WO2024092390A1 - 一种通信方法及装置 - Google Patents

一种通信方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2024092390A1
WO2024092390A1 PCT/CN2022/128562 CN2022128562W WO2024092390A1 WO 2024092390 A1 WO2024092390 A1 WO 2024092390A1 CN 2022128562 W CN2022128562 W CN 2022128562W WO 2024092390 A1 WO2024092390 A1 WO 2024092390A1
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Prior art keywords
physical channel
random number
terminal device
scrambling code
network device
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PCT/CN2022/128562
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
王文会
吴建军
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华为技术有限公司
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Priority to PCT/CN2022/128562 priority Critical patent/WO2024092390A1/zh
Publication of WO2024092390A1 publication Critical patent/WO2024092390A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L27/00—Modulated-carrier systems

Definitions

  • the embodiments of the present application relate to the field of communication technology, and in particular, to a communication method and device.
  • the fifth generation (5th generation, 5G) mobile communication system is similar to the fourth generation (4th generation, 4G) mobile communication system. Both have the characteristics of two-layer security, and the security mode command activation and security protection are performed in the non-access stratum (NAS) and the access stratum (AS) respectively.
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • AS access stratum
  • the terminal device and the network authenticate each other, they negotiate the security algorithms and keys used for the encryption and integrity protection of NAS signaling, radio resource control (RRC) signaling and user data in the subsequent communication process.
  • RRC radio resource control
  • the NAS security algorithm negotiation is completed, the NAS signaling between the access and mobility management function (AMF) network element on the network side and the terminal device will be encrypted and integrity protected based on the security algorithms and keys used for the negotiated encryption and integrity protection.
  • the network equipment on the network side and the terminal device negotiate the security algorithms and keys for AS encryption and integrity protection, and start the encryption and integrity protection of AS RRC signaling and user data.
  • the above security protection scheme only provides security protection for NAS signaling and RRC signaling.
  • the packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer in the AS layer provides signaling transmission services for the RRC layer, and implements encryption and integrity protection of RRC signaling, as well as decryption and integrity verification of RRC signaling in the reverse direction.
  • the signaling of each protocol sublayer below the PDCP layer does not have any security protection.
  • the physical (PHY) layer and media access control (MAC) layer signaling such as media access control layer control element (MAC CE), uplink control information (UCI), and downlink control information (DCI) have no security protection. Attackers can eavesdrop and tamper with these underlying signaling, which may cause legitimate terminal equipment service interruption, terminal equipment service performance damage, abnormal terminal equipment power consumption, abnormal network equipment resource scheduling, and other problems.
  • the present application provides a communication method and apparatus to improve the security of underlying signaling transmitted between network devices and terminal devices, and to enhance the security strength of the underlying signaling against eavesdropping and tampering.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a communication method, which can be executed by a terminal device, or by a component of the terminal device (such as a processor, a chip, or a chip system, etc.), or by a logic module or software that can realize all or part of the functions of the terminal device.
  • the following is an example of the method being executed by a terminal device, and the method includes: the terminal device generates at least one random number through a random number generator according to user-specific parameters of a physical channel from a network device, and a setting history message of the terminal device interacting with the network device, and the at least one random number includes a first random number; the terminal device generates a physical channel encryption key through a key generator according to the first random number; the terminal device encrypts or decrypts the physical channel according to the physical channel encryption key.
  • the physical channel can be a physical downlink control channel (physical downlink control channel, PDCCH), a physical downlink shared channel (physical downlink shared channel, PDSCH), a physical uplink control channel (physical uplink control channel, PUCCH), or a physical uplink shared channel (physical uplink shared channel, PUSCH), etc.
  • PDCCH physical downlink control channel
  • PDSCH physical downlink shared channel
  • PUCCH physical uplink control channel
  • PUSCH physical uplink shared channel
  • the terminal device can extract random numbers to generate physical channel encryption keys (such as extracting random numbers in a certain period to generate physical channel encryption keys) based on the user-specific parameters of the physical channel from the network device and the historical messages interacting with the network device, and encrypt or decrypt the physical channel, which can provide protection for the underlying signaling (such as physical layer signaling) transmitted between the network device and the terminal device, improve the security of the underlying signaling transmitted between the network device and the terminal device, and strengthen the security strength of the underlying signaling against eavesdropping and tampering.
  • generating random numbers based on the historical messages of the interaction can increase the difficulty of cracking by attackers, and can also prevent message spoofing and network device identity spoofing.
  • At least one random number also includes a second random number
  • the method also includes: the terminal device updates a physical channel scrambling sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the second random number; and the terminal device scrambles or descrambles the physical channel according to the updated physical channel scrambling sequence.
  • the physical channel scrambling sequence can be updated based on the generated random number (such as updating according to a certain period), which can increase the difficulty for an attacker to correctly descramble, thereby increasing the calculation and time cost for the attacker to eavesdrop on the signaling interacting between the terminal device and the network device.
  • At least one random number also includes a third random number
  • the method also includes: the terminal device updates a physical channel pilot sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the third random number; and the terminal device performs resource mapping or channel estimation on the physical channel according to the updated physical channel pilot sequence.
  • the physical channel pilot sequence can be updated based on the generated random number (such as updated according to a certain period), which can increase the difficulty for an attacker to correctly estimate the channel, thereby increasing the calculation and time cost of the attacker eavesdropping on the signaling interacting between the terminal device and the network device.
  • the method also includes: the terminal device receives a scrambling code-specific parameter of a physical channel from a network device, and the number of bits included in the scrambling code-specific parameter is greater than a first quantity threshold; the terminal device generates a physical channel scrambling sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to a first sub-scrambling code parameter, the first sub-scrambling code parameter is determined by the terminal device according to a first selection rule and the scrambling code-specific parameter, and the number of bits included in the first sub-scrambling code parameter is equal to the first quantity threshold; the terminal device generates a physical channel pilot sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to a second sub-scrambling code parameter, the second sub-scrambling code parameter is determined by the terminal device according to a second selection rule and the scrambling code-specific parameter, and the number of bits included in the second sub-scrambling code parameter is equal to the first quantity threshold.
  • the first sub-scrambling code parameters and the second sub-scrambling code parameters are extracted according to preset rules and used to update the physical channel scrambling sequence and the physical channel pilot sequence, thereby increasing the random space of the scrambling code-specific parameters and increasing the cracking difficulty for attackers.
  • the terminal device generates at least one random number through a random number generator based on user-specific parameters of a physical channel from the network device and set history messages of interaction between the terminal device and the network device, including: the terminal device obtains the set history message of the most recent interaction with the network device according to a set period; the terminal device generates at least one random number through a random number generator based on user-specific parameters and the set history message of the most recent interaction.
  • the terminal device can periodically obtain user-specific parameters and the latest historical messages, generate random numbers, and use them to generate or update physical channel encryption keys, etc. This can further increase the difficulty for attackers to crack physical channel encryption keys, etc., and improve the security of signaling transmission between network devices and terminal devices.
  • user-specific parameters of the physical channel are randomly configured by the network device.
  • the network device randomly configures the user-specific parameters of the physical channel, which can further increase the difficulty for attackers to crack the user-specific parameters, avoid the cracking of the physical channel encryption keys used by the network device and the terminal device, and further improve the security of signaling transmission between the network device and the terminal device.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a communication method, which can be executed by a network device, or by a component of the network device (such as a processor, a chip, or a chip system, etc.), and can also be implemented by a logic module or software that can realize all or part of the network device functions.
  • the following is an example of the method being executed by a network device, and the method includes: the network device generates at least one random number through a random number generator according to user-specific parameters of a physical channel sent to a terminal device, and a setting history message of interaction between the terminal device and the network device, and the at least one random number includes a first random number; the network device generates a physical channel encryption key through a key generator according to the first random number; the network device decrypts or encrypts the physical channel according to the physical channel encryption key.
  • the physical channel may be PDCCH, PDSCH, PUCCH, PUSCH or the like.
  • At least one random number also includes a second random number
  • the method also includes: the network device updates a physical channel scrambling sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the second random number; and the network device descrambles or scrambles the physical channel according to the updated physical channel scrambling sequence.
  • At least one random number also includes a third random number
  • the method also includes: the network device updates a physical channel pilot sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the third random number; and the network device performs channel estimation or resource mapping on the physical channel according to the updated physical channel pilot sequence.
  • the method also includes: the network device sends a scrambling code-specific parameter of a physical channel to the terminal device, and the number of bits included in the scrambling code-specific parameter is greater than a first quantity threshold; the network device generates a physical channel scrambling sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the first sub-scrambling code parameter, the first sub-scrambling code parameter is determined by the network device according to a first selection rule and the scrambling code-specific parameter, and the number of bits included in the first sub-scrambling code parameter is equal to the first quantity threshold; the network device generates a physical channel pilot sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the second sub-scrambling code parameter, the second sub-scrambling code parameter is determined by the network device according to a second selection rule and the scrambling code-specific parameter, and the number of bits included in the second sub-scrambling code parameter is equal to the first quantity threshold.
  • the network device generates at least one random number through a random number generator based on user-specific parameters of a physical channel sent to the terminal device and set history messages of interaction between the terminal device and the network device, including: the network device obtains the set history message of the most recent interaction with the terminal device according to a set period; the network device generates at least one random number through a random number generator based on user-specific parameters and the set history message of the most recent interaction.
  • user-specific parameters of the physical channel are randomly configured by the network device.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a communication device, which has the function of implementing the method in the first aspect, and the function can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions, such as an interface unit and a processing unit.
  • the device may be a chip or an integrated circuit.
  • the device includes a processor, which can be coupled to a memory, and the memory is used to store instructions executed by the processor. When the instructions are executed by the processor, the device can perform the method of the first aspect.
  • the so-called “coupling” refers to two components being directly or indirectly connected or having a certain communication relationship.
  • the device may be a complete terminal device.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a communication device, which has the function of implementing the method in the second aspect above, and the function can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions, such as an interface unit and a processing unit.
  • the device may be a chip or an integrated circuit.
  • the device includes a processor, which can be coupled to a memory, and the memory is used to store instructions executed by the processor. When the instructions are executed by the processor, the device can perform the method of the second aspect.
  • the so-called “coupling” refers to two components being directly or indirectly connected or having a certain communication relationship.
  • the device may be a complete network device.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a communication device, which includes an interface circuit and a processor, and the processor and the interface circuit are coupled to each other.
  • the processor is used to implement the method of the first aspect through a logic circuit or an execution instruction.
  • the interface circuit is used to receive signals from other communication devices outside the communication device and transmit them to the processor or send signals from the processor to other communication devices outside the communication device. It can be understood that the interface circuit can be a transceiver or a transceiver or a transceiver or an input-output interface.
  • the communication device may further include a memory for storing instructions executed by the processor or storing input data required by the processor to execute instructions or storing data generated after the processor executes instructions.
  • the memory may be a physically independent unit or may be coupled to the processor, or the processor may include the memory.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a communication device, which includes an interface circuit and a processor, and the processor and the interface circuit are coupled to each other.
  • the processor is used to implement the method of the second aspect above through a logic circuit or an execution instruction.
  • the interface circuit is used to receive a signal from other communication devices outside the communication device and transmit it to the processor or send a signal from the processor to other communication devices outside the communication device. It is understandable that the interface circuit can be a transceiver or a transceiver or a transceiver or an input-output interface.
  • the communication device may further include a memory for storing instructions executed by the processor or storing input data required by the processor to execute instructions or storing data generated after the processor executes instructions.
  • the memory may be a physically independent unit or may be coupled to the processor, or the processor may include the memory.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a communication system, which includes a terminal device and a network device.
  • the terminal device can implement the method of the first aspect above, and the network device can implement the method of the second aspect above.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program or instructions are stored.
  • a computer program or instructions are stored.
  • the method of the first aspect or the second aspect mentioned above can be implemented.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, including a computer program or instructions, which, when executed by a processor, can implement the method of the first or second aspect above.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a chip system, which includes a processor, the processor is used to couple with a memory, the memory is used to store programs or instructions, and when the program or instructions are executed by the processor, the method of the first or second aspect mentioned above can be implemented.
  • FIG1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG2 is a schematic diagram of a control plane protocol stack of 5G NR provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a signaling interaction process between a terminal device and a network device and a core network during the access phase provided by an embodiment of the present application;
  • FIG4 is a flow chart of an attacker eavesdropping on PDCCH resource configuration and counterfeiting DCI according to an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG5 is a schematic diagram of a communication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG6 is a schematic diagram of scrambling code ID allocation provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG7 is a schematic diagram of a measurement report provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG8 is a schematic diagram of an encryption key generation process provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG9 is a schematic diagram of one of the scrambled ID access rules provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG10 is a second schematic diagram of a scrambled ID access rule provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG11 is a third schematic diagram of a scrambled ID access rule provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG12 is a schematic diagram of a collision of scrambling code-specific parameters provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG13 is a schematic diagram of strengthening PDCCH security protection provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG14 is a schematic diagram of physical layer PDCCH encryption provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG15 is a schematic diagram of constellation phase rotation encryption provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG16 is a schematic diagram of data and pilot subcarrier confusion interleaving encryption provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG17 is a schematic diagram of strengthening PDSCH security protection provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG18 is a schematic diagram of strengthening PUSCH security protection provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG19 is a schematic diagram of a structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 20 is a second schematic diagram of the structure of the communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as the fourth generation (4G) mobile communication system, the fifth generation (5G) new radio (NR) mobile communication system, etc.
  • the technical solutions provided by the present application can also be applied to future communication systems, such as the sixth generation mobile communication system.
  • the communication system can also be an Internet of Things (IoT) network or other networks.
  • IoT Internet of Things
  • the architecture of the communication system used in the embodiment of the present application can be shown in FIG1 , and the communication system includes a wireless access network 100 and a core network 200.
  • the communication system may also include the Internet 300.
  • the wireless access network 100 may include at least one network device, such as 110a and 110b in FIG1 , and may also include at least one terminal device, such as 120a-120j in FIG1 .
  • 110a is a base station
  • 110b is a micro station
  • 120a, 120e, 120f and 120j are mobile phones
  • 120b is a car
  • 120c is a gas station
  • 120d is a home access point (HAP) arranged indoors or outdoors
  • 120g is a laptop
  • 120h is a printer
  • 120i is a drone.
  • the same terminal device or network device may provide different functions in different application scenarios.
  • mobile phones 120a, 120e, 120f, and 120j there are mobile phones 120a, 120e, 120f, and 120j.
  • Mobile phone 120a can access base station 110a, connect to car 120b, communicate directly with mobile phone 120e, and access HAP.
  • Mobile phone 120b can access HAP and communicate directly with mobile phone 120a.
  • Mobile phone 120f can be connected as micro station 110b, connect to laptop computer 120g, connect to printer 120h, and mobile phone 120j can control drone 120i.
  • Wireless communication is carried out between terminal devices and network devices, and network devices are connected to the core network (such as the evolved packet core (EPC) of the 4G mobile communication system and the core network (5G core, 5GC) of the 5G mobile communication system).
  • the core network device and the network device can be independent and different physical devices, or the functions of the core network device and the logical functions of the network device can be integrated on the same physical device, or the functions of some core network devices and some network devices can be integrated on one physical device.
  • Terminal devices and terminal devices, as well as network devices and network devices can be connected to each other by wire or wirelessly.
  • Figure 1 is only a schematic diagram, and the communication system can also include other devices, such as wireless relay devices and wireless backhaul devices, which are not drawn in Figure 1.
  • Network equipment also known as wireless access network equipment, may be a base station (base station), evolved NodeB (eNodeB), Node B (Node B), transmission reception point (TRP), access point, base station transceiver, transceiver function body, wireless transceiver, basic service set (BSS), extended service set (ESS), next generation NodeB (gNB) in the fifth generation (5th generation, 5G) mobile communication system, base station in future mobile communication system or access node in WiFi system, etc.; it may also be a module or unit that completes part of the functions of a base station, for example, it may be a centralized unit (CU) or a distributed unit (DU).
  • base station base station
  • eNodeB evolved NodeB
  • Node B Node B
  • TRP transmission reception point
  • base station transceiver transceiver function body
  • wireless transceiver wireless transceiver
  • BSS basic service set
  • ESS extended service set
  • gNB next generation NodeB
  • 5G fifth
  • the CU completes the functions of the radio resource control protocol and the packet data convergence layer protocol (PDCP) of the base station, and can also complete the function of the service data adaptation protocol (SDAP);
  • the DU completes the functions of the radio link control layer and the medium access control (MAC) layer of the base station, and can also complete the functions of part of the physical layer or all of the physical layer.
  • 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
  • the network device can be a macro base station (such as 110a in Figure 1), a micro base station or an indoor station (such as 110b in Figure 1), or a relay node or a donor node, etc.
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the specific technology and specific device form adopted by the network device.
  • the network equipment can perform one or more of the following functions: user data and control signaling transmission, user data or air interface signaling encryption and decryption, integrity protection, header compression, mobile control functions (e.g., switching, dual connection), inter-cell interference coordination, connection establishment and release, load balancing, NAS message distribution, NAS node selection, synchronization, paging, positioning and transmission of warning information, wireless access network (RAN) sharing, multimedia broadcast multicast service (MBMS), user and device tracking, RAN information management (RIM), etc.
  • Multiple network devices can communicate directly or indirectly through the backhaul network (X2, Xn interface).
  • the network equipment can communicate wirelessly with the terminal device and provide the terminal device with an access point to the EPC or 5GC core network. Each network device can provide communication services for terminal device users within the corresponding geographical coverage area.
  • the terminal device may also be referred to as a terminal, user equipment (UE), station, mobile station, subscriber station, mobile unit, subscriber unit, wireless unit, remote unit, mobile device, wireless device, wireless communication device, remote device, mobile subscriber station, access terminal, mobile terminal, wireless terminal, remote terminal, user agent, mobile client, client, etc.
  • the terminal device can be widely used in various scenarios, for example, device-to-device (D2D), vehicle to everything (V2X) communication, machine-type communication (MTC), IOT, virtual reality, augmented reality, industrial control, autonomous driving, telemedicine, smart grid, smart furniture, smart office, smart wear, smart transportation, smart city, etc.
  • D2D device-to-device
  • V2X vehicle to everything
  • MTC machine-type communication
  • IOT virtual reality
  • augmented reality industrial control
  • autonomous driving telemedicine, smart grid, smart furniture, smart office, smart wear, smart transportation, smart city, etc.
  • the terminal device may be a cellular phone, a mobile phone, a session initiation protocol (SIP) phone, a tablet computer, a computer with wireless transceiver function, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a wearable device, a vehicle, a drone, a helicopter, an airplane, a ship, a robot, a robotic arm, a smart home device, a healthcare device, etc. It may also be an IoT device such as a parking meter, a smart meter, a gas pump, a vehicle, a heart monitor, etc.
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the specific technology and specific device form adopted by the terminal device.
  • the network equipment and terminal equipment can be fixed or movable.
  • the network equipment and terminal equipment can be deployed on land, including indoors or outdoors, handheld or vehicle-mounted; they can also be deployed on the water surface; they can also be deployed on aircraft, balloons and artificial satellites in the air.
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the application scenarios of the network equipment and terminal equipment.
  • Network devices and terminal devices, network devices and network devices, and terminal devices and terminal devices may communicate through authorized spectrum, unauthorized spectrum, or both; may communicate through spectrum below 6 gigahertz (GHz), spectrum above 6 GHz, or spectrum below 6 GHz and spectrum above 6 GHz.
  • GHz gigahertz
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the spectrum resources used for wireless communication.
  • the functions of the network device may also be performed by a module (such as a chip) in the network device, or by a control subsystem including the network device function.
  • the control subsystem including the network device function here may be a control center in the above-mentioned application scenarios such as smart grid, industrial control, smart transportation, smart city, etc.
  • the functions of the terminal device may also be performed by a module (such as a chip or a modem) in the terminal device, or by a device including the terminal device function.
  • the network device sends a downlink signal or downlink information to the terminal device, and the downlink information is carried on the downlink channel; the terminal device sends an uplink signal or uplink information to the network device, and the uplink information is carried on the uplink channel.
  • the terminal device needs to establish a wireless connection with the cell controlled by the network device.
  • the cell with which the terminal device has established a wireless connection is called the service cell of the terminal device.
  • FIG2 is a schematic diagram of a control plane protocol stack of 5G NR provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG2, it includes a physical (PHY) layer (also referred to as L1 layer), a media access control (MAC) layer, a radio link control (RLC) layer, a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer, a radio resource control (RRC) layer and a non-access stratum (NAS), wherein the layers other than the NAS layer can be referred to as the access stratum (AS).
  • PHY physical
  • MAC media access control
  • RLC radio link control
  • PDCP packet data convergence protocol
  • RRC radio resource control
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • AS access stratum
  • the terminal device first selects a cell during the initial access phase, then performs random access to establish a connection with the network device, and then completes the RRC connection establishment.
  • the terminal device then performs two-way identity authentication with the core network (such as the AMF entity of the core network), and after successful authentication, the NAS and AS layer key derivation and negotiation are enabled.
  • the core network such as the AMF entity of the core network
  • the NAS and AS layer key derivation and negotiation are enabled.
  • all air interface signaling is without any security protection, including RRC signaling and NAS signaling.
  • encryption and integrity protection can be enabled for RRC, NAS signaling, and user plane data.
  • the above security protection scheme only provides security protection for NAS signaling and RRC signaling.
  • the PDCP layer in the AS layer provides signaling transmission services for the RRC layer, and implements encryption and integrity protection of RRC signaling, as well as decryption and integrity verification of RRC signaling in the reverse direction.
  • the signaling of each protocol sublayer below the PDCP layer does not have any security protection.
  • PHY layer and MAC layer signaling such as MAC CE, UCI, and DCI have no security protection. Attackers can eavesdrop and tamper with these underlying signaling, which may cause legitimate terminal equipment service interruption, terminal equipment service performance damage, abnormal terminal equipment power consumption, abnormal network equipment resource scheduling, and other problems.
  • DCI as a message carried by PDCCH has no security protection. Attackers can eavesdrop and tamper with the message to forge it, which may cause legitimate terminal equipment service interruption, terminal equipment service performance damage, abnormal terminal equipment power consumption, abnormal network equipment resource scheduling, etc.
  • the process of an attacker eavesdropping on PDCCH resource configuration and forging DCI can be shown in Figure 4, including:
  • MIB master information block
  • PBCH physical broadcast channel
  • CORESET cell parameter control resource set
  • SearchSpace search space
  • PCI physical cell identifier
  • S402 The attacker monitors the DCI of system information block (SIB) 1 in PDCCH CORESET0 and SearchSpace0, and obtains information such as the time-frequency resource location of SIB1. Then, the attacker monitors SIB1 on the physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) and obtains the RACH-ConfigCommon element in SIB1, which indicates the configuration of random access channel time-frequency resources/preamble/response window, and calculates the possible values of random access-radio network temporary identifier (RA-RNTI) based on these parameters (used to receive random access message 2 (Msg2)).
  • SIB system information block
  • PDSCH physical downlink shared channel
  • RACH-ConfigCommon element RACH-ConfigCommon element in SIB1
  • Msg2 random access-radio network temporary identifier
  • S403 The attacker uses RA-RNTI to monitor Msg2 and obtains the temporary cell RNTI (TC-RNTI) carried in Msg2.
  • TC-RNTI temporary cell RNTI
  • S404 The attacker uses TC-RNTI to monitor random access message 4 (Msg4) and obtains user-level CORESET/Searchspace parameters such as bandwidth part (BWP) 0 in Msg4. After the UE successfully competes for random access, the TC-RNTI is upgraded to the cell radio network temporary identifier (cell RNTI, C-RNTI). The attacker can obtain the C-RNTI assigned to the user by the legitimate base station through monitoring.
  • Msg4 random access message 4
  • BWP bandwidth part
  • RRC reconfiguration The legitimate base station sends an encrypted RRC reconfiguration message (RRC reconfiguration), in which the user-level CORESET and SearchSpace parameters may be the same as those sent in plain text in Msg4.
  • S406 Optionally, the attacker continues to monitor the key DCI sent by the legitimate base station, performs multiple blind checks, and further guesses the parameter configurations of the user-level CORESET and SearchSpace.
  • the DCI format includes downlink PDSCH scheduling, uplink PUSCH scheduling, time slot format indication, resource preemption indication, transmission power control, sidelink scheduling, multicast broadcast services (MBS) scheduling, etc.
  • Different DCI formats can be found in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard specification TS38.212 section 7.3.1.
  • PDCCH SearchSpace is divided into public SearchSpace and UE-specific SearchSpace.
  • Public SearchSpace is mainly used to transmit system information, random access response (RAR), paging message scheduling DCI.
  • UE-specific SearchSpace is mainly used to transmit user-specific information, such as uplink and downlink user data scheduling, uplink (UL) grants, etc.
  • RAR random access response
  • UE-specific SearchSpace is mainly used to transmit user-specific information, such as uplink and downlink user data scheduling, uplink (UL) grants, etc.
  • attackers can determine the location of public SearchSpace through the cell public parameters sent by the legitimate base station, thereby interfering with, counterfeiting and tampering with the legitimate UE.
  • Msg4 and RRC reconfiguration message For UE-specific SearchSpace, it is mainly sent by Msg4 and RRC reconfiguration message.
  • the attacker will perform blind detection on the UE-specific DCI sent by the legitimate base station and guess the information element parameters of UE-specific CORESET and SearchSpace, which will make it easy for the attacker to interfere with, counterfeit and tamper with the legitimate UE.
  • Attackers can forge P-RNTI-scrambled DCI format 1_0 at the paging occasion (PO) position.
  • the DCI contains a short message indicating a system message change. Combined with the tampered system message, the legitimate UE can be further banned from calling and called services.
  • Attackers can also forge PDCCH order DCI instructions based on C-RNTI, causing legitimate UEs to continuously initiate random access and fail to obtain normal network services.
  • Attackers can also monitor the DCI activation instructions of UL grant type 2 issued by legitimate base stations, and obtain UE-specific parameters such as configured scheduling RNTI (CS-RNTI) and user-level CORESET/SearchSpace through multiple blind detections. Then, attackers can forge DCI deactivation instructions, making it impossible for users to use unlicensed scheduling resources, resulting in the UE failing to achieve short-delay performance indicators.
  • CS-RNTI configured scheduling RNTI
  • searchSpace user-level CORESET/SearchSpace
  • An attacker can obtain the public CORESET and SearchSpace by eavesdropping on MIB, SIB1, Msg2, and Msg4, and can also obtain the user-specific CORESET and SearchSpace of BWP0 sent in the plain text Msg4, and can also obtain temporary identifiers such as C-RNTI of legitimate users. This allows the attacker to counterfeit and tamper with key DCI signaling.
  • the RRC reconfiguration message with encryption and integrity protection will re-send the user-specific CORESET and SearchSpace
  • the RRC reconfiguration has some of the same parameters as the user-specific CORESET and SearchSpace of Msg4, such as the PDCCH demodulation reference signal (DMRS) scrambling ID (pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID) and other parameters, it will also cause the attacker to easily crack the user-specific DCI with relatively little time and cost. Attackers can also impersonate legitimate UEs to access the base station and obtain user-specific CORESET and SearchSpace configurations.
  • DMRS PDCCH demodulation reference signal
  • the present application provides a communication method and apparatus to improve the security of the underlying signaling transmitted between the network device and the terminal device, and to strengthen the security strength of the underlying signaling against eavesdropping and tampering.
  • ordinal numbers such as “first” and “second” mentioned in the embodiments of the present application are used to distinguish multiple objects, and are not used to limit the size, content, order, timing, priority or importance of multiple objects.
  • the first random number and the second random number do not indicate the difference in priority or importance of the two random numbers.
  • the number of nouns means “singular noun or plural noun", that is, “one or more”.
  • At least one means one or more
  • plural means two or more.
  • “And/or” describes the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that three relationships may exist.
  • a and/or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone, where A and B can be singular or plural.
  • the character "/” generally indicates that the previous and next associated objects are in an “or” relationship.
  • A/B means: A or B.
  • “At least one of the following" or similar expressions refers to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items.
  • At least one of a, b, or c means: a, b, c, a and b, a and c, b and c, or a and b and c, where a, b, c can be single or multiple.
  • Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the method is schematically illustrated using a terminal device and a network device as the execution subjects.
  • the present application does not limit the execution subject of the method.
  • the terminal device in Figure 5 can also be a chip, a chip system, or a processor that can support the terminal device to implement the method, or a logic module or software that can implement all or part of the terminal device functions
  • the network device in Figure 5 can also be a chip, a chip system, or a processor that supports the network device to implement the method, or a logic module or software that can implement all or part of the network device functions.
  • Figure 5 is introduced by taking the physical channel as PDCCH as an example. It can be understood that the physical channel can also be PDSCH, PUCCH, or PUSCH, etc.
  • the method includes:
  • the terminal device generates at least one random number through a random number generator according to user-specific parameters of a PDCCH from a network device and setting history messages exchanged between the terminal device and the network device, where the at least one random number includes a first random number.
  • the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH sent by the network device to the terminal device may be the PDCCH scrambling code ID (such as pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID) sent by the network device to the terminal device through the RRC reconfiguration message, the time-frequency resource information of the user-level CORESET/SearchSpeace, and other information element parameters.
  • the PDCCH scrambling code ID such as pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID
  • the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH sent by the network device to the terminal device are not the same as the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH sent by the network device in plain text, and are randomly configured by the network device to increase the randomness and unpredictability of the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH sent by the network device to the terminal device.
  • the value of the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID in the RRC reconfiguration message is different from the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID in the random access message (Msg4) sent by the network device, and is randomly configured by the network device to increase the randomness and unpredictability of the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID to prevent it from being obtained or predicted by attackers.
  • Msg4 random access message
  • pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is related to the generation of PDCCH scrambling sequence and PDCCH pilot sequence (such as PDCCH DMRS sequence).
  • PSCH physical shared channel
  • PCI physical cell identifier
  • the network device can configure the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as follows.
  • the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID in the 3GPP standard is 16 bits in length and has a value space of 65536.
  • the network device can first remove the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID set used in the plaintext Msg4 configuration, taking 4800 as an example. Then the remaining pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID value set is divided into 3 groups according to PCI modulo 3 equal to 0, 1, and 2.
  • the corresponding pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID value set is selected according to its own PCI mode 3 to allocate pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID values to users in this cell. And try to keep the allocation random.
  • the network device can periodically randomly scramble the unallocated scrambling ID queue of the cell where the terminal device is located, and take it out from the head of the queue when sending a new scrambling ID to the user through RRC reconfiguration message. After the user RRC connection is released, the corresponding scrambling ID is put back to the tail of the queue.
  • scrambling ID such as pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID
  • the terminal device can be a history message sent by the terminal device to the network device and confirmed by the network device; it can also be a message sent by the network device to the terminal device and confirmed by the terminal device.
  • it can be the measurement value in the measurement report (MR) in the RRC signaling reported by the terminal device to the network device, or it can be a NAS message, such as a dedicated NAS message (DedicatedNAS-Message) that transmits UE-specific NAS layer signaling.
  • MR measurement report
  • NAS-Message dedicated NAS message
  • the measurement objects are the service cell and the neighboring cell
  • the measurement values include the beam measurement values of the service cell and the neighboring cell (such as beam ID, reference signal receiving power (RSRP), reference signal receiving quality (RSRQ), signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR), etc.).
  • the network device can configure the measurement report as periodic feedback.
  • the setting history message used by the terminal device or the network device is the setting history message of the most recent interaction obtained by the terminal device or the network device according to the set period (such as the period configured by the network device).
  • the measurement values in the L3RRC signaling MR measurement report may include RSRP, RSRQ, SINR at the cell level (such as the terminal device service cell) and RSRP, RSRQ, SINR at the beam level (such as one or more beams corresponding to the terminal device service cell).
  • the measurement object is the service cell of the terminal device
  • the measurement value i.e., the measurement feedback amount
  • the channel measurement amount of the service cell including precoding matrix indication (PMI), channel quality indication (CQI), rank indication RI (RI), etc.
  • beam measurement amount such as beam ID and corresponding RSRP, etc.
  • the L1 measurement feedback amount usually includes frequency domain subband level measurement information, with richer feedback information and shorter feedback cycle, making it difficult for attackers to eavesdrop and track all the time.
  • Random number generator which can be called randomness extractor, can adopt hash algorithm, deterministic random bit generator (deterministic random bit generator, DRBG), one-way hash algorithm deterministic random bit generator (Hash-DRBG), hash information authentication code deterministic random bit generator (hash-based message authentication code DRBG, HMAC-DRBG), counter mode deterministic random bit generator (counter DRBG, CTR_DRBG), etc., among which DRBG is also called pseudo random number generator (pseudo random number generator, PRNG).
  • deterministic random bit generator deterministic random bit generator
  • Hash-DRBG hash information authentication code deterministic random bit generator
  • counter DRBG counter mode deterministic random bit generator
  • PRNG pseudo random number generator
  • the terminal device After acquiring the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH from the network device and the setting history messages exchanged between the terminal device and the network device, the terminal device can generate at least one random number through a random number generator according to the user-specific parameters and the setting history messages.
  • the terminal device generates a PDCCH encryption key through a key generator according to the first random number.
  • the key generator may use a cryptographic key derivation algorithm, or a chaotic mathematical model, etc. to derive (or generate) the PDCCH encryption key.
  • the key generator may use a password-based key derivation function 2 (PBKDF2), a scrypt key derivation algorithm, etc., and may also use a key-based key derivation function (KBKDF) with a relatively faster calculation speed, such as a counter-mode KDF, a feedback-mode KDF, a double-line superposition-based KDF, etc.
  • PBKDF2 password-based key derivation function 2
  • KBKDF key-based key derivation function
  • SP800 is a series of guidelines on information security issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)).
  • two random numbers generated by the random number generator may be used as key materials (key): Q and salt values (salt): P, respectively, and input into the key derivation algorithm to generate the PDCCH encryption key.
  • the key generator can adopt mathematical models such as chaotic distribution, use one or more first random numbers output by the random number generator for generating the PDCCH encryption key as chaotic parameters with certain combination rules, and generate a "long random chaotic sequence x" based on chaotic mapping.
  • mathematical models such as chaotic distribution can be chaotic logic (logistic) model, chaotic Chebyshev (Chebyshev) model, etc.
  • the value of the element (x) in the long random chaotic sequence can be determined by the following formula as the PDCCH encryption key, and the value range of x is from -1 to 1.
  • yn +1 ⁇ * yn (1- yn ), y ⁇ (0.0,1.0),3.569945672 ⁇ 4.0;
  • the value of each element (x n+1 ) in the long random chaotic sequence can be determined by the following formula as the PDCCH encryption key.
  • x n+1 cos( ⁇ *cos -1 (x n )), x ⁇ (-1.0,1.0),2.0 ⁇
  • the terminal device can periodically generate PDCCH encryption keys according to the key generation cycle, and update the used PDCCH encryption keys to improve security.
  • the terminal device in order to avoid duplication of the generated PDCCH encryption keys, can also add anti-replay information when generating the PDCCH encryption key through the key generator, where the anti-replay information can be the transmission frequency, PCI, timestamp, etc., where the timestamp can be the time domain information such as the system frame number and slot number when the PDCCH encryption key is updated.
  • the terminal device can also use the anti-replay information as the input of the key generator, such as splicing the anti-replay information with the salt value: P as a new salt value: P; the anti-replay information can also be spliced with the PDCCH encryption key output by the key generator to obtain a new PDCCH encryption key, etc.
  • S503 The terminal device decrypts the PDCCH according to the PDCCH encryption key. Conversely, the network device encrypts the PDCCH according to the PDCCH encryption key.
  • the network device can generate a PDCCH encryption key in a manner similar to that of the terminal device.
  • the specific process of generating the PDCCH encryption key can refer to the implementation on the terminal device side and will not be repeated here.
  • the PDCCH can be encrypted and decrypted according to the PDCCH encryption key.
  • the network device can encrypt the PDCCH (such as the DCI carried by the PDCCH) by the PDCCH encryption key, and the terminal device can also decrypt the PDCCH by the PDCCH encryption key, thereby providing protection for the PDCCH (such as the DCI carried by the PDCCH).
  • the difficulty of cracking by an attacker may be increased by increasing the number of bits of the scrambling code-specific parameters (such as pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID, etc.) of the PDCCH sent by the network device to the terminal device and increasing the random space of the user-specific parameters.
  • the scrambling code-specific parameters such as pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID, etc.
  • the bit length of the cell parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID contained in CORESET in the current 3GPP standard is 16 bits.
  • 16 bits can be used as the first threshold, and the number of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID bits can be increased so that the length of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is greater than the first threshold, such as 24, 28 or 32 bits.
  • pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is used for PDCCH scrambling sequence generation and PDCCH pilot sequence generation at the physical layer.
  • selection rules for the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID value can be configured for the PDCCH scrambling sequence and the PDCCH pilot sequence, respectively, for the generation of the PDCCH scrambling sequence and the PDCCH pilot sequence.
  • the first selection rule for the PDCCH scrambling sequence configuration may be to select the first 16 bits, or the last 16 bits, of the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID
  • the second selection rule may be to select the last 16 bits, or the first 16 bits, of the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID, wherein the first selection rule and the second selection rule may be the same or different.
  • the first selection rule may be to select the first 16 bits of the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the first sub-scrambling code parameter for generating the PDCCH scrambling sequence
  • the second selection rule may be to select the last 16 bits of the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the second sub-scrambling code parameter for generating the PDCCH pilot sequence (such as the PDCCH DMRS sequence).
  • the first selection rule may be to select the last 16 bits of the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the first sub-scrambling code parameter for generating the PDCCH scrambling sequence
  • the second selection rule may be to select the first 16 bits of the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the second sub-scrambling code parameter for generating the PDCCH pilot sequence (such as the PDCCH DMRS sequence).
  • the first selection rule may be to divide the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID into multiple small blocks according to M bits (M may be 2, 4, 6, 8, etc.).
  • the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is divided into 8 small blocks, each with 4 bits, wherein the even-numbered index blocks are recombined into 16 bits as the first sub-scrambling code parameter for generating the PDCCH scrambling sequence.
  • the second selection rule may be to divide the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID into multiple small blocks according to M bits (M may be 2, 4, 6, 8, etc.), wherein the odd-numbered index blocks are recombined into 16 bits as the second sub-scrambling code parameter for generating the PDCCH pilot sequence (such as the PDCCH DMRS sequence).
  • the PDCCH scrambling sequence may be a pseudo-random sequence
  • the initialization of the PDCCH scrambling sequence generation may be as follows:
  • the first sub-scrambling code parameter n ID For the terminal device-specific search space, if the high-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is configured, n ID ⁇ 0,1,...,65535 ⁇ is equal to the first 16 bits of the high-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID; for the RNTI whose PDCCH cyclic redundancy check (cyclic redundancy check, CRC) is scrambled in the public search space is G-RNTI, G-CS-RNTI, or MCCH-RNTI, if the high-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is configured on the public MBS frequency domain resources, n ID ⁇ 0,1,...,65535 ⁇ 0,1,...,65535 ⁇ is equal to the first 16 bits of the high-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID.
  • c init indicates the initialization value of the PDCCH scrambling sequence.
  • the above is introduced by taking the first selection rule of selecting the first 16 bits of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the first sub-scrambling code parameter as an example. It can be understood that the first selection rule is not limited to selecting the first 16 bits of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the first sub-scrambling code parameter, and can also be selecting the last 16 bits of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the first sub-scrambling code parameter, etc.
  • the PDCCH pilot sequence (such as PDCCH DMRS sequence) r l (m) is generated as follows:
  • pseudo-random sequence c(i) is initialized (c init ) as follows:
  • l is the OFDM symbol index in the slot, It is the slot index number in the system frame, and j is an imaginary unit.
  • the second sub-scrambling code parameter N ID is defined as follows: For the terminal device-specific search space, if the high-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is configured, N ID ⁇ 0,1,...,65535 ⁇ is equal to the last 16 bits of the high-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID; if the high-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is configured in the public search space on the public MBS frequency domain resources, N ID ⁇ 0,1,...,65535 ⁇ is equal to the last 16 bits of the high-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID; in other cases
  • the above is introduced by taking the second selection rule of selecting the last 16 bits of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the second sub-scrambling code parameter as an example.
  • the second selection rule is not limited to selecting the last 16 bits of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the first sub-scrambling code parameter, but can also be selecting the first 16 bits of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as the first sub-scrambling code parameter, etc.
  • the horizontal axis represents the number of cells and the vertical axis represents the probability of collision of scrambling code-specific parameters.
  • the scrambling code-specific parameters take pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID as an example.
  • the bit length of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is 16
  • the probability of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID collision between cells is 1.526e-5.
  • the bit length of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is 32
  • the probability of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID collision between cells is 2.328e-10.
  • Increasing the bit length of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID can greatly reduce the probability of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID collision between cells and reduce DCI transmission interference between cells.
  • the cracking time of a single attacker with 64 threads in parallel is shown in the following formula. Because the attacker does not know the encrypted pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID value, he needs to traverse and try all possible values. When the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID bit length is 16, the attacker can crack this DCI in about 0.02 seconds. When the pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID bit length is 32, the attacker needs 1342 seconds to crack this DCI. Increasing the random bit length of pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID can greatly improve the security of DCI.
  • the terminal device may also update the PDCCH scrambling sequence corresponding to the PDCCH according to the random number generated by the random number generator, and/or update the PDCCH pilot sequence corresponding to the PDCCH.
  • the terminal device when the terminal device generates at least one random number through a random number generator according to the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH and the set historical messages of the interaction between the terminal device and the network device, it can also generate a second random number for updating the PDCCH scrambling sequence, wherein the second random number can be the same as or different from the first random number used to generate the PDCCH encryption key. After the terminal device obtains the second random number, the PDCCH scrambling sequence can be updated according to the second random number.
  • the second random number is used as a new scrambling code id parameter to generate a new PDCCH scrambling sequence, or a first sub-scrambling code parameter is selected from the second random number according to a first selection rule, and the first sub-scrambling code parameter is used to generate a new PDCCH scrambling sequence.
  • the terminal device when the terminal device generates at least one random number through a random number generator according to the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH and the setting history message of the interaction between the terminal device and the network device, it can also generate a third random number for updating the PDCCH pilot sequence (such as the PDCCH DMRS sequence), wherein the third random number can be the same as the first random number or the second random number, or can be different from both the first random number and the second random number.
  • the PDCCH scrambling code sequence can be updated according to the third random number.
  • the third random number is used as a new scrambling code id parameter to generate a new PDCCH scrambling code sequence, or a second sub-scrambling code parameter is selected from the third random number according to the second selection rule, and the second sub-scrambling code parameter is used to generate a new PDCCH scrambling code sequence.
  • the terminal device can generate at least one random number through a random number generator periodically based on the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH sent by the network device through the RRC reconfiguration message, and the setting history message interacted between the terminal device and the network device; wherein, the user-specific parameters of the PDCCH can be parameters such as pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID in the user-level CORESET, and the setting history message interacted between the terminal device and the network device can be an RRC message, such as the MeasurementReport reported by the terminal device through the RRC message. It can also be a NAS message, such as a DedicatedNAS-Message.
  • the terminal device may generate a PDCCH encryption key through a key generator according to a random number generated by a random number generator (such as a first random number); and may also update a PDCCH scrambling sequence and a PDCCH pilot sequence (such as a PDCCH DMRS sequence) according to a random number generated by a random number generator (such as a second random number and a third random number). Similar network devices may also determine a PDCCH encryption key and update a PDCCH scrambling sequence and a PDCCH pilot sequence (such as a PDCCH DMRS sequence) in a manner similar to that of the terminal device.
  • the network device can send the PDCCH information to be transmitted (such as DCI) through the air interface after adding one or more of the following processes: cyclic redundancy check (CRC), radio network temporary identity (RNTI) masking, polar coding, rate matching/interleaving, scrambling, quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) modulation, resource mapping, inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT), adding a cyclic prefix (CP), etc.
  • CRC cyclic redundancy check
  • RNTI radio network temporary identity
  • polar coding polar coding
  • rate matching/interleaving scrambling
  • QAM quadrature amplitude modulation
  • IFFT inverse fast Fourier transform
  • CP cyclic prefix
  • the signal received by the terminal device is subjected to CP removal, fast Fourier transform (FFT), demapping, channel estimation, multiple input multiple output (MIMO) decoding, QAM demodulation, descrambling/derate matching, polar decoding, RNTI demasking, CRC check, etc. to obtain the transmission information (such as DCI).
  • the network device can encrypt the PDCCH information to be transmitted (such as DCI) according to the PDCCH encryption key before adding CRC, before resource mapping or after resource mapping; the terminal device can decrypt the PDCCH information to be transmitted according to the PDCCH encryption key after CRC check, after demapping or before demapping.
  • the terminal device and the network device can also update the PDCCH scrambling sequence and the PDCCH pilot sequence according to the random numbers generated by the random number generator (such as the second random number and the third random number), the network device scrambles and performs resource mapping on the PDCCH according to the latest PDCCH scrambling sequence and the PDCCH pilot sequence, and the terminal device descrambles and performs channel estimation on the physical channel according to the latest PDCCH scrambling sequence and the PDCCH pilot sequence.
  • the random number generator such as the second random number and the third random number
  • the PDCCH information to be transmitted (such as DCI) is encrypted according to the PDCCH encryption key, and bit-level encryption can be used.
  • bit-level encryption can be used before adding CRC, the bit sequence of the transmitted information can be encrypted using a traditional cryptographic encryption algorithm (such as AES, Zuc, Snow, etc.).
  • the PDCCH information to be transmitted can be encrypted according to the PDCCH encryption key
  • complex domain encryption can also be used.
  • the PDCCH information to be transmitted can be encrypted in the complex domain by using operations such as constellation phase rotation, data and pilot subcarrier confusion and interleaving.
  • S' is the encrypted constellation point
  • x represents the element in the PDCCH encryption key
  • S is the constellation point before encryption, such as the data of the PDCCH physical transmission load after encoding and QAM modulation.
  • the PDCCH encryption key can be post-processed and transformed into an encrypted interleaving index, and the coordinate information of the data and pilot subcarriers can be rearranged and scrambled to achieve encryption.
  • the above description is made by taking the physical channel as PDCCH as an example. It is understandable that the physical channel may also be PDSCH, PUCCH, or PUSCH, etc.
  • FIG17 is a schematic diagram of strengthening PDSCH security protection provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the terminal device can generate at least one random number through a random number generator periodically based on the user-specific parameters of the PDSCH sent by the network device through the RRC reconfiguration message, and the setting history message of the terminal device interacting with the network device; wherein the user-specific parameters of the PDSCH can be the scrambling code ID in the user-level PDSCH configuration (PDSCH-Config) (such as data scrambling identity PDSCH (dataScramblingIdentityPDSCH), scrambling (scrambling) ID0 and scramblingID1 in the DMRS downlink configuration (DMRS-DownlinkConfig) and other information element parameters.
  • PDSCH-Config such as data scrambling identity PDSCH (dataScramblingIdentityPDSCH), scrambling (scrambling) ID0 and scramblingID1 in the DMRS downlink configuration (DMRS-DownlinkConfig) and other information element parameters.
  • the user-specific parameters of the PDSCH need to maintain randomness and unpredictability, and cannot be the same as those sent in plain text.
  • the setting history message that the terminal device interacts with the network device can be an RRC message, such as a MeasurementReport reported by the terminal device through an RRC message. It can also be a NAS message, such as a DedicatedNAS-Message, or it can also be the PDSCH load data that the terminal device has received in the same downlink HARQ process.
  • the terminal device can generate a PDSCH encryption key through a key generator according to a random number generated by a random number generator (such as a first random number); and can also update a PDSCH scrambling sequence and a PDSCH pilot sequence (such as a PDSCH DMRS sequence) according to a random number generated by a random number generator (such as a second random number and a third random number). Similar network devices can also determine a PDSCH encryption key and update a PDSCH scrambling sequence and a PDSCH pilot sequence (such as a PDSCH DMRS sequence) in a manner similar to that of the terminal device.
  • FIG18 is a schematic diagram of strengthening PUSCH security protection provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the terminal device can generate at least one random number through a random number generator periodically based on the user-specific parameters of the PUSCH sent by the network device through the RRC reconfiguration message, and the setting history message of the terminal device interacting with the network device; wherein the user-specific parameters of the PUSCH can be the scrambling code ID in the user-level PUSCH configuration (PUSCH-Config) (such as the data scrambling identifier PUSCH (dataScramblingIdentityPUSCH), the scramblingID0 and scramblingID1 in the DMRS uplink configuration (DMRS-UplinkConfig) and other information element parameters.
  • PUSCH-Config such as the data scrambling identifier PUSCH (dataScramblingIdentityPUSCH)
  • DMRS-UplinkConfig DMRS uplinkConfig
  • the user-specific parameters of the PUSCH need to maintain randomness and unpredictability, and cannot be the same as those sent in plain text.
  • the setting history message for the interaction between the terminal device and the network device can be an RRC message, such as a MeasurementReport reported by the terminal device through an RRC message. It can also be a NAS message, such as a DedicatedNAS-Message, or it can also be the PUSCH load data that the terminal device has received in the same downlink HARQ process.
  • the terminal device may generate a PUSCH encryption key through a key generator according to a random number generated by a random number generator (such as a first random number); and may also update a PUSCH scrambling sequence and a PUSCH pilot sequence (such as a PUSCH DMRS sequence) according to a random number generated by a random number generator (such as a second random number and a third random number). Similar network devices may also determine a PUSCH encryption key and update a PUSCH scrambling sequence and a PUSCH pilot sequence (such as a PUSCH DMRS sequence) in a manner similar to that of the terminal device.
  • the terminal device and the network device include hardware structures and/or software modules corresponding to the execution of each function.
  • the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed in the form of hardware or computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application scenario and design constraints of the technical solution.
  • Figures 19 and 20 are schematic diagrams of possible communication devices provided by embodiments of the present application. These communication devices can be used to implement the functions of the terminal device or network device in the above method embodiments, and thus can also achieve the beneficial effects of the above method embodiments.
  • the communication device can be a terminal device or a network device, and can also be a module (such as a chip) applied to a terminal device or a network device.
  • the communication device 1900 includes a processing unit 1910 and an interface unit 1920, wherein the interface unit 1920 may also be a transceiver unit or an input/output interface.
  • the communication device 1900 may be used to implement the functions of the terminal device or network device in the method embodiment shown in Fig. 7 above.
  • the interface unit 1920 is used to receive user-specific parameters of a physical channel from a network device; the processing unit 1910 is used to generate at least one random number through a random number generator based on the user-specific parameters and the set history messages interacting with the network device, and the at least one random number includes a first random number; based on the first random number, a physical channel encryption key is generated through a key generator; the processing unit 1910 is also used to encrypt or decrypt the physical channel according to the physical channel encryption key.
  • At least one random number also includes a second random number
  • the processing unit 1910 is further used to update a physical channel scrambling sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the second random number; and to scramble or descramble the physical channel according to the updated physical channel scrambling sequence.
  • At least one random number also includes a third random number
  • the processing unit 1910 is further used to update a physical channel pilot sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the third random number; and perform resource mapping or channel estimation on the physical channel according to the updated physical channel pilot sequence.
  • the interface unit 1920 is further used to receive a scrambling code-specific parameter of a physical channel from a network device, the number of bits included in the scrambling code-specific parameter being greater than a first quantity threshold; the processing unit 1910 is further used to generate a physical channel scrambling sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to a first sub-scrambling code parameter, the first sub-scrambling code parameter being determined by the processing unit 1910 according to a first selection rule and the scrambling code-specific parameter, the number of bits included in the first sub-scrambling code parameter being equal to the first quantity threshold; and to generate a physical channel pilot sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to a second sub-scrambling code parameter, the second sub-scrambling code parameter being determined by the processing unit 1910 according to a second selection rule and the scrambling code-specific parameter, the number of bits included in the second sub-scrambling code parameter being equal to the first quantity threshold.
  • the processing unit 1910 when the processing unit 1910 generates at least one random number through a random number generator based on user-specific parameters and set history messages of interaction between the interface unit 1920 and the network device, it is specifically used to obtain the set history message of the most recent interaction with the network device through the interface unit 1920 according to a set period; and generate at least one random number through a random number generator based on user-specific parameters and the set history message of the most recent interaction.
  • user-specific parameters of the physical channel may be randomly configured by the network device.
  • the physical channel may be PDCCH, PDSCH, PUCCH, or PUSCH, etc.
  • the interface unit 1920 is used to send user-specific parameters of the physical channel to the terminal device;
  • the processing unit 1910 is used to generate at least one random number through a random number generator based on the user-specific parameters and the set history messages interacting with the terminal device, and the at least one random number includes a first random number; based on the first random number, a physical channel encryption key is generated through a key generator; the processing unit 1910 is also used to decrypt or encrypt the physical channel according to the physical channel encryption key.
  • At least one random number also includes a second random number
  • the processing unit 1910 is further used to update a physical channel scrambling sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the second random number; and to descramble or scramble the physical channel according to the updated physical channel scrambling sequence.
  • At least one random number also includes a third random number
  • the processing unit 1910 is further used to update a physical channel pilot sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to the third random number; and perform channel estimation or resource mapping on the physical channel according to the updated physical channel pilot sequence.
  • the interface unit 1920 is further used to send a scrambling code-specific parameter of a physical channel to a terminal device, the number of bits included in the scrambling code-specific parameter being greater than a first quantity threshold; the processing unit 1910 is further used to generate a physical channel scrambling sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to a first sub-scrambling code parameter, the first sub-scrambling code parameter being determined by the processing unit 1910 according to a first selection rule and the scrambling code-specific parameter, the number of bits included in the first sub-scrambling code parameter being equal to the first quantity threshold; and to generate a physical channel pilot sequence corresponding to the physical channel according to a second sub-scrambling code parameter, the second sub-scrambling code parameter being determined by the processing unit 1910 according to a second selection rule and the scrambling code-specific parameter, the number of bits included in the second sub-scrambling code parameter being equal to the first quantity threshold.
  • the processing unit 1910 when the processing unit 1910 generates at least one random number through a random number generator based on user-specific parameters and set history messages of interaction with the terminal device, it is specifically used to obtain the set history message of the most recent interaction with the terminal device through the interface unit 1920 according to a set period; and generate at least one random number through a random number generator based on user-specific parameters and the set history message of the most recent interaction.
  • user-specific parameters of the physical channel may be randomly configured by processing unit 1910.
  • the physical channel may be PDCCH, PDSCH, PUCCH, or PUSCH, etc.
  • the present application also provides a communication device 2000, including a processor 2010 and an interface circuit 2020.
  • the processor 2010 and the interface circuit 2020 are coupled to each other.
  • the interface circuit 2020 can be a transceiver, an input-output interface, an input interface, an output interface, a communication interface, etc.
  • the communication device 2000 may also include a memory 2030 for storing instructions executed by the processor 2010 or storing input data required by the processor 2010 to run the instructions or storing data generated after the processor 2010 runs the instructions.
  • the memory 2030 may also be integrated with the processor 2010.
  • the processor 2010 may be used to implement the function of the processing unit 1910
  • the interface circuit 2020 may be used to implement the function of the interface unit 1920 .
  • the processor in the embodiments of the present application may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), logic circuits, field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components or any combination thereof.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.
  • the method steps in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by hardware, or by a processor executing software instructions.
  • the software instructions can be composed of corresponding software modules, and the software modules can be stored in a random access memory, a flash memory, a read-only memory, a programmable read-only memory, an erasable programmable read-only memory, an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory, a register, a hard disk, a mobile hard disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium well known in the art.
  • An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor so that the processor can read information from the storage medium and can write information to the storage medium.
  • the storage medium can also be a component of the processor.
  • the processor and the storage medium can be located in an ASIC.
  • the ASIC can be located in a network device or a terminal device.
  • the processor and the storage medium can also be present in a network device or a terminal device as discrete components.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer programs or instructions.
  • the computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, a network device, a user device or other programmable device.
  • the computer program or instruction may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer program or instruction may be transmitted from one network device, terminal, computer, server or data center to another network device, terminal, computer, server or data center by wired or wireless means.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media.
  • the available medium may be a magnetic medium, for example, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a tape; it may also be an optical medium, for example, a digital video disc; it may also be a semiconductor medium, for example, a solid-state hard disk.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be a volatile or nonvolatile storage medium, or may include both volatile and nonvolatile types of storage media.

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Abstract

本申请涉及通信技术领域，公开了一种通信方法及装置，以期提高网络设备和终端设备之间传输的底层信令的安全性，加强底层信令的防窃听和防篡改的安全强度。该方法包括：终端设备根据来自网络设备的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；终端设备根据第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；终端设备根据物理信道加密密钥，对物理信道进行加密或解密。

Description

一种通信方法及装置 技术领域
本申请实施例涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及一种通信方法及装置。
背景技术
第五代(5th generation，5G)移动通信系统和第四代(4th generation，4G)移动通信系统相似，都具有两层安全的特点，在非接入层(non-access stratum，NAS)和接入层(access stratum，AS)分别进行安全模式命令激活和安全保护。终端设备和网络互相认证对方后，协商后续通信过程中NAS信令、无线资源控制(radio resource control，RRC)信令和用户数据的加密和完整性保护所使用的安全算法和密钥。NAS安全算法协商完成后，网络侧的接入和移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)网元与终端设备之间的NAS信令，都会基于协商的加密和完整性保护所使用的安全算法和密钥进行加密和完整性保护。AS安全模式命令交互过程中，网络侧的网络设备和终端设备协商AS加密和完整性保护的安全算法和密钥，并启动了AS的RRC信令和用户数据的加密和完整性保护。
然而，以上安全保护方案只做了NAS信令和RRC信令的安全保护，对于4G移动通信系统和5G移动通信系统，由AS层中的分组数据汇聚协议(packet data convergence protocol，PDCP)层为RRC层提供信令传输服务，并实现RRC信令的加密和完整性保护，以及在反方向上实现RRC信令的解密和完整性校验。而PDCP层以下的各个协议子层的信令是没有任何安全保护的。例如：媒体接入控制层控制指令(media access control layer control element，MAC CE)、上行控制信息(uplink control information，UCI)、下行控制信息(downlink control information，DCI)等物理(physical，PHY)层、媒体接入控制(media access control，MAC)层信令没有安全防护，攻击者可以窃听并篡改仿冒这些底层信令，可能会导致合法终端设备业务中断、终端设备业务性能受损、终端设备耗电量异常、网络设备资源调度异常等问题。
发明内容
本申请提供一种通信方法及装置，以期提高网络设备和终端设备之间传输的底层信令的安全性，加强底层信令的防窃听和防篡改的安全强度。
第一方面，本申请实施例提供一种通信方法，该方法可以由终端设备执行，也可以由终端设备的部件(例如处理器、芯片、或芯片系统等)执行，还可以由能实现全部或部分终端设备功能的逻辑模块或软件实现。以下以该方法由终端设备执行为例进行说明，该方法包括：终端设备根据来自网络设备的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；终端设备根据第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；终端设备根据物理信道加密密钥，对物理信道进行加密或解密。
可选地，物理信道可以为物理下行控制信道(physical downlink control channel，PDCCH)、物理下行共享信道(physical downlink shared channel，PDSCH)、物理上行控制 信道(physical uplink control channel，PUCCH)、或物理上行共享信道(physical uplink shared channel，PUSCH)等。
采用上述方法，终端设备可以根据来自网络设备的物理信道的用户专属参数和与网络设备交互的历史消息，提取随机数来生成物理信道加密密钥(如按照一定的周期提取随机数来生成物理信道加密密钥)，对物理信道进行加密或解密，能够为网络设备和终端设备之间传输的底层信令(如物理层信令)提供保护，提高网络设备和终端设备之间传输的底层信令的安全性，加强底层信令的防窃听和防篡改的安全强度。并且基于交互的历史消息来生成随机数，可以增大攻击者的破解难度，也可以防范消息仿冒和网络设备身份仿冒。
在一种可能的设计中，至少一个随机数还包括第二随机数，该方法还包括：终端设备根据第二随机数，对物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列进行更新；终端设备根据更新后的物理信道加扰序列，对物理信道进行加扰或解扰。
上述设计中，可以基于生成的随机数对物理信道加扰序列进行更新(如按照一定的周期进行更新)，可以增加攻击者正确解扰的难度，从而提高攻击者窃听终端设备和网络设备之间交互的信令的计算和耗时等代价。
在一种可能的设计中，至少一个随机数还包括第三随机数，该方法还包括：终端设备根据第三随机数，对物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列进行更新；终端设备根据更新后的物理信道导频序列，对物理信道进行资源映射或信道估计。
上述设计中，可以基于生成的随机数对物理信道导频序列进行更新(如按照一定的周期进行更新)，可以增加攻击者正确信道估计的难度，从而提高攻击者窃听终端设备和网络设备之间交互的信令的计算和耗时等代价。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：终端设备接收来自网络设备的物理信道的扰码专属参数，扰码专属参数包括的比特数量大于第一数量阈值；终端设备根据第一子扰码参数，生成物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列，第一子扰码参数由终端设备根据第一选取规则和扰码专属参数确定，第一子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于第一数量阈值；终端设备根据第二子扰码参数，生成物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列，第二子扰码参数由终端设备根据第二选取规则和扰码专属参数确定，第二子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于第一数量阈值。
上述设计中，通过增加扰码专属参数长度，通过预设规则提取第一子扰码参数和第二子扰码参数，用于对物理信道加扰序列和物理信道导频序列进行更新，提高了扰码专属参数的随机空间，增加攻击者的破解难度。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备根据来自网络设备的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，包括：终端设备按照设定周期获取与网络设备最近一次交互的设定历史消息；终端设备根据用户专属参数，以及最近一次交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
上述设计中，终端设备可以周期性获取用户专属参数和最新的历史消息，生成随机数，用于物理信道加密密钥等的生成或更新，能够进一步提高攻击者破解物理信道加密密钥等的难度，提高网络设备和终端设备之间信令传输的安全性。
在一种可能的设计中，物理信道的用户专属参数由网络设备随机配置。
上述设计中，由网络设备随机配置物理信道的用户专属参数，能够进一步提高攻击者破解用户专属参数的难度，避免网络设备和终端设备使用的物理信道加密密钥等被破解， 进一步提高网络设备和终端设备之间信令传输的安全性。
第二方面，本申请实施例提供一种通信方法，该方法可以由网络设备执行，也可以由网络设备的部件(例如处理器、芯片、或芯片系统等)执行，还可以由能实现全部或部分网络设备功能的逻辑模块或软件实现。以下以该方法由网络设备执行为例进行说明，该方法包括：网络设备根据向终端设备发送的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；网络设备根据第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；网络设备根据物理信道加密密钥，对物理信道进行解密或加密。
可选地，物理信道可以为PDCCH、PDSCH、PUCCH、或PUSCH等。
在一种可能的设计中，至少一个随机数还包括第二随机数，该方法还包括：网络设备根据第二随机数，对物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列进行更新；网络设备根据更新后的物理信道加扰序列，对物理信道进行解扰或加扰。
在一种可能的设计中，至少一个随机数还包括第三随机数，该方法还包括：网络设备根据第三随机数，对物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列进行更新；网络设备根据更新后的物理信道导频序列，对物理信道进行信道估计或资源映射。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：网络设备向终端设备发送物理信道的扰码专属参数，扰码专属参数包括的比特数量大于第一数量阈值；网络设备根据第一子扰码参数，生成物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列，第一子扰码参数由网络设备根据第一选取规则和扰码专属参数确定，第一子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于第一数量阈值；网络设备根据第二子扰码参数，生成物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列，第二子扰码参数由网络设备根据第二选取规则和扰码专属参数确定，第二子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于第一数量阈值。
在一种可能的设计中，网络设备根据向终端设备发送的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，包括：网络设备按照设定周期获取与终端设备最近一次交互的设定历史消息；网络设备根据用户专属参数，以及最近一次交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
在一种可能的设计中，物理信道的用户专属参数由网络设备随机配置。
第三方面，本申请实施例提供一种通信装置，该装置具有实现上述第一方面中方法的功能，所述功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。所述硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块，比如包括接口单元和处理单元。
在一个可能的设计中，该装置可以是芯片或者集成电路。
在一个可能的设计中，该装置包括处理器，处理器可以用于与存储器耦合，存储器用于存储所述处理器执行的指令，当指令被处理器执行时，所述装置可以执行上述第一方面的方法。所谓“耦合”指的是两个部件直接连接或间接连接或具有某种通信关系。
在一个可能的设计中，该装置可以为终端设备整机。
第四方面，本申请实施例提供一种通信装置，该装置具有实现上述第二方面中方法的功能，所述功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。所述硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块，比如包括接口单元和处理单元。
在一个可能的设计中，该装置可以是芯片或者集成电路。
在一个可能的设计中，该装置包括处理器，处理器可以用于与存储器耦合，存储器用 于存储所述处理器执行的指令，当指令被处理器执行时，所述装置可以执行上述第二方面的方法。所谓“耦合”指的是两个部件直接连接或间接连接或具有某种通信关系。
在一个可能的设计中，该装置可以为网络设备整机。
第五方面，本申请实施例提供一种通信装置，该通信装置包括接口电路和处理器，处理器和接口电路之间相互耦合。处理器通过逻辑电路或执行指令用于实现上述第一方面的方法。接口电路用于接收来自该通信装置之外的其它通信装置的信号并传输至处理器或将来自处理器的信号发送给该通信装置之外的其它通信装置。可以理解的是，接口电路可以为收发器或收发机或收发信机或输入输出接口。
可选的，通信装置还可以包括存储器，用于存储处理器执行的指令或存储处理器运行指令所需要的输入数据或存储处理器运行指令后产生的数据。存储器可以是物理上独立的单元，也可以与处理器耦合，或者处理器包括该存储器。
第六方面，本申请实施例提供一种通信装置，该通信装置包括接口电路和处理器，处理器和接口电路之间相互耦合。处理器通过逻辑电路或执行指令用于实现上述第二方面的方法。接口电路用于接收来自该通信装置之外的其它通信装置的信号并传输至处理器或将来自处理器的信号发送给该通信装置之外的其它通信装置。可以理解的是，接口电路可以为收发器或收发机或收发信机或输入输出接口。
可选的，通信装置还可以包括存储器，用于存储处理器执行的指令或存储处理器运行指令所需要的输入数据或存储处理器运行指令后产生的数据。存储器可以是物理上独立的单元，也可以与处理器耦合，或者处理器包括该存储器。
第七方面，本申请实施例提供一种通信系统，该通信系统包括终端设备和网络设备，终端设备可以实现上述第一方面的方法，网络设备可以实现上述第二方面的方法。
第八方面，本申请实施例提供一种计算机可读存储介质，在计算机可读存储介质中存储有计算机程序或指令，当计算机程序或指令被处理器执行时，可以实现上述第一方面或第二方面的方法。
第九方面，本申请实施例还提供一种计算机程序产品，包括计算机程序或指令，当计算机程序或指令被处理器执行时，可以实现上述第一方面或第二方面的方法。
第十方面，本申请实施例还提供一种芯片系统，该芯片系统包括处理器，处理器用于与存储器耦合，存储器用于存储程序或指令，当程序或指令被处理器执行时，可以实现上述第一方面或第二方面的方法。
上述第二方面至第十方面所能达到的技术效果请参照上述第一方面所能达到的技术效果，这里不再重复赘述。
附图说明
图1为本申请实施例提供的通信系统的架构示意图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的5G NR的控制面协议栈示意图；
图3为本申请实施例提供的终端设备在接入阶段与网络设备和核心网的信令交互流程示意图；
图4为本申请实施例提供的攻击者窃听PDCCH资源配置和仿冒DCI的流程；
图5为本申请实施例提供的通信方法示意图；
图6为本申请实施例提供的扰码ID分配示意图；
图7为本申请实施例提供的测量报告示意图；
图8为本申请实施例提供的加密密钥生成过程示意图；
图9为本申请实施例提供的加扰ID取用规则示意图之一；
图10为本申请实施例提供的加扰ID取用规则示意图之二；
图11为本申请实施例提供的加扰ID取用规则示意图之三；
图12为本申请实施例提供的扰码专属参数碰撞示意图；
图13为本申请实施例提供的加强PDCCH安全保护示意图；
图14为本申请实施例提供的物理层PDCCH加密示意图；
图15为本申请实施例提供的星座相位旋转加密示意图；
图16为本申请实施例提供的数据和导频子载波混淆交织加密示意图；
图17为本申请实施例提供的加强PDSCH安全保护示意图；
图18为本申请实施例提供的加强PUSCH安全保护示意图；
图19为本申请实施例提供的通信装置的结构示意图之一；
图20为本申请实施例提供的通信装置的结构示意图之二。
具体实施方式
本申请实施例的技术方案可以应用于各种通信系统，例如：第四代(4th generation，4G)移动通信系统、第五代(5th generation，5G)新无线(new radio，NR)移动通信系统等。本申请提供的技术方案还可以应用于未来的通信系统，如第六代移动通信系统。通信系统还可以是物联网(internet of things，IoT)网络或者其他网络。
本申请实施例所应用的通信系统的架构可以如图1所示，该通信系统包括无线接入网100和核心网200，可选的，通信系统还可以包括互联网300。其中，无线接入网100可以包括至少一个网络设备，如图1中的110a和110b，还可以包括至少一个终端设备，如图1中的120a-120j。其中，110a是基站，110b是微站，120a、120e、120f和120j是手机，120b是汽车，120c是加油机，120d是布置在室内或室外的家庭接入节点(home access point，HAP)，120g是笔记本电脑，120h是打印机，120i是无人机。其中，同一个终端设备或网络设备，在不同应用场景中可以提供不同的功能。比如，图1中的手机有120a、120e、120f和120j，手机120a可以接入基站110a，连接汽车120b，与手机120e直连通信以及接入到HAP，手机120b可以接入HAP以及与手机120a直连通信，手机120f可以接入为微站110b，连接笔记本电脑120g，连接打印机120h，手机120j可以控制无人机120i。
终端设备与网络设备之间进行无线通信，网络设备与核心网(如4G移动通信系统演进分组核心网(evolved packet core，EPC)、5G移动通信系统的核心网(5G core，5GC)等)连接。核心网设备与网络设备可以是独立的不同的物理设备，也可以是将核心网设备的功能与网络设备的逻辑功能集成在同一个物理设备上，还可以是一个物理设备上集成了部分核心网设备的功能和部分的网络设备的功能。终端设备和终端设备之间以及网络设备和网络设备之间可以通过有线或无线的方式相互连接。图1只是示意图，该通信系统中还可以包括其它设备，如还可以包括无线中继设备和无线回传设备，在图1中未画出。
网络设备，也可以称为无线接入网设备，可以是基站(base station)、演进型基站(evolved NodeB，eNodeB)、节点B(Node B)、发送接收点(transmission reception point，TRP)、接入点、基站收发器、收发功能体、无线收发器、基本服务集(basic service set，BSS，)、 扩展服务集(extend service set，ESS)、第五代(5th generation，5G)移动通信系统中的下一代基站(next generation NodeB，gNB)、未来移动通信系统中的基站或WiFi系统中的接入节点等；也可以是完成基站部分功能的模块或单元，例如，可以是集中式单元(central unit，CU)，也可以是分布式单元(distributed unit，DU)。这里的CU完成基站的无线资源控制协议和分组数据汇聚层协议(packet data convergence protocol，PDCP)的功能，还可以完成业务数据适配协议(service data adaptation protocol，SDAP)的功能；DU完成基站的无线链路控制层和介质访问控制(medium access control，MAC)层的功能，还可以完成部分物理层或全部物理层的功能，有关上述各个协议层的具体描述，可以参考第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)的相关技术规范。网络设备可以是宏基站(如图1中的110a)，也可以是微基站或室内站(如图1中的110b)，还可以是中继节点或施主节点等。本申请的实施例对网络设备所采用的具体技术和具体设备形态不做限定。
网络设备可以执行以下一项或多项功能：用户数据和控制信令传输、用户数据或空口信令加密和解密、完整性保护、报头压缩、移动控制功能(例如，切换、双连接)、小区间干扰协调、连接建立和释放，负载均衡、NAS)消息的分发、NAS节点选择、同步、寻呼、定位和传递警告信息、无线接入网(wireless access network，RAN)共享、多媒体广播多播服务(multimedia broadcast multicast service，MBMS)、用户和设备跟踪、RAN信息管理(RAN information management，RIM)等。多个网络设备之间可以通过回传网络(X2、Xn接口)直接或间接通信。网络设备可以与终端设备无线通信，为终端设备提供到EPC或5GC核心网的接入点。每个网络设备可以为相应的地理覆盖区域内的终端设备用户提供通信服务。
终端设备也可以称为终端、用户设备(user equipment，UE)、站、移动站、订阅用户站、移动单元、订阅用户单元、无线单元、远程单元、移动设备、无线设备、无线通信设备、远程设备，移动订阅用户站、接入终端、移动终端、无线终端、远程终端、用户代理、移动客户端、客户端等。终端设备可以广泛应用于各种场景，例如，设备到设备(device-to-device，D2D)、车物(vehicle to everything，V2X)通信、机器类通信(machine-type communication，MTC)、IOT、虚拟现实、增强现实、工业控制、自动驾驶、远程医疗、智能电网、智能家具、智能办公、智能穿戴、智能交通、智慧城市等。终端设备可以是蜂窝电话、手机、会话发起协议(session initiation protocol，SIP)电话、平板电脑、带无线收发功能的电脑、个人数字助理(personal digital assistant，PDA)、可穿戴设备、车辆、无人机、直升机、飞机、轮船、机器人、机械臂、智能家居设备、医疗保健设备等。还可以是停车计时器、智能电表、加油泵、车辆、心脏监视器等IoT设备。本申请的实施例对终端设备所采用的具体技术和具体设备形态不做限定。
网络设备和终端设备可以是固定位置的，也可以是可移动的。网络设备和终端设备可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以部署在水面上；还可以部署在空中的飞机、气球和人造卫星上。本申请的实施例对网络设备和终端设备的应用场景不做限定。
网络设备和终端设备之间、网络设备和网络设备之间、终端设备和终端设备之间可以通过授权频谱进行通信，也可以通过免授权频谱进行通信，也可以同时通过授权频谱和免授权频谱进行通信；可以通过6千兆赫(gigahertz，GHz)以下的频谱进行通信，也可以通过6GHz以上的频谱进行通信，还可以同时使用6GHz以下的频谱和6GHz以上的频谱 进行通信。本申请的实施例对无线通信所使用的频谱资源不做限定。
在本申请的实施例中，网络设备的功能也可以由网络设备中的模块(如芯片)来执行，也可以由包含有网络设备功能的控制子系统来执行。这里的包含有网络设备功能的控制子系统可以是智能电网、工业控制、智能交通、智慧城市等上述应用场景中的控制中心。终端设备的功能也可以由终端设备中的模块(如芯片或调制解调器)来执行，也可以由包含有终端设备功能的装置来执行。
在本申请中，网络设备向终端设备发送下行信号或下行信息，下行信息承载在下行信道上；终端设备向网络设备发送上行信号或上行信息，上行信息承载在上行信道上。终端设备为了与网络设备进行通信，需要与网络设备控制的小区建立无线连接。与终端设备建立了无线连接的小区称为该终端设备的服务小区。当终端设备与该服务小区进行通信的时候，还会受到来自邻区的信号的干扰。
5G NR的控制面协议栈与4G长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)的控制面协议栈相同，图2为本申请实施例提供的一种5G NR的控制面协议栈示意图，如图2所示，包括物理(physical，PHY)层(也可以称为L1层)、媒体接入控制(media access control，MAC)层、无线链路控制(radio link control，RLC)层、分组数据汇聚协议(packet data convergence protocol，PDCP)层、无线资源控制(radio resource control，RRC)层和非接入层(non-access stratum，NAS)，其中除NAS层外的其它层可以称为接入层(access stratum，AS)。在终端设备侧，所有的协议栈都位于终端设备内；而在网络侧，NAS层不位于网络设备上，而是在核心网的AMF实体上。
参照如图3所示的终端设备在接入阶段与网络设备和核心网的信令交互流程示意图，终端设备在初始接入阶段先进行小区选择，然后进行随机接入与网络设备建立连接，进而完成RRC连接建立。然后终端设备与核心网(如核心网的AMF实体)进行双向身份认证，认证成功后开启NAS和AS层密钥派生和协商。在NAS安全和AS安全模式完成(SecurityModeComplete)之前，所有空口信令都是没有任何安全保护的，包括RRC信令和NAS信令。在NAS安全和AS安全完成之后，RRC、NAS信令、用户面数据可以开启加密和完整性保护。
然而，以上安全保护方案只做了NAS信令和RRC信令的安全保护，对于4G移动通信系统和5G移动通信系统，由AS层中的PDCP层为RRC层提供信令传输服务，并实现RRC信令的加密和完整性保护，以及在反方向上实现RRC信令的解密和完整性校验。而PDCP层以下的各个协议子层的信令是没有任何安全保护的。例如：MAC CE、UCI、DCI等PHY层、MAC层信令没有安全防护，攻击者可以窃听并篡改仿冒这些底层信令，可能会导致合法终端设备业务中断、终端设备业务性能受损、终端设备耗电量异常、网络设备资源调度异常等问题。
以DCI为例，DCI作为PDCCH承载的消息是没有安全防护的，攻击者可以窃听并篡改仿冒该消息，可能会导致合法终端设备业务中断、终端设备业务性能受损、终端设备耗电量异常、网络设备资源调度异常等问题。以网络设备为基站、终端设备为UE，攻击者窃听PDCCH资源配置和仿冒DCI的流程可以参照图4所示，包括：
S401：攻击者在广播信道(physical broadcast channel，PBCH)上监听合法基站发送的主信息块(master information block，MIB)，获取到MIB中信元参数控制资源集(CORESET)0、搜索空间(SearchSpace)0，其中在MIB上可以携带物理小区标识(physical cell identifier， PCI)。
S402：攻击者在PDCCH CORESET0、SearchSpace0监听系统信息块(system information block，SIB)1的DCI，获取到SIB1的时频资源位置等信息。然后在物理下行共享信道(physical downlink shared channel，PDSCH)信道上监听SIB1，获取到SIB1中信元RACH-ConfigCommon，指示了随机接入信道(random access channel)时频资源/前导码/响应窗等配置，根据这些参数计算随机接入无线网络临时标识(random access-radio network temporary identifier，RA-RNTI)可能取值(用于接收随机接入消息2(Msg2))。
S403：攻击者利用RA-RNTI监听Msg2，获取到Msg2中携带的临时小区无线网络临时标识(temporary cell RNTI，TC-RNTI)。
S404：攻击者利用TC-RNTI监听随机接入消息4(Msg4)，获取到Msg4中信元部分带宽(bandwidth part，BWP)0的用户级CORESET/Searchspace等参数。UE竞争随机接入在竞争成功后TC-RNTI升级为小区无线网络临时标识(cell RNTI，C-RNTI)。攻击者通过监听可以获取到合法基站给用户分配的C-RNTI。
S405：合法基站下发加密的RRC重配消息(RRC reconfiguration)，其中用户级CORESET和SearchSpace参数可能和Msg4明文下发的相同。
S406：可选地，攻击者继续监听合法基站下发的关键DCI，进行多次盲检，进一步猜测用户级CORESET、SearchSpace的参数配置。
S407：基于前述步骤获取到的用户级CORESET、SearchSpace参数，攻击者仿冒关键DCI。
在上述流程中，DCI格式(format)包括下行PDSCH调度、上行PUSCH调度、时隙格式指示、资源抢占指示、传输功率控制、侧行链路(sidelink)调度、多播广播业务(multicast broadcast services，MBS)调度等。不同的DCI格式可参见第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)标准规范TS38.212章节7.3.1。
PDCCH SearchSpace分为公共SearchSpace与UE专属SearchSpace。公共SearchSpace主要用于传输系统信息、随机接入响应(random access response，RAR)、寻呼消息等的调度DCI。UE专属SearchSpace主要用于传输用户专属信息，如上下行用户数据调度、上行(uplink，UL)授权(grants)等。对于公共SearchSpace，攻击者可以通过合法基站下发的小区公共参数确定公共SearchSpace位置，从而对合法UE进行干扰、仿冒和篡改等攻击。对于UE专属SearchSpace，主要是由Msg4和RRC重配消息下发。如果RRC重配消息下发的UE专属CORESET和SearchSpace的信元参数与Msg4完全相同或者部分相同，攻击者对合法基站下发的UE专属DCI进行盲检，猜测出UE专属CORESET和SearchSpace的信元参数，会造成攻击者很容易对合法UE进行干扰、仿冒和篡改等攻击。
攻击者可以在寻呼时机(paging occasion，PO)位置仿冒P-RNTI加扰的DCI format 1_0，该DCI包含短消息(short message)，指示系统消息变更，结合篡改的系统消息可以进一步让合法UE主叫和被叫服务被禁。攻击者也可以基于C-RNTI仿冒PDCCH order的DCI指令，使得合法UE不断地发起随机接入，无法获得正常的网络服务。攻击者也可以通过监听合法基站下发的UL grant类型(type)2的DCI激活指令，通过多次盲检获得配置调度RNTI(configured scheduling RNTI，CS-RNTI)、用户级CORESET/SearchSpace等UE专属参数，进而攻击者仿冒DCI去激活指令，使得用户无法使用免授权调度资源，导致UE无法达到短时延性能指标。
攻击者可以通过窃听MIB、SIB1、Msg2、Msg4，获取公共CORESET、SearchSpace，也可以获得明文Msg4中下发的BWP0的用户专属CORESET、SearchSpace，并且可以获得合法用户的C-RNTI等临时标识。从而可以仿冒和篡改关键DCI信令。具有加密和完整性保护的RRC重配消息虽然会重新下发用户专属CORESET、SearchSpace，但是如果RRC重配与Msg4的用户专属CORESET、SearchSpace部分参数相同，比如PDCCH解调参考信号(demodulation reference signal，DMRS)加扰ID(pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID)等参数，也会造成攻击者用比较少的时间和代价就可以容易破解用户专属DCI。攻击者也可以仿冒合法UE接入基站，获得用户专属CORESET、SearchSpace配置，如果同一个基站下多个用户之间CORESET、SearchSpace很多参数配置相同，比如CORESET信元里频域资源(frequencyDomainResources)等参数相同，也会造成攻击者容易破解和仿冒发给其他UE的DCI。
有鉴于此，本申请提供一种通信方法及装置，以期提高网络设备和终端设备之间传输的底层信令的安全性，加强底层信令的防窃听和防篡改的安全强度。下面将结合附图，对本申请实施例进行详细描述。
另外，需要理解的是，本申请实施例提及“第一”、“第二”等序数词是用于对多个对象进行区分，不用于限定多个对象的大小、内容、顺序、时序、优先级或者重要程度等。例如，第一随机数和第二随机数，并不是表示这两个随机数对应的优先级或者重要程度等的不同。
本申请实施例中，对于名词的数目，除非特别说明，表示“单数名词或复数名词”，即"一个或多个”。“至少一个”是指一个或者多个，“多个”是指两个或两个以上。“和/或”，描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B的情况，其中A,B可以是单数或者复数。字符“/”一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。例如，A/B，表示：A或B。“以下至少一项(个)”或其类似表达，是指的这些项中的任意组合，包括单项(个)或复数项(个)的任意组合。例如，a,b,或c中的至少一项(个)，表示：a,b,c,a和b,a和c,b和c,或a和b和c，其中a,b,c可以是单个，也可以是多个。
图5为本申请实施例提供的一种通信方法示意图。图5中以终端设备和网络设备作为执行主体来示意性说明该方法。其中，本申请并不限制该方法的执行主体，例如：图5中的终端设备还可以是能支持该终端设备实现该方法的芯片、芯片系统、或处理器，还可以是能实现全部或部分终端设备功能的逻辑模块或软件；图5中的网络设备也可以是支持该网络设备实现该方法的芯片、芯片系统、或处理器，还可以是能实现全部或部分网络设备功能的逻辑模块或软件。另外，在图5中是以物理信道为PDCCH为例进行介绍的，可以理解的是物理信道还可以是PDSCH、PUCCH、或PUSCH等。该方法包括：
S501：终端设备根据来自网络设备的PDCCH的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，所述至少一个随机数包括第一随机数。
在本申请实施例中，网络设备向终端设备发送的PDCCH的用户专属参数，可以为网络设备通过RRC重配消息向终端设备下发的PDCCH扰码ID(如pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID)、用户级CORESET/SearchSpeace的时频资源信息等信元参数。可选地，为了防止攻击者获知PDCCH的用户专属参数，网络设备向终端设备发送的 PDCCH的用户专属参数不与网络设备明文发送过的PDCCH的用户专属参数相同，且由网络设备随机配置，以增加网络设备向终端设备发送的PDCCH的用户专属参数的随机性与不可预测性。例如：在PDCCH的用户专属参数为RRC重配消息中的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID时，RRC重配消息中的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的数值与网络设备发送的随机接入消息(Msg4)中的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID不同，并且由网络设备随机配置，以增加pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的随机性和不可预测性，防止被攻击者获取或预测到。
以PDCCH的用户专属参数为网络设备通过RRC重配消息下发的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID为例，pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID与PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列(如PDCCH DMRS序列)生成有关。为了避免小区内发给不同终端设备的DCI混淆，需要尽量保障同一个小区内的不同终端设备的PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列不会同时碰撞。通常会在小区部署的时候避免不同小区的物理共享信道(physical shared channel，PSCH)模三干扰，也就是物理小区标识(physical cell identifier，PCI)模(Mod)3相同的小区一般不会部署在一起。
网络设备为了保证RRC重配消息中的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID随机性和不可预测性，可以按照如下方式配置pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID。目前，3GPP标准中pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID为16比特长度，取值空间为65536个。网络设备可以首先去除明文Msg4配置使用的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID集合，以4800个为例。然后将剩下的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID取值集合按照PCI模3等于0、1、2分为3组，每组里面pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID数量有floor(65536-4800)/3＝24245个，其中floor表示向下取整运算。网络设备的每个小区内按照自身的PCI模3选取对应的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID取值集合进行本小区用户pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID取值分配。并尽量保持随机分配。如图6所示的扰码ID(如pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID)分配示意图，网络设备可以周期地将终端设备所在小区未分配的扰码ID队列进行随机扰乱，给用户进行RRC重配消息下发新的扰码ID时从该队列头部取出。用户RRC连接释放后将对应的扰码ID放回队列尾部。
对于终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，可以是终端设备向网络设备发送，网络设备确认接收到的历史消息；也可以是网络设备向终端设备下发，终端设备确认接收到的消息。例如：可以是终端设备向网络设备上报的RRC信令中测量报告(measurement report，MR)中的测量值，还可以是NAS消息，比如传输UE特定(specific)NAS层信令的专用NAS消息(DedicatedNAS-Message)。
以终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息为测量报告中L3层测量值为例，测量对象是服务小区和邻区，测量值包括服务小区和邻区的波束测量值(如波束ID、参考信号接收功率(reference signal receiving power，RSRP)、参考信号接收质量(reference signal receiving quality，RSRQ)、信号与干扰加噪声比(signal to interference plus noise ratio，SINR)等)。网络设备可以将测量报告配置成周期性反馈，在生成随机数时，终端设备或网络设备采用的设定历史消息，为终端设备或网络设备按照设定周期(如网络设备配置的周期)获取的最近一次交互的设定历史消息。如图7所示，L3RRC信令MR测量报告中测量值可以包括小区级(如终端设备服务小区)的RSRP、RSRQ、SINR和波束级(如终端设备服务小区对应的一个或多个波束)的RSRP、RSRQ、SINR。
以终端设备与所述网络设备交互的设定历史消息为测量报告中L1层测量值为例，测 量对象是终端设备的服务小区，测量值(也即测量反馈量)包括服务小区的信道测量量(包括预编码矩阵指示(precoding matrix indication，PMI)、信道质量指示(channel quality indicator，CQI)、秩指示RI(rank indication，RI)等)和波束测量量(如波束ID及对应RSRP等)。L1测量反馈量通常包括频域子带级测量信息，反馈信息更丰富，反馈周期更短，攻击者很难一直窃听和跟踪。
随机数生成器，可以称为随机性提取器可以采用哈希算法、确定性随机位生成器(deterministic random bit generator，DRBG)、单向散列算法确定性随机位生成器(Hash-DRBG)、散列信息认证码确定性随机位生成器(hash-based message authentication code DRBG，HMAC-DRBG)、计数器模式确定性随机位生成器(counter DRBG，CTR_DRBG)等，其中DRBG也称为伪随机数产生器(pseudo random number generator，PRNG)。
终端设备在获取到来自网络设备的PDCCH的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息后，可以根据用户专属参数和设定历史消息通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
S502：终端设备根据第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成PDCCH加密密钥。
在本申请实施例中，密钥生成器可以采用密码学的密钥派生算法、还可以采用混沌数学模型等进行PDCCH加密密钥派生(或生成)。
作为一种示例：密钥生成器可以采用基于密码的密钥导出功能2(password-based key derivation function 2，PBKDF2)、scrypt密钥派生算法等，还可以使用计算速度相对更快的基于密钥的密钥派生算法(key-based key derivation function，KBKDF)，如SP800(SP800是美国国家标准与技术研究所(national institute of standards and technology，NIST)发布的一系列关于信息安全的指南)中提到的基于计数器模式的KDF、基于反馈模式的KDF、基于双线叠加的KDF等密钥派生算法。如图8所示，使用密钥派生算法生成PDCCH加密密钥时，可以将通过随机数生成器生成的两个随机数(如两个用于生成PDCCH加密密钥的第一随机数)分别作为密钥材料(key)：Q和盐值(salt)：P，输入密钥派生算法生成PDCCH加密密钥。
作为另一种示例：密钥生成器可以采用混沌分布等数学模型，把随机数生成器输出的一个或多个用于生成PDCCH加密密钥的第一随机数以一定的组合规则作为混沌参数，基于混沌映射生成“长随机混沌序列x”。长随机混沌序列的长度可以支持PDCCH加密密钥更新周期内每个信令的物理层加密密钥不同。比如假设更新周期为20ms，总共有40个时隙(slot)，每个slot需要物理层加密的星座点为5000个，那么可以生成的长随机混沌序列长度为200000＝40*5000，这样每个slot使用的物理层加密密钥都不相同。其中，混沌分布等数学模型可以为混沌逻辑(logistic)模型、混沌切比雪夫(Chebyshev)模型等。
1)、采用混沌logistic模型，可设置y 0＝P(混沌初值＝第一随机数1)，μ＝Q(分岔参数＝第一随机数2)。可以通过如下公式确定长随机混沌序列中个元素值(x)，作为PDCCH加密密钥，x取值范围从-1到1。
y n+1＝μ*y n(1-y n),y∈(0.0,1.0),3.569945672<μ≤4.0；
x＝1-2*y,x∈(-1.0,1.0)。
2)、采用混沌Chebyshev模型，可选择设置x 0＝P(混沌初值＝第一随机数1)，μ＝Q(分岔参数＝第一随机数2)。可以通过如下公式确定长随机混沌序列中各个元素(x n+1)的值，作为PDCCH加密密钥。
x n+1＝cos(μ*cos -1(x n)),x∈(-1.0,1.0),2.0<μ
可以理解的是，终端设备可以按照密钥生成周期，周期性的进行生成PDCCH加密密钥，对所使用的PDCCH加密密钥进行更新，以提高安全性。在一些实施中，为了避免生成的PDCCH加密密钥出现重复，终端设备通过密钥生成器生成PDCCH加密密钥还可以加入防重放信息，其中防重放信息可以为发送频点、PCI、时间戳等，其中时间戳可以是PDCCH加密密钥更新时的系统帧号和slot号等时域信息。终端设备可以将防重放信息也作为密钥生成器的输入，如将防重放信息与盐值：P拼接，作为新的盐值：P；还可以将防重放信息与密钥生成器输出的PDCCH加密密钥相拼接，得到新的PDCCH加密密钥等。
S503：终端设备根据PDCCH加密密钥，对PDCCH进行解密，相对地，网络设备根据PDCCH加密密钥对PDCCH进行加密。
在本申请实施例中，网络设备可以采取与终端设备相似的方式生成PDCCH加密密钥，具体生成PDCCH加密密钥的过程，可以参照终端设备侧的实现，不再进行赘述。
终端设备和网络设备确定PDCCH加密密钥后，即可根据PDCCH加密密钥实现对PDCCH的加密和解密。例如：网络设备可以通过PDCCH加密密钥对PDCCH(如对通过PDCCH所承载的DCI)进行加密，终端设备也可以通过PDCCH加密密钥对PDCCH进行解密，从而为PDCCH(如通过PDCCH所承载的DCI)提供保护。
在一些实施例，也可以通过增加网络设备发送给终端设备的PDCCH的扰码专属参数(如pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID等)的比特数，通过增大了用户专属参数的随机空间，增加攻击者的破解难度。
以PDCCH的扰码专属参数为pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID为例，目前3GPP标准中CORESET中包含的信元参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID比特长度为16比特。在本申请实施例中，可以将16比特作为第一阈值，增加pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID比特数，使pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的长度大于第一阈值，比如为24、28或者32比特等。pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID在物理层是用于PDCCH加扰序列生成和PDCCH导频序列生成的，在增大pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的长度的情况下，在本申请实施例中，可以为PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列分别配置对于pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID取值的选取规则，用于PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列的生成。例如：对于PDCCH加扰序列配置的第一选取规则可以为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的前16个比特、或后16个比特等，第二选取规则可以为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的后16个比特、或前16个比特等，其中第一选取规则和第二选取规则可以相同，也可以不同。
以pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID长度为32比特为例，如图9所示，第一选取规则可以为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的前16个比特作为第一子扰码参数，用于PDCCH加扰序列的生成，第二选取规则可以为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的后16个比特作为第二子扰码参数，用于PDCCH导频序列(如PDCCH DMRS序列)的生成。如图10所示，第一选取规则可以为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的后16个比特作为第一子扰码参数，用于PDCCH加扰序列的生成，第二选取规则可以为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的前16个比特作为第二子扰码参数，用于PDCCH导频序列(如PDCCH DMRS序列)的生成。如图11所示，第一选取规则可以为按照M比特(M可以为2、4、6、8等)比特将pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID分为多个小块，比如M＝4时，将pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID分为8个小块，每个小块4个比特，其中偶数索引块重新组合成16比特作为第一子扰码参 数，用于PDCCH加扰序列的生成，第二选取规则可以为按照M比特(M可以为2、4、6、8等)比特将pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID分为多个小块，其中奇数索引块重新组合成16比特作为第二子扰码参数，用于PDCCH导频序列(如PDCCH DMRS序列)的生成。
作为一种示例：PDCCH加扰序列可以是伪随机序列，PDCCH加扰序列生成的初始化可以如下：
Figure PCTCN2022128562-appb-000001
第一子扰码参数n ID：对于终端设备专属搜索空间，如果配置了高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID，则n ID∈{0,1,…,65535}等于高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的前16个比特；对于公共搜索空间中PDCCH循环冗余校验(cyclic redundancy check，CRC)被加扰的RNTI为G-RNTI，G-CS-RNTI，或MCCH-RNTI等情况，如果在公共MBS频域资源上配置了高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID，n ID∈{0,1,…,65535}∈{0,1,…,65535}等于高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的前16个比特。
n RNTI：如果配置了高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID，n RNTI等于搜索空间里的C-RNTI，其他情况n RNTI＝0。
c init：表示PDCCH加扰序列的初始化值。
其中，上述是以第一选取规则为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的前16个比特作为第一子扰码参数为例进行介绍的，可以理解的是第一选取规则不限于为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的前16个比特作为第一子扰码参数，还可以为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的后16个比特作为第一子扰码参数等。
PDCCH导频序列(如PDCCH DMRS序列)r l(m)生成如下：
Figure PCTCN2022128562-appb-000002
其中，伪随机序列c(i)初始化(c init)如下：
Figure PCTCN2022128562-appb-000003
l为slot内的OFDM符号索引，
Figure PCTCN2022128562-appb-000004
是系统帧内的slot索引号，j为虚数单位。
第二子扰码参数N ID定义如下：对于终端设备专属搜索空间，如果配置了高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID，N ID∈{0,1,…,65535}等于高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的后16个比特；如果公共MBS频域资源上的公共搜索空间里配置了高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID，N ID∈{0,1,…,65535}等于高层参数pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的后16个比特；其他情况
Figure PCTCN2022128562-appb-000005
其中，上述是以第二选取规则为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的后16个比特作为第二子扰码参数为例进行介绍的，可以理解的是第二选取规则不限于为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的后16个比特作为第一子扰码参数，还可以为选取pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID的前16个比特作为第一子扰码参数等。
不同小区是独立进行扰码专属参数配置下发，存在一定的碰撞概率。如图12所示的扰码专属参数碰撞示意图，其中横轴表示小区数量、纵轴表示扰码专属参数碰撞概率，其中图12中扰码专属参数以pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID为例，由图12可知，pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID比特长度为16时，小区间pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID碰撞概率为1.526e-5。pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID比特长度为32时，小区间 pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID碰撞概率为2.328e-10。增大pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID比特长度可以使得小区间dcch-DMRS-ScramblingID碰撞概率大大下降，减少小区间DCI发送干扰。
如果终端设备专属搜索空间有4个候选集，需要4次盲检，假设一次DCI盲检时间为5微秒(us)，单个攻击者可并行64个线程(threads)的破解时间如下公式所示。攻击者因为不知道加密下发的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID取值，需要遍历尝试所有可能取值。pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID比特长度为16时，攻击者约0.02秒可破解此DCI。pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID比特长度为32时，攻击者需要1342秒才可以破解此DCI。增大pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID随机比特长度可以使得DCI安全性大大提高。
16比特：～5us*(2^16)*4候选集/64/1000/1000＝0.02秒。
32比特：～5us*(2^32)*4候选集/64/1000/1000＝1342秒。
在一些实施中，为了进一步提高安全性，终端设备还可以根据随机数生成器生成的随机数对PDCCH对应的PDCCH加扰序列进行更新，和/或对PDCCH对应的PDCCH导频序列进行更新。
作为一种示例，终端设备在根据PDCCH的用户专属参数以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数时，还可以生成一个用于对PDCCH加扰序列进行更新的第二随机数，其中第二随机数可以与用于PDCCH加密密钥生成的第一随机数相同或不同。终端设备获取到第二随机数后，即可根据第二随机数，对PDCCH加扰序列进行更新。例如：将第二随机数作为新的扰码id参数用于生成新的PDCCH加扰序列，或者按照第一选取规则从第二随机数中选取出第一子扰码参数，第一子扰码参数用于生成新的PDCCH加扰序列。
类似地，终端设备在根据PDCCH的用户专属参数以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数时，还可以生成一个用于对PDCCH导频序列(如PDCCH DMRS序列)进行更新的第三随机数，其中第三随机数可以与上述第一随机数或第二随机数据相同，也可以与上述第一随机数和第二数据数均不相同。终端设备获取到第三随机数后，即可根据第三随机数，对PDCCH扰码序列进行更新。例如：将第三随机数作为新的扰码id参数用于生成新的PDCCH扰码序列，或者按照第二选取规则从第三随机数中选取出第二子扰码参数，第二子扰码参数用于生成新的PDCCH扰码序列。
如图13为本申请实施例提供的加强PDCCH安全保护的示意图。终端设备可以基于网络设备通过RRC重配消息下发的PDCCH的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器周期生成至少一个随机数；其中，PDCCH的用户专属参数可以为可以是用户级CORESET中的pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID等参数，终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，可以是RRC消息，比如终端设备通过RRC消息上报的MeasurementReport。也可以是NAS消息，比如DedicatedNAS-Message。
终端设备可以根据随机数生成器生成的随机数(如第一随机数)，通过密钥生成器生成PDCCH加密密钥；还可以根据随机数生成器生成的随机数(如第二随机数和第三随机数)，对PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列(如PDCCH DMRS序列)进行更新。类似的网络设备也可以采用与终端设备相似的方式，确定PDCCH加密密钥，以及对PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列(如PDCCH DMRS序列)进行更新。
参照如图14所示的物理层PDCCH加密示意图，网络设备对PDCCH待传输信息(如DCI)可以通过添加循环冗余校验(cyclic redundancy check，CRC)、无线网络临时标识(radio network temporary identity，RNTI)加掩、极化(polar)编码、速率匹配/交织、加扰、正交振幅调制(quadrature amplitude modulation，QAM)调制、资源映射、快速傅里叶逆变换(inverse fast fourier transform，IFFT)、加循环前缀(cyclic prefix,CP)等一项或多项处理后通过空口发送，终端设备接收到的信号进行去CP、快速傅里叶变换(fast Fourier transform，FFT)、解映射、信道估计、多输入多输出(multiple input multiple output，MIMO)译码、QAM解调、解扰/解速率匹配、polar译码、RNTI解掩、CRC校验等处理得到传输信息(如DCI)。其中，网络设备可以在添加CRC之前、或资源映射之前或资源映射之后，根据PDCCH加密密钥对PDCCH待传输信息(如DCI)加密；终端设备可以在CRC校验之后、或解映射之后或解映射之前，根据PDCCH加密密钥对PDCCH待传输信息进行解密。
另外，终端设备和网络设备还可以根据随机数生成器生成的随机数(如第二随机数和第三随机数)，对PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列进行更新，网络设备根据最新得到PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列对PDCCH进行加扰和资源映射，终端设备根据最新得到PDCCH加扰序列和PDCCH导频序列对所述物理信道进行解扰和信道估计。
其中，根据PDCCH加密密钥对PDCCH待传输信息(如DCI)加密，可以采用比特级加密。例如：在添加CRC之前，可以采用传统密码学加密算法(比如AES、Zuc、Snow等)对传输信息的比特序列进行加密。
当然，根据PDCCH加密密钥对PDCCH待传输信息(如DCI)加密，也可以采用复数域加密。例如：可以采用星座相位旋转、数据和导频子载波混淆交织等操作对PDCCH待传输信息进行复数域加密。如图15所示，采用星座相位旋转进行加密时，可以先计算星座相位加密密钥K，K＝x*2π，K∈(-2π，2π)。再根据K进行星座相位旋转，S'＝S*e jK，其中S’为加密后的星座点，x表示PDCCH加密密钥中的元素，S为加密前的星座点，如PDCCH物理传输载荷在经过编码和QAM调制后的数据。如图16所示，采用数据和导频子载波混淆交织加密时。可以将PDCCH加密密钥进行后处理变换成加密的交织索引，对数据和导频子载波的坐标信息进行重排列置乱，实现加密。
可以理解的是，上述是以物理信道为PDCCH为例进行介绍的，可以理解的是物理信道还可以是PDSCH、PUCCH、或PUSCH等。
以物理信道为PDSCH为例，如图17为本申请实施例提供的加强PDSCH安全保护的示意图。终端设备可以基于网络设备通过RRC重配消息下发的PDSCH的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器周期生成至少一个随机数；其中，PDSCH的用户专属参数可以为用户级PDSCH配置(PDSCH-Config)中的扰码ID(如数据加扰标识PDSCH(dataScramblingIdentityPDSCH)、DMRS下行配置(DMRS-DownlinkConfig)中的加扰(scrambling)ID0和scramblingID1等信元参数。PDSCH的用户专属参数需要保持随机性和不可预测性，不能与明文发送的相同。终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，可以是RRC消息，比如终端设备通过RRC消息上报的MeasurementReport。也可以是NAS消息，比如DedicatedNAS-Message，还可以是也可以是同一个下行HARQ进程中终端设备已经收到的PDSCH载荷数据。
终端设备可以根据随机数生成器生成的随机数(如第一随机数)，通过密钥生成器生 成PDSCH加密密钥；还可以根据随机数生成器生成的随机数(如第二随机数和第三随机数)，对PDSCH加扰序列和PDSCH导频序列(如PDSCH DMRS序列)进行更新。类似的网络设备也可以采用与终端设备相似的方式，确定PDSCH加密密钥，以及对PDSCH加扰序列和PDSCH导频序列(如PDSCH DMRS序列)进行更新。
以物理信道为PUSCH为例，如图18为本申请实施例提供的加强PUSCH安全保护的示意图。终端设备可以基于网络设备通过RRC重配消息下发的PUSCH的用户专属参数，以及终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器周期生成至少一个随机数；其中，PUSCH的用户专属参数可以为用户级PUSCH配置(PUSCH-Config)中的扰码ID(如数据加扰标识PUSCH(dataScramblingIdentityPUSCH)、DMRS上行配置(DMRS-UplinkConfig)中的scramblingID0和scramblingID1等信元参数。PUSCH的用户专属参数需要保持随机性和不可预测性，不能与明文发送的相同。终端设备与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，可以是RRC消息，比如终端设备通过RRC消息上报的MeasurementReport。也可以是NAS消息，比如DedicatedNAS-Message，还可以是也可以是同一个下行HARQ进程中终端设备已经收到的PUSCH载荷数据。
终端设备可以根据随机数生成器生成的随机数(如第一随机数)，通过密钥生成器生成PUSCH加密密钥；还可以根据随机数生成器生成的随机数(如第二随机数和第三随机数)，对PUSCH加扰序列和PUSCH导频序列(如PUSCH DMRS序列)进行更新。类似的网络设备也可以采用与终端设备相似的方式，确定PUSCH加密密钥，以及对PUSCH加扰序列和PUSCH导频序列(如PUSCH DMRS序列)进行更新。
可以理解的是，为了实现上述实施例中功能，终端设备和网络设备包括了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。本领域技术人员应该很容易意识到，结合本申请中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及方法步骤，本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件相结合的形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用场景和设计约束条件。
图19和图20为本申请的实施例提供的可能的通信装置的结构示意图。这些通信装置可以用于实现上述方法实施例中终端设备或网络设备的功能，因此也能实现上述方法实施例所具备的有益效果。在一种可能的实现中，该通信装置可以是终端设备或网络设备，还可以是应用于终端设备或网络设备的模块(如芯片)。
如图19所示，通信装置1900包括处理单元1910和接口单元1920，其中接口单元1920还可以为收发单元或输入输出接口。通信装置1900可用于实现上述图7中所示的方法实施例中终端设备或网络设备的功能。
当通信装置1900用于实现图5所示的方法实施例中终端设备的功能时：接口单元1920，用于接收来自网络设备的物理信道的用户专属参数；处理单元1910，用于根据用户专属参数，以及与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；根据第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；处理单元1910，还用于根据物理信道加密密钥，对物理信道进行加密或解密。
在一种可能的设计中，至少一个随机数还包括第二随机数，处理单元1910，还用于根据第二随机数，对物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列进行更新；以及根据更新后的物理信道加扰序列，对物理信道进行加扰或解扰。
在一种可能的设计中，至少一个随机数还包括第三随机数，处理单元1910，还用于根据第三随机数，对物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列进行更新；以及根据更新后的物理信道导频序列，对物理信道进行资源映射或信道估计。
在一种可能的设计中，接口单元1920，还用于接收来自网络设备的物理信道的扰码专属参数，扰码专属参数包括的比特数量大于第一数量阈值；处理单元1910，还用于根据第一子扰码参数，生成物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列，第一子扰码参数由处理单元1910根据第一选取规则和扰码专属参数确定，第一子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于第一数量阈值；以及根据第二子扰码参数，生成物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列，第二子扰码参数由处理单元1910根据第二选取规则和扰码专属参数确定，第二子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于第一数量阈值。
在一种可能的设计中，处理单元1910根据用户专属参数，以及接口单元1920与网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数时，具体用于通过接口单元1920按照设定周期获取与网络设备最近一次交互的设定历史消息；根据用户专属参数，以及最近一次交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
在一种可能的设计中，物理信道的用户专属参数可以由网络设备随机配置。
示例的，上述物理信道可以为PDCCH、PDSCH、PUCCH、或PUSCH等。
当通信装置1900用于实现图5所示的方法实施例中网络设备的功能时：接口单元1920，用于向终端设备发送物理信道的用户专属参数；处理单元1910，用于根据用户专属参数，以及与终端设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；根据第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；处理单元1910，还用于根据物理信道加密密钥，对物理信道进行解密或加密。
在一种可能的设计中，至少一个随机数还包括第二随机数，处理单元1910，还用于根据第二随机数，对物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列进行更新；根据更新后的物理信道加扰序列，对物理信道进行解扰或加扰。
在一种可能的设计中，至少一个随机数还包括第三随机数，处理单元1910，还用于根据第三随机数，对物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列进行更新；根据更新后的物理信道导频序列，对物理信道进行信道估计或资源映射。
在一种可能的设计中，接口单元1920，还用于向终端设备发送物理信道的扰码专属参数，扰码专属参数包括的比特数量大于第一数量阈值；处理单元1910，还用于根据第一子扰码参数，生成物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列，第一子扰码参数由处理单元1910根据第一选取规则和扰码专属参数确定，第一子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于第一数量阈值；以及根据第二子扰码参数，生成物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列，第二子扰码参数由处理单元1910根据第二选取规则和扰码专属参数确定，第二子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于第一数量阈值。
在一种可能的设计中，处理单元1910根据用户专属参数，以及与终端设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数时，具体用于通过接口单元1920按照设定周期获取与终端设备最近一次交互的设定历史消息；根据用户专属参数，以及最近一次交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
在一种可能的设计中，物理信道的用户专属参数可以由处理单元1910随机配置。
示例的，上述物理信道可以为PDCCH、PDSCH、PUCCH、或PUSCH等。
如图20所示，本申请还提供一种通信装置2000，包括处理器2010和接口电路2020。处理器2010和接口电路2020之间相互耦合。可以理解的是，接口电路2020可以为收发器、输入输出接口、输入接口、输出接口、通信接口等。可选的，通信装置2000还可以包括存储器2030，用于存储处理器2010执行的指令或存储处理器2010运行指令所需要的输入数据或存储处理器2010运行指令后产生的数据。可选的，存储器2030还可以和处理器2010集成在一起。
当通信装置2000用于实现图7所示的方法时，处理器2010可以用于实现上述处理单元1910的功能，接口电路2020可以用于实现上述接口单元1920的功能。
可以理解的是，本申请的实施例中的处理器可以是中央处理单元(central processing unit，CPU)，还可以是其它通用处理器、数字信号处理器(digital signal processor，DSP)、专用集成电路(application specific integrated circuit，ASIC)、逻辑电路、现场可编程门阵列(field programmable gate array，FPGA)或者其它可编程逻辑器件、晶体管逻辑器件，硬件部件或者其任意组合。通用处理器可以是微处理器，也可以是任何常规的处理器。
本申请的实施例中的方法步骤可以通过硬件的方式来实现，也可以由处理器执行软件指令的方式来实现。软件指令可以由相应的软件模块组成，软件模块可以被存放于随机存取存储器、闪存、只读存储器、可编程只读存储器、可擦除可编程只读存储器、电可擦除可编程只读存储器、寄存器、硬盘、移动硬盘、CD-ROM或者本领域熟知的任何其它形式的存储介质中。一种示例性的存储介质耦合至处理器，从而使处理器能够从该存储介质读取信息，且可向该存储介质写入信息。当然，存储介质也可以是处理器的组成部分。处理器和存储介质可以位于ASIC中。另外，该ASIC可以位于网络设备或终端设备中。当然，处理器和存储介质也可以作为分立组件存在于网络设备或终端设备中。
在上述实施例中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现。所述计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机程序或指令。在计算机上加载和执行所述计算机程序或指令时，全部或部分地执行本申请实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、网络设备、用户设备或者其它可编程装置。所述计算机程序或指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机程序或指令可以从一个网络设备、终端、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线或无线方式向另一个网络设备、终端、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是集成一个或多个可用介质的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质，例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带；也可以是光介质，例如，数字视频光盘；还可以是半导体介质，例如，固态硬盘。该计算机可读存储介质可以是易失性或非易失性存储介质，或可包括易失性和非易失性两种类型的存储介质。
在本申请的各个实施例中，如果没有特殊说明以及逻辑冲突，不同的实施例之间的术语和/或描述具有一致性、且可以相互引用，不同的实施例中的技术特征根据其内在的逻辑关系可以组合形成新的实施例。
另外，可以理解，在本申请实施例中，“示例的”一词用于表示作例子、例证或说明。本申请中被描述为“示例”的任何实施例或设计方案不应被解释为比其它实施例或设计方案更优选或更具优势。确切而言，使用示例的一词旨在以具体方式呈现概念。
可以理解的是，在本申请的实施例中涉及的各种数字编号仅为描述方便进行的区分，并不用来限制本申请的实施例的范围。上述各过程的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后，各过程的执行顺序应以其功能和内在逻辑确定。

Claims (31)

  1. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端设备根据来自网络设备的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及所述终端设备与所述网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，所述至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；
    所述终端设备根据所述第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；
    所述终端设备根据所述物理信道加密密钥，对所述物理信道进行加密或解密。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述至少一个随机数还包括第二随机数，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备根据所述第二随机数，对所述物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列进行更新；
    所述终端设备根据更新后的所述物理信道加扰序列，对所述物理信道进行加扰或解扰。
  3. 如权利要求1或2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述至少一个随机数还包括第三随机数，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备根据所述第三随机数，对所述物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列进行更新；
    所述终端设备根据更新后的所述物理信道导频序列，对所述物理信道进行资源映射或信道估计。
  4. 如权利要求1-3中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备接收来自所述网络设备的所述物理信道的扰码专属参数，所述扰码专属参数包括的比特数量大于第一数量阈值；
    所述终端设备根据第一子扰码参数，生成所述物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列，所述第一子扰码参数由所述终端设备根据第一选取规则和所述扰码专属参数确定，所述第一子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于所述第一数量阈值；
    所述终端设备根据第二子扰码参数，生成所述物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列，所述第二子扰码参数由所述终端设备根据第二选取规则和所述扰码专属参数确定，所述第二子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于所述第一数量阈值。
  5. 如权利要求1-4中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备根据来自网络设备的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及所述终端设备与所述网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，包括：
    所述终端设备按照设定周期获取与所述网络设备最近一次交互的设定历史消息；
    所述终端设备根据所述用户专属参数，以及所述最近一次交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
  6. 如权利要求1-5中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述物理信道的用户专属参数由所述网络设备随机配置。
  7. 如权利要求1-6中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述物理信道为物理下行控制信道PDCCH、物理下行共享信道PDSCH、物理上行控制信道PUCCH、或物理上行共享信道PUSCH。
  8. 一种通信方法，其特征在于，包括：
    网络设备根据向终端设备发送的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及所述终端设备与所述网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，所述至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；
    所述网络设备根据所述第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；
    所述网络设备根据所述物理信道加密密钥，对所述物理信道进行解密或加密。
  9. 如权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述至少一个随机数还包括第二随机数，所述方法还包括：
    所述网络设备根据所述第二随机数，对所述物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列进行更新；
    所述网络设备根据更新后的所述物理信道加扰序列，对所述物理信道进行解扰或加扰。
  10. 如权利要求8或9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述至少一个随机数还包括第三随机数，所述方法还包括：
    所述网络设备根据所述第三随机数，对所述物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列进行更新；
    所述网络设备根据更新后的所述物理信道导频序列，对所述物理信道进行信道估计或资源映射。
  11. 如权利要求8-10中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述网络设备向所述终端设备发送所述物理信道的扰码专属参数，所述扰码专属参数包括的比特数量大于第一数量阈值；
    所述网络设备根据第一子扰码参数，生成所述物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列，所述第一子扰码参数由所述网络设备根据第一选取规则和所述扰码专属参数确定，所述第一子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于所述第一数量阈值；
    所述网络设备根据第二子扰码参数，生成所述物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列，所述第二子扰码参数由所述网络设备根据第二选取规则和所述扰码专属参数确定，所述第二子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于所述第一数量阈值。
  12. 如权利要求8-11中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述网络设备根据向终端设备发送的物理信道的用户专属参数，以及所述终端设备与所述网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，包括：
    所述网络设备按照设定周期获取与所述终端设备最近一次交互的设定历史消息；
    所述网络设备根据所述用户专属参数，以及所述最近一次交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
  13. 如权利要求8-12中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述物理信道的用户专属参数由所述网络设备随机配置。
  14. 如权利要求8-13中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述物理信道为物理下行控制信道PDCCH、物理下行共享信道PDSCH、物理上行控制信道PUCCH、或物理上行共享信道PUSCH。
  15. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括接口单元和处理单元；
    所述接口单元，用于接收来自网络设备的物理信道的用户专属参数；
    所述处理单元，用于根据所述用户专属参数，以及与所述网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，所述至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；根据 所述第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述物理信道加密密钥，对所述物理信道进行加密或解密。
  16. 如权利要求15所述的装置，其特征在于，所述至少一个随机数还包括第二随机数；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第二随机数，对所述物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列进行更新；以及根据更新后的所述物理信道加扰序列，对所述物理信道进行加扰或解扰。
  17. 如权利要求15或16所述的装置，其特征在于，所述至少一个随机数还包括第三随机数；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第三随机数，对所述物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列进行更新；以及根据更新后的所述物理信道导频序列，对所述物理信道进行资源映射或信道估计。
  18. 如权利要求15-17中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述接口单元，还用于接收来自所述网络设备的所述物理信道的扰码专属参数，所述扰码专属参数包括的比特数量大于第一数量阈值；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据第一子扰码参数，生成所述物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列，所述第一子扰码参数由所述处理单元根据第一选取规则和所述扰码专属参数确定，所述第一子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于所述第一数量阈值；以及根据第二子扰码参数，生成所述物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列，所述第二子扰码参数由所述处理单元根据第二选取规则和所述扰码专属参数确定，所述第二子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于所述第一数量阈值。
  19. 如权利要求15-18中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元根据所述用户专属参数，以及所述接口单元与所述网络设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数时，具体用于通过所述接口单元按照设定周期获取与所述网络设备最近一次交互的设定历史消息；根据所述用户专属参数，以及所述最近一次交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
  20. 如权利要求15-19中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述物理信道的用户专属参数由所述网络设备随机配置。
  21. 如权利要求15-20中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述物理信道为物理下行控制信道PDCCH、物理下行共享信道PDSCH、物理上行控制信道PUCCH、或物理上行共享信道PUSCH。
  22. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括接口单元和处理单元；
    所述接口单元，用于向终端设备发送物理信道的用户专属参数；
    所述处理单元，用于根据所述用户专属参数，以及与所述终端设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数，所述至少一个随机数包括第一随机数；根据所述第一随机数，通过密钥生成器生成物理信道加密密钥；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述物理信道加密密钥，对所述物理信道进行解密或加密。
  23. 如权利要求22所述的装置，其特征在于，所述至少一个随机数还包括第二随机数；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第二随机数，对所述物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列进行更新；根据更新后的所述物理信道加扰序列，对所述物理信道进行解扰或加扰。
  24. 如权利要求22或23所述的装置，其特征在于，所述至少一个随机数还包括第三随机数；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第三随机数，对所述物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列进行更新；根据更新后的所述物理信道导频序列，对所述物理信道进行信道估计或资源映射。
  25. 如权利要求22-24中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述接口单元，还用于向所述终端设备发送所述物理信道的扰码专属参数，所述扰码专属参数包括的比特数量大于第一数量阈值；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据第一子扰码参数，生成所述物理信道对应的物理信道加扰序列，所述第一子扰码参数由所述处理单元根据第一选取规则和所述扰码专属参数确定，所述第一子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于所述第一数量阈值；以及根据第二子扰码参数，生成所述物理信道对应的物理信道导频序列，所述第二子扰码参数由所述处理单元根据第二选取规则和所述扰码专属参数确定，所述第二子扰码参数包括的比特数量等于所述第一数量阈值。
  26. 如权利要求22-25中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元根据所述用户专属参数，以及与所述终端设备交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数时，具体用于通过所述接口单元按照设定周期获取与所述终端设备最近一次交互的设定历史消息；根据所述用户专属参数，以及所述最近一次交互的设定历史消息，通过随机数生成器生成至少一个随机数。
  27. 如权利要求22-26中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述物理信道的用户专属参数由所述处理单元随机配置。
  28. 如权利要求22-27中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述物理信道为物理下行控制信道PDCCH、物理下行共享信道PDSCH、物理上行控制信道PUCCH、或物理上行共享信道PUSCH。
  29. 一种芯片系统，其特征在于，所述芯片系统包括处理器，所述处理器用于与存储器耦合，所述存储器用于存储程序或指令，当所述程序或指令被所述处理器执行时，实现如权利要求1-14中任一项所述的方法。
  30. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，所述计算机可读存储介质中存储有计算机程序或指令，当所述计算机程序或指令被处理器执行时，使得如权利要求1-14中任一项所述的方法被实现。
  31. 一种计算机程序产品，其特征在于，所述计算机程序产品包括计算机程序或指令，当所述计算机程序或指令被处理器执行时，使得如权利要求1-14中任一项所述的方法被实现。
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