CN115860750B - Electric automobile electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method - Google Patents

Electric automobile electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method Download PDF

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Publication number
CN115860750B
CN115860750B CN202310165002.5A CN202310165002A CN115860750B CN 115860750 B CN115860750 B CN 115860750B CN 202310165002 A CN202310165002 A CN 202310165002A CN 115860750 B CN115860750 B CN 115860750B
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electric automobile
identity authentication
signature
proof
electric
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CN115860750A (en
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邱日轩
肖子洋
李元诚
付俊峰
陈牧
井思桐
施玮
金波
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State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Jiangxi Electric Power Co Ltd
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State Grid Corp of China SGCC
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Jiangxi Electric Power Co Ltd
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Abstract

The invention discloses an electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method for an electric vehicle, which comprises the following steps: leader node selection of security parameters
Figure ZY_1
Running a group generation algorithm of a symmetric prime order bilinear pair and generating public parameters, and selecting a collision-resistant hash function by a leader node to release the public parameters; the electric automobile randomly selects a master key and a public key which meet uniform distribution from the anti-collision hash function; according to the invention, through the identity authentication privacy protection scheme of the electric vehicle optimization charge-discharge transaction process combining the anonymous certificate and the blockchain, a trusted third party is not relied on, a pseudonym is used for representing the identity in the charge/discharge optimization scheduling and identity authentication process, the legality is signed by a CL (code-based) and endorsed by zero knowledge, and the security analysis shows that the proposed model cannot reveal any privacy information to potential internal attackers such as blockchain nodes, charging piles and the like and any other external attackers and can resist some common attacks.

Description

Electric automobile electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of identity privacy protection, in particular to an electric vehicle electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method.
Background
With the large-scale popularization of electric vehicles, the online electric power transaction between the electric vehicles and the charging piles is more frequent, and the traditional online transaction mode only allows the electric vehicles to access the system and participate in the transaction after authentication and authorization, otherwise, the safety risks such as identity theft, data tampering and information theft are easy to occur;
in addition, the transaction information is collected and stored in the database for transaction information inquiry, arbitration and the like, and in the process, some private information of the electric automobile user, such as the position, the available charging period, the license plate number, the driving license and the like, is inevitably revealed, and an attacker can further disclose the track, the living habit and the like of the electric automobile user and share the track, the living habit, the insurance company and the like by analyzing the information.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method for an electric vehicle, which aims to solve the defects in the background technology.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: an electric automobile electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method comprises the following steps:
s1: leader node selection of security parameters
Figure SMS_2
Group generation algorithm running symmetric prime order bilinear pairs +.>
Figure SMS_4
Generating common parameters, the leader node selecting the anti-collision hash function +.>
Figure SMS_6
Publishing common parameters
Figure SMS_8
, wherein />
Figure SMS_9
Is a random prime number->
Figure SMS_10
Is prime order->
Figure SMS_11
G is belonging to the two multiplication cycle groups of
Figure SMS_1
Is a generator of->
Figure SMS_3
For a bilinear mapping,/a>
Figure SMS_5
For the number->
Figure SMS_7
Is a finite field of (2);
s2: electric automobile
Figure SMS_12
，/>
Figure SMS_14
From->
Figure SMS_15
Randomly selecting private keys satisfying a uniform distribution +.>
Figure SMS_16
Public key
Figure SMS_17
Omega represents the number of electric cars served by each blockchain node, blockchain node +.>
Figure SMS_18
，
Figure SMS_19
Is used to issue a certificate, a list of attributes is signed, wherein +.>
Figure SMS_13
Is a random integer;
S3：
Figure SMS_20
proof keys for a given proof paradigm, the zero knowledge proof expression is:
Figure SMS_21
，
in the formula ,
Figure SMS_22
for security parameters, P is credential, +.>
Figure SMS_23
Are random numbers in the finite field of number q,
Figure SMS_24
，/>
Figure SMS_25
select own private key->
Figure SMS_26
And corresponding public key
Figure SMS_27
。
Preferably, the electric automobile
Figure SMS_28
In (a): let per blockchain node service->
Figure SMS_29
Electric automobile +.>
Figure SMS_30
Electric automobile obtains voucher from block chain link point through zero knowledge proof modeAnd proving to the charging pile that the secret attribute corresponding to the certificate is known.
Preferably, in step S2, the blockchain node
Figure SMS_31
The detailed process of generating the proof is as follows:
s2.1: selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_32
，/>
Figure SMS_33
And generates a random value +.>
Figure SMS_34
；
S2.2: generating challenges
Figure SMS_35
, wherein />
Figure SMS_36
Expiration date for marking proof, +.>
Figure SMS_37
For blockchain node->
Figure SMS_38
Identity information of (a);
s2.3: calculating a response
Figure SMS_39
, wherein />
Figure SMS_40
,
Figure SMS_41
Mod is a remainder operation;
s2.4: reservation of
Figure SMS_42
As its public key->
Figure SMS_43
Is a proof of (3).
Preferably, the electric automobile
Figure SMS_44
In (a): is provided with->
Figure SMS_45
Attribute confidentiality in the certificate of (1) to form a secret attribute set
Figure SMS_46
，m ji For each attribute information, the same master secret is included as a special attribute in +.>
Figure SMS_47
In the certificate of (2) private key->
Figure SMS_48
Is->
Figure SMS_49
Helping to bind different credentials to the same identity.
Preferably, the secret attribute verification process is:
using public keys
Figure SMS_50
Before generating promise->
Figure SMS_51
Will request->
Figure SMS_52
Send->
Figure SMS_53
Is to verify and authenticate the public key->
Figure SMS_54
；
Figure SMS_55
The verification process is as follows:
calculation of
Figure SMS_56
；
Calculation of
Figure SMS_57
；
Satisfy the following requirements
Figure SMS_58
Then accept public key +.>
Figure SMS_59
Otherwise, refusing.
Preferably, the electric automobile
Figure SMS_60
Use of +.according to the Pedersen commitment scheme>
Figure SMS_61
Public key of->
Figure SMS_62
For secret attribute->
Figure SMS_63
Generating a promise->
Figure SMS_64
，/>
Figure SMS_65
The proof commitment is to correctly generate the corresponding zero knowledge proof expression as follows:
Figure SMS_66
，
Figure SMS_67
generating the proof of promise includes the steps of:
selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_68
，/>
Figure SMS_69
And generate->
Figure SMS_70
；
Generating challenges
Figure SMS_71
wherein />
Figure SMS_72
Is the current timestamp;
calculating a response
Figure SMS_73
, wherein />
Figure SMS_74
；
Transmitting
Figure SMS_75
To->
Figure SMS_76
。
Preferably, the blockchain node
Figure SMS_77
Pair ∈10 using CL signature algorithm>
Figure SMS_78
Commitment of submission->
Figure SMS_79
Signing to issue a voucher +.>
Figure SMS_80
。
Preferably, the blockchain node
Figure SMS_81
Random generator->
Figure SMS_83
And calculate->
Figure SMS_85
，/>
Figure SMS_87
Calculate->
Figure SMS_89
And calculate->
Figure SMS_91
，
Figure SMS_93
Finally->
Figure SMS_82
Calculating to obtain signature->
Figure SMS_84
And send to->
Figure SMS_86
Direct pair promise using CL signature algorithm>
Figure SMS_88
Signature generated->
Figure SMS_90
Direct price pair->
Figure SMS_92
Is a result of the signature of (a).
Preferably, the blockchain node
Figure SMS_94
Verifying the credential signature includes:
Figure SMS_95
receive->
Figure SMS_96
After the transmitted signature, verify the signature +.>
Figure SMS_97
Effective, combine attribute set->
Figure SMS_98
Packaging into a signature certificate and storing, wherein the signature verification process is as follows:
Figure SMS_99
by->
Figure SMS_100
Judging;
Figure SMS_101
and />
Figure SMS_102
Respectively through->
Figure SMS_103
and />
Figure SMS_104
Judging;
Figure SMS_105
by->
Figure SMS_106
Judging (1)>
Figure SMS_107
，m ji For each attribute information, private key +.>
Figure SMS_108
Is->
Figure SMS_109
Is the identity of (a).
Preferably, the method comprises the steps of,
Figure SMS_110
presenting a blinded version of the voucher to participate in the optimized charge-discharge transaction,>
Figure SMS_111
selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_112
And computes a blinded version of the credential as:
Figure SMS_113
，
Figure SMS_114
，
Figure SMS_115
，
wherein ,
Figure SMS_116
is further blinded to->
Figure SMS_117
The uniform distribution is independent of all parameters, will +.>
Figure SMS_118
As->
Figure SMS_119
The kana used in each transaction +.>
Figure SMS_120
Along with transaction information is recorded in the blockchain for transaction inquiry and transaction arbitration.
In the technical scheme, the invention has the technical effects and advantages that:
according to the invention, an identity authentication privacy protection scheme of an electric vehicle optimization charge-discharge transaction process combining an anonymous certificate and a blockchain is independent of a trusted third party, a pseudonym is used for representing identity in the charge/discharge optimization scheduling and identity authentication process, the pseudonym has anonymity and unlinkability, a CL signature and zero knowledge proof endorsement are used for legality, and security analysis shows that the proposed model cannot reveal any privacy information to potential internal attackers such as blockchain nodes and charging piles and any other external attackers and can resist some common attacks.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings that are needed in the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments described in the present invention, and other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings for a person having ordinary skill in the art.
FIG. 1 is a system architecture diagram of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the system configuration of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of anonymous attribute verification according to the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the credential issuance process of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is a flowchart of the charging authentication of the electric vehicle according to the present invention.
FIG. 6 is a block chain node of the present invention with the number of secret attributes and the computational overhead
Figure SMS_121
And the number of electric vehicles served by the same
Figure SMS_122
Is a variation of the schematic diagram.
FIG. 7 shows the calculation costs of the electric vehicle and the charging pile according to the present invention
Figure SMS_123
Is a variation of the schematic diagram.
FIG. 8 is a diagram showing the number of secret attributes of an electric vehicle according to the present invention
Figure SMS_124
And the total number of electric vehicles served by each block chain link point +.>
Figure SMS_125
Schematic change.
FIG. 9 is a diagram showing the communication overhead between the charging pile and the electric vehicle according to the present invention
Figure SMS_126
Is a variation of the schematic diagram.
Detailed Description
For the purpose of making the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention more apparent, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is apparent that the described embodiments are some embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Example 1
Referring to fig. 1 and 2, the method for protecting the identity authentication privacy of the electric power transaction of the electric vehicle according to the embodiment includes the following steps:
(1) Blockchain nodes:
Figure SMS_127
is a set of nodes that make up a distributed blockchain network, where τ is a random integer. In one aspect, all block link points together maintain normal operation of the block chain network, including transaction generation, consensus, block packing and chaining, and the like. The blockchain node on the other hand also acts as a certificate authority to issue digital certificates, hereinafter referred to as vouchers, in a distributed manner to a set of attributes of the electric vehicle.
In addition, the present application employs a HyperledgerFabric build blockchain system that uses a Raft consensus algorithm with a mature, efficient and highly reliable leader node (leader) selection mechanism. Considering that a single node may be invaded by an attacker, resulting in a single point of failure, the present application is responsible for initializing system settings, publishing system common parameters, and providing registration services for the node by this dynamically selected reliable node, the leader node.
(2) Charging pile: the charging pile firstly verifies whether the electric automobile acquires the charging permission, and then provides charging/discharging service for the electric automobile in a distributed mode. The intelligent ammeter built in the charging pile can record charging and discharging data of the electric automobile in real time.
(3) Electric automobile: assume that each block link point is at most serviceable
Figure SMS_128
Electric automobile
Figure SMS_129
. The electric automobile obtains the certificate from the block chain link point in a zero knowledge proving mode and proving to the charging pile that the secret attribute corresponding to the certificate is known. Therefore, the electric automobile obtains the charge and discharge permission and completes the charge and discharge transaction under the condition that any additional information is not disclosed to the blockchain node and the charge pile, and the electric automobile and the blockchain node are mutually communicated through the Internet.
1. Initialization of
The leader node selects the appropriate security parameters
Figure SMS_131
And running a group generation algorithm Setup (++f) for symmetric prime order bilinear pairs>
Figure SMS_132
) Generating the public parameter, the leader node furthermore has to select a collision-resistant hash function +.>
Figure SMS_134
Finally the leader node issues the common parameter +.>
Figure SMS_136
, wherein />
Figure SMS_138
Is a random prime number->
Figure SMS_139
Is prime order->
Figure SMS_140
G is belonging to +.>
Figure SMS_130
Is a generator of->
Figure SMS_133
For a bilinear mapping,/a>
Figure SMS_135
For the number->
Figure SMS_137
Is a finite field of the system. />
2. Key generation
Electric automobile
Figure SMS_142
，/>
Figure SMS_143
From->
Figure SMS_145
Randomly selecting private keys satisfying a uniform distribution +.>
Figure SMS_147
Public key
Figure SMS_149
. Block chain node->
Figure SMS_151
，/>
Figure SMS_152
For issuing a credential, i.e. for signing a list of attributes. />
Figure SMS_141
Select own private key->
Figure SMS_144
And corresponding public key
Figure SMS_146
，/>
Figure SMS_148
，
Figure SMS_150
。
3. Generating zero knowledge proof
In addition, in the case of the optical fiber,
Figure SMS_153
it is necessary to prove that the key pair is correct for a given credential paradigm (defining the size of the message block—equivalent to the number of attributes of the credential). This zero knowledge is demonstrated as follows:
Figure SMS_154
(1)，
in the formula ,
Figure SMS_155
for safety parameters->
Figure SMS_156
The method designs an identity authentication privacy protection scheme for an electric vehicle optimization charge-discharge transaction process combining an anonymous certificate and a blockchain, and does not depend on a trusted third party, a pseudonym is used for representing the identity in the charge/discharge optimization scheduling and identity authentication process, the pseudonym has anonymity and unlinkability, the legality of the pseudonym is endorsed by a CL signature and zero knowledge proof, and security analysis shows that the proposed model cannot reveal any privacy information to potential internal attackers such as blockchain nodes, charging piles and the like and any other external attackers and can resist some common attacks.
Figure SMS_157
The detailed procedure for generating the proof is as follows:
(1) Selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_158
，/>
Figure SMS_159
And generates a random value +.>
Figure SMS_160
。
(2) Generating challenges
Figure SMS_161
, wherein />
Figure SMS_162
Expiration date for marking proof, +.>
Figure SMS_163
For blockchain node->
Figure SMS_164
Identity information of (a) is provided.
(3) Calculating a response
Figure SMS_165
, wherein />
Figure SMS_166
，/>
Figure SMS_167
，/>
Figure SMS_168
，
Figure SMS_169
Is a remainder taking operation.
(4) Finally reserve
Figure SMS_170
As its public key->
Figure SMS_171
Is a proof of (3).
Anonymous attribute verification:
Figure SMS_172
it is desirable to register a credential for a set of attributes that it possesses (such as master key, driver license expiration date, owner name, owner nationality, owner identity ID, car model number, account balance, charging stake address, and charging stake number);
to hide the secret attribute such as master key, charging pile number, etc., the block link can be dotted
Figure SMS_173
Signing the commitments of the secret property set instead of the original property without loss of generality;
assume that
Figure SMS_174
All attributes in the credentials of (1) need to be kept secret, constituting a secret attribute set +.>
Figure SMS_175
，m ji For each attribute information, in particular, +.>
Figure SMS_176
I.e. the same master secret is included as a special attribute in all +.>
Figure SMS_177
Is a credential of (1);
can be considered as a private key
Figure SMS_178
Act as->
Figure SMS_179
Helping to bind different credentials to the same identity, +.>
Figure SMS_180
For the number of other secret properties than the master key, +.>
Figure SMS_181
In the direction->
Figure SMS_182
The need to provide a zero knowledge before obtaining the signature of the commitment proves that he really knows the secret attribute corresponding to the commitment submitted>
Figure SMS_183
。/>
The whole process is as shown in fig. 3: the detailed anonymity attribute verification process is as follows:
1) And (3) verifying correctness of the public key: in using public keys
Figure SMS_184
Before generating promise->
Figure SMS_185
Will request->
Figure SMS_186
Send->
Figure SMS_187
Is verified and validated.
Figure SMS_188
The detailed verification process is as follows:
(1) Calculating a random value
Figure SMS_189
。
(2) Calculation of
Figure SMS_190
.
(3) If it meets
Figure SMS_191
Then accept public key +.>
Figure SMS_192
Otherwise, refusing.
Figure SMS_193
The correctness of (1) comes from->
Figure SMS_194
The following can be demonstrated:
Figure SMS_195
，
Figure SMS_196
，
Figure SMS_197
(2)，
Figure SMS_198
，
Figure SMS_199
，
2) Generating a secret attribute commitment: in order to hide the attributes of the attributes,
Figure SMS_200
use of +.according to the Pedersen commitment scheme>
Figure SMS_201
Public key of (a)
Figure SMS_202
For secret attribute->
Figure SMS_203
Generating a promise->
Figure SMS_204
The petersen commitment solves the problem based on discrete logarithms, allowing the message submitter to submit the message to a verifier without revealing the committed message details.
3) Generating a promise proof:
Figure SMS_205
his commitment must be verified as correctly generated, corresponding to the following zero knowledge proof:
Figure SMS_206
(3)，
Figure SMS_207
the detailed process of generating the promise proof is as follows:
(1) Selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_208
，/>
Figure SMS_209
And generates a random value +.>
Figure SMS_210
；
(2) Generating challenges
Figure SMS_211
wherein />
Figure SMS_212
Is the current timestamp;
(3) Calculating a response
Figure SMS_213
, wherein />
Figure SMS_214
；
(4) Transmitting
Figure SMS_215
To->
Figure SMS_216
。
4) Verification promises to prove: received from
Figure SMS_217
After the demonstration of->
Figure SMS_218
The electric automobile is indirectly proved to be really aware of the secret attribute corresponding to the promise by serving as a verifier to verify the promise by the following steps>
Figure SMS_219
：
(1) Calculation of
Figure SMS_220
；
(2) Calculation of
Figure SMS_221
；
(3) If it meets
Figure SMS_222
Accept promise->
Figure SMS_223
Otherwise, refusing. />
Figure SMS_224
The correctness of (1) comes from->
Figure SMS_225
The verification can be as follows;
Figure SMS_226
，
Figure SMS_227
(4)，
Figure SMS_228
，
Figure SMS_229
，
Figure SMS_230
，
example 2
As shown in fig. 4: in the present embodiment, description is made of
Figure SMS_231
Pair ∈10 using CL signature algorithm>
Figure SMS_232
Commitment of submission->
Figure SMS_233
Signing to issue a voucher +.>
Figure SMS_234
。
1) Generating a credential signature:
Figure SMS_237
first randomly generate +>
Figure SMS_239
And calculate->
Figure SMS_241
Then->
Figure SMS_243
Calculation of
Figure SMS_245
，/>
Figure SMS_248
，/>
Figure SMS_250
And calculate->
Figure SMS_235
，
Figure SMS_238
. Finally->
Figure SMS_240
Calculating to obtain signature
Figure SMS_242
And send to->
Figure SMS_244
. Direct pair promise using CL signature algorithm>
Figure SMS_246
Signature generated->
Figure SMS_247
Equivalent direct pair->
Figure SMS_249
Because of->
Figure SMS_236
The following can be demonstrated:
Figure SMS_251
，
Figure SMS_252
，
Figure SMS_253
(5)，
Figure SMS_254
，/>
Figure SMS_255
，
Figure SMS_256
，
for a pair of
Figure SMS_258
For->
Figure SMS_259
Submitted->
Figure SMS_261
Signature and direct pair of attribute sets thereof>
Figure SMS_263
The security of the signature is the same. This is because +.>
Figure SMS_265
The validity of the corresponding attribute of the promise is proved by a zero-knowledge mode. For->
Figure SMS_267
For the sake of +>
Figure SMS_268
Can only go from->
Figure SMS_257
Extracting about->
Figure SMS_260
Is provided. However, according to the Pedersen commitment, < ->
Figure SMS_262
Is a security commitment whose information is theoretically independent of +.>
Figure SMS_264
Thus information theoretically conceals the secret attribute set +.>
Figure SMS_266
。
2) Verifying the certificate signature: received by
Figure SMS_269
After the signature sent->
Figure SMS_270
It is necessary to check its signature +.>
Figure SMS_271
Is effective, then combine the attribute set +.>
Figure SMS_272
Packaging into a signature certificate and storing. The specific signature verification process is as follows: />
2.1）
Figure SMS_273
Whether or not to pass right->
Figure SMS_274
To judge. The correctness of this equation is verified as follows:
Figure SMS_275
(6)，
2.2）
Figure SMS_276
and />
Figure SMS_277
Whether or not to pass through->
Figure SMS_278
and />
Figure SMS_279
And (5) judging. The correctness verification of the two equations is shown in (7) and (8), respectively:
Figure SMS_280
，
Figure SMS_281
(7)，
Figure SMS_282
，
Figure SMS_283
(8)，
2.3）
Figure SMS_284
whether or not to pass right->
Figure SMS_285
To judge. The correctness of this equation is verified as follows:
Figure SMS_286
，
Figure SMS_287
，
Figure SMS_288
(9)，
Figure SMS_289
，
Figure SMS_290
，/>
Figure SMS_291
，
Figure SMS_292
，
as shown in fig. 5, once
Figure SMS_293
Reaching the charging station and connecting with the charging post within a specified period of time requires authentication of itself to perform the charging and discharging. />
Figure SMS_294
Using different pseudonyms (a special cryptographic token, derived from the credentials non-deterministicallyOut) to interact with the charging post instead of simply sending the account and corresponding master key or key hash to the charging post for authentication. />
Figure SMS_295
There is a need to specify the property set corresponding to the pseudonym without revealing +.>
Figure SMS_296
On the premise of proving possession of the pseudonym to the charging pile. Finally->
Figure SMS_297
The method and the device realize that the validity of the identity of the charging pile is verified under the condition that the privacy information is not revealed, so that the charging/discharging service provided by the charging pile is obtained.
In order not to reveal the credentials,
Figure SMS_298
a blinded version of the credential is presented to participate in the optimized charge-discharge transaction. />
Figure SMS_299
Selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_300
And computes a blinded version of the credential as follows:
Figure SMS_301
，
Figure SMS_302
，
Figure SMS_303
，/>
wherein
Figure SMS_304
Is further blinded to->
Figure SMS_305
All are provided withThe uniform distribution is independent of all other parameters. Thus can be +.>
Figure SMS_306
As->
Figure SMS_307
Is a pseudonym of (c). Due to the security features of the blockchain, such as non-tamperability and traceability, the pseudonym +_ used in each transaction>
Figure SMS_308
Along with other transaction information may be recorded in the blockchain for transaction inquiry and transaction arbitration.
3) Generating a credential proof:
Figure SMS_309
it needs to be proved that he knows the property set to which the credential corresponds +.>
Figure SMS_310
The corresponding zero knowledge is demonstrated below.
Figure SMS_311
，(10)，
wherein
Figure SMS_312
，/>
Figure SMS_313
，/>
Figure SMS_314
，/>
Figure SMS_315
Are all intermediate parameters of CL signatures.
Figure SMS_316
The detailed process of generating the credential proof is as follows:
calculation of
Figure SMS_317
、/>
Figure SMS_318
、/>
Figure SMS_319
and />
Figure SMS_320
；
Selecting random numbers
Figure SMS_321
，/>
Figure SMS_322
And calculate +.>
Figure SMS_323
；
Computational challenges
Figure SMS_324
, wherein />
Figure SMS_325
Is the current timestamp used to resist potential replay attacks;
calculate the corresponding
Figure SMS_326
, wherein />
Figure SMS_327
，/>
Figure SMS_328
，/>
Figure SMS_329
；
Transmitting
Figure SMS_330
，/>
Figure SMS_331
To the charging pile。
4) Verification credentials prove that: received from
Figure SMS_332
After the information of (a), the charging pile firstly compares the current time with the timestamp +.>
Figure SMS_333
To preliminarily judge the validity of the proof. Then verify ++by judging whether or not formulas (5-11) - (5-13) are true>
Figure SMS_334
，
Figure SMS_335
Is the legitimacy of (2).
The correctness of formulas (11) - (13) prove similar to formulas (6) - (8), and are not repeated here.
Figure SMS_336
(11)，
Figure SMS_337
(12)，
Figure SMS_338
(13)，
Finally, the charging pile completes the alignment through the following zero knowledge proving process
Figure SMS_339
Verification of submitted information and authorization to start with a false name +.>
Figure SMS_340
Electric automobile of (2)>
Figure SMS_341
Charging and discharging are performed.
(1) Calculation of
Figure SMS_342
、/>
Figure SMS_343
、/>
Figure SMS_344
and />
Figure SMS_345
；
(2) Calculation of
Figure SMS_346
；
(3) Calculation of
Figure SMS_347
；
(4) If it meets
Figure SMS_348
The credential is accepted, otherwise rejected.
Figure SMS_349
The correctness of (1) comes from->
Figure SMS_350
The following can be verified:
Figure SMS_351
，/>
Figure SMS_352
，
Figure SMS_353
(14)，
Figure SMS_354
，
Figure SMS_355
，
from the above procedure it can be concluded that the cryptographic pseudonym thus derived has the property that on the one hand, no entity can determine whether the two pseudonyms are from the same master secret, and on the other hand, if the master secret and other properties to which the pseudonym corresponds are not known, it is not possible for the electric vehicle to successfully authenticate itself by means of the pseudonym.
The attack mode of identity privacy protection comprises the following steps:
1. block link point attack
The electric automobile verifies and knows anonymous secret attributes corresponding to promise to the block chain link point in a zero knowledge proof mode. The process does not require the electric vehicle to present its own true identity. And finally, the block chain link point only can know an anonymous electric vehicle request to carry out charge and discharge optimization scheduling, but cannot know privacy information such as charging habit, position, personal information and the like from the process.
2. Charging pile attack
The proposed scheme generates an electric car pseudonym by CL signature and authenticates it with zero knowledge proof. The pseudonym is anonymous and is unassociated with the true identity of the electric car. And finally, the charging pile can only know that a legal electric automobile finishes charging and discharging in a distributed time period, and cannot know the real identity of the electric automobile from the process.
3. Alliance chain account book attack
In the proposal, although the transaction information of the electric automobile and the charging pile stored on the alliance chain is transparent to the users of the alliance chain. But a different electric car pseudonym is saved in each newly generated transaction. Pseudonyms are randomly generated and evenly distributed, and it is difficult for an attacker to distinguish the pseudonyms and associate them with a single identity.
4. Man-in-the-middle attack
Because the scheduling request information sent by the electric vehicle to the blockchain node may be encrypted using the public key of the blockchain node. Even if an attacker can capture this data, it cannot access the information inside. And even if an attacker hives the blockchain node and acquires clear text information of the scheduling request, the attacker can only know when and where a certain electric automobile will be charged and discharged, but cannot know the real identity of the electric automobile and associate the real identity with future charging and discharging behaviors because the information is only bound with one pseudonym. In addition, the electric automobile needs to send a proof to the block chain link point in the identity authentication process. Because the proof is zero knowledge, an attacker cannot obtain any private information about the electric vehicle from the proof.
5. Replay attack
The verifier finally determines the validity of the proof by detecting that the current time is within the validity period of the proof and verifying the cryptographic validity of the proof.
6. Denial of service attack
The system may require its prepaid deposit to resist denial of service attacks when the electric vehicle applies for charge-discharge dispatch transactions. In this way, initiating a large number of scheduling requests would have a high cost and thus reduce the desire of an attacker to attack.
The scheme mainly considers the identity privacy of the electric automobile, and based on the identity privacy, the position, the charging habit and other privacy are jointly considered. The above security analysis may indicate that the proposed scheme does not reveal such private information to other internal or external attackers. The blockchain node cannot contact the private information, but is still able to authenticate and issue certificates to the electric vehicle through zero knowledge proof. It is difficult for a charging stake or blockchain node to link two proofs that are generated from the same credential. The charging stake can verify the legitimacy of the electric vehicle through credentials (anonymous and not linkable to true identity) and corresponding credentials without accessing other private information. Any attacker cannot obtain the scheduling request information and personal information from the communication channel or the alliance chain ledger and match it with the real electric car identity. Therefore, the proposal can protect the privacy of the users of the electric automobile in the distributed environment.
Example 3
This embodiment is mainly used for evaluating the protection methods in embodiment 1 and embodiment 2, and includes:
1) Simulation setting: scheme CL signature algorithm and SchnorrNIZKP protocol were implemented based on typeapaining of JPBC (java printing-basedcryptigy) Library. The performance of the scheme was evaluated on an Intel (R) 4CoreCPU@2.80GHz8GB memory virtual machine running the centos7.4 computing system. In addition, we build our coalition chain system based on hyperledgerFabricv2.3.2, and develop client programs and intelligent contracts based on Thefabric-sdk-java and fabric-char-java, respectively.
Specifically, bilinear pair is in the domain
Figure SMS_356
Upper structure, wherein->
Figure SMS_357
Bits. />
Figure SMS_358
Is marked by elliptic curve->
Figure SMS_359
The group of the upper dots is large prime order +.>
Figure SMS_360
Is 160, i.e. +.>
Figure SMS_361
Bits.
2) Computational overhead analysis: and considering the calculation overhead of the blockchain node, the electric automobile and the charging pile in the aspects of signature and signature verification, zero knowledge proof generation and verification.
Order the
Figure SMS_362
，/>
Figure SMS_363
Respectively indicate->
Figure SMS_364
and />
Figure SMS_365
The computational overhead of the medium exponent operation, wherein +.>
Figure SMS_366
A multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q. Let->
Figure SMS_367
Representing the computational overhead of the bilinear pairwise operation.
The computational overhead of other operations (e.g., random number generation, multiplication, and hash value computation) is negligible compared to the computational overhead of exponential and pair operations. Experimental measurement
Figure SMS_368
，/>
Figure SMS_369
，/>
Figure SMS_370
。
For a blockchain node, verifying a promise of an electric vehicle proves to be needed
Figure SMS_371
Personal->
Figure SMS_372
An exponential operation in (a). Block chain link point calculation of signature of an electric car approximately requires +.>
Figure SMS_373
Personal->
Figure SMS_374
An exponential operation in (a). Thus a blockchain node serves all +.>
Figure SMS_375
The total calculation cost of the electric vehicles is +.>
Figure SMS_376
。
EV verification for an electric vehicle
Figure SMS_378
Correctness needs->
Figure SMS_379
Personal->
Figure SMS_380
In (2) generating a commitment need by an exponential operation in (a)
Figure SMS_381
Personal->
Figure SMS_382
In (2) generating a promise proof need +.>
Figure SMS_383
Personal->
Figure SMS_384
The exponential operation in (3) has the calculation cost of
Figure SMS_377
。
Electric automobile inspection
Figure SMS_386
、/>
Figure SMS_388
and />
Figure SMS_390
Respectively need->
Figure SMS_391
and />
Figure SMS_392
Checking the arithmetic of the pairs>
Figure SMS_393
Need->
Figure SMS_394
The sum of the pairs>
Figure SMS_385
Personal->
Figure SMS_387
The exponential operation in (a) with a calculation overhead of +.>
Figure SMS_389
。
Electric automobile calculations prove to be about
Figure SMS_395
Couple operations->
Figure SMS_396
Personal->
Figure SMS_397
The exponential operation in (3) has the calculation cost of
Figure SMS_398
. The total calculation cost of an electric vehicle is therefore
Figure SMS_399
。
For a charging pile, the charging pile needs to be aligned first
Figure SMS_400
，/>
Figure SMS_401
Signature verification, need->
Figure SMS_402
And performing pairing operation. The charging stake then verifies that SchnorrNIZKF requires about +.>
Figure SMS_403
The sum of the pairs>
Figure SMS_404
Personal->
Figure SMS_405
An exponential operation in (a). />
Therefore, the total calculation cost of one charging pile serving one electric automobile is as follows
Figure SMS_406
。
FIG. 6 shows the computational overhead of a blockchain node as a function of the number of secret attributes
Figure SMS_407
And the number of electric vehicles served by the same
Figure SMS_408
Is a variation of (2).
When (when)
Figure SMS_409
，/>
Figure SMS_410
I.e. only attribute +.>
Figure SMS_411
When secret, the blockchain node obtains the minimum computational overhead as +.>
Figure SMS_412
. When->
Figure SMS_413
，/>
Figure SMS_414
The maximum calculation cost obtained by the time zone block chain node is +.>
Figure SMS_415
s。
Thus one blockchain node can issue anonymous credentials to all serviced electric vehicles in less than half a minute.
FIG. 7 shows the calculation overhead of an electric vehicle and a charging pile as a function of
Figure SMS_416
Is a variation of (2). When->
Figure SMS_417
In the process, the electric automobile and the charging pile respectively obtain the minimum calculation cost of +.>
Figure SMS_418
and />
Figure SMS_419
. When->
Figure SMS_420
In this case, the electric vehicle and the charging pile respectively acquire a maximum calculation cost of +>
Figure SMS_421
and />
Figure SMS_422
. Therefore, the electric automobile and the charging pile can complete the identity authentication process in less than 1 s.
3) Communication overhead analysis: implementation of secure hash functions in SchnorrNIZKP using SHA-256 algorithm
Figure SMS_423
The hash value is +.>
Figure SMS_424
. From the simulation settings, each +.>
Figure SMS_425
The element size of (a) is->
Figure SMS_426
. Each->
Figure SMS_427
The element size of (a) is->
Figure SMS_428
。
Consider the communication overhead between a blockchain node and an electric car. Each electric automobile
Figure SMS_430
Sending a proof of authenticity
Figure SMS_432
，/>
Figure SMS_434
To the blockchain node. Challenge->
Figure SMS_436
Is +.>
Figure SMS_438
. Each->
Figure SMS_440
Is +.>
Figure SMS_442
，/>
Figure SMS_444
The total size is +.>
Figure SMS_446
。/>
Figure SMS_448
The size is +.>
Figure SMS_449
。/>
Figure SMS_450
Negligible. />
Figure SMS_451
Transmitting signatures
Figure SMS_452
，/>
Figure SMS_453
Give->
Figure SMS_429
。/>
Figure SMS_431
The sizes are all +.>
Figure SMS_433
. Each->
Figure SMS_435
The size is +.>
Figure SMS_437
，/>
Figure SMS_439
And->
Figure SMS_441
The sizes are all +.>
Figure SMS_443
. Thus the blockchain node serves all->
Figure SMS_445
The total communication overhead of the electric automobile is that
Figure SMS_447
Bytes。
Consider the overhead of communication between a charging pile and an electric car. Each electric car sends
Figure SMS_454
，/>
Figure SMS_456
And (5) feeding the charging pile. Challenge->
Figure SMS_458
Is +.>
Figure SMS_460
. Each->
Figure SMS_462
In the size->
Figure SMS_464
Thus->
Figure SMS_466
The total size is +.>
Figure SMS_455
. Blinded signature->
Figure SMS_457
Comprises->
Figure SMS_459
Element of (2), thus->
Figure SMS_461
The size is +.>
Figure SMS_463
Bytes。/>
Figure SMS_465
Can be ignored. Therefore, the total communication cost of one charging pile and 1 electric automobile served by the charging pile is
Figure SMS_467
Bytes。
FIG. 8 shows the number of secret attributes with an electric vehicle
Figure SMS_469
And the total number of electric vehicles served by each block chain link point +.>
Figure SMS_470
The total communication overhead of a blockchain node changes. When->
Figure SMS_471
，/>
Figure SMS_472
The block link point gets the minimum communication overhead +.>
Figure SMS_473
. When->
Figure SMS_474
，/>
Figure SMS_475
When the blockchain node obtains the maximum communication overhead
Figure SMS_468
。
Fig. 9 shows the communication overhead of a charging pile and an electric vehicle
Figure SMS_476
Is a variation of (2). When->
Figure SMS_477
When the charging pile and the electric automobile are in the minimum communication cost +.>
Figure SMS_478
. When->
Figure SMS_479
When the charging pile and the electric automobile have the maximum communication cost of
Figure SMS_480
。/>
As can be seen from fig. 8 and 9, the blockchain node occupies less communication resources in both the process of issuing anonymous certificates to all the served electric vehicles and the charge-discharge authentication process of the electric vehicles.
The above embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination. When implemented in software, the above-described embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product comprises one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer program are loaded or executed on a computer, the processes or functions described in accordance with the embodiments of the present application are all or partially produced. The computer may be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable apparatus. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website site, computer, server, or data center to another website site, computer, server, or data center by wired (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). The computer readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, data center, etc. that contains one or more sets of available media. The usable medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium. The semiconductor medium may be a solid state disk.
It should be understood that the term "and/or" is merely an association relationship describing the associated object, and means that three relationships may exist, for example, a and/or B may mean: there are three cases, a alone, a and B together, and B alone, wherein a, B may be singular or plural. In addition, the character "/" herein generally indicates that the associated object is an "or" relationship, but may also indicate an "and/or" relationship, and may be understood by referring to the context.
In the present application, "at least one" means one or more, and "a plurality" means two or more. "at least one of" or the like means any combination of these items, including any combination of single item(s) or plural items(s). For example, at least one (one) of a, b, or c may represent: a, b, c, a-b, a-c, b-c, or a-b-c, wherein a, b, c may be single or plural.
It should be understood that, in various embodiments of the present application, the sequence numbers of the foregoing processes do not mean the order of execution, and the order of execution of the processes should be determined by the functions and internal logic thereof, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the various illustrative elements and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, or combinations of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present application.
It will be clear to those skilled in the art that, for convenience and brevity of description, specific working procedures of the above-described systems, apparatuses and units may refer to corresponding procedures in the foregoing method embodiments, and are not repeated herein.
In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices, and methods may be implemented in other manners. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative, e.g., the division of the units is merely a logical function division, and there may be additional divisions when actually implemented, e.g., multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted or not performed. Alternatively, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed with each other may be an indirect coupling or communication connection via some interfaces, devices or units, which may be in electrical, mechanical or other form.
The units described as separate units may or may not be physically separate, and units shown as units may or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.
In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated in one unit.
The functions, if implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as a stand-alone product, may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present application may be embodied essentially or in a part contributing to the prior art or in a part of the technical solution, in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, including several instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in the embodiments of the present application. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: a U-disk, a removable hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, or other various media capable of storing program codes.
The foregoing is merely specific embodiments of the present application, but the scope of the present application is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art can easily think about changes or substitutions within the technical scope of the present application, and the changes and substitutions are intended to be covered by the scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims (10)

1. The electric power transaction identity authentication privacy protection method for the electric vehicle is characterized by comprising the following steps of: the protection method comprises the following steps:
s1: leader node selection of security parameters
Figure QLYQS_2
Group generation algorithm running symmetric prime order bilinear pairs +.>
Figure QLYQS_4
Generating common parameters, the leader node selecting the anti-collision hash function +.>
Figure QLYQS_5
Publishing common parameters
Figure QLYQS_7
, wherein />
Figure QLYQS_9
Is a random prime number->
Figure QLYQS_10
Is prime order->
Figure QLYQS_11
G is belonging to the two multiplication cycle groups of
Figure QLYQS_1
Is a generator of->
Figure QLYQS_3
For a bilinear mapping,/a>
Figure QLYQS_6
For the number->
Figure QLYQS_8
Is a finite field of (2);
s2: electric automobile
Figure QLYQS_13
，/>
Figure QLYQS_15
From->
Figure QLYQS_16
Randomly selecting private keys satisfying a uniform distribution +.>
Figure QLYQS_17
Public key
Figure QLYQS_18
，/>
Figure QLYQS_19
Representing each blockchain node serviceElectric cars of (a), block chain node->
Figure QLYQS_20
，/>
Figure QLYQS_12
Is used to issue a certificate, a list of attributes is signed, wherein +.>
Figure QLYQS_14
Is a random integer;
S3：
Figure QLYQS_21
proof keys for a given proof paradigm, the zero knowledge proof expression is:
Figure QLYQS_22
，
in the formula ,
Figure QLYQS_23
for security parameters, P is credential, +.>
Figure QLYQS_24
Are random numbers in the finite field of number q,
Figure QLYQS_25
,/>
Figure QLYQS_26
select own private key->
Figure QLYQS_27
And corresponding public key
Figure QLYQS_28
。
2. An electric motor according to claim 1The privacy protection method for the identity authentication of the automobile power transaction is characterized by comprising the following steps of: the electric automobile
Figure QLYQS_29
In (a): let per blockchain node service->
Figure QLYQS_30
Electric automobile +.>
Figure QLYQS_31
The electric automobile obtains the certificate from the block chain link point in a zero knowledge proving mode and proving to the charging pile that the secret attribute corresponding to the certificate is known.
3. The method for protecting the identity authentication privacy of electric automobile power transaction according to claim 2, which is characterized in that: in step S2, blockchain nodes
Figure QLYQS_32
The detailed process of generating the proof is as follows:
s2.1: selecting random numbers
Figure QLYQS_33
，/>
Figure QLYQS_34
And generates a random value +.>
Figure QLYQS_35
；
S2.2: generating challenges
Figure QLYQS_36
, wherein />
Figure QLYQS_37
Expiration date for marking proof, +.>
Figure QLYQS_38
Is a blockChain node->
Figure QLYQS_39
Identity information of (a);
s2.3: calculating a response
Figure QLYQS_40
, wherein />
Figure QLYQS_41
,
Figure QLYQS_42
mod is a remainder operation;
s2.4: reservation of
Figure QLYQS_43
As its public key->
Figure QLYQS_44
Is a proof of (3).
4. The method for protecting the identity authentication privacy of electric automobile power transaction according to claim 3, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the electric automobile
Figure QLYQS_45
In (a): is provided with->
Figure QLYQS_46
Attribute confidentiality in the certificate of (1) to form a secret attribute set
Figure QLYQS_47
，m ji For each attribute information, the same master secret is included as a special attribute in +.>
Figure QLYQS_48
In the certificate of (2) private key->
Figure QLYQS_49
Is->
Figure QLYQS_50
Helping to bind different credentials to the same identity.
5. The method for protecting the identity authentication privacy of electric automobile power transaction according to claim 4, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the secret attribute verification process is as follows:
using public keys
Figure QLYQS_51
Before generating promise->
Figure QLYQS_52
Will request->
Figure QLYQS_53
Send->
Figure QLYQS_54
Is to verify and authenticate the public key->
Figure QLYQS_55
；
Figure QLYQS_56
The verification process is as follows:
calculating a random value
Figure QLYQS_57
；
Calculation of
Figure QLYQS_58
；
Satisfy the following requirements
Figure QLYQS_59
Then accept public key +.>
Figure QLYQS_60
Otherwise, refusing.
6. The method for protecting the identity authentication privacy of electric automobile power transaction according to claim 5, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the electric automobile
Figure QLYQS_61
Use of +.according to the Pedersen commitment scheme>
Figure QLYQS_62
Public key of->
Figure QLYQS_63
For secret attribute->
Figure QLYQS_64
Generating a commitment
Figure QLYQS_65
，/>
Figure QLYQS_66
The proof commitment is to correctly generate the corresponding zero knowledge proof expression as follows:
Figure QLYQS_67
，
Figure QLYQS_68
generating the proof of promise includes the steps of:
selecting random numbers
Figure QLYQS_69
，/>
Figure QLYQS_70
And generates a random value +.>
Figure QLYQS_71
；
Generating challenges
Figure QLYQS_72
wherein />
Figure QLYQS_73
Is the current timestamp;
calculating a response
Figure QLYQS_74
, wherein />
Figure QLYQS_75
；
Transmitting
Figure QLYQS_76
To->
Figure QLYQS_77
。
7. The method for protecting the identity authentication privacy of electric automobile power transaction according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the blockchain node
Figure QLYQS_78
Pair ∈10 using CL signature algorithm>
Figure QLYQS_79
Commitment of submission->
Figure QLYQS_80
Signing to issue a voucher +.>
Figure QLYQS_81
。
8. The method for protecting the identity authentication privacy of electric automobile power transaction according to claim 7, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the blockchain node
Figure QLYQS_83
Random generation->
Figure QLYQS_84
And calculate->
Figure QLYQS_86
，/>
Figure QLYQS_88
Calculation of
Figure QLYQS_90
And calculate->
Figure QLYQS_92
，
Figure QLYQS_94
Finally->
Figure QLYQS_82
Calculating to obtain signature->
Figure QLYQS_85
And send to->
Figure QLYQS_87
Direct pair promise using CL signature algorithm>
Figure QLYQS_89
Signature generated->
Figure QLYQS_91
Direct price pair->
Figure QLYQS_93
Is a result of the signature of (a).
9. The electric vehicle power transaction identity authentication of claim 8The privacy protection method is characterized in that: the blockchain node
Figure QLYQS_95
Verifying the credential signature includes:
Figure QLYQS_96
receive->
Figure QLYQS_97
After the transmitted signature, verify the signature +.>
Figure QLYQS_98
Effective, combine attribute set->
Figure QLYQS_99
Packaging into a signature certificate and storing, wherein the signature verification process is as follows:
Figure QLYQS_100
by->
Figure QLYQS_101
Judging;
Figure QLYQS_102
and />
Figure QLYQS_103
Respectively through->
Figure QLYQS_104
and />
Figure QLYQS_105
Judging;
Figure QLYQS_106
by->
Figure QLYQS_107
Judging (1)>
Figure QLYQS_108
，m ji For each attribute information, private key +.>
Figure QLYQS_109
Is->
Figure QLYQS_110
Is the identity of (a).
10. The method for protecting the identity authentication privacy of electric automobile power transaction according to claim 9, wherein the method comprises the following steps:
Figure QLYQS_111
presenting a blinded version of the voucher to participate in the optimized charge-discharge transaction,>
Figure QLYQS_112
select random number +.>
Figure QLYQS_113
And computes a blinded version of the credential as:
Figure QLYQS_114
，
Figure QLYQS_115
，
Figure QLYQS_116
，
wherein ,
Figure QLYQS_117
is further blinded byGet->
Figure QLYQS_118
The uniform distribution is independent of all parameters, will +.>
Figure QLYQS_119
As->
Figure QLYQS_120
The kana used in each transaction +.>
Figure QLYQS_121
Along with transaction information is recorded in the blockchain for transaction inquiry and transaction arbitration. />
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