CN113673895A - Over-amount consumption configuration method and system based on evolutionary game - Google Patents
Over-amount consumption configuration method and system based on evolutionary game Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides an excess consumption configuration method and system based on an evolutionary game, which comprises the following steps: constructing an excess consumption configuration evolution game model; setting initial probability of participation of participants in excess consumption trading, and respectively establishing market trading decision replication dynamic equations of participation of supply and demand parties of the power selling company based on the model; the simultaneous supply and demand parties are used as replication dynamic equations of participants, and evolutionary game equilibrium points enabling the simultaneous replication dynamic equations to be equal to 0 are obtained through a solving process; and substituting the equilibrium solution to be judged into the Jacobian matrix solved based on the payment matrix through a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, screening out the stable equilibrium solution through the rank and determinant symbols of the matrix, and configuring the excess consumption required by the supply and demand parties based on the equilibrium solution. The problem that the power supply cannot meet the load requirement in time is solved, and the overall stable operation of the power system is realized.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of power systems, and particularly relates to an excess consumption configuration method and system based on an evolutionary game.
Background
The statements in this section merely provide background information related to the present disclosure and may not necessarily constitute prior art.
The excess consumption transaction is one of supplementary transaction modes for the electricity selling company to complete the consumption of the renewable energy. For market bodies with consumption shortage, the excess consumption transaction is helpful for supplementing renewable energy sources to consume the shortage, so that the loss caused by the shortage is reduced; market entities who have excess responsibility for consumption can then transfer and sell consumption that exceeds their lowest responsibility weight through excess consumption trading, thereby gaining revenue and benefiting from the positive consumption of renewable energy.
At present, the research work of China on consumption trading is still in the starting and exploring stages. The document comprises a renewable energy excess consumption transaction system [ J ] based on a block chain, Chinese power, http:// kns.cnki.net/kcms/tail/11.3265. TM.20200515.0934.002.html. "establishes a reasonable and feasible electricity and electricity consumption main body consumption transfer market framework from the block chain construction perspective, establishes detailed market transaction rules, and provides a suggestion for the construction of the consumption transfer market. The literature includes "chime, zhangxixiang, guo yan honing, etc. A renewable energy power excess consumption trading pricing mechanism research [ J ] price theory and practice, 2020, (06):52-55,128. The document "Linhua, Yangminghui, Gaizhier, etc.. design of a renewable energy consumption responsibility weight market mechanism in a spot market environment [ J ].
https:// kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/11.3265.TM.20210223.1633.006.html "Chinese electric power, renewable energy consumption mechanism is designed based on electric power spot market environment, and the new energy market supply and demand relationship can be reflected through the excess consumption trading price, so that price signals are provided for new energy construction investment. The research work provides detailed suggestions for the construction of the excess consumption trading system in China.
The existing research work focuses on the system research of renewable energy excess consumption and the specific design of mechanisms such as transaction price in China, and there is little decision analysis aiming at excess consumption transaction participants such as power selling companies and the like. Compared with other forms of consumption trading, the construction and research of the excess consumption trading market are relatively in an initial stage, and market participants need a gradually-agreed and gradually-accepted process for the excess consumption trading. The evolutionary game thought considers that decision participants can continuously correct the recognition and acceptance degree of the decision participants on the excess consumption transaction in a simulation mode, and further form stable transaction decisions. At present, the research work of the evolutionary game idea on the operation decision and the transaction profit of the power selling company in the power market is rich. The method comprises the following steps of 1, according to a document, analyzing a selection process of a user on an electricity selling company based on an idea of an evolutionary game, and further obtaining market shares of the electricity selling company in different user groups, wherein the market subject decision-making behavior research [ D ] under an electricity selling market environment in the Sun clout and Shanghai transportation university 2018; the document "Zhao Xin just, anyu Zhi, Wan guan. renewable energy quota system, policy action and evolution of power generation manufacturers [ J ] China management science, 2019.27(03): 168-.
Considering that the implementation of the excess consumption transaction requires the mutual participation of the supply and demand parties, the acceptance degree of any one of the supply and demand parties to the excess consumption transaction affects the acceptance ability of the other party to participate in the excess consumption transaction.
Through the existing situation, it can be seen that how to perform effective configuration on the excess consumption at present is only in a rule making stage, but in the process of implementing the configuration of the excess consumption, information related to the excess consumption which can be acquired is less, and the excess consumption optimal configuration cannot be implemented only by means of the existing mode, so that the renewable energy consumption is reduced, and the development of the safety and stability of the whole power system is influenced.
Therefore, how to utilize the informatization processing technology to achieve the above purpose and how to realize the configuration of the excess consumption amount through the construction of the model and the processing of the data, which is the technical problem to be solved by the application, is how to improve the renewable energy consumption amount.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the defects of the prior art, the invention provides the excess consumption configuration method based on the evolutionary game, which can realize the reasonable configuration of the excess consumption and improve the renewable energy consumption.
In order to achieve the above object, one or more embodiments of the present invention provide the following technical solutions:
in a first aspect, an excess consumption configuration method based on an evolutionary game is disclosed, which comprises the following steps:
constructing an excess consumption configuration evolution game model;
setting initial probability of participation of participants in excess consumption trading, and respectively establishing market trading decision replication dynamic equations of participation of supply and demand parties of the power selling company based on the model;
the simultaneous supply and demand parties are used as replication dynamic equations of participants, and evolutionary game equilibrium points enabling the simultaneous replication dynamic equations to be equal to 0 are obtained through a solving process;
and substituting the equilibrium solution to be judged into the Jacobian matrix solved based on the payment matrix through a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, screening out the stable equilibrium solution through the rank and determinant symbols of the matrix, and configuring the excess consumption required by the supply and demand parties based on the equilibrium solution.
And obtaining the stable trading strategy finally selected by the two types of electricity selling companies with excess consumption and shortage consumption based on the equilibrium solution.
According to the further technical scheme, after the supply and demand parties receive the configured required excess consumption, the load is scheduled according to the required excess consumption.
And drawing a decision-making evolutionary game track based on a duplicate dynamic equation, wherein the track is used for showing whether the electricity selling companies with different acceptance degrees of the excess consumption transaction can choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction decision.
In a further technical scheme, the evolutionary game model comprises the following elements: the method comprises the steps of collecting a group of power selling companies, collecting a transaction strategy of the power selling companies and obtaining a function matrix of the revenue of the power selling companies, wherein the consumption indexes of the group of power selling companies, the transaction strategy of the power selling companies and the revenue function matrix of the power selling companies are different in completion condition.
According to the further technical scheme, renewable energy consumption actually completed based on a market main body is obtained in real time in an online mode, consumption responsibility weight indexes of the renewable energy consumption are calculated, index completion conditions are judged, electricity selling companies are classified into two types of electricity selling companies with shortage in consumption and electricity selling companies with excessive consumption, and electricity selling company group sets with different consumption index completion conditions are established.
According to the further technical scheme, based on the classification of the electricity selling companies, the behavior decision space of the two types of electricity selling companies participating in the game is analyzed:
the behavior decision space of the electricity selling company g with the shortage of the consumption is { buying the excess consumption, not buying the excess consumption };
the behavior decision space of the electricity selling company h with the over-amount consumption is { the over-amount consumption for sale, the over-amount consumption for not sale };
and obtaining the transaction results which may appear in the two types of electricity selling companies based on the decision space set elements of the two electricity selling companies.
In a further technical scheme, the transaction results which may appear in two types of electricity selling companies comprise:
the electricity selling company g selects to purchase the excess consumption, and the electricity selling company h selects to sell the excess consumption;
the electricity selling company g chooses to purchase the excess consumption, but the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption;
the electricity selling company g chooses not to purchase the excess consumption, but the electricity selling company h chooses to sell the excess consumption;
the electricity selling company g chooses not to purchase the excess consumption, while the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption.
According to the further technical scheme, based on various different results possibly existing in the transaction decisions of the electricity selling companies g and h, the profit functions of the electricity selling companies g and h under different decisions can be obtained by combining the acquired electric quantity and price data, and further a game payment matrix of the electricity selling companies g and h is constructed, wherein matrix elements are the corresponding transaction profits of the electricity selling companies after different decisions of the two parties are combined.
In a further technical scheme, a copy dynamic equation describing the evolution of the power selling company decision along with time is constructed based on a game payment matrix, and the method comprises the following steps:
respectively setting the probability that the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h select to purchase or not purchase the excess consumption based on the cognitive level and the transaction willingness of the excess consumption transaction;
based on the probability value, the probability of the event corresponding to all the elements of the game payment matrix is obtained;
based on profit values of the electricity-selling companies corresponding to the game payment matrix elements and the occurrence probability of events corresponding to the elements, expected values of profits obtained when the electricity-selling companies g and h participate in excess consumption transactions and total expected values of profits obtained when the electricity-selling companies h participate in transactions are respectively obtained, and then a copy dynamic equation describing a transaction decision evolution process of the electricity-selling companies g and h is established.
In a second aspect, an excess consumption configuration system based on an evolutionary game is disclosed, which includes a supplier server, a demander server and a central server, where the central server performs data interaction with the supplier server and the demander server, respectively, to obtain respective electricity consumption total amount and excess consumption completion data, and after receiving the data, the central server is configured to include:
a model building module configured to: constructing an excess consumption configuration evolution game model;
a replication dynamic equation building module configured to: setting initial probability of participation of participants in excess consumption trading, and respectively establishing market trading decision replication dynamic equations of participation of supply and demand parties of the power selling company based on the model;
a solving module configured to: the simultaneous supply and demand parties are used as replication dynamic equations of participants, and evolutionary game equilibrium points enabling the simultaneous replication dynamic equations to be equal to 0 are obtained through a solving process;
a required excess consumption configuration module configured to: substituting the equilibrium solution to be judged into the Jacobian matrix solved based on the payment matrix through a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, screening out the stable equilibrium solution through the rank and determinant symbol of the matrix, and configuring the excess consumption required by both the supply and demand parties based on the equilibrium solution;
and the central server respectively sends the configured excess consumption required by the supply and demand parties to the corresponding supply party server and demand party server, and the load is scheduled based on the configured required excess consumption.
The above one or more technical solutions have the following beneficial effects:
according to the method, the configuration of the excess consumption required by the supply and demand parties is realized by establishing a model, constructing a copied dynamic equation and solving, then the supply and demand parties carry out load scheduling according to the configured required excess consumption, the supply and demand balance is realized, the problem that the power supply cannot meet the load demand in time is solved, and the integral stable operation of the power system is realized.
The electric power selling companies are classified based on the renewable energy consumption weight actually completed by the market main body bearing the renewable energy consumption responsibility, and the behavior decision space of the electric power selling companies participating in the game with potential excess consumption trading willingness is analyzed; aiming at various different results which may exist in the trade decision of the power selling company under the limited rational environment, the invention classifies and discusses the operation profits of the power selling company and calculates the corresponding profit function; and (3) constructing a game payment matrix of the power selling company, and determining matrix elements, namely transaction profits of the power selling companies of both the consumption supply and demand parties under different decisions, so as to obtain a replication dynamic equation for describing the evolution of the decisions of the power selling company along with time. And (4) enabling the replication dynamic equation to be equal to 0, and further obtaining all equilibrium solutions of the game. And judging whether the balance point is a stable balance solution or not by a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, and further obtaining stable trading strategies finally selected by two types of electricity selling companies with excess consumption and shortage consumption.
The method is based on the evolutionary game thought, describes the initial transaction willingness of the power selling companies based on the theoretic hypothesis, draws the evolutionary game track of the decision based on the copied dynamic equation, and can more intuitively investigate whether the power selling companies with different acceptance degrees of the excess consumption transaction can choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction decision and how various factors influencing the decision play roles.
Advantages of additional aspects of the invention will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the invention.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, are included to provide a further understanding of the invention, and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate exemplary embodiments of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the invention and not to limit the invention.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an analysis system in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a model building module;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a replication dynamic equation module;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an equilibrium solution solving module;
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an equalization de-screening module;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of an evolution path of a power selling company in one situation;
FIG. 7 is a flow chart of an analysis method in the present invention;
FIG. 8 is a diagram of an evolution path of a power selling company decision in a transaction scenario;
fig. 9 shows the influence of punishment and punishment power variation on the transaction probability of the consumption amount;
fig. 10 shows the influence of punishment power drop (left) and rise (right) on the evolution path;
FIG. 11 shows that the penalty power decreases the influence on the evolution time of the electricity selling company g (left) and the electricity selling company h (right);
fig. 12 shows that the penalty force increases the influence on the evolution time of the electricity selling company g (left) and the electricity selling company h (right);
FIG. 13 is an illustration of the impact of green price changes on the probability of achieving an excess consumption transaction;
FIG. 14 green evidence of the impact of price drop (left), rise (right) on the evolution path;
FIG. 15 is a graph showing the effect of green price reduction on g (left) evolution time of a power selling company and h (right) evolution time of the power selling company;
FIG. 16 is a graph showing the influence of green price rise on the evolution time of g (left) and h (right) electric power vendors;
FIG. 17 the effect of excess consumption price changes on the probability of excess consumption trading;
FIG. 18 influence of excess consumption price drop (left), rise (right) on evolution path;
FIG. 19 is a graph showing the effect of price reduction of excess consumption on the evolution time of electricity vendors g (left) and h (right);
FIG. 20 is a graph showing the effect of price rise of excess consumption on the evolution time of the power selling company g (left) and the power selling company h (right).
Detailed Description
It is to be understood that the following detailed description is exemplary and is intended to provide further explanation of the invention as claimed. Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs.
It is noted that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of exemplary embodiments according to the invention.
The embodiments and features of the embodiments of the present invention may be combined with each other without conflict.
Example one
The embodiment discloses an excess consumption configuration method based on an evolutionary game, which comprises the following steps:
constructing an excess consumption configuration evolution game model;
setting initial probability of participation of participants in excess consumption trading, and respectively establishing market trading decision replication dynamic equations of participation of supply and demand parties of the power selling company based on the model;
the simultaneous supply and demand parties are used as replication dynamic equations of participants, and evolutionary game equilibrium points enabling the simultaneous replication dynamic equations to be equal to 0 are obtained through a solving process;
and substituting the equilibrium solution to be judged into the Jacobian matrix solved based on the payment matrix through a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, screening out the stable equilibrium solution through the rank and determinant symbols of the matrix, and configuring the excess consumption required by the supply and demand parties based on the equilibrium solution.
Assuming that the lowest renewable energy consumption weight to be completed by each market subject is the same as the lowest regional renewable energy consumption weight, according to the calculation method of regional completion consumption indexes specified in the national document, a calculation formula of the renewable energy consumption weight actually completed by the market subject responsible for consumption can be formulated as follows:
where δ represents the consumption weight actually completed by the market entity that bears the responsibility for consumption. q. q.sxRepresenting the consumption amount of the renewable energy source realized by market main bodies responsible for consumption through trading means; q. q.srThe total electric energy transaction amount of market main bodies bearing the consumption responsibility is shown, wherein the total transaction amount of main bodies such as power grid enterprises, power selling companies and the like is total electric sales amount, and the total transaction amount of market main bodies such as large users and the like is total electric purchase amount.
The electricity selling quantity data is obtained in real time through the data of the power system center.
Based on the renewable energy consumption actually completed by the market main body, the consumption responsibility weight index is calculated, the index completion condition is judged, and the electricity selling companies are classified into two types, namely electricity selling companies g with shortage in consumption and electricity selling companies h with excess in consumption.
And analyzing the behavior decision space of the g and h participation games of the power selling companies based on the classification of the power selling companies.
The behavior decision space of the power selling company g is { purchase excess consumption, not purchase excess consumption }.
The behavior decision space of the electricity selling company h is { sales excess consumption, no sales excess consumption }.
Based on decision space set elements of two power selling companies, obtaining transaction results which may occur to the two power selling companies, wherein the transaction results comprise the following contents:
(1) the electricity selling company g selects to purchase the excess consumption, and the electricity selling company h selects to sell the excess consumption;
(2) the electricity selling company g chooses to purchase the excess consumption, but the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption;
(3) the electricity selling company g chooses not to purchase the excess consumption, but the electricity selling company h chooses to sell the excess consumption;
(4) the electricity selling company g chooses not to purchase the excess consumption, while the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption.
In one embodiment, the renewable energy consumption responsibility is assessed as: the consumption weight achieved by the market entity responsible for consumption should not be less than the lowest consumption responsibility weight for the area in which it is located, i.e. the market entity is responsible for consumption
δ≥δ (2)
Wherein, variable
And expressing the consumption responsibility weight index established by the energy competent department. The market main body responsible for consumption should reasonably make a trading strategy according to the self condition so as to ensure that the renewable energy electric quantity at least occupies the lowest weight of all trading electric quantities. If it isThe annual consumption index of the renewable energy can not be completed, the supervision department charges a penalty to the power selling company, and the calculation formula of the consumption shortage is as follows:
the number of penalties required to be paid by the power selling company due to insufficient consumption is closely related to the completion condition of the consumption index of the power selling company. If delta is not less thanδThe consumption index actually completed by the electricity selling company reaches the minimum level limited by the supervision department, and the electricity selling company does not need to pay penalty; if delta<δAnd if the consumption index actually finished by the electricity selling company does not reach the minimum level limited by the supervision department, the electricity selling company needs to accept punishment, and corresponding punishment cost is paid according to the size of the punishment and the size of the consumption shortage.
The excess consumption trading refers to a trading mode that a market main body bearing the responsibility weight of renewable energy power consumption purchases excess consumption of the market main body for meeting the consumption requirement and excessively completing annual renewable energy power consumption. The calculation method of the excess consumption is expressed as follows:
in the formula, qreIndicating an excess of completed renewable energy consumption. For the electricity selling companies which complete the excess consumption, the transfer of the excess consumption can help to transfer the consumption cost of the renewable energy sources and improve the operation profits of the electricity selling companies.
Decision spaces of g and h participation games of the power selling companies are { excessive purchase consumption, excessive purchase consumption not }, { excessive sale consumption and excessive sale consumption not }, respectively. Two electricity selling companies select strategic behaviors under the constraint of related rules of a renewable energy consumption responsibility system and an excess consumption trading system. Accordingly, the following assumptions are made:
(1) describing its willingness to engage in excess consumption transactions based on the probability of selecting a certain transaction policy;
(2) the excess consumption can not be stored, so that the next renewable energy consumption assessment period can not be counted. Therefore, the excessive consumption which cannot complete the transaction in time cannot be traded in the next renewable energy consumption assessment period;
(3) the excess consumption transaction is arranged after the renewable energy consumption transaction in other forms is completed and before the consumption assessment, if the electricity selling company does not choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction, the electricity selling company cannot fill up the renewable energy consumption shortage through other transaction modes.
Analyzing the final transaction results and the operation profit changes of the power selling companies g and h under different transaction decisions according to the assumed conditions:
(1) and g, selling the excess consumption by the electricity selling company, and h, selling the excess consumption by the electricity selling company, wherein the excess consumption is successfully traded. At this time, the electricity selling company g will bear the transaction cost of buying the excess consumption, and the electricity selling company h will obtain the income brought by selling the excess consumption;
(2) the electricity selling company g purchases the excess consumption, but the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption, and the excess consumption transaction fails. At the moment, the electricity selling company g bears the penalty paid by the incomplete consumption obligation, and the electricity selling company h chooses to submit the excess consumption to a supervision department to obtain corresponding rewards;
(3) the electricity selling company g chooses not to buy the excess consumption, but the electricity selling company h chooses to sell the excess consumption, and the excess consumption transaction fails. At the moment, the electricity selling company g purchases the green certificate from the green certificate market to fill the shortage, the cost consumed by purchasing the green certificate is paid, and the electricity selling company h cannot obtain any income due to the overdue consumption;
(4) the electricity selling company g chooses not to purchase the excess consumption, and the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption, so that the transaction of the excess consumption fails. At the moment, the electricity selling company g chooses to buy the green certificate from the green certificate market to fill up the consumption shortage, pays the cost for buying the green certificate, and the electricity selling company h chooses to submit the excess consumption to the supervision department to obtain the excess consumption reward.
Based on various different results of the transaction decisions of the power selling companies g and h, the profit functions of the power selling companies g and h under different decisions can be obtained by combining the acquired electric quantity and price data. And further constructing game payment matrixes of the power selling companies g and h, wherein matrix elements are the corresponding transaction profits of the power selling companies after different decision combinations of the two parties are combined.
And constructing a duplicate dynamic equation describing the evolution of the power selling company decision with time based on the game payment matrix. Comprises the following contents:
(1) respectively setting the probability that the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h select to purchase or not purchase the excess consumption based on the cognitive level and the transaction willingness of the excess consumption transaction;
(2) based on the probability value, the probability of the event corresponding to all the elements of the game payment matrix is obtained;
(3) based on profit values of the electricity-selling companies corresponding to the game payment matrix elements and the occurrence probability of events corresponding to the elements, expected values of profits obtained when the electricity-selling companies g and h participate in excess consumption transactions and total expected values of profits obtained when the electricity-selling companies h participate in transactions are respectively obtained, and then a copy dynamic equation describing a transaction decision evolution process of the electricity-selling companies g and h is established.
And (5) making the copied dynamic equation equal to 0 and solving to obtain all equilibrium solutions of the game.
And analyzing and judging whether the balance point is a stable balance solution or not by a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, and further obtaining a stable trading strategy finally selected by the two power selling companies.
In the above, whether the equilibrium solution is stable is determined by the jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, which includes the following contents:
(1) substituting the equilibrium solution into a Jacobian matrix, and judging the sign of the rank;
(2) substituting the equilibrium solution into a Jacobian matrix, and judging the sign of the determinant;
(3) if the matrix determinant detJ >0 and trace trJ <0, it indicates that the equilibrium solution of the replication dynamic equation is asymptotically stable, and the corresponding business strategy of the supplier and the supplier is a stable decision strategy.
In a specific embodiment, the specific transaction situations are consolidated as shown in table 1.
TABLE 1 decision matrix
The transaction parameter settings and meanings associated with the electricity vendor are shown in table 2.
TABLE 2 symbols and meanings of parameters
Based on the definitions and parameter settings of table 1 and table 2, the game payment matrix of the electricity selling companies g and h is obtained as shown in table 3.
TABLE 3 Payment matrix
Wherein u isgAnd uhRespectively representing the profits of the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h after participating in the excess consumption trading decision. Before participating in the excess consumption transaction, the two electric power selling companies have obtained u electric power purchasing and selling profits respectivelyg0，uh0. The expressions of the profits obtained after the electricity vendors g and h select different trading strategies in table 3 are as follows.
Electricity selling company g profit function:
ug1＝ug0-pchqch (5)
ug2＝ug0-pfaqg (6)
ug3＝ug0-pzqg (7)
ug4＝ug0-pzqg (8)
electricity selling company h profit function:
uh1＝uh0+pchqch (9)
uh2＝uh0+preqh (10)
uh3＝uh0 (11)
uh4＝uh0+preqh (12)
let the probability that the electricity selling company g chooses to purchase the excess consumption be x (x is more than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1), and the probability that the electricity selling company h chooses to sell the excess consumption be y (y is more than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1).
When the electricity selling company g selects the purchase excess consumption, the expected value of the obtained profit is
The expected value of profit obtained when the electricity selling company g chooses not to purchase the excess consumption is
ugnb＝yug3+(1-y)ug4＝ug0-pzqg (14)
The total expected value of profits obtained when the electricity selling company g participates in the transaction is
When the electricity selling company h selects the sales excess consumption, the expected value of the obtained profit is
When the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption, the expected value of the obtained profit is
uhns＝xuh2+(1-x)uh4＝uh0+preqh (17)
The total expected value of profits obtained when the electricity selling company h participates in the transaction is
On the basis, the copy dynamic equation of the electricity selling company g participating in the game is obtained as follows:
the replication dynamic equation of the electricity selling company h participating in the game is as follows:
if the copy dynamic equation is equal to 0, the evolution of the decision behaviors of the power selling company tends to be balanced. At this time, the simultaneous equations are
First, the (0,0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1,1) satisfies the simultaneous equations, and is an equilibrium solution of the game.
Further, if ug1-ug3>0，uh1-uh2>0, solved by equation (21)
The set of solutions satisfies the constraint conditions that x is more than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1 and y is more than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1, and the solutions are also equilibrium solutions of the game. All equilibrium solutions for the game at this time are (0,0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1,1),
and (3) solving a jacobian matrix of the copied dynamic equation through a jacobian matrix local stability analysis method to judge whether the equilibrium point is a stable solution or not, and further obtaining an evolution final stable strategy (ESS) of the trade decision of the two power selling companies. The Jacobian matrix J that replicates the dynamic equations is
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
determinant according to Jacobian matrix
And trace trJ ═ a11+a12The sign of (a) determines the stability of the equalization solution. If detJ>0，trJ<0, the equilibrium solution of the replication dynamic equation is gradually stable, and the corresponding transaction strategy is an Evolution Stable Strategy (ESS); if detJ>0，trJ>0, the equilibrium solution is unstable; if detJ<0, the equilibrium point is the saddle point.
TABLE 4 Jacobian matrix determinant and trace of local equalization points
For the electricity selling companies that choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction, the noncompliance of the other party will bring profit loss to them. As can be seen from the formulae (5) to (12), ug2<ug4，uh3<uh4. This means that when one of the two electric sales companies chooses to participate in the super-premiumWhen the amount is traded and the other party chooses not to participate in the excess amount trade, the profit gained by the party who chooses to trade will be lower than the profit gained by the company when both parties choose not to participate in the excess trade. The five local equalization points (0,0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1,1), (x) obtained are used0，y0) The Jacobian matrix J is substituted into the Jacobian matrix J, and matrix determinants and traces corresponding to the Jacobian matrix J are obtained and are shown in a table 4.
Due to ug2<ug4，uh3<uh4The determinant of the equalization point and the sign of the trace thus depend on ug1-ug3And uh1-uh2The symbol of (2). To simplify the discussion, assume that the shortage of the amount of consumption that the electricity selling company attempts to fill by the excess consumption transaction is equal to the excess consumption that the electricity selling company h attempts to sell by the excess consumption transaction, i.e., it is
qg＝qh＝qch (25)
I.e., the supply and demand of the market excess consumption are equal. At this time, ug1-ug3And uh1-uh2Is dependent on-pchAnd-pz，pchAnd preThe magnitude relationship between them. The impact of this relationship on the decision-making equilibrium solution of the power-selling company is discussed in detail below:
TABLE 5 local stability analysis of equilibrium points for discussion 1
Table 6 local stability analysis of equilibrium points for discussion 2
At this time, the price p is traded in spite of the excess consumptionchLower than the green certificate trade price pzBut since the former is lower than the excess consumption award price preThe participation in the excess consumption transaction cannot bring improvement on profits to the electricity selling company h, the electricity selling company h does not have the intention of participating in the excess consumption transaction, and the two electricity selling companies cannot finally achieve the excess consumption transaction.
Table 7 local stability analysis of equilibrium points for discussion 3
Discussion 4 if ug1>ug3，uh1>uh2At this time pre<pch<pz. The local balance point types for the electric company transaction decision are shown in table 8. At this time, the excess consumption transaction price pchReward price p higher than excess consumptionreWhile being lower than the excess consumption award price pzTherefore, the participation of the excess consumption trading price is beneficial to improving the trading profits of the two electric selling companies, and the two electric selling companies are likely to simultaneously choose to participate in the excess consumption trading, so that the trading achievement possibility exists.
If and only if ug1>ug3，uh1>uh2That is, when the profits brought by the two parties of the electricity selling companies g and h respectively participating in the excess consumption transaction are higher than the profits brought by the two parties of the electricity selling companies g and h respectively not participating in the excess consumption transaction, the electricity selling companies g and h have the opportunity of achieving the excess consumption transaction, and the excess consumption transaction can be completed through cooperation. The strategy behavior evolution game of the two electricity selling companies is balanced into { no excess consumption is purchased, no excess consumption is sold } or { excess consumption is purchased, excess consumption is sold }. At this time, there are two stable equilibrium points (0,0), (1,1) for the evolving gaming path of two vendors.
TABLE 8 local stability analysis of equilibrium points for discussion 4
As shown in FIG. 6, let O, A1，A2，A3The coordinates of the point E are (0,0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1,1), (x), respectively0，y0). If the decision initial coordinates (x) of two power selling companies*，y*) Located in area OA1EA2Inside, the decision routes of the power selling company g and the power selling company h converge from the starting point to the point O, and the final choice for participating in the excess consumption market transaction is { no excess consumption is purchased, no excess consumption is sold }; if the initial decision of two electric power selling companies is located in the area EA1A3A2The inner part of the inner part is provided with a plurality of grooves,their decision path will gradually converge from the point of departure to a3At this time, the final choice for the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h to participate in the over-consumption market transaction is { purchase over-consumption, sell over-consumption }. It can be seen that the area EA can be enlarged if the effect of the relevant factors1A3A2The electricity selling company can choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction more.
The present invention will be further described with reference to the following specific examples, assuming that two electric power vendors g and h will receive the renewable energy consumption assessment, and the specific parameter settings are shown in tables 5 and 6.
TABLE 5 Electricity selling company g, h Power consumption demand and consumption situation
TABLE 6 initial price settings ($/MWh)
TABLE 7 Electricity vendors g, h trade initial decision point c (x)*，y*)
As shown in Table 7, 10 electricity vendors g, h are selected to participate in the initial value (x) of the decision of excess consumption transaction*，y*) And (6) carrying out simulation. The total simulation time of the evolutionary game is 5 time units, and the step length is 0.01 time unit. The results are shown in FIG. 2 under the initial data.
3.2 influence of regulatory punishment measures on transaction decisions
The parameters set in the table 5 and the table 6 are taken as the reference, the penalty strength of the supervision department is changed on the basis of no change of other parameters, and the influence of the change of the game balance and the achievement of the excess consumption transaction among the power selling companies is analyzed.
As shown in fig. 9, if the market regulatory authority increases the supervision of the renewable energy consumption and promotes the high renewable energy excess consumption reward and the shortage consumption penalty, the saddle point E moves from the lower left to the upper right along the curve in the figure, and the area EA is1A3A2The area of the area (E) will gradually become smaller, the probability that the electricity selling company successfully achieves the transaction of the excess consumption is also reduced, otherwise, if the market supervision department relaxes the supervision on the renewable energy consumption, and properly reduces the excess consumption reward and the shortage consumption penalty of the high renewable energy, the saddle point E moves from the upper right to the lower left along the same curve, and the area EA1A3A2Will gradually increase in area. The probability of the electricity vendor successfully completing the overdue transaction will also increase. The reason for this phenomenon is that the trade strategy of the electricity selling company g tends to be conservative due to the increase of the penalty, and the gap is supplemented and consumed by directly participating in the green certificate trade; the increase in prizes also makes the electricity vendors h more willing to trade off a more stable source of revenue by accepting the excess payout. Therefore, the excessively high punishment simultaneously eliminates the enthusiasm of both the supply and demand parties for participating in excessive consumption.
As shown in fig. 10, right, area EA1A3A2The area of (A) is reduced along with the increase of the consumption supervision strength, and the area is originally converged to A under the basic parameters3Initial point c of (1,1) point5，c6And converges to O (0, 0); on the contrary, if the market supervision department properly relaxes the supervision of the renewable energy consumption, and reduces the excess consumption reward and the shortage consumption penalty of the renewable energy, the willingness of the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h to choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction is improved, and the area EA is used for the purpose of increasing the willingness of the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h to participate in the excess consumption transaction1A3A2The area of (a) is increased compared with the basic parameter scene, and the initial point c originally converged to the point O (0,0) under the basic parameter scene4，c7And then converge at A3(1,1) (as shown on the left of FIG. 10).
FIGS. 11-12 show that when the initial decision of the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h is c10(0.6,0.65), the variation of reward and punishment of market supervision departmentThe effect of time required for equalization. If the market regulatory authority increases the renewable energy consumption regulatory level (see fig. 12), although the evolutionary game of the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h still converges to the point a3(1,1), but the time t required for the variables x, y to rise from the initial value to 1 increases, which means the time delay for the achievement of the excess amount transaction; on the contrary, if the market regulatory authority looses the supervision of the renewable energy consumption (as shown in fig. 11), the time t required for the variables x and y to rise from the initial values to 1 is reduced, which means that the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h achieve faster transaction of the excess consumption. It can be seen that the change of the supervision force of renewable energy consumption of the supervision department can influence the willingness and enthusiasm of the power selling company to participate in the excess consumption transaction, and the increase of the bonus and the penalty can weaken the willingness and enthusiasm of the power selling company to participate in the excess consumption transaction.
3.3 influence of Green license price on transaction decisions
The parameters set in the table 5 and the table 6 are taken as the reference, the green certificate price is changed on the basis of no change of other parameters, and the influence of the change of the game balance and the achievement of the transaction of the excess consumption among the power selling companies is analyzed.
As shown in fig. 13, if the price of the green certificate increases, the area EA1A3A2The area of the power selling company g is gradually increased, and the evolutionary game between the power selling companies g and h is converged to A3The probability of the point (1,1) is increased, so that the achievement of the transaction of the excess consumption amount between the power selling companies is facilitated; if the green license price is reduced, area EA1A3A2The area of the power selling company g is gradually reduced, and the evolutionary game between the power selling companies h and g is converged to A3The probability of the (1,1) point is reduced, thereby being unfavorable for the realization of the over-amount transaction.
The rising of the transaction price of the green certificate enables the g of the power selling company to have a reduced willingness to purchase the green certificate, and further more willing to fill up the self-consumption gap through the excess consumption transaction; on the contrary, the electricity selling company g prefers to meet the self consumption demand through green certificate transaction. FIGS. 15-16 show that the initial decision of electricity vendor g and electricity vendor h is c10Green at (0.6,0.65)The influence of the change of price on the time required for the evolution equilibrium is proved. As shown in fig. 9, if the green license price is decreased, the probabilities x that the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction are increased, and the time t required for the variable x to reach the equilibrium is increased from the initial value to 1, but the increase range of the time required for the variable x to reach the equilibrium is also obviously greater than the variable y; as shown in fig. 16, if the green price rises, the probabilities x, y that the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction decrease from the initial value to 1, but the time t required for the variable x to reach the equilibrium decreases by a significantly larger amount than the variable y. This shows that the effect of the change in the price of the green certificate transaction on the incentive of the electricity vendor g to opt in to the excess consumption transaction is more pronounced than for the electricity vendor h.
3.4 Effect of excess consumption price Change on transaction decisions
The parameters set in the table 5 and the table 6 are taken as the reference, the transaction price of the excess consumption is changed on the basis of no change of other parameters, and the change of game balance and the influence on the transaction of the excess consumption between the power selling companies are analyzed.
As shown in FIG. 17, as the over-bid trading price changes from low to high, the saddle point E moves along a curve from bottom right to top left. The data in Table 8 illustrates that either too high or too low of an excess consumption trading price will cause the area EA1A3A2The area of the utility model is reduced, and the probability of the electricity selling company achieving the transaction of the excess consumption is reduced. The over-consumption trading price is too low, so that the profit of selling the over-consumption by the electricity selling company h with the over-consumption is reduced, and the willingness of participating in the over-consumption trading is further reduced; although the excessively high transaction price of the excess consumption contributes to the increase of the sales income of the excess consumption by the electricity-selling company h, the transaction cost of the buyer electricity-selling company g selecting to purchase the excess consumption also increases, thereby increasing the difficulty of both parties to achieve the excess consumption transaction.
As shown in fig. 19, if the price of the excess consumption transaction is decreased, the time t required for the electricity selling company h to select the probability y of participating in the excess consumption transaction to increase from the initial value to 1 is increased, but the time t required for the electricity selling company g to select the probability x of participating in the excess consumption transaction to increase from the initial value to 1 is decreased; as shown in fig. 20, when the price of the excess consumption transaction increases, the time t required for the electric company h to select the probability y of participating in the excess consumption transaction to increase from the initial value to 1 decreases, but the time t required for the electric company g to select the probability x of participating in the excess consumption transaction to increase from the initial value to 1 increases. This shows that the rise and fall of the price of the excess consumption transaction have completely opposite effects on the enthusiasm of the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h for selecting to participate in the excess consumption transaction. The price of the excess consumption trading is increased, so that the enthusiasm of the electricity selling company h for selecting to participate in the excess consumption trading is improved, and the enthusiasm of the electricity selling company g for selecting to participate in the excess consumption trading is weakened; otherwise, the situation is opposite.
TABLE 8 Effect on revenue level of Electricity vendors under different Risk sensitivity coefficients
The invention focuses on the symbiotic evolution of the strategy behaviors of the power selling company under the condition of excessive consumption trading and the influence of the change of related parameters on the evolutionary game decision of the power selling company, and obtains the following conclusion:
a decision method established based on the evolutionary game idea can effectively realize the transaction analysis of the excess consumption of the power selling company to obtain a stable equilibrium solution;
the punishment degree of the renewable energy consumption, the green card transaction price, the excess consumption transaction price and the like of the consumption responsibility main body can be influenced by the supervision department, so that the willingness and the enthusiasm of the power selling company to participate in the excess consumption transaction are influenced, and the operational requirements of both the supply and demand parties are fully considered in the parameter formulation.
Example two
It is an object of this embodiment to provide a computing device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the steps of the above method when executing the program.
EXAMPLE III
An object of the present embodiment is to provide a computer-readable storage medium.
A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the above-mentioned method.
Example four
The purpose of this embodiment is to provide an excess consumption configuration system based on an evolutionary game, including a supplier server, a demander server and a central server, where the central server performs data interaction with the supplier server and the demander server, respectively, to obtain respective electricity consumption amount and excess consumption completion data, and after receiving the data, the central server is configured to include:
a model building module configured to: constructing an excess consumption configuration evolution game model;
a replication dynamic equation building module configured to: setting initial probability of participation of participants in excess consumption trading, and respectively establishing market trading decision replication dynamic equations of participation of supply and demand parties of the power selling company based on the model;
a solving module configured to: the simultaneous supply and demand parties are used as replication dynamic equations of participants, and evolutionary game equilibrium points enabling the simultaneous replication dynamic equations to be equal to 0 are obtained through a solving process;
a required excess consumption configuration module configured to: substituting the equilibrium solution to be judged into the Jacobian matrix solved based on the payment matrix through a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, screening out the stable equilibrium solution through the rank and determinant symbol of the matrix, and configuring the excess consumption required by both the supply and demand parties based on the equilibrium solution;
and the central server respectively sends the configured excess consumption required by the supply and demand parties to the corresponding supply party server and demand party server, and the load is scheduled based on the configured required excess consumption.
The steps involved in the apparatuses of the above second, third and fourth embodiments correspond to the first embodiment of the method, and the detailed description thereof can be found in the relevant description of the first embodiment. The term "computer-readable storage medium" should be taken to include a single medium or multiple media containing one or more sets of instructions; it should also be understood to include any medium that is capable of storing, encoding or carrying a set of instructions for execution by a processor and that cause the processor to perform any of the methods of the present invention.
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the modules or steps of the present invention described above can be implemented using general purpose computer means, or alternatively, they can be implemented using program code that is executable by computing means, such that they are stored in memory means for execution by the computing means, or they are separately fabricated into individual integrated circuit modules, or multiple modules or steps of them are fabricated into a single integrated circuit module. The present invention is not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.
Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described with reference to the accompanying drawings, it is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and it should be understood by those skilled in the art that various modifications and variations can be made without inventive efforts by those skilled in the art based on the technical solution of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. The excess consumption configuration method based on the evolutionary game is characterized by comprising the following steps:
constructing an excess consumption configuration evolution game model;
setting initial probability of participation of participants in excess consumption trading, and respectively establishing market trading decision replication dynamic equations of participation of supply and demand parties of the power selling company based on the model;
the simultaneous supply and demand parties are used as replication dynamic equations of participants, and evolutionary game equilibrium points enabling the simultaneous replication dynamic equations to be equal to 0 are obtained through a solving process;
and substituting the equilibrium solution to be judged into the Jacobian matrix solved based on the payment matrix through a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, screening out the stable equilibrium solution through the rank and determinant symbols of the matrix, and configuring the excess consumption required by the supply and demand parties based on the equilibrium solution.
2. The excess consumption configuration method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 1, wherein after receiving the configured required excess consumption, the supplier and the supplier perform load scheduling according to the required excess consumption;
preferably, an evolutionary game track of the decision is drawn based on a duplicate dynamic equation, and the track is used for showing whether the electricity selling companies with different acceptance degrees of the excess consumption transaction can choose to participate in the excess consumption transaction decision.
3. The over-allowance configuration method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 1, wherein the evolutionary game model comprises the following elements: the method comprises the steps of collecting a group of power selling companies, collecting a transaction strategy of the power selling companies and obtaining a function matrix of the revenue of the power selling companies, wherein the consumption indexes of the group of power selling companies, the transaction strategy of the power selling companies and the revenue function matrix of the power selling companies are different in completion condition.
4. The excess consumption configuration method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 3, wherein renewable energy consumption actually completed based on a market subject is obtained in real time in an online manner, a consumption responsibility weight index is calculated, index completion conditions are judged, electricity selling companies are classified into two categories, namely electricity selling companies with shortage in consumption and electricity selling companies with excess consumption, and electricity selling company group sets with different consumption index completion conditions are established.
5. The over-consumption configuration method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 4, wherein the behavioral decision space of the two types of electricity selling companies participating in the game is analyzed based on the classification of the electricity selling companies:
the behavior decision space of the electricity selling company g with the shortage of the consumption is { buying the excess consumption, not buying the excess consumption };
the behavior decision space of the electricity selling company h with the over-amount consumption is { the over-amount consumption for sale, the over-amount consumption for not sale };
and obtaining the transaction results which may appear in the two types of electricity selling companies based on the decision space set elements of the two electricity selling companies.
6. The over-amount consumption configuration method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 5, wherein the possible transaction results of two types of electricity selling companies comprise:
the electricity selling company g selects to purchase the excess consumption, and the electricity selling company h selects to sell the excess consumption;
the electricity selling company g chooses to purchase the excess consumption, but the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption;
the electricity selling company g chooses not to purchase the excess consumption, but the electricity selling company h chooses to sell the excess consumption;
the electricity selling company g chooses not to purchase the excess consumption, and the electricity selling company h chooses not to sell the excess consumption;
preferably, based on various different results of the trading decisions of the electricity selling companies g and h, the profit functions of the electricity selling companies g and h under different decisions can be obtained by combining the obtained electric quantity and price data, and further, a game payment matrix of the electricity selling companies g and h is constructed, wherein the matrix elements are the trading profits of the electricity selling companies corresponding to the combination of the different decisions of the two parties.
7. The over-amount consumption configuration method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 6, wherein a replicated dynamic equation describing the evolution of the power selling company decision with time is constructed based on a game payment matrix, and comprises the following contents:
respectively setting the probability that the electricity selling company g and the electricity selling company h select to purchase and not purchase the excess consumption;
based on the probability value, the probability of the event corresponding to all the elements of the game payment matrix is obtained;
based on profit values of the electricity-selling companies corresponding to the game payment matrix elements and the occurrence probability of events corresponding to the elements, expected values of profits obtained when the electricity-selling companies g and h participate in excess consumption transactions and total expected values of profits obtained when the electricity-selling companies h participate in transactions are respectively obtained, and then a copy dynamic equation describing a transaction decision evolution process of the electricity-selling companies g and h is established.
8. The excess consumption configuration system based on the evolutionary game is characterized by comprising a supplier server, a demander server and a central server, wherein the central server performs data interaction with the supplier server and the demander server respectively to obtain respective electricity total amount and excess consumption completion data, and after receiving the data, the central server is configured to comprise:
a model building module configured to: constructing an excess consumption configuration evolution game model;
a replication dynamic equation building module configured to: setting initial probability of participation of participants in excess consumption trading, and respectively establishing market trading decision replication dynamic equations of participation of supply and demand parties of the power selling company based on the model;
a solving module configured to: the simultaneous supply and demand parties are used as replication dynamic equations of participants, and evolutionary game equilibrium points enabling the simultaneous replication dynamic equations to be equal to 0 are obtained through a solving process;
a required excess consumption configuration module configured to: substituting the equilibrium solution to be judged into the Jacobian matrix solved based on the payment matrix through a Jacobian matrix local stability analysis method, screening out the stable equilibrium solution through the rank and determinant symbol of the matrix, and configuring the excess consumption required by both the supply and demand parties based on the equilibrium solution;
and the central server respectively sends the configured excess consumption required by the supply and demand parties to the corresponding supply party server and demand party server, and the load is scheduled based on the configured required excess consumption.
9. A computing device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor when executing the program performs the steps of the method of any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored which, when being executed by a processor, is adapted to carry out the steps of the method according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 7.
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