JP2004040650A - Relativity authentication method and relativity authentication system - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To shorten a authentication route and to easily construct a system. <P>SOLUTION: A user A creates a relativity description 100 added with relativity indicating the permission of access from information communication equipment AP1 operated by the user A to network dealing equipment AP2, an electronic signature SIG1 of the user A and an electronic signature SIG2 of the network dealing equipment AP2 and presents the relativity description 100 to a relativity authentication authority CAR which is a third party institution. The relativity authentication authority CAR verifies the propriety of each of the electronic signatures SIG1 and SIG2 included in the relativity description 100 and then issues a relativity certificate 200 to the user A. The authentication is performed based upon the relativity certificate 200. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2004,JPO

Description

[0001]
TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to an authentication technique used when connecting information communication devices connected on a network.
[0002]
[Prior art]
In order to enhance the security of various services using the Internet, authentication technology has been actively developed in recent years. As a conventional authentication technology, an authentication technology using a digital signature is known. This technology is realized by using a public key that is widely disclosed to the public and a secret key that can be known only by the user. is there. Here, this authentication technology requires a third party to publicly register the public key and prove that the public key is indeed the person's identity. being called.
[0003]
Conventionally, in an authentication system using this type of certificate authority, there is a subordinate hierarchical authentication technology in which a plurality of certificate authorities are arranged in a hierarchical structure and an upper certificate authority authenticates a lower certificate authority in the next hierarchy.
[0004]
FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram of the conventional dependent hierarchical authentication. Note that the solid arrow in the figure indicates the issuance of a certificate, and the dotted arrow indicates the certificate path (authentication path) of each of the user 401 and the user 402.
In the dependent hierarchical type authentication, as shown by a solid line arrow in the figure, the root certificate authority 410 issues a certificate to each of the certificate authorities 411 and 412 in the next layer, and the certificate authorities 411 and 412 respectively perform authentication in the next layer. This is an authentication model in which certificates are issued to the stations 413, 414, and 415, and the root certificate authority 410 is a common trust base for all users. The root certificate of the root certificate authority 410 is distributed to all users. In such a form where certificates are issued hierarchically, it is necessary to construct a certification path for verifying the certificates. This certification path is a chain of certificates that reaches the certificate trusted by the verifier from the certificate of the relying party, and the authentication path in the subordinate hierarchical authentication is the root that is the most trusted certificate authority. The certificate authority 410 terminates. Therefore, when the user 401 accesses the user 402, the user 401 is a certificate user and the user 402 is a verifier, and the certificate issued by the certificate authority 413 and the certificate issued by the certificate authority 411 held by the user 401. Then, the certification path becomes the certification path of the root certificate authority 410 trusted by the user 402. By verifying the certification path, the user 401 can be trusted to permit access.
[0005]
As described above, in the dependent hierarchical authentication, since certificates of all the certification authorities on the certification path up to the root certification authority are required, there is a problem that there is a possibility of performance delay due to the multi-layered certification authority hierarchy. is there. On the other hand, since the dependent hierarchical authentication is established under the premise that all users trust a single root certificate authority 410, it is possible when applied within one company. However, when a wide area network such as the Internet is applied, there is a problem that application is impossible.
[0006]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
Therefore, there is mutual authentication in which certificate authorities that do not have a subordinate relationship check each other's trust relationship and then make a contract to authenticate each other.
[0007]
FIG. 18 is an explanatory diagram of the conventional mutual authentication.
The arrows in the figure indicate the trust relationships that need to be established, i.e., in this example, two mutual authentication links from the certificate authority 420 to the certificate authority 421 and from the certificate authority 421 to the certificate authority 420 are established. ing. In such mutual authentication, each issues a "mutual authentication certificate" which certifies its public key to the other party's certificate authority. Then, when the user 403 accesses the user 404, the user 404 issues a mutual public certificate of the certificate authority 421 that has issued the certificate of the public key of the user 404 to the other party's public key (here, the user public key). Confirmation of the authentication path is completed by being included in the issuer of the certificate (public key 403).
[0008]
Such mutual authentication between certificate authorities is established on the premise of mutual trust, and audit verification under the following conditions is required in order to build the trust.
(1) The scope of the effect of each certification authority is clearly defined, and the certification authority is operated based on the same certification authority operation regulations (Certificate Practice Statement).
(2) Each certification body has the same level of security and personal information protection measures.
(3) If each certifying body belongs to a different country, there must be an agreement between the nations that can be treated as legally equivalent to the certification issued by each certifying body.
[0009]
The procedure for verifying the above conditions is very complicated. In mutual authentication, for example, assuming that the number of certificate authorities is n, as shown in FIG. 19 (“CA” in the figure indicates a certificate authority), the number of required links is n × (n−1). ), And there is a problem that a phenomenon called “n-square order problem” occurs in which the required number of related links explosively increases.
[0010]
Thus, there are various problems with the above-mentioned conventional authentication technology. In the future, as the number of services on the Internet is expected to increase, the number of opportunities that require authentication is expected to increase, and an authentication method that enables the construction of an authentication system without depending on the trust relationship between certificate authorities will be realized. Demands are growing.
[0011]
The present invention has been made in view of such a problem, and an object thereof is to realize an authentication method capable of shortening an authentication path and facilitating system construction.
[0012]
[Means for Solving the Problems]
A relationship authentication method according to the present invention provides a first information communication device operated by a user, a second information communication device, and a gateway device serving as a gateway between the first information communication device and the second information communication device. Are authentication methods in a system connected via a network, a first relationship indicating that access from the first information communication device to the second information communication device is permitted, and a secret key of the user. The digital signature SIG1 by the third party and the digital signature SIG1 with the secret key of the second information communication device from the user. And the digital signature SIG2 is verified with the public key of the second information communication device, and if both verification results are normal, the relationship certification authority issues a signature to the relationship description. A relationship certificate to which a digital signature SIGR with a secret key of the relationship certification authority itself has been issued is issued in advance, and the gateway device responds to the relationship execution request including the relationship certificate from the first information communication device. The digital signature SIGR of the relationship certificate is verified with the public key of the relationship certificate authority, the digital signature SIG1 is verified with the public key of the user, and the digital signature SIG2 is further verified with the public key of the second information communication device. If all the verification results are normal, a communication session between the first information communication device and the second information communication device is established to implement the first relationship.
[0013]
BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
Prior to the description of the embodiment, the premise of the present embodiment will be described. In recent years, IPv6 has appeared as a new version of the TCP / IP protocol and is being commercialized. In IPv6, since the number of IP addresses that can be assigned to devices on the network is much larger than that of current IPv4, it is expected that various devices will be assigned IP addresses in the future. Specifically, for example, the appearance of a system as shown in the following figure is expected.
[0014]
FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a remote control care system.
The remote monitoring and nursing care system includes a television 301, a web camera 302, an Internet telephone 303, a refrigerator 304, a microwave oven 305, a bedroom sensor 306, a bathroom sensor 307, and a toilet sensor 308, which are installed in the care home. The home care system 311 and the information communication device 320 include an in-home care system 311 connected to the home network server 310 and a home network server 310 via a network such as a LAN, and the in-home care system 311 and the information communication device 320 are an IPv6 network, a gateway device 330, and an IPv4. This is a system that is connected via a network of the home care system 311 so that each device 301 to 308 in the home care system 311 can be controlled from outside by the information communication device 320.
[0015]
As described above, when various devices 301 to 308 are connected on the network, it is necessary to identify a person who is permitted to access each of these devices 301 to 308 and a person who is not permitted to access. Specifically, the user 340 who has installed the home care system 311 in his / her home or the like is allowed to access all the devices 301 to 308 in the home care system 311. For a care contractor (not shown) entrusted with work, only the bedroom sensor 306, bathroom sensor 307, and toilet sensor 308 are permitted to access.
[0016]
In this case, an access right is given to each access source, and at the time of access, the device determines the access permission / non-permission after authenticating the individual of the access source that holds the access right. Become. Such authentication can be dealt with by setting a connection permission or the like on the device side for a person who is permitted to access the device, here, the user 340 and the care provider. However, it is very complicated to perform such a setting operation for each device. The relationship authentication method of the present invention is an authentication technique suitable for use in such a case.
[0017]
First, the position of the relationship authentication of the present invention will be described. The relationship authentication of the present invention is authentication at the time of connection between two parties (individual (device) -device) for which a connection has been agreed. The term “relationship” refers to a relationship in which access (connection request) from a certain individual (device) to a certain device is permitted, and a unidirectional access relationship, a two-way access relationship, a multipoint A multi-access relationship is established.
[0018]
3A is a diagram illustrating a unidirectional access relationship, FIG. 3B is a diagram illustrating a bidirectional access relationship, and FIG. 3C is a diagram illustrating a multipoint multiaccess relationship (here, an example of three points).
The one-way access relationship refers to a relationship that permits access from the relationship certification target AP1 to the relationship certification target AP2. The two-way access relationship refers to a relationship that permits two-way access from the relationship certification target AP1 to the relationship certification target AP2 and from the relationship certification target AP2 to the relationship certification target AP1. is there. The multi-point multi-access relationship includes, for example, an access from the relationship certification target AP1 to the relationship certification target AP2, an access from the relationship certification target AP2 to the relationship certification target AP3, and an access relationship certification target AP3. Indicates a relationship permitting a unidirectional access relationship between multiple points, such as an access to the relationship proof target AP1. That is, the two-way access relationship and the multipoint multi-access relationship have a configuration in which two or more unidirectional access relationships are combined.
[0019]
Now that the “relationship” has been clarified, the configuration of the relationship authentication system according to the present embodiment will be described.
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a schematic system configuration of a relationship authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the present embodiment, a unidirectional access relationship in which the user A connects to the network-compatible device AP2 will be described as an example.
[0020]
The relation authentication system 1 includes an information communication device AP1 operated by the user A, such as a personal computer or a mobile terminal, a network-compatible device AP2 such as a television or a web camera, a gateway device GW, and a relation authentication station CAR. The information communication device AP1, the gateway device GW, and the network-compatible device AP2 are connected so as to be capable of two-way communication using a communication protocol such as TCP / IP. In this example, it is assumed that the information communication device AP1 and the gateway are connected by an IPv4 network NET1, and the gateway device GW and the network-compatible device AP2 are connected by an IPv6 network NET2.
[0021]
Further, a personal certificate authority CA1 is connected to the network NET1, and a device certificate authority CA2 is connected to the network NET2. The personal certificate authority CA1 is a third-party organization that receives registration of the personal certificate of the user A from the user A and certifies that the user A is authentic. A third party that proves authenticity. The relationship certificate authority CAR trusts the relationship between the user A whose authenticity is certified by the personal certificate authority CA1 and the device whose authenticity is certified by the device certificate authority CA2, and This is an organization that issues a relationship certificate as shown in FIG. 9 described below, which proves the relationship between the user A and the network compatible device AP2 after confirming the authenticity of each of the network compatible device AP2. The relationship authentication of the present invention is realized by using the relationship certificate. The details will be described later.
[0022]
Next, the configuration of each device configuring the relationship authentication system of the present embodiment will be described.
FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the personal certificate authority.
The personal certificate authority CA1 includes a key generation unit 11 for generating a public key and a secret key, a storage unit 12 for storing the public key generated by the key generation unit 11, and a secret key generated by the key generation unit 11. An IC card issuance unit 13 that writes and issues a card, a communication control unit 15, and a control unit 15 that manages the entire personal certificate authority CA1 are provided.
[0023]
The personal certificate authority CA1 in the present embodiment confirms the identity of the user A to be certified by the configuration described above, and thereafter, the personal public key PK1 and the private secret key as the symmetric keys used by the user A. SK1 is generated, the personal public key PK1 is managed in the storage unit 12 so that it can be disclosed, and the personal secret key SK1 is stored in the IC card M1 with low falsification and issued to the user A.
[0024]
FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the device certificate authority.
The internal configuration of the device certificate authority CA2 is the same as that of the personal certificate authority CA1, and includes a key generation unit 21, a storage unit 22, an IC card issuing unit 23, a communication control unit 24, and a control unit 25. ing.
[0025]
The device certification authority CA2 is a certification authority under the jurisdiction of the manufacturer of the network-compatible device AP2 to be certified, generates a device public key PK2 and a device secret key SK2 for the network-compatible device AP2, and transmits the certificate to the personal certificate authority CA1. Similarly to the operation, the device public key PK2 is managed in the storage unit 22 so that the device public key PK2 can be disclosed, and the device private key SK2 is stored in the IC card M2 with low falsification. The sales maker ships each device with the IC card M2 issued by the device certification authority CA2 attached as an accessory, and therefore, the user A who owns the network-compatible device AP2 needs the device secret of the network-compatible device AP2. The key SK2 will be held.
[0026]
FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of the information communication device.
The information communication device AP1 is a device operated by the user A, and obtains a secret key from an input unit 31, a display unit 32, and an IC card mounted on an IC card reader / writer 35 described later, and uses the secret key. Generating unit 33 for generating an electronic signature by using the electronic signature generated by the signature generating unit 33, and a relationship for generating a relationship description including the relationship input from the user A via the input unit 31 A description creation unit 34, an IC card reader / writer 35, a communication control unit 36, and a control unit 37 that controls the entire network-compatible device AP2 are provided.
[0027]
In the information communication device AP1 according to the present embodiment, as shown in FIG. 10 described later, a user A sequentially mounts an IC card M1 and an IC card M2, and uses an electronic signature SIG1 using a personal secret key SK1 and a device secret key SK2. An electronic signature SIG2 is sequentially generated, and an operation of creating a relationship description 100 including the electronic signatures SIG1 and SIG2 and the relationship R input from the user A is performed. The relationship description 100 created here is submitted by the user A to the relationship certificate authority CAR, and the relationship certificate 200 is issued by the relationship certificate authority CAR. Then, by transmitting the relationship certificate 200 to the gateway device GW, a connection to the network-compatible device AP2 is requested.
[0028]
FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the relationship certification authority.
The relationship certification authority CAR checks the relationship description verification unit 41 that verifies the relationship description 100 (see FIG. 10) submitted by the user A, and the verification result of the relationship description verification unit 41 is normal. A relationship certificate creating unit 42 for creating a relationship certificate 200 by applying an electronic signature to the relationship description document 100 using the relationship secret key SKR of the relationship certificate authority CAR itself; A storage unit 43 for holding the relationship public key PKR and the relationship secret key SKR, a card issuing unit 44 for issuing the IC card M3 storing the relationship certificate 200, a communication control unit 45, and a relationship certification authority CAR And a control unit 46 for performing overall control.
[0029]
FIG. 8 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of the gateway device GW.
Upon connection between the information communication device AP1 and the network-compatible device AP2, the gateway device GW performs a verification process on the relationship certificate 200 received from the information communication device AP1, and determines a relationship between the relationship certificate 100 according to the verification result. A relationship certificate verification unit 51 for performing or canceling a relationship described in a relationship description document and including a signature verification unit 51a for verifying each electronic signature included in the received relationship certificate 200. , A communication control unit 52, and a control unit 53 for controlling the entire gateway device GW.
[0030]
It should be noted that the network-compatible device AP2 does not particularly hold a specific configuration for realizing the relationship authentication, and it is sufficient that the network-compatible device AP2 has a configuration capable of being connected to a network and capable of two-way communication. The details of the application program related to data communication between the information communication device AP1 and the network-compatible device AP2 after the relationship authentication result is normal and the two devices are established after the communication session is established differ from the gist of the present invention. Therefore, only a part will be described below, and details will be omitted.
[0031]
Hereinafter, a procedure for performing the relationship authentication according to the present embodiment will be described. The procedure for performing the relationship authentication is roughly divided into two stages of “issuing a relationship certificate” and “authentication using a relationship certificate”. First, the procedure for issuing the relationship certificate 200 will be described.
[0032]
FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram of a relationship certificate issuing procedure, and FIG. 10 is a diagram showing a specific example of a relationship certificate.
First, the user A needs to acquire the personal secret key SK1 of the user A himself and the device secret key SK2 of the network-compatible device AP2 as a preparation stage for issuing the relationship certificate 200. Therefore, first, the user A registers his / her own identity certificate (for example, an identification card, a license, a passport, a certified copy of a registry, etc.) in the personal certificate authority CA1, and the personal secret key SK1 is stored from the personal certificate authority CA1. Receives IC card M1. That is, in the personal certificate authority CA1, the key generation unit 11 generates the personal public key PK1 and the personal secret key SK1 for the user A, and the control unit 15 stores the personal public key PK1 generated by the key generation unit 11. While storing the private secret key SK1 generated by the key generation unit 11 in the IC card M1, the instruction is issued to the IC card issuance unit 13. The user A obtains his / her personal secret key SK1 using the IC card M1.
[0033]
The device secret key SK2 of the network-compatible device AP2 is stored in the IC card M2 attached at the time of shipment as an accessory of the network-compatible device AP2, as described above. Therefore, the user A issues the personal certificate authority CA1. The IC card M1 and the IC card M2 attached to the purchased network-compatible device AP2 hold both the user A's own personal secret key SK1 and the device secret key SK2 of the network-compatible device AP2. Here, the user A creates the electronic signatures SIG1 and SIG2 of the user A and the network-compatible device AP2 using the information communication device AP1 using the personal secret key SK1 and the device secret key SK2. To create the relationship description 100.
[0034]
Here, the configuration of the relationship description 100 will be described with reference to FIG. In FIG. 9, the right side is the relationship certificate 200 (here, an expression example in XML is shown), and the left side is a description of the configuration.
The relationship description 100 includes a relationship R (FROM = “AP1.aaa.jp” TO = “AP2.bbb.jp”) between the information communication device AP1 and the network-compatible device AP2 that are the objects of the relationship proof. The network address ADD1 (AP.aaa.jp) of the communication device AP1, the access permission information PA1 including an ID and a password for the user A to log in to the information communication device AP1, and the access permission information PA1 Access permission information PA2 including an electronic signature SIG1 signed with the personal secret key SK1, a network address ADD2 (AP2.bbb.jp) of the network-compatible device AP2, and an ID and a password for the user A to log in to the network-compatible device AP2. And the access permission information PA2. And a digital signature SIG2 signed with the device secret key SK2 of the network-compatible device AP2.
[0035]
FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure for creating a relationship description in the information communication device.
The control unit 37 of the information communication device AP1 acquires various types of information necessary for creating the relationship description 100 from the user A (S1). The various types of information include the relationship R between the information communication device AP1 and the network-compatible device AP2, the network address ADD1 of the information communication device AP1, an ID and a password for the user A to log in to the information communication device AP1 (access permission information). PA1), the network address ADD2 of the network compatible device AP2, and the ID and password (access permission information PA1) for the user A to log in to the information communication device AP1. It prompts the user A for input, such as by displaying it, and obtains it by input from the input unit 31.
[0036]
Next, the control unit 37 displays an IC card insertion screen for inserting an IC card storing the secret key to be proved on the relationship on the display unit 31. When the IC card M1 is mounted by the user A, the IC card M1 is displayed. Then, the personal secret key SK1 is obtained via the IC card reader / writer 35, and the signature generation unit 33 is instructed to generate an electronic signature SIG1 for the access permission information PA1 using the personal secret key SK1 (S2). Next, a screen prompting the user to replace the IC card is displayed on the display unit 32, and the user A removes the IC card M1 from the IC card reader / writer 35 and replaces the IC card M2 according to the screen. The control unit 37 similarly obtains the device secret key SK2 from the IC card M2 and instructs the signature generation unit 33 to generate an electronic signature S2 for the access permission information PA2 using the device secret key SK2 (S3).
[0037]
The control unit 37 instructs the relationship description creating unit 34 to include the various information acquired from the user A, the electronic signature SIG1, and the electronic signature SIG2, and the relationship description as shown in FIG. 100 is created (S4).
[0038]
The user A stores the relationship description 100 created as described above in a medium such as an IC card, submits the medium to the relationship certification authority CAR, and performs relationship authentication on the relationship description 100. The relationship certificate 200 to which the digital signature SIGR of the station CAR is added is received.
[0039]
FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing a procedure for issuing a relationship certificate in the relationship certificate authority.
The control unit 46 of the relationship certification authority CAR reads and acquires the relationship description 100 from the medium submitted by the user A (S11). Then, the communication control unit 45 actually accesses the network address ADD1 of the information communication device AP1 described in the relationship description 100 via the network NET1, and checks whether the information communication device AP1 responds. (S12). Specifically, for example, a response is confirmed by a “Ping” command. Next, the relationship description verification unit 41 verifies the electronic signature SIG1 described in the relationship description 100 (S13). At this time, the relationship description verification unit 41 obtains the personal public key PK1 of the user A from the personal certificate authority CA1 from the communication control unit 45 via the network, and verifies the electronic signature SIG1 based on the personal public key PK1. I do.
[0040]
Regarding the network-compatible device AP2, which is another relationship proof target, similarly to the above, the response confirmation to the network address ADD2 of the network-compatible device AP2 described in the relationship description 100 (S14), and the verification of the electronic signature SIG2 ( S15) is performed. When verifying the electronic signature SIG2, the relationship description verifying unit 41 acquires the device public key PK2 from the device certificate authority CA2 via the network NET2 from the communication control unit 45, and obtains the electronic public key PK2 based on the device public key PK2. The signature SIG2 is verified.
[0041]
When the control unit 46 recognizes that the results of the response confirmation and signature verification for the information communication device AP1 and the response confirmation and signature verification for the network compatible device AP2 performed by the relationship description verification unit 41 are all normal (S16). It is determined that the relationship description 100 is reliable, and the relationship certificate creation unit 42 is instructed, and the relationship certificate 100 uses the relationship secret key SKR of the relationship certification authority CAR itself to electronically transmit the relationship description 100. A relationship certificate 200 to which the signature SIGR is added is created (S16). Then, the control unit 46 instructs the IC card issuing unit 44 to issue the IC card M3 storing the relationship certificate 200 (S17). If it is determined in step S16 that at least one of them is abnormal, the creation of the relationship certificate 200 is stopped (S18).
[0042]
The user A who has been issued the IC card M3 in which the relationship certificate 200 is stored as described above accesses the network device AP2 from the information communication device AP1 using the relationship certificate 200. become.
[0043]
FIG. 13 is a diagram showing a sequence chart of the relationship authentication procedure, and FIG. 14 is an explanatory diagram of the relationship authentication procedure. Hereinafter, an authentication procedure using the relationship certificate 200 will be described with reference to FIGS.
[0044]
The user A inserts the IC card M3 storing the relationship certificate 200 into the IC card reader / writer 35 of the information communication device AP1. The control unit 37 of the information communication device AP1 acquires the relationship certificate 200 from the IC card M3 via the IC card reader / writer 35, and sends a relationship execution request including the relationship certificate 200 via the network NET1 to the gateway. The data is transmitted to the device GW (S21). Upon receiving the relationship execution request from the information communication device AP1 (S22), the gateway device GW starts the process of verifying the relationship certificate 200.
[0045]
That is, in the gateway device GW, as shown in FIG. 14, the relationship public key PKR for verifying the validity of the electronic signature SIGR is acquired online from the relationship certification authority CAR, and the signature verification unit 51a issues the relationship public key PKR. The validity of the electronic signature SIGR is verified using the public key PKR (S23). When the validity is confirmed, the personal public key PK1 of the user A for verifying the validity of the digital signature SIG1 is obtained online from the personal certificate authority CA1, and the validity of the digital signature SIG1 is verified using the personal public key PK1. Verification is performed (S24). Further, similarly, the device public key PK2 of the device certificate authority CA2 for validity verification of the electronic signature SIG2 is acquired online from the device certificate authority CA2, and the validity of the electronic signature SIG2 is verified using the device public key PK2. (S25).
[0046]
When all the validity verification results in the above step S are normal (S26), it is determined that the relationship authentication is successful, and the gateway device GW establishes a communication session between the information communication device AP1 and the network-compatible device AP2. At the same time, a relationship execution request is transmitted to the network compatible device AP2 (S27). With the establishment of the communication session by the gateway device GW, packet communication between the information communication device AP1 and the network-compatible device AP2 becomes possible. The relationship execution request transmitted from the gateway device GW is received by the network-compatible device AP2 (S28), and the network-compatible device AP2 transmits a relationship execution response to the information communication device AP1 (S29).
[0047]
Upon receiving the relationship execution request from the network compatible device AP2 (S30), the information communication device AP1 performs packet communication. Specifically, for example, when the network-compatible device AP2 is a Web camera, a packet requesting a captured image is transmitted from the information communication device AP1 to the Web camera, and a captured image is transmitted from the Web camera in response to the image request. Is displayed on the information communication device AP1.
[0048]
On the other hand, if the validity verification result is abnormal for any one of the signatures (S26), a message indicating that the verification result is abnormal is transmitted to the information communication device AP1 (S31), and the abnormal message is Error processing is performed such that the message is received by the communication device AP1 (S32) and an error message is displayed on the display unit 32.
[0049]
As described above, in the present embodiment, the relationship described in the relationship description document 100 described by the user A is trusted (that is, the relationship is not particularly verified), and the user A's electronic After verifying the validity of each of the signature SIG1 and the electronic signature SIG2 of the network compatible device AP2, a relationship certificate 200 issues a relationship certificate 200, and the gateway device GW authenticates based on the relationship certificate 200. Is performed and the relationship described in the relationship description 200 is performed or canceled based on the authentication result. Therefore, compared with a method in which the authentication path is multi-stage as in the conventional hierarchical mutual authentication technology, The authentication path can be simplified.
[0050]
In addition, the relationship certification authority CAR not only verifies the electronic signature of each of the relationship certification targets described in the relationship description, but also verifies whether each of the relationship certification targets actually exists on the network. Since the relationship certificate is issued after confirming the response to the network address, the reliability is higher than in the case where only the electronic signature is verified.
[0051]
Compared with the conventional mutual authentication route priority method, the conventional method required complicated checks of various reliability judgment conditions for verifying the trust relationship between certificate authorities during operation. In the relationship authentication according to the embodiment, if the relationship and the relationship certification target (individual or device) are reliable, a relationship certificate is issued by a relationship certification authority CAR, which is a third party, and the relationship certificate is issued. Since authentication can be realized by using a certificate, various procedures and the like at the time of operation are reduced.
[0052]
Also, in general, if there is any trouble between the parties in a certain electronic commerce, the certificate authority on the party X side confirms that the party X to be certified by the electronic certificate issued by the own certificate authority is legitimate. It is necessary to fulfill the responsibilities for proof of identity, that is, “responsibility for proof” and “responsibility for posting evidence. In this regard, the conventional cross-certification requires submission of all digital certificates on a certification path from a certification authority that certifies one party X to a certification authority that certifies the other party Y, In the relationship authentication of the present invention, it is sufficient to submit a relationship certificate managed by the relationship certificate authority CAR, so that the procedure for fulfilling the above responsibilities can be simplified.
[0053]
Further, as described above, since it is not necessary to provide the digital signature verification function on the network compatible device AP2 side, it is not necessary to set the relationship (connection permission or the like) on the network compatible device AP2.
[0054]
Further, according to the relationship authentication of the present invention, it is possible to avoid the n-square order accompanying the increase in the number of certificate authorities in the conventional mutual authentication.
[0055]
In the present embodiment, the personal public key PK1 and the personal secret key SK1 have been described as being generated by the personal certificate authority CA1, but not by the personal certificate authority CA1 but by the information communication device AP1 or another information communication device (not shown). It may be generated. In short, as long as the user A can safely hold his or her private secret key SK1, there is no particular limitation on the device that generates the private secret key SK1.
[0056]
By the way, the case of the one-way access relationship has been described above. However, in the case of the two-way access relationship and the multi-point multi-access relationship, a plurality of relationships are described in the relationship description 100 so that the one-way access relationship is described. It can be handled by almost the same procedure as in the case. The following figure shows an example of the relationship certificate in the two-way access relationship and the multi-point multi-access relationship.
[0057]
FIGS. 15 and 16 are diagrams illustrating an example of a relationship certificate in a two-way access relationship and a relationship certificate in a multipoint multi-access relationship. The relationship certificates of FIGS. 15 and 16 correspond to the cases of FIGS. 3B and 3C, respectively. The network address of the relationship certification target AP1 is “AP001”, and the relationship certification target AP2 is The network address is “AP002” and the network address of the relationship certification target AP3 is “AP003”.
In the case of the bidirectional access relationship shown in FIG. 3B, as shown in FIG. 15, two relationships of “FROM =“ AP001 ”TO =“ AP002 ”, FROM =“ AP002 ”TO =“ AP001 ”” In the case of a multipoint multi-access relationship, “FROM =“ AP001 ”TO =“ AP002 ”, FROM =“ AP002 ”TO =“ AP003 ”, FROM =“ AP003 ”TO = “AP001” ”. It should be noted that the relationship certificate requires the network address and electronic signature of each relationship certification target and the electronic signature of the relationship certification authority CAR as in the case of the unidirectional access relationship.
[0058]
The gateway device GW that has received the relationship certificate describing a plurality of relationships as described above verifies each electronic signature included in the relationship certificate, and when all the verification results are normal. Of the plurality of relationships described in the relationship certificate, the relationship is performed with the relationship certification target of the relationship certificate transmission source as the access source.
[0059]
Here, specific examples in which the two-way access relationship and the multipoint multi-access relationship are implemented include a VoIP (Voice over IP) phone, an Internet TV phone, and an Internet TV conference system.
[0060]
Also, as described above, a plurality of relationships can be described in the relationship description, but a plurality of one-way access relationships can be described. Specifically, for example, the user A wants to access the same network-compatible device AP2 from a plurality of devices such as a personal computer and a mobile terminal of a company. In this case, the relationship description includes “FROM: This can be handled by setting the network address of the personal computer TO: the network address of the network-compatible device AP2 and the FROM: the network address of the portable terminal TO: the network address of the network-compatible device AP2.
[0061]
【The invention's effect】
As described above, according to the present invention, when a relationship and each relationship certification target are reliable, a relationship certificate is issued from a relationship certificate authority, and authentication is performed based on the relationship certificate. Therefore, the authentication path can be shortened and the system construction can be facilitated.
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a schematic system configuration of a relationship authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a remote control care system.
3A is a diagram illustrating a unidirectional access relationship, FIG. 3B is a diagram illustrating a bidirectional access relationship, and FIG. 3C is a diagram illustrating a multipoint multiaccess relationship (here, an example of three locations).
FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a personal certificate authority and a device certificate authority of FIG. 2;
FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a device certificate authority.
FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of an information communication device.
FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a relationship certification authority.
FIG. 8 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a gateway device.
FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram of a procedure for issuing a relationship certificate.
FIG. 10 is a diagram showing a specific example of a relationship description.
FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure for creating a relationship description in the information communication device.
FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing a procedure for issuing a relationship certificate in a relationship certificate authority.
FIG. 13 is a diagram showing a sequence chart of a relationship authentication procedure.
FIG. 14 is an explanatory diagram of a relationship authentication procedure.
FIG. 15 is a diagram illustrating an example of a relationship certificate (in the case of “two-way access relationship”).
FIG. 16 is a diagram showing an example of a relationship certificate (in the case of “multipoint multipoint access relationship”).
FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram of the conventional dependent hierarchical authentication.
FIG. 18 is an explanatory diagram of conventional mutual authentication.
FIG. 19 is an explanatory diagram of an n-square order.
[Explanation of symbols]
1 relationship authentication system
A user
AP1 Information communication equipment (first information communication equipment)
AP2 network compatible device (second information communication device)
AP3 Relationship certification target (third information communication device)
CAR Relationship Certificate Authority
GW gateway device
NET1, NET2 network

Claims (12)

A first information communication device operated by a user, a second information communication device, and a gateway device serving as a gateway between the first information communication device and the second information communication device are connected via a network. Authentication method in the system,
A first relationship indicating that access from the first information communication device to the second information communication device is permitted, an electronic signature SIG1 using a secret key of the user, and The digital signature SIG1 is verified by the user's public key by a relationship certification authority, which is a third-party organization, which has received the submission of the relationship description including the digital signature SIG2 with the private key from the user, The electronic signature SIG2 is verified with the public key of the second information communication device, and if both verification results are normal, the relationship certificate authority sends the relationship description to the relationship description document, A relationship certificate to which a digital signature SIGR with a key has been issued is issued in advance,
The gateway device verifies an electronic signature SIGR of the relationship certificate with a public key of the relationship certificate authority in response to a relationship execution request including the relationship certificate from the first information communication device. At the same time, the digital signature SIG1 is verified with the user's public key, and the digital signature SIG2 is further verified with the public key of the second information communication device. If all the verification results are normal, the first A communication session between said information communication device and said second information communication device to implement said first relationship. The relationship description further includes a second relationship indicating that access from the second information communication device to the first information communication device is permitted, and the gateway device includes the relationship description. When a relationship certificate corresponding to the relationship certificate is received, the relationship between the first relationship and the second relationship, with the information communication device of the relationship certificate transmission source being the access source, is implemented. The relationship authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: The relationship description further includes a network address of each of the first information communication device and the second information communication device, and the relationship certificate authority stores the first information communication device and the second information communication device. 3. The relationship certificate is issued by applying the electronic signature SIGR when a response from each of the information communication devices is confirmed by accessing the network address of each of the information communication devices. Relationship authentication method. A first information communication device operated by a user, a second information communication device, and a gateway device serving as a gateway between the first information communication device and the second information communication device are connected via a network. Authentication method in the system,
A first relationship indicating that access from the first information communication device to the second information communication device is permitted; and third information connected to the network from the second information communication device. A second relationship indicating that access to the communication device is permitted, a third relationship indicating that access from the third information communication device to the first information communication device is permitted, and Submit a relationship description including an electronic signature SIG1 using the user's private key, an electronic signature SIG2 using the secret key of the second information communication device, and an electronic signature SIG3 using the secret key of the third information communication device. The digital signature SIG1 is verified by the public key of the user and the digital signature SIG2 is verified by the public key of the second information communication device by a relationship certification authority, which is a third party received from the user. Further, the digital signature SIG3 is verified with the public key of the third information communication device, and when all verification results are normal, the relationship certification authority issues a relationship certificate to the relationship description. A relationship certificate with a digital signature SIGR by the bureau's own private key is issued in advance,
The gateway device, in response to a relationship execution request including the relationship certificate from the first information communication device, the second information communication device, and the third information communication device, the relationship certificate The electronic signature SIGR is verified with the public key of the relationship certification authority, the electronic signature SIG1 is verified with the public key of the user, and the digital signature SIG2 is verified with the public key of the second information communication device. Further, the electronic signature SIG3 is verified with the electronic signature of the third information communication device, and when all the verification results are normal, the first relationship, the second relationship, and the third relationship are verified. A relationship authentication method, wherein, among the relationships, a relationship in which the information communication device of the relationship certificate transmission source is an access source is implemented. The relationship description includes a network address of each of the first information communication device, the second information communication device, and the third information communication device, and the relationship certificate authority stores the first information When a network address of each of the communication device, the second information communication device, and the third information communication device is accessed and a response from each is confirmed, the electronic signature SIGR is applied and a relationship certificate is issued. 5. The relationship authentication method according to claim 4, wherein: The relationship authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the relationship certification authority stores the relationship certificate in an IC card and issues the certificate. A first information communication device operated by a user, a second information communication device connected to the first information communication device via a network, and a second information communication device from the first information communication device. With a gateway device that serves as a gateway to the
The relationship certification authority includes a first relationship indicating that access from the first information communication device to the second information communication device is permitted, an electronic signature SIG1 using a secret key of the user, Upon receiving from the user a relationship description including the electronic signature SIG2 using the secret key of the second information communication device from the user, the electronic signature SIG1 is verified with the user's public key, and the electronic signature SIG2 is A relationship certificate obtained by performing verification with the public key of the second information communication device, and when both verification results are normal, applying the electronic signature SIGR to the relationship description using the secret key of the relationship certification authority itself; Is issued in advance,
The gateway device verifies an electronic signature SIGR of the relationship certificate with a public key of the relationship certificate authority in response to a relationship execution request including the relationship certificate from the first information communication device. At the same time, the digital signature SIG1 is verified with the user's public key, and the digital signature SIG2 is further verified with the public key of the second information communication device. If all the verification results are normal, the first A communication session between said information communication device and said second information communication device to implement said first relationship. The relationship description further includes a second relationship indicating that access from the second information communication device to the first information communication device is permitted, and the gateway device includes the relationship description. When a relationship certificate corresponding to the relationship certificate is received, the relationship between the first relationship and the second relationship, with the information communication device of the relationship certificate transmission source being the access source, is implemented. The relationship authentication system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The relationship description further includes a network address of each of the first information communication device and the second information communication device, and the relationship certificate authority stores the first information communication device and the second information communication device. 9. A relationship certificate is issued by applying the electronic signature SIGR when a network address of each information communication device is accessed and a response from each device can be confirmed. Relationship authentication system. A first information communication device operated by a user, a second information communication device connected to the first information communication device via a network, and a second information communication device from the first information communication device. With a gateway device that serves as a gateway to the
The relationship certification authority includes a first relationship indicating that access from the first information communication device to the second information communication device is permitted, and a relationship between the first information communication device and the second information communication device on the network. A second relationship indicating that access to the connected third information communication device is permitted, and a second relationship indicating that access from the third information communication device to the first information communication device is permitted. 3, a digital signature SIG1 using the secret key of the user, a digital signature SIG2 using the secret key of the second information communication device, and a digital signature SIG3 using the secret key of the third information communication device. Receiving the submission of the relationship description from the user, verifying the electronic signature SIG1 with the public key of the user, verifying the electronic signature SIG2 with the public key of the second information communication device, The child signature SIG3 is verified with the public key of the third information communication device, and if all verification results are normal, the electronic signature SIGR using the secret key of the relation certification authority itself is added to the relation description. The gateway device issues the relationship certificate in advance, and the gateway device includes the relationship certificate including the relationship certificate from the first information communication device, the second information communication device, and the third information communication device. In response to the execution request, the digital signature SIGR of the relationship certificate is verified with the public key of the relationship certificate authority, the digital signature SIG1 is verified with the public key of the user, and the digital signature SIG2 is verified with the digital signature SIG2. 2 is verified with the public key of the information communication device, and the electronic signature SIG3 is verified with the electronic signature of the third information communication device. If all the verification results are normal, the first relationship Said 2 relationships, the third of the relationships, relationships authentication system the relationship certificate transmission source information communication device which comprises carrying out the relationship of the access source. The relationship description includes a network address of each of the first information communication device, the second information communication device, and the third information communication device, and the relationship certificate authority stores the first information When a network address of each of the communication device, the second information communication device, and the third information communication device is accessed and a response from each is confirmed, the electronic signature SIGR is applied and a relationship certificate is issued. The relationship authentication system according to claim 10, wherein: The relationship authentication system according to claim 7, wherein the relationship certificate authority stores the relationship certificate in an IC card and issues the certificate.

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