CN114710294A - Novel block chain privacy protection method - Google Patents

Novel block chain privacy protection method Download PDF

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Publication number
CN114710294A
CN114710294A CN202210418814.1A CN202210418814A CN114710294A CN 114710294 A CN114710294 A CN 114710294A CN 202210418814 A CN202210418814 A CN 202210418814A CN 114710294 A CN114710294 A CN 114710294A
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signature
point
elliptic curve
private key
public
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Inventor
杜爽
蒋鹏
甘章怡
杨文慧
谢彬
杨冠
甘旭东
王清林
鲁琪
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Same Side Seville Information Technology Co ltd
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
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Same Side Seville Information Technology Co ltd
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
    • H04L9/3033—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters details relating to pseudo-prime or prime number generation, e.g. primality test
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3255—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures

Abstract

The invention relates to a novel block chain privacy protection method, which comprises the following steps: s1, setting a security parameter 1, randomly selecting a prime number Q greater than 1, outputting parameters of par { Q, G, G1, P, H0, H1 and H2}, and obtaining a private key k and a public key Q according to an elliptic curve; s2, inputting security parameters to generate public and private key pair (pk) for each useri,ski) S3, input message m, a set of public keys R and a signer private key skiOutputting a ring signature for m; and S4, verifying the input message m and the public key R, if the verification result is true, verifying whether the signature image is used in other signatures, if not, the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is regarded as an invalid signature. The invention can ensure better security without increasing the length of the key, strengthen and improve the protection of the identity of the signer, has strong unforgeability, and ensures that an attacker breaks the keyThe probability decreases.

Description

Novel block chain privacy protection method
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of network security, in particular to a novel block chain privacy protection method.
Background
The block chain technology has remarkable advantages in privacy protection, such as information tamper resistance, anonymity and network stability, and can solve the privacy disclosure problem of some centralized services; however, the decentralized architecture and data storage mechanism adopted by the blockchain technology also bring some adverse effects to privacy protection, wherein two main problems are user identity privacy challenge and user transaction privacy challenge.
Identity privacy refers to the relationship between the user's true identity and the blockchain address. The information on the block chain cannot be changed, the information is stored on the chain in a distributed account book mode, and any node can acquire complete information from the chain. An attacker discovers sensitive information by monitoring and analyzing the correlation of the announcement data in the global ledger, and deduces user identity information and location information. Transaction privacy refers to transaction records stored in the blockchain and potential information behind the transaction, and protection is traditionally accomplished by encrypting the information. When the block chain encrypts the transaction information, on one hand, the transaction information is required to be ensured not to be stolen by an unauthorized node; on the other hand, the transaction authenticity needs to be verified under the condition that sensitive information is not disclosed, and the transaction amount cannot be completely encrypted, so that the two methods are contradictory.
In the prior art, a coin mixing mechanism is added with an intermediate transmission model to enhance communication anonymity, and execution is realized by a trusted third party or some protocols, including a coin mixing mechanism based on a central node and a distributed coin mixing mechanism. A trusted third party replaces a coin mixing mechanism based on a central node to complete fund transfer, and transfer relations in a partial hidden block chain are realized, but the trusted third party is required to increase cost and transaction delay; and third parties may be exposed to the process by taking hold of the user's privacy. The method cancels the participation of a third-party coin mixing provider based on a distributed coin mixing mechanism, combines a plurality of one-to-one transaction records into a plurality-to-many transaction record, requires a user to finish the coin mixing process by himself, and has the following defects: 1) the mixed coin user can not effectively find other mixed coin users, so a third-party platform is still needed to help to search for the mixed coin user; 2) a user participating in the mixed coin process may expose own mixed coin information in the negotiation process, which cannot ensure that all participants are credible; 3) coin mixing requires multiple users to participate simultaneously, once some users cannot mix coins due to illegal operation, an attacker can launch denial of service attack; 4) an attacker owns a plurality of addresses to participate in the coin mixing process, and other users receive the threat of information leakage in the process. The zero knowledge proof method is also adopted to ensure that the verifier can believe that the message is correct, the zero knowledge proof efficiency of the test sheet is low, and the time for generating a new proof is as long as one minute; the homomorphic encryption method has good privacy protection effect, but needs to consume a large amount of calculation time and memory, is not suitable for large-scale application, and has a bottleneck in use efficiency; the hidden address method can solve the problem of the correlation between an input address and an output address, and can not determine which transaction user the intermediate address belongs to due to the random uncertainty of the intermediate address, so that the privacy security of the user and the authenticity of coins are protected, but an attacker can break the privacy of a transaction flow by analyzing the relationship between a transaction from a sending end to a disposable address and then to a receiving end by using a transaction diagram;
therefore, the prior art has some defects, and what method to protect the privacy of the user is the current consideration.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art, provides a novel block chain privacy protection method and overcomes the defects of the prior art.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: a novel block chain privacy protection method comprises the following steps:
s1, setting a security parameter 1, randomly selecting a prime number Q greater than 1, and obtaining a private key k and a public key Q according to an elliptic curve, wherein the output parameter is par { Q, G, G1, P, H0, H1 and H2}, P is a generator of G1, G is a base point on an error elliptic curve, G1 is a Q-order additive cyclic group, and H0, H1 and H2 are hash functions;
s2, inputting security parameters to generate public and private key pair (pk) for each useri,ski)；
S3, input message m, a set of public keys R and a signer private key skiOutputting a ring signature for m;
and S4, verifying the input message m and the public key R, if the verification result is true, verifying whether the signature image is used in other signatures, if not, the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is regarded as an invalid signature.
The obtaining of the private key k and the public key Q according to the elliptic curve comprises:
at FqOn which a nonsingular elliptic curve E is presentq(a, b) is defined as y2modq＝(x3+ ax + b) modq, mod denotes the modulo operation, a, b, x, y all belonging to Fq，(4a3+27b2) mod q is not equal to 0, FqRepresenting an integer field modulo q;
if the point P (x, y) satisfies Eq(a, b), if the point P is on an elliptic curve, the negative point of the point P is Q (x, -y), and P is-Q, where P (x1, y1) and Q (x2, y2) are two points on the elliptic curve, and P is not equal to Q, a straight line is drawn through the point P and the point Q to intersect the elliptic curve at the point R '═ x3, -y3, and the point R' symmetric to the x axis, where R is (x3, y3), is the sum of P and Q, that is, R is P + Q;
elliptic curve EqThe points on (a, b) and the point at infinity O together form a q-th prime additive cyclic group Gq＝(x,y):a,b,x,y∈Fq， (x,y)∈Fq(a, b), definition GqPoint ofThe multiplication is kP + P + … + P, k is Zq*，ZqDenotes a positive integer domain modulo Q, defining the relationship between point P and point Q on the elliptic curve as Q ═ kP, setting k as the private key and Q as the public key.
The input security parameters generate a public and private key pair (pk) for each useri,ski) The method comprises the following steps: user U in block chaini(1<＝i<N) randomly selecting Z as belonging toqX ofiCalculating xi×P→pkiDefining user public key pki E G and private key ski＝xi∈Zq*。
The input message m, a set of public keys R and a signer private key skiOutputting the ring signature for m comprises:
the transaction initiator s selects the public key set R ═ pk of the user participating in the ring signature1,pk2,…,pknAccording to the formula
Figure BDA0003606022860000031
And
Figure BDA0003606022860000032
calculating and solving each public key pkiProperty value L ofi，RiWherein R does not contain the public key pk of the initiator s himselfs，Is＝sks*H0(pks) Representing the signature of the information, H0(pks) representing the generation of pkiMapping to a point on a finite field elliptic curve; .
Randomly selecting r belonging to Zq, and calculating H-H according to formula2(m||r).、
Figure BDA0003606022860000033
And
Figure BDA0003606022860000034
where m is the content of the signature, and the ring signature drawn by the final transaction initiator s on the message m is T ═ Is,c1,c2,…,cs,…,cn,d1,d2,…,ds,…,dn}。
The verifying the input message m and the public key R comprises:
by the formula
Figure BDA0003606022860000035
Calculating parameters and verifying
Figure BDA0003606022860000036
And if the signature image is true, verifying whether the signature image is used in other signatures, if the signature image is not used, the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is regarded as an invalid signature.
The invention has the following advantages: a novel block chain privacy protection method can ensure better security under the condition of not increasing the length of a secret key, strengthens and improves the protection of the identity of a signer, has strong unforgeability, and reduces the probability of breaking the secret key by an attacker.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solutions will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the embodiments of the present application, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments of the present application without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present application. The invention is further described below.
The invention designs a completely anonymous user data storage protocol by using a ring signature technology so as to ensure the priority of user information in a block chain. In the ring signature generation process, a real signer arbitrarily selects a group of members (including the real signer) as possible signers, and signs a file by using a private key of the real signer and public keys of other members. The group member selected by the signer is called Ring (Ring), and the generated Signature is called Ring Signature (Ring Signature); the method specifically comprises the following steps:
1. initialization:
a security parameter l is set, where l is a sufficiently large prime number. And randomly selecting a prime number q larger than l. G is a base point on the elliptic curve. G1 is a q-order cyclic additive group.
The output system parameters are par { q, G1, P, H0, H1, H2}, where P is the generator of G1, and the hash function is as follows: h0: e (F)q)→E(Fq)，H1：{0，1}→Fq，H2：{0,1}*×G1→ZqA first step of; arrows in H0, H1, and H2 indicate mapping relationships, and H0 indicates that setting mapping in an integer domain modulo q is satisfied. .
Wherein:
(1)Fqrepresenting an integer field modulo q, ZqDenotes the positive integer domain modulo q;
(2) at FqOn which a nonsingular elliptic curve E existsq(a, b) is defined as y2modq＝(x3+ ax + b) modq, mod indicating modulo operations, a, b, x, y all belonging to Fq，(4a3+27b2) modq is not equal to 0 (the elliptic equation can be solved, i.e. non-singular conditions are met); the error curve is defined by selecting the elliptic curve of the equation as the error curve (the error curve is not necessarily an ellipse), wherein a and b are elliptic curve parameters.
(3) Addition and multiplication over an additive cyclic group:
if P (x, y) satisfies Eq(a, b), then point P is on the elliptic curve, the negative of point P is Q (x, -y), satisfying P ═ Q;
let P (x1, y1) and Q (x2, y2) be two points on an elliptic curve, where P is not equal to Q, and a straight line is drawn through P, Q intersecting the elliptic curve at R ═ x3, -y3, where the symmetric point R ═ x3, y3 of R' with respect to the x axis is the sum of P and Q, i.e., R ═ P + Q.
(4) Additive cycle group:
elliptic curve EqThe points on (a, b) and the point at infinity O together form a q-th prime additive cyclic group Gq＝(x,y):a,b,x,y∈Fq， (x,y)∈Fq(a, b) adding GqThe dot product operation above is defined as: kP + P + … + P (k. epsilon. Z)q*)。
(5) Two points Q on the elliptic curve are defined as kP, Q can be solved relatively simply when k and P are known, but it is difficult to determine the value of k by knowing Q, P, so that one point on the elliptic curve can be selected as a base point P, k is set as a private key, and Q is set as a public key.
2. The key generation algorithm: inputting security parameters and generating public and private key pair (pk) for each useri,ski)。
User U in block chaini(1<＝i<N) is the number of users, and is randomly selected to belong to ZqX ofiCalculating xi×P→pkiDefining user public key pki E G and private key ski＝xi∈ZqX ofiThat is, k in Q ═ kP is randomly selected as a private key, and a private key x is randomly generated for each encryption of the user UiiAnd a public key Q is generated, and at the moment, an attacker can not decrypt the content according to the public key Q as long as the attacker does not know the private key.
3. Signature algorithm: input message m, a set of public keys R and a signer private key skiAnd outputting the ring signature of m.
The transaction initiator s selects the public key set R ═ pk of the users participating in the ring signature1,pk2,…,pknR does not contain the public key pk of the initiator ssEach public key pk is solved by the following calculationiProperty value L ofi，Ri。
(1) Randomly choosing to belong to ZqU ofi,vi,wiThen, calculate:
Figure BDA0003606022860000051
Figure BDA0003606022860000052
wherein, Is＝sks*H0(pks) Is a signature of the information, H0(pks) will pkiMapping to a point on the finite field elliptic curve.
(2) R belonging to Zq is randomly chosen and then calculated as follows:
h＝H2(m||r). (3)
Figure BDA0003606022860000053
Figure BDA0003606022860000054
wherein m is the content of the signature, and the ring signature drawn by the final transaction initiator s on the message m is: t ═ Is,c1,c2,…,cs,…,cn,d1,d2,…,ds,…,dn}
4. And (3) verification algorithm: input (m, R), output True or False.
Any person who owns the public keys of all members participating in the ring signature can verify the transaction signature T as follows:
Figure BDA0003606022860000055
Figure BDA0003606022860000056
the parameters are calculated by equation (6) and it is verified whether equation (7) is true. If true, verifying whether the signature image is used in other signatures, if not, the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is regarded as an invalid signature.
The foregoing is illustrative of the preferred embodiments of this invention, and it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the precise form disclosed herein and that various other combinations, modifications, and environments may be resorted to, falling within the scope of the concept as disclosed herein, either as described above or as apparent to those skilled in the relevant art. And that modifications and variations may be effected by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.

Claims (5)

1. A novel block chain privacy protection method is characterized in that: the privacy protection method comprises the following steps:
s1, setting a security parameter 1, randomly selecting a prime number Q greater than 1, and obtaining a private key k and a public key Q according to an elliptic curve, wherein the output parameter is par { Q, G, G1, P, H0, H1 and H2}, P is a generator of G1, G is a base point on an error elliptic curve, G1 is a Q-order additive cyclic group, and H0, H1 and H2 are hash functions;
s2, inputting security parameters to generate public and private key pair (pk) for each useri,ski)；
S3, input message m, a set of public keys R and a signer private key skiOutputting a ring signature for m;
and S4, verifying the input message m and the public key R, if the verification result is true, verifying whether the signature image is used in other signatures, if not, the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is regarded as an invalid signature.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises: the obtaining of the private key k and the public key Q according to the elliptic curve comprises:
at FqOn which a nonsingular elliptic curve E is presentq(a, b) is defined as y2modq＝(x3+ ax + b) modq, mod denotes the modulo operation, a, b, x, y all belonging to Fq，(4a3+27b2) mod q is not equal to 0, FqRepresenting an integer field modulo q;
if the point P (x, y) satisfies Eq(a, b), if the point P is on the elliptic curve, the negative point of the point P is Q (x, -y), and P ═ Q is satisfied, let P (x1, y1) and Q (x2, y2) be two points on the elliptic curve, and P is not equal to Q, make a straight line pass through the point P and the point Q to intersect the elliptic curve at the point R '═ x3, -y3, and obtain the symmetric point R ═ x3, y3 of the point R' relative to the x axis, that is, the sum of P and Q, that is, R ═ P + Q;
elliptic curve EqThe points on (a, b) and the point at infinity O together form a q-th prime additive cyclic group Gq＝(x,y):a,b,x,y∈Fq，(x,y)∈Fq(a, b) definition GqThe dot product of (c) is kP + P + … + P, k ∈ Zq*，ZqDenotes a positive integer domain modulo Q, defining the relationship between point P and point Q on the elliptic curve as Q ═ kP, setting k as the private key and Q as the public key.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the method comprises: the input security parameters generate a public and private key pair (pk) for each useri,ski) The method comprises the following steps: user U in block chaini(1<＝i<N) randomly selecting Z as belonging toqX ofiCalculating xi×P→pkiDefining user public key pki E G and private key ski＝xi∈Zq*。
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the method comprises: the input message m, a set of public keys R and a signer private key skiOutputting the ring signature for m comprises:
the transaction initiator s selects the public key set R ═ pk of the user participating in the ring signature1,pk2,…,pknAccording to the formula
Figure FDA0003606022850000021
And
Figure FDA0003606022850000022
calculating and solving each public key pkiProperty value L ofi，RiWherein R does not contain the public key pk of the originator s himselfs，Is＝sks*H0(pks) Representing the signature of the information, H0(pks) representing the generation of pkiMapping to a point on a finite field elliptic curve; .
Randomly selecting r belonging to Zq, and calculating H-H according to formula2(m||r).、
Figure FDA0003606022850000023
And
Figure FDA0003606022850000024
where m is the content of the signature, and the ring signature drawn by the final transaction initiator s on the message m is T ═ Is,c1,c2,…,cs,…,cn,d1,d2,…,ds,…,dn}。
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the method comprises: the verifying the input message m and the public key R comprises:
by the formula
Figure FDA0003606022850000025
Calculating parameters and verifying
Figure FDA0003606022850000026
And if the signature image is true, verifying whether the signature image is used in other signatures, if the signature image is not used, the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is regarded as an invalid signature.
CN202210418814.1A 2022-04-20 2022-04-20 Novel block chain privacy protection method Pending CN114710294A (en)

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