WO2015083443A1

WO2015083443A1 - Transaction device and transaction method

Info

Publication number: WO2015083443A1
Application number: PCT/JP2014/077364
Authority: WO
Inventors: 昌史酢谷
Original assignee: 沖電気工業株式会社
Priority date: 2013-12-06
Filing date: 2014-10-14
Publication date: 2015-06-11
Also published as: JP2015111363A

Abstract

A transaction device is provided which has: a transaction means which carries out transactions with an operator by presenting to the operator an operation screen that can receive transaction operations; an image acquisition means which captures an image of an operator or of a medium inserted by the operator and which acquires the captured image thereof; a fraud determination means which determines whether or not there is a possibility of fraud on the transaction device; and an image display means which displays the image acquired by the image acquisition means on the operation screen if the fraud determination means has determined that there is a possibility of fraud.

Description

Transaction apparatus and transaction method

The present invention relates to a transaction apparatus and a transaction method, and can be applied to, for example, an ATM (Automatic Teller Machine) installed in a financial institution such as a bank or a convenience store.

Conventionally, there is an apparatus described in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-034813 as an ATM corresponding to a crime prevention function.

In the ATM described in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-034813, when an abnormality is detected by a door opening / closing sensor, a vibration sensor, a thermal sensor, etc., the current surrounding situation is imaged by the ATM camera and displayed on the display. To do. As a result, in the ATM described in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2001-034813, a security guard or the like rushed after the occurrence of an abnormality can immediately find a suspicious person such as the face or clothes of the suspicious person by looking at the image at the time of the occurrence of the abnormality. There is an effect that it is highly possible to obtain necessary information and to find a suspicious person relatively quickly.

However, as in ATM in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2001-034813, an abnormality detection means such as a door opening / closing sensor, a vibration sensor, a heat sensor, etc. has no effect of suppressing fraudulent acts such as transactions using forged cards. It was.

Therefore, a transaction apparatus and transaction method that can deter fraudulent acts are desired.

The transaction apparatus according to the first aspect of the present invention includes: (1) a transaction means for presenting an operation screen capable of accepting a transaction operation to the operator and performing a transaction with the operator; and (2) an operator and Image acquisition means for capturing at least one of media inserted by an operator and acquiring the captured image; (3) fraud determination means for determining the possibility of fraud against the transaction device; (4) An image display means for displaying an image acquired by the image acquisition means on the operation screen when the fraud determination means determines that there is a possibility of an illegal action.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, in the transaction method performed by the transaction apparatus, (1) transaction means, image acquisition means, fraud determination means, and image display means are provided. (2) The transaction means performs transaction operations. An operation screen that can be accepted is presented to the operator and a transaction is made with the operator. (3) The image acquisition means images at least one of the operator and the medium inserted by the operator, (4) the fraud determination means determines whether or not the transaction device may be fraudulent; (5) the image display means is the fraud determination means; When it is determined that there is a possibility of the image, the image acquired by the image acquisition unit is displayed on the operation screen.

According to the present invention, it is possible to provide a transaction apparatus capable of deterring fraud.

It is the block diagram shown about the functional structure of ATM which concerns on 1st Embodiment. It is an external appearance perspective view of ATM of a 1st embodiment. It is the flowchart shown about operation | movement of ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the transaction selection screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the money amount input screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the money amount input screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the screen in process displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the screen in process displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the statement slip issue selection screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the statement slip issue selection screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the card and statement receipt request | requirement screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the card and statement receipt request | requirement screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the card receipt request | requirement screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the card receipt request | requirement screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the cash receipt request | requirement screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the cash receipt request | requirement screen displayed by ATM of 1st Embodiment. It is the block diagram shown about the functional structure of ATM which concerns on 2nd Embodiment. It is an external appearance perspective view of ATM of 2nd Embodiment. It is the flowchart (the 1) shown about operation | movement of ATM of 2nd Embodiment. It is the flowchart (the 2) shown about operation | movement of ATM of 2nd Embodiment. It is explanatory drawing shown about the transaction selection screen displayed by ATM of 2nd Embodiment.

(A) 1st Embodiment Hereinafter, 1st Embodiment of the transaction apparatus and transaction method by this invention is described in full detail, referring drawings. 1st Embodiment demonstrates the example which applied the transaction apparatus of this invention to ATM.

(A-1) Configuration of the First Embodiment FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the ATM 1 according to the first embodiment. FIG. 2 is an external perspective view of the ATM 1 according to the first embodiment.

The ATM 1 performs transaction processing with the customer (for example, withdrawal of cash from the customer's account) by the operation of the customer who performs the transaction processing or the cooperative processing (for example, transaction processing) involving communication with the host computer 2. Etc.).

Next, the internal configuration of ATM1 will be described.

ATM 1 has a control unit 10, a network interface unit 20, a card processing device 30, an operation display unit camera 40, an operation display unit 50, a cash processing device 60, a statement processing device 70, and a journal processing device 80.

The control unit 10 has a function of controlling the operation of each unit in the ATM 1, and includes a transaction processing unit 11, a determination processing unit 12, an operator image acquisition / display processing unit 13, and a card image acquisition / display processing unit 14. have.

The control unit 10 includes, for example, a transaction program (transaction processing unit 11, determination processing unit 12, operator image acquisition / display processing unit 13, and card image) in a computer (program implementation configuration) including a processor and a communication interface. This can be realized by installing a program including the acquisition display processing unit 14).

The network interface unit 20 is an interface for connecting to the host computer 2 via a network line. Note that the network interface unit 20 can be the same as the existing ATM or the like, and will not be described in detail.

The operation display unit 50 has a user interface function with an operator who operates the ATM 1. The type of device used for the interface with the customer in the operation display unit 50 is not limited, but here, the touch panel display 51 capable of displaying a screen capable of accepting a transaction operation and a password such as a password. In the following description, it is assumed that the hardware key unit 52 including a hardware key (for example, a numeric keypad) capable of inputting the key is applied. The operation display unit 50 can be the same as that of various ATMs and the like, and thus detailed description thereof is omitted.

The cash processing device 60 has a function of receiving and storing cash (banknotes or coins) received from a customer and a function of withdrawing the stored cash to the customer. The cash processing apparatus 60 includes a banknote deposit / withdrawal port 601 for depositing / withdrawing banknotes and a coin deposit / withdrawal port 602 for depositing / withdrawing coins. In addition, since the thing similar to various ATM etc. can be applied for the cash processing apparatus 60, detailed description is abbreviate | omitted.

The card processing device 30 reads data of a card (medium, cash card) inserted by a customer at a card insertion / extraction port 301 (see FIG. 2). For the inserted card, the card processing device 30 captures an image of a card information handling unit 31 that can process (read or write) information on a data recording medium such as an IC chip and a magnetic stripe, A card image acquisition unit 32 that acquires an image captured on one side or both sides of the card (hereinafter referred to as “card image”). The card processing device 30 can apply the same components as those of various ATMs and the like other than the card image acquisition unit 32, and thus detailed description thereof will be omitted.

The card image acquisition unit 32 is not limited to a means for capturing the card and acquiring the card image. For example, the card image acquisition unit 32 irradiates the card with visible light (for example, irradiates light using illumination such as an LED). You may make it employ | adopt the structure imaged with a CCD camera etc. FIG.

The statement slip processing apparatus 70 prints transaction details on a printing paper and discharges the statement slip (receipt) from the statement slip discharge port 701. The detailed statement processing device 70 can be applied to various ATMs and the like, and detailed description thereof will be omitted.

The journal processing device 80 prints and holds a journal (transaction history information) on a journal printing paper (for example, roll paper) or the like. The journal processing device 80 can apply the same ones as various ATMs and the like, and will not be described in detail.

The operation display unit camera 40 images an operator who operates the operation display unit 50 and acquires an image thereof (hereinafter referred to as “operator image”). As the device itself of the operation display unit camera 40 and the installation method (setting method of the installation position and imaging direction / range), for example, the same imaging means used for crime prevention in various transaction devices such as ATMs is applied. Therefore, description of the detailed configuration is omitted. FIG. 2 shows a configuration in which the operation display unit camera 40 is arranged around the touch panel display 51 and is arranged at a position where it is easy to capture the face of a person looking into the touch panel display 51.

Next, the detailed configuration of the control unit 10 will be described.

The transaction processing unit 11 performs information processing for performing transaction processing with a customer (including processing associated with presentation of an operation screen to the customer and operation reception) and control of each component in the ATM 1 along with the transaction processing. Is what you do. Moreover, the transaction processing part 11 shall memorize | store the information of the operation log | history and transaction result log | history for the nearest predetermined period in the log | history information storage part 111 at least. Here, it is assumed that the history information storage unit 111 holds at least the history of accepting the input of a password by the transaction processing unit 11 and the authentication result of the password (transaction result from the host computer 2). .

The determination processing unit 12 performs a process (hereinafter also referred to as “fraud determination process”) for determining whether or not there is a possibility of fraud on the ATM 1 based on the transaction and operation history of the ATM 1. If the determination processing unit 12 determines that there is a possibility of an illegal act against the ATM 1, the determination processing unit 12 determines to perform a process of issuing a warning for suppressing the illegal action (hereinafter referred to as “illegal operation warning process”), According to the determination result, the operator image acquisition / display processing unit 13 and the card image acquisition / display processing unit 14 are controlled.

The operator image acquisition / display processing unit 13 performs processing for acquiring an operator image, displaying it, and outputting it according to control based on the determination result of the determination processing unit 12. Further, the card image acquisition / display processing unit 14 performs processing for acquiring a card image and displaying it according to control based on the determination result of the determination processing unit 12. In this embodiment, the operator image acquisition / display processing unit 13 and the card image acquisition / display processing unit 14 perform an unauthorized operation warning process by displaying an image on the touch panel display 51 being operated by the operator.

Next, details of fraud determination processing performed by the determination processing unit 12 will be described.

Here, description will be made assuming that the determination processing unit 12 performs fraud determination processing (determination processing for determining whether or not to perform the fraudulent operation warning processing) based on the history information stored in the history information storage unit 111.

For example, when a fraudulent person attempts to make a transaction by entering a personal identification number at ATM1 continuously using a large number of multiple types of counterfeit cards (when receiving a so-called PIN attack), a normal customer makes a transaction The password is entered more frequently than the password. For this reason, if the ATM 1 receives password input (password input using the hard key unit 52) at a predetermined frequency or more (including when authentication fails), the ATM 1 will receive an illegal output. It can be estimated that there is a possibility that money processing (for example, a withdrawal transaction by a person who does not own the card) is being performed.

Therefore, in this embodiment, as an example, the determination processing unit 12 inputs the code number at a frequency of twice or more when converted per minute based on the history information held in the history information storage unit 111. In this case, it is determined that there is a possibility that an illegal act has been performed. Specifically, for example, if the number of input of the personal identification number is 120 times or more by 60 minutes before the current time, the determination processing unit 12 (substantially at a frequency of 2 times or more per minute). If the personal identification number is input), it may be determined that there is a possibility that an illegal act has been performed.

For example, T1 is a check period for counting the number of input of a personal identification number (check period for fraud determination processing), a threshold value k1 used for determination, and the number of input of the personal identification number from the present time to a time point before the period T1 (history information storage unit 111 In the case where e1 is the number of inputs based on the history of (1), the determination processing unit 12 may determine that there is a possibility that an illegal act has been performed when e1 ≧ k1 is satisfied. Note that any value may be set for the check period T1 and the threshold value k1. For example, the determination processing unit 12 may set an arbitrary value in the range of 1 to 60 minutes for the check period T1 and 2 to 120 times for k1.

Further, the determination processing unit 12 makes an input mistake of the PIN number (host computer 2) in the same customer transaction (for example, transaction using the same account number) based on the information held in the history information storage unit 111. It is determined that there is a possibility that fraud has been carried out even when a notification that the personal identification number is nonconforming is generated a plurality of times. For example, when a fraudulent person attempts to make a transaction by entering a personal identification number at ATM1 continuously using a large number of multiple types of counterfeit cards (when receiving a so-called PIN attack), a normal customer makes a transaction In this case, mistakes in inputting the password occur more frequently. Therefore, if the same customer (account number of the same card) has entered a wrong PIN number several times in a short period of time (for example, one day), the ATM1 will use an unauthorized withdrawal process. It can be estimated that there is a possibility that (for example, a withdrawal transaction by a person who does not own the card) is being performed.

For example, T2 is a check period (counter of fraud determination processing) for counting a PIN number input error, a threshold value k2 used for determination, and the number of PIN code input mistakes from the current time to a time point before T2 (history information storage unit 111) When the number of inputs based on the history of e2 is e2 (where e2 is 2 or more), the determination processing unit 12 may determine that there is a possibility of fraud when e2 ≧ k2. . Note that arbitrary values may be set for the check period T2 and the threshold value k2. For example, the determination processing unit 12 may set 1 to 24 hours for the check period T2.

As described above, in ATM1, the card image acquisition unit 32, the operation display unit camera 40, the operator image acquisition display processing unit 13, and the card image acquisition display processing unit 14 realize an image acquisition unit. In ATM1, the transaction processing unit 11 and the customer operation display unit 50 realize a transaction unit and a password acceptance unit. Furthermore, in ATM1, the determination processing unit 12 and the information storage unit 111 realize a fraud determination unit. Furthermore, in ATM1, the operator image acquisition display processing unit 13, the card image acquisition display processing unit 14, and the touch panel display 51 realize an image display means.

(A-2) Operation of the First Embodiment Next, the operation of the ATM 1 of the first embodiment having the above configuration will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG.

Here, as an initial state, on the touch panel display 51 based on the control of the transaction processing unit 11, an operation screen capable of selecting the type of transaction (for example, a plurality of deposit transactions, withdrawal transactions, balance inquiry, etc.) It is assumed that an operation screen capable of selecting one of the transactions from the transaction, and hereinafter referred to as a “transaction selection screen”) is displayed. In this example, it is assumed that the withdrawal transaction is selected on the transaction selection screen by the operator (S101).

Here, as an example, it is assumed that a transaction selection screen as shown in FIG. 4 is displayed on the touch panel display 51 and the button B101 for accepting a withdrawal transaction is pressed.

Next, it is assumed that the transaction processing unit 11 displays a screen for requesting insertion of a card on the touch panel display 51 (for example, a screen displaying a message “Please insert a card”). Then, it is assumed that a card has been inserted into the card insertion / extraction port 301 of the card processing device 30 by the operator (S102).

Next, the transaction processing unit 11 controls the card processing device 30 (card information handling unit 31) to read data recorded on the card (S103), and further, the card processing device 30 (card image acquisition unit 32). ) To capture the card and acquire a card image (S104).

Then, the transaction processing unit 11 controls the operation display unit camera 40 to capture an image, and acquires an operator image (S105).

Next, the transaction processing unit 11 displays on the touch panel display 51 a screen requesting input of a password (for example, a password) (for example, a screen displaying a message “Please enter the password”). It is assumed that the personal identification number is input using the hard key unit 52 (S106).

When the personal identification number is input, the determination processing unit 12 performs fraud determination processing based on the number of input of the personal identification number (S107). At this time, the determination processing unit 12 obtains the number of times e1 by acquiring the history in which the password is input from the history information for the check period T1 in the history information storage unit 111. And the determination process part 12 determines with the possibility that the fraudulent act was performed, when e1 is more than threshold value k1 (when it is e1> = k1).

In the above-described step S107, when the determination processing unit 12 determines that there is a possibility that an illegal act has been performed, the operator image acquisition display processing unit 13 and the card image acquisition display processing unit 14 are at least currently executed. Until the end of the transaction, the process of displaying the card image and the operator image on the touch panel display 51 is continued (S108).

Next, the transaction processing unit 11 displays an operation screen (hereinafter referred to as “amount input screen”) for receiving an input of the transaction amount from the operator on the touch panel display 51 and receives an input of the transaction amount from the operator ( S109). 5A and 5B show a configuration example of the money amount input screen. FIG. 5A is a normal money amount input screen (an operation screen when the unauthorized operation warning process is not performed). FIG. 5B is an amount input screen for performing an unauthorized operation warning process, and an operator image G101 and a card image G102 are additionally displayed.

Next, the transaction processing unit 11 communicates with the host computer 2 via the network interface unit 20 and executes information processing (transaction processing) related to the accepted transaction processing (processing of withdrawal transaction) (S110).

The transaction processing unit 11 is a screen for notifying the operator that the transaction processing is being executed on the touch panel display 51 while communicating with the host computer 2 (hereinafter referred to as “processing screen”). ) Is displayed. 6A and 6B show a configuration example of the money amount input screen.
FIG. 6A is a normal processing-in-progress screen (screen in the case of not performing an illegal operation warning process). FIG. 6B is a processing screen when performing an unauthorized operation warning process, and an operator image G101 and a card image G102 are additionally displayed.

Next, the determination processing unit 12 performs fraud determination processing based on the number of input mistakes for the password (S111).

At this time, the determination processing unit 12 uses the same transaction as the customer related to the transaction currently being executed (the same as the card inserted in the card processing device 30) from the history information for the past check period T2 in the history information storage unit 111. In the account number transaction), the number of times e2 (the number of times the non-conformity of the password is notified from the host computer 2) that has occurred is entered and obtained. Then, the determination processing unit 12 determines that there is a possibility that an illegal act has been performed when e2 is equal to or greater than the threshold value k2 (when e2 ≧ k2).

In the above-described step S111, when the determination processing unit 12 determines that there is a possibility that an illegal act has been performed, the operator image acquisition display processing unit 13 touches the touch panel at least until after the transaction currently being executed. The process of displaying the card image and the operator image on the display 51 is continuously performed (S112). If the unauthorized operation warning process (process for displaying the card image and the operator image) has already been started in step S108 described above, the operator image acquisition / display processing unit 13 continues the process. It will be.

Next, the transaction processing unit 11 controls the journal processing device 80 to print the current transaction content on a journal printing paper and acquire (hold) it as a journal (S113).

Next, the transaction processing unit 11 displays on the touch panel display 51 a screen for allowing the operator to select whether or not to issue a statement slip (hereinafter referred to as a “detail statement issuance selection screen”). The necessity of issuing a vote is accepted (S114).

7A and 7B show a configuration example of the statement slip issue selection screen. FIG. 7A is a normal statement slip issue selection screen. FIG. 7B is a detailed statement issuance selection screen when performing an illegal operation warning process, and an operator image G101 and a card image G102 are additionally displayed.

Next, the transaction processing unit 11 controls the card processing device 30 to discharge the card from the card insertion / discharge port 301. In addition, in the above-described step S114, the transaction processing unit 11 controls the statement slip processing device 70 to print the details of the current transaction on the statement slip sheet when the operator selects issue of the statement slip. Then, it is discharged from the statement slip discharge port 701. In addition, in the above-described step S114, when the issue slip is selected by the operator, the transaction processing unit 11 displays a screen requesting the operator to receive the card and the statement slip (hereinafter referred to as a “card / detail slip receipt request screen”). Is displayed on the touch panel display 51. On the other hand, in the above-described step S114, when the statement slip issue is not selected by the operator, the transaction processing unit 11 displays a screen for requesting the operator to receive a card (hereinafter referred to as “card receipt request screen”). It is displayed on the touch panel display 51 (S115).

FIGS. 8A and 8B (FIGS. 9A and B) show a configuration example of a card / detail slip receipt request screen (card receipt request screen). FIG. 8A (FIG. 9A) is a normal card / detail slip receipt request screen (card receipt request screen). FIG. 8B (FIG. 9B) is a normal card / detail slip receipt request screen (card receipt request screen) when performing an illegal operation warning process, and an operator image G101 and a card image G102 are additionally displayed.

When the card and statement slip (when discharged) are extracted by the operator, the transaction processing unit 11 controls the cash processing device 60 to perform a withdrawal transaction from the banknote deposit / withdrawal port 601 or the coin deposit / withdrawal port 602. The accompanying cash is discharged (released). At this time, the transaction processing unit 11 displays a screen for requesting the operator to receive cash (hereinafter referred to as a “cash receipt request screen”) on the touch panel display 51 (S116).

10A and 10B show a configuration example of the cash receipt request screen. FIG. 10A is a normal cash receipt request screen. FIG. 10B is a cash receipt request screen when performing an unauthorized operation warning process, and an operator image G101 and a card image G102 are additionally displayed.

(A-3) Effects of the First Embodiment According to the first embodiment, the following effects can be achieved.

In ATM1, when the determination processing unit 12 determines that there is a possibility of an illegal act on the ATM1, the operator image and the card image are displayed and output on the touch panel display 51 as an unauthorized operation warning process. Thus, in ATM1, by displaying an operator image and a card image, for example, by making an unauthorized operator who uses a counterfeit card recognize that monitoring and image retention are being performed, The operator can be restrained (pressurized) and cheating can be suppressed.

Further, usually, forged cards, only the magnetic stripe (MS) of the normal card is forged, and the image and processing of the card surface (formation of embossed data) are often not reproduced. However, during the transaction, the counterfeit card is contained in the card processing device 30 and thus is not seen by others. Therefore, in ATM1, by displaying a card image that can be understood as a card that is clearly not authentic (counterfeit card), it is possible to check (provide pressure) an unauthorized operator who uses the counterfeit card and to suppress fraud.

In addition, in ATM1, an unauthorized operation warning process may be performed on the basis of an operation of a normal customer (regular customer) who does not intend fraud, and there is a possibility of an illegal operation. For a legitimate customer, the displayed operator image and card image are the display of their own image and their card, and can be regarded as simple operation guidance, and there is an effect that it is difficult to have a sense of incongruity.

(B) Second Embodiment Hereinafter, a second embodiment of the transaction apparatus and the transaction method according to the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. 2nd Embodiment demonstrates the example which applied the transaction apparatus of this invention to ATM.

(B-1) Configuration of Second Embodiment FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of ATM 1A according to the second embodiment. FIG. 12 is an external perspective view of an ATM 1A according to the second embodiment.

ATM1A is different from the first embodiment in that a skimming detection device 90 is added and the control unit 10 (determination processing unit 12) is replaced with the control unit 10A (determination processing unit 12A).

ATM includes foreign substances such as a device (hereinafter referred to as “skimming device” or “illegal reader”) that illegally extracts data (data on a data recording medium such as a magnetic stripe attached to the card) from an inserted card. It may be attached. The skimming detection device 90 is a sensor that can detect whether or not a skimming device is attached to the card processing device 30 (mainly around the card insertion / discharge port 301). Although the specific detection configuration of the skimming detection device 90 is not limited, for example, the skimming detection device 90 may be configured using a sensor described in Reference Document 1 (Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2010-250711). it can. Here, the skimming detection apparatus 90 is demonstrated as what is arrange | positioned around the card insertion discharge port 301. FIG.

Then, the determination processing unit 12A of the second embodiment determines that there is a possibility that an illegal act has been performed based on the detection state of the skimming detection device 90. Specifically, the determination processing unit 12A determines that there is a possibility that an illegal act has been performed even when it is detected that a skimming device is attached to the ATM 1A.

The skimming detection device 90 includes a function for preventing skimming, such as a function for obstructing the operation of the skimming device and a function for detecting fraudulent acts on the card processing device 30 (for example, an act of opening the casing or applying vibration). May be added. If the skimming detection device 90 is compatible with the function of detecting other fraudulent acts (acts of opening the casing or applying vibration) to the card processing device 30 described above, the skimming device itself is attached. Even if it cannot be detected, it may be determined that there is a possibility that fraud has been performed when the above-mentioned fraud is detected.

The determination processing unit 12A does not insert a card into the card processing device 30 even before the transaction operation by the operator starts (for example, before the transaction content is selected on the transaction selection screen) or after the transaction starts. Even in the state, if the skimming detection device 90 detects an illegal act (for example, the detection of the skimming device or the above-mentioned illegal act with respect to the card processing device 30), the operator image acquisition display processing unit 13 is controlled. Then, an operator image capturing / display process (a process of additionally displaying on the touch panel display 51) is performed.

In addition, the determination processing unit 12 </ b> A allows the skimming detection device 90 to perform fraud (for example, the detection of the skimming device or the above-mentioned for the card processing device 30) even after the card is inserted into the card processing device 30 during the transaction operation. When an illegal action is detected, the operator image acquisition / display processing unit 13 and the card image acquisition / display processing unit 14 are controlled, and the operator image and card image imaging / display processing (additionally displayed on the touch panel display 51). Process).

As described above, in the ATM 1A of the second embodiment, the unauthorized reading device detection means is realized by the skimming detection device 90.

(B-2) Operation of the Second Embodiment Next, the operation of the ATM 1A of the second embodiment having the above configuration will be described with reference to the flowcharts of FIGS.

Hereinafter, only differences from the first embodiment will be described in the ATM 1A of the second embodiment. The ATM 1A according to the second embodiment is different from the first embodiment in that the processing of the flowcharts of FIGS. 13 and 14 is added. The processing of the flowcharts of FIGS. 13 and 14 is executed in parallel with the processing of the flowchart of FIG. 3 described above in ATM 1A.

FIG. 13 shows an ATM 1A in which a card is inserted into the card processing device 30 before the transaction operation is started by the operator's operation (for example, the state before step S101 described above) and after the transaction is started. FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram showing processing executed in the control unit 10A in a state where there is no state (a state between steps S101 to S102 described above).

At this time, the control unit 10A (determination processing unit 12A) continues the process of monitoring the detection state of the skimming detection device 90 as shown in FIG. 13 (S201).

When the skimming detection device 90 detects an illegal act, the determination processing unit 12A determines to perform the illegal operation warning process, and controls the operator image acquisition / display processing unit 13 to capture the operator image. Display processing (processing to additionally display on the touch panel display 51) is performed (S202, S203).

For example, in the state where the transaction selection screen shown in FIG. 4 described above is displayed on the touch panel display 51, when the fraudulent act is detected by the skimming detection device 90, the determination processing unit 12A follows the flowchart of FIG. It is determined that the unauthorized operation warning process is performed. Then, the operator image acquisition display processing unit 13 captures an operator image and additionally displays it on the touch panel display 51 as shown in FIG. FIG. 15 is a transaction selection screen for performing an unauthorized operation warning process, and an operator image G101 is additionally displayed.

FIG. 14 shows the ATM 1A, which is executed by the control unit 10A after the transaction operation is started by the operation of the operator, the card is inserted, and the operator image and the card image are acquired (after the process of step S104 described above). It is explanatory drawing shown about the process performed.

At this time, the control unit 10A (determination processing unit 12A) continues the process of monitoring the detection state of the skimming detection device 90 as shown in FIG. 14 (S301).

If the skimming detection device 90 detects an unauthorized act, the determination processing unit 12A determines to perform an unauthorized operation warning process, and controls the operator image acquisition display processing unit 13 and the card image acquisition display processing unit 14. Then, display processing of the operator image and card image (processing of additionally displaying on the touch panel display 51) is performed (S302). Thereafter, the determination processing unit 12A performs control so that the display process of the operator image and the card image is continuously performed at least until the transaction currently being executed is completed.

(B-3) Effects of Second Embodiment According to the second embodiment, the following effects can be obtained in addition to the effects of the first embodiment.

In ATM1A, since the possibility of fraudulent acts is determined using the detection state of the skimming detection device 90 as well, the fraudulent person who wears a foreign object such as a skimming device is displayed on the touch panel display 51 as a fraudulent operation warning process. Display and output images. As a result, in ATM1A, unauthorized persons wearing foreign objects, such as skimming devices, are also aware of the fact that monitoring and image retention are being performed, thereby restraining the unauthorized operator (applying pressure) Can be suppressed.

(C) Other Embodiments The present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiments, and may include modified embodiments as exemplified below.

(C-1) In each of the above embodiments, an example in which the transaction apparatus of the present invention is applied to ATM has been described. However, the transaction apparatus may be applied to other transaction apparatuses. For example, a transaction device that performs transactions using an IC card that can be charged (deposited) with cash dispensers, electronic money, etc. (for example, a ticket machine at a transportation facility, a transaction that performs processing for charging an IC card, etc.) You may make it apply the transaction apparatus of this invention with respect to an apparatus.

(C-2) In the ATM of each of the embodiments described above, it has been described that both the operator image and the card image are acquired and displayed. However, only one of the images may be acquired and displayed.

(C-3) In each of the above embodiments, the customer operation display unit 50 is equipped with the touch panel display 51 and the hard key unit 52. However, the touch panel display 51 alone is used, and the software key (on the operation screen) The input may be accepted only with the button.

(C-4) In each of the above embodiments, an example has been described in which cards handled are not distinguished between Japanese bank cards and overseas bank cards (cards issued by banks other than Japan). The transaction apparatus of the present invention may be applied only when the bank card is used. In other words, the transaction apparatus of each of the above embodiments does not distinguish between the types of cards used for the transaction, but is handled differently only for specific types of cards (for example, cards issued from overseas banks). May be performed. Specifically, for example, in the transaction apparatus of each of the embodiments described above, only the history of using overseas bank cards is considered as history information referred to in the fraud determination process for determining whether or not fraudulent activity is necessary ( You may make it refer). In ATMs in Japan, cards used for fraudulent acts are often foreign bank cards (counterfeit cards for overseas bank accounts), so the above configuration is adopted in the ATMs of the above embodiments. Thus, it is possible to perform fraud determination processing with higher accuracy. In the ATM of each of the above embodiments, the method for determining whether the card issuance source is a Japanese bank or an overseas bank is not limited. For example, data included in a magnetic stripe (for example, an identification code of a financial institution) ) Or the like.

The entire disclosure of Japanese Patent Application 2013-253425 is incorporated herein by reference.

All documents, patent applications, and technical standards mentioned in this specification are to the same extent as if each individual document, patent application, and technical standard were specifically and individually described to be incorporated by reference, Incorporated herein by reference.

Claims

A transaction means for presenting an operation screen capable of accepting a transaction operation to the operator and performing a transaction with the operator;
Image acquisition means for imaging at least one of an operator and a medium inserted by the operator and acquiring the captured image;
Fraud determination means for determining the possibility of fraud against the transaction device;
An image display means for displaying an image acquired by the image acquisition means on the operation screen when it is determined by the fraud determination means that there is a possibility of an illegal action;
A transaction device.
A password receiving means for receiving a password input from the operator;
The fraud determination means determines the possibility of fraud based on a password input history of the password acceptance means;
The transaction apparatus according to claim 1.
3. The transaction apparatus according to claim 2, wherein the fraud determination means determines that there is a possibility of fraud when the frequency of password input accepted by the password acceptance means exceeds a predetermined value.
4. The transaction apparatus according to claim 3, wherein the fraudulent determination means determines that there is a possibility of fraud when the number of password inputs within a predetermined period is equal to or greater than a threshold value.
The transaction apparatus according to any one of claims 2 to 4, wherein the fraudulent act determination means determines that there is a possibility of fraud based on a history of input of an incompatible password to the password accepting means. .
6. The fraudulent act determining means determines that there is a possibility of fraud if a wrong password is input to the password accepting means a plurality of times for the same customer transaction within a predetermined period. Transaction equipment.
An unauthorized reading device detecting means for detecting that an unauthorized reading device for illegally reading a medium inserted into the transaction device is attached;
2. The fraudulent act determination unit according to claim 1, wherein when the fraudulent reader detection unit detects that the fraudulent reader is attached to the transaction apparatus, the fraudulent act determination unit determines that there is a possibility of fraud. Trading device.
When the image display means is determined by the fraud determination means to have a possibility of fraud, at least until the transaction currently being executed by the transaction means is completed on the operation screen, The transaction apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the display of the image acquired by the image acquisition unit is continued.
The fraudulent determination means uses the transaction history of the transaction performed by the transaction means using only a specific type of medium, and whether or not there is a possibility of fraud against the transaction device. The transaction apparatus according to claim 1, wherein:
10. The transaction apparatus according to claim 9, wherein the specific type of medium is a medium issued in a country other than Japan.
In the transaction method performed by the transaction device,
Provided with transaction means, image acquisition means, fraud determination means, image display means,
The transaction means presents an operation screen capable of accepting a transaction operation to the operator, conducts a transaction with the operator,
The image acquisition means images at least one of an operator and a medium inserted by the operator, acquires the captured image,
The fraud determination means determines the possibility of fraud against the transaction device,
The image display means displays the image acquired by the image acquisition means on the operation screen when the fraud determination means determines that there is a possibility of fraud.
Transaction system.