CA2400223A1 - Validation protocol and system - Google Patents

Validation protocol and system Download PDF

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Publication number
CA2400223A1
CA2400223A1 CA002400223A CA2400223A CA2400223A1 CA 2400223 A1 CA2400223 A1 CA 2400223A1 CA 002400223 A CA002400223 A CA 002400223A CA 2400223 A CA2400223 A CA 2400223A CA 2400223 A1 CA2400223 A1 CA 2400223A1
Authority
CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
chip
random number
function
signature
authentication chip
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
CA002400223A
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
CA2400223C (en
Inventor
Simon Robert Walmsley
Paul Lapstun
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Memjet Technology Ltd
Original Assignee
Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd
Simon Robert Walmsley
Paul Lapstun
Zamtec Limited
Memjet Technology Limited
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd, Simon Robert Walmsley, Paul Lapstun, Zamtec Limited, Memjet Technology Limited filed Critical Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd
Publication of CA2400223A1 publication Critical patent/CA2400223A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CA2400223C publication Critical patent/CA2400223C/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H04L9/0662—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response

Abstract

This invention is a validation protocol for determining whether an untrusted authentication chip is valid, or not. In another aspect it concerns a validation system for the protocol. The protocol may be used to determine the physical presence of a valid authentication chip. In this case a system may call the trusted chip to generate a random number and a digital signature for it, encrypt them with a first key and then call a prove function in the untrusted chip. The prove function decrypts the random number and signature, and calculates another signature from the decrypted random number, for comparison with the decrypted one. If the comparison is successful the random number is encrypted with another key and sent back. Finally, a test function is called in the trusted chip to generate its own encrypted version of the random number using the second key and then compare it with the received version to validate the untrusted chip. The untrusted chip may be associated with a consumable so that validation of the untrusted chip authenticates the consumable.

Claims (20)

1. A validation protocol for determining whether an untrusted authentication chip is valid, or not, including the steps of:
generating a secret random number and calculating a signature for the random number using a signature function, in a trusted authentication chip;
encrypting the random number and the signature by a symmetric encryption function using a first key, in the trusted authentication chip;
passing the encrypted random number and signature from the trusted authentication chip to an untrusted authentication chip;
decrypting the encrypted random number and signature with a symmetric decryption function using the first key, in the untrusted authentication chip;
calculating a signature for the decrypted random number using the signature function, in the untrusted authentication chip;
comparing the signature calculated in the untrusted authentication chip with the signature decrypted;
in the event that the two signatures match, encrypting the decrypted random number by the symmetric encryption function using a second key and returning it to the trusted authentication chip;
encrypting the random number by the symmetric encryption function using the second key, in the trusted authentication chip;
comparing the two random numbers encrypted using the second key, in the trusted authentication chip;
in the event that the two random numbers encrypted using the second key match, considering the untrusted authentication chip to be valid;
otherwise considering the unfrosted authentication chip to be invalid.
2. The protocol according to claim 1, where the first and second keys are held in both the trusted and unfrosted authentication chips, and are kept secret.
3. The protocol according to claim 1, where the trusted authentication chip contains a random function to produce random numbers from a seed, and the function advances after each successful validation, so that the next random number will be produced from a new seed.
4. The protocol according to claim 1, where the symmetric decrypt function is held only in the unfrosted chip.
5. The protocol according to claim 1, where the signature function generates digital signatures of 160 bits.
6. The protocol according to claim 1, where a prove function is held only in the untrusted chip to test the decrypted random number and signature, and return the random number encrypted with the second key if a signature calculated from the decrypted random number matches the decrypted signature; otherwise it returns an indication the chip is invalid.
7.~The protocol according to claim 6, where the time taken to return an indication the chip is invalid is the same for all bad inputs, and the time taken to return the random number encrypted with the second key is the same for all good inputs.
8. ~The protocol according to claim 1, where a test function is held only in the trusted chip to advance the random number if the untrusted chip is valid; otherwise it returns an indication the chip is invalid.
9. ~The protocol according to claim 8, where the time taken to return an indication the chip is invalid is the same for all bad inputs, and the time taken to return an indication the chip is valid is the same for all good inputs.
10. ~The protocol according to claim 1, where it is used to determine the physical presence of a valid authentication chip.
11. ~A validation system for performing the method according to claim 1, where the system includes a trusted authentication chip and an untrusted authentication chip;
where the trusted authentication chip includes a random number generator, a symmetric encryption function and two keys for the function, a signature function and a test function; and the untrusted authentication chip includes a symmetric encryption and decryption function and two keys for these functions, a signature function, and a prove function to decrypt a random number and signature encrypted using the first key by the trusted authentication chip, and to calculate another signature from the decrypted random number, for comparison with the decrypted one, and in the event that the comparison is successful to encrypt the random number with the second key and send it back; the test function in the trusted chip then operates to generate an encrypted version of the random number using the second key and to compare it with the received version to validate the untrusted chip.
12. ~A validation system according to claim 11, where the remainder of the system is software, hardware or a combination of both, but the trusted chip is a physical authentication chip.
13. ~A validation system according to claim 11, where both chips have the same internal structure.
14. ~A validation system according to claim 11, where the first and second keys are kept secret.
15. ~A validation system according to claim 11, where the trusted authentication chip contains a random function to produce random numbers from a seed, and the function advances after each successful validation, so that the next random number will be produced from a new seed.
16. ~A validation system according to claim 11, where the signature function generates digital signatures of 160 bits.
17. ~A validation system according to claim 11, where the prove function returns an indication the chip is invalid for all bad inputs and the time taken to do this is the same for all bad inputs, and the time taken to return the random number encrypted with the second key is the same for all good inputs.
18. ~A validation system according to claim 11, where the test function advances the random number if the untrusted chip is validated.
19. ~A validation system according to claim 11, where the time taken for the test function to return an indication the chip not validated is the same for all bad inputs, and the time taken to return an indication that the chip is validated is the same for all good inputs.
20. A validation system according to claim 11, where it is used to determine the physical presence of a valid authentication chip.
CA2400223A 2000-02-15 2001-02-15 Validation protocol and system Expired - Fee Related CA2400223C (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US09/505,951 2000-02-15
US09/505,951 US7685423B1 (en) 2000-02-15 2000-02-15 Validation protocol and system
PCT/AU2001/000141 WO2001061918A1 (en) 2000-02-15 2001-02-15 Validation protocol and system

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CA2400223A1 true CA2400223A1 (en) 2001-08-23
CA2400223C CA2400223C (en) 2011-05-03

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CA2400223A Expired - Fee Related CA2400223C (en) 2000-02-15 2001-02-15 Validation protocol and system

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (4) US7685423B1 (en)
EP (1) EP1260054B1 (en)
AU (2) AU3144301A (en)
CA (1) CA2400223C (en)
SG (1) SG127733A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2001061918A1 (en)

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US7685424B2 (en) 2010-03-23
US7685423B1 (en) 2010-03-23
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AU3144301A (en) 2001-08-27
AU2001231443B2 (en) 2004-02-19
US20030159036A1 (en) 2003-08-21
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EP1260054A1 (en) 2002-11-27
CA2400223C (en) 2011-05-03
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US20040049678A1 (en) 2004-03-11
US20100153729A1 (en) 2010-06-17

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