CN100401271C - Data access method and apparatus for storing safety key enciphering (SAKE) equipment to control network - Google Patents

Data access method and apparatus for storing safety key enciphering (SAKE) equipment to control network Download PDF

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Publication number
CN100401271C
CN100401271C CNB038018209A CN03801820A CN100401271C CN 100401271 C CN100401271 C CN 100401271C CN B038018209 A CNB038018209 A CN B038018209A CN 03801820 A CN03801820 A CN 03801820A CN 100401271 C CN100401271 C CN 100401271C
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Prior art keywords
information
informant
storage
piracy
user
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CN1610888A (en
Inventor
黄敬弦
林利泉
符廷彬
陈亨利
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TERCO 2000 INTERNATIONAL CO Ltd
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TERCO 2000 INTERNATIONAL CO Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
    • G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/78—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/78—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
    • G06F21/79—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
    • G06F21/85—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices interconnection devices, e.g. bus-connected or in-line devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0861—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2115—Third party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload

Abstract

An apparatus and method of storage anti-piracy key encryption (SAKE) device controls data access for a storage/memory/network. An authentication system includes a first storage, a ROM and a microcontroller and verifies the password of a host. The first storage unit stores an authentication sequence (e.g. biometric information) and the authentication algorithm is programmed on the ROM. Upon receiving the password from the host the microcontroller loads and executes the authentication algorithm to verify the password with the hard coded authentication sequence. Access to the second storage unit/memory/network is permitted only if password is verified.

Description

The method and apparatus that is used for the data access on the Control Network
Technical field
The present invention relates to network communication field.More particularly, the present invention relates to the secret restricted information that is accessed on the network, particularly relate to and utilize storage anti-piracy key encryption (SAKE) equipment so that control is used for the method and apparatus of the data access of network.
Background technology
The piracy and the bootlegging of software and other digital medias have become extremely general, cause global media and the billions of loss of income of software owner usually.This problem is along with the arrival that the advanced computers of technology is arranged sooner and more, inexpensive mass storage media (that is CDs, exploitation DVDs), and help copying equipment such as the CD writer of the various aspects of digital piracy to become more complicated.
Each technological contribution produces the new and better method of intellecture property that bootlegging belongs to another outwardly.The example of digital piracy comprises: duplicate proprietary software so that be sold to other people, single proprietary software bag is installed on several different systems, the copy of proprietary software is placed on the Internet or even download the copyright image from Internet.
Although in many terminal users of legal purchase software, digital piracy is quite general, extensive piracy usually occurs in distributor layer again.For example, dealer can duplicate and a plurality of copies of software program, digital audio file or digital video file are distributed to different user again.These are copied version and are passed to the user who does not suspect sometimes.Known hardware dealer uses single software package preload different system.In these examples, original manuals, disk and/or CD (CDs) are not provided or its pirate copies is provided simply to the user.
Many methods of the problem that spreads that prevents digital piracy have been designed.A method is to use trial edition software (trialware) to limit the use software product.Can realize trial edition software by cut-off date or access times are programmed for software program.This scheme is restricted to specific duration or time on probation (trial time) with the use of software product respectively, after this, and the shielded application program of not reruning.Force the user to buy full version product then or withdraw from fully and use it.
Hardware keys is another kind of anti-piracy device, is commonly used to prevent illegally use software.Hardware keys is to insert the equipment of selected computer port.As long as executive software, it is used and detects similarly mode of other hardware devices (such as printer, monitor or mouse), the existence of detection hardware key so.Programming software prevents from illegally to use software so that it is only just operated when connecting suitable hardware keys.Because the quantity of distributing terminals user's hardware keys is corresponding to the quantity of the client access licence of being bought (seat license), in the time of on being installed in another system that there is no need hardware keys, this software is with inoperative.
Another general anti-piracy technique is to require before install software a certain login key that input is provided by software company.Traditionally, only give login key, although some are issued electronically with the priginal soft bag.Unfortunately, the holder that can't prevent login key is installed in software in several systems.In addition, many electronic register keys are based on user's personal information (that is, such as user name), and therefore, some hackers have developed to calculate and have been used for the program of the login key of name arbitrarily.
Unfortunately, by using login key, the hacker is easy to avoid all above-mentioned anti-piracy (and many other systems).The universal method of resisting these anti-piracy techniques is that the coding dis-assembling with application programming interface (API) becomes assembly language, after this, assembly language is decompiled into programming language.By the knowledge that obtains from program flow, the hacker is rewriting program or some condition is set in program itself easily, consequently avoids all anti-piracy authentication algorithms.
By above it seems, be starved of that have can not be by the anti-piracy of computer hacker or easy reprogrammed of other digital piracy or avoidance.Also need to have the anti-piracy that can combine with existing mass-memory unit.
Summary of the invention
According to an aspect of the present invention, the invention provides a kind of be used on information network provides the method for carrying out data access control from long-range informant's information to sending to the digital processing system of subscriber's local, comprising: (a) opertaing device is connected to described digital processing system; (b) by carrying out user authentication process, obtain user identity; (c) when the described user identity of checking, from first storage unit retrieval initialization information of opertaing device; (d),, described initialization information is provided to described informant by described digital processing system through described information network; (e) when receiving the affirmation of user identity, between described opertaing device and informant, set up and communicate by letter; (f) from described informant's acquired information; And, (g) with described information stores in second storage unit of described opertaing device.
According to another aspect of the present invention, provide a kind of be used on information network to provide the storage and the anti-piracy device of carrying out data access control from long-range informant's information to sending to the digital processing system of subscriber's local, it operationally is attached to described digital processing system; By carrying out user authentication process, obtain user identity; When having verified described user identity, from first storage unit retrieval initialization information of described control and anti-piracy device; Through described information network,, described initialization information is provided to described informant by described digital processing system; When receiving the affirmation of user identity, between described control and anti-piracy device and informant, set up and communicate by letter; From described informant's acquired information; And, with described information stores in second storage unit of described control and anti-piracy device.
According to a further aspect of the invention, a kind of method that is used for by the user access limited information is provided, described method comprises step: the communication port that portable memory apparatus is connected to the local client computer with user interface, described client computer can be connected to the remote content server on the network communicatedly, described content servers store limited information, described portable memory apparatus has position biosensors thereon also can be with respect to the stored authorized user's of institute biological template, the verified users identity; Use described biosensors, catch the biological information of request; The described portable memory apparatus checking described request person's who is provided identity is sent to described content server with first notice from described portable memory apparatus; From described content server receiving equipment checking request, and in response to this, device authentication replied from described portable memory apparatus be sent to described content server, described device authentication is replied the checking that is used to finish between described content server and described portable memory apparatus and is shaken hands; Receive key request from described content server, and in response to this, expression described request person's first key is sent to described content server from described portable memory apparatus, and described first key is used to allow described content server to confirm described request person's identity; Receive described limited information from described content server; Use second key of expression described request person's identity, encrypt described limited information; And the form to encrypt stores described limited information in the described portable memory apparatus into, wherein, does not use described second key, can not decipher described institute storage encryption information.
According to an aspect of the present invention, provide the method for SAKE, wherein SAKE is connected on main frame or the client and SAKE obtains user's biological identity information by its biology sensor.According to the biological template in the internal storage unit that is stored in SAKE, the biological identity information of verified users is such as fingerprint.Internal storage unit retrieval and the subscriber-related various initialization informations that comprise PKI from SAKE, and the machine network is provided to informant or Internet Service Provider (" ISP ") by host computer system with initialization information such as Internet as calculated.Behind the verification initialization information, between SAKE and informant, set up network service.As SAKE during, encrypt this information and be stored in the flash memory in the SAKE from informant's acquired information.
Details description, accompanying drawing and the claims of setting forth from below, additional features of the present invention and advantage will be conspicuous.
Description of drawings
From the accompanying drawing of the following detailed description that provides and each embodiment of the present invention, will more fully understand the present invention, yet, should not be taken to limit the invention to specific embodiment, and only be to be used for explanation and understanding.
Fig. 1 example illustrates that according to one embodiment of present invention verification is from the synoptic diagram of the verification system of the password of main frame.
Fig. 2 example illustrates that according to another embodiment of the present invention verification is from the synoptic diagram of the verification system of the password of main frame.
Fig. 3 example illustrates that according to another embodiment of the present invention verification is from the synoptic diagram of the verification system of the password of main frame.
Fig. 4 example illustrates that according to another embodiment of the present invention verification is from the synoptic diagram of the verification system of the password of main frame.
The explanation of Fig. 5 example is verified the method from the password of main frame according to one embodiment of present invention.
The explanation of Fig. 6 example is used the synoptic diagram of the computer system of anti-piracy file manager according to another embodiment of the present invention.
The explanation of Fig. 7 example is used for receiving from Web server the synoptic diagram of the verification system of data according to another embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 8 example illustrates network structure according to an embodiment of the invention.
Fig. 9 is according to one embodiment of present invention, the block diagram of example explanation SAKE equipment.
Figure 10 is according to one embodiment of present invention, and the example explanation provides the process flow diagram of the method for data access control on network.
Figure 11 is the process flow diagram of each step of the embodiment of expression verification method of the present invention.
Embodiment
Argumentation is used for providing the apparatus and method of data access control on Internet.
In following description, for the purpose of illustration, set forth each concrete details so that complete understanding of the present invention is provided.Yet, to one skilled in the art, implement the present invention and can not require that these concrete details are conspicuous.In other cases, provide very known circuit and equipment so that avoid making the present invention unclear with the block diagram form.
It will be appreciated that the present invention can comprise the use known technology, such as for example CMOS (" complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) ") technology, or other semiconductor fabrication process transistor circuit of being easy to make.In addition, can be by being used to make other manufacturing process realizations the present invention of digital device.
Fig. 1 example illustrates that according to one embodiment of present invention verification is from the verification system 10 of the password 12 of main frame 14.Verification system 10 comprises first storage unit 16, ROM (read-only memory) (ROM) unit 18 and microcontroller 20.Microcontroller 20 is connected to main frame 14, first storage unit 16, ROM cell 18 and second storage unit 22.Microcontroller 20 preferably is connected to main frame 14 by USB (universal serial bus) (USB) controller.
In another embodiment of the present invention, ROM cell 18 can form the part of microcontroller 20.In addition, first storage unit 16 and second storage unit 22 can be of a plurality of mass-memory units, comprise hard disk drive, floppy disk or mobile flash memory device, such as the ThumbDrive that is made by Trek2000.In addition, two storage unit can be used in the physical arrangement so that form single mass-memory unit.Mass-memory unit also can be put together so that form one chip with microcontroller 20.
First storage unit 16 storage checking sequence 24s, it is used for verification password 12.The verification algorithm 26 of authentication password 12 and checking sequence 24 are coded on the ROM cell 18 together.In addition, ROM cell 18 preferably includes shutdown algorithm (shutdown algorithm) 28.Because these algorithms and other data are hard codeds, the content of ROM cell 18 can not be compiled again or be revised.After receiving password 12, microcontroller 20 loads and carries out verification algorithm 26 so that verification password 12 and checking sequence 24.Have only behind verification password 12, just allow access second storage unit 22.
After receiving inquiry, can import password 12 by the software program that user or main frame 14 are carried out from microcontroller 20.Because verification algorithm 26 is hard coded within on the ROM cell 18, duplicates or compile again and change the software program that resides on the main frame 14 and do not destroy by copyright protection provided by the invention.To one skilled in the art password 12 can be privately owned character string, communication protocol sequence or only the some other confidentiality agreement known to the authorized user be conspicuous.In addition, fingerprint, iris, face or voice that password 12 and checking sequence 24 can pass through to use the user form the part of biometric authentication as the checking means.
Password 12 can also be programmed on the software of operation on the main frame 14 and can therefore, be unknown to the terminal user by verification algorithm 26 identifications only.As mentioned above, be preferably in hardware or firmware (such as ROM cell 18) and go up realization verification algorithm 26 so that it is anti-tamper; That is, verification algorithm 26 will extremely be difficult to contrary the manipulation or extracted data, therefore extremely be difficult to avoid.
If shutdown algorithm 28 preferably by receiving a series of incorrect cipher by microcontroller 20, stops total system and realizes, attack to stop rough power.Authentication system programmer can be defined in the maximum times of the incorrect cipher that allows before the system closedown.Shutdown algorithm 28 can also be programmed so that no longer accept to reach the password input of specific times.By using shutdown algorithm 28, make by rough power application program to be used for the test and the error approach of recognition code 12 and concerning the hacker, will to become process slowly.Therefore, algorithm stops potential hacker to attempt recognition code 12.
Second storage unit 22 is used for required program and/or the file of program run on the storage host 12.The example of this file comprises executable program (such as software installation procedure), digital audio file, digital video file, image file, text and library file.Microcontroller 20 has only after receiving proper password 12 by microcontroller 20, just allows from main frame 14 accesses second storage unit 22.
Although in this embodiment, be exemplified as single entity, can should be conspicuous with a plurality of method combination microcontrollers 20, first storage unit 16, ROM cell 18 and second storage unit 22 to one skilled in the art.For example, can on single semiconductor chip, realize microcontroller 20, first storage unit 16, ROM cell 18 and second storage unit 22.In another embodiment, can on the chip that separates with storage unit, realize microcontroller 20 and ROM cell 18.
Therefore, the present invention has very big design flexibility, can change easily according to user's request.For example, on the one hand, use a plurality of chips can allow the different sellers to make the different piece of verification system.On the other hand, the present invention being produced on still less on the chip (or one chip) can be more cheap and more performance is provided.In addition, if ROM cell 18 and microcontroller 20 are positioned on the identical chips, more be difficult to separate ROM so that read storage data thereon.
Fig. 2 example illustrates that according to another embodiment of the present invention verification is from the verification system 50 of the password 52 of main frame 54.Verification system 50 comprises first storage unit 56, ROM cell 58 and microcontroller 60.Microcontroller 60 is connected on main frame 54, first storage unit 56, ROM cell 58 and the scrambler 62.Scrambler 62 further is connected to second storage unit 64.The storage of first storage unit 54 is used for the checking sequence 66 of verification password 52.The verification algorithm 68 of authentication password 52 is programmed on the ROM cell 58.ROM cell 58 preferably includes shutdown algorithm 70.
After receiving password 52, microcontroller 60 loads and carries out verification algorithm 68 so that by checking sequence 66 verification passwords 52.Have only behind verification password 52, just allow access second storage unit 64.If receive a series of bad passwords by microcontroller 60, shutdown algorithm 70 preferably stops total system.Authentication system programmer determines to allow to attempt the maximum times of incorrect cipher.
At first respectively by scrambler deciphering or encrypt and to read or to write data on it from second storage unit 64.Can use many different encipherment schemes by scrambler 62, comprise that IDEA (IDEA), data encryption standards (DES) are encrypted, triple DES (3-DES) is encrypted and the secret standard of high-quality (PGP).By encrypting the content of second storage unit 64,, can not understand the implication of content even the hacker manages to read the content (for example detecting by use) of avoiding microcontroller 60.Behind the overstocked sign indicating number 52 of empirical tests, can use the demoder (not shown) to decipher the content of second storage unit 64.
In addition, the data that are stored in second storage unit 64 can be protected by hash-coding.In addition, preferably also encryption or hash are taken checking sequence 66 apart so that prevent the hacker to checking sequence 66.If first storage unit 56 is arranged in second storage unit 64, this can not need other scrambler to realize.
Fig. 3 example illustrates that according to another embodiment of the present invention verification is from the synoptic diagram of the verification system 100 of the password 102 of main frame 104.Verification system 100 comprises ROM cell 106 and microcontroller 108.Microcontroller 108 is connected to main frame 104, ROM cell 106 and scrambler 110.Scrambler 110 further is connected to storage unit 112.The verification algorithm 114 of authentication password 102 is programmed on the ROM cell 106.The checking sequence 116 of verification password 102 is hard-coded on the verification algorithm 114.ROM cell 106 preferably includes shutdown algorithm 118.
As described at preceding embodiment, after receiving password 102, microcontroller 108 loads and carries out verification algorithm 114 so that by checking sequence 116 verification passwords 102.Only behind verification password 102, just allow access memory cell 112.If behind a series of incorrect passwords of microcontroller 108 receptions, preferably use shutdown algorithm 118 to stop total system.
By verifying that directly sequence 116 is hard coded into verification algorithm 114, can revise checking sequence 116 and become more difficult in fact in a plurality of positions.For a change hard code authentication sequence not only needs to recompilate (if using compiler language), and requires enough understanding realizations will not cause program mal so that guarantee to change.This measure makes the more difficult reprogramming verification system 100 of hacker.
Fig. 4 example illustrates that according to another embodiment of the present invention verification is from the verification system 150 of the password 152 of main frame 154.Verification system 150 comprises ROM (read-only memory) (ROM) unit 156 and microcontroller 158.Microcontroller 158 is connected to main frame 154, ROM cell 156 and scrambler 160.Scrambler 160 further is connected to storage unit 162.At first respectively by scrambler 160 deciphering or encrypt from storage unit 162 read or write on it data.In addition, hash-coding can be adopted so that protection is stored in the data on the storage unit 162.
Storage unit 162 is made up of two types data storage area: common storage area 164 and dedicated memory 166.Being used for the checking sequence 168 of verification password 152 is stored on the dedicated memory 166.The verification algorithm 170 of authentication password 152 is programmed on the ROM cell 156.ROM cell 156 also comprises shutdown algorithm 172.By not declaring memory size available on storage unit 162, can create common storage area 164 and dedicated memory 166.
For example, have the storage unit of from 000 to 1000 physical address, have only when the declaration of operating system (OS) such as the Windows on main frame 154 physical address 000 to 500, OS will not know to exist physical address 501 to 1000.In this case, the data that are stored in the physical address 000 to 500 can be by arbitrary user access.This district is called the common storage area.On the contrary, the physical address 501 to 1000 of declaration does not form dedicated memorys, because these addresses only can be used for microcontroller 158 and only can be by authorized user or software program access.
Under not secret operating conditions, arbitrary user can indicate main frame 154 to come from the common storage area 164 reading of data or data are write on the common storage area 164.Yet if the user wishes access common storage area 166, user or software program must at first be inputed password 152, send it to microcontroller 158 then, are used for checking.After receiving password 152, microcontroller 158 is carried out verification algorithm 170 so that by checking sequence 168 verification passwords 152.Have only behind verification password 152, just allow access dedicated memory 166.If receive a series of incorrect cipher by microcontroller 158, shutdown algorithm 172 stops total system.
The explanation of Fig. 5 example is used to verify the method 200 from the password of main frame according to one embodiment of present invention.At first provide the checking sequence also preferably to be stored in first storage unit at piece 202.Simultaneously in another piece 204, provide the verification algorithm that is stored in the ROM cell.After receiving prompting, by user or software program input password from main frame.Then, receive password by the microcontroller of carrying out verification algorithm so that pass through checking sequence check password at piece 206 at decision block 208.
If verification password in decision block 208 will allow the access exclusive district in piece 210, such as second storage unit in the foregoing description.Then, the user can read or write second storage unit, preferably encrypts.If verification password not in decision block 208, the user will not refuse access second storage unit and method 200 will finish in piece 212.In addition, if password bad is imported proper password with giving the other chance of user.Yet, if receive a series of incorrect cipher by microcontroller, best halt system.
The explanation of Fig. 6 example is used the synoptic diagram of the computer system 250 of anti-piracy file manager 252 according to another embodiment of the present invention.Anti-piracy file manager 252 is connected to anti-piracy authentication engine 254 and storage unit 256.Anti-piracy manager 252 is replied the request from a plurality of software programs 258, and a plurality of software program 258 requests are from the different proof schemes of anti-piracy authentication engine 254.By verification system 260 protection access memory cells 256.In this example system, dirigibility of the present invention allows the many dissimilar software programs of simultaneous verification by anti-piracy file manager 252.
The explanation of Fig. 7 example is used for receiving from Web server 302 synoptic diagram of the verification system 300 of data according to another embodiment of the present invention.Verification system 300 is connected to main frame 304, and main frame 304 is connected to Web server 302 by dialing or broadband connection usually.Main frame 304 preferably is connected to verification system 300 through USB connector.The example of main frame 304 comprises the mobile phone and the tablet of personal computer (PC), PDA(Personal Digital Assistant), permission WAP (wireless application protocol) (allowing WAP).
For from Web server 302 retrieve data, the password that receives by main frame 304 by verification system 300 verifications.Usually by the input of the software in user or main frame password.If input password, verification system can also be configured to accept biometrics password, such as fingerprint or retina scanning by the user.If be proved to be successful, verification system 300 sends the request of access Web server 302 by main frame 304.After receiving this request, Web server 302 is permitted the webpage that access has private data.These data can be with the form of music file or online book or software program.Because the verification algorithm in the hard code authentication system 300, the checkschema in the verification system 300 can not be evaded or change to unauthorized user, therefore, and the data on can not access Web server 302.
In another embodiment of the present invention, password will embed will be from the Internet data retrieved.The request that main frame 304 will be used for data sends to Web server 302.After receiving this request, Web server 302 will embed password in the data of being asked and send to verification system 300 and be used for verification.If verification succeeds, after showing or carrying out it, verification system 300 allows main frame 304 access datas.In a preferred embodiment, encryption is from the data of Web server 302.Before being used in main frame 304 or being stored in verification system 300, in verification system 300, carry out the deciphering of data.
By considering explanation of the present invention and principle, to one skilled in the art, other embodiment of the present invention will be conspicuous.In addition, some term is used to describe clearly purpose, and does not limit the present invention.The foregoing description and preferred feature should be considered as exemplary, limit the present invention by the accessory claim book.
The general introduction of storage anti-piracy key encryption device (" SAKE ")
According to an aspect of the present invention, provide the method for SAKE, wherein SAKE is connected on main frame or the client, and SAKE receives the user biological identity information by its biology sensor.According to the biological template in the internal storage unit that is stored in SAKE, the biological identity information of verified users is such as fingerprint.Internal storage unit retrieval and the subscriber-related various initialization informations that comprise PKI from SAKE, and the machine network is provided to informant or Internet Service Provider (" ISP ") by host computer system with initialization information such as Internet as calculated.Behind the verification initialization information, between SAKE and informant, set up network service.As SAKE during, encrypt this information and be stored in the flash memory in the SAKE from informant's acquired information.
In one embodiment, SAKE is storage and the anti-piracy device that comprises biometric verification ability on the plate.SAKE has general connectivity ability, such as USB connector.High-speed data transfer and high capacity storage capacity are another advantages of SAKE.For example, SAKE can have the memory capacity of a GB and have the access speed that reaches per second 1 gigabit.To discuss the more detailed description of SAKE below.
Fig. 8 example illustrates network structure 800 according to an embodiment of the invention.Network structure 800 comprises a plurality of SAKEs802, host computer system, Internet810 and each informant, content provider and/or ISPs.Host computer system comprises personal computer (" PC ") 804, kneetop computer 805, personal digital assistant (" PDA ") and other digital processing systems in one aspect, such as server, small-size computer, mainframe computer, point of sale machine, workstation or the like.Internet810 can be Intranet, wide area network (" WAN ") and/or LAN (Local Area Network) (" LAN ") in another embodiment.The informant comprises online transaction 820, Internet website 830, sale service 840, personal medical information 850, e-learning data 860, library 865, publisher 870, music 875 and TV recreation and film 880.Also to be increased on the network structure 800 be conspicuous to other functional blocks to one skilled in the art.
The content provider of online transaction 820 comprises various online sales transaction, and it comprises the online sales of commodity, software, information and network service on the Internet.In one embodiment, SAKE802 provides secure transactions, and it is included in access between user and informant, purchase and download product.The advantage of using SAKE is to prevent unauthorized, duplicate business information without limit.
The content provider of Internet website 830 comprises the website that each is limited, and it requires membership for example to come access to be placed on information in the limited website.In one embodiment, SAKE82 provides the controlled access to limited Internet website.In another embodiment, SAKE802 provides the method for controlled distribution by the information of SAKE reception.In this case, using the advantage of SAKE is to prevent unauthorized access.
Service 840 content provider comprise in one aspect provide support, the various online services of resource and/or upgrading.In one embodiment, SAKE802 provides the method that service and/or upgrading are provided to the client of mandate and/or registration service.In this case, using the advantage of SAKE is to prevent that unauthorized side from receiving service.
The content provider of medical data 850 comprises medical information in one aspect, such as restricted hospital web site.In one embodiment, SAKE802 provides time slot scrambling so that retrieve personal medical information on the Internet from the content provider who is used for medical data 850.In this case, using the advantage of SAKE is to prevent unauthorized side's access individual medical data.
The content provider of e-learning 860 comprises in one aspect and can stick on the webpage or the online education data of downloading from the website.In one embodiment, SAKE802 provides time slot scrambling so that from the content provider various education and/or learning materials are downloaded to each user who authorizes and/or register, thereby receives education material.In this case, using the advantage of SAKE is to prevent that unauthorized side from downloading education material from the content provider of e-learning 860.
The content provider of library 865 and publisher 870 comprises various online books and the article that can borrow or buy in one aspect.In one embodiment, SAKE802 is used for the books of authorized user and/or the digital copies of article by download, and the time slot scrambling of buying or borrowing is provided.In this case, using the advantage of SAKE is to prevent that unauthorized side from obtaining to stick on the books in the website and the copy of article.
The content provider of music 875 and video game/film 880 comprises various online digital music and the game/movie that can borrow or buy in one aspect.In one embodiment, SAKE802 is provided for the time slot scrambling that the digital copies of music, recreation and/or film was bought or borrowed to authorized user.In this case, using the advantage of SAKE is to prevent that unauthorized side from obtaining to stick on the copy of music, recreation and/or film in the website.
In operation, when for example user want from website's purchase software, SAKE at first verified the user, and it can comprise biometric identification process.After the identity of verified users, SAKE informs website's request of access and security code.After confirming request of access and security code, can on Internet810, set up network service by the website that ISP works with SAKE.Subsequently encrypted public key is forwarded to the user's for confirmation of website true identity from SAKE.As long as confirm this user identity by the website, it sends to SAKE with the software of being asked through the host computer system of SAKE.After receiving this software, it directly is stored in the flash memory that has the limited SAKE that maybe can't find out in the host computer system.
The advantage of using SAKE to serve as anti-piracy device be prevent on the unauthorized copying Internet information.Using another advantage of SAKE is only directly institute's downloaded contents to be stored among the SAKE, thereby after disconnecting SAKE from host computer system, can't search on host computer system.Another advantage is allowing on the user access network, before the senior content on Internet or the Intranet, adopts individual and biological information to verify the user.
Fig. 9 is according to one embodiment of present invention, the block diagram of example explanation SAKE900.SAKE900 comprises micro-control unit (" MCU ") 901, flash memory 922, USB connector (plug-in unit) 916 and biology sensor 920.MCU901 further comprises processor 902, internal storage 904, tamper proof unit 906, encryption/decryption element 908, hashing algorithm 910, biometric verification 912 and USB controller 914.In one embodiment, on single chip, make processor 902, internal storage 904, tamper proof unit 906, encryption/decryption element 908, hashing algorithm 910, biometric verification 912 and USB controller 914.Use various bus 930-938 to come in SAKE900, to connect each unit.To one skilled in the art, also can be increased on the SAKE900 be conspicuous to other functional blocks.
Processor 902 is connected on the 930-932 bus, is used for transmitting information back and forth with each parts.Processor 902 comprises microprocessor, processor, CPU (central processing unit) or digital processing element, such as Pentium TM, PowerPC TM, Alpha TMOr the like.Processor 902 is by the data stream of execution command control SAKE900.In one embodiment, processor 902 is carried out the navigation software that can be stored in the internal storage 904, is used for control data stream.
Internal storage 904 is to be designed to store verification msg in one embodiment, such as the flash memory of PKI, private key and biological template etc.It should be noted that PKI, private key and biological template are loaded in the internal storage 904 during setting or initialization SAKE900.Internal storage 904 is connected to processor 902 by private bus 932, is used for fast data store and extraction.In another embodiment, internal storage 904 is connected to processor 902 by system bus 930.Biological template comprises fingerprint and/or iris templates.In another embodiment, internal storage 904 storages are used for controlling the navigation software of the data stream between ISP and SAKE.Navigation software also is responsible for showing these data then from flash memory 922 retrieve data.
Biology sensor 920 is connected to biometric authentication unit 912 through bus 936, and wherein biology sensor 920 detects from user biological information or figure.For example, detect fingerprint image as the fingerprint sensor of biology sensor from the user of current positive control SAKE900.As long as obtain user's fingerprint, it is forwarded to biometric verification unit 912 from fingerprint sensor, be used to verify the user.As long as receive biological information, biometric verification unit 912 is storer 904 internally, and treated device 902 extracts biological template, such as fingerprint template and relative biological template, the biological information that checking just in time receives.To verify that the result is forwarded to processor 902.It should be noted that during initialization SAKE, load biological template.
USB controller 914 is connected to system bus 930 and USB connector 916 through private bus 938.USB controller 914 is designed to control communicating by letter between SAKE900 and host computer system, and is not shown in Fig. 9.USB connector 916 is the USB plug-in unit that can be directly connected to the USB port of host computer system in one embodiment.USB connector 916 is designed to support the whole weight of SAKE and inserts in the USB port simultaneously.Be further noted that and when SAKE inserts the USB port of host computer system, only a part of SAKE inserted host computer system.
Hashing algorithm 910 is connected to system bus 930 so that carry out hash function.Hashing algorithm 910 is the hashing algorithm of standard in one embodiment, is designed to Hash public keys such as secure Hash standard (SHS) and before on the Internet they being sent to their destinations.
Flash memory 922 is connected to MCU901 and is configured to store mass data through bus 934.For example, flash memory 922 can be stored and reach 1 GB.In one embodiment, flash memory 922 has the ability of high capacity storage and can directly be stored in the flash memory 922 from the ISP data downloaded.For protected data is avoided steal, before it being stored in the flash memory 922, enciphered data.Encryption/decryption element 908 is connected to system bus 930 and is connected to flash memory 922 through bus 934.In one embodiment, the encryption/decryption element 908 that can be the Standard Encryption sign indicating number is before being stored in flash memory 922, according to the encrypted private key data.Encryption/decryption element 908 also is used for after extracting data from flash memory 922, according to the private key data decryption.
Tamper proof unit 906 is connected on the system bus 930.The function of tamper proof unit 906 is designed to work as, detects and use high temperature, voltage and/or frequency is altered or during steal SAKE, tamper proof unit 906 deletions are stored in the data in internal storage 904 and the flash memory 922.In one embodiment, tamper proof unit 906 comprises can detect abnormality, exceeds the sensor of specification such as voltage, frequency and temperature.
Figure 10 is according to one embodiment of present invention, and the example explanation provides flow process Figure 100 of the method for data access control on the network.At piece 1002, process is connected to digital processing system with opertaing device.In one aspect, opertaing device is SAKE, and it comprises USB connector, MCU, flash memory and biology sensor.USB connector is used for being directly connected on the USB port of digital processing system of the host computer system of serving as SAKE.This process enters piece 1004.
At piece 1004, biology sensor detects user biological information and the biological information that is detected is forwarded to biometric verification unit.Biometric verification unit is verified the biological information that is detected with respect to the biological template that is stored in the internal storage.Behind identifying user identity, this means biological information such as fingerprint and biological template coupling, process enters piece 1006.
At piece 1006, process is the memory search initialization information internally.In one embodiment, initialization information comprises security code and PKI.Can be used between SAKE and ISP, setting up initial communication at the security code that changes between ISPs.Process enters piece 1008.
At piece 1008, security code is forwarded to relevant ISP to process and communication is set up in request.As long as form communication, PKI be forwarded to ISP real user for confirmation just communicate by letter with ISP.Process enters piece 1010.
At piece 1010, set up between SAKE and ISP communicate by letter and ISP prepares to carry out user's request.Process enters piece 1012.
At piece 1012, SAKE receives institute's information requested, such as the copy of digital books or film.After encrypting institute's information requested, process enters piece 1014.
At piece 1014, process is stored in institute's ciphered data in the flash memory of SAKE.Process enters next piece.
Figure 11 is the process flow diagram of each step of the embodiment of expression verification method of the present invention.In currently preferred embodiment, the user uses following with reference to the described proof procedure of Figure 11, and request is also downloaded limited content to the SAKE equipment of distributing to that user from content server.As mentioned above, limited content can be any of various information, such as copyrighted data (for example, newspaper, books, magazine, music, film, software, recreation or the like), confidential records (such as the medical treatment, finance), privately owned business information (for example, personal document, technical design, trade connection or the like), before permitting visit, require the content of paying or age verification and any other information that requires access control.
In step 1105, for starting this proof procedure, the user utilizes the embodiment of verification method of the present invention, accessed content supplier's log-on webpage.Usually, the user uses general purpose I nternet browser software (for example, the Microsoft Internet Explorer) WWW of navigating that is installed on the client computer that is connected to Internet.For visiting specified log in page, the user imports the web page address (for example, URL address) of log in page or clicks hyperlink or the bookmark that points to that address.According to specific application, client computer can be desk-top computer, laptop computer, PDA(Personal Digital Assistant), point of sale (POS) terminal, TV, game console, network information station or allow the user and the equipment of interactive any other permission network of content server.In one embodiment, log in page is stored on the content server and is programmed to comprise " login " button or link, when clicking, makes content server generate the order that starts proof procedure.Therefore, the user clicks " login " button so that the starting proof procedure.
In step 1110, SAKE equipment in one embodiment, comprises that the USB plug-in unit of the USB port of inserting client computer receives order from content server.Communicating by letter of content server and SAKE equipment room set up in this order.This order is used for also informing that the preparation of SAKE device content server receives the information that belongs to proof procedure from SAKE equipment.
In step 1115, SAKE equipment is captured biological information through embedding the biology sensor of SAKE equipment from the user.In current preferred embodiment, biology sensor is the embedding fingerprint sensor on the upper surface of SAKE equipment.When the user is placed on his/her thumb on the sensor, catch fingerprint, be used for device authentication, as below will be described in the step 1120 by SAKE.Although described fingerprint as identity validation technology at this, should recognize according to the present invention, also can use other technology, such as iris scan based on biology.
In step 1120, with respect to the biological template of one or more authorized users of being stored, the biological information that verification is caught.In one embodiment, when SAKE equipment is assigned to authorized user, catches the fingerprint of that authorized user and store in the SAKE equipment as fingerprint template.In one embodiment, under the situation of supporting a plurality of authorized users, for single template is created and stored to each authorized user.After this, when people think limited content on the specified server of access SAKE equipment, by the finger-mark check machine in the SAKE equipment, with respect to the stored authorized user's of institute fingerprint template, that people's of verification fingerprint.
If in step 1120, determine that biological information (for example fingerprint) of being caught and the biological template of being stored are (or under the situation of a plurality of authorized users, when one or more templates) mating, so in step 1125, SAKE equipment is sent to content server with notice, shows the identity of verifying current user to server biologically.
In step 1130, SAKE equipment is from content server receiving equipment checking request.In a preferred embodiment, content server is sent to SAKE equipment with the device authentication request, as described in above-mentioned step 1125 after receiving the notice of subscriber authentication from SAKE equipment.
In step 1135, the SAKE device responds is in the described device authentication request of step 1130, device authentication replied be sent to content server.Importantly, device authentication is replied and is allowed SAKE equipment and content server to finish checking to shake hands.The SAKE device programming also can be replied by the device authentication of its identification for the feature that generates specific content servers.Therefore, reply the verification of permission server and SAKE equipment suitably is assigned to the user who is used for the limited content on the access server.According to preferred embodiment, device authentication is replied and is comprised a plurality of checking sequences, and each sequence is separately transmitted to server.For example, after transmitting the first checking sequence, before transmitting next sequence itself, SAKE equipment can be waited for the affirmation sequence from server.Consider the dirigibility of personalized aspect, in checking is shaken hands, can use the sequence of arbitrary number.In a preferred embodiment, the different content server has different checkings with their corresponding SAKE equipment shakes hands, and consequently the appointment SAKE equipment that distributes for specific content servers can not be used for the limited content on another content server of access.
In step 1140, SAKE equipment receives key request from content server.In a preferred embodiment, when finishing the checking described in the above-mentioned steps 1135 and shake hands, content server is sent to SAKE equipment with key request.In other words, when content server was concluded the legal SAKE equipment of doing for oneself the request source that is used for limited content that purpose suitably distributing, server sent to SAKE equipment with key request.
In step 1145, the SAKE device responds is sent to content server in the key request described in the above-mentioned steps 1140 with first key of representing user identity.This first key allows server to confirm user's identity.In a preferred embodiment, first key is the third-party key holder's of unique identification a PKI (for example, employed under public-key architectures or PKI), such as content server in this case.In one embodiment, use the secure Hash algorithm that preferably is stored in the non-volatile solid-state memory, before being sent to content server, Hash public keys.Should recognize according to the present invention, can carry out key verification by content server itself or the evaluation authorities (" CA ") by the represent content server.
In step 1150, SAKE equipment receives limited content from content server as requested.In one embodiment, receive limited content as one or more data stream by SAKE equipment.In other words, by streaming content is sent to SAKE equipment from content server.
Should recognize according to above preferred embodiment, content server only sends to limited content SAKE equipment after the good authentication of user's successful authentication, content server and SAKE equipment room is shaken hands and used the successful verification of user identity of unique key such as PKI.Aforesaid three level verification processes of the present invention provide stronger safeguard protection, prevent that unauthorized access is stored in the limited content on the content server.
In step 1155, the content that the SAKE devices encrypt receives from content server.In a preferred embodiment, use second key of expression user identity, carry out and encrypt.In one embodiment, second key is the private key that is assigned to this user.
In step 1160, SAKE equipment is stored in encrypted content in its storer.The content of maintaining secrecy and to be stored prevents unauthorized access, because it is in encrypted form and there not being second key (for example private key) not decipher, described in step 1155.In one embodiment, the content stores of being encrypted is in non-volatile solid-state memory.
In a preferred embodiment, SAKE equipment comprises that one or more voltage-level detectors, frequency detector and Temperature Detector (for example, thermometer, constant temperature meter) so that further protect institute's canned data, prevent to alter.The running parameter of these detector monitors voltages, frequency and temperature.Should recognize that common hacking technique comprises change ambient voltage, frequency and/or temperature, wherein memory device is attempted to operate so that obtain the data that unauthorized access is stored.Therefore, according to this embodiment, during one or more running parameter outside detecting device detects the normal range of operation that drops on specified they, SAKE unit deletion or destroy enciphered data in this storage, alternatively, be first key, second key and biological template.This data self destruction feature provides and prevents that unauthorized access is stored in the defence bottom line of the limited content in the SAKE equipment.
Importantly, the content that receives from content server directly enters SAKE equipment and is not stored on the client computer in any form.Internet browser is served as the conduit of the data transmission of content server and SAKE equipment room.It is transparent and content neither is shown to the user in browser that data transmit the user, do not allow to use yet browser interface with content stores on client computer.In a preferred embodiment, transmit data by streaming, it provides the other protection that prevents steal, because under the situation of malicious intercepted, can not have a mind to the free burial ground for the destitute partial data stream that collects again.In one embodiment, by the enciphered data that browser (using the standard decryption protocol such as DES, AES, 3-DS) deciphering receives from server, before storage, use encrypted private key then by SAKE equipment.In another embodiment, the enciphered data former state is delivered to SAKE equipment, it can be carried out other deciphering and/or encrypt again.Be stored in limited content in the SAKE equipment and can not copy to another storage medium that is connected to client computer with encrypted form.In addition, only after by biosensors and collator identifying user identity, just allow retrieve data.
As long as content is stored in SAKE equipment secretly, authorized user can be by successfully transmitting biometric authentication, this content of acquisition access, thus make content that the SAKE device decrypts is stored and make it flow to appropriate application program to be used for processing.For example, deciphering music file or movie file also flow to media player, is used for resetting.The deciphering executable file is then by the SAKE equipment operation.Declassified document is so that by viewer/directly browse from the word processor of SAKE equipment.Therefore, content is still in SAKE equipment, and data stream is under the SAKE device control, so that prevent unauthorized access.In another embodiment, the encrypted content that flows is used for by the appropriate application program processing non-decrypting.In this embodiment, provide the personalized application that to handle encrypted content program.
In the above description, the present invention has been described with reference to its concrete exemplary embodiment.Yet under the situation that does not deviate from more wide region of the present invention, it is conspicuous can making various improvement and modification.Therefore, instructions and accompanying drawing should be considered as exemplary rather than limited significance.

Claims (56)

1. one kind is used on information network providing the method for carrying out data access control from long-range informant's information to sending to the digital processing system of subscriber's local, comprising:
(a) opertaing device is connected to described digital processing system;
(b) by carrying out user authentication process, obtain user identity;
(c) when the described user identity of checking, from first storage unit retrieval initialization information of opertaing device;
(d),, described initialization information is provided to described informant by described digital processing system through described information network;
(e) when receiving the affirmation of user identity, between described opertaing device and informant, set up and communicate by letter;
(f) from described informant's acquired information; And
(g) with described information stores in second storage unit of described opertaing device.
2. the method for claim 1 wherein saidly is connected to digital processing system with opertaing device and comprises that further the universal serial bus protocol connector with described opertaing device is connected to the USB jack of described digital processing system so that communication.
3. method as claimed in claim 2, wherein said method further comprise described digital processing system are connected in internet, Intranet, wide area network and the LAN (Local Area Network) at least one.
4. method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said step by execution user authentication process acquisition user identity further comprises:
Start fingerprint detector and detect user fingerprints;
Obtain described user fingerprints from described fingerprint detector;
Described first storage unit retrieval file fingerprint from described opertaing device; And
Respond described file fingerprint, the checking user fingerprints.
5. method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said step by execution user authentication process acquisition user identity further comprises:
Start the iris detection device so that detect user's iris;
Obtain the scanning of described user's iris from described iris detection device;
Described first storage unit retrieval iris file from described opertaing device; And
Respond described iris file, verify described user's iris.
6. the method for claim 1 wherein saidly provides the step of initialization information further to comprise to the informant:
Retrieve the security code relevant with described informant;
Described security code is sent to described informant;
Retrieve the PKI relevant with described informant; And
Before described PKI is sent to described informant, the described Gong Keying of hash.
7. method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said step from informant's acquired information further comprises:
The online transaction request is sent to described informant; And
Respond described online transaction request, receive described information.
8. method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said step from informant's acquired information further comprises:
The request that will be used to visit limited internet sites sends to described informant; And
After the verification described request, the response described request receives described information.
9. method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said step from informant's acquired information further comprises:
To serve or upgrade request sends to described informant; And
After the verification described request, the response described request receives described information.
10. the method for claim 1 further comprises the operation navigation software so that show described information in described second storage unit that is stored in described opertaing device.
11. anti-piracy method that controlled propagation information also further is provided by computer network according to claim 1, wherein said opertaing device exists with the form of storage and anti-piracy device, and described local digital disposal system also is a local host system, and wherein:
Step (a) comprises and connects the device to host computer system;
Step (b) comprises from fingerprint sensor acquisition user fingerprints, and comes the verified users identity according to the finger print data in first storage unit that is stored in described equipment;
Step (c) comprises described first storage unit retrieval and described subscriber-related PKI from described equipment;
Step (d) comprises machine network as calculated, by described host computer system, described PKI is provided to described informant;
Step (e) comprises when receiving the message of verification PKI, sets up between described equipment and informant and communicates by letter;
12. method as claimed in claim 11, the step that wherein connects the device to host computer system comprises that further the universal serial bus protocol connector with described equipment is connected to the USB jack of described host computer system so that communication.
13. method as claimed in claim 12, wherein said method further comprises at least one that is connected in internet, Intranet, wide area network and the LAN (Local Area Network).
14. method as claimed in claim 11 wherein saidly further comprises the step that described PKI is provided to described informant by described host computer system through described computer network:
Security code is sent to described informant; And
Before sending described PKI, the described PKI of hash.
15. method as claimed in claim 11, the step of wherein retrieving described PKI further comprises:
Retrieval and the extra relevant PKI of described informant; And
Before described PKI is sent to described informant, the described PKI of hash.
16. method as claimed in claim 11, wherein said step from described informant's acquired information further comprises:
The online transaction request is sent to described informant; And
Respond described online transaction request, receive described information.
17. method as claimed in claim 11, wherein said step from informant's acquired information further comprises:
The request that will be used to visit limited internet sites sends to described informant; And
After the verification described request, the response described request receives described information.
18. method as claimed in claim 11, wherein said step from informant's acquired information further comprises:
To serve or upgrade request sends to described informant; And
After the verification described request, the response described request receives described information.
19. method as claimed in claim 11, wherein said with information stores before the step of second storage unit of described equipment further is included in described second storage unit of described information stores at described equipment, response private key and encrypt described information.
20. method as claimed in claim 11 further comprises:
Retrieve described information from described second storage unit of described equipment;
Decipher described information; And
The operation navigation software is so that show described information.
21. the method for claim 1 further comprises:
Detect when altering when one in voltage, frequency and the temperature testing equipment, the tamperproof sign indicating number is loaded into carries out in the sequence; And
Carry out described tamperproof sign indicating number.
22. method as claimed in claim 13 comprises that further deletion is stored in the data in internal storage and the flash memory when altering when deleted.
23. storage and anti-piracy device, it is configured and operationally is used for enforcement of rights and requires each described method among the 1-22.
24. one kind is used on information network providing the storage and the anti-piracy device of carrying out data access control from long-range informant's information to sending to the digital processing system of subscriber's local, operationally
Be attached to described digital processing system;
By carrying out user authentication process, obtain user identity;
When having verified described user identity, from first storage unit retrieval initialization information of described control and anti-piracy device;
Through described information network,, described initialization information is provided to described informant by described digital processing system;
When receiving the affirmation of user identity, between described control and anti-piracy device and informant, set up and communicate by letter;
From described informant's acquired information; And
With described information stores in second storage unit of described control and anti-piracy device.
25. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, comprising the universal serial bus protocol connector, this universal serial bus protocol connector is used for described control and anti-piracy device are connected to the USB jack of data handling system so that communicate by letter.
26. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, wherein said control and anti-piracy device are operationally carried out user authentication process by following process:
Start fingerprint detector and detect user fingerprints;
Obtain described user fingerprints from described fingerprint detector;
Described first storage unit retrieval file fingerprint from described control and anti-piracy device; And
Respond described file fingerprint, the checking user fingerprints.
27. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, wherein said and piracy prevention apparatus is operationally carried out user authentication process by following process:
Start the iris detection device so that detect user's iris;
Obtain the scanning of described user's iris from described iris detection device;
Described first storage unit retrieval iris file from described control and anti-piracy device; And
Respond described iris file, verify described user's iris.
28. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, wherein in order to provide initialization information to the informant, described storage and anti-piracy device are further operationally
Retrieve the security code relevant with described informant;
Described security code is sent to described informant;
Retrieve the PKI relevant with described informant; And
Before described PKI is sent to described informant, the described Gong Keying of hash.
29. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, wherein for from informant's acquired information, described storage and anti-piracy device are further operationally
The online transaction request is sent to described informant; And
Respond described online transaction request, receive described information.
30. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, wherein for from informant's acquired information, described storage and anti-piracy device are further operationally
The request that will be used to visit limited internet sites sends to described informant; And
After the verification described request, the response described request receives described information.
31. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, wherein for from informant's acquired information, described storage and anti-piracy device are further operationally
To serve or upgrade request sends to described informant; And
After the verification described request, the response described request receives described information.
32. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device are further operationally moved navigation software so that show described information in described second storage unit be stored in described opertaing device.
33. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, wherein before information is stored in second storage unit of described storage and anti-piracy device further operationally enciphered message to respond a private key.
34. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, when the operation navigation software, described storage and anti-piracy device are further operationally
Retrieve described information from described second storage unit of described storage and anti-piracy device; And
Decipher described information.
35. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device, described storage and anti-piracy device are further operationally
Detect when altering when one in voltage, frequency and the temperature testing equipment, the tamperproof sign indicating number is loaded into carries out in the sequence; And
Carry out described tamperproof sign indicating number.
36. storage as claimed in claim 35 and anti-piracy device, described storage and anti-piracy device are further operationally
Deletion is stored in data in internal storage and the flash memory, when altering when deleted.
37. storage as claimed in claim 24 and anti-piracy device further comprise:
Processor;
Be connected to the internal storage unit of described processor, be configured to store identity data;
Be connected to the fingerprint sensor that described processor also can read user fingerprints;
Be connected to the finger-mark check unit of described fingerprint sensor, be configured to come identifying user identity according to the verification msg that is stored in the described internal storage;
Be connected to the hashing algorithm unit of described processor, and it is configured to the PKI that hash is used to visit the information that is provided by the remote information supplier;
Be connected to the flash memory cell of described processor with the storage mass data, the information that is provided by described informant is provided described data; And
Be connected to the universal serial bus connector of described processor, be used to be connected to local host system with user interface, when described host computer system and informant were connected to computer network, described local host system communicated by described local host system and via described computer network and described informant.
38. storage as claimed in claim 37 and anti-piracy device, further comprise the encryption and decryption unit that is connected to described processor, be configured to respond described private key, encrypt the described information that receives from described informant with before described information stores is in described flash memory cell.
39. storage as claimed in claim 37 and anti-piracy device further comprise the encryption and decryption unit that is connected to described processor, are configured to before sending described information on the described network, deciphering is stored in the described information in the described flash memory cell.
40. storage as claimed in claim 37 and anti-piracy device, further comprise the tamper proof unit that is connected to described processor, one that is configured to when voltage, frequency and temperature testing equipment detects when altering state, destroys the data that are stored in described inside and the flash memory cell.
41. storage as claimed in claim 37 and anti-piracy device further comprise:
Be connected to described processor and be used for the finger-mark check unit of identifying user identity; And
Be connected to described processor and be configured to control the USB controller of communicating by letter between described equipment and described host computer system.
42. a method that is used for by the user access limited information, described method comprises step:
Portable memory apparatus is connected to the communication port of local client computer with user interface, described client computer can be connected to the remote content server on the network communicatedly, described content servers store limited information, described portable memory apparatus has position biosensors thereon also can be with respect to the stored authorized user's of institute biological template, the verified users identity;
Use described biosensors, catch the biological information of request;
The described portable memory apparatus checking described request person's who is provided identity is sent to described content server with first notice from described portable memory apparatus;
From described content server receiving equipment checking request, and in response to this, device authentication replied from described portable memory apparatus be sent to described content server, described device authentication is replied the checking that is used to finish between described content server and described portable memory apparatus and is shaken hands;
Receive key request from described content server, and in response to this, expression described request person's first key is sent to described content server from described portable memory apparatus, and described first key is used to allow described content server to confirm described request person's identity;
Receive described limited information from described content server;
Use second key of expression described request person's identity, encrypt described limited information; And
Form to encrypt stores described limited information in the described portable memory apparatus into, wherein, does not use described second key, can not decipher described institute storage encryption information.
43. method as claimed in claim 42, further be included in when detecting at least one running parameter and exceeding the predetermined rated working range, delete at least one step of described first key, described second key, described biological template and described enciphered data of storing, wherein, described at least one running parameter comprises voltage, frequency and temperature.
44. method as claimed in claim 42, further be included in send it to described content server before, the step of described first key of hash.
45. method as claimed in claim 44, resident secure Hash algorithm in the non-volatile solid-state memory in the wherein said portable memory apparatus, described secure Hash algorithm are used for described first key of hash.
46. method as claimed in claim 42, wherein said first key are the third-party described request person's of unique identification PKIs.
47. method as claimed in claim 42, wherein said second key are described request person's private keys.
48. method as claimed in claim 42, wherein said biological template comprises the finger print information of described authorized user.
49. being USB port and described portable memory apparatus, method as claimed in claim 42, the described communication port of wherein said client computer comprise the USB jack.
50. method as claimed in claim 42, wherein said enciphered message of storing reside in the non-volatile solid-state memory in the described portable memory apparatus.
51. replying, method as claimed in claim 42, wherein said device authentication comprise a plurality of checking sequences that are sent to described content server from described portable memory apparatus.
52. method as claimed in claim 42 wherein is sent to described portable memory apparatus with described limited information from described content server by streaming.
53. method as claimed in claim 42, wherein said limited information comprises copyright material.
54. method as claimed in claim 42, wherein said limited information comprises secret medical records.
55. method as claimed in claim 42, wherein said limited information comprises privately owned business information.
56. method as claimed in claim 42, further be included in receive described limited information by described content server before, finish the step of electronic cash transaction.
CNB038018209A 2002-07-31 2003-02-14 Data access method and apparatus for storing safety key enciphering (SAKE) equipment to control network Expired - Fee Related CN100401271C (en)

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PCT/SG2002/000227 WO2004015515A2 (en) 2002-07-31 2002-10-04 System and method for authentication
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US10/339,696 2003-01-08
US10/339,696 US7353399B2 (en) 2002-07-31 2003-01-08 Method and apparatus of storage anti-piracy key encryption (SAKE) device to control data access for networks

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