JP6565866B2 - Fraud prevention device and fraud prevention unit - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a fraud prevention device for preventing unauthorized exchange of equipment used in a vehicle and a fraud prevention unit including the fraud prevention device. In particular, the present invention relates to prevention of unauthorized replacement of products mounted at positions that can be easily viewed by a user, such as ETC (registered trademark) and in-vehicle navigation devices.

  2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, a technique for preventing unauthorized exchange of equipment used in a vehicle using near field communication (NFC) is known. For example, Patent Document 1 discloses an unauthorized modification detection system that detects whether or not a regular radiator is attached by reading ID information transmitted from an RFID attached to the radiator with an ECU. Patent Document 1 also discloses a tampering detection system that uses a non-contact temperature sensor and a contact temperature sensor in combination with RFID to detect an act of fraudulently attaching the RFID in an unauthorized manner. Is disclosed. In this unauthorized modification detection system, the temperature information from the non-contact type temperature sensor and the contact type temperature sensor is compared with the correlation between the radiator surface temperature and the engine water temperature recorded in advance by the ECU. It is determined whether or not the temperature sensor is properly attached to the radiator.

JP 2007-22467 A

  Even if the ID information returned from the RFID is intercepted and the legitimate ID information is forged, the fraudulent modification detection system disclosed in Patent Document 1 can judge fraud if the legitimate temperature information is not forged. It becomes possible. However, the correlation between the radiator surface temperature and the engine water temperature varies depending on the vehicle, and the characteristics vary depending on the aging of the equipment. Therefore, it is difficult to set this correlation.

  Further, in the unauthorized modification detection system disclosed in Patent Document 1, it is difficult to share the design. For example, when trying to apply a tampering detection system developed for one vehicle to another vehicle, reexamine the relationship between the radiator surface temperature and the engine water temperature according to the vehicle, and It is necessary to adjust the parameters to take into account the effects of deterioration and variation, and it takes a lot of man-hours to change the design.

  The present invention has been made in view of the above-described conventional problems, and an object of the present invention is to prevent unauthorized replacement of devices used in a vehicle more easily and reliably while using short-range wireless communication. It is an object of the present invention to provide a fraud prevention device and a fraud prevention unit that make it possible.

  The above object is achieved by a combination of the features described in the independent claims, and the subclaims define further advantageous embodiments of the invention. Reference numerals in parentheses described in the claims indicate a correspondence relationship with specific means described in the embodiments described later as one aspect, and do not limit the technical scope of the present invention. .

  In order to achieve the above object, a fraud prevention device of the present invention is a fraud prevention device used in a vehicle, and is a short distance between the wireless tag (10, 10a) used in the vehicle and transmitting an identification code. By comparing the short-range communication unit (25) that performs wireless communication with the identification code received from the wireless tag by the short-range communication unit, the target device (30) to which the wireless tag is fixed and the target device including the own device ( 20) includes a fraud determination unit (206) that determines whether or not the target device (20, 30) is illegally exchanged, and a travel determination unit (203) that determines whether the vehicle is traveling. The distance communication unit requests the wireless tag to transmit the identification code and transmits the identification code from the wireless tag, and does not transmit the identification code from the wireless tag until the traveling determination unit determines that the vehicle is traveling. .

  According to this, since the target device is fixed to the wireless tag or includes the fraud prevention device, the fraud determination unit checks the identification code received by the fraud prevention device from the wireless tag through short-range wireless communication. It can be determined whether the device has been tampered with. In order to forge the identification code, it is conceivable to intercept the identification code transmitted from the wireless tag. However, it is difficult to intercept the identification code unless the vehicle is stopped. On the other hand, according to the present invention, it is difficult to forge the identification code easily by preventing the identification code from being transmitted from the wireless tag until the traveling determination unit determines that the vehicle is traveling. be able to. As a result, it is possible to more easily and more reliably prevent unauthorized exchange of devices used in the vehicle while using short-range wireless communication.

  The fraud prevention unit of the present invention includes the above-described fraud prevention device (21, 21a) and a wireless tag (10, 10a) that is used in the same vehicle where the fraud prevention device is used and transmits an identification code. Including. According to this, since the above-described fraud prevention device is included, it is possible to more easily and more reliably prevent unauthorized exchange of equipment used in the vehicle while using short-range wireless communication.

It is a figure which shows an example of a schematic structure of the system 3 for vehicles. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of a vehicle-side unit 1. FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of a fraud prevention processing unit 200. FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a flow of fraud determination-related processing in the fraud prevention device 21. 10 is a diagram for explaining an example of a configuration of Modification 1. FIG. It is a figure which shows an example of the schematic structure of the system 3a for vehicles. It is a figure which shows an example of a schematic structure of the vehicle side unit 1a.

  A plurality of embodiments and modifications for disclosure will be described with reference to the drawings. For convenience of explanation, between the plurality of embodiments and the modified examples, parts having the same functions as those shown in the drawings used for the explanation so far are denoted by the same reference numerals and description thereof is omitted. There is a case. For the portions denoted by the same reference numerals, the description in other embodiments and / or modifications can be referred to.

(Embodiment 1)
<Schematic configuration of vehicle system 3>
Embodiment 1 of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. As shown in FIG. 1, the vehicle system 3 includes a vehicle-side unit 1 used in the vehicle A and a center 2. The vehicle-side unit 1 includes an NFC (Near Field Communication) tag 10 and an in-vehicle device 20. Details of the vehicle-side unit 1 will be described later. In the present embodiment, an explanation will be given by taking an automobile as an example of the vehicle A, but it may be applied to a vehicle such as a motorcycle other than the automobile.

  The center 2 is a server device of a company, a store, a public institution, or the like, and communicates with the vehicle-mounted device 20 via a public communication network and a base station, so that a user who uses the vehicle-mounted device 20 is provided. To provide a predetermined service. An example of the predetermined service includes a service that automatically performs road pricing and parking fee settlement based on information such as the position of the vehicle A obtained from the vehicle-mounted device 20. The center 2 may be composed of a plurality of server devices.

<Schematic configuration of vehicle-side unit 1>
Next, the vehicle side unit 1 will be described. As described above, the vehicle-side unit 1 includes the NFC tag 10 and the vehicle-mounted device 20. The NFC tag 10 corresponds to a wireless tag in the claims, and the vehicle-mounted device 20 corresponds to a target device in the claims.

  The NFC tag 10 is a wireless tag that is fixed to the vehicle A and performs near field communication (NFC) with the vehicle-mounted device 20 existing within the communication range. The near field communication mentioned here is communication according to the NFC standard, and the communication distance is limited to about 10 cm. Near field communication can be rephrased as near field wireless communication.

  The NFC tag 10 may be an active type wireless tag or a passive type wireless tag, but in the present embodiment, the passive type wireless tag that functions by converting radio waves from the vehicle-mounted device 20 into electric power. And As an example, the NFC tag 10 is affixed to a glass, a body portion, or the like such as a windshield of the vehicle A in a state that is difficult to remove. The state where it is difficult to remove includes a state where it is difficult to remove without breakage, a state where removal is difficult, and the like. The NFC tag 10 stores a unique password in the nonvolatile memory, and transmits an identification code by short-range wireless communication only when a password that matches the unique password is received. This password corresponds to the authentication information in the claims.

  The vehicle-mounted device 20 is attached in the vicinity of the NFC tag 10 as shown in FIG. 1 so that a short-range communication device 25 (described later) included in the vehicle-mounted device 20 can perform short-range wireless communication with the NFC tag 10. As an example, the vehicle-mounted device 20 may be configured to be detachably attached to a support such as a bracket fixed to the vehicle A. The schematic configuration of the vehicle-mounted device 20 itself will be described below.

<Schematic configuration of the vehicle-mounted device 20>
Then, the schematic structure of the onboard equipment 20 is demonstrated using FIG. As shown in FIG. 2, the vehicle-mounted device 20 includes a control device 22, a gyro sensor 23, an acceleration sensor 24, a short-range communication device 25, a center communication device 26, a positioning device 27, and a display device 28.

  The gyro sensor 23 detects an angular velocity generated in the vehicle-mounted device 20. As an example, the gyro sensor 23 detects the rotational angular velocity around the vertical axis of the vehicle A in a state where the vehicle-mounted device 20 is attached to the vehicle A in a predetermined posture.

  The acceleration sensor 24 is a triaxial acceleration sensor that detects acceleration acting in three axial directions that are orthogonal to each other. For convenience, the three axial directions for detecting acceleration are referred to as the X-axis, Y-axis, and Z-axis directions, respectively. The acceleration sensor 24 corresponds to the inertial sensor of the claims. The acceleration sensor 24 is provided in the housing of the vehicle-mounted device 20.

  The near field communication device 25 performs near field communication according to the NFC standard. The near field communication device 25 transmits a password unique to the NFC tag 10 by near field communication. When the identification code is transmitted from the NFC tag 10 by short-range wireless communication, the identification code is received. The near field communication device 25 functions as a reader of the NFC tag 10. The short-range communication device 25 corresponds to a short-range communication unit in claims. The center communication device 26 communicates with the center 2 via a public communication network and a base station.

  The positioning device 27 is based on a positioning signal received by a GNSS receiver that receives a positioning signal transmitted by a positioning satellite that constitutes a GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System). , Vehicle position) is sequentially measured. The positioning device 27 may be configured to measure the vehicle position using the measurement results of the gyro sensor 23 and the acceleration sensor 24. The display device 28 is a display such as a liquid crystal display, for example, and displays text.

  The control device 22 includes a processor, a volatile memory, a nonvolatile memory, an I / O, and a bus connecting them, and performs various processes by executing a control program stored in the nonvolatile memory. The control device 22 includes a fraud prevention processing unit 200 that performs processing related to prevention of unauthorized exchange of the vehicle-mounted device 20. It is assumed that the fraud prevention processing unit 200, the acceleration sensor 24, and the short-range communication device 25 function as the fraud prevention device 21. Moreover, the structure provided with this fraud prevention apparatus 21 and the NFC tag 10 corresponds to the fraud prevention unit in the claims.

<Schematic Configuration of Fraud Prevention Processing Unit 200>
Next, a schematic configuration of the fraud prevention processing unit 200 will be described with reference to FIG. As illustrated in FIG. 3, the fraud prevention processing unit 200 includes a registration unit 201, a vehicle position acquisition unit 202, a travel determination unit 203, a transmission control unit 204, a code acquisition unit 205, a fraud determination unit 206, a notification unit 207, and a stop. An instruction unit 208 is provided.

  The registration unit 201 is a non-volatile memory in which a password unique to the NFC tag 10 (hereinafter simply referred to as a password), a regular identification code of the NFC tag 10, a vehicle registration number of the vehicle A, and the like are stored. This vehicle registration number corresponds to the identification information in the claims. The vehicle position acquisition unit 202 sequentially acquires the vehicle position measured by the positioning device 27.

  The traveling determination unit 203 determines whether or not the vehicle A is traveling by monitoring the value of acceleration detected by the acceleration sensor 24. The traveling determination unit 203 may be configured to determine that the vehicle A is traveling when the acceleration sensor 24 detects an acceleration of a certain value or more. The constant value mentioned here may be an acceleration value that occurs while the vehicle A is traveling but does not occur when the vehicle A is stopped.

  Moreover, it is more preferable that the traveling determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is traveling when the acceleration sensor 24 detects acceleration (that is, movement) for a certain period in a certain direction. This is to prevent erroneous determination that the vehicle A is traveling due to the acceleration caused by the person shaking the vehicle A. As an example, it may be determined as a motion in a certain direction that the state in which the deviation amount of the direction of the combined vector of the accelerations in the three-axis directions detected by the acceleration sensor 24 is kept within the threshold range. In addition, the certain period here refers to a temporary constant direction generated when a person shakes the vehicle A and the vehicle A continuously travels in a certain direction. It may be a period that is estimated to be able to distinguish from the exercise to.

  When the travel determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is traveling, the transmission control unit 204 reads the password from the registration unit 201 and transmits the password from the short-range communication device 25. On the other hand, if the travel determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is not traveling, the password is not transmitted from the short-range communication device 25 until the travel determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is traveling.

  In the NFC tag 10, when a password is transmitted from the short-range communication device 25, this password is received. The NFC tag 10 transmits an identification code when the received password matches the password stored in the nonvolatile memory. Therefore, transmitting a password from the transmission control unit 204 corresponds to requesting transmission of an identification code. When the identification code is transmitted from the NFC tag 10, the code acquisition unit 205 acquires the identification code via the short-range communication device 25.

  The fraud determination unit 206 collates the identification code acquired by the code acquisition unit 205 with the regular identification code stored in the registration unit 201. When these identification codes match (that is, when code verification is established), it is determined that there is no unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 20, while when these identification codes do not match, the vehicle-mounted device It is determined that there are 20 unauthorized exchanges.

  The notification unit 207 reads the vehicle registration number of the vehicle A from the registration unit 201 and transmits the vehicle registration number from the center communication device 26 to the center 2 when the fraud determination unit 206 determines that there is an unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 20. Let In the center 2, since the vehicle registration number has been transmitted from the vehicle-mounted device 20, the vehicle A in which the vehicle-mounted device 20 has been illegally replaced is identified. The notification unit 207 may also be configured to transmit the vehicle position of the vehicle A acquired by the vehicle position acquisition unit 202 when transmitting the vehicle registration number of the vehicle A from the center communication device 26 to the center 2. In the center 2, since the vehicle position of the vehicle A has been transmitted from the vehicle-mounted device 20, the position of the vehicle A where the vehicle-mounted device 20 has been illegally replaced is specified. Then, based on the information on the vehicle A that has been illegally exchanged identified in the center 2 and the information on the position of the vehicle A, the public organization may perform the control of the vehicle A that has been illegally exchanged. .

  Further, the notification unit 207 may be configured to cause the display unit 28 to display that the vehicle-mounted device 20 has been tampered with when the fraud determination unit 206 determines that the vehicle-mounted device 20 has been tampered with. Good. Note that the notification unit 207 may be configured to display on the meter or the like of the vehicle A a message indicating that there has been an unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 20.

  The stop instruction unit 208 stops the function of the vehicle-mounted device 20 when the fraud determination unit 206 determines that the vehicle-mounted device 20 has been tampered with. For example, the stop instructing unit 208 may be configured to stop a function related to a service received by the user using the vehicle-mounted device 20 through the vehicle-mounted device 20 among the functions of the vehicle-mounted device 20. In addition, all the functions of the vehicle-mounted device 20 may be stopped. The on-vehicle device 20 whose function is stopped by the stop instruction unit 208 is more preferably configured such that the stop of the function is not released by the restart after the power is turned off. For example, the function of the vehicle-mounted device 20 whose function is stopped by the stop instruction unit 208 may be canceled by a special operation in a service factory or the like authorized by a public organization or a vehicle manufacturer.

<Illegal determination-related processing in fraud prevention device 21>
Here, with reference to the flowchart of FIG. 4, an example of a flow of processing (hereinafter referred to as fraud determination-related processing) related to determination of unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 20 in the fraud prevention device 21 will be described. The flowchart in FIG. 4 may be configured to start when the power of the vehicle-mounted device 20 is turned on. If the vehicle power source 20 is turned on when the ignition power source of the vehicle A is turned on, the flowchart of FIG. 4 starts when the ignition power source of the vehicle A is turned on. .

  First, in step S1, the traveling determination unit 203 monitors the value of acceleration detected by the acceleration sensor 24, and determines whether or not the vehicle A is traveling. If it is determined that the vehicle A is traveling (YES in S1), the process proceeds to step S2. On the other hand, when it determines with the vehicle A not driving | running | working (it is NO at S1), it moves to step S7.

  In step S <b> 2, the transmission control unit 204 transmits the password from the short-range communication device 25. The password transmitted from the short-range communication device 25 is received by the NFC tag 10, and an identification code is transmitted from the NFC tag 10 when it matches the password stored in the NFC tag 10.

  In step S3, when the code acquisition unit 205 can acquire the identification code transmitted from the NFC tag 10 via the short-range communication device 25 (YES in S3), the process proceeds to step S4. On the other hand, if the code acquisition unit 205 cannot acquire the identification code (NO in S3), the process proceeds to step S7. As an example, if the identification code is not acquired within a set time after transmitting the password, it may be determined that the identification code could not be acquired.

  In step S <b> 4, the fraud determination unit 206 collates the identification code acquired by the code acquisition unit 205 with the regular identification code stored in the registration unit 201. In step S5, when the code verification in S4 is established (YES in S5), the process proceeds to step S6. On the other hand, if the code verification in S4 is not established (NO in S5), the process proceeds to step S8.

  In step S <b> 6, the fraud determination unit 206 determines that there is no unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 20. In step S7, when it is the end timing of the fraud determination related process (YES in S7), the fraud determination related process is ended. On the other hand, if it is not the end timing of the fraud determination related process (NO in S7), the process returns to S1 and the process is repeated. An example of the end timing of the fraud determination related process is when the power of the vehicle-mounted device 20 is turned off.

  In step S8, which is a process performed when the code verification in S4 is not established, the fraud determination unit 206 determines that there is an unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 20. In step S 9, the notification unit 207 causes the center communication device 26 to transmit the vehicle registration number of the vehicle A read from the registration unit 201 and the vehicle position of the vehicle A acquired by the vehicle position acquisition unit 202 to the center 2. In step S10, the stop instruction unit 208 stops the function of the vehicle-mounted device 20, and ends the fraud determination related process.

<Summary of Embodiment 1>
According to the configuration of the first embodiment, the fraud prevention device 21 is provided in the vehicle-mounted device 20 and is a legitimate device in which the identification code received by the fraud prevention device 21 from the NFC tag 10 through short-range wireless communication is registered in its own device. Check against the identification code. Therefore, based on the fact that the vehicle-mounted device 20 is illegally exchanged and verification is not established, it can be determined whether the vehicle-mounted device 20 is illegally exchanged.

  Here, a method that can be considered when the fraud prevention device 21 is deceived and attempted to be exchanged illegally and countermeasures thereof will be described. In order to exchange the vehicle-mounted device 20 illegally, it is necessary to forge the NFC tag 10. In order to read the memory of the NFC tag 10 with a password as in this embodiment, the short-range communication device 25 transmits a Read command and a password as a set to the NFC tag 10. In order to counterfeit the NFC tag 10 with a password, a so-called replay attack can be considered. First, a device for intercepting wireless communication is installed in the vicinity of the NFC tag 10 to intercept the communication contents between the NFC tag 10 and the short-range communication device 25. Next, the last forged wireless tag or electronic circuit that is written in an electronic circuit that works in the same manner as another wireless tag or NFC tag 10 so as to replay the intercepted communication content is fixed to the vehicle-mounted device 20.

  In response to such an unauthorized exchange attempt, according to the configuration of the first embodiment, the password transmitted by the NFC tag 10 from the fraud prevention device 21 by the short-range communication device 25 is the password stored in the NFC tag 10. If it does not match, the identification code is not transmitted. Therefore, it is difficult to illegally read a regular identification code from the NFC tag 10.

  Further, according to the configuration of the first embodiment, the identification code is not transmitted from the NFC tag 10 until the traveling determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is traveling, so that the NFC tag 10 and the short distance only during traveling of the vehicle. Communication with the communication device 25 is enabled. If the vehicle is running, a legitimate user (that is, a driver) is in the passenger compartment, so it is difficult to attach a device for interception to the vehicle. Even if a device for intercepting is attached to the vehicle while the vehicle is stopped and there is no legitimate user, when the legitimate user returns, it is easily noticed that the device for intercepting is attached. Therefore, unauthorized exchange can be prevented by means such as removing a device for an authorized user to intercept. Further, since the NFC tag 10 and the short-range wireless device 25 do not communicate during the stop, they cannot be intercepted.

  As described above, according to the configuration of the first embodiment, the identification code is not transmitted from the NFC tag 10 until the traveling determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is traveling. It can be difficult to forge. As a result, it is possible to prevent unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 20 more easily and reliably while using short-range wireless communication.

  Furthermore, according to the configuration of the first embodiment, the travel determination unit 203 determines whether or not the vehicle A is traveling from the detection result of the acceleration sensor 24 provided in the vehicle-mounted device 20. It is also more difficult to disguise. Details are as follows. For example, in the case where the travel determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is traveling when the ignition (hereinafter referred to as IG) power source of the vehicle A is on, the fraud prevention device 21 and the IG power source are disconnected and another power source is disconnected. If the vehicle A is traveling, it can be camouflaged by connecting to. Further, even when the travel determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is traveling based on the output of the accelerator sensor of the vehicle A, a pseudo signal is input from the outside of the fraud prevention device 21. If the vehicle A is traveling, it can be camouflaged.

  On the other hand, according to the configuration of the first embodiment, such determination is made by determining whether or not the vehicle A is traveling by the traveling determination unit 203 from the detection result of the acceleration sensor 24 provided in the vehicle-mounted device 20. The camouflage is not performed, and it is more difficult for the vehicle A to camouflage that it is running. Further, as a means for misjudging the anti-fraud device 21 as a running state, a method of giving an acceleration by shaking the vehicle is conceivable. However, in this embodiment, since it is not judged as a running state unless it is an acceleration in a certain direction, disguise is Have difficulty.

(Modification 1)
Although Embodiment 1 showed the structure where the housing | casing of the vehicle equipment 20 is one, it does not necessarily restrict to this. For example, it is good also as a structure (henceforth modification 1) that the housing | casing of the onboard equipment 20 is plurality. Here, an example of the configuration of Modification 1 will be described with reference to FIG. In FIG. 5, the case where the vehicle-mounted device 20 is detachably attached to a support such as a bracket fixed to the windshield of the vehicle A (see B in FIG. 5) will be described as an example.

  As shown in FIG. 5, the housing | casing of the onboard equipment 20 is divided into the holder case 20a and the main case 20b, and it is good also as a structure connected by the arm 20c. As an example, the holder case 20a includes a gyro sensor 23, an acceleration sensor 24, a short-range communication device 25, a center communication device 26, a positioning device 27, and a control device that functions as the fraud prevention processing unit 200. do it. Moreover, what is necessary is just to set it as the structure with which the main case 20b is equipped with the indicator 28 and the control apparatus which bears control of the indicator 28. FIG. Furthermore, the arm 20c may be, for example, a cylindrical flexible member, and may be configured to pass a flexible cable for connecting the electronic component of the holder case 20a and the electronic component of the main case 20b. . Moreover, what is necessary is just to set it as the structure which can change the angle of the main case 20b with respect to the holder case 20a because a user bends the flexible arm 20c.

(Embodiment 2)
In the first embodiment, the configuration in which the fraud determination-related processing is performed in a device that is a target for determining whether or not there is a fraudulent exchange (hereinafter referred to as a target device) has been described. For example, a configuration in which fraud determination-related processing is performed by a device other than the target device (hereinafter, a second embodiment) may be employed.

<Schematic configuration of vehicle system 3a>
Embodiment 2 of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. As shown in FIG. 6, the vehicle system 3 a includes a vehicle side unit 1 a used in the vehicle A and a center 2. The vehicle-side unit 1a includes an NFC tag 10a, a fraud prevention device 21a, a center communication device 26a, a positioning device 27a, a display device 28a, and an in-vehicle device 30. Details of the vehicle-side unit 1a will be described later. The center 2 is the same as the center 2 of the first embodiment except for providing a predetermined service to a user who uses the in-vehicle device 30 by communicating with the in-vehicle device 30. Examples of the predetermined service include a service that automatically performs road pricing and parking fee settlement, as described above.

<Schematic configuration of vehicle-side unit 1a>
Then, the vehicle side unit 1a is demonstrated using FIG. As described above, the vehicle-side unit 1a includes the NFC tag 10a, the fraud prevention device 21a, the center communication device 26a, the positioning device 27a, the display device 28a, and the vehicle-mounted device 30. The NFC tag 10a corresponds to the wireless tag in the claims, and the vehicle-mounted device 30 corresponds to the target device in the claims.

  The NFC tag 10a is the same as the NFC tag 10 except that the NFC tag 10a is fixed to the vehicle-mounted device 30 and performs short-range wireless communication with the fraud prevention device 21a existing within the communication range. The NFC tag 10a is attached to the vehicle-mounted device 30 in a state where it is difficult to remove. The state where it is difficult to remove includes a state where it is difficult to remove without breakage, a state where removal is difficult, and the like. The fraud prevention device 21a functions in the same manner as the fraud prevention device 21 of the first embodiment. The fraud prevention device 21a may be configured to be fixed to the vehicle A or may be configured to be detachably attached to the vehicle A. Details of the fraud prevention device 21a will be described later.

  The center communication device 26a is the same as the center communication device 26 of the first embodiment except that the center communication device 26a is not provided in the target device and is connected to the fraud prevention device 21a. The positioning device 27a is the same as the positioning device 27 of the first embodiment, except that the positioning device 27a is not provided in the target device and is connected to the fraud prevention device 21a. The indicator 28a is a display such as a liquid crystal display provided in a meter or the like of the vehicle A and displays text.

  For example, the vehicle-mounted device 30 may be configured to be detachably attached to a support such as a bracket fixed to the vehicle A. Further, as described above, the NFC tag 10a is fixed to the vehicle-mounted device 30 in a state where it is difficult to remove.

<Schematic configuration of fraud prevention device 21a>
Next, a schematic configuration of the fraud prevention device 21a will be described with reference to FIG. As shown in FIG. 7, the fraud prevention device 21 includes a control device 22a, a gyro sensor 23a, an acceleration sensor 24a, and a short-range communication device 25a.

  The gyro sensor 23a detects an angular velocity generated in the fraud prevention device 21a. As an example, the gyro sensor 23a detects the rotational angular velocity around the vertical axis of the vehicle A in a state where the fraud prevention device 21a is attached to the vehicle A in a predetermined posture. The fraud prevention device 21a may be configured not to include the gyro sensor 23a. The acceleration sensor 24a is the same as the acceleration sensor 24 of the first embodiment except that the acceleration sensor 24a is provided in the housing of the fraud prevention device 21a. This acceleration sensor 24a also corresponds to the inertial sensor of the claims. The near field communication device 25a is the same as the near field communication device 25 of the first embodiment except that the near field communication device 25a is not included in the target device but is included in the fraud prevention device 21a. The short-range communication device 25a also corresponds to the short-range communication unit in the claims.

  The control device 22a includes a processor, a volatile memory, a nonvolatile memory, an I / O, and a bus connecting them, and performs various processes by executing a control program stored in the nonvolatile memory. The control device 22a includes the fraud prevention processing unit 200 similar to that of the first embodiment, and uses the short-range wireless communication between the NFC 10a and the short-range communication device 25a in the same manner as the fraud determination-related processing of the first embodiment. Then, processing related to prevention of unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 30 is performed.

  In the fraud prevention device 21a, the fraud determination unit 206 collates the identification code of the NFC 10a acquired by the code acquisition unit 205 with the regular identification code stored in the registration unit 201, and these identification codes do not match. If it is determined that the vehicle-mounted device 30 has been tampered with, In addition, when the fraud determination unit 206 determines that the in-vehicle device 30 is illegally exchanged, the stop instruction unit 208 transmits an instruction to stop the function of the on-vehicle device 30 wirelessly or by wire to the on-vehicle device 30. To the vehicle-mounted device 30, and the function of the vehicle-mounted device 30 may be stopped in the same manner as in the first embodiment.

  Even when the configuration of the second embodiment is adopted, since the identification code is not transmitted from the NFC tag 10a until the traveling determination unit 203 determines that the vehicle A is traveling, prevention of unauthorized replacement of the vehicle-mounted device 30 is prevented. Can be performed more easily and reliably while using short-range wireless communication.

(Modification 2)
In the above-described embodiment, the configuration in which the triaxial acceleration sensor is used as the acceleration sensors 24 and 24a is shown, but the configuration is not necessarily limited thereto. For example, when the vehicle-mounted device 20 and the anti-fraud device 21a are used in the vehicle A so that the detection axes of the acceleration sensors 24 and 24a coincide with the longitudinal direction of the vehicle A, the biaxial acceleration sensor may be used. It may be a uniaxial acceleration sensor.

(Modification 3)
In the above-described embodiment, the traveling determination unit 203 determines whether or not the vehicle A is traveling from the detection results of the acceleration sensor 24 included in the vehicle-mounted device 20 and the acceleration sensor 24a included in the fraud prevention device 21a. Although the configuration is shown, it is not necessarily limited to this. For example, the traveling determination unit 203 determines whether or not the vehicle A is traveling based on the detection results of the gyro sensor 23 included in the vehicle-mounted device 20 and the gyro sensor 23a included in the fraud prevention device 21a (hereinafter, referred to as “the vehicle A”). Modification 3) may be employed. In the case of adopting the configuration of the modified example 2, it may be configured to determine that the vehicle A is traveling when the gyro sensors 23 and 23a detect an angular velocity of a certain value or more. In addition, in order to prevent erroneous determination that the vehicle A is traveling due to the angular velocity generated when the person shakes the vehicle A, the gyro sensors 23 and 23a turn in a certain direction for a certain period or longer (that is, exercise). It is good also as a structure which determines with the vehicle A driving | running | working. The gyro sensors 23 and 23a also correspond to the inertial sensors in the claims. When the modified example 2 is employed in the second embodiment, the tamper-proof device 21a may not include the acceleration sensor 24a.

(Modification 4)
Moreover, it is good also as a structure which determines whether the vehicle A is drive | working with the driving | running | working determination part 203 according to ON / OFF of the IG power supply of the vehicle A, and the vehicle A is based on the signal obtained from the signal wire | line of the vehicle A. It is good also as a structure which determines whether it is drive | working. Examples of signals obtained from the signal line of the vehicle A include an accelerator sensor signal, a vehicle speed sensor signal, and the like.

(Modification 5)
In the above-described embodiment, the NFC 10, 10a has a configuration in which the identification code is not transmitted unless the password transmitted from the fraud prevention devices 21, 21a matches the password stored in the NFC 10, 10a. Not limited to this. For example, the NFC 10 or 10a may be configured to transmit the identification code when receiving an identification code transmission request from the fraud prevention devices 21 and 21a. In this case, the fraud prevention devices 21 and 21a may be configured such that the short-range communication devices 25 and 25a transmit a transmission request for an identification code instead of a password.

(Modification 6)
In the above-described embodiment, when the fraud determination unit 206 determines that there is an unauthorized exchange of the vehicle-mounted devices 20 and 30, the fraud prevention devices 21 and 21 a notify the center 2 and the functions of the vehicle-mounted devices 20 and 30. Although the structure to stop is shown, it is not necessarily limited to this. For example, the fraud prevention devices 21 and 21a may notify the center 2 but do not stop the functions of the vehicle-mounted devices 20 and 30. The fraud prevention devices 21 and 21a do not notify the center 2 but function the vehicle-mounted devices 20 and 30. It is good also as a structure which stops.

(Modification 7)
The vehicle-mounted devices 20 and 30 include a communication module that performs wireless communication (that is, road-to-vehicle communication) with a roadside device that provides a predetermined service. By performing road-to-vehicle communication with the roadside device, It is good also as a structure which provides a service to the user who uses 30. FIG. Examples of services in this case include automatic settlement through drive-through, automatic settlement of parking fees at toll parking lots, support for traffic at intersections, provision of traffic jam information, and the like. For example, the road-to-vehicle communication between the vehicle-mounted devices 20 and 30 and the roadside device may be configured to use wireless communication compliant with the WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment) standard.

  The present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiments and modifications, and various modifications are possible within the scope of the claims, and technical means disclosed in different embodiments and modifications, respectively. Embodiments obtained by appropriately combining the above are also included in the technical scope of the present invention.

1, 1a Vehicle side unit, 2 center, 3, 3a Vehicle system, 10, 10a NFC tag (wireless tag, fraud prevention unit), 20 On-vehicle device (target device), 20a Holder case, 20b Main case, 20c Arm, 21, 21a Fraud prevention device (fraud prevention unit), 22, 22a Control device, 23, 23a Gyro sensor (inertial sensor), 24, 24a Acceleration sensor (inertial sensor), 25, 25a Short range communication unit, 26, 26a Center Communication device (center communication device), 27, 27a Positioning device, 30 vehicle-mounted device, 200 fraud prevention processing unit, 203 travel determination unit, 206 fraud determination unit, 208 stop instruction unit

Claims (10)

A fraud prevention device used in a vehicle,
A short-range communication unit (25) that performs short-range wireless communication with the wireless tag (10, 10a) that is used in the vehicle and transmits an identification code;
By collating the identification code received by the short-range communication unit from the wireless tag, the target device (30) to which the wireless tag is fixed and the target device (20) including the device itself (20) 20, 30) and a fraud determination unit (206) that determines whether or not there is a fraudulent exchange;
A travel determination unit (203) for determining whether or not the vehicle is traveling,
The short-range communication unit requests the wireless tag to transmit the identification code and causes the wireless tag to transmit the identification code. Until the traveling determination unit determines that the vehicle is traveling, An anti-fraud device that does not transmit the identification code from the wireless tag. In claim 1,
Including inertial sensors (23, 23a, 24, 24a),
The travel determination unit is a fraud prevention device that determines whether the vehicle is traveling based on a detection result of the inertial sensor. In claim 2,
The inertial sensor is an acceleration sensor (24, 24a),
The fraud prevention device, in which the traveling determination unit determines that the vehicle is traveling when the acceleration sensor detects movement in a certain direction for a certain period or longer. In any one of Claims 1-3,
A fraud prevention apparatus comprising a stop instruction unit (208) for stopping the function of the target device when the fraud determination unit determines that the target device is illegally exchanged. The fraud prevention device (21, 21a) according to any one of claims 1 to 4,
A fraud prevention unit including a wireless tag (10, 10a) used in the same vehicle as the fraud prevention device and transmitting an identification code. In claim 5,
The wireless tag (10a) is a fraud prevention unit fixed to a target device (30) used in the vehicle. In claim 5,
The wireless tag (10) is fixed to the vehicle,
The fraud prevention device (21) is a fraud prevention unit provided in a target device (20) used in the vehicle. In any one of Claims 5-7,
The short-range communication unit of the fraud prevention device transmits authentication information used for authentication in the wireless tag as a request for transmission of the identification code performed on the wireless tag,
The wireless tag is a fraud prevention unit that transmits the identification code when authentication is established by the authentication information transmitted from the short-range communication unit. In any one of Claims 5-8,
Including a center communication device (26, 26a) for communicating with the center,
The fraud prevention unit that transmits identification information for identifying the vehicle to the center when the fraud determination unit of the fraud prevention device determines that the target device is illegally exchanged. In claim 9,
Including a positioning device (27, 27a) for measuring the position of the vehicle;
The fraud prevention unit that transmits the position of the vehicle measured by the positioning device to the center when the fraud determination unit of the fraud prevention device determines that the target device is illegally exchanged.

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