JPS58141066A - Detecting method for mischievous call - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To detect a mischievous call immediately without the operation of a person in charge of maintenance by providing a memory wherein calling-subscriber in formation for every subscriber is stored and an output device which, when a subscriber dials a specified number, calls a subscriber corresponding to said calling subscriber information to inform the call. CONSTITUTION:When this method is applied to a local connection, a subscriber A (number 2001) originates to call a subscriber B (number 3112). At this time, the number 2001 of the subscriber A is stored in a calling subscriber memory M for the subscriber B provided for every subscriber. When the subscriber B answers to the call, the number 2001 stored in the memory M is transferred to an answer memory N for the subscriber B provided for every subscriber and the response time is further stored. When the subscriber B judges that the call is mischievous, a specified number is dialed immediately after the completion of the call. When the number is received by an originating register trunk ORT, the subscriber A is called through a link 6 according to the storage contents of the memory N and at the same time, the calling- subscriber's number 2001, called-subscriber's number, and answer time are outputted on a typewriter TP under the control of a central controller CC to obtain the evidence of the mischievous call.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to a method for detecting malicious calls in a telephone exchange.

In the conventional malicious call detection method, the exchange maintainer performs some kind of operation to detect a malicious call based on the notification from the subscriber, and it is almost impossible to detect a malicious call only once with this method. . It is difficult to detect malicious calls that occur for a long time, such as once a year, and it takes time and effort to detect malicious calls that occur to an unspecified number of subscribers. In addition, the workload of maintenance personnel is heavy.

The object of the present invention is to eliminate the above-mentioned drawbacks, that is, to provide a malicious call detection method that does not require any operation by a maintenance person and can detect any malicious call.

To achieve this objective, the malicious call detection method of the present invention includes a first memory for storing a calling number, generally for each subscriber, and a first memory for storing a calling number when the subscriber answers a call. a second memory for storing a calling party number and a response time; An output device that records the called party number and response time, and a central control device that controls the memory and the output device are provided, and if the called party determines that the call is a malicious call, the Fi
The device is characterized by dialing the specific number after the call ends, calling back the malicious call, and displaying the message on the output device to confirm the malicious call.

That is, according to the present invention, if there is even one malicious call, the other party can be detected immediately without relying on the operation of a maintenance person.

Another advantage is that even if it is not a malicious call, even if you forget to ask the other party's phone number after the call ends, you can still call by dialing the specific number.

Next, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

FIG. 1 shows that in a first connection in which the present invention is applied to an internal connection, when subscriber A (for example, extension number 2001) makes a call and is connected to the calling register trunk ORT and the link ■ of the communication path SW, Link subscriber B (internal number 3112)■
Called by At this time, the extension number of subscriber A, who is the calling party, is stored in the calling party memory for subscriber B (hereinafter referred to as M) in the first memory M created for each subscriber under the control of the central controller CC. 2001 is stored. When subscriber B is called on the output signal trunk GT and responds, the extension number 2 stored in the calling party memory (M) for subscriber B is called.
001 is the second memo created for each subscriber1. IN
Among them, the response memory for subscriber B (hereinafter referred to as N) also stores the response time. After such control, subscriber A and subscriber B start talking via links ①, ② and their own rank IDT. If subscriber B, who is the called party, determines that the call is a malicious call, he immediately issues a call termination IK and dials a specific number. Furthermore, at this time,
Caller memo for subscriber B even if called by another subscriber before making a call! j (M) will be rewritten, but if there is no response, it will be a response memo for subscriber B! j(N) still has the extension number 2001, so you can make the call after the bell stops ringing. When a specific number is dialed and received at the originating register trunk ORT via the link ■, it calls the subscriber A from the stored contents of the answer memory (N) for the subscriber B via the link ■, and at the same time calls the central leg unit. C
Under the control of C, the typewriter outputs the malicious call's calling number 2001, called party number 3112, and response time (for example, '10:30) to ITP via the interface device INT.
is output and serves as evidence of a malicious call. At this time, if subscriber A is busy, subscriber B will hear the busy tone and will receive a "K" message, but the memorized contents of the response memo +7 (N) for subscriber B are saved, so you can make the call as many times as you like. and dial a specific number. Subscriber A responds with links ■, ■ and internal trunk 1. Once connected via OT, calls can be made. Even if subscriber A is restored in such a connected state, the communication channel can be prevented from becoming empty if a specific number is dialed. This is a rounding that allows a maintenance person to investigate such a connection state even in a telephone exchange that does not have a typewriter output device 1TP or the like. In Figure 1, the same internal trunks and links ■, ■, etc. were used for initial connection and repeat connection, but normally these trunks and links are arbitrarily selected and connected by the central controller. It is something.

In addition, 1. shown in FIG. The details of the second memories M and N are as shown in FIG.

FIG. 3 is a relay system diagram of a second embodiment in which the present invention is applied to inter-office connections. As shown in Figure 3, a subscriber subscriber connected to a different exchange calls subscriber B outside his/her own station, so the link from the sender 8ND to the communication path 8W2 ■9 Outgoing trunk OG
The incoming trunk ICTK numeric information of the other station is sent via T. For example, at this time, subscriber B's called party number 3112, calling station number AB, and calling party number 2001 are sent out as a series of information. When subscriber B enters the calling state by the link ■ of communication path SW1 of the other station, a caller memo for subscriber B at the other station! J(M) stores the calling station number AB and calling party number 2001 as calling party information AB2001.

Subscriber B responds and links ■ of call path SW1 and call path SW
When the state is terminated via link 2, the caller information AB2001 stored in the calling thought memory CM)K for subscriber B at the other station is transferred to the response memo IJ (N
) and also stores the time of response.

When the call ends and Person B determines that the call is a malicious call, he immediately makes a call and dials a specific number via link 8 of communication path 8W1. Here, reply memo IJ for subscriber B (
N) The other station is identified from the calling party information AB2001 stored in the sender 8ND, and the specific number and the called party number 2001 are transmitted from the sender 8ND to the incoming trunk ICT of the other station via the link ■ of the communication path 8W1 and the outgoing trunk OG 'I'. Send to. At this time, the calling party number AB2001, called party number 3112, and response time are output as malicious information from the central control unit CC to the typewriter output device via the interface device INT. The method of this output is the same as that shown in FIG. When subscriber A responds from the calling state via the ringing signal trunk RGT and link ■, subscriber A and subscriber B enter an inter-office communication state via link ■ of communication path 8Wl and communication path 8W2Cr) link ■. .

In such a state, even if subscriber A recovers, the line will not be opened until subscriber B recovers, provided that subscriber B is called by a specific number, so the maintenance person can investigate the connection status.

Note that the memory in this embodiment is the calling party memory (first
memory) and response memory (second memory) KAB2
The memory is the same as that shown in FIGS. 1 and 2, except that a calling station number such as 001 is added. Storing the calling subscriber's information in the memory for the called subscriber in this way
It becomes possible to detect malicious calls more immediately.

As explained above, the present invention includes a memory that stores calling party information for each subscriber, and a device that, when a subscriber dials a specific number, calls the subscriber with the calling party information and makes a call to that effect. By providing an output device, it is possible to immediately detect a malicious call without any operation by a maintenance person.

Simple Table Explanation on Page 1 FIG. 1 is a relay system diagram of the first embodiment in which the present invention is applied to connections within the local station, FIG. 2 is a storage state diagram showing an example of the memory in the present invention, and FIG. FIG. 7 is a relay system diagram of a second embodiment in which the present invention is applied to inter-office connections.

A, B... (extension) subscriber, SW...
Call path, ORT...Outgoing register trunk, I
OT・・・・・・Trunk within own station, RGT・・・・・・
Ringing signal trunk, M...Caller memory for subscriber B (first memory), N...Response memory for subscriber B (second memory).

ICT...Incoming trunk, OGT...
Outgoing trunk, SND...Pulse sender trunk, CC...Central control unit, INT...
・Interface device, TP...Output device for typewriter.

No.? figure

Claims (1)

[Claims] In the method for detecting malicious calls in a switching system, each subscriber has a first memory configured to store a calling number, and each subscriber has a first memory configured to store a calling number and a response when the subscriber answers a call. a second memory for storing time and a calling party number stored in the first and second memories of the dialed subscriber when the subscriber dials a particular number; Additionally, an output device for recording the calling party number, called party number, and response time as a malicious call, and a central control device controlling the memory and the output device are provided. If it is determined to be a malicious call, dial the specific number at the end of the call and detect the malicious call based on the information displayed on the output device and the other party's name that is output from the memory contents of the first and second mesori. A malicious call detection method that uses