CN107404719A - SIM card processing method, device, terminal and ESAM chips - Google Patents
SIM card processing method, device, terminal and ESAM chips Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN107404719A CN107404719A CN201610333585.8A CN201610333585A CN107404719A CN 107404719 A CN107404719 A CN 107404719A CN 201610333585 A CN201610333585 A CN 201610333585A CN 107404719 A CN107404719 A CN 107404719A
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- Prior art keywords
- sim card
- esam
- card
- terminal
- card number
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Telephone Function (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention provides a kind of client identification module SIM card processing method, device, terminal and ESAM chips, wherein, this method includes：Obtain the card number of the SIM card of insertion terminal；Using the embedded safety module ESAM chips for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, the card number of the SIM card to getting is authenticated.By the present invention, solve in correlation technique, exist and SIM card is authenticated by way of software algorithm, the problem of safety and reliability of authentication can not be ensured, and then improve the effect of the safety and reliability of SIM card authentication.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the communications field, in particular to a kind of client identification module (Subscriber Identity
Module, referred to as SIM) card processing method, device, terminal and embedded safety module (Embedded Secure Access
Module, referred to as ESAM) chip.
Background technology
In the related art, lost due to terminal (for example, mobile phone) often occurs, stolen phenomenon, therefore, many terminals
It is both provided with carrying out the SIM card of insertion the function of authentication.But to terminal access SIM card authenticate when, typically
Authenticated by the way of software algorithm.It is typically also that can be broken by software code even if these functions are set
Solution.Once being cracked, the terminal lost or be stolen can still use.
Therefore, in the related art, exist and SIM card is authenticated by way of software algorithm, can not ensure to authenticate
Safety and reliability the problem of.
The content of the invention
The embodiments of the invention provide a kind of SIM card processing method, device, terminal and ESAM chips, at least to solve
In correlation technique, SIM card is authenticated by way of software algorithm, the safety and reliability that can not ensure to authenticate is asked
Topic.
According to one embodiment of present invention, there is provided a kind of terminal, including：Client identification module SIM card circuit, base band
Processor, and embedded safety module ESAM chips, wherein：The SIM card circuit, for having detected SIM card insertion, read
The card number of the SIM card of access；The ESAM chips, be connected to the SIM card circuit and the BBP, for pair
The card number of the SIM card read is authenticated.
Alternatively, the ESAM chips, it is additionally operable to according to the ESAM marks ID and and ESAM for being used to identify ESAM chips
The binding relationship of the card number of the SIM card of chip bonding, the card number of the SIM card to reading are authenticated.
Alternatively, the BBP, it is used to indicate to the SIM card for what is sent according to the ESAM chips
The notice of card number authentification failure, carry out the destruction of the software of the terminal.
Alternatively, the ESAM chips, the destruction of software for notifying the BBP to carry out the terminal is additionally operable to,
And after the instruction message that software destruction that the BBP returns, for indicating the terminal is completed is received, break
Open the communication path with the SIM card circuit and with the BBP.
According to another embodiment of the invention, there is provided a kind of client identification module SIM card processing method, including：Obtain
Take the card number of the SIM card of insertion terminal；Using the embedded safety module ESAM cores for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card
Piece, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated.
Alternatively, using the ESAM chips for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, to the SIM card that gets
Card number is authenticated including：According to for identify ESAM chips ESAM identify ID and with the SIM card of ESAM chip bondings
The binding relationship of card number, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated, including：According to the SIM card got
The ESAM ID that store in card number, the ESAM chips and for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated；Compare meter
Obtained ciphertext and card number, the ESAM in the ESAM chips according to the SIM card prestored in the binding relationship
Whether the predetermined ciphertext that ID and the cipher key calculation obtain is identical；It is that the ciphertext being calculated makes a reservation for described in comparison result
Ciphertext be identical in the case of, it is determined that to the SIM card card number certification success；And/or it is calculated in comparison result
Ciphertext is in the case of differing, it is determined that the card number authentification failure to the SIM card with the predetermined ciphertext.
Alternatively, according to the ESAM ID stored in the card number of the SIM card got, the ESAM chips, with
And carry out ciphertext is calculated and include for the key of encryption：Generate the random number for calculating the ciphertext；Using generation
The random number, according to the ESAM ID, Yi Jiyong stored in the card number of the SIM card got, the ESAM chips
In the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated.
Alternatively, the embedded safety module ESAM chips for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card are being used, to obtaining
To the SIM card card number be authenticated after, in addition to：When to the card number authentification failure of the SIM card, control
The terminal carries out destruction operation, including：Sent a notification message to the BBP of the terminal, wherein, the notice disappears
Cease for notifying the BBP to destroy the software of the terminal；Returned receiving the BBP
, for indicating that the software of the terminal destroys the instruction message completed after, disconnect with the SIM card circuit of the terminal and with
The communication path of the BBP of the terminal.
According to still a further embodiment, there is provided a kind of client identification module SIM card processing unit, including, obtain
Modulus block, the card number of the SIM card for obtaining insertion terminal；Authentication module, for using for recognizing the card number of SIM card
The embedded safety module ESAM chips of card, the card number of the SIM card to getting is authenticated.
Alternatively, the authentication module be additionally operable to according to be used for identify ESAM chips ESAM mark ID and with ESAM cores
The binding relationship of the card number of the SIM card of piece binding, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated；Wherein, the certification
Module includes：Computing unit, described in being stored in the card number according to the SIM card got, the ESAM chips
ESAM ID and key for encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated；Comparing unit, for comparing the ciphertext being calculated and institute
State in ESAM chips according to the card number of the SIM card prestored in the binding relationship, the ESAM ID and the key meter
Whether obtained predetermined ciphertext is identical；Determining unit, for comparison result be the ciphertext that is calculated with it is described predetermined close
Text be identical in the case of, it is determined that to the SIM card card number certification success；And/or comparison result be calculated it is close
In the case that the literary and predetermined ciphertext is differs, it is determined that the card number authentification failure to the SIM card.
Alternatively, the computing unit includes：Subelement is generated, for generating the random number for being used for calculating the ciphertext；
Computation subunit, for the random number using generation, according to the card number of the SIM card got, the ESAM chips
The ESAM ID of middle storage, and for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated.
Alternatively, described device also includes：Control module, for when to the card number authentification failure of the SIM card, control
The terminal carries out destruction operation；The control module includes：Notification unit, for the BBP transmission to the terminal
Notification message, wherein, the notification message is used to notify the BBP to destroy the software of the terminal；Disconnect
Unit, for disappearing in the instruction for receiving software destruction completion that the BBP returns, for indicating the terminal
After breath, the communication path with the SIM card circuit of the terminal and with the BBP of the terminal is disconnected.
According to still another embodiment of the invention, a kind of embedded safety module ESAM chips are additionally provided.The ESAM cores
Piece includes any one of foregoing client identification module SIM card processing unit.
According to still another embodiment of the invention, a kind of storage medium is additionally provided.The storage medium is arranged to storage and used
In the program code for performing following steps：Obtain the card number of the SIM card of insertion terminal；Using for the card number progress to SIM card
The embedded safety module ESAM chips of certification, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated.
Alternatively, storage medium is also configured to the program code that storage is used to perform following steps：Using for SIM card
The ESAM chips that are authenticated of card number, the card number of the SIM card to getting is authenticated including：According to for identifying
The ESAM mark ID of ESAM chips and the binding relationship with the card number of the SIM card of ESAM chip bondings, described in getting
The card number of SIM card is authenticated, including：According to being stored in the card number of the SIM card got, the ESAM chips
ESAM ID and key for encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated；Compare in the ciphertext being calculated and the ESAM chips
Obtained according to the card number of the SIM card prestored in the binding relationship, the ESAM ID and the cipher key calculation predetermined
Whether ciphertext is identical；In the case of in comparison result, to be the ciphertext that is calculated be identical with the predetermined ciphertext, it is determined that to institute
State the card number certification success of SIM card；And/or in comparison result it is that the ciphertext that is calculated differs with the predetermined ciphertext
In the case of, it is determined that the card number authentification failure to the SIM card.
Alternatively, storage medium is also configured to the program code that storage is used to perform following steps：According to what is got
The ESAM ID and the key for encryption stored in the card number of the SIM card, the ESAM chips is calculated
Ciphertext includes：Generate the random number for calculating the ciphertext；Using the random number of generation, according to getting
The ESAM ID stored in the card number of SIM card, the ESAM chips, and for encryption key be calculated it is close
Text.
Alternatively, storage medium is also configured to the program code that storage is used to perform following steps：Using be used for pair
The embedded safety module ESAM chips that the card number of SIM card is authenticated, the card number of the SIM card to getting are carried out
After certification, in addition to：When to the card number authentification failure of the SIM card, the terminal is controlled to carry out destruction operation, including：
Sent a notification message to the BBP of the terminal, wherein, the notification message is used to notify the BBP pair
The software of the terminal is destroyed；Receiving software pin that the BBP returns, for indicating the terminal
After ruining the instruction message of completion, the communication with the SIM card circuit of the terminal and with the BBP of the terminal is disconnected
Path.
By the present invention, an ESAM chip is set between the SIM card circuit and BBP of terminal, passes through ESAM
The card number for the SIM card that chip accesses to terminal is authenticated, and because ESAM chips have safe, is not easy to be cracked excellent
Point, therefore, can solve in the related art, to authenticate SIM card by way of software algorithm, authentication can not be ensured
The problem of safety and reliability, reach the effect for the safety and reliability for improving SIM card authentication.
Brief description of the drawings
Accompanying drawing described herein is used for providing a further understanding of the present invention, forms the part of the application, this hair
Bright schematic description and description is used to explain the present invention, does not form inappropriate limitation of the present invention.In the accompanying drawings：
Fig. 1 is the structured flowchart of terminal according to embodiments of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the flow chart of SIM card processing method according to embodiments of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is the flow chart of SIM card processing method according to the preferred embodiment of the invention；
Fig. 4 is the structured flowchart one of SIM card processing unit according to embodiments of the present invention；
Fig. 5 is the structured flowchart of authentication module 44 in SIM card processing unit according to embodiments of the present invention；
Fig. 6 is the structured flowchart of computing unit 52 in SIM card processing unit according to embodiments of the present invention；
Fig. 7 is the structured flowchart two of SIM card processing unit according to embodiments of the present invention.
Embodiment
Describe the present invention in detail below with reference to accompanying drawing and in conjunction with the embodiments.It should be noted that do not conflicting
In the case of, the feature in embodiment and embodiment in the application can be mutually combined.
It should be noted that term " first " in description and claims of this specification and above-mentioned accompanying drawing, "
Two " etc. be for distinguishing similar object, without for describing specific order or precedence.
Embodiment 1
The terminal that the present embodiment is provided can be mobile terminal, terminal or similar arithmetic unit.Fig. 1 is
The structured flowchart of terminal according to embodiments of the present invention.(only show in figure as shown in figure 1, terminal 10 can include one or more
Go out one) SIM card circuit 102, one or more (one is only shown in figure) ESAM chips 104 and BBP 106.
It will appreciated by the skilled person that the structure shown in Fig. 1 is only to illustrate, it does not cause to limit to the structure of above-mentioned terminal
It is fixed.For example, terminal 10 may also include the component more or less than shown in Fig. 1 (for example, baseband portion, radio frequency part, aobvious
Show part, peripheral hardware part, daughter board etc.), or there is the configuration different from shown in Fig. 1.
SIM card circuit 102, for having detected SIM card insertion, read the card number of the SIM card of insertion；ESAM chips 104,
SIM card circuit 102 and BBP 106 are connected respectively to, the card number for the SIM card to reading is authenticated.
By the above-mentioned technical proposal of the embodiment of the present invention, between the SIM card circuit 102 and BBP of terminal 10
ESAM chips are set, are authenticated by the card number of SIM card of the ESAM chips to being inserted in SIM card circuit 102.Due to ESAM cores
Piece has the advantages of safe, to be not easy to be cracked, and can solve in the related art, to exist by way of software algorithm pair
SIM card is authenticated, can not ensure authentication safety and reliability the problem of, reach improve SIM card authentication security and
The effect of reliability.
Terminal 10 can include one or more SIM card circuits 102, when comprising multiple SIM card circuits 102, each SIM card
The SIM card of identical or different operators (such as move, UNICOM etc.) is can be inserted into circuit 102, as long as SIM card circuit 102 can
To identify and read the card number corresponding to the SIM card of insertion.
Terminal 10 can include one or more ESAM chips 104, when including multiple ESAM chips 104, each ESAM chips
104 can be respectively connecting to different SIM card circuits 102.That is, according to different demands, one in terminal 10 or
Multiple SIM card circuits 102 may be connected to same ESAM chips 104, or different SIM card circuits 102 be connected to it is different
ESAM chips 104, as long as meeting that ESAM chips 104 are respectively connecting to SIM card circuit 102 and BBP 106.ESAM
Chip 104 can by bus with and SIM card circuit 102 and BBP 106 be connected.
Alternatively, ESAM chips 104 are additionally operable to according to for identifying the ESAM ID of ESAM chips and being tied up with ESAM chips
The binding relationship of the card number of fixed SIM card, the card number of the SIM card to reading are authenticated.
ESAM chip hardware securities obtain ITSECEAL5 level certifications, it is seen that its security is to be worth affirmative.Together
When, ESAM chips also have the function of identification.Unique label (ESAM ID) is stored in ESAM chip internals, this
Unique label is set before ESAM chips dispatch from the factory, and is unique, such as the identity card of people, can not be changed, while can
To prevent the attack of the measures such as SEMA/DEMA, SPA/DPA, DFA and sequential from cracking, security and uniqueness ensure that.
Identify ID in the ESAM that will be used to identify that ESAM chips, and the card number of SIM card when being bound, it is necessary to distribute this
The operator of SIM card binds together the ESAM ID of SIM card number and ESAM chips, and corresponding binding information is write
ESAM chips.
When lost terminal or it is stolen after, it is general to change other SIM cards when using.When having detected SIM card insertion
When, read the card number of the SIM card of insertion.ESAM chips according to for identifying the ESAM ID of ESAM chips, and with ESAM chips
The binding relationship of the card number of the SIM card of binding, the card number of the SIM card to reading are authenticated, and in the SIM card to reading
Card number certification.
By the above-mentioned technical proposal of the embodiment of the present invention, according to the ESAM ID, Yi Jiyu for identifying ESAM chips
The binding relationship of the card number with SIM card of ESAM chip bondings, the card number of the SIM card to reading are authenticated, and ensure that pair
The accuracy of the card number certification of the SIM card of insertion, further ensures the safety and reliability to SIM card certification.
Alternatively, in card number authentification failure of the ESAM chips 104 to the SIM card of reading, control terminal carries out destruction behaviour
Make.
It should be noted that above-mentioned control terminal carry out destroy operation can include it is a variety of, for example, can include to terminal
Lock operation and to terminal breaking-up operation.Wherein, the lock operation can carry out limitation use to some important applications
Restriction operation.And breaking-up operation is then the destruction operation destroyed to terminal hardware.When the owner of terminal obtains again
To terminal, it is necessary to when being reused to terminal, for above-mentioned lock operation, it is necessary to carried terminal, binding when used correlation
The place or other relevant departments that certificate and SIM card arrange to operator are unlocked operation to limiting operation.And for upper
State breaking-up operation, then when needing carried terminal, binding used related certificate and the place that is arranged to operator of SIM card or
Other relevant departments carry out hardware recovery operation processing to destroying to operate, and the hardware recovery of breaking-up operation is compared to lock operation
Unblock operation comparatively, it may be necessary to consume a longer time.
By the above-mentioned technical proposal of the embodiment of the present invention, it can solve the problem that the auto-destruct function of terminal data is easily broken
The problem of solution, and then ensure that the privacy and property safety of user.
Alternatively, BBP 106 is according to the notices of ESAM chips 104, the software installed in terminal it is automatic
Destroy, for example, the client installed in unloading or partial relief terminal 10, removing in terminal 10 account that preserves and close
Code, format the file stored in terminal 10, the operating system for formatting terminal 10 etc..
By the above-mentioned technical proposal of the embodiment of the present invention, the destruction of the software to being installed in terminal 10 is realized, is removed
The data such as picture, the video of privacy of user may be revealed and user's bank account, the void of user's property loss may be caused
Intend the related account of account (such as account and GID of each Bank Account Number, Alipay, wechat, internet finance correlation)
With encrypted message and business information etc., it targetedly ensure that the privacy and property safety of user.
Alternatively, ESAM chips 104 can be also used for the software installed in the notice progress terminal 10 of BBP 106
Destroy, and after receiving software that BBP 106 returns, for instruction terminal and destroying the instruction message completed, break
Open the communication path with SIM card circuit 102 and with BBP 106.For example, by the way that the inside of ESAM chips 104 is melted
Silk short circuit, disconnects and SIM card circuit 102 and the communication path with BBP 106.
By the above-mentioned technical proposal of the embodiment of the present invention, due to ESAM chips 104 be connected to SIM card circuit 102 and
Between BBP 106, after the communication path between SIM card circuit 10 and BBP 106 disconnects, SIM card circuit
102 by cisco unity malfunction.Simultaneously as the communication path between ESAM chips 104 and BBP 106 disconnects, base band
Processor 106 will can't detect ESAM chips 104, and detect that ESAM chips 104 are the necessary conditions of download version, therefore detect
It also will be unable to complete download function less than ESAM chips 104, terminal now turns into plate brick, it is therefore prevented that lose terminal and used,
And non-serviceable terminal does not possess the value that can be merchandised, therefore, reduce because stealing terminal and caused by injury accident
Quantity.
Embodiment 2
A kind of client identification module SIM card processing method is provided in the present embodiment, and Fig. 2 is according to embodiments of the present invention
SIM card processing method flow chart, as shown in Fig. 2 the flow comprises the following steps：
Step S202, obtain the card number of the SIM card of insertion terminal；
Step S204, using the embedded safety module ESAM chips for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, to obtaining
To the card number of SIM card be authenticated.
Alternatively, above-mentioned steps S204 can include：According to the ESAM ID for identifying ESAM chips, and and ESAM
The binding relationship of the card number of the SIM card of chip bonding, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated, including：
Carried out according to the ESAM ID stored in the card number of the SIM card got, ESAM chips and for the key of encryption
Ciphertext is calculated；
Compare the ciphertext being calculated and the card in ESAM chips according to the SIM card prestored in above-mentioned binding relationship
Number, the obtained predetermined ciphertext of above-mentioned ESAM ID and above-mentioned cipher key calculation it is whether identical；
In the case of in comparison result, to be the ciphertext that is calculated be identical with predetermined ciphertext, it is determined that the card number to SIM card
Certification success；And/or comparison result be the ciphertext that is calculated with predetermined ciphertext to differ in the case of, it is determined that to SIM
The card number authentification failure of card.
Alternatively, can also be authenticated according to the card number of SIM card of other various ways to getting, for example, can be with
According to the binding of the ID of the user of ESAM ID, the ESAM chip bondings for identifying ESAM chips and the card number of SIM card
Relation, or, according to the ID of the user of ESAM chip bondings and the binding relationship of the card number of SIM card, or, direct root
According to the card number of binding SIM card in ESAM chips, the card number of the SIM card to getting is authenticated.And above-mentioned ID can be
The identity card of user or other can be unique mark user identity certificate number.
The mode compared by using key encryption and encrypted result, the card number for adding the SIM card to getting are recognized
The security of card and the reliability of authentication result.
Alternatively, above-mentioned steps S204 can also include：
Generate the random number for calculating ciphertext；
Using the random number of generation, according to the ESAM ID stored in the card number of the SIM card got, ESAM chips, and
Key for encryption carries out that ciphertext is calculated.
By generating the random number for being used for calculating ciphertext, above-mentioned random number is used when calculating ciphertext, due to random number
Generation be random, ensure that the security of card number certification and the reliability of authentication result of the SIM card to getting.
Alternatively, after step S204, can also include：
Sent a notification message to the BBP of terminal, wherein, notification message is used to notify BBP to terminal
Software destroyed；
After receiving software that BBP returns, for instruction terminal and destroying the instruction message completed, disconnect
Communication path with the SIM card circuit of terminal and with the BBP of terminal.
Alternatively, BBP can be destroyed using various ways to the software of terminal, for example, can by with
At least one of under type is destroyed to the software of terminal：Unloading or partial relief terminal on installed client,
Remove the account preserved in terminal and password, format the file stored in terminal, the operating system of formatting terminal.
It is alternatively possible to disconnected using various ways with the SIM card circuit of terminal and with the BBP of terminal
Communication path, for example, can be by the internal fuse short circuit of ESAM chips.
Alternatively, the executive agent of above-mentioned steps can be ESAM chips or the terminal for being embedded with above-mentioned ESAM chips
Deng, but not limited to this.
Based on above-described embodiment and preferred embodiment, to illustrate that the whole flow process of scheme interacts, in this preferred embodiment
In, there is provided a kind of SIM card processing method, Fig. 3 are the flow charts of SIM card processing method according to the preferred embodiment of the invention,
It should be noted that in the SIM card processing method, terminal illustrates by taking mobile phone as an example.As shown in figure 3, the flow includes
Following steps：
Step S302：Into client, auto-destruct setting is carried out, can select to unload some clients, format text
Part, the removing of account number cipher and deletion mobile phone operating system；
Step S304：The insertion of SIM card is detected whether, is detected accordingly by the interrupt signal of SIM card；
Step S306：The inside mini system of ESAM modules is read out to SIM card number；
Step S308：ESAM inside modules produce one group of random number, the checking for ciphertext；
Step S310：The SIM card number that will be read, with reference to the identity card originally bound, the ID of ESAM in itself carry out key
Calculating；
Step S312：The ciphertext calculated and the ciphertext originally set are compared；If both ciphertexts are identical,
Go to S314 and S316；Ciphertext difference then goes to S318；
Step S314：Ciphertext is identical, the card number certification success to the SIM card of reading, can carry out data transmission work；
Step S316：After certification, mobile phone can be terminated with normal use, flow.
Step S318：The ciphertext of calculating and the ciphertext originally set are different, and the card number certification to the SIM card of reading is lost
Lose, start the Shredding Process of correlation.For example, the destruction work of software can be carried out first, application program app unloading, account are carried out
The removing of number password, the deletion of formatted file and mobile phone operating system；
Step S320：Judge that software is destroyed whether to complete, if do not completed, return to S318, completed if software is destroyed,
Jump to S322；
Step S322：The fuse short circuit of ESAM inside modules, starts corresponding hardware and destroys；
Step S324：ESAM modules stopped work, shut off logical between SIM card circuit and BBP
Letter, mobile phone can not carry out the work related to SIM；
Step S326：Mobile phone is completed to destroy.After ESAM inside modules fuse short circuits, BBP can not detect
ESAM modules, even if brush machine again, whole mobile phone system will not also start.
For example, owner A mobile phone is lost, owner A phone number is 15888888888, identity card
300000199911113333, ESAM ID is IS400500600, and it is automatic that owner A has handled startup when mobile phone is bought
The function of destruction, and bound phone number, ESAM ID and identity card in business hall.And to the pattern of auto-destruct
Also set, when SIM card number not pair when, will all applications, while format the file and hand of storage such as unloading Alipay
Machine system, ESAM auto-destructs are also started, and this is the setting that owner A is carried out to the auto-destruct item of oneself mobile phone.Have
One day, owner A mobile phone was lost, and is found by B, and B has injected the Mobile phone card of oneself A mobile phone, and now, mobile phone can detect
The insertion of SIM card, carry out the reading of SIM card number after detection, and by the SIM card number of reading and owner A identification card number, ESAM
Id number carries out the calculating of ciphertext, is then compared the ciphertext of calculating and the ciphertext originally set, after comparing, finds ciphertext
It is different, the card number authentification failure of SIM card, now start auto-destruct, first carry out software auto-destruct, mainly unloading is paid
The application programs such as treasured, format the data and cell phone system of storage, after the completion of carry out ESAM auto-destruct, now, in ESAM
Portion's fuse short circuit, completes to destroy, while the path being also disconnected between SIM card circuit and BBP, mobile phone turn into plate brick.
Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can be understood that according to above-mentioned implementation
The method of example can add the mode of required general hardware platform to realize by software, naturally it is also possible to by hardware, but a lot
In the case of the former be more preferably embodiment.Based on such understanding, technical scheme is substantially in other words to existing
The part that technology contributes can be embodied in the form of software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage
In medium (such as ROM/RAM, magnetic disc, CD), including some instructions to cause a station terminal equipment (can be mobile phone, calculate
Machine, server, or network equipment etc.) perform method described in each embodiment of the present invention.
Embodiment 3
A kind of client identification module SIM card processing unit and ESAM chips are additionally provided in the present embodiment, and the device is used
In realizing above-described embodiment and preferred embodiment, repeating no more for explanation had been carried out.As used below, term
" module " can realize the combination of the software and/or hardware of predetermined function.Although the device described by following examples is preferably
Realized with software, but hardware, or software and hardware combination realization and may and be contemplated.
Fig. 4 is the structured flowchart one of SIM card processing unit according to embodiments of the present invention, as shown in figure 4, the device bag
Include：Acquisition module 42, authentication module 44, are illustrated to the device below.
Acquisition module 42, the card number of the SIM card for obtaining insertion terminal；Authentication module 44, it is connected to above-mentioned acquisition mould
Block 42, for using the embedded safety module ESAM chips for being used for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, to the SIM got
The card number of card is authenticated.
Fig. 5 is the structured flowchart of authentication module 44 in SIM card processing unit according to embodiments of the present invention, the authentication module
4 are additionally operable to according to the ESAM mark ID and the binding with the card number of the SIM card of ESAM chip bondings for being used to identify ESAM chips
Relation, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated, as shown in figure 5, the authentication module 44 includes computing unit 52, compared
Unit 54 and determining unit 56, the authentication module 44 is illustrated below.
Computing unit 52, for the ESAM ID, Yi Jiyong stored in the card number according to the SIM card got, ESAM chips
In the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated；Comparing unit 54, above-mentioned computing unit 52 is connected to, is calculated for comparing
Ciphertext with being obtained in ESAM chips according to the card number of the SIM card prestored in binding relationship, ESAM ID and cipher key calculation
Predetermined ciphertext it is whether identical；Confirmation unit 56, above-mentioned comparing unit 54 is connected to, for being calculated in comparison result
In the case of ciphertext and predetermined ciphertext are identical, it is determined that the card number certification success to above-mentioned SIM card；And/or it is in comparison result
The ciphertext being calculated is in the case of differing, it is determined that the card number authentification failure to SIM card with above-mentioned predetermined ciphertext.
Fig. 6 is the structured flowchart of computing unit 52 in SIM card processing unit according to embodiments of the present invention, as shown in fig. 6,
The computing unit 52 includes generation subelement 62 and computation subunit 64, and the computing unit 52 is illustrated below.
Subelement 62 is generated, for generating the random number for being used for calculating ciphertext；Computation subunit 64, it is connected to above-mentioned generation
Subelement 62, for the random number using generation, according to the ESAM stored in the card number of the SIM card got, ESAM chips
ID, and for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated.
Fig. 7 is the structured flowchart two of SIM card processing unit according to embodiments of the present invention, as shown in fig. 7, the device also wraps
Control module 46 is included, for when to the card number authentification failure of SIM card, control terminal to carry out destruction operation.The control module 46
Including notification unit 72, switching units 74, the control module 46 is illustrated below.
Notification unit 72, for being sent a notification message to the BBP of terminal, wherein, above-mentioned notification message is used to lead to
Know that above-mentioned BBP is destroyed to the software of terminal；Switching units 74, above-mentioned notification unit 72 is connected to, for connecing
After receiving the instruction message that software destruction that BBP returns, for instruction terminal is completed, the SIM card with terminal is disconnected
Circuit and the communication path with the BBP of terminal.
Alternatively, above-mentioned BBP, which to the software of terminal destroy, includes at least one of：Unloading or portion
Divide on discharging terminal in the client installed, removing terminal the account preserved and password, format the text stored in terminal
Part, the operating system for formatting terminal；Or disconnect logical with the SIM card circuit of terminal and with the BBP of terminal
Letter path includes：By the internal fuse short circuit of ESAM chips.
It should be noted that above-mentioned modules can be realized by software or hardware, for the latter, Ke Yitong
Cross in the following manner realization, but not limited to this：Above-mentioned module is respectively positioned in ESAM chips；Or above-mentioned modules are with any group
The form of conjunction is located in different ESAM chips respectively, and above-mentioned ESAM chips are positioned at including SIM card circuit and BBP
Terminal among.
Embodiments of the invention additionally provide a kind of storage medium.Alternatively, in the present embodiment, above-mentioned storage medium can
The program code for performing following steps to be arranged to storage to be used for：
S1, obtain the card number of the SIM card of insertion terminal；
S2, using the embedded safety module ESAM chips for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, to what is got
The card number of SIM card is authenticated；
Alternatively, storage medium is also configured to the program code that storage is used to perform following steps：
Using the ESAM chips for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, the card number of the SIM card to getting is authenticated
Including：
ID and binding with the card number of the SIM card of ESAM chip bondings are identified according to the ESAM for identifying ESAM chips
Relation, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated, including：
S1, according to the ESAM ID stored in the card number of the SIM card got, ESAM chips, and the key for encryption
Carry out that ciphertext is calculated；
S2, compare the ciphertext that is calculated and the card number in ESAM chips according to the SIM card prestored in binding relationship,
Whether the predetermined ciphertext that ESAM ID and cipher key calculation obtain is identical；
S3, in the case of to be the ciphertext that is calculated be identical with predetermined ciphertext in comparison result, it is determined that the card to SIM card
Number certification success；And/or comparison result be the ciphertext that is calculated with predetermined ciphertext to differ in the case of, it is determined that pair
The card number authentification failure of SIM card
Alternatively, storage medium is also configured to the program code that storage is used to perform following steps：
Enter according to the ESAM ID stored in the card number of the SIM card got, ESAM chips, and for the key of encryption
Ciphertext, which is calculated, in row includes：
S1, generate the random number for calculating ciphertext；
S2, using the random number of generation, according to the ESAM ID stored in the card number of the SIM card got, ESAM chips,
And for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated.
Alternatively, storage medium is also configured to the program code that storage is used to perform following steps：Using be used for pair
The embedded safety module ESAM chips that the card number of SIM card is authenticated, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated it
Afterwards, in addition to：When to the card number authentification failure of SIM card, control terminal carries out destruction operation, including：
S1, sent a notification message to the BBP of terminal, wherein, notification message is used to notify BBP to end
The software at end is destroyed；
S2, after receiving software that BBP returns, for instruction terminal and destroying the instruction message completed, break
Open the communication path with the SIM card circuit of terminal and with the BBP of terminal.
Alternatively, in the present embodiment, above-mentioned storage medium can include but is not limited to：USB flash disk, read-only storage (ROM,
Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, RandomAccess Memory), mobile hard disk, magnetic disc or light
Disk etc. is various can be with the medium of store program codes.
Alternatively, in the present embodiment, processor performs according to the program code stored in storage medium：Obtain insertion
The card number of the SIM card of terminal；Using the embedded safety module ESAM chips for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, to obtaining
The card number for the SIM card got is authenticated.
Alternatively, in the present embodiment, processor performs according to the program code stored in storage medium：Using for
The ESAM chips being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated including：According to for marking
The ESAM ID of ESAM chips and the binding relationship with the card number of the SIM card of ESAM chip bondings are known, to the SIM card got
Card number be authenticated, including：According to the ESAM ID stored in the card number of the SIM card got, ESAM chips, and it is used for
The key of encryption carries out that ciphertext is calculated；Compare the ciphertext that is calculated with ESAM chips according to being deposited in advance in binding relationship
Whether the predetermined ciphertext that card number, ESAM ID and the cipher key calculation of the SIM card of storage obtain is identical；It is to calculate in comparison result
In the case of the ciphertext that arrives and predetermined ciphertext are identical, it is determined that the card number certification success to SIM card；And/or it is in comparison result
The ciphertext being calculated is in the case of differing, it is determined that the card number authentification failure to SIM card with predetermined ciphertext.
Alternatively, in the present embodiment, processor performs according to the program code stored in storage medium：According to acquisition
To the card number of SIM card, the ESAM ID that store in ESAM chips, and for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext bag is calculated
Include：Generate the random number for calculating ciphertext；Using the random number of generation, according to the card number of the SIM card got, ESAM chips
The ESAM ID of middle storage, and for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated.
Alternatively, in the present embodiment, processor performs according to the program code stored in storage medium：Using use
In the embedded safety module ESAM chips that the card number to SIM card is authenticated, the card number of the SIM card to getting is authenticated
Afterwards, in addition to：Control terminal carries out destruction operation, including：Sent a notification message to the BBP of terminal, wherein, lead to
Know that message is used to notify BBP to destroy the software of terminal；Receive BBP return, for referring to
After showing that the software of terminal destroys the instruction message completed, the BBP with the SIM card circuit of terminal and with terminal is disconnected
Communication path.
Alternatively, the specific example in the present embodiment may be referred to described in above-described embodiment and optional embodiment
Example, the present embodiment will not be repeated here.
Obviously, those skilled in the art should be understood that above-mentioned each module of the invention or each step can be with general
Computing device realize that they can be concentrated on single computing device, or be distributed in multiple computing devices and formed
Network on, alternatively, they can be realized with the program code that computing device can perform, it is thus possible to they are stored
Performed in the storage device by computing device, and in some cases, can be with different from shown in order execution herein
The step of going out or describing, they are either fabricated to each integrated circuit modules respectively or by multiple modules in them or
Step is fabricated to single integrated circuit module to realize.So, the present invention is not restricted to any specific hardware and software combination.
The preferred embodiments of the present invention are the foregoing is only, are not intended to limit the invention, for the skill of this area
For art personnel, the present invention can have various modifications and variations.Within the spirit and principles of the invention, that is made any repaiies
Change, equivalent substitution, improvement etc., should be included in the scope of the protection.
Claims (13)
- A kind of 1. terminal, it is characterised in that including client identification module SIM card circuit, BBP, and embedded-type security mould Block ESAM chips, wherein：The SIM card circuit, for having detected SIM card insertion, read the card number of the SIM card of insertion；The ESAM chips, the SIM card circuit and the BBP are connected to, for the SIM card to reading Card number be authenticated.
- 2. terminal according to claim 1, it is characterised in that the ESAM chips, be additionally operable to according to for identifying ESAM The ESAM mark ID of chip, and the binding relationship with the card number of the SIM card of ESAM chip bondings, to the SIM read The card number of card is authenticated.
- 3. terminal according to claim 1, it is characterised in that the BBP, for according to the ESAM chips What is sent is used for notice of the instruction to the card number authentification failure of the SIM card, carries out the destruction of the software of the terminal.
- 4. terminal according to any one of claim 1 to 3, it is characterised in thatThe ESAM chips, the destruction of software for notifying the BBP to carry out the terminal is additionally operable to, and received After the instruction message that software destruction that the BBP returns, for indicating the terminal is completed, disconnect and the SIM Card circuit and the communication path with the BBP.
- A kind of 5. client identification module SIM card processing method, it is characterised in thatObtain the card number of the SIM card of insertion terminal；Using the embedded safety module ESAM chips for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, to the SIM card got Card number be authenticated.
- 6. according to the method for claim 5, it is characterised in that using the ESAM for being used to be authenticated the card number of SIM card Chip, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated including：According to for identifying the ESAM mark ID of ESAM chips and being closed with the binding of the card number of the SIM card of ESAM chip bondings System, the card number of the SIM card to getting are authenticated, including：According to the ESAM ID stored in the card number of the SIM card got, the ESAM chips and for encryption Key carries out that ciphertext is calculated；Compare the ciphertext being calculated and the card in the ESAM chips according to the SIM card prestored in the binding relationship Number, the obtained predetermined ciphertext of the ESAM ID and the cipher key calculation it is whether identical；In the case of in comparison result, to be the ciphertext that is calculated be identical with the predetermined ciphertext, it is determined that to the SIM card Card number certification success；And/or comparison result be the ciphertext that is calculated with the predetermined ciphertext to differ in the case of, really The fixed card number authentification failure to the SIM card.
- 7. according to the method for claim 6, it is characterised in that according to the card number of the SIM card got, the ESAM The ESAM ID that are stored in chip and key for encryption, which carry out ciphertext is calculated, to be included：Generate the random number for calculating the ciphertext；Using the random number of generation, according to being stored in the card number of the SIM card got, the ESAM chips ESAM ID, and for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated.
- 8. according to the method for claim 5, it is characterised in that using embedding for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card Enter formula security module ESAM chips, after the card number of the SIM card to getting is authenticated, in addition to：When to the card number authentification failure of the SIM card, the terminal is controlled to carry out destruction operation, including：Sent a notification message to the BBP of the terminal, wherein, the notification message is used to notify the Base-Band Processing Device is destroyed to the software of the terminal；After the instruction message that software destruction that the BBP returns, for indicating the terminal is completed is received, Disconnect the communication path with the SIM card circuit of the terminal and with the BBP of the terminal.
- A kind of 9. client identification module SIM processing units, it is characterised in that including：Acquisition module, the card number of the SIM card for obtaining insertion terminal；Authentication module, for using the embedded safety module ESAM chips for being used for being authenticated to the card number of SIM card, to obtaining To the card number of the SIM card be authenticated.
- 10. device according to claim 9, it is characterised in that the authentication module is additionally operable to according to for identifying ESAM The ESAM mark ID of chip and the binding relationship with the card number of the SIM card of ESAM chip bondings, to the SIM card got Card number be authenticated；Wherein, the authentication module includes：Computing unit, for the ESAM ID stored in the card number according to the SIM card got, the ESAM chips And for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated；Comparing unit, for comparing the ciphertext being calculated with being prestored in the ESAM chips according in the binding relationship SIM card the obtained predetermined ciphertext of card number, the ESAM ID and the cipher key calculation it is whether identical；Determining unit, in the case of in comparison result, to be the ciphertext that is calculated be identical with the predetermined ciphertext, it is determined that Card number certification success to the SIM card；And/or in comparison result it is the ciphertext that is calculated and the predetermined ciphertext for not phase With in the case of, it is determined that the card number authentification failure to the SIM card.
- 11. device according to claim 10, it is characterised in that the computing unit includes：Subelement is generated, for generating the random number for being used for calculating the ciphertext；Computation subunit, for the random number using generation, according to the card number of the SIM card got, the ESAM The ESAM ID stored in chip, and for the key of encryption carry out that ciphertext is calculated.
- 12. device according to claim 9, it is characterised in that also include：Control module, for the SIM card During card number authentification failure, the terminal is controlled to carry out destruction operation；The control module includes：Notification unit, for being sent a notification message to the BBP of the terminal, wherein, the notification message is used to notify The BBP is destroyed to the software of the terminal；Switching units, for complete in the destruction for receiving software that the BBP returns, for indicating the terminal Into instruction message after, disconnect the communication path with the SIM card circuit of the terminal and with the BBP of the terminal.
- 13. a kind of embedded safety module ESAM chips, it is characterised in that including any one of claim 9 to 12 Device.
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610333585.8A CN107404719A (en) | 2016-05-18 | 2016-05-18 | SIM card processing method, device, terminal and ESAM chips |
| PCT/CN2016/085725 WO2017197689A1 (en) | 2016-05-18 | 2016-06-14 | Sim card processing method and apparatus, terminal, and esam chip |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610333585.8A CN107404719A (en) | 2016-05-18 | 2016-05-18 | SIM card processing method, device, terminal and ESAM chips |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN107404719A true CN107404719A (en) | 2017-11-28 |
Family
ID=60324625
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610333585.8A Withdrawn CN107404719A (en) | 2016-05-18 | 2016-05-18 | SIM card processing method, device, terminal and ESAM chips |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN107404719A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2017197689A1 (en) |
Cited By (1)
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| CN111008392A (en) * | 2019-12-25 | 2020-04-14 | 中电科航空电子有限公司 | Self-destruction control method of positioning equipment and related device |
Families Citing this family (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN113064725B (en) * | 2021-03-30 | 2023-11-03 | 三川在线(杭州)信息技术有限公司 | Virtual resource transfer method, vehicle-mounted unit, storage medium and electronic device |
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Also Published As
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| WO2017197689A1 (en) | 2017-11-23 |
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