CH666363A5 - METHOD FOR IMMOBILIZING THE USE OF UNAUTHORIZED COPIES OF PROTECTED DATA AND STORAGE MEDIUM FOR CARRYING OUT THE METHOD. - Google Patents

Description

DESCRIPTION

The present invention relates to a method according to the preamble of claim 1 and storage media for performing this method.

Every year billions of dollars are spent on computer software. Typically, the software is sold in recorded form on a diskette. As soon as the consumer has read the program into the working memory of his computer from the floppy disk, it is possible for the consumer to read the program out of the kernel and to save it on a second floppy disk, thereby creating a non-authorized copy of the program. It is estimated that 50% of the software will be copied without permission.

The owner of software recorded in the form of an approved copy that has been sold to a customer has an interest in preventing the customer from making and selling unapproved copies. The present invention enables the production of copies, but the copies are not usable according to the invention and are therefore of no value.

The instructions typically recorded on the disc, disk or disk, i.e. Instructions and other data include an initiation or initialization process and a main application program. The initiation process enables formatting and other operational formalities, including the establishment of an operating system directory, which tells the computer the actual location within the hardware where certain files or filings can be found.

U.S. Patent 4,214,280 describes a method and apparatus 5

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device for recording data on a disk with defective areas. According to this method, the defective area is arranged so that the data can be written on the parts of the disk that are not defective. The invention is not aimed at securing the recorded data against copying, but instead at permitting the use of defective or damaged disks. The defects are not deliberately introduced and no attempt is made to write data to the defective or damaged areas.

The reference “Recorded Data Security Device” by A.F. Shugart in IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, Volume 4, No. 10, March 1962, describes a device that prevents certain protected data from being read from a disk storage device. The disk storage in this case consists of at least two disks arranged for rotation on a common shaft. One of the disks contains recorded control signals that control the operation of the read / write heads of the remaining disks. As a result of the security signals on the first disk, the read / write heads of the remaining disks are electrically isolated from their amplifiers, which prevents the protected data from being read out. Although this invention provides a special channel for security purposes, the use of this channel is completely different from the procedures according to the invention.

U.S. Patent 4,086,634 describes a method and apparatus for preventing unauthorized magnetic tape duplication. The method provides for the recording of a radio frequency modulated signal, together with the program listening material on a magnetic tape, so that the subsequent copying of the program material and the modulated signal onto an unauthorized magnetic tape is detectable with the conventional high frequency bias recording on the copied tape and produces identifiable interference signals that, when played back, result in an audible noise that spoils the copied tape.

The present invention aims to provide a method of the type mentioned at the outset which, although it is possible to copy protected data in an unauthorized manner, guarantees that the unauthorized data copy cannot be used again. For this purpose, the present invention is characterized in accordance with the characterizing part of claim 1.

The invention will now be explained using examples and a figure.

It shows:

Fig. 1 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the invention.

The preferred exemplary embodiments are now described below. First, the first exemplary embodiment is discussed, which is preferred in view of its simplicity. According to this embodiment, a localized permanent defective area is deliberately located in the factory on which the non-record-bearing disc is randomly placed on the recording surface, on the part of the recording surface reserved for the material to be protected. The effect of the defect is to make it impossible for the affected part of the disk to read out part of the data that a write head previously tried to record on the defect.

The exact location of the defect on the plate (disc) is then determined in the factory. According to one embodiment, this is achieved by recording louder "1" at all points and then reading back the data. The areas from which “l” are not read back form the defective area.

The locations forming the defect are collectively considered by the computer as a file (file), for example called File D, and the location or location of this "file" is stored in the initiation process recorded on the disk. The initiation procedure also includes the safety test steps.

At this point, the main application program or other data to be protected can be recorded on the disk in the factory. Alternatively, the disc may be sold to someone at that time who wishes to record a safe program on the disc.

Then, each time the disc is played, the initiation process including the security check is carried out. The security test procedure comprises the following steps: opening file D, writing in a special part of the data there, closing the file, reopening file D, reading out the contents and comparing the contents with the special part of the written data.

If the read data is identical to the written data (which would be the case if the disk were an unauthorized copy that did not contain a defect), the security check procedure commands that the files in which the protected data are stored are opened and the contents are destroyed.

If the data read out differs from the written data (which is normal for an approved disk because it contains a defect), the security check enables the protected data to be read. In this way, an unauthorized copy of the disk does not give protected data, making unauthorized copying impossible, i.e. leads to frustration.

In a second embodiment, which provides a higher level of security than the first embodiment, a special recording medium on a tape of the disc is used. This tape can span multiple tracks.

The special recording medium is a material that is recorded by a special recording head in the factory where the disc is manufactured, but is not written by the read / write head of any computer in which the disc could be used can.

In one embodiment, the special recording medium is a ferromagnetic material with such large domains that the domains can only be magnetized by the application of a magnetic field that is larger than that generated by the read / write heads of existing computers.

In other words, the special recording medium is a “harder” magnetic material than the material normally used on conventional floppy disks, so that the limited magnetic field generated by the write heads in existing computers cannot write on the special recording medium. Also, the special recording medium should have a coercive force which is large compared to the computer-generated magnetic field existing by the write / erase heads, so that the data written in the special recording medium by the computer. cannot be deleted.

The tracks on which the special recording medium is used thus form a read-only memory which the read / write head of the computer can read, but into which it cannot write or change.

When the disk is manufactured in the factory, the special recording head writes a permanent "fingerprint number (such as a series of" l "s) on the tracks of the special recording medium.

An initiation or initialization procedure of the program commands that the file, arranged on the special tracks, is opened and that the file is filled with O'en.

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If the disk is now a normal disk to which the program was copied without permission, this command is executed and the file in the place of the special tracks is filled with O'en.

However, if an approved disc (one that has the special tracks) is played, the recording head of the computer will not be able to influence the special tracks that still contain the "fingerprint" number.

The security check then requires reading the file. If only O'en is read, the security routine commands that all files, including the main program, are opened and filled with meaningless numbers, rendering the copy unusable. When the “fingerprint” number is read, the security check routine enables the main application program to be read out.

A third exemplary embodiment is shown in FIG. 1 and permits an even higher level of security than can be achieved with the first and second exemplary embodiments. However, the third embodiment requires a special device 12, which is an integral part of the envelope of the plate.

In the third exemplary embodiment, a track 14 of the plate 16 is dedicated exclusively to use together with the safety test method. When the disk 16 leaves the factory and before it is used, this dedicated track contains a synchronization (sync) signal followed by a file X containing a certain number No. The same number No is contained in machine language in a file Y in the safety check routine.

When the disk 16 is inserted into the computer, the computer first executes the initialization or initiation routine before reading the main application program or other data to be protected into the core of the computer (from where the reading onto another one) Plate could be made for the purpose of making an unapproved copy). The security check procedure completes the initialization routine.

The security check method contains instructions which increment the number No initially contained in the file Y in order to obtain a new number Ni which is then stored in the file Y. The number in file Y is then compared to the number in file X. If the numbers are the same, the computer is enabled to read the main application program into the core. If the numbers are not the same, the computer is instructed to destroy all files, including those containing the main application program.

It is clear that the latter result will be obtained if the number No initially stored in File X was not previously incremented by the same amount that the number No initially stored in File Y was incremented.

A special device 12 is provided in the shell of the plate as an integral part of the shell. The purpose of this special device is to increment the number in the file X each time the disc 16 is played. The incrementation takes place during the first two revolutions of the plate 16 is thus completed before the safety test method is carried out. In normal use, the special device 12 causes the number in File X to be equal to the number Y so that the main application program can be read into the core of the computer by the read / write head 18 of the computer, under the control of the Introductory routine.

If an unauthorized copy of the protected data is made after it has been read into the core of the computer, and if this copy is recorded on a conventional disk and not on a secure disk according to the invention, the copy is unusable simply because because the conventional plate does not have the special device 12 for

Incrementing the number in File X. In this way, the device according to the invention and the method according to the invention make it impossible to make unauthorized copies.

Furthermore, if an attempt is made to change the special device 12 and this thereby puts it out of operation, the original disk becomes unusable since the file X can no longer be incremented without using the special device.

The special device 12, as shown in the embodiment shown in FIG. 1, has a read / write head 20, and also an amplifier 22, an incrementing and storage system 24 and a battery 26, the latter providing the other components with power provided. This entire special device 12 is housed in the shell of the plate. The read / write head 20 is extremely thin and is placed in the case in such a fixed position that it only has access to the dedicated dedicated security track 14 of the disk 16.

For purposes of illustration, assume that track 14 of disk 16, which is dedicated to security, is track 3. 1 operates as follows.

Upon receiving the command to read the program from disk 16, the computer starts rotating disk 16. During the first revolution, the read / write head 20 of the disk senses an initial sync pulse on track 3, dedicated track 14. This sync pulse is used to turn on amplifier 22 and increment and store system 24.

As disk 16 continues to rotate, disk read / write head 20 reads a number No following the first sync pulse on track 3. This number No is incremented by a number which is stored in the incrementing and storage system 24, so as to obtain an incremented number Ni.

During the second rotation of the disk 16, the sync pulse is again sensed by the read / write head 20 of the disk. This second sync pulse switches the amplifier 22 to the passage of the number Ni to the plate 16, where Ni is written on track 3 via No. The incrementing and storage system 24 causes the amplifier 22 to ignore further sync pulses that can subsequently be read. The operating system directory gives Track 3 a name: Track 3 is File X.

As described above, the program includes a security check method according to which a number No, stored in machine language, is incremented in the initiation routine in the same manner as before in order to generate the number Ni in a file Y. . The initiation routine then compares the number in File X with the number in File Y. If the number in File X is equal to the number in File Y, then the protected data is written into the computer core by the read / write head 18 of the computer transfer. If the number in File X is not the same as the number in File Y, then the security check procedure in the read / write head 18 of the computer commands all files, including those containing protected data, to be filled with meaningless numbers.

In the simplest form of this exemplary embodiment, the numbers in the files X and Y are incremented by the same size each time the disc is played. In a slightly more complicated variation, the incremental size changes every time the record is played. This can be achieved by changing a number stored in a special increment file each time the disc is played.

In summary, three exemplary embodiments have thus been described which relate to a method and a device for making the unauthorized copying of protected data impossible, i.e. of data,

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which are recorded on a floppy disk. The method according to the invention and the device according to the invention can also be used for other recording media.

According to each exemplary embodiment, a fingerprint is assigned to an authorized plate, with this fingerprint being able to physically or physically distinguish an authorized plate from a conventional plate on which an unauthorized copy would have to be made.

In the first embodiment, the fingerprint is an intentionally provided defective or damaged area at a random location. In the second embodiment, the fingerprint is an immutable magnetic signature recorded on a special read-only part of the disk. Finally, in the third embodiment, the fingerprint is a magnetic signature that is recorded on a dedicated or specific track of the disc and that is changed each time the disc is used.

In each embodiment, the initiation or initialization routine, recorded on the disk, includes a security check procedure that tests for the presence of the known fingerprint and that prevents the readout of protected data in the absence of the fingerprint, such as this would be the case with an unapproved copy.

Modifications of the invention are within the skill of the art.

In summary, the invention provides the following:

Approved disks are formed according to the invention in a physically distinguishable manner from unrecorded disks, the latter of which would be used for the production of unapproved copies. A security check procedure is provided within the initialization routine, recorded on the approved disk, and this routine is executed before any protected data is read out. The security check procedure includes a test to determine whether or not the disk on which the recording was made has the physical fingerprint, i.e. the fingerprint that is the mark for an authorized plate. If the fingerprint is not present, the security check procedure prevents the protected material from being read out. In this way, unauthorized copies become unusable because the protected data cannot be extracted from them.

The invention is therefore primarily intended for use with floppy disks, namely with floppy disks on which software is recorded which is distributed or sold in large quantities to consumers. A primary aim of the above-described invention is to prevent the consumer from making an unauthorized copy of the authorized copy that he has purchased.

The consumer of course has the right to use his approved copy for the intended purpose, so techniques are not applicable here that prevent access to recorded data. The described invention thus belongs to the class of procedures which want to prevent unauthorized duplication of protected material, i.e. the production of an unapproved plate. However, unauthorized duplication is not prevented,

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but only the use of unauthorized duplicated material. However, the consumer's right to read authorized material is not affected.

As has been apparent from the foregoing description, the present invention does not prevent the consumer from making an unauthorized transfer of protected material. However, it guarantees that the unauthorized copy is unusable.

Authorized plates produced according to the above-described invention are physically or physically distinguishable from raw plates or empty plates which the consumer would use to make unauthorized copies. Modifications that identify the authorized plate are relatively simple in some of the prescribed exemplary embodiments and cannot be determined easily. Physical features or markings that distinguish the authorized plates from the others correspond to an identifying fingerprint on such plates. One aspect of the present invention is particularly directed to the security check procedure built into the initialization routine, the latter of which is recorded on the authorized disk and executed prior to reading any data. The protected data can typically be an application program and can be in a wide variety of forms, including binary signals and analog signals.

The initiation routine, as described, must be performed prior to reading data from the disk, with the computer read / write head being controlled by the initiation routine.

As described, the security verification process includes a test to determine whether or not the disk on which data is recorded has the above physical fingerprint which is the mark or seal of an approved disk. If it is present, the security check procedure allows the read / write head to read out the material found on the disk and found to be approved. However, if the fingerprint is not present, as in the case of an unauthorized disk, the security check procedure prevents the read / write head from reading out the protected, obviously unauthorized copied material.

If the fingerprint is not present in one of the preferred exemplary embodiments described, the security check method instructs the read / write head to blur or delete the unauthorized, protected material.

In this way, the material recorded on a disk, including the initiation routine, and the protected material can also be transferred to an unapproved disk without permission. The recorded material is identical on the approved plate with that on the unapproved one. When attempting to subsequently use the unapproved plate, the security test method by detection means that the distinctive fingerprint that identifies an approved plate is not present, the reading of the intended, protected material is prevented, this material is destroyed or blurred.

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1 sheet of drawings

Claims (8)

666 363 2nd PATENT CLAIMS 1. A method of prohibiting the use of unauthorized copies of protected data recorded on and read from the medium by a device controlled by commands recorded on the medium, the commands including an initiation routine that is executed before any of the protected data are read from the medium, characterized by the following steps, which are separate from the initiation routine: a) arranging distinctive evidence in the medium of the approved copies, the distinguishing evidence being known to be absent in the medium in which unapproved copies are recorded, b) performing a test to determine whether the distinguishing indications are present in the copy in use, which may be an approved copy or an unapproved copy, and c) preventing protected data from being read out, if the test indicates that the distinguishing evidence is not present in the copy used 2. The method of claim 1, wherein step c) further comprises rendering the protected data unusable if the test indicates that the differing indicia are not present in the copy used. 3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that a) a local permanent defective zone is generated on the medium prior to the recording of protected data, which is not able to record data, the defective zone being in a random position on protected data provided area of the medium is provided b) the defective zone is located on the medium, c) the position of the zone is saved in the initiation routine, d) an attempt is made to enter special data at the position of the zone as data to be written. e) data stored in this position is read back, f) the data read back are compared with the data entered for writing, g) reading out the protected data is prevented, when the data read back is identical to the data entered for reading. 4. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that a) with the initiation routine, the operation of a read / write head that controls the medium is controlled, b) a part that cannot be written on with the read / write head and can only be operated as a read-only part is provided on the medium, c) first data are written in with a special write head at the point where the read-only part of an original copy of the medium is arranged, d) the read / write head is instructed to write second data which differ from the first into the read-only part, then e) the data provided at the position of the read-only part is read back, f) the read back data are compared with the first data or with the second data, g) reading out of the protected data is prevented if the read back data do not match the first data or the read back data match the second data. 5. The method according to any one of claims 1 or 2, characterized in that a) a first storage location is provided on an original medium, b) a first number is stored in this first storage location, c) by means of a device integrated with the original medium, the first number is incremented each time this medium is read and preferably an intervention on the said device disables the latter, d) a second memory location is provided in the initiation routine, e) the first number is stored in the second memory location, f) the first number is incremented each time the medium is read, the same as in the first storage location, g) it is checked whether the first number in the first storage location and that in the second match, h) reading of the protected data is prevented if these first two numbers do not match. 6. Storage medium for carrying out the method according to one of claims 1, 2 or 3, characterized in that a defective zone is provided on a part intended for the storage of data to be protected. 7. Storage medium for carrying out the method according to one of claims 1, 2 or 4, characterized in that a storage zone is provided which differs from the rest of the medium in terms of its writability, but not in terms of its readability. 8. Storage medium for carrying out the method according to one of claims 1, 2 or 5, characterized in that the medium comprises, without destruction, inseparable incrementing elements (12) which act on a predetermined location (14) of the storage medium (16), and that these Each time the storage medium (16) is read, the incrementing means change the data (No) at this point (14) so that a command is also stored in an initiation routine provided on the storage medium, so that each time the medium (16) is read, the data stored by the incrementing device (12 ) to generate data (N0) entered at the said point (14) corresponding data.