CN100367701C - Apparatus and method for implementing data safety transmission of mobile communication apparatus - Google Patents
Apparatus and method for implementing data safety transmission of mobile communication apparatus Download PDFInfo
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- CN100367701C CN100367701C CNB2005100706010A CN200510070601A CN100367701C CN 100367701 C CN100367701 C CN 100367701C CN B2005100706010 A CNB2005100706010 A CN B2005100706010A CN 200510070601 A CN200510070601 A CN 200510070601A CN 100367701 C CN100367701 C CN 100367701C
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Abstract
The present invention discloses a device and a method for implementing the data safety transmission of mobile communication devices. The device can be connected to GSM or CDMA network wireless mobile communication devices in a dismountable mode through interface units of the wireless mobile communication devices, and is composed of seven parts of a main control unit, a data coding and decoding CODEC unit, a data compression coding and decoding unit, an asymmetric encryption unit, a symmetric encryption unit, a power supply unit, an interface unit of the wireless mobile communication devices, etc. The device uses the existing GSM or CDMA wireless network to carry out identity certification and session key transmissibility by an improved PKI asymmetric cryptosystem without CA and carry out encryption processing to date through a session key, and then the encrypted data is transmitted through circuit switching data service supported by the network and inversely processed simultaneously at a receiving end so as to realize a function of end-to-end secure communication. Owing to the binding processing to SIM cards, the present invention has the characteristic that the use of the whole group of users can not be influenced even though a mobile communication device of a certain user is lost.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of apparatus and method that realize mobile communication equipment data security transmission, relate in particular to and be attached to existing GSM (global system for mobile communications) net or CDMA (code division multiple access) thereby the device that carries out secure data communication on the net wireless mobile communications handheld device.
Background technology
Along with the development of mobile communication technology, people also rely on more and more and use existing mobile radio communication device, as mobile phone.The application of mobile phone has brought huge flexibility for the communication between the people really, and can save time, and it is also very convenient to use.But along with the extensive use of mobile phone and the increase of function, for example transmit literal and pictorial information, even some present mobile phone can also realize the function of faxing, the thing followed is exactly the problem of information security.People take notice of mobile communication equipment voice or the safety of data transmission of oneself very much sometimes, can or can not be eavesdropped as oneself making a phone call, and pass data and can or can not be intercepted and captured etc.
The major function of the mobile radio communication device of current trend is exactly to realize the reception and the transmission of various data, does not guarantee on the safety.The third party is easy to by eavesdropping or steals the equipment intercepted data.Especially the GSM mobile radio communication is easy to use, the coverage rate ambassador its become China use the most extensive, a kind of mobile telephone system that customer volume is maximum.Yet gsm system is not the system of a safety.The original cryptographic algorithm of network is not safe and only is used for wireless portion that voice are still and adopt the transparent mode transmission on switching network.State security department pays much attention to the security hidden trouble that brings owing to mobile communication at present, has formulated some systems and measure, but can not fundamentally solve the problem that mobile phone is divulged a secret.Therefore, can not reveal by mobile phone in order to guarantee state secret, can enjoy the convenience of work that modern communication technology brings and life and quick again, it is extremely urgent that development has the mobile phone of encryption function.And safety product in the past, in case lose the then often use of the whole group user of influence.Even characteristics of the present invention are uses that a certain user's mobile communication equipment is lost also can not influence whole group user.
Summary of the invention
Purpose of the present invention is exactly to realize safety of data transmission on common mobile communication equipment.
Core of the present invention considers to be exactly that transmission data both sides are carried out authentication and the data of transmission are carried out encryption and decryption realization secure communication, especially voice communication.The present invention utilizes the mobile radio communication device interface unit to be detachably connected on mobile phone or other mobile radio communication device, can be described as the expansion on the function of mobile phone or other mobile radio communication device, perhaps annex.
A kind of device of realizing the data security transmission of mobile communication equipment, additional module that is used for authentication and encryption and decryption on mobile communication equipment, by this module transmission data both sides are carried out authentication and the data of transmission are carried out encryption and decryption, thereby realize secure data communication.
The inventive system comprises the authentication part, the secret key safety hop, data encrypting and deciphering part and with the interface section of mobile communication equipment.
This authentication has partly realized the checking of password, authentication to the integrality of program, to the authentication of Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Card, finish in the asymmetric encryption unit checking of self certificate, finish the checking of certificate in the other side's asymmetric encryption unit and the checking of the term of validity simultaneously.
This secret key safety hop has realized that words one are close, carries out the transmission of session key by the asymmetric encryption unit.
Data encrypting and deciphering is realized digitlization by codec CODEC processing unit after having realized that partly original sound is through the microphone input; The speech data that these are original or directly give main control unit is realized speech coding by main control unit, perhaps gives the speech coding chip and directly compresses processing; Speech data behind the coding or directly give main control unit and realize encryption, promptly realize encrypting by software, perhaps give external encryption chip and realize encryption, speech data after the encryption, be that ciphertext is sent in the network by the Wireless Telecom Equipment interface and goes, and carry out the processing of contrary therewith at receiving terminal.
With the interface section of mobile communication equipment is to make this device be connected to the interface of mobile radio communication device, i.e. serial ports, infrared or bluetooth standard interface.
SIM card identity (ID) number is at first read in user's SIM card authentication, SIM card ID number is picked will, obtain s1, from the asymmetric encryption unit, read the signature that SIM card ID number is picked after wanting, if that signature usefulness is RSA Algorithm (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, a kind of general public key cryptographic algorithm): with administrative center's public key verifications signature, obtain s2, compare s1 and s2, identical then checking is passed through, difference is authentication failed then, and lock asymmetric encryption unit withdraws from; If that signature usefulness is ECC algorithm (elliptic curve cryptography, elliptic curve cryptosystem): signature and s1 are sent in the asymmetric encryption unit and do checking, be proved to be successful then and pass through, difference is authentication failed then, withdraw from the use of the whole group user of back influence that prevents loss after the asymmetric encryption unit is locked automatically.
Signature to SIM card ID number is used to prevent loss; Signature to subprogram prevents that run time version from being distorted; Utilize the signature algorithm checking the other side identity in the asymmetric encryption unit.
One words, one close mechanism realizes by the physical noise source.The physical noise source is a separate modules, perhaps is integrated in the asymmetric encryption unit.
Use the mobile radio communication device interface unit this device can be detachably connected on the mobile radio communication device.
Processor and asymmetric encryption unit and symmetric cryptography unit are integrated on the circuit board.
Processor can be located on the different circuit boards with asymmetric encryption unit and symmetric cryptography unit.
The symmetric cryptography unit can be hardware chip or the software algorithm that realizes symmetric encipherment algorithm.
The symmetric cryptography unit can be a certain cryptographic algorithm, comprises sequential encryption or block encryption here.
The asymmetric encryption unit be realize rivest, shamir, adelman be RSA or ECC with the inside the integrated circuit IC-card of corresponding asymmetric encryption decrypted signature verification algorithm is arranged, perhaps other has the equipment or the chip of relevant above-mentioned security mechanism.
The data compression coding decoding unit can be realized by certain software program.
Described mobile communication equipment operates in the GSM network.
Described mobile communication equipment operates in CDMA (CDMA mobile communication systems) network.
The data of described transmission are speech data or other categorical data.
A kind of method that realizes the data security transmission of mobile communication equipment, before carrying out transfer of data between the mobile communication equipment, carry out identity authentication by the identity authentication and the encryption and decryption module that detachably are attached on the mobile communication equipment, after identity validation, just carry out transfer of data.
Realize authentication by this module with following step:
1) at first to enter password, send system verification again.If mistake then can be re-entered, be limited to certain number of times in the password input, for example three times, if this predetermined number of times is all failed then pintle hook lock withdraws from;
2) verification portion program code, process is as follows: subprogram is picked will obtain r1, read the signature result to subprogram from subscriber card, if signature usefulness is RSA Algorithm: with production center public key verifications signature result, obtain r2, compare r1 and r2, identical then checking is passed through; If signature usefulness is the ECC algorithm: signature result and r1 be sent to do in the card that card is interior to be verified, be proved to be successful then and pass through;
3) binding of checking smart card and SIM card: at first read SIM card ID number, SIM card ID number is picked will, obtain s1, from subscriber card, read the signature that SIM card ID number is picked after wanting, if signature usefulness is RSA Algorithm:, obtain s2 with administrative center's public key verifications signature, compare s1 and s2, identical then checking is passed through, and difference is authentication failed then, and pintle hook lock withdraws from; If signature usefulness is the ECC algorithm: signature and s1 be sent to do in the card that card is interior verifies that be proved to be successful then and pass through, difference is authentication failed then, pintle hook lock withdraws from;
4) the authentication certificate term of validity is if expired then pintle hook lock withdraws from;
5) transmit certificate, receive the other side's certificate simultaneously, and carry out authentication, failure is withdrawed from;
6) carry out session key exchange with RSA cryptographic algorithms encrypted session key or ECDH (elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman) algorithm computation session key.
7) generate initialized key, initialized cryptographic algorithm;
8) use symmetric cryptographic algorithm to encrypt, data decryption begins communication.
The symmetric cryptography unit can be realized by certain algorithm, also can realize by encryption chip; Simultaneously the symmetric cryptography unit here both can also can be based on block encryption based on sequential encryption.
The algorithm that uses in the asymmetric encryption is RSA or ECC.
The certificate of described transmission number is speech data or other categorical data.
Described mobile communication equipment operates in the GSM network.
Described mobile communication equipment operates in the cdma network.
The present invention uses easily flexibly, can preserve separately when not wanting to beat encrypted word, only just it is received on the mobile radio communication device by the mobile radio communication device interface unit when wanting to beat encrypted word, carries out secure communication.
The mobile radio communication device that the present invention will connect preferably utilizes GSM net or CDMA net to carry out the equipment of voice communication, and has outside growth data interface, can be serial ports here, standard interface such as infrared or bluetooth.
The present invention has anti-tamper, and is anti-lost, the anti-SIM card of changing, authentication and the close advantage of words one, even and a certain user's mobile communication equipment lose the use that also can not influence whole group user.This is because by the binding SIM card, loses the back and reports the loss processing to Virtual network operator, even the person of picking up can be by self check but can not access network like this, thereby has guaranteed the safe handling of other group user.
Accompanying drawing is described
Be described with reference to the accompanying drawings the specific embodiment of the present invention and can understand content of the present invention more exactly.
Accompanying drawing 1 is the formation block diagram of security module of the present invention.
Embodiment
At Fig. 1, from the angle of operation principle, system of the present invention can be divided into three parts.
First uses wireless mobile security call function to authenticate through series.This part work is mainly finished by main control unit and asymmetric encryption unit.Key step is as follows:
1. at first to enter password, send system verification again.If mistake then can be re-entered, be limited to three times in the password input, if all fail for three times then the asymmetric encryption unit withdraws from after being automatically locked;
2. verification portion program code, process is as follows: subprogram is picked will obtain r1, read the signature result to subprogram from the asymmetric encryption unit, if signature usefulness is RSA Algorithm: with production center public key verifications signature result, obtain r2, compare r1 and r2, identical then checking is passed through; If signature usefulness is the ECC algorithm: sign result and r1 be sent in the asymmetric encryption unit do checking, be proved to be successful then and pass through;
3. the binding of checking asymmetric encryption unit and SIM card: at first read SIM card ID number, SIM card ID number is picked will, obtain s1, from the asymmetric encryption unit, read the signature that SIM card ID number is picked after wanting, if signature usefulness is RSA Algorithm:, obtain s2 with administrative center's public key verifications signature, compare s1 and s2, identical then checking is passed through, and difference is authentication failed then, and lock asymmetric encryption unit withdraws from; If signature usefulness is the ECC algorithm: signature and s1 are sent in the asymmetric encryption unit and do checking, be proved to be successful then and pass through, difference is authentication failed then, withdraw from after the asymmetric encryption unit is automatic locked;
4. verify own validity period of certificate, if expired then asymmetric encryption unit withdraws from after locked;
5. the transmission certificate receives the other side's certificate simultaneously, and carries out authentication, and failure is withdrawed from;
6. if checking the other side validity period of certificate is failure then withdraw from;
7. carry out session key exchange with RSA cryptographic algorithms encrypted session key or ECDH algorithm computation session key;
8. generate the key of initialization symmetric cryptography unit, initialization symmetric cryptography unit;
9, use the symmetric cryptography unit to encrypt, data decryption begins communication.
Second portion is meant two processes that Audio Processing Unit sends and receives speech.Process of transmitting comprises: voice carry out analog-to-digital conversion by codec CODEC and produce digital voice data after the microphone input, again through voice compression coding decoding unit compressed encoding (expressly).These speech datas pass through symmetric cryptography unit encryption (ciphertext) by group forming criterion, interface by main control unit processor and mobile radio communication device is transferred to mobile radio communication device at last, and final speech data sends to network with the form of ciphertext by mobile radio communication device.Receiving course then be one from network, through mobile radio communication device, system module, to an inverse process of earphone.
The 3rd part is main control unit and the communicating by letter of mobile radio communication device.Mainly be communicating by letter of control system module and mobile radio communication device, order by AT promptly that the mobile radio communication device keyboard that carries out link establishment, dials, replys and detect the user is imported, the state of mobile radio communication device by AT order (Attention Command).
As mentioned above, use the present invention can utilize existing GSM or CDMA net mobile radio communication device to carry out secure communication.
Self check work after system powers on comprises password authentication, program verification and checking SIM card.Program verification (anti-tamper) is to realize by following mode: the source code in this device is crossed with production center private key signature, signature is the result be kept in the asymmetric encryption unit by safety, when system start-up, to carry out self check,, then withdraw from if source code is changed.Prevent illegal change run time version by this method effectively, protected the fail safe of program.The harmful effect that prevents loss and prevent to change arbitrarily SIM card, the result that carried out having been signed and having signed for following processing: SIM card ID number is kept in the asymmetric encryption unit by safety, the signature of self check checking SIM card when system start-up is if SIM card is changed then authentication failed; In this way, in case the user who loses reports the loss processing to operator, then this device can not normally be linked in the network and go, even change SIM card also can not be by checking, thereby solved the user effectively and lose influence to whole group user.
After above-mentioned steps was passed through, main control unit passed through the radio communication terminal interface to network application wireless channel.The equipment interface here can be a serial ports, infrared or bluetooth standard interface.Channel request success back communicating pair transmits certificate mutually, and communicating pair is finished the other side's the authentication and the transmission of session key simultaneously.Authentication: the certificate that KMC signs and issues and the PKI of KMC are housed in the asymmetric encryption unit in this device, when both sides converse, just can carry out authentication like this by transmitting certificate; Session key exchange: be meant that the random number that produces at the physical noise source by the asymmetric encryption unit realizes; By as above guaranteeing that the safe transfer of session key is to the other side after the step.
Communicating pair just can carry out secure communication like this.After original sound is imported through microphone, realize digitlization (can be linearity, a rule or u rule) here by the CODEC processing unit; These original speech datas both can directly be given main control unit, realized speech coding by main control unit, also can give the speech coding chip and directly compress processing; Similarly, the speech data behind the coding both can directly have been given main control unit and realize encryption (realizing encrypting by software), also can give external encryption chip and realize encryption.Speech data after the encryption (ciphertext) is sent in the network by the Wireless Telecom Equipment interface and goes.
Main control unit partly is mainly used in the device of configuration periphery, plays the effect of a coordinated scheduling.This part can have very strong computing capability; Thereby the encoding and decoding speech part also can here be finished, and encrypts symmetrical cell and also can here finish, and the asymmetric encryption unit also can here be realized.
Anti-tamper is to realize by following mode: the source code in this device is crossed with production center private key signature, and signature is the result be kept in the asymmetric encryption unit by safety, will carry out self check when system start-up, if source code is changed, then withdraws from.Prevent illegal change program by this method effectively, protected the fail safe of program.
The harmful effect that prevents loss and anti-change the result that signed and signed for SIM card: SIM card ID number and be kept in the asymmetric encryption unit by safety, the signature of self check checking SIM card when system start-up is if SIM card is changed then authentication failed; In this way, in case the user who loses reports the loss processing to operator, then this device can not normally be linked in the network and go, even change SIM card also can not be by checking, thereby solved the user effectively and lose influence to whole group user.
Authentication: the certificate that KMC signs and issues and the PKI of KMC are housed in the asymmetric encryption unit in this device, when both sides converse, just can carry out authentication like this by transmitting certificate;
One words one are close: in communication process, the key of used initialization symmetric cryptography unit is the interim random key (generation of physical noise source) that session key exchange obtains, and therefore has randomness and words one close property.
When not using this device, the function operation that mobile radio communication device has according to itself, connect this device after, can play code phone.The communicating pair that utilizes this device to play code phone does not need the third party to authenticate can realize both sides' authentication secure communication.
Claims (25)
1. the device of a data security transmission that realizes mobile communication equipment, it is characterized in that, additional module that is used for authentication and encryption and decryption on mobile communication equipment, described module is carried out authentication and the data of transmission is carried out encryption and decryption transmission data both sides by transmitting certificate, thereby realization secure data communication, described device comprises the authentication part, the secret key safety hop, data encrypting and deciphering part and with the interface section of mobile communication equipment, wherein the work of this authentication part is by the main control unit processor, asymmetric encryption unit and symmetric cryptography unit are finished, realize the checking of password successively, authentication to the integrality of program, authentication to Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Card, finish in this asymmetric encryption unit the checking of self certificate, finish the checking of certificate in the other side's the asymmetric encryption unit and the checking of the term of validity.
2. device as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, the work of this secret key safety hop is finished by main control unit processor, asymmetric encryption unit and symmetric cryptography unit, has realized that words one are close, carries out the transmission of session key by this asymmetric encryption unit.
3. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that, data encrypting and deciphering is realized digitlization by codec (CODEC) processing unit after having realized that partly original sound is through the microphone input; The speech data that these are original or directly give main control unit is realized speech coding by main control unit, perhaps gives the speech coding chip and directly compresses processing; Speech data behind the coding or directly give main control unit and realize encryption, promptly realize encrypting by software, perhaps give external encryption chip and realize encryption, speech data after the encryption, be that ciphertext is sent in the network by the Wireless Telecom Equipment interface and goes, and carry out the processing of contrary therewith at receiving terminal.
4. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that, is to make this device be connected to the interface of mobile radio communication device with the interface section of mobile communication equipment, i.e. serial ports, infrared or bluetooth standard interface.
5. device as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number is at first read in Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Card authentication, identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number picked want, obtain s1, from the asymmetric encryption unit, read identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number is picked signature after wanting, signature usefulness be RSA Algorithm: with administrative center public key verifications signature, obtain s2, compare s1 and s2, identical then checking is passed through, and difference is authentication failed then, and lock asymmetric encryption unit withdraws from.
6. device as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number is at first read in Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Card authentication, identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number picked want, obtain s1, from the asymmetric encryption unit, read identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number is picked signature after wanting, signature usefulness be the ECC algorithm: signing and s1 is sent in the asymmetric encryption unit and does checking, be proved to be successful then and pass through, difference is authentication failed then, withdraw from the use of the whole group user of back influence that prevents loss after the asymmetric encryption unit is locked automatically.
7. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that the asymmetric encryption unit is used to store production center PKI, administrative center's PKI, private key for user, certificate file; Signature to identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number is used to prevent loss; Signature to subprogram prevents to be distorted; Utilize the signature algorithm checking the other side identity in the asymmetric encryption unit.
8. device as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that, words one compact part divides in communication process, and the key of used initialization symmetric cryptography unit is the interim random key that session key exchange obtains.
9. device as claimed in claim 8 is characterized in that the physical noise source is a separate modules, perhaps is integrated in the asymmetric encryption unit.
10. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: use the mobile radio communication device interface unit that this device is detachably connected on the mobile radio communication device.
11. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: described main control unit processor and asymmetric encryption unit and symmetric cryptography unit are integrated on the circuit board.
12. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: described main control unit processor is located on the different circuit boards with asymmetric encryption unit and symmetric cryptography unit.
13. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: described symmetric cryptography unit is hardware chip or the software algorithm that realizes symmetric encipherment algorithm.
14. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: described symmetric cryptography unit is a certain cryptographic algorithm, comprises sequential encryption or block encryption here.
15. device as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that: described asymmetric encryption unit be realize rivest, shamir, adelman be RSA or ECC with the inside integrated circuit (IC) card of corresponding asymmetric encryption decrypted signature verification algorithm is arranged, perhaps other has the equipment or the chip of relevant above-mentioned security mechanism.
16. device as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: the work of described data encrypting and deciphering part is finished by the data compression coding decoding unit, and described data compression coding decoding unit is realized by certain software program.
17. the device as one of claim 1 to 16 is characterized in that, described mobile communication equipment operates in the GSM network.
18. the device as one of claim 1 to 16 is characterized in that, described mobile communication equipment operates in the cdma network.
19. the device as one of claim 1 to 16 is characterized in that, the data of described transmission are speech data or other categorical data.
20. method that realizes the data security transmission of mobile communication equipment, it is characterized in that, before carrying out transfer of data between the mobile communication equipment, utilize identity authentication and the encryption and decryption module detachably be attached on the mobile communication equipment transmission data both sides to be carried out identity authentication by transmitting certificate, after identity validation, just carry out transfer of data, wherein realize authentication with following step by this identity authentication and encryption and decryption module:
1) at first enters password, send system verification again,, be limited to certain number of times in the password input, if should determine that number of times was all failed then pintle hook lock withdraws from if mistake then can be re-entered;
2) verification portion program code, process is as follows: subprogram is picked will obtain r1, read the signature result to subprogram from subscriber card, if signature usefulness is RSA Algorithm: with production center public key verifications signature result, obtain r2, compare r1 and r2, identical then checking is passed through; If signature usefulness is the ECC algorithm: signature result and r1 be sent to do in the card that card is interior to be verified, be proved to be successful then and pass through;
3) binding of checking smart card and identification module (SIM) card: at first read identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number, identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number picked want, obtain s1, from subscriber card, read identification module (SIM) card identity (ID) number is picked signature after wanting, if signature usefulness is RSA Algorithm:, obtain s2 with administrative center's public key verifications signature, compare s1 and s2, identical then checking is passed through, and difference is authentication failed then, and pintle hook lock withdraws from; If signature usefulness is the ECC algorithm: signature and s1 be sent to do in the card that card is interior verifies that be proved to be successful then and pass through, difference is authentication failed then, pintle hook lock withdraws from;
4) verify own validity period of certificate, if expired then pintle hook lock withdraws from;
5) transmit certificate, receive the other side's certificate simultaneously, and carry out authentication, if failure then withdraw from;
6) if checking the other side validity period of certificate is expired then withdraw from;
7) carry out session key exchange with RSA cryptographic algorithms encrypted session key or ECDH algorithm computation session key;
8) generate initialized key, initialized cryptographic algorithm;
9) use symmetric cryptographic algorithm to encrypt, data decryption begins communication.
21. method as claimed in claim 20 is characterized in that, the symmetric cryptography unit is realized by certain algorithm, is perhaps realized by encryption chip; The symmetric cryptography unit here is based on sequential encryption and/or based on block encryption simultaneously.
22. the method as claim 20 is characterized in that: the algorithm that uses in the asymmetric encryption is RSA or ECC.
23. the method as one of claim 20 to 22 is characterized in that, the data of described transmission are speech data or other categorical data.
24. the method as one of claim 20 to 22 is characterized in that, described mobile communication equipment operates in the GSM network.
25. the method as one of claim 20 to 22 is characterized in that, described mobile communication equipment operates in the cdma network.
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| CN102131192B (en) * | 2010-01-15 | 2016-06-15 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | NGN protects the method and system of three layers mobility user face data safety |
| CN103617128B (en) * | 2013-12-11 | 2016-08-17 | 长城信息产业股份有限公司 | A kind of embedded system and the implementation method of SOS |
| CN103813333B (en) * | 2014-02-21 | 2017-12-19 | 天地融科技股份有限公司 | A kind of data processing method based on arranging key |
| CN104581714A (en) * | 2015-01-29 | 2015-04-29 | 成都三零瑞通移动通信有限公司 | Method for encrypting speech on basis of TD-SCDMA (time division-synchronization code division multiple access) circuit domains |
| CN105553669B (en) * | 2015-12-21 | 2019-01-08 | 中城智慧科技有限公司 | A kind of information encryption transmission device and method and monitoring and managing method based on ID authentication |
| CN107404719A (en) * | 2016-05-18 | 2017-11-28 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | SIM card processing method, device, terminal and ESAM chips |
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| WO2003098868A1 (en) * | 2002-05-17 | 2003-11-27 | Nokia Corporation | Method and system in a digital wireless data communication network for arranging data encryption and corresponding server |
| CN1549526A (en) * | 2003-05-16 | 2004-11-24 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method for realizing radio local area network authentication |
| CN1599499A (en) * | 2003-09-17 | 2005-03-23 | 乐金电子(中国)研究开发中心有限公司 | Device and method for managing electronic sequence number of portable terminal |
| CN1555151A (en) * | 2003-12-26 | 2004-12-15 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Enbedded equipment secrete communication method |
| CN2669488Y (en) * | 2004-01-17 | 2005-01-05 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Apparatus for encrypting voice and data based on bluetooth GSM mobile station |
| CN2691172Y (en) * | 2004-03-30 | 2005-04-06 | 上海华曼信息技术有限公司 | Device for realizing radio local net safety |
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|---|---|
| CN1688171A (en) | 2005-10-26 |
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