as intercepting signal etc., because they are more much smaller than the energy that transmits.Ideally, an intermediate node uses the emission rank to make signal just arrive next node.Receive that the node of message can know the signal strength signal intensity of receiving message, if receiving node is also known the energy rank when information sends, then this node can be estimated transmit the needed minimum power of message between these two nodes.Therefore, be increased in the packets headers if a sending node sends intensity with its signal, receiving node just can be known the required least energy of communicating by letter between sending node and receiving node, and this information is transmitted to sending node.Particularly, when sending data, it is P that node is selected transmitting power
i Emit, it has determined transmission range, thereby has also determined to receive the set of the neighbor node of data.With node v
iNode v apart from d
jReceive v
iSignal power be:
K is a constant, and α is a distance-power gradient, and its occurrence depends on different network environments.Suppose node v
iTransmit power level is included in the data of transmission, then v
jCan estimate at v
iAnd v
jBetween the transmitting power of transmission data needed minimum:
Then from v
iTo v
jThe expense that transmits grouping is
Summary of the invention
Technical problem: the purpose of this invention is to provide in a kind of wireless self-organization network based on the route and the retransmission method of paying, this method can provide incorporate excitation for node participates in network function.Particularly, in the Route Selection stage, this method can encourage Ad hoc node to show different expenses truly when participating in network function, thereby selects the route of Energy Efficient; In the packet forward stage, can prevent the various deceptive practices of node.
Technical scheme: target tightening of the present invention is in negotiation mechanism: promptly method for designing shows factum truly with the excitation user, and realizes expense validity in the route of Ad hoc and repeating process.The problem of actual delivery electronic money belongs to different fields.Target based on payment scheme is to provide incentive mechanism for node participates in cooperation, and the motivation of " speaking the truth " is provided for the user.The present invention mainly concentrates on two aspects: routing mechanism and forwarding mechanism in the Ad hoc network
In routing mechanism, at first each node oneself declares to participate in the expense of network function, and design is participated in the compensation of network function and the expense of participating in network function as each node to each node, makes " directly showing " become the optimal policy of each node; Participate in the expense situation of node based on each that determine in the route stage, constructed offset, transmit grouping to encourage node to last forward node; Determine offset, collude with to prevent node to sending node; Design the discount rate of each forward node at last, forge receipt, obtain additional benefit to prevent node.
This method comprises the method for following two aspects:
A, method for routing: the minimum cost path based on " Vickrey-Clark-Groove " mechanism is selected: adopt the VCG scheme in the Mechanism Design, calculating is to the compensation of the node of participation route, show the expense that network function was caused that participates in truly with the excitation user, and based on the path of true expense sorting charge with optimum; Minimum cost path based on " Vickrey " auction is selected: the Vickrey auction mechanism that adopts the destination to drive, and the excitation node is real competitive bidding in routing mechanism, and the selection in the path of realization expense optimum; Based on the auxiliary Vickrey auction mechanism of direction: in the Vickrey auction process, adopt the direction ancillary technique, reduce the expense when obtaining expense than shortest path;
B, retransmission method: target is the deceptive practices that stop node, and for node provides the motivation of transmitting grouping, retransmission method prevents the following deceptive practices of node: after receiving message, node has been preserved receipt, but does not transmit grouping; Node has been received grouping, but does not report receipt; Node is not received message, but false declares that they have received message.
Described steps A further comprises following concrete grammar:
A1: according to shortest path first, the expense shortest path of obtaining from source S to purpose D is S, 1 ... n, D is according to VCG mechanism, to being positioned at being compensated for as of node i on the shortest path: α
i:=| SP
-(i, i+1)|-| SP (i, i+1) |, wherein | SP
-(i, i+1)| the expression lack link (i, the minimum cost path in the time of i+1), | SP (i, i+1) | the expression link (i, i+1) forwarding expense is 0 o'clock a minimum cost path;
A2: the minimum cost path based on the Vickrey auction is selected, and begins to carry out the Vickrey auction process from destination node, and record is the set of triumph node down, and the compensation of the triumph node being done in this stage; Continue corresponding auction process by the triumph node as the auctioner, and the cost that last round of auctioner pays is added on the suitor of new round triumph, cost as new victor, and new victor is added in the victor set, hold the auction of a new round by the node in victor's set, up to arriving source node;
A3: adopt the auxiliary technology of direction, from destination node on the source node direction, destination node is auctioned in this locality, and be time minimum competitive bidding value in the node of all competitive biddings to the compensation of triumph node, by the triumph node, in the neighbor node on approaching the direction of source node iteration carry out above-mentioned auction, up to arriving source node.
Described step B further comprises following concrete scheme:
B1:, determine expense optimal path p=(n from source S to purpose D according to the routing mechanism based on paying of top A part
0, n
1..., n
k..., n
d), calculate node n
1..., n
k..., n
D-1Compensation, be expressed as α respectively
1..., α
k..., α
D-1, determine that path p goes up last the node k that submits effective receipt to;
B2: when packet forward, path p is gone up the r that is compensated for as that node i is transmitted grouping
iγ＜1 wherein
B3; The expense that calculating is collected source node S: (α
1+ ...+α
D-1+ β)-(d-k) γ β.The estimation node acts in collusion, and making the expense of the receipt that the node of not receiving message also can forge is δ.
One, routing mechanism
1, selects based on the minimum cost path of VCG mechanism
The present invention adopts the thought of Mechanism Design, and the excitation user shows real forwarding expense, and can realize the optimum of the overall situation.Mechanism Design is called " reverse theory of games (Inverse game theory) " again, its basic thought is layout strategy situation or " rule of recreation (rules of game) ", take selfishly when tactful from sharp node with box lunch, system demonstrates the behavior of expectation on the whole when equilibrium.In the research of Mechanism Design, one of most important achievement is the mechanism that is called VGC (Vickrey-Groves-Clarke).VCG mechanism is applied to such class problem: optimization aim is all participants' an evaluation sum.Under the scene of Ad hoc network route, each forward node has own evaluation (transmitting the expense of grouping based on node) for transmitting grouping, and the target of system is to wish under the situation of consideration node selfishness, selects the path of expense optimum.This meets the application scenarios of VCG scheme just.Suppose to adopt the network topology G={V of routing discovering method foundation, E, ω from source S to purpose D }, V={v
1..., v
n, connect directed edge (v apart from two nodes that can reach
i, v
j) set
And with each limit (v
i, v
j) the weights function ω that is associated: E → R, its expression packet is from node v
iTo node v
jExpense during transmission.According to VCG mechanism, at the expense shortest path of selecting from S to D, as S, 1 ... n, D to the compensation of node i is: α
i:=| SP
-(i, i+1)|-| SP (i, i+1) | wherein | SP
-(i, i+1)| the expression lack link (i, the minimum cost path in the time of i+1), | SP (i, i+1) | the expression link (i, i+1) forwarding expense is 0 o'clock a minimum cost path.
2, select based on the minimum cost path of Vickrey auction
Second kind of mechanism adopts based on destination thought that drive, the Vickrey auction technique, and the selfishness that comes processing node can realize the Energy Efficient target of overall expectation equally.Basic thought is that auction node a asks each neighbor node to transmit grouping proposition competitive bidding value, each neighbor node v for it
i aBased on own competitive bidding value from the expense proposition oneself of grouping to the auction node that transmit
And the auction node will be auctioned cost f
a(in fact only node a becomes just qualified auctioning of triumph node in last round of auction) is added to node v
i aThe competitive bidding value on form
(f
iIn fact representation node v
i aExpense to destination node), select minimum f
i, and node is added in the set of triumph node, the compensation of triumph node is carried out according to following mode:
F wherein
1 'Expression time minimum f
iValue.The node of winning is by above-mentioned Vickrey auction technique, and iteration is carried out, up to arriving source node.
3. based on the auxiliary Vickrey auction mechanism of direction
Two kinds of above-mentioned mechanism, though can realize the expense validity of the overall situation, similar with Ad hoc-VCG mode, this mechanism needs the complete information of bottom-layer network, finishes the auction of being carried out at each triumph node.If adopt the auxiliary technology of some directions, from destination node on the path of source node direction, adopt local auction will reduce the expense of auction greatly.The thought of this approximate schemes is that the node of winning is auctioned at local (in its neighbor node), and is time minimum competitive bidding value in the node of all competitive biddings to the compensation of triumph node.Then by of the carry out above-mentioned auction of triumph neighbor node, up to arriving destination node according to the information iteration of this locality.
This mechanism does not need the complete information of bottom-layer network, and to node v
iCompensation can finish very easily in the process of competitive bidding, avoided producing a large amount of expenses in the route discovery stage.The top selected path of algorithm may be the expense suboptimum.This approximate scheme has exchanged the increase of robustness and extensibility for the validity of some energy.
Two, packet forward
First of the present invention is about the true competitive bidding of excitation node in routing mechanism, and selects the route of Energy Efficient.Second portion mainly is that the excitation node is transmitted the mechanism of grouping.Node is transmitted the following description of basic scheme of grouping: when node is received grouping, node is preserved the receipt of this grouping, and forward node provides receipt to report the grouping that it is received/transmits to the bank node (banker node) at center then.Bank node is determined to the expense of source node collection charge and to the compensation of forward node.
For the reason of following two aspects, the present invention adopts the mode to the sending node charge.At first, if to the destination node charge, other node may cause that by sending a large amount of groupings to destination node (Denial-of-Service DoS) attacks Denial of Service attack.If to sender's charge, sending node does not have motivation to send useless message; The second, if the destination benefits from the content of message, and thereby this is paid, then can sending node be compensated by the fee agreements of application layer.Therefore, adopt mode to the sending node charge, healthy and strong more, and have more generality.The problem that another one is relevant is who will obtain compensation because of transmitting grouping.Desirable, any node of attempting to transmit grouping all should obtain compensation, because transmit the expense that message is brought for this node, and no matter whether successfully transmit.But transmitting message may be destroyed on link, and does not have mode to verify that the forwarding behavior has taken place really.Though some local area wireless network for example IEEE802.11 provide replying of link layer, this acknowledgement mechanism is not general.Therefore, whether the compensation that node is received depends on the forwarding behavior successful, and have only when the next node on the forward-path has been received message, and a forwarding behavior is successful.That is, the succession of this node on the path reported effective receipt.
The target of payment scheme of the present invention is the deceptive practices that stop node, and provides the motivation of transmitting grouping for node.Therefore in our mechanism, do not adopt the paying of balance, that is to say, do not require that the total cost that the sender is collected equals the compensation sum of all forward node on the path.In order to offset the long-term expense net outflow from the mobile node to the bank node, bank node is returned to mobile node with the part expense periodically.
The deceptive practices of node can be divided into:
(1) after receiving message, node has been preserved receipt, but does not transmit grouping;
(2) node has been received grouping, but does not report receipt;
(3) node is not received message, but false declares that they have received message.
Solve deceptive practices (1)-excitation node and transmit grouping
Suppose that the path of selecting is (n
0, n
1..., n
D-1, n
d), n wherein
0It is source of packets; n
dBe the destination of grouping, and in routing procedure, determine to node n
1..., n
D-1Compensation be respectively α
1..., α
D-1Transmit grouping in order to encourage from sharp node for other node, bank node more compensates for the node of transmitting grouping than the node of not transmitting grouping.A basic scheme that realizes this target is: at first bank node is determined last node of receiving grouping to the path of purpose D from source S to be assumed to be k.Bank node is compensated for as β＜min{ α to last node
i-C
i, i-1 ..., n. is to the α that is compensated for as of 1 to k-1 node
j, j=1 ..., k-1.The net utility that obtains when then last node k transmits grouping on the path is α
k-c
kAnd node not transmit the net utility that when grouping obtain be β.So node has the motivation of the grouping of transmitting.Fig. 3 has provided the schematic diagram of solution deceptive practices (1).
Solve deceptive practices (2)-excitation node report receipt
Clearly, each receives that the node of grouping has motivation report receipt.If but the expense that sending node is collected is equaled compensation to forward node, i.e. (α
1+ ...+α
k+ β).But, when sending node and last (or m) node associating, the mechanism existing problems that design above.Particularly, when last node k does not report receipt, the sender has saved α
K-1, node k has lost β.If but sending node " privately " is given last node β+ε, ε＞0 compensation, then sending node and last node are colluded with, and have obtained extra income.
Solution is: the expense that sending node is collected is not equal to the compensation sum of all forward node, but when equaling grouping and arriving destination node, to the compensation sum of all nodes, deducts the number of the node of not reporting receipt and the product of β value.
As node k is last node, and then the associating effectiveness of sending node and node k is :-[(α
1+ ...+α
D-1+ β)-(d-k) β]+β; And if node k does not deliberately report receipt, then the associating effectiveness of sending node and node k is :-[(α
1+ ...+α
D-1+ β)-(d-k+1) β], therefore under this payment scheme, node colludes with can not producing extra income.Fig. 4 has provided the schematic diagram of solution deceptive practices (1) and (2).
Solve the false receipt of deceptive practices (3)-prevent
A kind of behavior of selfishness below considering.Because in order to save bandwidth and memory space, the present invention only requires node that receipt rather than complete information are provided, so that the compensation to node to be provided.This problem that may cause is: node is only transmitted receipt, rather than complete grouping; Perhaps act in collusion between the node and forge the compensation of receipt to obtain.Stop the key of this behavior to be destination node, the hypothesis goal node does not participate in this fraud.If intermediate node is only transmitted the receipt of grouping, then destination node can not be received complete grouping, based on this observation, compensation to forward node will be given a discount, discount rate is γ＜1, if γ meets some requirements, then node does not have motivation only to transmit receipt or forges receipt.
The source that is located at is to the path of purpose, and node acts in collusion, and making the expense of the receipt that the node of not receiving message also can forge is δ, and following conclusion is then arranged:
Conclusion 1: in the present invention, if δ 〉=γ β, then the optimal policy of each node i is to report factum really.
Conclusion 2: if δ 〉=γ is (α
1+ α
2+ ...+α
D-1), mechanism of the present invention has the characteristic that resistance is colluded with.And the expense that collect source node this moment is: (α
1+ ...+α
D-1+ β)-(d-k) γ β.Fig. 5 has provided the schematic diagram of solution deceptive practices (1), (2) and (3).
Beneficial effect: this method can encourage Ad hoc node to show different expenses truly when participating in network function, thereby selects the route of Energy Efficient; In the packet forward process, explicitly has considered that each node is transmitted expenses different when dividing into groups on the optimal path, and the designed compensation scheme to node can prevent the various deceptive practices of node.This method has solved in the Ad hoc network preferably, excitation problem in node route and the forwarding mechanism, simplified the decision space of node, prevented various " opportunistic " behavior of node, having realized overall target optimum, is to encourage issue-resolution in the Ad hoc network based on economic model than system.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 overall procedure schematic diagram of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the schematic diagram that minimum cost path is selected among the present invention.
Fig. 3 is the schematic diagram (v1) of the payment scheme of packet forward among the present invention.
Fig. 4 is the schematic diagram (v2) of the payment scheme of packet forward among the present invention.
Fig. 5 is the schematic diagram (v3) of the payment scheme of packet forward among the present invention.
Embodiment
Describe the working mechanism and the concrete operations step of the inventive method in detail below in conjunction with accompanying drawing.
One, Route Selection
1, selects based on the minimum cost path of VCG mechanism
1A, employing routing discovering method are set up the network topology G={V from source S to purpose D, E, ω }, V={v
1..., v
n, connect directed edge (v apart from two nodes that can reach
i, v
j) set
And with each limit (v
i, v
j) the weights function ω that is associated: E → R, its expression packet is from node v
iTo node v
jExpense during transmission.1B, according to shortest path first, obtain expense shortest path from source S to purpose D, be S, 1 ... n, D.1C, according to VCG mechanism, to being positioned at being compensated for as of node i on the shortest path: α
1:=| SP
-(i, i+1)|-| SP (i, i+1) |.Wherein | SP
-(i, i+1)| the expression lack link (i, the minimum cost path in the time of i+1), | SP (i, i+1) | the expression link (i, i+1) forwarding expense is 0 o'clock a minimum cost path.
As shown in Figure 2, the shortest path from S to D is S, v
4, v
5, D is according to above-mentioned mechanism, to node v
4Compensation be: 7-2=5; To node, v
5Compensation be: 7-2=5.
2, select based on the minimum cost path of Vickrey auction
2A, as the step among the 1A, adopt routing discovering method to set up network topology G={V from source S to purpose D, E, ω }.
2B, begin to carry out the Vickrey auction process from destination node, record is the set of triumph node down, and the compensation of the triumph node being done in this stage;
2C, continue corresponding auction process as the auctioner by the triumph node, and the cost that last round of auctioner pays is added on the suitor of new round triumph, cost as new victor, and new victor is added in the victor set, hold the auction of a new round by the node in victor's set, up to arriving source node.
Fig. 2 has illustrated the example that drive based on the destination, the Vickrey auction of the present invention's design.Concrete auction step is as follows:
The auction that D carries out: the set of winning is { v
2, v
5, v
6, D}, to the 10-1+1=10 that is compensated for as of triumph node, the cost that these nodes are held the next round auction is 1;
v
2The auction of holding: victor v
1, f
1If=10+1=11 is v
1Can obtain to hold the next round auction, then its cost is 11;
v
5The auction of holding: victor v
4, f
4If=1+1=2 is v
4Can obtain to hold the next round auction, then its cost is 2;
v
6The auction of holding: victor v
4, f '
4If=1+5=6 is v
4Can obtain to hold the next round auction, then its cost is 6;
And do not produce new triumph node by the auction that D holds.
Therefore take turns second that the victor is v in the auction
4, to node v
4Be compensated for as 6-2+1=5;
Victor's set of this moment is { v
2, v
5, v
6, v
4, D}.
Because source node has been known v
2And v
5The result who auctions, and this moment v
4The result who auctions is:
The auction that v4 holds: victor S, f
s=2+1=3,
According to top algorithm, then the path of expense optimum is S, v
4, v
5, D.Node v
5The expense of transmitting grouping is 1, and to its compensation 10; Node v
4The expense of transmitting grouping is 1, and is 5 to its compensation.Obviously, to the compensation that forward node carried out, be not less than it and transmit grouping and the expense of generation.Therefore node has motivation to participate in transmitting grouping.
3. based on the auxiliary Vickrey auction mechanism of direction
3A, adopt the auxiliary technology of direction, from destination node on the source node direction, destination node is auctioned at local (in its neighbor node), and is time minimum competitive bidding value in the node of all competitive biddings to the compensation of triumph node.
3B, by the triumph node, in the neighbor node on approaching the direction of source node iteration carry out above-mentioned auction, up to arriving source node.
According to top approximate algorithm, then the path of expense optimum is S, v
4, v
5, D.Node v
5The expense of transmitting grouping is 1, and is v to its compensation
2, v
3, v
5, and v
6In time minimum competitive bidding value 10; Node v
4The expense of transmitting grouping is 1, and is v to its compensation
1And v
2In time minimum competitive bidding value 15.
Two, packet forward
1,, determines expense optimal path from source S to purpose D according to routing mechanism
P=(n
0, n
1..., n
k..., n
d), calculate node n
1..., n
k..., n
D-1Compensation, be expressed as α respectively
1..., α
k..., α
D-1, determine that path p goes up last the node k that submits effective receipt to.
2, when packet forward, path p is gone up the r that is compensated for as that node i is transmitted grouping
iγ＜1 wherein
3, calculate the expense that source node S is collected: (α
1+ ...+α
D-1+ β)-(d-k) γ β.
4, the estimation node acts in collusion, and making the expense of the receipt that the node of not receiving message also can forge is δ, if δ 〉=γ β, then the optimal policy of each node i is to report factum really; If δ 〉=γ is (α
1+ α
2+ ...+α
D-1), then this mechanism has the characteristic that resistance is colluded with.
Claims (1)
1, in a kind of wireless self-organization network based on the route and the retransmission method of paying, it is characterized in that in routing mechanism, at first each node oneself declares to participate in the expense of network function, and design is participated in the compensation of network function and the expense of participating in network function as each node to each node; Make the expense of the participation network function that direct demonstration determines become the optimal policy of each node; Participate in the expense situation of node based on each that determine in the route stage, constructed offset, transmit grouping to encourage node to last forward node; Determine offset, collude with to prevent node to sending node; Design the discount rate of each forward node at last, forge receipt, obtain additional benefit to prevent node;
This method comprises the method for following two aspects:
A, method for routing: the minimum cost path based on " Vickrey-Groove-Clark " mechanism is selected: adopt the VGC scheme in the Mechanism Design, calculating is to the compensation of the node of participation route, show the expense that network function was caused that participates in truly with the excitation user, and based on the path of true expense sorting charge with optimum; Minimum cost path based on " Vickrey " auction is selected: the Vickrey auction mechanism that adopts the destination to drive, and the excitation node is real competitive bidding in routing mechanism, and the selection in the path of realization expense optimum; Based on the auxiliary Vickrey auction mechanism of direction: in the Vickrey auction process, adopt the direction ancillary technique, reduce the expense when obtaining expense than shortest path;
B, retransmission method: target is the deceptive practices that stop node, and for node provides the motivation of transmitting grouping, retransmission method prevents the following deceptive practices of node: after receiving message, node has been preserved receipt, but does not transmit grouping; Node has been received grouping, but does not report receipt; Node is not received message, but false declares that they have received message;
Described steps A further comprises following concrete grammar:
A1: according to shortest path first, the expense shortest path of obtaining from source S to purpose D is S, 1 ... n, D is according to VGC mechanism, to being positioned at being compensated for as of node i on the shortest path: α
i:=| SP
-(i, i+1)|-| SP (i, i+1) |, wherein | SP
-(i, i+1)| the expression lack link (i, the minimum cost path in the time of i+1), | SP (i, i+1) | the expression link (i, i+1) forwarding expense is 0 o'clock a minimum cost path;
A2: the minimum cost path based on the Vickrey auction is selected, and begins to carry out the Vickrey auction process from destination node, and record is the set of triumph node down, and the compensation of the triumph node being done in this stage; Continue corresponding auction process by the triumph node as the auctioner, and the cost that last round of auctioner pays is added on the suitor of new round triumph, cost as new victor, and new victor is added in the victor set, hold the auction of a new round by the node in victor's set, up to arriving source node;
A3: adopt the auxiliary technology of described direction, from destination node on the source node direction, destination node is auctioned in this locality, and be time minimum competitive bidding value in the node of all competitive biddings to the compensation of triumph node, by iteration in the neighbor node of triumph node on approaching the source node direction, carry out above-mentioned auction, up to arriving source node;
Described step B further comprises following concrete scheme:
B1:, determine expense optimal path p=(n from source S to purpose D according to the routing mechanism based on paying of top A part
0, n
1..., n
k..., n
d), calculate node n
1..., n
k..., n
D-1Compensation, be expressed as α respectively
1..., α
k..., α
D-1, determine that path p goes up last the node k that submits effective receipt to;
B2: when packet forward, path p is gone up the offset r that node i is transmitted grouping
iWherein, discount rate γ＜1
B3; The expense that calculating is collected source node S: (α
1+ ... + α
D-1+ β)-(d-k) γ β, the estimation node acts in collusion, and making the expense of the receipt that the node of not receiving message also can forge is δ.
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|---|---|---|---|
| CNB2006100408849A CN100442781C (en) | 2006-08-02 | 2006-08-02 | Fee-based route and relay method for wireless self-organized network |
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| US8780732B2 (en) * | 2008-03-18 | 2014-07-15 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Method of network management by assistance from terminal using control-plane signaling between terminal and network |
| CN101296190B (en) * | 2008-06-27 | 2010-08-25 | 清华大学 | Cooperative communication mode based on game theory in wireless ad hoc network |
| CN102546381B (en) * | 2010-12-08 | 2014-12-10 | 中国科学院声学研究所 | Method of selecting IP (internet protocol) network data transmission path |
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