CN109102284A - A kind of optimization method of block chain tamper-resistance techniques - Google Patents
A kind of optimization method of block chain tamper-resistance techniques Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention proposes the methods that the account book data that some node on a kind of discovery block chain is stored are tampered, this method is traversed in the block chain stored in verifying node first except whether all blocks of the last one block are tampered, the block for existing in node and being tampered such as is verified, then records pre_H for restoring data.When block newly is added in the node block chain, the pre_H of new time zone block storage and the private key of data node are signed respectively, and are individually stored.When detection by the pre_H stored in newest block and data in the signature that is stored pre_H and data be compared respectively, so that whether the data for verifying new time zone block are tampered, and position and restore the data that front has been tampered in block.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to block chain technical fields, and in particular to a kind of optimization method of block chain tamper-resistance techniques.
Background technique
Block chain is the Floor layer Technology of the digital virtuals currency such as bit coin, by the data record of decentralization, by the whole network
All nodes safeguard data jointly, realize safely storing data, have unforgeable, can not tamper, trackability,
The features such as anonymity.
The decentralization technical solution of block chain is managed and storing data using block as basic unit.Block is by two
Partial data structure composition, respectively block head and Mei Keer tree construction.The head of block includes that miner can modify
Provisional random number, timestamp, digs the data such as mine disaster degree, the tree root that transaction is set at the cryptographic Hash of preamble block.Another part of block
It is Mei Keer tree, for storing effective transaction.When the block comprising transaction data orderly links, it is formed block
Chain.
It can be seen that block chain is a distributed account book, each node maintenance portion account book data, each account book data
Include all historical transactional informations, is connected between account book by Hash pointer.Under normal circumstances, the whole network safeguards common area
The data of block chain data, individual node storage are consistent with the data of the whole network.But if there is attacker attempts to tamper with the node
The initial data of historical data, account book is destroyed, and is accurately gone through then intelligent contract can not just be obtained by the account book of the node
History transaction data, all applications based on account book historical data will be affected.How the safety of node deposited account book is guaranteed
Property, it is ensured that node account book data and the validity of application become technical problem urgently to be resolved.
Summary of the invention
The invention proposes the methods that the account book data that some node on a kind of discovery block chain is stored are tampered.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
By the cryptographic Hash of each block on the detection node, its immediate the latter block head is stored the present invention
Preamble block cryptographic Hash pre_H compare, if there is inconsistent, illustrate that the node account book data are tampered.
The above method is achieved through the following steps:
A kind of optimization method of block chain tamper-resistance techniques, includes the following steps:
1, it examines whether all blocks in node in addition to the last one block are tampered, and positions the block being tampered:
1.1) in each node, by block at first, traversal verifying institute's memory block chain block cryptographic Hash with
It is whether consistent close to subsequent block pre_H value, think that this block has been tampered if there is inconsistent, and record this block
Pre_H restores for data, if the cryptographic Hash of all blocks is consistent with the pre_H close to subsequent block, needs according to subsequent
Step judges whether the block is tampered；
1.2) while whether the cryptographic Hash that traversal verifies all blocks is consistent with close to subsequent block pre_H value, root
According to the timestamp of each block, all blocks on the same day are stored in same file, previous file last
The cryptographic Hash of a block, the Hash pointer of first block as the latter file, is per diem split block chain with this, if
It does not find that the cryptographic Hash of previous block is different from close to subsequent block pre_H in file on the same day, then calculates this document
Cryptographic Hash H, and H is stored in temporary folder；
2, the last one block in node is examined, and is positioned according to inspection result and restores the area being tampered in block chain
Block:
2.1) for the pre_H and data of the last one block storage in node, the block of node is hung up in the block
It is signed when chain with the private key of node, and individually stored respectively.When node block chain newly hangs block, storage dynamic updates
For the pre_H of newest block storage and the signature of data；
2.2) data stored in the last one block are compared with the data in the signature individually stored, it is such as consistent
Then think that the data of the last one block are not tampered with.If inconsistent, illustrate that the data of newest block are tampered, at this time to neighbour
Nearly node inquires newest block and restores data.
The pre_H stored in the last one block is compared with the pre_H in the signature individually stored, is verified with this
Whether the pre_H value of block is modified.If inconsistent, by successively being ask since nearest block on the net to other nodes
It asks acquisition block, orients the block being tampered by comparing, and restore data.
Using the pre_H in step 1.1) as ID, the block by inquiring other nodes pre_H on the net is (inconsistent
Pre_H is verified after obtaining block as the ID for requesting other nodes to find block), so as to find preamble block.
With block of the same method before available, by comparing, to position and restore the data being tampered.
For the file being not tampered with, the file formally stored is labeled as to the H of the file of temporary file underedge storage and is breathed out
Uncommon value calculates the formal storage file cryptographic Hash of affiliated file after restoring for the data being tampered.
3, whether fast verification block chain is correct:
It after detection is completed for the first time, checks whether to be tampered again, directly progress file detection:
3.1) the cryptographic Hash file_hash of the file of every day in block chain is recalculated；
3.2) compare the file H formally stored in file_hash and step 2；
3.3) if file_hash is identical as H, then it is assumed that data are not tampered with, and otherwise repeat to walk for the block in file
Rapid 1 and 2, for there are n times to distort high-risk piece of (N >=1) of experience, it is arranged and records the high-risk parameter identification r of file, r is
The weighting number that block in this document is tampered,Wherein k is the number being tampered, and m is that correspondence is tampered k times
Block number.For the block of r > 0, it is separately provided in per unit time (as every other week) scanning r times, as scanning frequency
Rate.High-risk parameter identification is updated after scanning through every time, calculates the time of this document scanning next time, timed task is arranged.
The invention adopts the above technical scheme compared with prior art, has following technical effect that
1, can judge to repair block chain data while whether the block chain of single node is tampered.
2, verifying number is less, and verification efficiency is high.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the data structure diagram of block；
Fig. 2 is the schematic diagram that file is daily divided into file；
Fig. 3 is block chain structure schematic diagram；
Fig. 4 is the block chain schematic diagram for not distorting a last block；
Fig. 5 is to store to the signature of the last one block；
Schematic diagram when Fig. 6 is checking file cryptographic Hash；
Fig. 7 is to complete the block chain schematic diagram after file divides；
Fig. 8 is the flow chart of embodiment.
Specific embodiment
Technical solution of the present invention is described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawing:
Assuming that node A safeguards a block chain as shown in Figure 3, each piece, according to time stamp T, passes through the Kazakhstan of preamble block
Uncommon value is interconnected, and currently has n block, and each block content includes: the data D of block and the Hash pointer of a upper block
pre_H。
Hash pointer on block chain can simplify are as follows:
Pre_H (1)=hash (D (1))
Pre_H (2)=hash (pre_H (1) | | D (1))
……
Pre_H (n-2)=hash (pre_H (n-3) | | D (n-2))
Pre_H (n-1)=hash (pre_H (n-2) | | D (n-1))
Pre_H (n)=hash (pre_H (n-1) | | D (n))
Anti-tamper testing mechanism following steps:
1, start to detect for the first time, pre_H contrasting detection mainly carrying out block to entire block chain, as shown in Figure 1, such as
Fruit pre_H (m)=hash (pre_H (m-1) | | D (m)), then this time detection passes through；Otherwise it detects and does not pass through, and will be problematic
Pre_H (m) is recorded, and is restored for subsequent data.
2, while pre_H contrasting detection between carrying out block, the timestamp of each block is counted, it will section at the same time
Block be divided into a file, file is divided as unit of day.Assuming that the timestamp of block 1,2,3 belongs to file 1
These three blocks are attributed to file 1, as shown in Figure 2 by period 2018-6-1.
Wherein file_H1=hash (D1 | | pre_H1 | | D2 | | pre_H2 | | D3), when all blocks for belonging to file 1 all
After the completion of statistics, the file cryptographic Hash file_H1 of calculation document 1, and this document cryptographic Hash is stored in temporary file underedge.
3, if there is interpolater distorts the data D (m) in block m, and interpolater does not distort last block storage
Pre_H (n), then compare according to technical solution first method, total energy find the cryptographic Hash of some block with close to
The value of the pre_H of postorder block storage is different.As shown in figure 4, leading to if D (m), pre_H (m), pre_H (m+1) are modified
The cryptographic Hash and pre_H (m+2) of comparison block m+2 are crossed, because inconsistent to find that data are tampered.
4, by inquiring the block of other nodes pre_H (m+2) that (pre_H (m+2) is sought as other nodes of request on the net
The ID of block is looked for, and is verified after obtaining block), so as to find block m+2.With same method, block m+1 and block are found
M is compared by veritifying, is tampered to orient data D (m), and restore data.
5, node is veritified after new block passes through, and while chaining, node increases a job, it may be assumed that for this newly into
The pre_H of the storage of block and the private key of data node are signed, and are individually stored.In this way, node is newest in order to verify
The pre_H that block stores need to only be compared with the pre_H in the signature deposited, verify block with this by the pre_H of block
Whether pre_H value is modified.It, can be by comparing the signature of data, together if what interpolater modified is the data of newest block
Sample, which is can be found that, to be distorted.As shown in Figure 5.
If 6, pre_H (n-1) value comparison result is different in step 5, newest block is inquired to other nodes, by step 4
It can position and distort block and revert to original correct data.If data value comparison result is different in step 5, to other nodes
It inquires newest block, restores the data of the last one block.
7, when detecting for the first time, step as above is carried out, for the file being not tampered with, step 2 temporary file underedge is deposited
The H of the file of storage is marked, and the cryptographic Hash of file is recalculated after restoring for the data being tampered, later detection can be straight
The cryptographic Hash file_H of detection file was connected, to improve scan efficiency, as shown in Figure 6.
8, entire block chain completes detection and file division between block, it is assumed that the block chain of present node A is complete by three
File and the same day be not classified as also file remaining block composition, as shown in Figure 7.
9, after positioning the block being specifically tampered in detection process, which is stamped to the label being tampered, and each
It is secondary to be found to distort rear accumulative frequency.For there are n times to distort high-risk piece of (N >=1) of experience, it is arranged and records the height of file
Endanger parameter identification r, and r is the weighting number that the block in this document is tampered,Wherein k is the number being tampered, m
For the corresponding block number for being tampered k times.In some file, there is 1 to be distorted by 3 times by block that 2 times are distorted and 2
Block, the label of this document are 2 * 2=8 times of * 1+3 times.It is separately provided in per unit time (as every other week) scanning r times,
As scan frequency.High-risk parameter identification is updated after scanning through every time, calculates the time of this document scanning next time, setting timing
Task.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of optimization method of block chain tamper-resistance techniques, includes the following steps:
1, it examines whether all blocks in node in addition to the last one block are tampered, and positions the block being tampered:
1.1) in each node, by block at first, traversal verifying institute's memory block chain block cryptographic Hash with close to
Whether subsequent block pre_H value is consistent, thinks that this block has been tampered if there is inconsistent, and record the pre_H of this block,
Restore for data, if the cryptographic Hash of all blocks is consistent with the pre_H close to subsequent block, needs to be sentenced according to subsequent step
Whether the block that breaks is tampered；
1.2) while whether the cryptographic Hash that traversal verifies all blocks is consistent with close to subsequent block pre_H value, according to every
All blocks on the same day are stored in same file, the last one area of previous file by the timestamp of a block
The cryptographic Hash of block, the Hash pointer of first block as the latter file, is per diem split block chain with this, if same
It does not find that the cryptographic Hash of previous block is different from close to subsequent block pre_H in file in it, then calculates the Kazakhstan of this document
Uncommon value H, and H is stored in temporary folder；
2, the last one block in node is examined, and is positioned according to inspection result and restores the block being tampered in block chain:
2.1) for the pre_H and data of the last one block storage in node, when the block is hung up the block chain of node
It is signed with the private key of node, and individually stored respectively.When node block chain newly hangs block, storage dynamic is updated to most
The pre_H of new block storage and the signature of data；
2.2) data stored in the last one block are compared with the data in the signature individually stored, are recognized if consistent
It is not tampered with for the data of the last one block.If inconsistent, illustrate that the data of newest block are tampered, at this time to neighbouring section
Point inquires newest block and restores data.
The pre_H stored in the last one block is compared with the pre_H in the signature individually stored, block is verified with this
Pre_H value whether be modified.If inconsistent, obtained by successively being inquired since nearest block on the net to other nodes
Block is taken, orients the block being tampered by comparing, and restore data.
Using the pre_H in step 1.1) as ID, by block (the inconsistent pre_H for inquiring other nodes pre_H on the net
As the ID for requesting other nodes to find block, and verified after obtaining block), so as to find preamble block.With same
Block before the method for sample is available, by comparing, to position and restore the data being tampered.
For the file being not tampered with, the file cryptographic Hash formally stored is labeled as to the H of the file of temporary file underedge storage,
The formal storage file cryptographic Hash of file belonging to being calculated after restoring for the data being tampered.
3, whether fast verification block chain is correct:
It after detection is completed for the first time, checks whether to be tampered again, directly progress file detection:
3.1) the cryptographic Hash file_hash of the file of every day in block chain is recalculated；
3.2) compare the file H formally stored in file_hash and step 2；
3.3) if file_hash is identical as H, then it is assumed that data are not tampered with, otherwise for the block in file repeat step 1 and
2, for there are n times to distort high-risk piece of (N >=1) of experience, it is arranged and records the high-risk parameter identification r of file, r is this document
The weighting number that interior block is tampered,Wherein k is the number being tampered, and m is the corresponding block for being tampered k times
Number.For the block of r > 0, it is separately provided in per unit time (as every other week) scanning r times, as scan frequency.Every time
High-risk parameter identification is updated after scanning through, and calculates the time of this document scanning next time, timed task is set.
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| CN116883027A (en) * | 2023-09-06 | 2023-10-13 | 南通汉迪自动化设备有限公司 | Material import and export clearance networking supervisory systems |
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