CN104333537A - RFID security authentication method based on physical unclonable function - Google Patents
RFID security authentication method based on physical unclonable function Download PDFInfo
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- CN104333537A CN104333537A CN201410566735.0A CN201410566735A CN104333537A CN 104333537 A CN104333537 A CN 104333537A CN 201410566735 A CN201410566735 A CN 201410566735A CN 104333537 A CN104333537 A CN 104333537A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
- H04L63/0846—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using time-dependent-passwords, e.g. periodically changing passwords
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
- G06K7/10—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation
- G06K7/10009—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation sensing by radiation using wavelengths larger than 0.1 mm, e.g. radio-waves or microwaves
- G06K7/10158—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation sensing by radiation using wavelengths larger than 0.1 mm, e.g. radio-waves or microwaves methods and means used by the interrogation device for reliably powering the wireless record carriers using an electromagnetic interrogation field
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3278—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response using physically unclonable functions [PUF]
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Abstract
The invention relates to an RFID security authentication method based on a physical unclonable function. The method realizes non-replicability of label data by utilizing the unique excitation response mapping mechanism of the physical unclonable function, and realizes freshness of shared secret values in an authentication period by introducing a dynamic updating mechanism. Targeted for the particularity and limitation of air interfaces of labels and reader-writers of an RFID system, the method utilizes an XOR operation and a unidirectional Hash function to effectively solve the problem of security data transmission of the RFID system. The method is practical and novel, and identity authentication is carried out by utilizing a lightweight cryptography operator, so that tamper-proofing performance of the label data is improved; and the method is suitable for RFID application scenarios having higher safety false-proofing demand.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to RFID air-interface security technical field, relate to RFID safety authentication protocol algorithm, particularly relate to the RFID safety authentication that a kind of physically based deformation can not clone function.
Background technology
RFID (radio-frequency (RF) identification) technology utilizes the noncontact of radio frequency signal realize target object automatically to identify, is applied to the fields such as Intelligent logistics, supply chain management, safety anti-fake, identity are false proof, asset management gradually.RFID technique, as the typical radio sensing technology of Internet of things system, can realize article perception and information sharing in global range, have market application foreground widely.But, due to the limitation of rfid system own hardware system and the particularity of wireless communication link, air interface between label and read write line is faced with severe security threat and attacks tender spots, and thus rfid system safety problem becomes an important research topic.
The eavesdropping that the safety problem that rfid system air interface faces mainly comprises label data is distorted, and the intercepting of communication data is reset, the identity personation of communication entity, the malice obstruction etc. of communication link.In order to meet the demand for security of rfid system confidentiality, integrality, availability, propose in the industry multiple security solution and safeguard procedures, mainly comprise physical mechanism (such as, Faraday cage, active interference etc.), cipher mechanism (such as, certification, access control and encryption etc.) and mechanism that both combine.In recent years, by utilizing the physical structure of label chip to realize RFID unique identity and safety certification, become the emphasis of industrial quarters and academia's research.Physics can not clone function (Physical Unclonable Function, PUF) be the miniature delay circuit of one group of physically based deformation structural difference, by the uncontrollability and the non-reproduction that utilize chip manufacturing proces to produce difference, generate unique, uncertain exciter response.Physics can not be cloned function and is easy to carry out in chip design process integrated, and does not substantially improve chip design cost, effectively can realize the safety certification of chip.Based on this, the present invention proposes the RFID safety authentication that a kind of physically based deformation can not clone function, for realizing rfid system tag security transfer of data and reliable authentication.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of physically based deformation can not clone the RFID safety authentication of function, the method is applicable to the rfid system of higher demand for security, put forth effort to solve label-copying that RFID air interface faces, distort, reset, the exemplary secure such as personation attacks, in order to ensure label tamper-resistance properties and the forward direction Unlinkability of rfid system air interface.
Based on above object, the present invention is achieved by taking following technical scheme:
Physically based deformation can not clone a RFID safety authentication for function, it is characterized in that: when rfid system initialization, and each label T has identification identifier PID
tfunction PUF () can not be cloned with physics; Read write line R has identification identifier PID
r; Background data base DB has all labels, the identification identifier of read write line and the Mathematical Modeling of all inside tags integrated PUF () circuit structures; Label T, read write line R and database D B has secret shared secret S
n; In described rfid system, the communication link between read write line to background data base is considered to safe.
The safety authentication protocol step of described rfid system is as follows:
Step 1: first read write line R generates a random number r
r, and by r
rlabel T is sent to as inquiry request;
Step 2: after label T receives request, generates a random number r
t; Label T utilizes physics can not clone function and obtains S
n+1=PUF (S
n) and S
n+2=PUF (S
n+1|| r
t); Then label T utilizes Hash function and XOR to obtain
with
label T is by the numerical value r of cascade
t|| M
t|| M '
t|| N
tread write line R is sent to as response;
Step 3: read write line R calculates after receiving label response
with
read write line R is by r
r|| r
t|| S
n+1|| M '
t|| N
r|| N
tsend to back-end data base DB;
First step 4: database D B carries out XOR and obtains
then database D B verifies that the read write line identification identifier that whether there is certain coupling meets:
the tag identity identifier whether checking exists certain coupling meets:
if existed, then database D B thinks that read write line R and label T is legal, and when and if only if read write line R and label T is legal, agreement proceeds, otherwise protocol ends; Then database D B upgrades S
n=S
n+1and S
n+1=S
n+2, calculate the temporary identifications symbol PID ' of read write line and label
r=H (PID
r|| S
n) and PID '
t=H (PID
t|| S
n+1); The calculated with mathematical model that database D B extracts PUF () obtains N
dB=PUF (PID '
r|| PID '
t|| r
t); Database D B is by N
dBsend to read write line R;
Step 5: after read write line R receives data, upgrades S
n=S
n+1, and calculate temporary identifications symbol PID '
r=H (PID
r|| S
n); Read write line R is by N
dB|| PID '
rsend to label T;
Step 6: label T upgrades S
n=S
n+1and S
n+1=S
n+2, and calculate temporary identifications symbol PID '
t=H (PID
t|| S
n+1); Label T is by comparing the N calculated
dB=PUF (PID '
r|| PID '
t|| r
t) with the N that receives
dBthe whether equal legitimacy verifying read write line R; If equal, then read write line R is by certification, otherwise protocol ends;
The parameter related in above-mentioned authentication protocol and oeprator are respectively described below:
R: read write line
T: label
DB: database
PID
r: the identification identifier of read write line
PID
t: the identification identifier of label
PID '
r: the temporary identifications symbol of read write line in verification process
PID '
t: the temporary identifications symbol of label in verification process
S
n: the shared secret of label T, read write line R and database D B
S
n+1, S
n+2: the temporary value calculated in verification process
M
t, M '
t, N
t: the numerical value that label T calculates
N
r: the numerical value that read write line R calculates
N
dB: the numerical value that database D B calculates
R
r: the random number that read write line R generates
R
t: the random number that label T generates
PUF (): physics can not clone functional operation
H (): One-way Hash function computing
: XOR
Feature of the present invention is:
1, the exciter response mapping mechanism that the present invention utilizes physics can not clone function uniqueness achieves the non-reproduction of label data: label T utilizes physics can not clone function PUF () and calculates S
n+1=PUF (S
n) and S
n+2=PUF (S
n+1|| r
t), and then calculate M
t, M '
tand N
tfor the transfer of data of forward communication link.Back-end data base DB utilizes the calculated with mathematical model of inside tags the integrated PUF () circuit structure prestored to obtain N
dB=PUF (PID '
r|| PID '
t|| r
t).Label is by comparing the N calculated
dBwith the N received
dBthe whether equal legitimacy verifying read write line R.In addition, in whole verification process, rfid system secure data anonymity transmission is realized by adopting bit exclusive-OR operation and One-way Hash function.The present invention does not do strict regulations to adopted concrete Hash function algorithm, tends to adopt lightweight algorithm, reaches the object of saving system resource, improving execution efficiency while guaranteeing system security as far as possible.
2, the present invention utilizes Dynamic Updating Mechanism to realize the freshness of shared secret in authentication period: in each session cycle, S
nand S
n+1be updated to S respectively
n+1and S
n+2guarantee the freshness of shared secret.In addition, random number r is introduced
rand r
t, and the temporary identifications symbol PID ' of read write line and label
r=H (PID
r|| S
n) and PID '
t=H (PID
t|| S
n+1), realize the forward direction Unlinkability in session cycle.
The invention has the advantages that:
1, a kind of physically based deformation that the present invention proposes can not clone the RFID safety authentication of function, utilizes physics can not clone function PUF (), the attack such as can effectively resist label-copying, forge and distort.Introduce freshness and forward direction Unlinkability that Dynamic Updating Mechanism achieves authentication period.The present invention has taken into account system resource occupancy and execution efficiency, has and responds the advantages such as rapid, simple and practical.
2, a kind of physically based deformation that the present invention proposes can not clone the RFID safety authentication of function; according to the feature of rfid system forward direction air interface and backward communication link; bit exclusive-OR operation and One-way Hash function is adopted to realize rfid system secure data anonymity transmission; and then realize the protection of label data information confidentiality and integrity, effectively resist the attacks such as playback and personation.
3, a kind of physically based deformation that the present invention proposes can not clone the RFID safety authentication of function, utilizes random number r
rand r
tensure the dynamic of interaction data, ensure that the data of transmission are based on the random number dynamically generated, even if making certain interaction data when being intercepted by malicious attacker, still keeping good forward direction Unlinkability, effectively resisting the attacks such as tracking.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the communication process schematic diagram that physically based deformation of the present invention can not clone the RFID safety authentication of function.
Embodiment
One, rfid system initialization
When rfid system initialization, each label T has identification identifier PID
tfunction PUF () can not be cloned with physics; Read write line R has identification identifier PID
r; Background data base DB has all labels, the identification identifier of read write line and the Mathematical Modeling of all inside tags integrated PUF () circuit structures; Label T, read write line R and database D B has secret shared secret S
n; In described rfid system, the communication link between read write line to background data base is considered to safe.
Two, verification process
The safety authentication protocol step of described rfid system is as follows:
Step 1: first read write line R generates a random number r
r, and by r
rlabel T is sent to as inquiry request;
Step 2: after label T receives request, generates a random number r
t; Label T utilizes physics can not clone function and obtains S
n+1=PUF (S
n) and S
n+2=PUF (S
n+1|| r
t); Then label T utilizes Hash function and XOR to obtain
with
label T is by the numerical value r of cascade
t|| M
t|| M '
t|| N
tread write line R is sent to as response;
Step 3: read write line R calculates after receiving label response
with
read write line R is by r
r|| r
t|| S
n+1|| M '
t|| N
r|| N
tsend to back-end data base DB;
First step 4: database D B carries out XOR and obtains
then database D B verifies that the read write line identification identifier that whether there is certain coupling meets:
the tag identity identifier whether checking exists certain coupling meets:
if existed, then database D B thinks that read write line R and label T is legal, and when and if only if read write line R and label T is legal, agreement proceeds, otherwise protocol ends; Then database D B upgrades S
n=S
n+1and S
n+1=S
n+2, calculate the temporary identifications symbol PID ' of read write line and label
r=H (PID
r|| S
n) and PID '
t=H (PID
t|| S
n+1); The calculated with mathematical model that database D B extracts PUF () obtains N
dB=PUF (PID '
r|| PID '
t|| r
t); Database D B is by N
dBsend to read write line R;
Step 5: after read write line R receives data, upgrades S
n=S
n+1, and calculate temporary identifications symbol PID '
r=H (PID
r|| S
n); Read write line R is by N
dB|| PID '
rsend to label T;
Step 6: label T upgrades S
n=S
n+1and S
n+1=S
n+2, and calculate temporary identifications symbol PID '
t=H (PID
t|| S
n+1); Label T is by comparing the N calculated
dB=PUF (PID '
r|| PID '
t|| r
t) with the N that receives
dBthe whether equal legitimacy verifying read write line R; If equal, then read write line R is by certification, otherwise protocol ends;
The parameter related in above-mentioned authentication protocol and oeprator are respectively described below:
R: read write line
T: label
DB: database
PID
r: the identification identifier of read write line
PID
t: the identification identifier of label
PID '
r: the temporary identifications symbol of read write line in verification process
PID '
t: the temporary identifications symbol of label in verification process
S
n: the shared secret of label T, read write line R and database D B
S
n+1, S
n+2: the temporary value calculated in verification process
M
t, M '
t, N
t: the numerical value that label T calculates
N
r: the numerical value that read write line R calculates
N
dB: the numerical value that database D B calculates
R
r: the random number that read write line R generates
R
t: the random number that label T generates
PUF (): physics can not clone functional operation
H (): One-way Hash function computing
: XOR.
Claims (3)
1. physically based deformation can not clone a RFID safety authentication for function, it is characterized in that: when rfid system initialization, and each label T has identification identifier PID
tfunction PUF () can not be cloned with physics; Read write line R has identification identifier PID
r; Background data base DB has all labels, the identification identifier of read write line and the Mathematical Modeling of all inside tags integrated PUF () circuit structures; Label T, read write line R and database D B has secret shared secret S
n; In described rfid system, the communication link between read write line to background data base is considered to safe;
The safety authentication protocol step of described rfid system is as follows:
Step 1: first read write line R generates a random number r
r, and by r
rlabel T is sent to as inquiry request;
Step 2: after label T receives request, generates a random number r
t; Label T utilizes physics can not clone function and obtains S
n+1=PUF (S
n) and S
n+2=PUF (S
n+1|| r
t); Then label T utilizes Hash function and XOR to obtain
with
label T is by the numerical value r of cascade
t|| M
t|| M '
t|| N
tread write line R is sent to as response;
Step 3: read write line R calculates after receiving label response
with
read write line R is by r
r|| r
t|| S
n+1|| M '
t|| N
r|| N
tsend to back-end data base DB;
First step 4: database D B carries out XOR and obtains
then database D B verifies that the read write line identification identifier that whether there is certain coupling meets:
the tag identity identifier whether checking exists certain coupling meets:
if existed, then database D B thinks that read write line R and label T is legal, and when and if only if read write line R and label T is legal, agreement proceeds, otherwise protocol ends; Then database D B upgrades S
n=S
n+1and S
n+1=S
n+2, calculate the temporary identifications symbol PID ' of read write line and label
r=H (PID
r|| S
n) and PID '
t=H (PID
t|| S
n+1); The calculated with mathematical model that database D B extracts PUF () obtains N
dB=PUF (PID '
r|| PID '
t|| r
t); Database D B is by N
dBsend to read write line R;
Step 5: after read write line R receives data, upgrades S
n=S
n+1, and calculate temporary identifications symbol PID '
r=H (PID
r|| S
n); Read write line R is by N
dB|| PID '
rsend to label T;
Step 6: label T upgrades S
n=S
n+1and S
n+1=S
n+2, and calculate temporary identifications symbol PID '
t=H (PID
t|| S
n+1); Label T is by comparing the N calculated
dB=PUF (PID '
r|| PID '
t|| r
t) with the N that receives
dBthe whether equal legitimacy verifying read write line R; If equal, then read write line R is by certification, otherwise protocol ends;
The parameter related in above-mentioned authentication protocol and oeprator are respectively described below:
R: read write line
T: label
DB: database
PID
r: the identification identifier of read write line
PID
t: the identification identifier of label
PID '
r: the temporary identifications symbol of read write line in verification process
PID '
t: the temporary identifications symbol of label in verification process
S
n: the shared secret of label T, read write line R and database D B
S
n+1, S
n+2: the temporary value calculated in verification process
M
t, M '
t, N
t: the numerical value that label T calculates
N
r: the numerical value that read write line R calculates
N
dB: the numerical value that database D B calculates
R
r: the random number that read write line R generates
R
t: the random number that label T generates
PUF (): physics can not clone functional operation
H (): One-way Hash function computing
: XOR.
2. a kind of physically based deformation according to claim 1 can not clone the RFID safety authentication of function, it is characterized in that: the exciter response mapping mechanism utilizing physics can not clone function uniqueness achieves label data PUF (S
n) and PUF (S
n+1|| r
t) non-reproduction.
3. a kind of physically based deformation according to claim 1 can not clone the RFID safety authentication of function, it is characterized in that: introduce the freshness that Dynamic Updating Mechanism realizes shared secret in authentication period, wherein: S
nand S
n+1be updated to S respectively
n+1and S
n+2; In addition, temporary identifications symbol PID ' is introduced
rwith PID '
trealize the authentication of label to read write line.
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| CN201410566735.0A CN104333537A (en) | 2014-10-22 | 2014-10-22 | RFID security authentication method based on physical unclonable function |
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Cited By (10)
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| CN108616358A (en) * | 2018-05-10 | 2018-10-02 | 广西大学 | The authentication method of sensor and main control unit in wireless body area network based on PUF |
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| CN109818745B (en) * | 2017-11-21 | 2022-04-01 | 佛山芯珠微电子有限公司 | Internet of things information security chip |
| CN108616358A (en) * | 2018-05-10 | 2018-10-02 | 广西大学 | The authentication method of sensor and main control unit in wireless body area network based on PUF |
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| CN109787761B (en) * | 2019-02-20 | 2021-06-29 | 金陵科技学院 | Equipment authentication and key distribution system and method based on physical unclonable function |
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