DE102010025226A1 - Method for collision prevention for e.g. pedestrian, involves comparing information with predetermined information and calculating potential collision hazards and communicating hazards to vehicle operator by alarm - Google Patents

Abstract

The method involves emitting information of position and speed of a vehicle in a traffic from a radio equipment of a road user in short time intervals, where the information is determined by a global positioning system (GPS). The information is compared with predetermined information. Potential collision hazards are calculated and communicated to a vehicle operator by an alarm if hazard is detected. Radio traffic is routed between transceiver units via relay stations based on hazards. An independent claim is also included for a device for collision prevention by GPS-supported and programmable transmission and receiving for all kind of road users.

Description

In order to avoid accidents in traffic and to reduce the consequences of accidents, the technical equipment of vehicles and the road safety has been improved in recent decades. In addition, measures have been taken to improve the suitability and ability of drivers and other road users to cope with modern traffic.

Examples of aerospace applications include radar systems on the ground and in aircraft, ground-independent collision avoidance systems (TCAS), traffic separation at flight heights and flight routes with appropriate support from ground and aircraft technical facilities,
for maritime navigation: radar systems on land and on ships, traffic separation and route guidance with appropriate support by maritime signals,
for traffic on land: traffic lights, traffic signs, crash barriers, lane markings, asymmetric low beam, antilock braking systems, barriers and block fuses in railway facilities,
On vehicles, in addition to reducing the consequences of accidents, seat belts, airbags, crumple zones, protective helmets.

The suitability and empowerment of persons is ensured and promoted by examination of physical and mental health and reliability, training with subsequent examination, general education and educational measures with the help of criminal law. For vehicles, technical safety checks are carried out at regular intervals.

Transceivers that communicate automatically with each other and are also part of this invention, although known for a long time - from the smoke detector network to the electronic ankle bracelet - and in use; However, they are not used to inform the drivers of the otherwise only visually observable traffic events and the meanings of traffic signs - timely and clearly - on the acoustic way to compensate for the disadvantages that complicate the visual and cognitive detection, delay or impossible.

In addition, the above-mentioned measures to increase traffic safety are only very imperfectly suited to compensate for the main cause of traffic accidents - human error. This failure is primarily due to the fact that the demands of fast means of transport to their users far exceed the natural power of the human senses and of the human brain.

Such performance deficits have long been known to scientists, especially brain researchers; However, the results of such research in the control of traffic and accident prevention measures have been considered only to a very limited extent.

The following are some human senses and their limitations on their performance, which are rarely reported in schools and media, and therefore unaware of the vast majority of road users.

Visual performance in general.

Most of all, eyesight and image processing ability in the brain are overwhelmed. The cognitively perceived image is composed of image information taken via the eye and image information retrieved from memory. The image information recorded via the eye is only cognitively captured and processed in the brain to a fraction of the time. However, the consciousness can only imperfectly recognize which parts of the picture are taken in through the eye and which come from memory.

Whether and how an image is captured cognitively depends on other factors. For example, when searching specifically for a particular object - such as object, pattern, color, light spot, etc. - there is a risk that other important image information may be hidden from consciousness, or processed and processed, although directed from eye to brain were.

Whilst the ear and the sense of hearing can sense all the acoustic signals of known patterns (such as speech) independently of direction and - especially alarming messages - can process without delay, the eye can focus only on both directionally and distance consciously focused pixels the brain regions intended for cognitive acquisition and processing feed and process reliably. Delays to cognitive detection arise because even more brain regions - as for the recognition of pattern, color, etc. - must be activated. During such activities, important parts of the brain are blocked from collecting and processing other information.

Peripheral field of view weakness.

One of the most common causes of human error accidents is the peripheral visual field weakness caused. On the retina of the eye, only the point of the visual field is focused 100% sharp, which is focused by the lens of the eye. As the distance from the focused point increases, the image taken by the eye becomes blurred. From a certain blurring on the image taken over the eye is no longer considered by the brain, but supplemented or superimposed by existing image parts in the memory. Among other things, this peripheral visual field weakness is responsible for the fact that, for example, road signs, flashing lights at level crossings, children playing on sidewalks, etc. are overlooked in general, which - if only the road surface is focused - outside the cognitive perceptible via the eye's perspective are located.

Targeted, selective vision.

In traffic, the acquisition and processing of image information by the brain is often controlled selectively and goal-oriented. A cognitive detection then takes place due to unconsciously selected image patterns, while road users or obstacles - especially in the peripheral field of view - are not recognized if they do not correspond to the selected image pattern.

An important information for drivers is the nature of traffic routes. Therefore, they focus their attention - within their individually different security area - on traffic areas that they currently want to use.

Personal security area.

Drivers whose personal safety range is too small drive, for example, in the dark despite high speed only with low beam. Compared to a vehicle ahead, they do not maintain the necessary safety distance - even during the day - because they cognitively detect it only as a potential source of danger if the distance between the vehicles is below the limit of their personal safety range.

Other obstacles are only perceived cognitively if the personal safety distance is undershot. Previously, the meaning and the connection with the current traffic situation in the subconscious is not recognized. What is next to the traffic routes - ie in the peripheral field of view - is consciously perceived only if it stands out by color design, shaping, movement, flashing, brightness or other abnormalities sufficiently against the background.

Upper area of the field of vision.

Due to the sunlight or other reasons, the retina of the eye may be damaged in the upper field of view and thus impaired the ability to see there. Then, looking downwards, obstacles are perceived only at closer approach; in particular, when the driver sits elevated and his gaze in a steeper. Angle is directed downward on the road surface - for example, in trucks.

Deceptions.

Image information taken via the eye in the peripheral field of view can be misinterpreted in the brain. For example, in extreme cases, a driver otherwise claimed in thought may hold a vehicle parked on the breakdown strip of a highway for a properly preceding vehicle behind which he is to be placed.

Distorted overview.

Drivers see themselves at the center of a surrounding traffic scene. Therefore, you do not have a full scale overview such as an air traffic controller on a radar screen. Objects further from this subjective center appear reduced in size and are therefore classified as subordinate in the subconscious. For example, this can lead to underestimating the danger potential of an aircraft approaching from a greater distance and not taking it into account in decisions.

The importance of an overall overview has been recognized, for example, when operating the sluices of the Panama Canal. In the control room for the sluice gates, therefore, a model synchronized with the gates has been installed.

Procedural memory.

Routine actions in driving vehicles are controlled in the subconscious mind by the procedural memory. However, there may be gaps in this, which can only be filled up by frequent repetitive exercises, experiences or shock events. It is in the nature of things that unknown or rarely occurring events can not complete the procedural memory. For example, there is such a gap in the procedural memory, if it is neglected when changing lanes of a road vehicle, the area of the blind spot between the in the rearview mirror and through See page view detectable area. Only an accident caused by this would trigger a shock and thereby fill this gap in the procedural memory.

Information transmitted in the classroom is stored only in the declaratory memory, but not in the procedural memory or in brain regions that it could access immediately, as it should be. When rapid decisions need to be made in critical traffic situations, information stored in declaratory memory may not always be considered.

Routine actions controlled by procedural memory can be disrupted or disrupted by external events, such as telephone call, dropping a pencil, door noise, and so forth. Because routine actions are largely controlled subconsciously, it is not always guaranteed that they will be completed correctly.

The object of this invention is to apply a method by means of a technical device which compensates for the natural imperfections given by nature by alerting the drivers to a potential collision or other danger at the precise moment when a reaction occurs to avoid an accident is required. In addition, this danger needs to be described so accurately that it can be delivered directly to the areas of the brain where decisions are made to act without unnecessary, reaction-delaying brain activity.

The following - by way of example listed - accident hazards, traffic problems and warning texts for drivers are to be considered in the production, programming and installation of the devices:
Collision risks of aircraft with each other in the air and on taxiways,
Collision hazards with obstacles in approach lanes, ground vehicles, ground elevations, tall buildings and masts,
Endangering small aircraft by whirling large aircraft,
Weather and land information from airports,
Collision risks between ships,
Collision hazards with wrecks, shallows, navigation marks and structures such as harbor entrances,
Endangerment of persons (for example at river bathing beaches) and small ships due to the waves of large ships,
Collision hazards of rail vehicles at level crossings, points and construction sites, collision risks of road vehicles with slow moving or stationary vehicles, at intersections, level crossings, power lines, construction sites, low bridge crossings,
Endangering people at bus stops, schools (times adapted to timetables), kindergarten, playgrounds and venues, in darkness and fog, when loading with road crossing, unnatural traffic behavior (mm example abrupt changes in direction when drunk), warnings when falling below safety distances, in front of ghost drivers, in the case of a prohibited entry, closed road, cyclists in the blind spot, in front of accident centers in confusing areas, curves, bottlenecks and hilltops,
Warnings of transportable installations in the event of temporary traffic obstructions, construction sites, accident sites, traces of oil, road closures with programming and transmission of detour routes,
stationary installations (sensor-generated) warning of black ice, fog, smoke, avalanches, rockfall or approaching tidal waves in rivers,
Speed recommendations at traffic lights, level crossings and jam ends,
from stationary or transportable installations information of local significance, which is also transmitted via traffic information.

Information about petrol stations, hotels, etc. about petrol prices, free hotel capacities, workshop capacities with office hours, free parking etc.
of emergency vehicles from traffic-controlling instructions on duty trips, heavy transport, over-wide vehicles, etc.

Automatic shutdown of various functions in high traffic density (for example, in stop-and-go traffic in the narrow road network, but not in cyclists in the dead corner).

Information to be disseminated in transmitters must be programmable via computer, input keys or by recording. They must be coded so that messages can be suppressed at receivers that do not serve traffic safety or are not desired. Vehicle features must be included. Be requested by the collision warning device and be programmable (length, width, height, weight, in navigation vehicles additional navigation characteristics such as draft, turning circle, etc.).

The invention described in the claims is suitable for eliminating human error as a major cause of traffic accidents in many cases, by alerting drivers to details to be taken care of when maneuvering to avoid accidents and so accurately describing them as without Delay and unnecessary brain activity, the eyes are directed in the correct direction and the necessary maneuvers can be performed. In addition, other problems are solved, which serve the traffic relief or other needs.

If it is required that information should reach remote areas that are not directly accessible because of low transmission power of the collision warning systems, then these can also be transmitted via one or more relay stations according to claim 10 (for example, for the extensive planning of detour routes in road closures ).

Execution / Examples of accidents.

In some of the various examples listed below, it becomes clear how accidental, non-culpable human error has in the past caused accidents and how they could have been prevented by using a technical device according to this invention.

Aircraft collision at Überlingen on Lake Constance on July 01, 2002. (Source: Federal Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, Investigation Report of 19 May 2004)

The collision of two airplanes over Lake Constance was not prevented because in the last seconds before the crash in eight people due to human error to wrong or omitted decisions.

The radar pilot of the flight control center in Zurich has informed the crew of the Tupolev TU154M flying westward that there is an airplane from the right (2 o'clock position) and given their appropriate descent instructions. In fact, there was no plane there. Rather, it was Tupolev himself who was in front of the northbound Boeing B757-200, and the radar pilot would have had to give the Boeing crew the appropriate descent instructions. Presumably, the radar pilot, who had to dispatch another aircraft from another work station besides these two - later collided - aircraft, either confused the two aircraft with each other or with the right on the left; - possibly because he has observed the radar screen from different angles in the constant change of location. He had two tasks to do at the same time, each of which was routinely easy to do, but constantly disrupted each other. Additional disturbances in the work process still resulted because a telephone system did not work. A human working memory is overwhelmed with coping with so many tasks at the same time.

The crew of five Tupolev had in the subjective center of the traffic not the full scale overview as the radar pilot on his radar screen. Although the crew members have seen the Boeing coming from the left, they have not considered that - from their subjective midpoint position - a dangerous approach can only be detected on fast-moving aircraft when it is already too late for a safe evasive maneuver. Instead, because of the wrong communication from the radar pilot, they assumed that a collision hazard could originate from a plane on the right and looked for it.

About two and a half minutes before the collision, the Tupolev crew saw the aircraft coming from the left on an instrument, and nearly a minute before the collision, they had it in sight. In the last minute there were conflicting instructions from the automatic TCAS collision warning device in the Tupolev (request for climb) and the radar pilot in the control center Zurich (request for descent). Controversial in this last minute and the situation in the cockpit of Tupolev discussed. The left-seated - in the on-board hierarchy below - copilot (without function in free space) repeatedly pointed to the left-hand aircraft and the corresponding climb instructions of the TCAS collision warning device. The mid-seat navigator suggested that the aircraft coming from the left would fly through below them.

The right-seat responsible pilot trusted in the (false) descent instructions of the radar pilot. Only in the last second was the risk of collision with the aircraft coming from the left finally recognized and jerky, but too late initiated an evasive maneuver.

The crew of the Boeing also had in the subjective center of traffic also not the overall view as the radar pilot on his radar screen. Fifty seconds before the collision, the pilot-in-command at that time alone in the cockpit was alerted by the automatic TCAS collision warning device in his plane on conflict and 8 seconds later asked to descend (simultaneously with the TCAS request for climb in the Tupolev). About half a minute before the collision, the copilot, who had meanwhile returned to the cockpit, spotted Tupolew flying from the right.

The twice (wrong) request of the radar pilot to the Tupolev for accelerated descent has overheard the crew of the Boeing. However, she did not recognize and therefore did not take into account in the processing of information in the brain that the instructions given by radio to the Tupolew exactly corresponded to the instructions that had been given by the own TCAS collision warning device.

Only two seconds before the collision, she realized the danger that emanated from the Tupolev, who had been in sight for half a minute.

Collision warning systems according to claim 1 and 7 would the two crews acoustically - optionally also optically - communicated in which direction, distance and altitude was the other, already sighted aircraft, and the crews timely pointed to the visually unrecognizable risk of collision. Likewise, the warning systems have calculated with the help of other transmitted data, when and at what distance it would come without evasive maneuver to a collision. The automatically established radio connection would have enabled an immediate agreement on evasive maneuvers. In addition, the radar pilot would have been alerted to the contradiction between his instructions and the situation found in both aircraft.

It can be assumed that the crew members of the Tupolev trusted the false descent instructions of the radar pilot primarily because they had been provided with a plausible justification and corresponded to a pattern that was firmly anchored in their brains. By contrast, the TCAS instruction was issued without explanation, which meant that it was no longer considered in competition with the dominant pilot instruction in brain processing. The logical next step was the visual search for a plane in the foreground. The futile search created a kind of panic, which then led to - at least among the hierarchically higher crew members - the brain being blocked for other considerations.

On the other hand, all five crew members of the Tupolev had cognitively recorded the information from a collision warning device according to claim 1 and their meaning without great effort and observed with priority in the execution of their flight maneuvers, because they would have been plausibly justified and visually checked for correctness can. The same would have been true for the two crew members of the Boeing.

Airplane collision on the ground in Tenerife. (Source: Stuttgarter Zeitung online)

On March 27, 1977, the runway of the airport Los Rodeos on Tenerife was the worst catastrophe in aviation history. An aircraft of the Dutch KLM collided in the fog at the start with an American PanAm jumbo jet, which had missed a departure from the runway and this could not leave in time. There were 583 people killed. The decisive cause was misunderstandings in the radio traffic between the pilots of the two aircraft and the air traffic controller in the control tower, who could not see each other because of the fog. Small sounds of the copilot and the flight engineer to the uncertain position of the PanAm jumbo had not respected the dominating KLM captain.

A warning system according to claim 1 would have the crew of the Dutch KLM aircraft immediately after the start of the roll pointed out that the PanAm jumbo jet was still on the runway behind the missed departure. If the KLM aircraft had continued to take off despite the warning, the crew of the PanAm jumbo jet could have tried to avoid the accident or to reduce the consequences of an accident by leaving the runway.

Collision warning systems according to claim 1, 6 and 7 would have triggered alarm messages in the control tower, at the airport fire department and other emergency services.

Collision at the railroad crossing in Lauffen and at the railway crossing near Siófok (Hungary).

On June 20, 1959, at the railroad crossing in Lauffen (Neckar), a bus occupied by 71 people was caught by an express train, because the barriers had been closed too late.

45 people were killed.

On May 8, 2003, a German coach was captured by an express train at Siofok on Lake Balaton on an unrestricted level crossing. This 32 travelers and the driver of the bus have died. Two buses of the same company were in front of the damaged bus.

It can be assumed that the driver did not want to lose the connection to the buses in front and watched them in a kind of tunnel look. The overwhelming dominance of this vision objective meant that in the image processing in the driver's brain the flashing lights on the periphery of the driver's eye were perceived blurred in the peripheral field of vision Railroad crossing has been downgraded in importance and thus not recognized as a warning signal.

In the two preceding cases would collision warning systems according to claim 1 in the trains each information about the beginning and duration of the closure of the railroad crossing and a description of the level crossings (limited / unobstructed, lying behind a curve, slope of the road, etc.) sent out. The collision warning systems in the buses had warned of the risk of accidents and also calculated a speed recommendation for the bus drivers.

Had it come despite the warning to a collision, collision warning systems would have alarmed in accordance with claim 6 emergency services in the vicinity of the railroad crossings and randomly located emergency vehicles there.

In the second case would have a collision warning system according to claim 1 and 6 - with appropriate programming - the two preceding bus driver pointed to the lingering of the third bus and communicated its distance.

Collision of a Transrapid train with a workshop car on 22.09.2006.

In order to avoid a collision with the workshop car on the Transrapid line, several devices were installed and procedures provided, but all failed, such as:
The train driver was able to see the route and could have stopped the train when detecting the workshop car or did not even need to drive off. However, it is to be assumed that he has focused his attention on instrument display, driving noise, driving behavior, condition of the rail immediately before the train and possible disturbances of the train technology in the test vehicle and therefore located outside of his focused field of vision tool trolley in the image processing Brain did not take into account.

There were two dispatchers who could monitor each other. They had clear rules to follow and routinely handle easy-to-perform tasks that did not place high demands on their mental performance. They may have been disturbed by a third person in attendance, who took considerable part of their attention.

An electronic driving lock could be activated since 2005, but was not a (technically secured) prerequisite for a start release and was not automatically activated when the workshop car was on the track. Possibly because activation has always been superfluous in the past, it has only rarely been activated for a long time.

Systems and procedures have been tested for reliability by TÜV. The numerous. Causes that could lead to human error, but were obviously not considered by the TÜV.

Overlooking or disregarding individual points of the security concept would have been intercepted by the other security precautions. It is not surprising that it could come to a probability expect one day that the safety concept of the Transrapid train would fail in all points. On 22.09.2006 then also all security measures failed at the same time, and it came to the collision of the Transrapidzuges with the workshop car. It killed 23 people.

A collision warning system according to claim 1 would have pointed immediately after detecting the movement of the Transrapid train both vehicle crews on the risk of collision and issued alarm signals when continuing the journey. If the system had been connected to the train driving system, it would have automatically caused an emergency stop.

Collision warning systems according to claim 6 and 7 would have alarmed first the dispatcher and shortly thereafter rescue services and made a radio communication between the two vehicles and the control rooms.

Collision of a mobile home with a signal car.

After a truck accident on the A2 motorway on a bridge near Göttingen in July 2004, clearing work was carried out. In the process, the accident site was secured by a signal car of the automobile inspection company. Undeterred drove a 57-year-old with a camper in the car and was fatally injured.

It can be assumed that he has focused the road surface with his eyes downwards. The thereby recorded in the upper peripheral region of his field of vision light signals of the buggy, which he may have registered only as a shadowy brightness changes without meaning, have not been recognized in the image processing in the brain then as warning lights in the immediate vicinity.

A Kollisionswarnlage according to claim 1, 3 or 4 would have warned the RV driver early on the work at the accident site and issued in the absence of a response (speed reduction) increasingly stronger audible alarm signals.

Rear-end collisions on the A1 motorway.

On September 19, 2007, a truck at a daily construction site on a traffic jam on the A1 motorway in the municipality of Harpstedt. The Danish driver of the approaching truck was fatally injured. Two trucks at the end of the queue were pushed together. Two occupants of these trucks were seriously injured and one slightly injured.

It can be assumed that the driver of the Danish lorry, while looking down at the road surface, cognitively detected the lorry in front of him in the upper peripheral field of vision too late. In the traffic jam it came afterwards to three further traffic accidents.

Such collision accidents happen every day; so on 3 December 2009 again in the community Harpstedt on the A1 at a construction site near Groß Ippener with two fatalities and two seriously injured.

Rear-end collisions also regularly occur at traffic lights and closed railway barriers, as well as in the event of sudden visibility deterioration due to fog.

Collision warning systems according to claim 1 would have ensured that in a traffic jam or in a slowly moving column the last vehicle information on position and distance to the first vehicle in the traffic jam (or length of the traffic jam) would have sent out. In approaching vehicles, drivers would have been alerted to the risk of collision, if necessary due to increasing alerting. In addition, speed recommendations could have been calculated.

If, nevertheless, a serious accident had occurred as a result of abrupt acceleration, collision warning systems according to claim 6 would have alarmed emergency services.

Pedestrians, cyclists and wagons.

During the day, cyclists are harder to spot in traffic than larger vehicles; especially when they visually merge with a diffuse background. At night, there is a risk that their fainter and only individually existing sources of illumination are confused with house lighting and other fixed light sources or are not perceived at glare from stronger light sources. Also in fog, cyclists are difficult to recognize because of their poor lighting.

Serious accidents often occur when cyclists are overlooked in the blind spot by turning vehicles.

In the dark, tractor and horse carts - if their taillights do not differ from other vehicle taillights - are hard to recognize as slow moving vehicles. Generally pedestrians are always without lights and often in dark clothes. In addition, many drivers drive despite high speed with low beam. Collision warning systems according to claim 1, 2 and / or 5 are suitable for preventing accidents in such traffic situations. If a cyclist or a pedestrian is thrown through the air in an accident and commits the driver involved in the accident, a collision warning device according to claim 2, 6 and 9 may recognize the accident and automatically alert an emergency service.

Warnings, instructions and recommendations from the collision warning devices are carried out at the right time, location and situation. Without unnecessary information, the traffic situation is comprehensively acoustically represented. As a result, the direction of view and eye focus are directed immediately to objects to be observed. These are then captured cognitively faster, and the necessary decisions can be made earlier and more safely. As the messages are sent acoustically, they ensure that they reach the places in the brain where decisions are made about what to do, which is not the case when taken via the eye, for example when a driver accidentally or as a result of distraction looking in the wrong direction. Announcements such as "Bus stops at bus stop", "Children leave school", "In 100 meters three pedestrians", "In 50 meters child with bicycle" etc. also help to protect weaker road users from accidents.

Many traffic announcements can be replaced by more precise messages from collision warning devices. For example, warnings to ghost drivers are issued without delay in all vulnerable vehicles with accurate distance and direction indication. Thus, even those drivers are reliably informed, who are using a navigation device on the road and do not even know if they are even on a reported on the traffic section of the road. The ghost drivers themselves are of course also referred to their misconduct.

Data collected by means of sensors on visibility or ice on bridges, data sent from emergency vehicles on heavy transports, accident sites, etc. are only issued close to the location and not nationwide for large areas that are only partially or not at all affected.

With appropriate search input road drivers in the desired radius information about free parking (especially important for truck drivers on highways and major events), free hotel rooms, gasoline prices, garages, opening hours, etc., provided that such stations are available at such places , If such information is offered via collision warning devices, this also contributes to their acceptance and dissemination.

Collision warning systems in traffic lights can not only calculate a speed recommendation in approaching vehicles, but also adapt the traffic light phases to traffic. Traffic lights can be completely switched off at night or when traffic is low and only have to be activated when the vehicle approaches. As a result of the lower energy consumption, this saves a multiple of the investment costs.

If traffic is slowed down less and accelerated less when starting, this also reduces wear on the road surface.

Data entered at the start of the journey on vehicle width, height and weight in receivers ensure that drivers are warned in good time about low bridges, power lines at level crossings, etc.

When approaching the most accident-prone situation in air traffic, pilots receive up-to-date sensor-based data - in particular on ground pressure - to complement or compare with verbal submissions and review current instrument settings.

Existing safety devices with similar tasks - such as the collision avoidance system TCAS on aircraft - are advantageously supplemented by the collision warning devices described in this invention because warnings are issued twice and thus contribute to more reliable attention and to avoid misunderstandings, and they because of their low power requirements can be operated independently of the vehicle electrical system or continue to be operated in the event of a power failure.

For effective collision avoidance in traffic, the widest possible spread of collision warning systems is required. In particular, the benefits below can be expected to come in a short time.

When integrated into mobile phones and navigation devices, existing functions can be shared.

Independence from external power, small size and low weight ensure that collision warning devices can be easily carried by cyclists and pedestrians. As transportable systems collision warning devices for different tasks and changing vehicles can be used.

Road signs or other stationary objects are only marginally expensive due to the installation of the required transmitter systems.

It can be expected that the cost of acquisition will pay off in a short time through the reduction of insurance premiums.

In addition, mass production after the introductory phase ensures that the cost of acquisition drops to a low level.

A rapid nationwide dissemination of collision warning devices is to be expected because the acquisition costs are negligible in comparison to the costs saved through accident prevention. For example, the costs that would be spared by a single prevented aviation accident such as that on 1 July 2002 on Lake Constance or on 27 March 1977 in Tenerife, probably would be sufficient to equip all aircraft worldwide with a simple version of the collision warning device.

Claims (10)

Device and method for collision avoidance using GPS-based and programmable transmission and reception systems for road users of all kinds, characterized in that the transmitting section of a radio data about the traffic behavior and the characteristics of the road user with the current, determined by the GPS method position be sent out at short intervals, from which in potential radio stations other road users possible collision hazards calculated and the drivers can be communicated by voice output and, if necessary, additionally by alarm signals. Device and method for collision avoidance according to claim 1, characterized in that the device for road users with slow travel speed consists only of a transmission system, the data on the traffic behavior and the characteristics of the road user with the current, determined by the GPS method position at short intervals emitted at short intervals, from which potential radio interference other road users calculates possible collision risks and the drivers can be communicated by voice output and, if necessary, additionally by alarm signals. Device and method for collision avoidance according to claim 1, characterized in that the device for stationary objects in the catchment area of traffic consists only of a transmitter that programmed at short intervals, data received from sensors or external data processing equipment and / or information entered via language properties sends the object, position and other information intended for the driver, from which in radio systems of road users possible collision or other accident hazards calculated and the drivers can be communicated by voice output and, if necessary, additionally by alarm signals. Apparatus and method for collision avoidance according to claim 1 and 3, characterized in that the device, which consists only of a transmitter, is used as a portable system, with the not permanently existing danger situations or traffic impairments can be warned. Device and method for collision avoidance according to claim 1 and 2, characterized in that the device can be integrated into mobile phones, navigation devices or other devices with radio technology and / or can be installed in protective helmets or clothing for cyclists and motorcyclists. Device and method for collision avoidance according to claim 1 and 2, characterized in that the transmitting device with the aid of sensor controls, keyboard and / or voice input emergency messages can send together with the determined via the GPS method position on emergency services and emergency vehicles whose receivers for such Messages are ready to receive. Device and method for collision avoidance according to claim 1, 5 and / or 6, characterized in that the transmitting / receiving equipment can automatically establish a radio communication between the vehicles involved upon detection of a collision hazard. A collision avoidance device and method according to claim 1, 3, 4, and / or 5, characterized in that off-traffic facilities can be equipped with transmitters which indicate their position and programmable information which need not be related to traffic Traffic participants who have switched their receiving devices for such messages ready to receive. Collision avoidance apparatus and method according to claims 1 to 6 and / or 8, characterized in that the apparatuses emit all messages with an unchangeable code enabling lost equipment to be retrieved. Apparatus and method for collision avoidance according to the preceding claims, characterized in that the radio communication between the transmitting / receiving equipment can also be routed via relay stations.