CN107231230B - Cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method and system based on diseases - Google Patents

Cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method and system based on diseases Download PDF

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CN107231230B
CN107231230B CN201710397579.3A CN201710397579A CN107231230B CN 107231230 B CN107231230 B CN 107231230B CN 201710397579 A CN201710397579 A CN 201710397579A CN 107231230 B CN107231230 B CN 107231230B
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CN107231230A (en
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杨旸
张煜超
郑相涵
刘西蒙
叶少珍
董晨
邹剑
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Fuzhou University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • G—PHYSICS
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    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • G06F21/6254—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes by anonymising data, e.g. decorrelating personal data from the owner's identification
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these

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Abstract

The invention provides a disease-based cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method and system, patients can be diagnosed and treated by different medical institutions, and the system allows a group of patients from different medical fields to generate a group session key, so that safe group communication is established. The system supports patient anonymity and traceability, hiding the patient's identity in an anonymous identity (pseudonym), only designated institutions can recover their true identity. Cross-domain group key protocol guarantees: authenticated patients from different medical institutions and having the same condition may generate a secure group key. The patient establishes secure group communication by using the key, thereby protecting the privacy information of the patient in the electronic medical social system. The system also supports dynamic group management, and when group members change, the system generates a new group session key.

Description

Cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method and system based on diseases
Technical Field
The invention relates to a dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method and system based on symptoms in a cross-domain electronic medical social system.
Background
The electronic medical system realizes a novel universal calculation mode suitable for high-quality medical care through electronized medical data processing. Patient condition can be monitored by collecting patient vital signs and other medical data through electronic medical devices or miniature sensors. In medical systems, medical personnel are required to provide patients with specialized disease and condition diagnoses. On the other hand, these patients are also intentionally communicated with other patients having the same condition. They wish to establish a communication group based on the disease state to communicate information about the disease, share treatment experience and expert advice. They can chat among the communication groups, talk about their real-time disease status, and encourage each other to combat the disease.
In view of the sensitivity of medical information, the privacy of the patient should be protected by the system. It is necessary to establish a secure group information exchange system. Such a system can be easily set up if the patients can negotiate out a group key through a real meeting. However, the fact that they have to stay in the hospital to receive treatment does not allow a chance to meet in reality, and only communication via the internet is possible. We should design a secure group key management scheme (GKM) to protect group sessions. On the other hand, patients with the same condition are likely to be from medical institutions in different cities or different countries. Some patients with rare diseases may have difficulty finding patients with similar conditions even in the same city. To enhance international medical assistance, we should establish a secure group session system across medical domains.
In a secure cohort system, patient anonymity and mutual authentication are crucial. Anonymity can protect the true identity of the patient and avoid unnecessary disclosure and discrimination of personal information. The user identity authentication can prevent the system from being subjected to masquerading attack. One way to achieve patient authentication is a digital signature mechanism. The public key of the user is managed by a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In a PKI system, a Certificate Authority (CA) is responsible for distributing, storing, verifying, and revoking certificates, thereby incurring high management costs. Another way to design an authentication algorithm is the identity-based public key cryptosystem (ID-PKC), where each user has an identity and all user keys are generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC). Since KGC keeps the keys of all users, once KGC storage server is hacked, the identity-based cryptosystem is at risk. Certificateless cryptographic systems may solve the key escrow problem because in such systems the KGC only knows the partial key (partial secret key) of the user.
To achieve flexible patient management, the system should revoke the patient's key after the patient has recovered from the disease. Furthermore, the condition-based group communication system should be dynamic. On the one hand, patients can freely join or leave the system without revealing the privacy of the group session. In addition, in a case of a disorder-based authenticated group key protocol, disorder information should be embedded in the group session key so that patients with different disorders cannot join the group for communication. Meanwhile, in the information interaction process, it is required to ensure that the symptoms of the patient cannot be revealed to other patients not belonging to the group or to an attacker who eavesdrops.
In addition to functional requirements, efficiency is also an important factor in weighing the cross-domain group key management system. Most patients in a hospital cannot join a group chat using an electronic device with powerful computing capabilities, such as a laptop or desktop computer. They often lie in the hospital bed and chat with others using a cell phone or tablet, which devices have limited computing and memory capabilities. However, most of the existing group key agreement protocols (GKA) rely on bilinear pairwise operations with large computational overhead and hash computation mapping to points, and these schemes requiring large computational effort are not suitable for the e-medical social system.
Key management and other security methods (e.g., encryption, signing, etc.) are equally important. Group Key Management (GKM) has been studied more extensively in group communications. In 2010, Srinivasa et al propose a secure GKM scheme suitable for a multicast network, which combines a logical key tree structure and the Chinese remainder theorem to carry out scheme design. Drira et al designed a group key management scheme for mobile ad hoc networks that was based on a trust-oriented clustering approach. In the scheme, the trust information is taken as a clustering basis related to key management. Harn and Lin propose a broadcast GKM scheme based on secret sharing and prove that the scheme is secure. However, Liu et al demonstrate that the solution of Harness is vulnerable to internal attacks. Chen et al proposeA group key management scheme based on one-way proxy re-encryption is presented. Nabbel et al constructs an attribute-based group key management scheme that manages group keys based on the attributes of the group members. In their solution, only users that satisfy certain access control policy attributes can obtain a group key. Jiang et al propose a self-healing group key management scheme, and a self-healing method with revocation and collusion resistance capabilities. Sun et al[17]Two collusion attack resistant GKM schemes are provided, which are respectively based on a repeated unidirectional function tree and a node unidirectional function tree. In 2017, Chen et al designed a management scheme with dynamic group keys, which is based on a key tree structure.
The group key agreement protocol (GKA) is a core technology for generating group session keys. 2013, Cheng et al[22]A fault-tolerant GKA protocol based on a binary tree structure is provided, which supports dynamic operation of participant joining or leaving. Yang et al propose a GKA scheme for an identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks. In this scheme, when the administrator knows the identities of the group members, the group session key can be generated without message interaction, however it does not provide a user authentication mechanism. Later, Cheng et al designed a bilinear pairing based authentication GKA scheme. Xu et al propose an asymmetric GKA scheme for identity hiding authentication based on short signatures. Lv et al propose a certificateless GKA scheme. 2015, Sun et al[27]A verifiable authentication GKA protocol is provided for a mobile environment. Ranjani et al propose the identity-based GKA protocol to resist both active and passive attacks, which is constructed based on bilinear pairs. Tan et al propose an identity-based GKA scheme without bilinear pairings.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems that cross-domain secure group communication is not realized, group establishment based on disease matching cannot be supported, and efficiency is low in the conventional group key agreement scheme, the invention provides a dynamic anonymous authentication group key management scheme based on disease in a cross-domain electronic medical social system.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme: a cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method based on diseases comprises the following steps: s1: establishing a key generation center KGC; s2: the KGC firstly checks whether the MI of the medical institution has relevant medical qualification, and then generates a partial key for the MI; s3: MI is responsible for diagnosis and treatment of the patient and generates a partial key for the patient; s4: patients from different medical institutions securely generate group session keys.
The invention also provides a disease-based cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key management system, which comprises a key generation center KGC, wherein the key generation center KGC is responsible for generating a main public key/private key pair and is trusted by all entities, and a part of public key/private key pairs are generated for registered medical institutions, so that the problem of key escrow is avoided; a medical institution MI which needs to be registered with the KGC; the medical institution selects the secret value and generates public information of the secret value; in order to obtain a part of public key/private key pairs, the MI submits the generated public information to the KGC; the MI is responsible for managing and diagnosing patients within its medical field and generating partial public/private key pairs for the patients, thereby avoiding key escrow problems; and a patient PT which registers with the medical institution, selects the secret value and generates public information of the secret value, and in order to obtain a partial public key/private key pair, the PT submits the public information corresponding to the secret value to the MI.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
(1) cross-domain authenticated key management and disorder matching functions: in the scheme, after the patients from different medical domains are subjected to identity authentication, the system can generate a group session key for the patients with the same disease symptoms, and the patients can establish a disease symptom-based security group by using the key and share the disease symptom-related information through group communication.
(2) Anonymity and traceability: because the information of the medical institution and the disease information of the patient are sensitive, the invention ensures that the real identities of the medical institution and the patient cannot be recovered from the anonymous identities by the outside world, and realizes the anonymity of the medical institution and the patient. In order to prevent the medical institution and the patient from malicious behaviors, the key generation center KGC can recover the true identity of the medical institution, and the true identity of the patient can be recovered by the registered medical institution, so that traceability of the medical institution and the patient is realized.
(3) Safety: the scheme utilizes perfect forward security (perfect forward security) to protect the privacy of information, and even if an attacker can defend a group member, the attacker cannot deduce the previous session key. The scheme can also resist various active attacks: masquerading attacks, tampering attacks, replay attacks, and the like.
(4) Time-controlled user revocation: in order to simplify the user management process, the scheme provides a time-based automatic user revocation mechanism. Once the set expiration date has passed, the patient's public/private key pair will automatically expire.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a system framework diagram according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a flow chart of medical institution registration in an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a patient registration flow chart.
Fig. 4 is a flowchart of group key agreement.
Detailed Description
The invention is further explained below with reference to the figures and the specific embodiments.
Aiming at the problems that cross-domain secure group communication is not realized, group establishment based on symptom matching cannot be supported, efficiency is low and the like in the conventional group key agreement scheme, the invention designs a dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method based on symptoms in a cross-domain electronic medical social system. Which comprises the following steps: s1: establishing a key generation center KGC; s2: the KGC firstly checks whether the MI of the medical institution has relevant medical qualification, and then generates a partial key for the MI; s3: MI is responsible for diagnosis and treatment of the patient and generates a partial key for the patient; s4: patients from different medical institutions securely generate group session keys.
FIG. 1 is a system framework of the present invention. The system includes three types of entities: key Generation Center (KGC), Medical Institution (MI) and Patient (PT) wherein the Key Generation Center (KGC): responsible for generating the master public/private key pair and trusted by all entities. It generates a partial public/private key pair for the registered medical institution, thereby avoiding the key escrow problem. Medical Institution (MI): registration with the KGC is required. The medical institution selects the secret value and generates public information of the secret value. To obtain part of the public/private key pair, the MI submits the generated public information to the KGC. The MI is responsible for managing and diagnosing patients within its medical field and generating partial public/private key pairs for the patients, thereby avoiding key escrow problems. Patient (PT): registering with the medical institution. The patient selects the secret value and generates public information of the secret value. To obtain part of the public/private key pair, the PT submits public information corresponding to the secret value to the MI. The Key Generation Center (KGC) is at the top level, responsible for managing the Medical Institution (MI). The KGC first checks whether the MI has the relevant medical qualifications and then generates a partial key for the MI. The MI is at the second level of the system, responsible for diagnosis and treatment of the patient, and generating the patient's partial key. The bottom layer of the system is patients with different diseases and conditions. Patients from different medical institutions (cross-domain) can securely generate group session keys.
The invention realizes anonymous identity verification of patients based on disease matching: in order to establish a secure group key, all participating patients must be authenticated anonymously; the true identity of the patient cannot be revealed to other patients; all patients in the same cohort must have the same condition; plaintext information about the disease cannot be revealed during the authentication process.
The invention can support dynamic patient and cohort management: the system provides a time-controlled patient withdrawal mechanism. Based on the estimated treatment time, the system assigns the validity period of the key to each patient and embeds it implicitly in the patient's partial key. Once the validity time has elapsed, the user's key is automatically revoked. In addition, the group key management system allows patients to dynamically join or leave groups. When the group members change, the system generates a new group session key. The electronic medical social system provides a convenient way for patients to share treatment experience and communicate medical information. The patients of the system can be diagnosed and treated by different medical institutions, and the system allows a group of patients from different medical fields to generate a group session key, thereby establishing secure group communication. The system supports patient anonymity and traceability, hiding the patient's identity in an anonymous identity (pseudonym), only designated institutions can recover their true identity. Cross-domain group key protocol guarantees: authenticated patients from different medical institutions and having the same condition may generate a secure group key. The patient establishes secure group communication by using the key, thereby protecting the privacy information of the patient in the electronic medical social system. The system also supports dynamic group management, and when group members change, the system generates a new group session key.
The KGC establishment in S1 comprises the following steps:
s11 with safety parameter kappa ∈ Z+As input, the algorithm outputs security parameters and a system master public/private key pair;
s12: selecting prime numbers p, q of kappa bits and elliptic curve E/FqThe generated elliptic curve has a generator P;
s13: selecting
Figure BDA0001308876950000051
Figure BDA0001308876950000052
Representing the set 1,2, …, P-1, calculating PpubxP, the system master private key MSK x, and the master public key MPK (P, P)pub)；
S14: selecting a secure symmetric encryption/decryption pair SEnc/SDec with symmetric key space
Figure BDA0001308876950000053
And collusion resistant hash function
Figure BDA0001308876950000054
And
Figure BDA0001308876950000055
in one embodiment of the present invention, the elliptic curve is defined as follows: q is a prime number, FqIs a finite field, E/F, characterized by a prime numberqIs FqElliptic curve of (1) and defined as E/Fq＝{(x,y)|y2＝x3+ ax + bmod }; from FqWherein the elements a, b are randomly selected and △ -4 a is satisfied3+72b2Not equal to 0 modq. The elliptic curve group G includes E/FqThe upper point and a special point O, O is called the infinity point G { (x, y): x, y ∈ Fq,(x,y)∈E/FqU { O }; the addition operation on group G is defined as follows: let P, Q be two points on G, l be a straight line connecting the two points, l and an elliptic curve E/FqIntersecting with a third point R ', point R is the point of symmetry of R' about the x-axis, then R ═ P + Q, and the scalar multiplication on G is defined as:
Figure BDA0001308876950000056
in an embodiment of the present invention, S2 medical institution registration main flow chart is shown in fig. 3, which includes the following steps:
when in use
Figure BDA0001308876950000057
When applying for joining the system as the ith medical institution, it first registers with the KGC. KGC checks after receiving registration request
Figure BDA0001308876950000058
Whether it is a medical institution with relevant qualifications. If not, the KGC will reject the request. If so, KGC and
Figure BDA0001308876950000059
interaction generation
Figure BDA00013088769500000510
A public/private key pair. The key generation process is certificateless in order to avoid key escrow problems.
1. Setting a secret value: medical institution
Figure BDA00013088769500000511
(identity is
Figure BDA00013088769500000512
) Selecting random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000513
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000514
Figure BDA00013088769500000515
Will be provided with
Figure BDA00013088769500000516
As a secret value, will be transmitted over a secure channel
Figure BDA00013088769500000517
Sent to the KGC.
2. Partial key extraction: with the primary private key MSK of KGC,
Figure BDA00013088769500000518
of
Figure BDA00013088769500000519
And a common value
Figure BDA00013088769500000520
As input, algorithm output
Figure BDA00013088769500000521
The anonymous identity of (a) and a partial private key. KGC selects random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000522
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000523
The anonymous identity of (c):
Figure BDA00013088769500000524
KGC selects random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000525
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000526
KGC calculation
Figure BDA00013088769500000527
Partial keys over secure channels
Figure BDA00013088769500000528
Is sent to
Figure BDA00013088769500000529
Receive from
Figure BDA00013088769500000530
After, medical institution
Figure BDA00013088769500000531
Verification equation
Figure BDA0001308876950000061
Whether or not this is true. If the equation holds, the key
Figure BDA0001308876950000062
The method is effective; otherwise, this is not true.
3. Setting a private key: medical institution
Figure BDA0001308876950000063
Handle
Figure BDA0001308876950000064
As a private key and stored secretly.
4. Setting a public key: medical institution
Figure BDA0001308876950000065
Handle
Figure BDA0001308876950000066
As a public key and is disclosed in the system.
To be in medical institutions
Figure BDA0001308876950000067
Registration, patient
Figure BDA0001308876950000068
Firstly, firstly
Figure BDA0001308876950000069
And (6) checking. On the basis of the result of the diagnosis,
Figure BDA00013088769500000610
is aware of
Figure BDA00013088769500000611
Suffering from a disease state
Figure BDA00013088769500000612
Figure BDA00013088769500000613
And
Figure BDA00013088769500000614
interaction generation
Figure BDA00013088769500000615
A public/private key pair. The key generation process avoids the key escrow problem. Based on the predicted treatment time, the KGC determines the validity period of the user's public/private key pair
Figure BDA00013088769500000616
Settings are made, for example "20170501 vs 20171201". When the time exceeds
Figure BDA00013088769500000617
The patient's key automatically expires.
S3: the MI is responsible for diagnosis and treatment of a patient and generates a partial key of the patient, and the method specifically comprises the following steps:
1. setting a secret value: patient's health
Figure BDA00013088769500000618
(identity)
Figure BDA00013088769500000619
) Selecting random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000620
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000621
Then the
Figure BDA00013088769500000622
Handle
Figure BDA00013088769500000623
As a secret value and is held by a secure channel
Figure BDA00013088769500000624
Is sent to
Figure BDA00013088769500000625
2. Partial key extraction: to be provided with
Figure BDA00013088769500000626
Is a key of
Figure BDA00013088769500000627
Of
Figure BDA00013088769500000628
And public value
Figure BDA00013088769500000629
As input, algorithm output
Figure BDA00013088769500000630
Anonymous identity and partial key.
Figure BDA00013088769500000631
Selecting random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000632
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000633
The identity of (c):
Figure BDA00013088769500000634
·
Figure BDA00013088769500000635
selecting random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000636
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000637
Figure BDA00013088769500000638
·
Figure BDA00013088769500000639
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000640
Partial keys over secure channels
Figure BDA00013088769500000641
Is sent to
Figure BDA00013088769500000642
Upon receipt of
Figure BDA00013088769500000643
Then, the patient
Figure BDA00013088769500000644
Verification equation
Figure BDA00013088769500000645
Whether or not this is true. If the equation holds, the key
Figure BDA00013088769500000646
The method is effective; otherwise, this is not true.
3. Setting a private key: patient's health
Figure BDA00013088769500000647
Handle
Figure BDA00013088769500000648
As the private key, the private key is stored secretly.
4. Setting a public key: patient's health
Figure BDA00013088769500000649
Handle
Figure BDA00013088769500000650
As the public key, it is disclosed in the system.
S4 group key agreement, the main flowchart is shown in fig. 4, which includes the following steps:
suppose a patient
Figure BDA00013088769500000651
And
Figure BDA00013088769500000652
to establish a secure, disorder-based group communication to ensure the security of the disease discussion-related information, they first need to generate a group session key. Suppose that
Figure BDA00013088769500000653
Is a patient with strong computing power, U0The middle patients are less computationally powerful. The interaction of the group key protocol is performed as follows.
And (1).
Figure BDA00013088769500000654
Sending
Figure BDA00013088769500000655
For U0，
Figure BDA00013088769500000656
Sending
Figure BDA00013088769500000657
To give
Figure BDA00013088769500000658
Receiving information
Figure BDA0001308876950000071
After that, the air conditioner is started to work,
Figure BDA0001308876950000072
selecting random numbers
Figure BDA0001308876950000073
And calculate
Figure BDA0001308876950000074
Figure BDA0001308876950000075
Figure BDA0001308876950000076
Wherein
Figure BDA0001308876950000077
Figure BDA0001308876950000078
Figure BDA0001308876950000079
Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure BDA00013088769500000710
handle
Figure BDA00013088769500000711
Is sent to
Figure BDA00013088769500000712
Wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n.
Step 2. from other patients
Figure BDA00013088769500000713
Is received by
Figure BDA00013088769500000714
Then, the patient
Figure BDA00013088769500000715
Verification equation
Figure BDA00013088769500000716
Is established, wherein
Figure BDA00013088769500000717
Figure BDA00013088769500000718
Figure BDA00013088769500000719
If the equation holds, then ensure
Figure BDA00013088769500000720
Has been authenticated, and
Figure BDA00013088769500000721
and
Figure BDA00013088769500000722
suffer from the same conditions. Assume a validated set of patients as
Figure BDA00013088769500000723
Figure BDA00013088769500000724
Is provided with
Figure BDA00013088769500000725
Then the
Figure BDA00013088769500000726
Selecting random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000727
And calculate
Figure BDA00013088769500000728
Figure BDA00013088769500000729
Figure BDA00013088769500000730
Figure BDA00013088769500000731
Figure BDA00013088769500000732
Figure BDA00013088769500000733
Figure BDA0001308876950000081
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0001308876950000082
Figure BDA0001308876950000083
then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure BDA0001308876950000084
handle
Figure BDA0001308876950000085
Is sent to
Figure BDA0001308876950000086
Step 3. receive
Figure BDA0001308876950000087
Coming from
Figure BDA0001308876950000088
Then, each patient
Figure BDA0001308876950000089
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000810
Wherein
Figure BDA00013088769500000811
Figure BDA00013088769500000812
If Authi,0＝Auth0,iThen ensure
Figure BDA00013088769500000813
Has been authenticated, and
Figure BDA00013088769500000814
and
Figure BDA00013088769500000815
suffer from the same conditions. Then the
Figure BDA00013088769500000816
Computing session keys
Figure BDA00013088769500000817
A new patient joins the cohort comprising the steps of:
assume a set of patients with a low computational power U0'＝{PTn+1,...,PTmTo join a group, the group members generate a new session key as follows.
Step 1. the patient
Figure BDA00013088769500000818
Sending
Figure BDA00013088769500000819
For U0'，
Figure BDA00013088769500000820
Will be provided with
Figure BDA00013088769500000821
Is sent to
Figure BDA00013088769500000822
Receive from
Figure BDA00013088769500000823
Then, the patient
Figure BDA00013088769500000824
Selecting
Figure BDA00013088769500000825
And calculate
Figure BDA00013088769500000826
Then sends it to
Figure BDA00013088769500000827
Step 2. receiving the patient
Figure BDA00013088769500000828
Coming from
Figure BDA00013088769500000829
After that, the air conditioner is started to work,
Figure BDA00013088769500000830
authentication according to methods in group key agreement
Figure BDA00013088769500000831
Assuming that these patients are both authenticated and have the same condition,
Figure BDA00013088769500000832
order to
Figure BDA00013088769500000833
Figure BDA00013088769500000834
Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure BDA00013088769500000835
selecting random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000836
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000837
Figure BDA00013088769500000838
Figure BDA00013088769500000839
Figure BDA0001308876950000091
Figure BDA0001308876950000092
Figure BDA0001308876950000093
Figure BDA0001308876950000094
Wherein
Figure BDA0001308876950000095
Figure BDA0001308876950000096
Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure BDA0001308876950000097
handle
Figure BDA0001308876950000098
Is sent to
Figure BDA0001308876950000099
Step 3. receiving the patient
Figure BDA00013088769500000910
Coming from
Figure BDA00013088769500000911
Then, each patient
Figure BDA00013088769500000912
Computing
Figure BDA00013088769500000913
Wherein
Figure BDA00013088769500000914
Figure BDA00013088769500000915
If Auth'i,0＝Auth'0,iThen ensure
Figure BDA00013088769500000916
Has been authenticated, and
Figure BDA00013088769500000917
and
Figure BDA00013088769500000918
suffer from the same conditions. Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure BDA00013088769500000919
computing session keys
Figure BDA00013088769500000920
The patient exit from the cohort includes the following steps:
assume a set of patients with a low computational power U0”＝{PTj+1,...,PTnWanting to leave, the group members generate a new session key as follows.
Figure BDA00013088769500000921
Order to
Figure BDA00013088769500000922
Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure BDA00013088769500000923
selecting random numbers
Figure BDA00013088769500000924
And calculate
Figure BDA00013088769500000925
Figure BDA00013088769500000926
Figure BDA00013088769500000927
Figure BDA00013088769500000928
Figure BDA00013088769500000929
Figure BDA0001308876950000101
Figure BDA0001308876950000102
Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure BDA0001308876950000103
handle
Figure BDA0001308876950000104
Is sent to
Figure BDA0001308876950000105
Receive from
Figure BDA0001308876950000106
Coming from
Figure BDA0001308876950000107
Then, each patient
Figure BDA0001308876950000108
Computing
Figure BDA0001308876950000109
Wherein
Figure BDA00013088769500001010
Figure BDA00013088769500001011
If Auth'i,0＝Auth”0,iThen, then
Figure BDA00013088769500001012
Calculating a session key:
Figure BDA00013088769500001013
the above are preferred embodiments of the present invention, and all changes made according to the technical scheme of the present invention that produce functional effects do not exceed the scope of the technical scheme of the present invention belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (6)

1. A cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method based on diseases is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1: establishing a key generation center KGC;
s2: the KGC firstly checks whether the MI of the medical institution has relevant medical qualification, and then generates a partial key for the MI;
s3: MI is responsible for diagnosis and treatment of the patient and generates a partial key for the patient;
s4: patients from different medical institutions securely generate a group session key;
s2 includes the following steps:
s21: is provided with
Figure FDA0002538638110000011
Is the ith medical institution when
Figure FDA0002538638110000012
When the system is applied to join the system as the ith medical institution, registering the system with the KGC; KGC checks after receiving registration request
Figure FDA0002538638110000013
If not, the KGC will reject the request, if so, go to step S22;
s22: medical institution
Figure FDA0002538638110000014
Its identity is
Figure FDA0002538638110000015
Selecting random numbers
Figure FDA0002538638110000016
Calculating a common value
Figure FDA0002538638110000017
Figure FDA0002538638110000018
Will be provided with
Figure FDA0002538638110000019
As a secret value, will be transmitted over a secure channel
Figure FDA00025386381100000110
Sending to KGC; p is a generator;
s23: with the primary private key MSK of KGC,
Figure FDA00025386381100000111
of
Figure FDA00025386381100000112
And a common value
Figure FDA00025386381100000113
As input, algorithm output
Figure FDA00025386381100000114
The KGC selects a random number
Figure FDA00025386381100000115
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000116
The anonymous identity of (c):
Figure FDA00025386381100000117
KGC selects random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000118
Calculating parameters
Figure FDA00025386381100000119
And parameters
Figure FDA00025386381100000120
KGC calculation
Figure FDA00025386381100000121
Partial keys over secure channels
Figure FDA00025386381100000122
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000123
Receive from
Figure FDA00025386381100000124
After, medical institution
Figure FDA00025386381100000125
Verification equation
Figure FDA00025386381100000126
If true, if the equation is true, then the key
Figure FDA00025386381100000127
The method is effective; otherwise, the method is not true;
s24: setting a private key: medical institution
Figure FDA00025386381100000128
Handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000129
As private key and stored secretly;
s25: setting a public key: medical institution
Figure FDA00025386381100000130
Handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000131
As a public key and is disclosed in the system;
s3 includes the steps of:
s31: setting a secret value: patient's health
Figure FDA00025386381100000132
Its identity is
Figure FDA00025386381100000133
Selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000134
Calculating parameters
Figure FDA00025386381100000135
Then the
Figure FDA00025386381100000136
Handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000137
As a secret value and is held by a secure channel
Figure FDA00025386381100000138
To the ith medical institution
Figure FDA00025386381100000139
P is a generator;
s32: partial key extraction: to be provided with
Figure FDA00025386381100000140
Is a key of
Figure FDA00025386381100000141
Figure FDA00025386381100000142
Of
Figure FDA00025386381100000143
And public value
Figure FDA00025386381100000144
As input, algorithm output
Figure FDA00025386381100000145
Anonymous identity ofAnd a partial key,
Figure FDA00025386381100000146
selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000147
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000148
The anonymous identity of (c):
Figure FDA00025386381100000149
Figure FDA00025386381100000150
selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000151
VT is the effective period, SP is the symptom set, calculate
Figure FDA00025386381100000152
Figure FDA00025386381100000153
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000154
Partial keys over secure channels
Figure FDA00025386381100000155
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000156
Is receiving
Figure FDA00025386381100000157
Then, the patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000158
Verification equation
Figure FDA00025386381100000159
If true, the key is generated if the equation is true
Figure FDA00025386381100000160
The method is effective; otherwise, the method is not true;
s33, setting a private key: patient's health
Figure FDA0002538638110000021
Handle
Figure FDA0002538638110000022
As a private key, the private key is stored secretly;
s34: setting a public key: patient's health
Figure FDA0002538638110000023
Handle
Figure FDA0002538638110000024
As a public key, published in the system;
s4 group key negotiation, which includes the steps of:
when the patient is suffering from
Figure FDA0002538638110000025
And
Figure FDA0002538638110000026
to establish a disorder-based secure group communication, a group session key needs to be generated; wherein
Figure FDA0002538638110000027
Is a patient with strong computing power, U0The middle patient is less computationally powerful; the interaction of the group key protocol is performed as follows;
and (1).
Figure FDA0002538638110000028
Sending
Figure FDA0002538638110000029
For U0，
Figure FDA00025386381100000210
Sending
Figure FDA00025386381100000211
To give
Figure FDA00025386381100000212
Receiving information
Figure FDA00025386381100000213
After that, the air conditioner is started to work,
Figure FDA00025386381100000214
selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000215
And calculate
Figure FDA00025386381100000216
Figure FDA00025386381100000217
Figure FDA00025386381100000218
Wherein
Figure FDA00025386381100000219
Figure FDA00025386381100000220
Figure FDA00025386381100000221
Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure FDA00025386381100000222
handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000223
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000224
Wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n;
step 2. from other patients
Figure FDA00025386381100000225
Is received by
Figure FDA00025386381100000226
Then, the patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000227
Verification equation
Figure FDA00025386381100000228
Is established, wherein
Figure FDA00025386381100000229
Figure FDA00025386381100000230
Figure FDA00025386381100000231
If equationIf it is, ensure
Figure FDA00025386381100000232
Has been authenticated, and
Figure FDA00025386381100000233
and
Figure FDA00025386381100000234
suffer from the same conditions; if the verified patient set is
Figure FDA00025386381100000235
Figure FDA00025386381100000236
Is provided with
Figure FDA00025386381100000237
Then the
Figure FDA00025386381100000238
Selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000239
And calculate
Figure FDA0002538638110000031
Figure FDA0002538638110000032
Figure FDA0002538638110000033
Figure FDA0002538638110000034
Figure FDA0002538638110000035
Figure FDA0002538638110000036
Figure FDA0002538638110000037
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002538638110000038
Figure FDA0002538638110000039
then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure FDA00025386381100000310
handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000311
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000312
Step 3. receive
Figure FDA00025386381100000313
Coming from
Figure FDA00025386381100000314
Then, each patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000315
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000316
Wherein
Figure FDA00025386381100000317
Figure FDA00025386381100000318
If Authi,0＝Auth0,iThen ensure
Figure FDA00025386381100000319
Has been authenticated, and
Figure FDA00025386381100000320
and
Figure FDA00025386381100000321
suffering from the same condition, then
Figure FDA00025386381100000322
Computing session keys
Figure FDA00025386381100000323
S1 includes the steps of:
s11 with safety parameter kappa ∈ Z+As input, outputting security parameters and a system master public/private key pair;
s12: selecting prime numbers p, q of kappa bits and elliptic curve E/FqThe generated elliptic curve has a generator P;
s13: selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000324
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA00025386381100000325
representing a set {1,2, L, P-1}, calculating a public parameter PpubSystem master private key MSKX, the master public key MPK (P, P)pub)；
S14: selecting secure symmetric encryption/decryption pairs SEnc/SDec with symmetric key space K and collusion resistant hash function H0{0,1 }. → K and Hi:
Figure FDA00025386381100000326
S15: KGC issues common parameters (SEnc, SDec, H)0，H1，...，H6) And the master public key MPK, and the master private key MSK is secretly stored by the KGC.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: the elliptic curve in S12 is defined as follows: q is a prime number, FqIs a finite field, E/F, characterized by a prime numberqIs FqElliptic curve of (1) and defined as E/Fq＝{(x,y)|y2＝x3+ ax + bmod }; from FqWherein the elements a, b are randomly selected and Δ ═ 4a is satisfied3+72b2Not equal to 0 modq; the elliptic curve group G includes E/FqThe upper point and a special point O, O is called the infinity point G { (x, y): x, y ∈ Fq,(x,y)∈E/Fq∪ { O }, wherein the addition of the group G is defined as if P, Q are two points on G, l is a straight line connecting the two points, l and an elliptic curve E/FqIntersecting with a third point R ', point R is the point of symmetry of R' about the x-axis, then R ═ P + Q, and the scalar multiplication on G is defined as:
Figure FDA0002538638110000041
3. the method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: in order to at the ith medical institution
Figure FDA0002538638110000042
Registration, patient
Figure FDA0002538638110000043
Firstly, firstly
Figure FDA0002538638110000044
Carrying out inspection; on the basis of the result of the diagnosis,
Figure FDA0002538638110000045
is aware of
Figure FDA0002538638110000046
Suffering from a disease state
Figure FDA0002538638110000047
Figure FDA0002538638110000048
And
Figure FDA0002538638110000049
interaction generation
Figure FDA00025386381100000410
A public/private key pair of; based on the predicted treatment time, the KGC determines the validity period of the user's public/private key pair
Figure FDA00025386381100000411
Make settings when time exceeds
Figure FDA00025386381100000412
The patient's key automatically expires; wherein SP ═ S (SP)1,SP2,..) is a collection of disorders.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: when a group of patients with low computing power is collected
Figure FDA00025386381100000413
When a group member wants to join the group, the group member generates a new session key according to the following steps:
s51: patient's health
Figure FDA00025386381100000414
Sending
Figure FDA00025386381100000415
For U', the patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000416
Will be provided with
Figure FDA00025386381100000417
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000418
Receive from
Figure FDA00025386381100000419
Then, the patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000420
Selecting
Figure FDA00025386381100000421
And calculate
Figure FDA00025386381100000422
Then sends it to
Figure FDA00025386381100000423
S52: receiving the patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000424
Coming from
Figure FDA00025386381100000425
After that, the air conditioner is started to work,
Figure FDA00025386381100000426
authentication according to methods in group key agreement
Figure FDA00025386381100000427
When these patients are both authenticated and have the same condition, order
Figure FDA00025386381100000428
Figure FDA00025386381100000429
S53：
Figure FDA00025386381100000430
Selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000431
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000432
Figure FDA00025386381100000433
Figure FDA00025386381100000434
Figure FDA00025386381100000435
Figure FDA00025386381100000436
Figure FDA0002538638110000051
Figure FDA0002538638110000052
Wherein
Figure FDA0002538638110000053
Figure FDA0002538638110000054
Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure FDA0002538638110000055
handle
Figure FDA0002538638110000056
Is sent to
Figure FDA0002538638110000057
S54: receiving the patient
Figure FDA0002538638110000058
Coming from
Figure FDA0002538638110000059
Then, each patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000510
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000511
Wherein
Figure FDA00025386381100000512
Figure FDA00025386381100000513
If Auth'i,0＝Auth'0,iThen ensure
Figure FDA00025386381100000514
Has been authenticated, and
Figure FDA00025386381100000515
and
Figure FDA00025386381100000516
(ii) suffer from the same;
S55：
Figure FDA00025386381100000517
computing session keys
Figure FDA00025386381100000518
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises: when a group of patients with low computing power is collected U0”＝{PTj+1,...,PTnWhen wanting to leave, the group members generate a new session key as follows:
S61：
Figure FDA00025386381100000519
order to
Figure FDA00025386381100000520
S62：
Figure FDA00025386381100000521
Selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000522
And calculating:
Figure FDA00025386381100000523
Figure FDA00025386381100000524
Figure FDA00025386381100000525
Figure FDA00025386381100000526
Figure FDA00025386381100000527
Figure FDA00025386381100000528
Figure FDA00025386381100000529
S63：
Figure FDA00025386381100000530
handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000531
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000532
Receive from
Figure FDA00025386381100000533
Coming from
Figure FDA00025386381100000534
Then, each patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000535
Computing
Figure FDA0002538638110000061
Wherein
Figure FDA0002538638110000062
Figure FDA0002538638110000063
If Auth'i,0＝Auth”0,iThen, then
Figure FDA0002538638110000064
Calculating a session key:
Figure FDA0002538638110000065
6. the system for managing the cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key based on the diseases is characterized in that: the key generation center KGC is responsible for generating a main public key/private key pair, is trusted by all entities and generates a part of public key/private key pairs for a registered medical institution, so that the problem of key escrow is avoided;
a medical institution MI which needs to be registered with the KGC; the medical institution selects the secret value and generates public information of the secret value; in order to obtain a part of public key/private key pairs, the MI submits the generated public information to the KGC; the MI is responsible for managing and diagnosing patients within its medical field and generating partial public/private key pairs for the patients, thereby avoiding key escrow problems;
and a patient PT, the patient PT registering with the medical institution, the patient selecting the secret value and generating public information of the secret value, the PT submitting the public information corresponding to the secret value to the MI in order to obtain part of public key/private key pairs;
the MI is responsible for diagnosis and treatment of a patient and generates a partial key of the patient, and the method specifically comprises the following steps:
1. setting a secret value: patient's health
Figure FDA0002538638110000066
Its identity is
Figure FDA0002538638110000067
Selecting random numbers
Figure FDA0002538638110000068
Computing
Figure FDA0002538638110000069
Then the
Figure FDA00025386381100000610
Handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000611
As a secret value and is held by a secure channel
Figure FDA00025386381100000612
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000613
2. Partial key extraction: to be provided with
Figure FDA00025386381100000614
Is a key of
Figure FDA00025386381100000615
Figure FDA00025386381100000616
Of
Figure FDA00025386381100000617
And public value
Figure FDA00025386381100000618
As input, algorithm output
Figure FDA00025386381100000619
An anonymous identity and a partial key;
Figure FDA00025386381100000620
selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000621
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000622
The identity of (c):
Figure FDA00025386381100000623
·
Figure FDA00025386381100000624
selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000625
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000626
·
Figure FDA00025386381100000627
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000628
Partial keys over secure channels
Figure FDA00025386381100000629
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000630
Upon receipt of
Figure FDA00025386381100000631
Then, the patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000632
Verification equation
Figure FDA00025386381100000633
Whether the result is true or not; if the equation holds, the key
Figure FDA00025386381100000634
The method is effective; otherwise, the method is not true;
3. setting a private key: patient's health
Figure FDA00025386381100000635
Handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000636
As a private key, the private key is stored secretly;
4. setting a public key: patient's health
Figure FDA00025386381100000637
Handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000638
As a public key, published in the system;
group key negotiation, the main flow comprises the following steps:
when the patient is suffering from
Figure FDA00025386381100000639
And
Figure FDA00025386381100000640
to establish a secure, disorder-based group communication to ensure the security of the disease discussion-related information, they first need to generate a group session key; if it is
Figure FDA0002538638110000071
Is a patient with strong computing power, U0The middle patient is less computationally powerful; the interaction of the group key protocol is performed as follows;
and (1).
Figure FDA0002538638110000072
Sending
Figure FDA0002538638110000073
For U0，
Figure FDA0002538638110000074
Sending
Figure FDA0002538638110000075
To give
Figure FDA0002538638110000076
Receiving information
Figure FDA0002538638110000077
After that, the air conditioner is started to work,
Figure FDA0002538638110000078
selecting random numbers
Figure FDA0002538638110000079
And calculate
Figure FDA00025386381100000710
Figure FDA00025386381100000711
Figure FDA00025386381100000712
Wherein
Figure FDA00025386381100000713
Figure FDA00025386381100000714
Figure FDA00025386381100000715
Then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure FDA00025386381100000716
handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000717
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000718
Wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n;
step 2. from other patients
Figure FDA00025386381100000719
Is received by
Figure FDA00025386381100000720
Then, the patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000721
Verification equation
Figure FDA00025386381100000722
Is established, wherein
Figure FDA00025386381100000723
Figure FDA00025386381100000724
Figure FDA00025386381100000725
If the equation holds, then ensure
Figure FDA00025386381100000726
Has been authenticated, and
Figure FDA00025386381100000727
and
Figure FDA00025386381100000728
if the patients with the same disease are proved to be in the group
Figure FDA00025386381100000729
Figure FDA00025386381100000730
Is provided with
Figure FDA00025386381100000731
Then the
Figure FDA00025386381100000732
Selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000733
And calculate
Figure FDA00025386381100000734
Figure FDA00025386381100000735
Figure FDA00025386381100000736
Figure FDA0002538638110000081
Figure FDA0002538638110000082
Figure FDA0002538638110000083
Figure FDA0002538638110000084
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002538638110000085
Figure FDA0002538638110000086
then, the user can use the device to perform the operation,
Figure FDA0002538638110000087
handle
Figure FDA0002538638110000088
Is sent to
Figure FDA0002538638110000089
Step 3. receive
Figure FDA00025386381100000810
Coming from
Figure FDA00025386381100000811
Then, each patient
Figure FDA00025386381100000812
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000813
Wherein
Figure FDA00025386381100000814
Figure FDA00025386381100000815
If Authi,0＝Auth0,iThen ensure
Figure FDA00025386381100000816
Has been authenticated, and
Figure FDA00025386381100000817
and
Figure FDA00025386381100000818
suffer from the same conditions; then the
Figure FDA00025386381100000819
Computing session keys
Figure FDA00025386381100000820
S2 the medical institution registration main flow includes the following steps:
using the following steps in a disorder-based cross-domain dynamic anonymous authentication group key management method as claimed in claim 1
S11 with safety parameter kappa ∈ Z+As input, outputting security parameters and a system master public/private key pair;
s12: selecting prime numbers p, q of kappa bits and elliptic curve E/FqThe generated elliptic curve has a generator P;
s13: selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000821
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA00025386381100000822
representing a set {1,2, L, P-1}, calculating a public parameter PpubxP, the system master private key MSK x, and the master public key MPK (P, P)pub)；
S14: selecting secure symmetric encryption/decryption pairs SEnc/SDec with symmetric key space K and collusion resistant hash function H0{0,1 }. → K and Hi:
Figure FDA00025386381100000823
S15: KGC issues common parameters (SEnc, SDec, H)0，H1，...，H6) And a master public key MPK, the master private key MSK is stored by KGC secret
When in use
Figure FDA00025386381100000824
When the system is applied to join as the ith medical institution, the system is registered with the KGC firstly; KGC checks after receiving registration request
Figure FDA00025386381100000825
Whether it is a medical institution with relevant qualifications; if not, the KGC will reject the request; if so, KGC and
Figure FDA00025386381100000826
interaction generation
Figure FDA00025386381100000827
A public/private key pair of; the key generation process is certificateless;
1. setting a secret value: medical institution
Figure FDA00025386381100000828
Its identity is
Figure FDA00025386381100000829
Selecting random numbers
Figure FDA00025386381100000830
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000831
Figure FDA00025386381100000832
Will be provided with
Figure FDA00025386381100000833
As a secret value, will be transmitted over a secure channel
Figure FDA0002538638110000091
Sending to KGC;
2. partial key extraction: with the primary private key MSK of KGC,
Figure FDA0002538638110000092
of
Figure FDA0002538638110000093
And a common value
Figure FDA0002538638110000094
As input, algorithm output
Figure FDA0002538638110000095
An anonymous identity of and a partial private key; KGC selects random numbers
Figure FDA0002538638110000096
Computing
Figure FDA0002538638110000097
The anonymous identity of (c):
Figure FDA0002538638110000098
KGC selects random numbers
Figure FDA0002538638110000099
Computing
Figure FDA00025386381100000910
KGC calculation
Figure FDA00025386381100000911
Partial keys over secure channels
Figure FDA00025386381100000912
Is sent to
Figure FDA00025386381100000913
Receive from
Figure FDA00025386381100000914
After, medical institution
Figure FDA00025386381100000915
Verification equation
Figure FDA00025386381100000916
Whether the result is true or not; if the equation holds, the key
Figure FDA00025386381100000917
The method is effective;otherwise, the method is not true;
3. setting a private key: medical institution
Figure FDA00025386381100000918
Handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000919
As private key and stored secretly;
4. setting a public key: medical institution
Figure FDA00025386381100000920
Handle
Figure FDA00025386381100000921
As a public key and is disclosed in the system.
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