WO2024113724A1

WO2024113724A1 - Data transmission method, device, and storage medium

Info

Publication number: WO2024113724A1
Application number: PCT/CN2023/096611
Authority: WO
Inventors: 崔佳宁; 尹作刚; 张琪
Original assignee: 苏州元脑智能科技有限公司
Priority date: 2022-11-30
Filing date: 2023-05-26
Publication date: 2024-06-06
Also published as: CN115549910B; CN115549910A

Abstract

The present application relates to the field of storage, and discloses a data transmission method, comprising the following steps: a data sending hard disk and a data receiving hard disk perform identity information negotiation and temporary key negotiation by using a digital certificate, and generate the same symmetric key on the basis of negotiated identity information and temporary key; the data sending hard disk encrypts, by using the symmetric key, data to be transmitted and sends same to the data receiving hard disk; and the data receiving hard disk decrypts, by using the symmetric key, the received data to be transmitted. The present application further discloses a computer device and a non-transient computer readable storage medium. according to the solution provided by the present application, key negotiation and data encryption transmission are performed between hard disks without depending on a host environment, thus ensuring the flexibility and security of data transmission.

Description

Data transmission method, device and storage medium

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority to a Chinese patent application filed with the China Patent Office on November 30, 2022, with application number 202211513285.X and invention name “A data transmission method, device and storage medium”, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference in this application.

Technical Field

The present application relates to the field of storage, and in particular to a data transmission method, device and storage medium.

Background technique

At present, solid-state drives are widely used to record data due to their advantages such as low latency, high performance, and low power consumption. For example, in environments such as artificial intelligence and environmental testing, a large amount of data needs to be collected quickly for subsequent analysis or training. However, due to the conditions of the local environment, the data may need to be remotely transmitted to the server through the network for analysis and modeling. In order to prevent data from being stolen or modified by attackers during network transmission, the data needs to be encrypted. The generally adopted solution is to read the solid-state drive data on the host, and then the two parties negotiate the key and encrypt the data using the negotiated key. However, this solution depends on the host environment and requires the host to be trustworthy, otherwise it will still lead to data leakage.

Summary of the invention

In view of this, in order to overcome at least one aspect of the above problems, the embodiment of the present application proposes a data transmission method according to the first aspect of the present application, comprising the following steps:

The data sending hard disk and the data receiving hard disk use the digital certificate to negotiate identity information and temporary key, and generate the same symmetric key based on the negotiated identity information and temporary key;

The data sending hard disk uses the symmetric key to encrypt the data to be transmitted and sends it to the data receiving hard disk;

The data receiving hard disk uses the symmetric key to decrypt the received data to be transmitted.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

Before the data sending hard disk and the data receiving hard disk leave the factory, the signature public-private key pair and the encryption public-private key pair are pre-generated;

Use the preset private key to sign the public key in the signature public-private key pair and the encryption public-private key pair to obtain a signature certificate and an encryption certificate;

The signature private key corresponding to the signature certificate in the signature public-private key pair, the signature certificate, the encryption private key corresponding to the encryption certificate in the encryption public-private key pair, the encryption certificate, and the public key certificate corresponding to the preset private key are saved to the preset storage location.

In some embodiments, the data sending hard disk and the data receiving hard disk use digital certificates to negotiate identity information and temporary keys, and generate the same symmetric key based on the negotiated identity information and temporary keys, further comprising:

Using the data sending hard disk to send a preset command to the data receiving hard disk;

The data receiving hard disk receives the preset command, reads the first signature certificate and the first encryption certificate, and sends them to the data sending hard disk;

In response to the data sending hard disk receiving the first signature certificate and the first encryption certificate, the legitimacy of the first signature certificate and the first encryption certificate is verified using the public key certificate in the data sending hard disk.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

In response to the verification being passed, the data sending hard disk generates a second temporary key, and encrypts the second temporary key using the received first encryption certificate;

Using the second temporary key to encrypt the data, the second identity information of the hard disk is sent;

Obtain a second signature certificate and a second encryption certificate of the hard disk to which the data is sent;

The encrypted second temporary key, the encrypted second identity information, the second signature certificate and the second encryption certificate are signed using the signature private key of the data sending hard disk to obtain second signature data, and sent to the data receiving hard disk.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

In response to the data receiving hard disk receiving the second signature data, using the public key certificate in the data receiving hard disk to verify the legitimacy of the second signature certificate and the second encryption certificate in the second signature data;

In response to the validity, the second signature certificate is used to verify whether the second signature data is complete.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

The data receiving hard disk uses the first encryption private key corresponding to the first encryption certificate to decrypt the encrypted second temporary key to obtain the second temporary key;

The encrypted second identity identification information is decrypted using the second temporary key to obtain the second identity identification information.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

The data receiving hard disk generates a first temporary key, and encrypts the first temporary key using the received second encryption certificate;

Encrypting the data using the first temporary key to receive the first identity information of the hard disk;

The encrypted first temporary key and the encrypted first identity identification information are signed using the signature private key of the data receiving hard disk to obtain first signature data, and the first signature data is sent to the data sending hard disk.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

In response to the data being sent, the hard disk uses the first signature certificate to verify the integrity of the first signature data.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

The data sending hard disk uses the second encryption private key corresponding to the second encryption certificate to decrypt the encrypted first temporary key to obtain the first temporary key;

The encrypted first identity identification information is decrypted using the first temporary key to obtain the first identity identification information.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

The data receiving hard disk and the data sending hard disk generate a symmetric key and an authentication key using the first temporary key, the first identity identification information, the second temporary key, and the second identity identification information respectively.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

The data sending hard disk calculates the second verification data using the first formula, encrypts the second verification data using the symmetric key, and The encrypted second verification data is sent to the data receiving hard disk, wherein the first formula is:

Wherein, K is the authentication key, M1 is the second temporary key | the first temporary key | the second identity information | the first identity information, opad and ipad are different constants, It is an XOR operation, H represents hash operation, and '|' represents data concatenation.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

The data receiving hard disk calculates the first verification data using the first formula, decrypts the received encrypted second verification data using the symmetric key, and compares the first verification data with the second verification data.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

The data receiving hard disk calculates the first verification data using the second formula, encrypts the first verification data using the symmetric key, and sends the encrypted first verification data to the data sending hard disk, wherein the second formula is:

Wherein, K is the authentication key, M2 is the first temporary key | the second temporary key | the first identity information | the second identity information, opad and ipad are different constants, It is an XOR operation, H represents hash operation, and '|' represents data concatenation.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

The data sending hard disk calculates the second verification data using the second formula, decrypts the received encrypted first verification data using the symmetric key, and compares the first verification data with the second verification data.

In some embodiments, the data sending hard disk encrypts the data to be transmitted using a symmetric key and sends the encrypted data to the data receiving hard disk, further comprising:

Obtaining data to be transmitted and encrypting it using a symmetric key;

Organize the header information and calculate the hash value of the header information using the authentication key;

The encrypted data to be transmitted and the hash value are sent to the data receiving hard disk.

In some embodiments, the data receiving hard disk uses a symmetric key to decrypt the received data to be transmitted, further comprising:

Verify the hash value using the authentication key;

In response to successful verification, the plaintext data is decrypted using the symmetric key and saved to a corresponding location based on the address and data length.

Based on the same inventive concept, according to the second aspect of the present application, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer device, including:

at least one processor; and

A memory storing a computer program executable on a processor, wherein the processor executes the steps of any one of the above data transmission methods when executing the program.

Based on the same inventive concept, according to the third aspect of the present application, an embodiment of the present application also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, which stores a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it performs the steps of any of the above data transmission methods.

The present application has one of the following beneficial technical effects: the solution proposed in the present application performs key negotiation and data encryption transmission between hard disks, is independent of the host environment, and ensures the flexibility and security of data transmission.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the prior art, the following will describe the technical solutions in the embodiments or the prior art. The drawings required for use are briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other embodiments can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

FIG1 is a schematic diagram of a flow chart of a data transmission method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

FIG2 is a schematic diagram of all data interactions during the key negotiation process in the first phase provided by an embodiment of the present application;

FIG3 is a schematic diagram of part of the data interaction in the key negotiation process in the first stage provided by an embodiment of the present application;

FIG4 is a schematic diagram of another part of data interaction in the key negotiation process in the first stage provided by an embodiment of the present application;

FIG5 is a schematic diagram of another part of data interaction in the key negotiation process in the first stage provided by an embodiment of the present application;

FIG6 is a schematic diagram of a universal load head defined in an embodiment of the present application;

FIG7 is a schematic diagram of header information provided by an embodiment of the present application;

FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium provided in an embodiment of the present application.

Detailed ways

In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more clearly understood, the embodiments of the present application are further described in detail below in combination with specific embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings.

It should be noted that all expressions using "first" and "second" in the embodiments of the present application are for distinguishing two non-identical entities with the same name or non-identical parameters. It can be seen that "first" and "second" are only for the convenience of expression and should not be understood as limitations on the embodiments of the present application. The subsequent embodiments will not explain this one by one.

In the embodiment of the present application, Asymmetric_Encrypt(msg,pub_key): uses the public key pub_key of the asymmetric key pair to encrypt the message msg using an asymmetric algorithm. The asymmetric algorithm may be SM2 or RSA, etc.

Asymmetric_Sign(msg, priv_key): Use the private key priv_key of the asymmetric key pair to digitally sign the message msg. The signature algorithm can be SM2 or RSA, etc.

Symmetric_Encrypt(msg, key): Use the symmetric key key to encrypt the message msg using a symmetric algorithm. The encryption algorithm can be SM4 or 3DES, etc.

PRF (key, msg): Use the key key to calculate the data summary of the message msg. PRF (pseudo random function)

HASH(msg): Use a cryptographic hash algorithm to calculate the data digest of the message msg. The digest algorithm can be SM3 or SHA-256.

Vendor_cert: Vendor certificate, a certificate issued by the vendor's private key to the vendor's public key. The contents of the certificate include: vendor information, vendor public key, signature of an authority, validity period, etc. The format and verification method of the certificate generally follow the X.509 international standard.

SSD_cert: SSD certificate, a certificate issued using the manufacturer's private key to the SSD's public key. The contents of the certificate include: manufacturer information, SSD public key, signature and validity period of the authority, etc. The format and verification method of the certificate generally follow the X.509 international standard. There are two types of certificates used in this application. One is a signature certificate. The associated public and private key pairs are used for signature verification. The local SSD certificate is represented as SSD_cert_sig_local, and the SSD certificate on the remote server is represented as SSD_cert_sig_server. One is an encryption and decryption certificate. The associated public and private key pairs are used for encryption and decryption operations. The local SSD certificate is represented as SSD_cert_enc_local, and the SSD certificate on the remote server is represented as SSD_cert_enc_server.

HMAC: It is the abbreviation of Hash-based Message Authentication Code. The H in HMAC refers to the Hash algorithm. HMAC can use a variety of one-way hashing formulas, such as SHA-1. Where 'K' represents the key, 'M' represents the message, Indicates XOR operation, 'H' indicates hash operation, '|' indicates concatenation of the previous and next data, and opad and ipad indicate different constants.

According to one aspect of the present application, an embodiment of the present application proposes a data transmission method, as shown in FIG1 , which may include the steps of:

S1, the data sending hard disk and the data receiving hard disk use digital certificates to negotiate identity information and temporary keys, and generate the same symmetric key based on the negotiated identity information and temporary keys;

S2, the data sending hard disk uses the symmetric key to encrypt the data to be transmitted and sends it to the data receiving hard disk;

S3, the data receiving hard disk uses the symmetric key to decrypt the received data to be transmitted.

The solution proposed in this application performs key negotiation and data encryption transmission between hard disks, which is independent of the host environment, thereby making data transmission more flexible and secure.

In some embodiments, data transmission between hard disks designed in the present application, such as secure data transmission between a local solid-state drive and a solid-state drive on a remote server, can be divided into two stages. The first stage is key exchange, and the second stage is the use of key encryption to protect the transmitted data.

(1) In the first phase, the communicating parties use digital certificates to protect the exchanged data. The same symmetric key is calculated based on the exchanged data according to the agreed algorithm to protect the data transmission process in the second phase. If the attacker cannot obtain the manufacturer's private key, he cannot generate a legitimate digital certificate. Even if the attacker intercepts the transmitted SSD digital certificate, he cannot obtain the private key stored in the SSD, nor can he use the private key to decrypt data or sign data, which ensures the security of the key negotiation process.

(2) In the second stage, the host sends the address and length of the data to be read to the SSD. The SSD uses the symmetric key obtained in the first stage to calculate the hash value of the data, encrypts it with the symmetric key, and returns it to the host. The host transmits the data remotely to the server through the network. The SSD on the server will use the symmetric key obtained in the first stage to decrypt the data, verify the hash value, and save the data.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

Specifically, before the SSD leaves the factory, the manufacturer sends a private command to the SSD to make the SSD generate two pairs of public and private key pairs. The SSD saves the private key in the non-volatile flash and returns the public key to the host. The host uses the manufacturer's private key to sign the SSD's public key, and generates the SSD_cert_sig signature certificate and SSD_cert_enc encryption certificate of the SSD respectively, and sends them together with the manufacturer's public key certificate Vendor_cert to the SSD. The SSD saves the Vendor_cert, SSD_cert_sig signature certificate and SSD_cert_enc encryption certificate in the non-volatile flash.

Two pairs of public and private keys, one pair of public and private keys is used to sign and verify the transmitted data during the key negotiation phase to ensure the integrity of the data and the identity of the data source, private key signature, public key signature verification. One pair of public and private keys is used for encryption and decryption operations. During the key negotiation phase, the temporary symmetric key generated by encryption and decryption is encrypted with the public key and decrypted with the private key.

It should be noted that, in an embodiment of the present application, the signature certificate of the data receiving hard disk is recorded as the first signature certificate, the encryption certificate is recorded as the first encryption certificate, the identity identification information is recorded as the first identity identification information, the signature data is recorded as the first signature data, and the temporary key is recorded as the first temporary key; the signature certificate of the data sending hard disk is recorded as the second signature certificate, the encryption certificate is recorded as the second encryption certificate, the identity identification information is recorded as the second identity identification information, the signature data is recorded as the second signature data, and the temporary key is recorded as the second temporary key.

In some embodiments, it also includes:

Obtaining data to be transmitted and encrypting it using a symmetric key;

Verify the hash value using the authentication key;

The following describes in detail the data transmission method proposed in the present application by taking the local hard disk as the data sending hard disk and the remote server hard disk as the data receiving hard disk as an example.

The data interaction during the key negotiation process in the first phase can be shown in Figure 2. The data interaction process is analyzed in conjunction with Figures 3 to 5:

(1) As shown in Figure 3, messages 1, 2, and 3 are:

a) When the data of the local SSD needs to be sent to the SSD on the remote server, the local host sends a custom negotiation key start command to the remote server through the IP address of the remote server and the pre-agreed port number.

b) The remote server uses the port number to determine that this is an application instruction for negotiating keys and secure data transmission, and sends a private command to the SSD where the data is to be stored, reading the SSD certificate SSD_cert_sig_server signature certificate and SSD_cert_enc_server encryption certificate. The SSD organization returns the signature certificate payload sig_cert_server_payload and the encryption certificate payload enc_cert_server_payload (multiple types of data are transmitted during the data interaction process, referred to as payloads here) and sends them to the local host.

c) After receiving the data, the local host sends it to the local SSD. The SSD determines that it has received the certificate payload and uses the manufacturer's public key in the manufacturer's certificate Vendor_cert stored in the non-volatile flash before leaving the factory to verify the legitimacy of the two certificates. If successful, continue with subsequent operations. If certificate verification fails, stop subsequent negotiations and return an error status.

(2) As shown in Figure 4, messages 4 and 5 are:

a) After the local SSD successfully verifies the certificate of the server-side SSD, it generates a temporary symmetric key Sk_local, and uses the public key pub_server in the public key certificate of the server-side SSD SSD_cert_enc_server to encrypt the symmetric key Sk_local, and obtains the symmetric key payload Sk_local_payload. The symmetric key Sk_local is used to encrypt the SSD's own identity information (such as serial number and other information representing the identity) to obtain the identity information payload ID_local_payload. The local SSD's own SSD_cert_sig_local signature certificate and SSD_cert_enc_local encryption certificate are used to organize the signature certificate payload sig_cert_local_payload and the encrypted certificate payload enc_cert_local_payload. In order to ensure data integrity and anti-counterfeiting, the local SSD's signature private key sig_priv_local is used to calculate the signature data sig_local for Sk_local_payload, ID_local_payload, and enc_cert_local_payload (the calculation formula is as follows), and the signature payload sig_payload_local is organized. The local SSD sends the above organized payload data to the local host, and the local host sends it to the remote server.
sig_local=Asymmetric_Sign(Sk_local_payload|ID_local_payload|enc_cert_local_payload,
sig_priv_local)

b) After receiving the data, the remote server sends it to the server-side SSD. After receiving the data, the server-side SSD first uses the manufacturer's public key in the manufacturer certificate Vendor_cert stored in the non-volatile flash before leaving the factory to verify the legitimacy of the two certificates in sig_cert_local_payload and enc_cert_local_payload. If the certificate is legitimate, the signature data sig_local of the signature payload sig_payload_local is verified using the local SSD signature public key in the signature certificate payload sig_cert_local_payload and the transmitted payload data. If the signature data verification is successful, it means that the data transmission is complete and legal. The attacker cannot obtain the manufacturer's private key and cannot modify the certificate payload, otherwise the certificate verification will fail. The attacker also cannot obtain the private key of the local SSD. If the transmitted data is modified, the signature payload sig_payload_local will fail to verify the signature.

c) The server-side SSD uses its own encryption and decryption private key to decrypt the symmetric key payload Sk_local_payload to obtain the temporary symmetric key Sk_local of the local SSD (because the local SSD uses the encryption public key of the server-side SSD when encrypting Sk_local), and then uses Sk_local to decrypt the identity information payload ID_local_payload to obtain the identity information ID_local of the local SSD.

d) The server-side SSD generates a temporary symmetric key Sk_server, and uses the public key pub_local in the SSD_cert_enc_local certificate of the local SSD to encrypt the symmetric key Sk_server, and obtains the symmetric key payload Sk_server_payload. The symmetric key Sk_server is used to encrypt the SSD's own identity information ID_server (such as serial number and other information representing identity) to obtain the identity information payload ID_server_payload. In order to ensure data integrity and anti-counterfeiting, the signature private key sig_priv_server of the server-side SSD is used to calculate the signature data sig_server (the calculation formula is as follows) for Sk_server_payload, ID_server_payload, and enc_cert_server_payload (which have been transmitted to the local SSD in message 3), and obtain the signature payload sig_payload_server. The server-side SSD sends the payload data of the above organization to the server, and the server sends it to the local host.
sig_server＝Asymmetric_Sign(Sk_server_payload|ID_server_payload|enc_cert_server_payload，
sig_priv_server)

e) The server-side SSD now knows Sk_local, Sk_server, ID_local, and ID_server, and uses the following algorithm to calculate the key seed keyseed. It then uses the keyseed to calculate the encryption key key_enc used to encrypt data in the second stage and the authentication key key_auth used to verify message integrity and data source identity.
keyseed = PRF (HASH (Sk_local | Sk_server), ID_local | ID_server)
key_enc = PRF(keyseed, ID_local|ID_server|0)
key_auth = PRF(key_enc, ID_local | ID_server | 1)

The values 0 and 1 in the above calculation formula are to prevent the calculated key_enc and key_auth from being the same.

f) After receiving the data, the local host sends it to the local SSD. After receiving the data, the local SSD uses the server-side SSD signature public key in the server-side signature certificate payload sig_cert_server_payload received in message 3 and the transmitted payload data to verify the signature data of the signature payload sig_payload_server. If the signature data verification is successful, it means that the data transmission is complete and legal.

g) The local SSD uses its own encryption and decryption private key to decrypt the symmetric key payload Sk_server_payload to obtain the temporary symmetric key Sk_server of the server-side SSD, and then uses Sk_server to decrypt the identity information payload ID_server_payload to obtain the identity information ID_server of the server-side SSD.

h) At this point, the local SSD now knows Sk_local, Sk_server, ID_local, and ID_server, and uses the following algorithm to calculate the key seed keyseed, and then uses keyseed to calculate the encryption key key_enc used to encrypt data in the second stage and the authentication key key_auth used to verify message integrity and data source identity.
keyseed＝PRF(HASH(Sk_local|Sk_server),ID_local|ID_server)
key_enc＝PRF(keyseed,ID_local|ID_server|0)
key_auth = PRF(key_enc, ID_local | ID_server | 1)

(3) As shown in Figure 5, messages 6 and 7 are:

a) At this point, the local and server SSDs have already calculated the same key through the exchanged data and the agreed algorithm. In order to authenticate the previous exchange process and verify whether the keys calculated by both parties are correct, the local SSD uses the following formula to calculate hash_local:

Among them, K is key_auth, M1 is Sk_local|Sk_server|ID_local|ID_server, opad and ipad are different constants, It is an XOR operation, H represents hash operation, and '|' represents data concatenation.

The encryption key key_enc calculated locally is then used to encrypt hash_local, and the resulting encrypted hash data payload enc_hash_local_payload is sent to the remote server via the local host.

b) After receiving the data, the server sends it to the server-side SSD. The server-side SSD uses the encryption key key_enc calculated by the server to decrypt the payload data and uses the same formula as above to verify whether hash_local is correct. If hash_local verification succeeds, the server-side SSD uses the following formula to calculate hash_server:

K is key_auth, and M2 is Sk_server|Sk_local|ID_server|ID_local.

It should be noted that the order of the relevant data of the local and server SSDs in the message calculated here is different, so the hash values are different.

Then use the key_enc key calculated by the server to encrypt hash_server, and the encrypted hash data payload enc_hash_server_payload is sent to the local host through the server.

c) After receiving the data, the local host sends it to the local SSD. The local SSD decrypts and verifies the hash_server. If the verification is successful, it means that both parties have calculated the same encryption key key_enc and authentication key key_auth through the previous interaction process, and can proceed to the second stage of data transmission.

In some embodiments, in order to distinguish each payload, a general payload header can be defined. As shown in Figure 6, current payload: The length of this field is 1 byte, which identifies the type of this payload. Determine which operations to apply to the current data based on the payload type. Next payload: The length of this field is 1 byte, which identifies the type of the next payload after this payload. If the current payload is the last one, this field will be set to 0. Payload length: The length of this field is 2 bytes, and the length value is in bytes. The calculation range includes the entire payload including the general payload header.

Phase 2 - Data encryption to protect transmission

(1) After the first phase of key negotiation, both parties have established the same key and can start transmitting data. The local host sends the data address offset and data length to be read to the local SSD. After receiving the data, the local SSD reads the data from the non-volatile flash and uses the symmetric algorithm encryption key key_enc negotiated in the first phase to calculate the encrypted data using the following formula ①. The organized header information shown in Figure 7 (the header information can be expanded according to actual conditions) and the encrypted data are then used. The authentication key key_auth negotiated in the first phase is used to calculate the hash value using the following formula ② and then added to the end of the data. The local SSD returns the organized data to the local host, which then sends it to the remote server.
data_enc＝Symmetric_Encrypt(data,key_enc) ①
data_hash＝HMAC(key_auth,header|data_enc) ②

(2) After receiving the data, the remote server sends it to the server-side SSD. The server-side SSD first uses the authentication key key_auth to verify the hash value at the end of the data. If the hash value verification is successful, it means that the data is complete and has not been tampered with. Then the encryption key key_enc is used to decrypt the plaintext data and save it to the non-volatile flash according to the address and data length. If the hash value verification fails, it replies to the server that the verification failed, and the server informs the local host.

(3) Repeat steps 1 and 2 above to transfer and save all the data to the SSD on the server side, so that the server can use the data for analysis or training and other operations.

It should be noted that the validity period of the key depends on the actual usage. The key may become invalid after sending and receiving a batch of data. If a new batch of data is to be transmitted, it needs to be renegotiated.

The solution proposed in this application performs key negotiation and data encryption transmission between hard disks, which is independent of the host environment, thus ensuring the flexibility and security of data transmission. That is, key negotiation is performed between solid-state drives, and the host does not need to install any relevant security certificates, and does not need to rely too much on whether the local system environment is trustworthy. There is no need to worry about the local host being invaded to obtain the plaintext data of the solid-state drive or obtain key information. It only needs to send private commands to the solid-state hardware in the local system environment, and transmit the obtained data remotely to the server via the network. Each time a data transmission is applied, a key negotiation is first performed between the solid-state drives, and the transmitted data is encrypted using the negotiated key, and a hash value is calculated to ensure the security and integrity of data transmission.

Based on the same inventive concept, according to another aspect of the present application, as shown in FIG8 , an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer device 501, including:

at least one processor 520; and

The memory 510 stores a computer program 511 that can be run on the processor. When the processor 520 executes the program, the steps of any of the above data transmission methods are performed.

Based on the same inventive concept, according to another aspect of the present application, as shown in Figure 9, an embodiment of the present application also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium 601, which stores a computer program 610. When the computer program 610 is executed by a processor, it performs the steps of any of the above data transmission methods.

Finally, it should be noted that a person skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be implemented by instructing related hardware through a computer program, and the program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods.

Furthermore, it should be understood that the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium (eg, memory) in the present application is a non-volatile memory.

It will also be apparent to those skilled in the art that the various exemplary logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in conjunction with the disclosure herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. In some embodiments, the functions of various schematic components, blocks, modules, circuits and steps have been generally described. Whether such functions are implemented as software or hardware depends on the specific application and the design constraints imposed on the entire system. Those skilled in the art may implement the functions in various ways for each specific application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope disclosed in the embodiments of the present application.

The above are exemplary embodiments disclosed in the present application, but it should be noted that various changes and modifications may be made without departing from the scope disclosed in the embodiments of the present application as defined in the claims. The functions, steps and/or actions of the method claims according to the disclosed embodiments described herein do not need to be performed in any particular order. In addition, although the elements disclosed in the embodiments of the present application may be described or required in individual form, they may also be understood as multiple unless explicitly limited to the singular.

It should be understood that, as used in this application, the singular forms "a", "an" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly supports an exception. It should also be understood that, as used in this application, "and/or" refers to any and all possible combinations of one or more associated listed items.

The serial numbers of the embodiments disclosed in the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application are only for description and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

A person of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that all or part of the steps for implementing the above embodiments may be accomplished by hardware, or may be accomplished by instructing related hardware through a program, and the program may be stored in a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, and the non-transitory computer storage medium mentioned above may be a read-only memory, a disk, or an optical disk, etc.

A person of ordinary skill in the art should understand that the discussion of any of the above embodiments is merely exemplary and is not intended to imply that the scope of the disclosure of the embodiments of the present application (including the claims) is limited to these examples; under the concept of the embodiments of the present application, the technical features in the above embodiments or different embodiments may also be combined, and there are many other variations of different aspects of the embodiments of the present application as above, which are not provided in detail for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, any omissions, modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the embodiments of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

A data transmission method, characterized in that it comprises the following steps:

The data sending hard disk and the data receiving hard disk use the digital certificate to negotiate identity information and temporary key, and generate the same symmetric key based on the negotiated identity information and temporary key;

The data sending hard disk encrypts the data to be transmitted using the symmetric key and sends the encrypted data to the data receiving hard disk;

The data receiving hard disk uses the symmetric key to decrypt the received data to be transmitted.
The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

Before the data sending hard disk and the data receiving hard disk leave the factory, a signature public-private key pair and an encryption public-private key pair are pre-generated;

Using a preset private key to sign the public key in the signature public-private key pair and the encryption public-private key pair to obtain a signature certificate and an encryption certificate;

The signature private key in the signature public-private key pair corresponding to the signature certificate, the signature certificate, the encryption private key in the encryption public-private key pair corresponding to the encryption certificate, the encryption certificate and the public key certificate corresponding to the preset private key are saved to a preset storage location.
The method according to claim 1, wherein the data sending hard disk and the data receiving hard disk use digital certificates to negotiate identity information and temporary keys, and generate the same symmetric key based on the negotiated identity information and temporary keys, further comprising:

Using the data sending hard disk to send a preset command to the data receiving hard disk;

The data receiving hard disk receives the preset command, reads the first signature certificate and the first encryption certificate, and sends them to the data sending hard disk;

In response to the data sending hard disk receiving the first signature certificate and the first encryption certificate, the legitimacy of the first signature certificate and the first encryption certificate is verified using the public key certificate in the data sending hard disk.
The method according to claim 3, further comprising:

In response to the verification being successful, the data sending hard disk generates a second temporary key and encrypts the second temporary key using the received first encryption certificate.
The method according to claim 4, further comprising:

Encrypting the data using the second temporary key to send the second identity information of the hard disk; and

Obtain a second signature certificate and a second encryption certificate of the data sending hard disk.
The method according to claim 5, further comprising:

The encrypted second temporary key, the encrypted second identity information, the second signature certificate and the second encryption certificate are signed using the signature private key of the data sending hard disk to obtain second signature data, and sent to the data receiving hard disk.
The method according to claim 6, further comprising:

In response to the data receiving hard disk receiving the second signature data, using the public key certificate in the data receiving hard disk to verify the legitimacy of the second signature certificate and the second encryption certificate in the second signature data;

In response to the validity, the second signature certificate is used to verify whether the second signature data is complete.
The method according to claim 6, further comprising:

The data receiving hard disk uses the first encryption private key corresponding to the first encryption certificate to decrypt the encrypted second temporary key to obtain the second temporary key.
The method according to claim 8, further comprising:

The encrypted second identity identification information is decrypted using the second temporary key to obtain the second identity identification information.
The method according to claim 9, further comprising:

The data receiving hard disk generates a first temporary key, and encrypts the first temporary key using the received second encryption certificate;

The first temporary key is used to encrypt the first identity information of the data receiving hard disk.
The method according to claim 10, further comprising:

The encrypted first temporary key and the encrypted first identity identification information are signed using the signature private key of the data receiving hard disk to obtain first signature data, and the first signature data is sent to the data sending hard disk.
The method according to claim 11, further comprising:

In response to the data sending, the hard disk uses the first signature certificate to verify the integrity of the first signature data.
The method according to claim 11, further comprising:

The data sending hard disk uses the second encryption private key corresponding to the second encryption certificate to decrypt the encrypted first temporary key to obtain the first temporary key;

The encrypted first identity identification information is decrypted using the first temporary key to obtain the first identity identification information.
The method according to claim 13, further comprising:

The data receiving hard disk and the data sending hard disk generate the symmetric key and the authentication key using the first temporary key, the first identity identification information, the second temporary key, and the second identity identification information respectively.
The method of claim 14, further comprising:

The data sending hard disk calculates the second verification data using the first formula, encrypts the second verification data using the symmetric key, and sends the encrypted second verification data to the data receiving hard disk, wherein the first formula is:

HMAC(K,M1)=H(K⊕opad|H(K⊕ipad|M1))

Wherein, K is the authentication key, M1 is the second temporary key | the first temporary key | the second identity information | the first identity information, opad and ipad are different constants, It is an XOR operation, H represents hash operation, and '|' represents data concatenation.
The method according to claim 15, further comprising:

The data receiving hard disk calculates the first verification data using the first formula, decrypts the received encrypted second verification data using the symmetric key, and compares the first verification data with the second verification data.
The method of claim 14, further comprising:

The data receiving hard disk calculates the first verification data using the second formula, encrypts the first verification data using the symmetric key, and sends the encrypted first verification data to the data sending hard disk, wherein the second formula is:

Wherein, K is the authentication key, M2 is the first temporary key | the second temporary key | the first identity information | the second identity information, opad and ipad are different constants, It is an XOR operation, H represents hash operation, and '|' represents data concatenation.
The method of claim 17, further comprising:

The data sending hard disk calculates the second verification data using the second formula, decrypts the received encrypted first verification data using the symmetric key, and compares the first verification data with the second verification data.
The method according to claim 14, wherein the data sending hard disk uses the symmetric key to encrypt the data to be transmitted and sends the data to the data receiving hard disk, further comprising:

Obtaining data to be transmitted and encrypting it using the symmetric key;

Organizing header information and calculating a hash value of the header information using the authentication key;

The encrypted data to be transmitted and the hash value are sent to the data receiving hard disk.
The method according to claim 19, wherein the data receiving hard disk uses the symmetric key to decrypt the received data to be transmitted, further comprising:

verifying the hash value using an authentication key;

In response to successful verification, the plaintext data is decrypted using the symmetric key and saved to a corresponding location based on the address and data length.
A computer device comprising:

at least one processor; and

A memory storing a computer program executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 20 when executing the program.
A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, performs the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 20.