CN107947913A - The anonymous authentication method and system of a kind of identity-based - Google Patents

The anonymous authentication method and system of a kind of identity-based Download PDF

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Publication number
CN107947913A
CN107947913A CN201711132811.7A CN201711132811A CN107947913A CN 107947913 A CN107947913 A CN 107947913A CN 201711132811 A CN201711132811 A CN 201711132811A CN 107947913 A CN107947913 A CN 107947913A
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private key
calculate
key
authentication
user
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CN107947913B (en
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何德彪
王婧
冯琦
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Wuhan University WHU
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Wuhan University WHU
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0847—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving identity based encryption [IBE] schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC

Abstract

The present invention relates to the anonymous authentication method and system of a kind of identity-based, including：Server generates two part private keys and is sent respectively to participate in the both sides P of certification1And P2。P1And P2Primary authentication code is generated in verification processAnd R, and ensure P with zero-knowledge proof1And P2Between interactive information privacy and reliability.P1After obtaining primary authentication code, dummy address A is calculatedID, generate the 3rd temporary public key R3, final authentication code α is calculated, by authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and server is sent to, authentication verification information is fed back to user by server again, and after successfully completing three-way handshake, secure communication can be established between server and user.The present invention is suitable for completing the Distributed Anonymous certification of identity-based jointly in the case where two sides do not reveal respective partial authentication private key, and holding the both sides of part private key must simultaneously participate in, and need not recover complete certification private key.

Description

The anonymous authentication method and system of a kind of identity-based
Technical field
The invention belongs to information security field, the authentication method and system of identity are based particularly on.
Background technology
Anonymous authentication agreement is the important component of secure communication of network.By performing anonymous authentication agreement, two ginsengs It can be mutually authenticated on the common channels between person, and consult a session key, so that the safety realized in open network is led to Letter.In the anonymous agreement based on conventional public-key cipher authentication, communicating pair possesses a pair of public and private key：Public key and private key, wherein Private key is used to generate authentication information, and public key carrys out the legitimacy of checking information.Recognize to solve the anonymity based on conventional public-key password Demonstrate,prove there are certificate management difficult problem in agreement, the anonymous authentication that scientific research personnel proposes identity-based using the thought of public key is assisted View.In this agreement, the identity (name, ID card No., e-mail address etc.) of user is exactly the public key of user, significantly Reduce system legal person's complexity.
Private key is the most secret information of cryptographic system, is the basis of secure communication, and the degree of safety of private key, which directly determines, is The level of security of system.In order to strengthen the security of private key, security risk caused by single-point key loss is avoided, generally use is secret Shared/threshold technique designs effective key managing project.Private key is divided into multiple shares by this method, and is distributed to more In a user or equipment so that private key can just be reconstructed by only obtaining the user of enough shares, and less than threshold number Share can not then reconstruct private key.However, when recovering private key, the user for taking complete private key can be in the unwitting feelings of its other party Illegal certification is carried out under condition, threatens the rights and interests of other users and the safety of system.
For such case, the present invention devises a kind of two side's Distributed Anonymous certificate schemes of identity-based, Yong Huke Authentication information is generated in a distributed manner between both devices to realize, must be selected by authenticating party two of the authentication information are credible Equipment participates in completing jointly, and need not recover complete certification private key in the generating process of authentication information, ensure that private The security of key.
The content of the invention
The two part private keys of oneself are revealed when different it is an object of the invention to the side of being certified, and need not have been obtained In the case of whole certification private key, the identifiable information of identity-based can be generated jointly by two part private keys.
For the purpose of the present invention, the present invention proposes the authenticating party of two side's distributed informations generation of an identity-based Case, is given below specific descriptions.
A kind of anonymous authentication method of identity-based, it is characterised in that including：
Key distributing step：A random big integer for meeting security parameter is produced as main private key s, and is calculated corresponding Public key Ppub=sP, main private key secret preserve, and public key publishes, and wherein P is a basic point of circled addition point group, the point group Rank be prime number q；Then a certification private key D is generatedID=h (s, ID) P, and a random number rIDIt is allowed to meet By partial authentication keySend P1, It is sent to P2。
Distributed authentication step：Participate in the both sides P of certification1And P2, a random number r is generated respectively1And r2。P1Calculate first R1=r1P, r is encrypted using homomorphic cryptography method1Obtain C1, then send C1And R1To P2。P2Calculate R2=r2P, while P2Pass through The property of homomorphic cryptography, can calculateCiphertext C2, and by this ciphertext C2And R2It is sent to P1。P1Solution Close C2, and utilize the partial authentication key of oneselfPrimary authentication code r is calculated1r2DIDMod q and R, use xor operation Dummy address A is calculated with hash algorithmID, generate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P, final authentication code is generated with hash algorithm Then by authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and server is sent to, server is recognized verification Card information feeds back to user again, and after successfully completing three-way handshake, secure communication can be established between server and user.
In a kind of anonymous authentication method of above-mentioned identity-based, the key distributing step specifically includes：
Step 2.1, produce a random big integer for meeting security parameter as main private key s, and calculates corresponding public key Ppub=sP, main private key secret preserve, and public key publishes, and wherein P is a basic point of circled addition point group, the order of a group For prime number q；
Step 2.2, calculate private key for user DID=h (s, ID) P, wherein h (ID) represent the cryptographic Hash of user identity ID；
One step 2.3, generation random number rID, calculate Part I private keyAnd Part II is private KeyWherein
Step 2.4, a pair of of the public private key pair (pk, sk) for generating homomorphic encryption algorithm；WillIt is sent to One participant P1, willIt is sent to the second participant P2；
In a kind of anonymous authentication method of above-mentioned identity-based, the distributed authentication step specifically includes：
Step 3.1, P1Generate first random number r1, calculate first temporary public key R1=r1P, is calculated using homomorphic cryptography The public key pk of method is to r1Encrypt, i.e. first ciphertext C1=Encpk(r1)。P1(R1, C1) it is sent to P2。
Step 3.2, P2Generate second random number r2, calculate second temporary public key R2=r2P, calculates second ciphertextWherein ρ is random number.P2(R2, C2) it is sent to P1。
Step 3.3, P1Decrypted using the private key of homomorphic encryption algorithm, calculate C2PlaintextPrimary authentication codeTarget temporary public key R=r1R2。P1Generate the 3rd random number r3, Calculate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P and dummy address AID=ID^h (R3, r3Ppub) and final authentication codeWherein T is current time stamp.P1By authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and it is sent to server.
After step 3.4, server receive authentication information, R '=sR is calculated with its private key3, user's true address ID=AID ^h(R3, R ') and primary authentication codeCalculate final authentication codeJudge to calculate Whether authentication code α out is equal with the α that user sends over, the termination protocol if unequal, if equal calculate (β, T ') is sent to user, wherein T ' is current time stamp.
Step 3.5, P1CalculateJudge the value whether with the β that receives, if equal, Communication connection is then established, otherwise terminates this communication.
A kind of anonymous authentication system of identity-based, it is characterised in that including：
Server：For user first to server registration, server provides certification private key to the user, and server produces one completely The random big integer of sufficient security parameter calculates corresponding public key P as main private key spub=sP, main private key secret preserve, public key Publish, wherein G is a basic point of circled addition point group, which is prime number q；Server generates one for user Certification private key DID=h (s, ID) P, and a random number meet
Cipher key distribution unit：For by part private keySend P1, It is sent to P2。
Distributed authentication unit：Participate in the both sides P of certification1And P2, one is generated respectively at random by distributed authentication unit Number r1And r2。P1R is calculated first1=r1P, r is encrypted using homomorphic cryptography method1Obtain C1, then send C1And R1To P2。P2Calculate R2=r2P, while P2By the property of homomorphic cryptography, can calculateCiphertext C2, and by this ciphertext C2 And R2It is sent to P1。P1Decrypt C2, and utilize the part private key of oneselfPrimary authentication code r is calculated1r2DIDMod q and R, dummy address A is calculated with xor operation and hash algorithmID, generate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P, is generated with hash algorithm Final authentication codeBy authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and server is sent to, server will be verified Feed back to user again to authentication information, after successfully completing three-way handshake, secure communication can be established between server and user.
In the method that a kind of anonymous authentication method of above-mentioned identity-based, the cipher key distribution unit carry out key distribution Specifically include：
Step 2.1, produce a random big integer for meeting security parameter as main private key s, and calculates corresponding public key Ppub=sP, main private key secret preserve, and public key publishes, and wherein G is a basic point of circled addition point group, the order of a group For prime number q；
Step 2.2, calculate private key for user DID=h (s, ID) P, wherein h (ID) represent the cryptographic Hash of user identity ID；
One step 2.3, generation random number rID, calculate Part I private keyAnd Part II is private KeyWherein
Step 2.4, a pair of of the public private key pair (pk, sk) for generating homomorphic encryption algorithm；WillIt is sent to One participant P1, willIt is sent to the second participant P2；
In a kind of anonymous authentication method of above-mentioned identity-based, the distributed authentication unit carries out distributed authentication Method specifically includes：
Step 3.1, P1Generate first random number r1, calculate first temporary public key R1=r1P, is calculated using homomorphic cryptography The public key pk of method is to r1Encrypt, i.e. first ciphertext C1=Encpk(r1)。P1(R1, C1) it is sent to P2。
Step 3.2, P2Generate second random number r2, calculate second temporary public key R2=r2P, calculates second ciphertextWherein ρ is random number.P2(R2, C2) it is sent to P1。
Step 3.3, P1Decrypted using the private key of homomorphic encryption algorithm, calculate C2PlaintextPrimary authentication codeTarget temporary public key R=r1R2。P1Generate the 3rd random number r3, Calculate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P and dummy address AID=ID^h (R3, r3Ppub) and final authentication codeWherein T is current time stamp, symbol " ^ " represents xor operation.P1By authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) it is sent to server.
After step 3.4, server receive authentication information, R '=sR is calculated with its private key3, user's true address ID=AID ^h(R3, R ') and primary authentication codeSo as to calculate final authentication codeSentence Whether the authentication code α calculated that breaks is equal with the α that user sends over, the termination protocol if unequal, if equal Calculate(β, T ') is sent to user, wherein T ' is current time stamp.Step 3.5, P1CalculateJudge the value whether with the β that receives, if equal, establish communication connection, otherwise eventually Only this communicates.
The present invention has the following advantages that compared with prior art and beneficial effect：1st, the security on certification private key, mesh Preceding existing threshold secret sharing scheme, although can be split certification private key, in authentication phase, private key can be resumed And grasped by one party, the leakage of private key for user is caused, so reduces the security of certification.2nd, the justice on certification Property, current existing threshold secret sharing scheme, finally holding a side of full authentication private key can independently carry out with server Certification, it is not necessary to which whole participants are participated in jointly, so reduce the fairness of certification.3rd, the present invention realizes identity-based Distributed cipher key consults and certification, ensures that both sides expose portion certification private key and will not need not recover original private in verification process Key, while verification process must simultaneously participate in by both party, be achieved in that the security and fairness of certification.4th, the present invention is based on Difficult math question, even if ensureing to have the certification private key of a side to lose, the partial authentication private key quilt that an other side will not be caused to hold Leakage, will not more reveal complete certification private key.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is two side's identifying procedure figure of key in the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the generation of part (son) key and anonymous authentication flow chart in the present invention.
Fig. 3 is communication party in the present invention (server and user) identifying procedure figure.
Specific implementation method
The present invention is described in detail with reference to example, embodiments below only represents that the present invention is a kind of possible Embodiment, is not all of possible embodiment, not as a limitation of the invention.
In the following description of this invention, the side of being certified is referred to as user, authenticating party abbreviation server.Two integer phases Multiply (or integer symbol be multiplied), do not produce it is ambiguous in the case of, omit multiplication sign " ", such as ab is reduced to ab.mod n Represent mould n computings, the priority of mould n computings is minimum, such as a+b mod n are equal to (a+b) mod n, ab mod and are equal In (ab) mod n." ≡ " represents congruence expression, i.e. a ≡ b modn are equal to a mod n=b mod n.Gcd (a, b) represents to ask whole Number a, the greatest common factor (G.C.F.) of b, if gcd (a, b)=1 represents a, b is coprime.
For the present invention, key by server to being generated, the two side P to needing participation certification1And P2Computing device (such as PC, Intelligent mobile equipment) generating portion certification private keyWithEither party is P1Or P2It can mustn't go to Authentication information is generated in the case of whole certification private key, and server can be with the correctness of authentication verification information.Both sides are respective Preservation and the underground partial authentication private key of oneself.
In the description to authentication phase of the present invention below, P1Message is encrypted using homomorphic encryption algorithm, is used Public private key pair is (pk, sk).Define EncpkFor cryptographic calculation, DecskTo decrypt computing.DefinitionFor c1, c2Ciphertext " multiplication " computing, it is that the ciphertext in c does " index " computing with a to define c ⊙ a computings, and it is data x and data y to define x^y computings Between XOR operation, which has following property：
Public key pk does message encryption, and only unique corresponding private key sk can just be decrypted, i.e. Decsk(Encpk(m))=m；
Multiplication operation between ciphertext may map to the sum operation between plaintext, i.e.,
Ciphertext and the exponent arithmetic of certain plaintext may map to the corresponding multiplication operation with the plaintext in plain text of ciphertext, i.e. Decsk (Encpk(m1)⊙m2)=m1m2。
The present invention specifically includes：
First, key distribution algorithm：
In the present invention, the private key of user anonymity certification is generated by the server registered.Two selected for user Trusted party, generating portion certification private key, operation are as follows respectively：
1st, for user first to server registration, server provides certification private key to the user, and server produces one and meets peace The random big integer of population parameter calculates corresponding public key P as main private key spub=sP, main private key secret preserve, and public key discloses Issue, wherein G is a basic point of circled addition point group, which is prime number q；
2nd, private key for user D is calculatedID=h (s, ID) P, wherein h (ID) represent the cryptographic Hash of user identity ID；
3rd, a random number r is generatedID, calculate Part I private keyAnd Part II private keyWherein
4th, a pair of of public private key pair (pk, sk) of homomorphic encryption algorithm is generated；WillIt is sent to the first participation Square P1, willIt is sent to the second participant P2；
2nd, distributed authentication algorithm：
In the present invention, the user terminal authentication information of the authentication method of identity-based is by two side P1And P2It is common to complete, specifically Operation is as follows：
1、P1Generate first random number r1, calculate first temporary public key R1=r1P, uses the public affairs of homomorphic encryption algorithm Key pk is to r1Encrypt, i.e. first ciphertext C1=Encpk(r1)。P1(R1, C1) it is sent to P2。
2、P2Generate second random number r2, calculate second temporary public key R2=r2P, calculates second ciphertextWherein ρ is random number.P2(R2, C2) it is sent to P1。
3、P1Decrypted using the private key of homomorphic encryption algorithm, calculate C2PlaintextPrimary authentication codeTarget temporary public key R=r1R2。P1Generate the 3rd random number r3, Calculate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P and dummy address AID=ID^h (R3, r3Ppub) and final authentication codeWherein T is current time stamp.P1By authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and it is sent to server.
4th, after server receives authentication information, R '=sR is calculated with its private key3, user's true address ID=AID^h(R3, R ') and primary authentication codeCalculate authentication codeJudge the certification calculated Whether code α is equal with the α that user sends over, the termination protocol if unequal, if equal calculate(β, T ') is sent to user, wherein T ' is current time stamp.
5、P1CalculateJudge the value whether with the β that receives, if equal, establish Communication connection, otherwise terminates this communication.
The present invention is in P1And P2In communication, zero-knowledge proof mechanism is added, for proving that the data sent are actually from Sender's, so as to reduce the risk that data are tampered, improve the security of scheme.
Specific implementation example described herein is only to spirit explanation for example of the invention.Technology belonging to the present invention The technical staff in field can do various modifications or additions to described specific implementation example or use similar side Formula substitutes, but without departing from spirit of the invention or beyond the scope of the appended claims.

Claims (6)

  1. A kind of 1. anonymous authentication method of identity-based, it is characterised in that including：
    Key distributing step：A random big integer for meeting security parameter is produced as main private key s, and calculates corresponding public key Ppub=sP, main private key secret preserve, and public key publishes, and wherein P is a basic point of circled addition point group, the order of a group For prime number q；Then a certification private key D is generatedID=h (s, ID) P, and a random number meetGenerate a certification private key DID=h (s, ID) P, and a random number rIDIt is allowed to meetBy part private keySend P1,Send To P2；
    Distributed authentication step：Participate in the both sides P of certification1And P2, a random number r is generated respectively1And r2；P1R is calculated first1= r1P, r is encrypted using homomorphic cryptography method1Obtain C1, then send C1And R1To P2；P2Calculate R2=r2P, while P2Pass through homomorphism Encrypted property, can calculateCiphertext C2, and by this ciphertext C2And R2It is sent to P1；P1Decrypt C2, And utilize the part private key of oneselfPrimary authentication code r is calculated1r2DIDModq and R, with xor operation and hash algorithm Calculate dummy address AID, generate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P, final authentication code is generated with hash algorithmBy authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and server is sent to, server believes verification to certification Breath feeds back to user again, and after successfully completing three-way handshake, secure communication can be established between server and user.
  2. A kind of 2. anonymous authentication method of identity-based according to claim 1, it is characterised in that the key distribution step Suddenly specifically include：
    Step 2.1, produce a random big integer for meeting security parameter as main private key s, and calculates corresponding public key Ppub= SP, main private key secret preserve, and public key publishes, and wherein P is a basic point of circled addition point group, which is prime number q；
    Step 2.2, calculate private key for user DID=h (s, ID) P, wherein h (ID) represent the cryptographic Hash of user identity ID；
    One step 2.3, generation random number rID, calculate Part I private keyAnd Part II private keyWherein
    Step 2.4, a pair of of the public private key pair (pk, sk) for generating homomorphic encryption algorithm；WillIt is sent to the first ginseng With square P1, willIt is sent to the second participant P2。
  3. A kind of 3. anonymous authentication method of identity-based according to claim 1, it is characterised in that the distributed authentication Step specifically includes：
    Step 3.1, P1Generate first random number r1, calculate first temporary public key R1=r1P, uses the public affairs of homomorphic encryption algorithm Key pk is to r1Encrypt, i.e. first ciphertext C1=Encpk(r1)；P1(R1, C1) it is sent to P2；
    Step 3.2, P2Generate second random number r2, calculate second temporary public key R2=r2P, calculates second ciphertextWherein ρ is random number；P2(R2, C2) it is sent to P1；
    Step 3.3, P1Decrypted using the private key of homomorphic encryption algorithm, calculate C2PlaintextPrimary authentication codeTarget temporary public key R=r1R2；P1Generate the 3rd random number r3, Calculate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P and dummy address AID=ID^h (R3, r3Ppub) and final authentication codeWherein T is current time stamp, and ^ represents xor operation；P1By authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and hair Give server；
    After step 3.4, server receive authentication information, R '=sR is calculated with its private key3, user's true address ID=AID^h (R3, R ') and primary authentication codeCalculate authentication codeJudge what is calculated Whether authentication code α is equal with the α that user sends over, the termination protocol if unequal, if equal calculate(β, T ') is sent to user, wherein T ' is current time stamp；
    Step 3.5, P1CalculateJudge the value whether with the β that receives, if equal, build Vertical communication connection, otherwise terminates this communication.
  4. A kind of 4. anonymous authentication system of identity-based, it is characterised in that including：
    Server：For user first to server registration, server provides certification private key to the user, and server produces one and meets peace The random big integer of population parameter calculates corresponding public key P as main private key spub=sP, main private key secret preserve, and public key discloses Issue, wherein P is a basic point of circled addition point group, which is prime number q；Server generates a certification for user Private key DID=h (s, ID) P, and a random number meet
    Cipher key distribution unit：For by part of keySend P1,Hair Give P2；
    Distributed authentication unit：Participate in the both sides P of certification1And P2, a random number r is generated by distributed authentication unit respectively1 And r2；P1R is calculated first1=r1P, r is encrypted using homomorphic cryptography method1Obtain C1, then send C1And R1To P2；P2Calculate P2= r2P, while P2By the property of homomorphic cryptography, can calculateCiphertext C2, and by this ciphertext C2And R2 It is sent to P1；P1Decrypt C2, and utilize the part private key of oneselfPrimary authentication code r is calculated1r2DIDModq and R, use are different Or operation and hash algorithm calculate dummy address AID, generate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P, is finally recognized with hash algorithm generation Demonstrate,prove codeBy authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and it is sent to server, server is by verification to recognizing Card information feeds back to user again, and after successfully completing three-way handshake, secure communication can be established between server and user.
  5. 5. the anonymous authentication method of a kind of identity-based according to claim 4, it is characterised in that the key distribution is single The method that member carries out key distribution specifically includes：
    Step 2.1, produce a random big integer for meeting security parameter as main private key s, and calculates corresponding public key Ppub= SP, main private key secret preserve, and public key publishes, and wherein G is a basic point of circled addition point group, which is prime number q；
    Step 2.2, calculate private key for user DID=h (s, ID) P, wherein h (ID) represent the cryptographic Hash of user identity ID；
    One step 2.3, generation random number rID, calculate Part I private keyAnd Part II private keyWherein
    Step 2.4, a pair of of the public private key pair (pk, sk) for generating homomorphic encryption algorithm；WillIt is sent to the first ginseng With square P1, willIt is sent to the second participant P2。
  6. A kind of 6. anonymous authentication method of identity-based according to claim 4, it is characterised in that the distributed authentication The method that unit carries out distributed authentication specifically includes：
    Step 3.1, P1Generate first random number r1, calculate first temporary public key R1=r1P, uses the public affairs of homomorphic encryption algorithm Key pkTo r1Encrypt, i.e. first ciphertext C1=Encpk(r1)；P1(R1, C1) it is sent to P2；
    Step 3.2, P2Generate second random number r2, calculate second temporary public key R2=r2P, calculates second ciphertextWherein ρ is random number；P2(R2, C2) it is sent to P1；
    Step 3.3, P1Decrypted using the private key of homomorphic encryption algorithm, calculate C2PlaintextPrimary authentication codeTarget temporary public key R=r1R2；P1Generate the 3rd random number r3, Calculate the 3rd temporary public key R3=r3P and dummy address AID=ID^h (R3, r3Ppub) and final authentication codeWherein T is current time stamp；P1By authentication information (AID, R, R3, α, T) and it is sent to server；
    After step 3.4, server receive authentication information, R '=sR is calculated with its private key3, user's true address ID=AID^h (R3, R ') and primary authentication codeCalculate authentication codeJudge what is calculated Whether authentication code α is equal with the α that user sends over, the termination protocol if unequal, if equal calculate(β, T ') is sent to user, wherein T ' is current time stamp；
    Step 3.5, P1CalculateJudge the value whether with the β that receives, if equal, build Vertical communication connection, otherwise terminates this communication.
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