WO2024193372A1 - 伪基站识别方法、装置及电子设备 - Google Patents

伪基站识别方法、装置及电子设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2024193372A1
WO2024193372A1 PCT/CN2024/080889 CN2024080889W WO2024193372A1 WO 2024193372 A1 WO2024193372 A1 WO 2024193372A1 CN 2024080889 W CN2024080889 W CN 2024080889W WO 2024193372 A1 WO2024193372 A1 WO 2024193372A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
base station
target
target base
information
pseudo
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PCT/CN2024/080889
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
谢丁速
储圆圆
裴红周
罗建庭
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维沃移动通信有限公司
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Publication of WO2024193372A1 publication Critical patent/WO2024193372A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/08—Access point devices
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Definitions

  • the present application belongs to the field of communication technology, and specifically relates to a pseudo base station identification method, device and electronic equipment.
  • Fake base stations refer to illegal radio communication equipment that has not obtained telecommunications equipment access licenses and radio transmitter equipment model approvals.
  • a terminal is connected to a fake base station, it is easy to be disconnected from the network or receive spam information.
  • fake base stations are usually identified based on the strength of the electrical signal, and the above identification results have large errors.
  • the purpose of the embodiments of the present application is to provide a pseudo base station identification method, device and electronic device, which can improve the accuracy of pseudo base station identification results.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a method for identifying a pseudo base station, including:
  • the target base station When the response of the target base station to the target request message satisfies a second condition, the target base station is determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a pseudo base station identification device, including:
  • a receiving module used for receiving a system message sent by a target base station
  • a sending module configured to send a target request message to the target base station when the operator tag carried by the system message meets a first condition, wherein the target request message is used to request the target base station to allow execution of a target process, wherein the target process is a process for executing a target service;
  • the determination module is used to determine the target base station as a pseudo base station when the response of the target base station to the target request message meets the second condition.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, which includes a processor, a memory, and a program or instruction stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the program or instruction is executed by the processor. When executed, the steps of the method described in the first aspect are implemented.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a readable storage medium, on which a program or instruction is stored, and when the program or instruction is executed by a processor, the steps of the method described in the first aspect are implemented.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a chip, comprising a processor and a communication interface, wherein the communication interface is coupled to the processor, and the processor is used to run a program or instruction to implement the method described in the first aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a computer program product, which is stored in a storage medium and is executed by at least one processor to implement the method described in the first aspect.
  • the target base station when the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition and the response of the target base station to the target request message meets the second condition, it means that the target base station meets the characteristics of a pseudo base station, that is, the probability that the target base station is a pseudo base station is relatively high. At this time, the target base station is determined to be a pseudo base station. In this way, the accuracy of the identification result of the pseudo base station can be improved.
  • FIG1 is a flow chart of a pseudo base station identification method provided by some embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG2 is a flow chart of a pseudo base station identification method provided by some embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG3 is a flow chart of a pseudo base station identification method provided by some embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG4 is a flow chart of a pseudo base station identification method provided by some embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG5 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a pseudo base station identification device provided in some embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG6 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a pseudo base station identification device provided in some embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in some embodiments of the present application.
  • FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in some embodiments of the present application.
  • first, second, etc. in the specification and claims of this application are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchangeable under appropriate circumstances, so that the embodiments of the present application can be implemented in an order other than those illustrated or described here, and the objects distinguished by "first”, “second”, etc. are generally of one type, and the number of objects is not limited.
  • the first object can be one or more.
  • “and/or” in the specification and claims represents at least one of the connected objects, and the character “/" generally indicates that the objects associated with each other are in an "or” relationship.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a pseudo base station identification method provided in an embodiment of the present application, as shown in FIG. 1 , comprising the following steps:
  • Step 101 Receive a system message sent by a target base station.
  • the embodiments of the present application can be applied to target electronic devices, that is to say, the steps in the embodiments of the present application can be executed by the target electronic device, and the specific type of the target electronic device is not limited here.
  • the above-mentioned target electronic device can be a mobile phone, a tablet computer (Tablet Personal Computer), a laptop computer (Laptop Computer), a personal digital assistant (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA), a mobile Internet device (Mobile Internet Device, MID) or a wearable device (Wearable Device), etc.
  • the target base station can be any base station.
  • the target base station can send a system message to an electronic device within the radiation range of the target base station. Therefore, the target base station can be any base station whose operator tag carried in the sent system message meets the first condition or does not meet the first condition.
  • the target base station can be a 4th generation mobile communication technology (4G) base station, a 5th generation mobile communication technology (5G) base station, or a 6th generation mobile communication technology (6G) base station.
  • the system information can be called a system message (System Information Block, SIB1), and SIB1 can carry the operator tag supported by the target base station, and the operator tag can refer to the operator network corresponding to the operator tag that the target base station can support, and the above operator tag can refer to the public land mobile network (Public Land Mobile Network, PLMN).
  • SIB1 can also include scheduling information and initial access information of other system blocks.
  • Step 102 When the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition, send a target request message to the target base station, wherein the target request message is used to request the target base station to allow execution of target processing, where the target processing is processing for executing a target service.
  • the specific content of the operator tag carried by the system message satisfying the first condition is not limited here.
  • the first condition includes at least one of the following: the number of operator tags carried by the system message is greater than a first threshold; the system message carries at least two operator tags, and the tag combination composed of the at least two operator tags is the same as any alternative operator tag combination.
  • the number of operator tags carried by the system message is greater than a first threshold, it is determined that the operator tags carried by the system message meet the first condition. For example, there are a total of 4 operators in the area where the target electronic device is located. The number of operation tags of the system message is 4, and the first threshold is 3. Thus, it can be determined that the number of operation tags of the system message is greater than the first threshold, that is, it can be determined that the operator tags carried by the system message meet the first condition.
  • the system message carries at least two operator tags
  • the tag combination composed of the at least two operator tags is the same as any alternative operator tag combination, then it is determined that the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition.
  • the tag combination can be a combination composed of at least two tags.
  • the area where the target electronic device is located includes a total of 4 operators A, B, C and D.
  • the alternative operator tag combination may include at least one of the first combination and the second combination, the first combination is a combination of A, B, C, and the second combination is a combination of A, B, C and D. In this way, when the combination of operator tags carried by the system message is a combination of A, B, C, or a combination of A, B, C and D, it can be determined that the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition.
  • the alternative operator label combination may also include at least one of the following combinations: a third combination, a fourth combination, a fifth combination, a sixth combination, a seventh combination and an eighth combination, the third combination being a combination of A and B, the fourth combination being a combination of B and C, the fifth combination being a combination of C and D, the sixth combination being a combination of A and C, the seventh combination being a combination of A and D, and the eighth combination being a combination of B and D.
  • the combination of operator labels carried by the system message is at least one of the third combination, fourth combination, fifth combination, sixth combination, seventh combination and eighth combination, it can be determined that the operator label carried by the system message meets the first condition.
  • A, B, and C may be operators with a long operating time, and D may be a newly established operator.
  • A, B, and C may refer to China Mobile (CMCC), China Unicom (CU), and China Telecom (CT) respectively, and D may refer to China Broadcasting Network Corporation (CBN).
  • CCC China Mobile
  • CU China Unicom
  • CT China Telecom
  • CBN China Broadcasting Network Corporation
  • the process of judging whether the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition is that, in order to increase the connectivity rate with the target electronic device, a fake base station usually supports as many networks of operators as possible, while a normal base station usually supports fewer networks of operators.
  • the target base station supports a large number of networks of operators, that is, the number of operator tags carried by the system message is greater than the first threshold, or the system message carries at least two operator tags, and the tag combination composed of at least two operator tags is the same as any alternative operator tag combination, then it can be determined that the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition, and when the target base station's response to the target request message meets the second condition, it can be judged by combining the above conditions that the target base station is likely to be a fake base station, thereby improving the accuracy of the fake base station identification result.
  • Step 103 When the response of the target base station to the target request message satisfies a second condition, determine the target base station as a pseudo base station.
  • the second condition includes Include at least one of the following:
  • a second reply message from the target base station to the target request message is received, the information content of the second reply message does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than a second threshold.
  • fake base stations can be understood as illegal radio communication equipment that has not obtained telecommunications equipment access licenses and radio transmission equipment model approvals. It uses itself as the center to search for information about electronic devices within a certain radius, and uses the numbers of other electronic device users to forcibly send various short messages to the user's electronic devices.
  • the above short messages may include fraudulent information, promotional information, and sensitive information.
  • the target electronic device when the target electronic device is connected to a fake base station, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) will be lost, reducing user privacy; when the signal of the target electronic device is forcibly connected by the fake base station, it will be disconnected from the network for 8 to 12 seconds, and the target electronic device needs to be restarted before it can re-enter the network and connect to a normal base station, which reduces the network adaptability experience of the target electronic device; when the fake base station captures the target electronic device, it can use other people's numbers to forcibly push a large number of spam text messages to the target electronic device.
  • IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
  • IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
  • the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition and the response of the target base station to the target request message meets the second condition, it means that the target base station meets the characteristics of a pseudo base station, that is, the probability that the target base station is a pseudo base station is relatively high.
  • the target base station is determined to be a pseudo base station. In this way, the accuracy of the identification result of the pseudo base station can be improved.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the first reply information is used to instruct the target base station to allow execution of the target processing.
  • the target base station when the first reply information of the target base station to the target request message is not received, it can be recognized that If the target base station ignores the target request message sent by the target electronic device, or the target base station cannot correctly reply to the first reply message based on the target request message, the probability that the target base station is a fake base station increases, and thus the target base station can be determined as a fake base station, thereby improving the accuracy of the identification result of the fake base station.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the first moment is the moment when the target request message is sent to the target base station, the second moment is later than the first moment, and the second moment is separated from the first moment by a first time length.
  • the specific value of the first duration is not limited here.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the target base station is determined to be a pseudo base station, and the first moment is the moment of sending the target request message to the target base station.
  • the target base station when no first reply information is received within a preset time period from the first moment of sending a target request message to the target base station, the target base station can be determined as a pseudo base station. In this way, the resource overhead of the target electronic device can be saved, and at the same time, the diversity of the determination methods of determining the target base station as a pseudo base station is increased.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the target base station is determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the target base station is determined to be a pseudo base station. In this way, the target base station can be distinguished as a normal base station. However, the target electronic device is located outside the preset range of the target base station, resulting in the phenomenon that the first reply information cannot be received, thereby further improving the accuracy of the determination result of the pseudo base station.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the second reply information is used to indicate that the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing.
  • the specific content of the target service is not limited here, and the type of the target base station and the target service may correspond to each other.
  • the target service may include at least one of the following: Tracking Area Update (TAU), ATTACH request, and Service Request (SR).
  • TAU Tracking Area Update
  • SR Service Request
  • the target service may include at least one of the following: Registration Request (Register Request, RegReq), and Service Request (SR).
  • the first target information may include at least one of the following: cause#13 (Roaming not allowed in this tracking area), and cause#15 (No suitable cells in tracking area).
  • the first target information may be the information content of the second reply information, or the first target information may be the rejection reason information included in the information content of the second reply information, and the rejection reason information may be the reason information replied by the target base station.
  • the rejection reason information may also include at least one of the following: cause#13 (Roaming not allowed in this tracking area), and cause#15 (No suitable cells in tracking area).
  • the target base station when the target base station does not allow the target electronic device to perform target processing, and the information content of the second reply information matches the first target information, the target base station can be accurately determined to be a fake base station, thereby further improving the accuracy of the fake base station identification result.
  • the target base station is a normal base station and the normal base station does not allow the target electronic device to perform target processing, the information content of the second reply information will usually not match the first target information. Therefore, if the information content of the second reply information matches the first target information, it can be directly determined that the target base station is a fake base station.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the target base station After receiving the second reply information of the target base station to the target request message, and the second reply information carries When the tag information carried matches the first target tag information, the target base station is determined to be a pseudo base station;
  • the second reply information is used to indicate that the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing
  • the tag information carried in the second reply information is used to indicate the reason why the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing.
  • the first target label information can refer to the description of the above-mentioned first target information, that is, the first target label information can be at least one of the following: cause#13 (Roaming not allowed in this tracking area), and cause#15 (No suitable cells in tracking area).
  • the target base station when the target base station does not allow the target electronic device to perform the target processing, and the tag information carried by the second reply information matches the first target tag information, the target base station can be accurately determined to be a fake base station, thereby further improving the accuracy of the fake base station identification result.
  • the diversity and flexibility of the method for determining the fake base station can be further improved.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the second reply information is used to indicate that the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing
  • the tag information carried in the second reply information is used to indicate the reason why the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing.
  • the rejection reason information that the target base station does not allow the target electronic device to perform target processing includes at least one of the following: cause #13 (Roaming not allowed in this tracking area), and cause #15 (No suitable cells in tracking area).
  • the target base station when the target base station does not allow the target electronic device to perform the target processing, and the classification carried by the second reply information of the reply belongs to the first target classification, the target base station can be accurately determined to be a pseudo base station, thereby further improving the accuracy of the pseudo base station identification result. In addition, the diversity and flexibility of the pseudo base station determination method can be further improved.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the information content of the second reply information does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than a preset threshold, determining the target base station as a pseudo base station;
  • the second reply information is used to indicate that the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing.
  • the types of the target base stations are different, and the types of the periodic location update timers may also be different, that is, the types of the periodic location update timers and the types of the target base stations may correspond one to one.
  • the periodic location update timer may be a T3412 timer
  • the periodic location update timer may be a T3512 timer
  • the pseudo base station since the pseudo base station needs to increase the frequency of periodic location updates, that is, shorten the location update interval duration, in order to connect more electronic devices, and the periodic location update frequency of the normal base station is low, that is, the location update interval duration of the normal base station is usually longer, therefore, when the information content of the second reply information does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than the preset threshold, it can be determined that the frequency of periodic location updates of the target base station is high and the location update interval duration is short, that is, the probability that the target base station is a pseudo base station is high. In this way, the accuracy of the identification result of the pseudo base station can be further improved.
  • the periodic location update timer may be a T3412 timer
  • the preset threshold may generally be 60 minutes
  • the information of the first target information may include at least one of the following: cause#13 (Roaming not allowed in this tracking area) and cause#15 (No suitable cells in tracking area), and the information content of the second reply message does not match the content of the above-mentioned first target information, but it is detected that the location update interval of the T3412 timer is 6 minutes, which is less than the preset threshold value of 60 minutes, then the target base station can be determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the target base station is a normal base station or a suspicious base station.
  • the periodic location update timer can be a T3512 timer
  • the preset threshold can generally be 60 minutes.
  • the information of the first target information can include at least one of the following: cause#13 (Roaming not allowed in this tracking area) and cause#15 (No suitable cells in tracking area), and the information content of the second reply message does not match the content of the above-mentioned first target information, but it is detected that the location update interval of the T3512 timer is 12 minutes, which is less than the preset threshold value of 60 minutes, then the target base station can be determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the target base station is a normal base station or a suspicious base station.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the suspicious base station is determined as Fake base station.
  • the suspicious base station can also be called a suspected pseudo base station, that is, the status of the suspicious base station has not been determined. It may be a pseudo base station or a normal base station, and further judgment is required.
  • the target base station when the location update interval duration is greater than or equal to a preset threshold, the target base station can be determined as a suspicious base station.
  • the suspicious base station when the information received from the target base station includes sensitive information, the suspicious base station can be corrected to a pseudo base station, thereby improving the accuracy of the identification result of the pseudo base station.
  • the suspicious base station can be determined as a fake base station, and the sensitive information may include fraudulent information, sales information, advertising information and other information.
  • the method is applied to a target electronic device, and after determining the target base station as a pseudo base station, the method further includes:
  • the third moment is the moment when the target base station is stored in the pseudo base station list, the fourth moment is later than the third moment, and the fourth moment is the moment when the target electronic device is restarted.
  • the fake base station list can also be called a fake base station blacklist.
  • the target base station after determining that the target base station is a pseudo base station, the target base station can be saved in a list of pseudo base stations, thereby managing and controlling the target base station, so that the target base station is prohibited from communicating with the target electronic device from the third moment to the fourth moment.
  • the interference of the target base station on the communication between the target electronic device and the normal base station can be reduced, thereby improving the communication security of the target electronic device.
  • the sensitive information sent by the target base station to the target electronic device can also be reduced, thereby enhancing the usage performance of the target electronic device.
  • the target base station can be removed from the list of pseudo base stations, that is, the communication between the target base station and the target electronic device is no longer prohibited.
  • a control method for removing the target base station from the list of pseudo base stations can be provided, that is, when the target base station is mistakenly added to the list of pseudo base stations, the target electronic device can be restarted to remove the target base station from the list of pseudo base stations, providing a method for correcting errors in the list of pseudo base stations.
  • the third moment is the moment when the target base station is stored in the pseudo base station list.
  • the fourth moment is 2:30. Therefore, during the period from 2 o'clock to 2:30, the target base station is prohibited from communicating with the target electronic device.
  • the fourth time is 2:30 on the next day.
  • the target base station is prohibited from communicating with the target electronic device.
  • the method further includes at least one of the following:
  • the second target information of the target base station is sent to a server, so that the server instructs an electronic device to forward the second target information.
  • the second target information of the target base station may include at least one of the following information: physical-layer Cell Identity (PCI), cell identity (Cell Identity, Cell ID), tracking area code (Tracking Area Code, TAC), and location information, and the above location information may be the latitude and longitude information of the target base station.
  • PCI physical-layer Cell Identity
  • Cell Identity Cell Identity
  • Cell ID Cell ID
  • TAC Track Area Code
  • location information may be the latitude and longitude information of the target base station.
  • big data is buried for the second target information of the target base station, so that the interaction between the target base station and other electronic devices can be tracked, so as to better monitor the target base station and enhance the prevention and control effect of the target base station.
  • the data of the pseudo base station can also be collected, thereby providing more data support for the prevention and control of the pseudo base station, thereby enhancing the prevention and control effect of the pseudo base station.
  • the number distribution of pseudo base stations in each city can be collected and reported to the server of the relevant agency, so that each pseudo base station can be monitored and controlled at a fixed point.
  • the data of the pseudo base station collected above may include at least one of the following information: physical-layer Cell Identity (PCI), cell identification information (Cell Identity, Cell ID), tracking area code (TAC) and longitude and latitude information.
  • PCI physical-layer Cell Identity
  • Cell Identity Cell Identity
  • Cell ID Cell ID
  • TAC tracking area code
  • the second target information of the target base station is sent to the server so that the server instructs an electronic device to forward the second target information, that is, the second target information can be shared with other electronic devices.
  • the recognition effect of the target base station by other electronic devices can be enhanced, and the connection between other electronic devices and the target base station can be reduced, resulting in the phenomenon that the performance of other electronic devices is deteriorated.
  • the method after receiving the system message sent by the target base station, the method further includes:
  • M is not limited here.
  • the value of M can be 3.
  • the above-mentioned suspicious base station may also be referred to as a suspected pseudo base station, that is, the suspicious base station may be a pseudo base station or may not be a pseudo base station.
  • the target base station when M target request messages are all ignored by the target base station, it is possible that the communication link between the target base station and the target electronic device is blocked, resulting in the target electronic device not receiving the target base station's response message to the M target request messages, or the target base station cannot correctly give a response message to the M target request messages and directly ignores the M target request messages. Therefore, at this time, the target base station can be determined as a suspicious base station, that is, it is necessary to further determine the type of the suspicious base station to avoid the occurrence of the phenomenon of misjudgment caused by directly determining the target base station as a normal base station or a pseudo base station.
  • the method is applied to a target electronic device, and after determining the target base station as a suspicious base station, the method further includes:
  • the target base station is saved in a list of suspicious base stations to prohibit the target base station from communicating with the target electronic device from a fifth moment to a sixth moment, wherein the fifth moment is the moment when the target base station is added to the list of suspicious base stations, the sixth moment is later than the fifth moment, and the sixth moment is separated from the fifth moment by a second time period.
  • the communication between the target base station and the target electronic device may be temporarily prohibited, and the prohibition duration is the second duration.
  • the specific value of the second duration is not limited here.
  • the second duration can be any value between 60 minutes and 180 minutes.
  • the communication between the target base station and the target electronic device can be temporarily prohibited to reduce the interference of the target base station on the communication between the target electronic device and other normal base stations, thereby ensuring that the communication performance between the target electronic device and other normal base stations is better.
  • the method further includes:
  • the target base station is determined as a normal base station, where N is an integer greater than 1 and less than M;
  • the normal base station is determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the target base station When at least one target request message among the M target request messages is responded by the target base station, it can be determined that the target base station is a normal base station.
  • the target base station is a normal base station.
  • the normal base station after determining that the target base station is a normal base station, since generally only a pseudo base station will send sensitive information to the target electronic device, when the information received from the target base station includes sensitive information, the normal base station can be corrected to a pseudo base station, thereby further enhancing the accuracy of the identification result of the target base station.
  • the target base station after the target base station is corrected as a pseudo base station, the target base station still needs to be managed and controlled to reduce the interference of the target base station on the communication performance of the target electronic device.
  • the value of M can be 3. If at least one target request message among three target request messages is responded to by the target base station, the target base station can be determined as a normal base station; if one target request message among three target request messages is responded to by the target base station, and two target request messages are ignored by the target base station, the target base station can be determined as a normal base station; if two target request messages among three target request messages are responded to by the target base station, and one target request message is ignored by the target base station, the target base station can be determined as a normal base station; if three target request messages among three target request messages are responded to by the target base station, the target base station can be determined as a normal base station.
  • FIG 3 is a flowchart of a pseudo base station identification method provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • steps 301 to 315 included in Figure 3 can completely include the relevant contents of the above-mentioned embodiments, that is, steps 301 to 315 included in Figure 3 are a collective embodiment of the above-mentioned embodiments, and the details will not be repeated here.
  • Table 1 and Table 2 respectively include two scenarios to illustrate the embodiments of the present application, that is, Table 1 includes scenario 1 and scenario 2, and Table 2 includes scenario 3 and scenario 4.
  • Table 1 includes scenario 1 and scenario 2
  • Table 2 includes scenario 3 and scenario 4.
  • the target base station corresponding to scenario 1 and scenario 2 in Table 1 is a 4G base station, and the standard of the target base station is Long Term Evolution (LTE).
  • the operator tag carried by the system message in scenario 1 is a combination of CMCC&CU&CT, and the combination of CMCC&CU&CT belongs to an alternative operator tag combination, that is, the operator tag carried by the system message in scenario 1 meets the first condition, and the second reply information in scenario 1 is cause#13, that is, the content of the second reply information matches the first target information, and the periodic location update timing
  • the timer is T3412
  • the value of the second threshold can be 60 minutes
  • the location update interval corresponding to the timer is 6 minutes, which is significantly less than the second threshold
  • no spam information is received from the target base station, that is, spam information includes sensitive content.
  • the corresponding target base station in scenario 1 can be determined as a pseudo base station, and the prevention and control result of the pseudo base station is to permanently add the pseudo base station to the list of pseudo base stations, that is, permanently prohibit (bar) the base station from communicating with the target electronic device, and can collect relevant information of the pseudo base station for burying points; in this way, through the combination of the above-mentioned multiple information, the accuracy of the pseudo base station determination result can be improved.
  • the operator tag carried by the system message in scenario 2 is a combination of CMCC&CT, and the combination of CMCC&CT does not belong to an alternative operator tag combination, that is, the operator tag carried by the system message in scenario 2 does not meet the first condition.
  • the target electronic device in scenario 2 receives the first reply information of the target base station to the target request message, that is, the target base station allows the target electronic device to perform target processing, and the target processing is TAU, ATTACH or SR.
  • the periodic location update timer in scenario 2 is T3412, and the location update interval corresponding to the timer is 120 minutes, which is significantly greater than the second threshold.
  • the target electronic device in scenario 2 does not receive the spam information sent by the target base station, then the corresponding target base station in scenario 1 can be determined as a normal base station, thereby distinguishing normal base stations from pseudo base stations, screening out normal base stations, and continuing to detect normal base stations, that is, determining whether the information received from the normal base station includes sensitive information. If sensitive information is received, the normal base station can be determined as a pseudo base station, thereby reducing the occurrence of the phenomenon of misjudging pseudo base stations as normal base stations, and improving the accuracy of the identification results of pseudo base stations;
  • the target base station corresponding to scenario 3 and scenario 4 in Table 2 is a 5G base station
  • the standard of the target base station is the new radio (New Radio, NR)
  • the operator tag carried by the system message in scenario 3 is CMCC&CU&CT
  • the combination of CMCC&CU&CT belongs to an alternative operator tag combination, that is, the operator tag carried by the system message in scenario 3 satisfies the first condition
  • the target processing is Register Request/SR
  • the target base station ignores the target request message, that is, there is no response to the target request message, and the target electronic device does not receive the target base station's response to the
  • the first reply information of the target request message, the periodic location update timer is T3512, and the location update interval of the timer is 12 minutes, which is significantly less than the second threshold, and no spam information is received from the target base station, then the corresponding target base station in scenario 3 can be determined as a pseudo base station, and the prevention and control result of the pseudo base station is to permanently add the pseudo base station
  • the operator tags carried in the system message are CMCC and CT, and the combination of CMCC and CT does not belong to an alternative operator tag combination, that is, the operator tag carried in the system message in scenario 4 does not meet the first condition.
  • the target electronic device receives the first reply information of the target base station to the target request, and the target processing is Register Request or SR.
  • the periodic location update timer in scenario 4 is T3512, and the value corresponding to the timer is 60 minutes, which is equal to the second threshold value.
  • the target electronic device in scenario 4 does not receive the spam information sent by the target base station.
  • the corresponding target base station in scenario 4 can be determined as a normal base station, thereby distinguishing between normal base stations and pseudo base stations, screening out normal base stations, and continuing to detect normal base stations, that is, determining whether the information received from the normal base station includes sensitive information. If sensitive information is received, the normal base station can be determined as a pseudo base station, thereby reducing the occurrence of the phenomenon of misjudging pseudo base stations as normal base stations, and improving the accuracy of the identification results of pseudo base stations.
  • FIG. 4 is a specific application embodiment of a pseudo base station identification method provided in an embodiment of the present application, which may include the following steps:
  • Step 401 The target electronic device sends a registration request to the target base station
  • the target electronic device may receive a system message sent by the target base station.
  • the system message is the reply information of the target base station to the registration request.
  • the system message may carry an operator tag.
  • Step 402 Detect whether the target base station is a pseudo base station according to the system message
  • the method of detecting a fake base station can refer to the various implementation methods for determining a fake base station in the above-mentioned implementation methods; specifically, it can be combined with whether the operator label carried by the system message meets the first condition, and whether the target base station's response to the target request message meets the second condition to detect whether the target base station is a fake base station.
  • a target request message is sent to the target base station, where the target request message is used to request the target base station to allow execution of a target process, where the target process is a process for executing a target service;
  • the target base station's response to the target request message satisfies the second clause
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the first reply information is used to instruct the target base station to allow execution of the target processing.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the first moment is the moment when the target request message is sent to the target base station, the second moment is later than the first moment, and the second moment is separated from the first moment by a first time length.
  • determining the target base station as a pseudo base station includes:
  • the information content of the second reply information does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than a preset threshold, determining the target base station as a pseudo base station;
  • the second reply information is used to indicate that the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the suspicious base station is determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the method is applied to a target electronic device, and after determining the target base station as a pseudo base station, the method further includes:
  • the third moment is the moment when the target base station is stored in the pseudo base station list, the fourth moment is later than the third moment, and the fourth moment is the moment when the target electronic device is restarted.
  • steps 403, 404 and 405 are optional steps.
  • Step 403 When the target base station is a pseudo base station, the pseudo base station may be monitored;
  • the monitoring method of the pseudo base station may include at least one of the following information: relevant information of the electronic device communicating with the pseudo base station, and communication information between the pseudo base station and the electronic device; in addition, it can also be determined whether there is sensitive information in the collected information. If sensitive information exists, it is necessary to control the pseudo base station or the electronic device communicating with the pseudo base station, such as limiting the communication function of the pseudo base station or the electronic device;
  • Step 404 Perform big data embedding on the second target information of the target base station
  • big data is buried for the second target information of the target base station, so that the interaction between the target base station and other electronic devices can be tracked, so as to better monitor the target base station and enhance the control effect of the target base station.
  • Step 405 The target electronic device is connected to a normal base station
  • step 405 the communication between the target electronic device and the pseudo base station is switched to the communication between the target electronic device and the normal base station, thereby ensuring the normal realization of the communication function of the target electronic device and reducing the impact of the pseudo base station on the communication function of the target electronic device.
  • the pseudo base station identification method provided in the embodiment of the present application can be executed by a pseudo base station identification device, or a control module in the pseudo base station identification device for executing the pseudo base station identification method.
  • the pseudo base station identification device is used as an example to illustrate the pseudo base station identification method performed by the pseudo base station identification device.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a pseudo base station identification device provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the pseudo base station identification device 500 includes:
  • the receiving module 501 is used to receive a system message sent by a target base station
  • a sending module 502 is configured to send a target request message to the target base station when the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition, wherein the target request message is used to request the target base station to allow execution of a target process, where the target process is a process for executing a target service;
  • the determination module 503 is configured to determine the target base station as a pseudo base station when a response of the target base station to the target request message satisfies a second condition.
  • the first condition includes at least one of the following: the number of operator tags carried by the system message is greater than a first threshold;
  • the system message carries at least two operator tags, and a tag combination consisting of the at least two operator tags is the same as any alternative operator tag combination;
  • the second condition includes at least one of the following:
  • the first reply information of the target base station to the target request message is not received, and the first reply information is used to instructing the target base station to allow execution of the target process;
  • a second reply message from the target base station to the target request message is received, the information content of the second reply message does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than a second threshold.
  • the determination module 503 is also used to determine the target base station as a pseudo base station when the first reply information of the target base station to the target request message is not received; wherein the first reply information is used to indicate that the target base station allows the execution of the target processing.
  • the determining module 503 is further configured to:
  • the information content of the second reply information does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than a preset threshold, determining the target base station as a pseudo base station;
  • the second reply information is used to indicate that the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing.
  • the determination module 503 is further configured to: determine the target base station as a pseudo base station if no first reply information of the target base station to the target request message is received within a time period from the first moment to the second moment;
  • the first moment is the moment when the target request message is sent to the target base station, the second moment is later than the first moment, and the second moment is separated from the first moment by a first time length.
  • the determination module 503 is further used to: determine the target base station as a pseudo base station when receiving second reply information of the target base station to the target request message and the information content of the second reply information matches the first target information; or,
  • the information content of the second reply information does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than a preset threshold, determining the target base station as a pseudo base station;
  • the second reply information is used to indicate that the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing.
  • the determining module 503 is further configured to:
  • the suspicious base station is determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the pseudo base station identification device 500 is applied to a target electronic device.
  • the pseudo base station identification device 500 further includes:
  • the storage module 504 is used to store the target base station in a pseudo base station list to prohibit the target base station from communicating with the target electronic device from the third moment to the fourth moment;
  • the third moment is the moment when the target base station is stored in the pseudo base station list, the fourth moment is later than the third moment, and the fourth moment is the moment when the target electronic device is restarted.
  • the pseudo base station identification device 500 further includes at least one of the following:
  • a tracking module 505 is used to perform big data tracking on the second target information of the target base station
  • the sending module 502 is further configured to send the second target information of the target base station to the server, so that the server instructs an electronic device to forward the second target information.
  • the sending module 502 is further configured to send M target request messages to the target base station when the operator tag carried by the system message does not meet the first condition, where M is an integer greater than 1;
  • the determination module 503 is further configured to determine the target base station as a suspicious base station when the M target request messages are all ignored by the target base station.
  • the determination module 503 is further configured to:
  • the target base station is determined as a normal base station, where N is an integer greater than 1 and less than M;
  • the normal base station is determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the pseudo base station identification device provided in the embodiment of the present application can improve the accuracy of the pseudo base station identification result.
  • the pseudo base station identification device in the embodiment of the present application can be a device, or a component, integrated circuit, or chip in a terminal.
  • the device can be a mobile electronic device or a non-mobile electronic device.
  • the mobile electronic device can be a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a laptop computer, a PDA, an in-vehicle electronic device, a wearable device, an ultra-mobile personal computer (UMPC), a netbook, or a personal digital assistant (PDA), etc.
  • the non-mobile electronic device can be a server, a network attached storage (NAS), a personal computer (PC), a television (TV), ATM or self-service machine, etc., are not specifically limited in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the pseudo base station identification device in the embodiment of the present application may be a device having an operating system.
  • the operating system may be an Android operating system, an iOS operating system, or other possible operating systems, which are not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the pseudo base station identification device provided in the embodiment of the present application can implement each process implemented by the method embodiment of Figure 1, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides an electronic device 700, including a processor 701, a memory 702, and a program or instruction stored in the memory 702 and executable on the processor 701.
  • a processor 701 a memory 702
  • the program or instruction is executed by the processor 701
  • each process of the above-mentioned pseudo base station identification method embodiment is implemented, and the same technical effect can be achieved. To avoid repetition, it will not be repeated here.
  • the electronic devices in the embodiments of the present application include the mobile electronic devices and non-mobile electronic devices mentioned above.
  • FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device implementing an embodiment of the present application.
  • the electronic device 800 includes but is not limited to: a radio frequency unit 801, a network module 802, an audio output unit 803, an input unit 804, a sensor 805, a display unit 806, a user input unit 807, an interface unit 808, a memory 809, and a processor 810 and other components.
  • the electronic device 800 may also include a power source (such as a battery) for supplying power to each component, and the power source may be logically connected to the processor 810 through a power management system, so that the power management system can manage charging, discharging, and power consumption management.
  • a power source such as a battery
  • the electronic device structure shown in FIG8 does not constitute a limitation on the electronic device, and the electronic device may include more or fewer components than shown, or combine certain components, or arrange components differently, which will not be described in detail here.
  • the radio frequency unit 801 is used to receive a system message sent by a target base station; when the operator tag carried by the system message meets the first condition, send a target request message to the target base station, wherein the target request message is used to request the target base station to allow the target processing to be performed, and the target processing is the processing for performing the target service;
  • the processor 810 is configured to determine the target base station as a pseudo base station when a response of the target base station to the target request message satisfies a second condition.
  • the first condition includes at least one of the following:
  • the number of operator tags carried by the system message is greater than a first threshold
  • the system message carries at least two operator tags, and a tag combination consisting of the at least two operator tags is the same as any alternative operator tag combination;
  • the second condition includes at least one of the following:
  • a second reply message from the target base station to the target request message is received, the information content of the second reply message does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than a second threshold.
  • the processor 810 executing, when a response of the target base station to the target request message satisfies a second condition, determining the target base station as a pseudo base station, includes:
  • the first reply information is used to instruct the target base station to allow execution of the target processing.
  • the processor 810 executing, when first reply information of the target base station to the target request message is not received, determining the target base station as a pseudo base station, includes:
  • the first moment is the moment when the target request message is sent to the target base station, the second moment is later than the first moment, and the second moment is separated from the first moment by a first time length.
  • the processor 810 executing, when a response of the target base station to the target request message satisfies a second condition, determining the target base station as a pseudo base station, includes:
  • the information content of the second reply information does not match the first target information, and the location update interval duration of the periodic location update timer of the target base station is less than a preset threshold, determining the target base station as a pseudo base station;
  • the second reply information is used to indicate that the target base station is not allowed to execute the target processing.
  • processor 810 is further configured to:
  • the target base station is determined as Suspicious base station
  • the suspicious base station is determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the method is applied to a target electronic device, and the processor 810 is further configured to:
  • the third moment is the moment when the target base station is stored in the pseudo base station list, the fourth moment is later than the third moment, and the fourth moment is the moment when the target electronic device is restarted.
  • the processor 810 is further used to: perform big data embedding on the second target information of the target base station; and/or the radio frequency unit 801 is further used to: send the second target information of the target base station to the server, so that the server instructs an electronic device to forward the second target information.
  • the radio frequency unit 801 is further configured to: when the operator tag carried by the system message does not meet the first condition, send M target request messages to the target base station, where M is an integer greater than 1;
  • the processor 810 is further configured to: when the M target request messages are all ignored by the target base station, determine the target base station as a suspicious base station.
  • the processor 810 is further configured to: when at least one of the target request messages in the M target request messages is responded by the target base station, determine the target base station as a normal base station, where N is an integer greater than 1 and less than M;
  • the normal base station is determined to be a pseudo base station.
  • the input unit 804 may include a graphics processor (GPU) 8041 and a microphone 8042, and the graphics processor 8041 processes the image data of the static picture or video obtained by the image capture device (such as a camera) in the video capture mode or the image capture mode.
  • the display unit 806 may include a display panel 8061, and the display panel 8061 may be configured in the form of a liquid crystal display, an organic light emitting diode, etc.
  • the user input unit 807 includes a touch panel 8071 and other input devices 8072.
  • the touch panel 8071 is also called a touch screen.
  • the touch panel 8071 may include two parts: a touch detection device and a touch controller.
  • Other input devices 8072 may include but are not limited to a physical keyboard, a function key (such as a volume control button, a switch button, etc.), a trackball, a mouse, and a joystick, which will not be repeated here.
  • the memory 809 can be used to store software programs and various data, including but not limited to applications and operating systems.
  • the processor 810 can integrate an application processor and a modem processor, wherein the application processor mainly processes an operating system, a user interface, and applications, and the modem processor mainly processes wireless communications. Can be It should be noted that the above-mentioned modem processor may not be integrated into the processor 810.
  • An embodiment of the present application also provides a readable storage medium, on which a program or instruction is stored.
  • a program or instruction is stored.
  • the various processes of the above-mentioned pseudo base station identification method embodiment are implemented, and the same technical effect can be achieved. To avoid repetition, it will not be repeated here.
  • the processor is a processor in the electronic device described in the above embodiment.
  • the readable storage medium includes a computer readable storage medium, such as a computer read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, etc.
  • An embodiment of the present application further provides a chip, which includes a processor and a communication interface, wherein the communication interface is coupled to the processor, and the processor is used to run programs or instructions to implement the various processes of the above-mentioned pseudo base station identification method embodiment, and can achieve the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, it will not be repeated here.
  • the embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, which is stored in a storage medium.
  • the computer program product is executed by at least one processor to implement the various processes of the above-mentioned method embodiment and can achieve the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, it will not be repeated here.
  • the chip mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can also be called a system-level chip, a system chip, a chip system or a system-on-chip chip, etc.

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Abstract

本申请公开了一种伪基站识别方法、装置及电子设备，伪基站识别方法，包括：接收目标基站发送的系统消息；在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理；在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。

Description

伪基站识别方法、装置及电子设备
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请主张在2023年3月17日在中国提交的中国专利申请No.202310259431.9的优先权，其全部内容通过引用包含于此。
技术领域
本申请属于通信技术领域，具体涉及一种伪基站识别方法、装置及电子设备。
背景技术
随着通信技术的发展，基站在通信中所占据的作用越来越重要。而当前出现了很多伪基站，而伪基站是指未取得电信设备进网许可和无线电发射设备型号核准的非法无线电通信设备，当终端与伪基站连接时，容易导致脱网或者接收到垃圾信息。在实际的使用过程中，通常根据电信号强度来识别伪基站，而上述识别结果的误差较大。
发明内容
本申请实施例的目的是提供一种伪基站识别方法、装置及电子设备，能够提高伪基站识别结果的准确度。
为了解决上述技术问题，本申请是这样实现的：
第一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种伪基站识别方法，包括：
接收目标基站发送的系统消息；
在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理；
在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。
第二方面，本申请实施例提供了一种伪基站识别装置，包括：
接收模块，用于接收目标基站发送的系统消息；
发送模块，用于在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理；
确定模块，用于在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。
第三方面，本申请实施例提供了一种电子设备，该电子设备包括处理器、存储器及存储在所述存储器上并可在所述处理器上运行的程序或指令，所述程序或指令被所述处理器 执行时实现如第一方面所述的方法的步骤。
第四方面，本申请实施例提供了一种可读存储介质，所述可读存储介质上存储程序或指令，所述程序或指令被处理器执行时实现如第一方面所述的方法的步骤。
第五方面，本申请实施例提供了一种芯片，所述芯片包括处理器和通信接口，所述通信接口和所述处理器耦合，所述处理器用于运行程序或指令，实现如第一方面所述的方法。
第六方面，本申请实施例提供了一种计算机程序产品，所述计算机程序产品被存储在存储介质中，所述计算机程序产品被至少一个处理器执行以实现如第一方面所述的方法。
在本申请实施例中，当系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件，且目标基站对目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件时，说明目标基站符合伪基站的特性，即目标基站属于伪基站的概率较大，此时将目标基站确定为伪基站，这样，可以提高伪基站的识别结果的准确度。
附图说明
图1是本申请的一些实施例提供的伪基站识别方法的流程图；
图2是本申请的一些实施例提供的伪基站识别方法的流程图；
图3是本申请的一些实施例提供的伪基站识别方法的流程图；
图4是本申请的一些实施例提供的伪基站识别方法的流程图；
图5是本申请的一些实施例提供的伪基站识别装置的结构示意图；
图6是本申请的一些实施例提供的伪基站识别装置的结构示意图；
图7是本申请的一些实施例提供的电子设备的结构示意图；
图8是本申请的一些实施例提供的电子设备的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图，对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所描述的实施例是本申请一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本申请中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有作出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本申请保护的范围。
本申请的说明书和权利要求书中的术语“第一”、“第二”等是用于区别类似的对象，而不用于描述特定的顺序或先后次序。应该理解这样使用的数据在适当情况下可以互换，以便本申请的实施例能够以除了在这里图示或描述的那些以外的顺序实施，且“第一”、“第二”等所区分的对象通常为一类，并不限定对象的个数，例如第一对象可以是一个，也可以是多个。此外，说明书以及权利要求中“和/或”表示所连接对象的至少其中之一，字符“/”，一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。
下面结合附图，通过具体的实施例及其应用场景对本申请实施例提供的伪基站识别方 法、装置及电子设备进行详细地说明。
参见图1，图1为本申请实施例提供的一种伪基站识别方法的流程图，如图1所示，包括如下步骤：
步骤101、接收目标基站发送的系统消息。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例可以应用在目标电子设备上，也就是说：本申请实施例中的步骤可以由目标电子设备执行，而目标电子设备的具体类型在此不做限定，本申请实施例中，上述目标电子设备可以是手机、平板电脑(Tablet Personal Computer)、膝上型电脑(Laptop Computer)、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，PDA)、移动上网装置(Mobile Internet Device，MID)或可穿戴式设备(Wearable Device)等等。
其中，目标基站的具体类型在此不做限定，目标基站可以是任意的基站，目标基站可以向位于该目标基站的辐射范围内的电子设备发送系统消息，因而目标基站可以是发送的系统消息中携带的运营商标签满足第一条件或者不满足第一条件的任意一个基站。例如，目标基站可以为第四代移动通信技术(the 4th generation mobile communication technology，4G)基站、第五代移动通信技术(the 5th generation mobile communication technology，5G)基站或者第六代移动通信技术(the 6th generation mobile communication technology，6G)基站等。
其中，系统信息可以被称作为系统消息(System Information Block,SIB1)，而SIB1可以携带有目标基站支持的运营商标签，而运营商标签可以指的是目标基站可以支持运营商标签对应的运营商网络，上述运营商标签可以指的是公共陆地移动网(Public Land Mobile Network，PLMN)。另外，SIB1还可以包括其他系统块的调度信息与初始接入信息。
步骤102、在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理。
其中，系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的具体内容在此不做限定，可选地，所述第一条件包括以下至少一项：所述系统消息携带的运营商标签的数量大于第一阈值；所述系统消息携带至少两个运营商标签，且所述至少两个运营商标签组成的标签组合与备选的任一个运营商标签组合相同。
这样，可以使得第一条件的灵活性和多样性较好。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述系统消息携带的运营商标签的数量大于第一阈值，则确定系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件。例如，目标电子设备所在的区域总共有4家， 而系统消息的运营标签的数量为4个，第一阈值为3，这样，可以确定系统消息的运营标签的数量大于第一阈值，即可以确定系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述系统消息携带至少两个运营商标签，且所述至少两个运营商标签组成的标签组合与备选的任一个运营商标签组合相同，则确定系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件。其中，标签组合可以是由至少两个标签组成的组合。例如，目标电子设备所在的区域包括有A、B、C和D总共4家运营商，备选的运营商标签组合可以包括第一组合和第二组合中的至少一个，第一组合为A、B、C的组合，第二组合为A、B、C和D的组合，这样，当系统消息携带的运营商标签的组合为A、B、C的组合，或者，A、B、C和D的组合时，则可以确定系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件。
本申请的一些实施例中，例如，备选的运营商标签组合还可以包括如下组合中的至少一种：第三组合、第四组合、第五组合、第六组合、第七组合和第八组合，第三组合为A和B的组合，第四组合为B和C的组合，第五组合为C和D的组合，第六组合为A和C的组合，第七组合为A和D的组合，第八组合为B和D的组合，当系统消息携带的运营商标签的组合为上述第三组合、第四组合、第五组合、第六组合、第七组合和第八组合中的至少一种组合时，则可以确定系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件。
上述A、B、C可以为运营时间较长的运营商，而D可以为新成立的运营商，例如，A、B、C可以分别指的是移动(China Mobile Communications Group,CMCC)、联通(China Unicom,CU)与电信(China Telecom,CT)，D可以指的是广电(China Broadcasting Network Corporation,CBN)。
需要说明的是，上述判断系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的过程是，伪基站通常为了增加与目标电子设备的连通率，通常是支持的运营商的网络的数量越多越好，而正常基站通常支持的运营商的网络的数量较少，因此，若目标基站支持的运营商的网络的数量较多，即系统消息携带的运营商标签的数量大于第一阈值，或者，系统消息携带至少两个运营商标签，且至少两个运营商标签组成的标签组合与备选的任一个运营商标签组合相同，则可以确定系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件，并且在目标基站对目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件时，进而可以通过上述条件结合判断目标基站属于伪基站的概率较大，提高了伪基站识别结果的准确度。
步骤103、在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。
其中，第二条件的具体内容在此不做限定，本申请的一些实施例中，所述第二条件包 括以下至少一项：
未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理；
接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理；
接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于第二阈值。
这样，可以增加第二条件的灵活性和多样性。
其中，伪基站可以理解为：未取得电信设备进网许可和无线电发射设备型号核准的非法无线电通信设备，以自身为中心、搜取一定半径范围内的电子设备的信息，并冒用其他电子设备用户的号码强行向用户的电子设备群发各类短信息。上述短信息可以包括诈骗信息、推销信息、敏感信息。
另外，当目标电子设备与伪基站连接后，会造成国际移动用户识别码(International Mobile Subscriber Identity，IMSI)与移动设备国际身份码(International Mobile Equipment Identity，IMEI)的丢失，降低用户私密性；当目标电子设备的信号被伪基站强制连接后，会造成8～12秒脱网，且目标电子设备需要重启才能重新入网，与正常基站连接，即降低了目标电子设备的网络适应性体验；当伪基站捕获目标电子设备后，可以冒用他人号码强行向目标电子设备推送大量垃圾短信。
本申请实施例中，通过步骤101至103，当系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件，且目标基站对目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件时，说明目标基站符合伪基站的特性，即目标基站属于伪基站的概率较大，此时将目标基站确定为伪基站，这样，可以提高伪基站的识别结果的准确度。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理。
本申请实施方式中，当未接收到目标基站对目标请求消息的第一回复信息时，可以认 为目标基站忽略了目标电子设备发送的目标请求消息，或者目标基站不能基于目标请求消息正确的回复第一回复消息，则目标基站为伪基站的概率加大，因而可以将目标基站确定为伪基站，这样，提高了伪基站的识别结果的准确度。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例的流程图可以参见图2所示，即图2包括的步骤201至203可以理解为本申请实施例包括的各个步骤，具体在此不再赘述。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在第一时刻至第二时刻的时间段内，未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第一时刻为向所述目标基站发送所述目标请求消息的时刻，所述第二时刻晚于所述第一时刻，且所述第二时刻与所述第一时刻之间间隔第一时长。
其中，第一时长的具体取值在此不做限定。
本申请实施方式中，当在第一时刻和第二时刻之间的时间段内，未接收到目标基站对目标请求消息的第一回复信息时，可以认为目标基站超时未反馈目标电子设备发送的目标请求消息，则可以将目标基站确定为伪基站，这样，可以节约目标电子设备一直等待目标基站的第一回复信息的资源开销，降低了资源的消耗。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
从第一时刻起的预设时间段内，未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，第一时刻为向所述目标基站发送所述目标请求消息的时刻。
本申请实施方式中，当从向目标基站发送目标请求消息的第一时刻起的预设时间段内，未接收到第一回复信息，即可将目标基站确定为伪基站，这样，既可以节约目标电子设备的资源开销，同时，又增加了将目标基站确定为伪基站的确定方式的多样性。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
当目标电子设备位于目标基站的预设范围之内，且未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。
本申请实施方式中，只有在目标电子设备位于目标基站的预设范围内，且未接收到第一回复信息时，才将目标基站确定为伪基站，这样，可以区分判别目标基站为正常基站， 但是目标电子设备位于目标基站的预设范围外导致不能接收到第一回复信息的现象，从而进一步提高伪基站的确定结果的准确度。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理。
其中，目标业务的具体内容在此不做限定，且目标基站的种类和目标业务可以互相对应，例如，当目标基站为4G基站时，则目标业务可以包括如下至少一种：跟踪区更新(Tracking Area Update，TAU)、附着(ATTACH)请求、业务请求(Service Request，SR)。当目标基站为5G基站时，则目标业务可以包括如下至少一种：注册请求(Register Request，RegReq)、业务请求(Service Request，SR)。
第一目标信息的具体内容在此不做限定，例如，第一目标信息可以包括如下中的至少一种：cause#13(此跟踪区域内不允许漫游(Roaming not allowed in this tracking area))，以及cause#15(跟踪区域内没有合适的小区(No suitable cells in tracking area))。
另外，第一目标信息可以为第二回复信息的信息内容，或者，第一目标信息也可以为第二回复信息的信息内容中包括的拒绝理由信息，而上述拒绝理由信息可以为目标基站回复的理由信息。
需要说明的是，当第一目标信息为第二回复信息的信息内容中包括的拒绝理由信息时，拒绝理由信息也可以包括如下中的至少一种：cause#13(Roaming not allowed in this tracking area)，以及cause#15(No suitable cells in tracking area)。
本申请实施方式中，当目标基站不允许目标电子设备执行目标处理，且回复的第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配时，则可以准确确定目标基站为伪基站，从而进一步提高伪基站识别结果的准确度。
需要说明的是，若目标基站是正常基站，且正常基站不允许目标电子设备执行目标处理时，回复的第二回复信息的信息内容通常不会与第一目标信息匹配，因此，若第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配时，则可以直接确定目标基站为伪基站。
本申请的另一些实施例中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息携 带的标签信息与第一目标标签信息匹配的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理，而第二回复信息携带的标签信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理的理由信息。
其中，第一目标标签信息可以参照上述第一目标信息的表述，即第一目标标签信息可以为如下中的至少一种：cause#13(Roaming not allowed in this tracking area)，以及cause#15(No suitable cells in tracking area)。
本申请实施方式中，当目标基站不允许目标电子设备执行目标处理，且回复的第二回复信息携带的标签信息与第一目标标签信息匹配时，则可以准确确定目标基站为伪基站，从而进一步提高伪基站识别结果的准确度。另外，还可以进一步提升伪基站的确定方式的多样性和灵活性。
本申请的另一些实施例中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息携带的标签信息的分类属于第一目标分类的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理，而第二回复信息携带的标签信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理的理由信息。
其中，当第二回复信息携带的标签信息的分类属于第一目标分类时，则可以确定目标基站不允许目标电子设备执行目标处理的拒绝理由信息包括如下中的至少一种：cause#13(Roaming not allowed in this tracking area)，以及cause#15(No suitable cells in tracking area)。
本申请实施方式中，当目标基站不允许目标电子设备执行目标处理，且回复的第二回复信息携带的分类属于第一目标分类时，则可以准确确定目标基站为伪基站，从而进一步提高伪基站识别结果的准确度。另外，还可以进一步提升伪基站的确定方式的多样性和灵活性。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理。
其中，目标基站的种类不同，周期性位置更新定时器的种类也可以不同，即周期性位置更新定时器的种类与目标基站的种类可以一一对应。
例如，当目标基站为4G基站时，则周期性位置更新定时器可以为T3412定时器，当目标基站为5G基站时，则周期性位置更新定时器可以为T3512定时器。
本申请实施方式中，由于伪基站需要提高周期性位置更新的频率，即缩短位置更新间隔时长，以连接更多的电子设备，而正常基站的周期性位置更新频率较低，即正常基站的位置更新间隔时长通常较长，因此，当第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于预设阈值时，可以确定目标基站的周期性位置更新的频率较高，位置更新间隔时长较短，即目标基站为伪基站的概率较大，这样，可以进一步提高伪基站的识别结果的准确度。
本申请的一些实施方式中，例如，当目标基站为4G基站时，周期性位置更新定时器可以为T3412定时器，预设阈值通常可以采用60分钟，当接收到目标基站对目标请求消息的第二回复信息，第一目标信息的信息可以包括如下至少一种：cause#13(Roaming not allowed in this tracking area)与cause#15(No suitable cells in tracking area)，而第二回复信息的信息内容与上述第一目标信息的内容不匹配，但是检测到T3412定时器的位置更新间隔时长为6分钟，小于预设阈值的取值60分钟，则可以判定目标基站为伪基站。
另外，当检测到T3412定时器的位置更新间隔时长为120分钟，大于预设阈值的取值60分钟，则可以判定目标基站为正常基站或者可疑基站。
本申请的一些实施例中，例如，当目标基站为5G基站时，周期性位置更新定时器可以为T3512定时器，预设阈值通常可以采用60分钟，当接收到目标基站对目标请求消息的第二回复信息，第一目标信息的信息可以包括如下至少一种：cause#13(Roaming not allowed in this tracking area)与cause#15(No suitable cells in tracking area)，而第二回复信息的信息内容与上述第一目标信息的内容不匹配，但是检测到T3512定时器的位置更新间隔时长为12分钟，小于预设阈值的取值60分钟，则可以判定目标基站为伪基站。
另外，当检测到T3512定时器的位置更新间隔时长为70分钟，大于预设阈值的取值60分钟，则可以判定目标基站为正常基站或者可疑基站。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述方法还包括：
在所述位置更新间隔时长大于或等于所述预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站；
在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述可疑基站确定为 伪基站。
其中，可疑基站也可以被称作为疑似伪基站，即可疑基站的状态还未确定，可能是伪基站，也可能是正常基站，需要后续进一步判断。
本申请实施方式中，当位置更新间隔时长大于或等于预设阈值时，可以将目标基站确定为可疑基站，同时，当接收到的目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息时，可以将可疑基站校正为伪基站，从而提高了伪基站的识别结果的准确度。
需要说明的是，通常只有伪基站会向目标电子设备发送敏感信息，因而当接收到的信息包括敏感信息时，可以将可疑基站确定为伪基站，而敏感信息可以包括诈骗信息、推销信息、广告信息等信息。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述方法应用于目标电子设备，所述将所述目标基站确定为伪基站之后，所述方法还包括：
将所述目标基站存储至伪基站名单中，以禁止所述目标基站从第三时刻至第四时刻与所述目标电子设备通信；
其中，所述第三时刻为将所述目标基站存储至所述伪基站名单的时刻，所述第四时刻晚于所述第三时刻，且所述第四时刻为所述目标电子设备重启的时刻。
其中，伪基站名单也可以被称为伪基站黑名单。
本申请实施方式中，在确定目标基站为伪基站之后，可以将目标基站保存至伪基站名单中，从而对目标基站进行管控，使得目标基站从第三时刻至第四时刻，禁止与目标电子设备通信，这样，可以减少目标基站对目标电子设备与正常基站通信的干扰，提高了目标电子设备的通信安全性，同时，还可以减少目标基站对目标电子设备发送的敏感信息，增强了目标电子设备的使用性能。
另外，当第四时刻之后，即目标电子设备重启之后，可以将目标基站移出伪基站名单，即不再禁止目标基站与目标电子设备之间的通信，这样，可以提供一种将目标基站移出伪基站名单的控制方式，即当目标基站被误加入伪基站名单中之后，可以通过目标电子设备重启，从而将目标基站移出伪基站名单，提供了一种对伪基站名单进行纠错的方式。
本申请的一些实施方式中，例如，第三时刻为将目标基站存储至伪基站名单的时刻，当第三时刻为2点，目标电子设备在2点30分重启时，则第四时刻即为2点30分，因此，在2点至2点30分这一段时间内，禁止目标基站与目标电子设备通信。
本申请的一些实施例中，例如，当第三时刻为2点，目标电子设备在第二天的2点30分重启时，则第四时刻即为第二天的2点30分，因此，在2点至第二天的2点30分 这一段时间内，禁止目标基站与目标电子设备通信。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述将所述目标基站确定为伪基站之后，所述方法还包括以下至少一项：
对所述目标基站的第二目标信息进行大数据埋点；
向服务器发送所述目标基站的第二目标信息，以使所述服务器指示一个电子设备转发所述第二目标信息。
其中，目标基站的第二目标信息可以包括如下信息中的至少一种：物理层小区标识(Physical-layer Cell Identity，PCI)、小区标识(Cell Identity，Cell ID)、跟踪区代码(Tracking Area Code，TAC)、位置信息，而上述位置信息可以为目标基站的经纬度信息。
本申请实施方式中，对目标基站的第二目标信息进行大数据埋点，这样，可以追踪目标基站与其他电子设备的交互，从而更好的监控目标基站，增强对目标基站的防控效果。同时，通过对第二目标信息进行大数据埋点，还可以收集伪基站的数据，从而对伪基站的防控提供了更多数据支持，进而增强对伪基站的防控效果。例如，可以收集各个城市伪基站的数量分布，并上报给相关机构的服务器，从而可以对各个伪基站进行定点监测防控。
需要说明的是，上述收集的伪基站的数据可以包括如下信息中的至少一项：物理层小区标识(Physical-layer Cell Identity，PCI)、小区标识信息(Cell Identity，Cell ID)、跟踪区域代码(tracking area code，TAC)和经纬度等信息。
另外，向服务器发送目标基站的第二目标信息，以使服务器指示一个电子设备转发第二目标信息，即可以将第二目标信息共享给其他电子设备，这样，可以增强其他电子设备对目标基站的识别效果，减少其他电子设备与目标基站连接，导致其他电子设备的使用性能变差的现象的出现。
需要说明的是，上述其他电子设备与目标电子设备可以属于同一生产制造商生产的电子设备；或者，上述其他电子设备与目标电子设备也可以属于不同生产制造商生产的电子设备，但是其他电子设备与目标电子设备可以处于同一对话群组；或者，上述其他电子设备可以处于目标电子设备的预设范围内。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述接收目标基站发送的系统消息之后，所述方法还包括：
在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签不满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送M次目标请求消息，M为大于1的整数；
在所述M次目标请求消息均被所述目标基站忽略的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站。
其中，M的具体取值在此不做限定，例如，M的取值为可以3。
其中，上述可疑基站也可以被称作为疑似伪基站，即可疑基站可能是伪基站，也可能不是伪基站。
本申请实施方式中，在M次目标请求消息均被目标基站忽略时，可能目标基站与目标电子设备之间的通信链路不通，导致目标电子设备未接收到目标基站对M次目标请求消息的响应消息，或者，目标基站不能正确给出对M次目标请求消息的响应消息，直接对M次目标请求消息进行忽略，因此，此时可以将目标基站确定为可疑基站，即需要后续进一步判断可疑基站的种类，避免直接将目标基站确定为正常基站或者伪基站造成误判断的现象的出现。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述方法应用于目标电子设备，所述将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站之后，所述方法还包括：
将所述目标基站保存至可疑基站名单中，以禁止所述目标基站从第五时刻至第六时刻与所述目标电子设备通信，所述第五时刻为将所述目标基站加入所述可疑基站名单的时刻，所述第六时刻晚于所述第五时刻，且所述第六时刻与所述第五时刻之间间隔第二时长。
其中，当目标基站为可疑基站时，可以暂时禁止目标基站与目标电子设备的之间的通信，且禁止时长为第二时长。
需要说明的是，上述第二时长的具体取值在此不做限定，例如，上述第二时长可以为60分钟至180分钟中的任一取值。
本申请实施方式中，当目标基站确定为可疑基站时，即不能准确确定目标基站是伪基站还是正常基站时，则可以暂时禁止目标基站与目标电子设备的之间的通信，减少目标基站对目标电子设备与其他正常基站之间通信的干扰，从而保证目标电子设备与其他正常基站的通信性能较好。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述向所述目标基站发送M次目标请求消息之后，所述方法还包括：
在所述M次目标请求消息中至少一次所述目标请求消息被所述目标基站应答的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为正常基站，N为大于1，且小于M的整数；
在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述正常基站确定为伪基站。
其中，当M次目标请求消息中至少一次目标请求消息被目标基站应答时，则可以确定目标基站为正常基站。
也可以理解为：在M次目标请求消息中只有N次目标请求消息被目标基站忽略，M-N次目标请求消息被目标基站响应时，则可以确定目标基站为正常基站。
本申请实施方式中，在确定目标基站为正常基站之后，由于通常只有伪基站才会向目标电子设备发送敏感信息，因此，在接收到的目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将正常基站可以矫正为伪基站，从而进一步增强了目标基站的识别结果的准确度。
需要说明的是，在将目标基站校正为伪基站之后，还需要对目标基站进行管控，从而减少目标基站对目标电子设备的通信性能的干扰。
本申请实施方式中，例如，M的取值可以为3，若3次目标请求消息中存在至少一次目标请求消息被目标基站应答，则可以将目标基站确定为正常基站；如3次目标请求消息中有1次目标请求消息被目标基站应答，2次目标请求消息被目标基站忽略，则可以将目标基站确定为正常基站；如3次目标请求消息中有2次目标请求消息被目标基站应答，1次目标请求消息被目标基站忽略，则可以将目标基站确定为正常基站；如3次目标请求消息中有3次目标请求消息均被目标基站应答，则可以将目标基站确定为正常基站。
参见图3，图3为本申请实施例提供的一种伪基站识别方法的流程图，如图3所示，图3中包括的步骤301至315可以完整包括上述各个实施方式的相关内容，即图3包括的步骤301至315为上述各个实施方式的集合实施例，具体在此不再赘述。
参见表1和表2，表1和表2分别包括了两种场景来举例说明本申请实施例，即表1包括了场景1和场景2，表2包括了场景3和场景4，具体可以参见下文中的相关表述。
表1
表2

其中，参见表1，表1中场景1和场景2对应的目标基站为4G基站，目标基站的制式为长期演进(Long Term Evolution，LTE)，场景1中系统消息携带的运营商标签为CMCC&CU&CT的组合，而CMCC&CU&CT的组合属于备选的一个运营商标签组合，也就是说场景1中的系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件，而场景1中的第二回复信息为cause#13，即第二回复信息的内容与第一目标信息匹配，周期性位置更新定时器为T3412，第二阈值的取值可以为60分钟，而该定时器对应的位置更新间隔时长为6分钟，明显小于第二阈值，且未收到目标基站发送的垃圾信息，垃圾信息即包括敏感内容的信息，则场景1中对应的目标基站可以确定为伪基站，且对该伪基站的防控结果是将该伪基站永久性拉入伪基站名单，即永久禁止(bar)该基站与目标电子设备通信，并可以收集该伪基站的相关信息进行埋点；这样，通过上述多种信息的组合，从而可以提高伪基站判定结果的准确度。
场景2中系统消息携带的运营商标签为CMCC&CT的组合，而CMCC&CT的组合不属于备选的一个运营商标签组合，也就是说场景2中的系统消息携带的运营商标签不满足第一条件，场景2中目标电子设备接收到了目标基站针对目标请求消息的第一回复信息，即目标基站允许目标电子设备执行目标处理，目标处理为TAU，ATTACH或SR，场景2中周期性位置更新定时器为T3412，且该定时器对应的位置更新间隔时长为120分钟，明显大于第二阈值，场景2中的目标电子设备未收到目标基站发送的垃圾信息，则场景1中对应的目标基站可以确定为正常基站，从而将正常基站和伪基站进行了区分，筛选出了正常基站，并可以继续对正常基站进行检测，即确定收到的正常基站发送的信息中是否包括敏感信息，若接收到了敏感信息，可以将正常基站确定为伪基站，从而可以减少将伪基站误判定为正常基站的现象的出现，提高了伪基站的识别结果的准确度；
参见表2，表2中场景3和场景4对应的目标基站为5G基站，目标基站的制式为新空口(New Radio，NR)，场景3中系统消息携带的运营商标签为CMCC&CU&CT，而CMCC&CU&CT的组合属于备选的一个运营商标签组合，也就是说场景3中的系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件，且目标处理为Register Request/SR，而目标基站对目标请求消息进行了忽略，即对目标请求消息无应答，目标电子设备未接收到目标基站对所述 目标请求消息的第一回复信息，周期性位置更新定时器为T3512，且该定时器的位置更新间隔时长为12分钟，明显小于第二阈值，且未收到目标基站发送的垃圾信息，则场景3中对应的目标基站可以确定为伪基站，且对该伪基站的防控结果是将该伪基站永久性拉入伪基站名单，即永久禁止(bar)该基站与目标电子设备通信，并可以收集该伪基站的相关信息进行埋点；这样，通过上述多种信息的组合，从而可以提高伪基站判定结果的准确度。
场景4中系统消息携带的运营商标签为CMCC和CT，而CMCC和CT的组合不属于备选的一个运营商标签组合，也就是说场景4中的系统消息携带的运营商标签不满足第一条件，场景4中目标电子设备接收到了目标基站针对目标请求的第一回复信息，目标处理为Register Request或者SR，场景4中周期性位置更新定时器为T3512，且该定时器对应的数值为60分钟，等于第二阈值，场景4中的目标电子设备未收到目标基站发送的垃圾信息，则场景4中对应的目标基站可以确定为正常基站，从而将正常基站和伪基站进行了区分，筛选出了正常基站，并可以继续对正常基站进行检测，即确定收到的正常基站发送的信息中是否包括敏感信息，若接收到了敏感信息，可以将正常基站确定为伪基站，从而可以减少将伪基站误判定为正常基站的现象的出现，提高了伪基站的识别结果的准确度。
参见图4，图4为本申请实施例提供的一种伪基站识别方法的一个具体应用实施例，可以包括如下步骤：
步骤401、目标电子设备向目标基站发送注册请求；
需要说明的是，在步骤401之后，目标电子设备可以接收目标基站发送的系统消息，系统消息即为目标基站对注册请求的回复信息，系统消息可以携带有运营商标签；
步骤402、根据系统消息检测目标基站是否为伪基站；
其中，伪基站检测的方式可以参见上述实施方式中关于确定伪基站的各个实施方式；具体可以结合根据系统消息携带的运营商标签是否满足第一条件，以及，根据目标基站对目标请求消息的应答是否满足第二条件来检测目标基站是否为伪基站。
本申请的一些实施例中，在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理；
在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条 件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在第一时刻至第二时刻的时间段内，未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第一时刻为向所述目标基站发送所述目标请求消息的时刻，所述第二时刻晚于所述第一时刻，且所述第二时刻与所述第一时刻之间间隔第一时长。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；或者，
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述方法还包括：
在所述位置更新间隔时长大于或等于所述预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站；
在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述可疑基站确定为伪基站。
本申请的一些实施例中，所述方法应用于目标电子设备，所述将所述目标基站确定为伪基站之后，所述方法还包括：
将所述目标基站存储至伪基站名单中，以禁止所述目标基站从第三时刻至第四时刻与所述目标电子设备通信；
其中，所述第三时刻为将所述目标基站存储至所述伪基站名单的时刻，所述第四时刻晚于所述第三时刻，且所述第四时刻为所述目标电子设备重启的时刻。
需要说明的是，步骤403、404和405是可选的步骤。
步骤403、当目标基站为伪基站时，可以对伪基站进行监测；
其中，对伪基站的监测方式可以包括如下信息中的至少一种，与伪基站进行通信的电子设备的相关信息，以及，伪基站与电子设备之间的通信信息；另外，还可以确定搜集的信息中是否存在敏感信息，若存在敏感信息，则需要对伪基站或者与伪基站通信的电子设备进行控制，如限制伪基站或者电子设备的通信功能；
步骤404、对目标基站的第二目标信息进行大数据埋点；
其中，对目标基站的第二目标信息进行大数据埋点，这样，可以追踪目标基站与其他电子设备的交互，从而更好的监控目标基站，增强对目标基站的管控效果。
步骤405、目标电子设备与正常基站连接；
其中，步骤405中即将目标电子设备与伪基站的通信切换为目标电子设备与正常基站通信，从而保证目标电子设备的通信功能的正常实现，减少伪基站对目标电子设备的通信功能的影响。
这样，可以提高伪基站的识别结果的准确度，增强目标电子设备的使用性能。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例提供的伪基站识别方法，执行主体可以为伪基站识别装置，或者该伪基站识别装置中的用于执行伪基站识别的方法的控制模块。本申请实施例中以伪基站识别装置执行伪基站识别的方法为例，说明本申请实施例提供的伪基站识别装置。
参见图5，图5为本申请实施例提供的一种伪基站识别装置的结构示意图，如图5所示，伪基站识别装置500，包括：
接收模块501，用于接收目标基站发送的系统消息；
发送模块502，用于在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理；
确定模块503，用于在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。
可选地，所述第一条件包括以下至少一项：所述系统消息携带的运营商标签的数量大于第一阈值；
所述系统消息携带至少两个运营商标签，且所述至少两个运营商标签组成的标签组合与备选的任一个运营商标签组合相同；
所述第二条件包括以下至少一项：
未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息，所述第一回复信息用于 指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理；
接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理；
接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于第二阈值。
可选地，所述确定模块503，还用于在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；其中，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理。
可选地，所述确定模块503，还用于：
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；或者，
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理。
可选地，所述确定模块503，还用于：在第一时刻至第二时刻的时间段内，未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第一时刻为向所述目标基站发送所述目标请求消息的时刻，所述第二时刻晚于所述第一时刻，且所述第二时刻与所述第一时刻之间间隔第一时长。
可选地，所述确定模块503，还用于：在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；或者，
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理。
可选地，所述确定模块503，还用于：
在所述位置更新间隔时长大于或等于所述预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站；
在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述可疑基站确定为伪基站。
可选地，伪基站识别装置500应用于目标电子设备，参见图6，伪基站识别装置500，还包括：
存储模块504，用于将所述目标基站存储至伪基站名单中，以禁止所述目标基站从第三时刻至第四时刻与所述目标电子设备通信；
其中，所述第三时刻为将所述目标基站存储至所述伪基站名单的时刻，所述第四时刻晚于所述第三时刻，且所述第四时刻为所述目标电子设备重启的时刻。
可选地，伪基站识别装置500，参见图6，还包括以下至少一项：
埋点模块505，用于对所述目标基站的第二目标信息进行大数据埋点；
发送模块502，还用于向服务器发送所述目标基站的第二目标信息，以使所述服务器指示一个电子设备转发所述第二目标信息。
可选地，发送模块502，还用于在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签不满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送M次目标请求消息，M为大于1的整数；
确定模块503，还用于在所述M次目标请求消息均被所述目标基站忽略的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站。
可选地，确定模块503，还用于：
在所述M次目标请求消息中至少一次所述目标请求消息被所述目标基站应答的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为正常基站，N为大于1，且小于M的整数；
在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述正常基站确定为伪基站。
本申请实施例提供的伪基站识别装置可以提高伪基站的识别结果的准确度。
本申请实施例中的伪基站识别装置可以是装置，也可以是终端中的部件、集成电路、或芯片。该装置可以是移动电子设备，也可以为非移动电子设备。示例性的，移动电子设备可以为手机、平板电脑、笔记本电脑、掌上电脑、车载电子设备、可穿戴设备、超级移动个人计算机(ultra-mobile personal computer，UMPC)、上网本或者个人数字助理(personal digital assistant，PDA)等，非移动电子设备可以为服务器、网络附属存储器(Network Attached Storage，NAS)、个人计算机(personal computer，PC)、电视机(television，TV)、 柜员机或者自助机等，本申请实施例不作具体限定。
本申请实施例中的伪基站识别装置可以为具有操作系统的装置。该操作系统可以为安卓(Android)操作系统，可以为ios操作系统，还可以为其他可能的操作系统，本申请实施例不作具体限定。
本申请实施例提供的伪基站识别装置能够实现图1的方法实施例实现的各个过程，为避免重复，这里不再赘述。
可选地，如图7所示，本申请实施例还提供一种电子设备700，包括处理器701，存储器702，存储在存储器702上并可在所述处理器701上运行的程序或指令，该程序或指令被处理器701执行时实现上述伪基站识别方法实施例的各个过程，且能达到相同的技术效果，为避免重复，这里不再赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中的电子设备包括上述所述的移动电子设备和非移动电子设备。
图8为实现本申请实施例的一种电子设备的硬件结构示意图。
该电子设备800包括但不限于：射频单元801、网络模块802、音频输出单元803、输入单元804、传感器805、显示单元806、用户输入单元807、接口单元808、存储器809、以及处理器810等部件。
本领域技术人员可以理解，电子设备800还可以包括给各个部件供电的电源(比如电池)，电源可以通过电源管理系统与处理器810逻辑相连，从而通过电源管理系统实现管理充电、放电、以及功耗管理等功能。图8中示出的电子设备结构并不构成对电子设备的限定，电子设备可以包括比图示更多或更少的部件，或者组合某些部件，或者不同的部件布置，在此不再赘述。
其中，射频单元801用于接收目标基站发送的系统消息；在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理；
处理器810，用于在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。
可选地，所述第一条件包括以下至少一项：
所述系统消息携带的运营商标签的数量大于第一阈值；
所述系统消息携带至少两个运营商标签，且所述至少两个运营商标签组成的标签组合与备选的任一个运营商标签组合相同；
所述第二条件包括以下至少一项：
未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理；
接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理；
接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于第二阈值。
可选地，处理器810，执行的所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理。
可选地，处理器810，执行的所述在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在第一时刻至第二时刻的时间段内，未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第一时刻为向所述目标基站发送所述目标请求消息的时刻，所述第二时刻晚于所述第一时刻，且所述第二时刻与所述第一时刻之间间隔第一时长。
可选地，处理器810，执行的所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；或者，
在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理。
可选地，处理器810，还用于：
在所述位置更新间隔时长大于或等于所述预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为 可疑基站；
在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述可疑基站确定为伪基站。
可选地，所述方法应用于目标电子设备，处理器810，还用于：
将所述目标基站存储至伪基站名单中，以禁止所述目标基站从第三时刻至第四时刻与所述目标电子设备通信；
其中，所述第三时刻为将所述目标基站存储至所述伪基站名单的时刻，所述第四时刻晚于所述第三时刻，且所述第四时刻为所述目标电子设备重启的时刻。
可选地，处理器810，还用于：对所述目标基站的第二目标信息进行大数据埋点；和/或，射频单元801，还用于：向服务器发送所述目标基站的第二目标信息，以使所述服务器指示一个电子设备转发所述第二目标信息。
可选地，射频单元801，还用于：在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签不满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送M次目标请求消息，M为大于1的整数；
处理器810，还用于：在所述M次目标请求消息均被所述目标基站忽略的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站。
可选地，处理器810，还用于：在所述M次目标请求消息中至少一次所述目标请求消息被所述目标基站应答的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为正常基站，N为大于1，且小于M的整数；
在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述正常基站确定为伪基站。
应理解的是，本申请实施例中，输入单元804可以包括图形处理器(Graphics Processing Unit，GPU)8041和麦克风8042，图形处理器8041对在视频捕获模式或图像捕获模式中由图像捕获装置(如摄像头)获得的静态图片或视频的图像数据进行处理。显示单元806可包括显示面板8061，可以采用液晶显示器、有机发光二极管等形式来配置显示面板8061。用户输入单元807包括触控面板8071以及其他输入设备8072。触控面板8071，也称为触摸屏。触控面板8071可包括触摸检测装置和触摸控制器两个部分。其他输入设备8072可以包括但不限于物理键盘、功能键(比如音量控制按键、开关按键等)、轨迹球、鼠标、操作杆，在此不再赘述。存储器809可用于存储软件程序以及各种数据，包括但不限于应用程序和操作系统。处理器810可集成应用处理器和调制解调处理器，其中，应用处理器主要处理操作系统、用户界面和应用程序等，调制解调处理器主要处理无线通信。可以理 解的是，上述调制解调处理器也可以不集成到处理器810中。
本申请实施例还提供一种可读存储介质，所述可读存储介质上存储有程序或指令，该程序或指令被处理器执行时实现上述伪基站识别方法实施例的各个过程，且能达到相同的技术效果，为避免重复，这里不再赘述。
其中，所述处理器为上述实施例中所述的电子设备中的处理器。所述可读存储介质，包括计算机可读存储介质，如计算机只读存储器(Read-Only Memory，ROM)、随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等。
本申请实施例另提供了一种芯片，所述芯片包括处理器和通信接口，所述通信接口和所述处理器耦合，所述处理器用于运行程序或指令，实现上述伪基站识别方法实施例的各个过程，且能达到相同的技术效果，为避免重复，这里不再赘述。
本申请实施例另提供了一种计算机程序产品，所述计算机程序产品被存储在存储介质中，所述计算机程序产品被至少一个处理器执行以实现上述方法实施例的各个过程，且能达到相同的技术效果，为避免重复，这里不再赘述。
应理解，本申请实施例提到的芯片还可以称为系统级芯片、系统芯片、芯片系统或片上系统芯片等。
需要说明的是，在本文中，术语“包括”、“包含”或者其任何其他变体意在涵盖非排他性的包含，从而使得包括一系列要素的过程、方法、物品或者装置不仅包括那些要素，而且还包括没有明确列出的其他要素，或者是还包括为这种过程、方法、物品或者装置所固有的要素。在没有更多限制的情况下，由语句“包括一个……”限定的要素，并不排除在包括该要素的过程、方法、物品或者装置中还存在另外的相同要素。此外，需要指出的是，本申请实施方式中的方法和装置的范围不限按示出或讨论的顺序来执行功能，还可包括根据所涉及的功能按基本同时的方式或按相反的顺序来执行功能，例如，可以按不同于所描述的次序来执行所描述的方法，并且还可以添加、省去、或组合各种步骤。另外，参照某些示例所描述的特征可在其他示例中被组合。
通过以上的实施方式的描述，本领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到上述实施例方法可借助软件加必需的通用硬件平台的方式来实现，当然也可以通过硬件，但很多情况下前者是更佳的实施方式。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质(如ROM/RAM、磁碟、光盘)中，包括若干指令用以使得一台终端(可以是手机，计算机，服务器，空调器，或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述的方法。
上面结合附图对本申请的实施例进行了描述，但是本申请并不局限于上述的具体实施方式，上述的具体实施方式仅仅是示意性的，而不是限制性的，本领域的普通技术人员在本申请的启示下，在不脱离本申请宗旨和权利要求所保护的范围情况下，还可做出很多形式，均属于本申请的保护之内。

Claims (18)

  1. 一种伪基站识别方法，包括：
    接收目标基站发送的系统消息；
    在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理；
    在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述第一条件包括以下至少一项：
    所述系统消息携带的运营商标签的数量大于第一阈值；
    所述系统消息携带至少两个运营商标签，且所述至少两个运营商标签组成的标签组合与备选的任一个运营商标签组合相同；
    所述第二条件包括以下至少一项：
    未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理；
    接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理；
    接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于第二阈值。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
    在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
    其中，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其中，所述在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
    在第一时刻至第二时刻的时间段内，未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
    其中，所述第一时刻为向所述目标基站发送所述目标请求消息的时刻，所述第二时刻晚于所述第一时刻，且所述第二时刻与所述第一时刻之间间隔第一时长。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站，包括：
    在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；或者，
    在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
    其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的方法，其中，所述方法还包括：
    在所述位置更新间隔时长大于或等于所述预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站；
    在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述可疑基站确定为伪基站。
  7. 根据权利要求1至6中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述方法应用于目标电子设备，所述将所述目标基站确定为伪基站之后，所述方法还包括：
    将所述目标基站存储至伪基站名单中，以禁止所述目标基站从第三时刻至第四时刻与所述目标电子设备通信；
    其中，所述第三时刻为将所述目标基站存储至所述伪基站名单的时刻，所述第四时刻晚于所述第三时刻，且所述第四时刻为所述目标电子设备重启的时刻。
  8. 根据权利要求1至6中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述将所述目标基站确定为伪基站之后，所述方法还包括以下至少一项：
    对所述目标基站的第二目标信息进行大数据埋点；
    向服务器发送所述目标基站的第二目标信息，以使所述服务器指示一个电子设备转发所述第二目标信息。
  9. 根据权利要求1至6中任一项所述的方法，其中，所述接收目标基站发送的系统消息之后，所述方法还包括：
    在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签不满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送M次目标请求消息，M为大于1的整数；
    在所述M次目标请求消息均被所述目标基站忽略的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为可疑基站。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其中，所述向所述目标基站发送M次目标请求消息之后，所述方法还包括：
    在所述M次目标请求消息中至少一次所述目标请求消息被所述目标基站应答的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为正常基站，N为大于1，且小于M的整数；
    在接收到的所述目标基站发送的信息包括敏感信息的情况下，将所述正常基站确定为伪基站。
  11. 一种伪基站识别装置，包括：
    接收模块，用于接收目标基站发送的系统消息；
    发送模块，用于在所述系统消息携带的运营商标签满足第一条件的情况下，向所述目标基站发送目标请求消息，所述目标请求消息用于请求所述目标基站允许执行目标处理，所述目标处理为执行目标业务的处理；
    确定模块，用于在所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的应答满足第二条件的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的装置，其中，所述第一条件包括以下至少一项：所述系统消息携带的运营商标签的数量大于第一阈值；
    所述系统消息携带至少两个运营商标签，且所述至少两个运营商标签组成的标签组合与备选的任一个运营商标签组合相同；
    所述第二条件包括以下至少一项：
    未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理；
    接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理；
    接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于第二阈值。
  13. 根据权利要求11所述的装置，其中，所述确定模块，还用于在未接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第一回复信息的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；其中，所述第一回复信息用于指示所述目标基站允许执行所述目标处理。
  14. 根据权利要求11所述的装置，其中，所述确定模块，还用于：
    在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，且所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息匹配的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；或者，
    在接收到所述目标基站对所述目标请求消息的第二回复信息，所述第二回复信息的信息内容与第一目标信息不匹配，且所述目标基站的周期性位置更新定时器的位置更新间隔时长小于预设阈值的情况下，将所述目标基站确定为伪基站；
    其中，所述第二回复信息用于指示所述目标基站不允许执行所述目标处理。
  15. 一种电子设备，包括处理器，存储器及存储在所述存储器上并可在所述处理器上运行的程序或指令，所述程序或指令被所述处理器执行时实现如权利要求1-10中任一项所述的伪基站识别方法的步骤。
  16. 一种可读存储介质，所述可读存储介质上存储程序或指令，所述程序或指令被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1-10中任一项所述的伪基站识别方法的步骤。
  17. 一种芯片，所述芯片包括处理器和通信接口，所述通信接口和所述处理器耦合，所述处理器用于运行程序或指令，实现如权利要求1-10中任一项所述的伪基站识别方法。
  18. 一种计算机程序产品，所述计算机程序产品被存储在存储介质中，所述计算机程序产品被至少一个处理器执行以实现如权利要求1-10中任一项所述的伪基站识别方法。
PCT/CN2024/080889 2023-03-17 2024-03-11 伪基站识别方法、装置及电子设备 WO2024193372A1 (zh)

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