WO2023273293A1 - 认证的方法和装置 - Google Patents

认证的方法和装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023273293A1
WO2023273293A1 PCT/CN2022/070996 CN2022070996W WO2023273293A1 WO 2023273293 A1 WO2023273293 A1 WO 2023273293A1 CN 2022070996 W CN2022070996 W CN 2022070996W WO 2023273293 A1 WO2023273293 A1 WO 2023273293A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
user
operator
network device
information
signature
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PCT/CN2022/070996
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
林霖
张冠华
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
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Priority to EP22831130.4A priority Critical patent/EP4362515A1/en
Publication of WO2023273293A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023273293A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0861—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/10—Architectures or entities
    • H04L65/1016—IP multimedia subsystem [IMS]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066—Session management
    • H04L65/1073—Registration or de-registration
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the communication field, and more specifically, relates to an authentication method and device.
  • AI artificial intelligence
  • This application provides an authentication method, which can ensure that the communication content is authentic and not tampered with during the end-to-end communication process.
  • an authentication method is provided.
  • the authentication method can be executed by the network equipment of the first operator, or can also be executed by a chip or a circuit set in the network equipment of the first operator. Not limited.
  • Methods of this certification include:
  • the first operator's network device authenticates whether the first user is credible, and obtains a first authentication result.
  • the first user is a user who uses the first terminal device to send a message to the first operator's network device; the first operator's network device Sign the first authentication result to generate a first signature; the first operator network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature, wherein the second operator's network device is an operator's network device that provides services to the second user, and the second user is a user called by the first user.
  • the first operator's network device authenticates the first user, and signs the first authentication result obtained through authentication to generate a first signature, and then uses the The second terminal device of the network sends the first authentication result and the first signature, or sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second operator's network device that provides services to the second user. After verifying whether the user is credible, Ensure that the communication content in the end-to-end communication process is true and cannot be tampered with, which can avoid or reduce telecommunications fraud.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device receives a first message from the first terminal device, and the first message includes first encrypted information , the first encrypted information is the encrypted physiological characteristic information of the first user, and the physiological characteristic information of the first user includes at least one of the following: fingerprint information of the first user, voiceprint information of the first user, The first user's face information, the first user's iris information, and the first user's palmprint information; the first operator's network equipment authenticates whether the first user is credible, including: the first operator's network The device sends the first user's identification information and the first encrypted information to a third-party certification body, the first encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to verify whether the first user is credible, and the first user's identification information is used to to identify the first user; the first operator network equipment receives first information from the third-party certification authority, the first information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible; the first operator network equipment according to the The first information authenticates
  • the network device of the first operator may call the authentication service of a third-party certification authority to authenticate the first user according to the first encrypted information reported by the first terminal device. It is not necessary for the network device of the first operator to directly authenticate the first user, but The authentication is performed by a third-party certification body, and the first operator’s network equipment only needs to verify whether the first user is credible through the feedback information of the third-party certification agency, which simplifies the operation of the first operator’s network equipment, and the physiological characteristics of the first user The information can be authenticated without being stored in the first operator's network equipment, thereby avoiding privacy trust issues caused by users storing sensitive information in the operator's network equipment.
  • the first message includes at least one of the following: signaling message, video data and audio data, when the first message is the video data and/or the audio When receiving data, the first message periodically carries the first encrypted information.
  • the foregoing first message may specifically be different messages or data, which increases the flexibility of the solution.
  • the first encrypted information can be periodically carried in the first message, that is, whether the first user can be periodically authenticated, increasing the reliability.
  • the method before the first operator network device receives the first message from the first terminal device, the method further includes: the first operator network device from The third-party certification authority obtains a first encryption method and a first public key; the first operator network device sends the first encryption method and the first public key to the first terminal device, where the first public key is The public key in the first public-private key pair determined by the third-party certification authority, the first public-private key pair also includes the first private key, the first encryption method and the first public key are used to encrypt the first terminal device
  • the first encrypted information is obtained from the physiological characteristic information of the first user, and the first private key is stored in the third-party certification body for verifying the first encrypted information.
  • the first user may authorize the network device of the first operator to obtain the first encryption method and the first public key before communication.
  • the authorization method can be that the first user authorizes when the first user accesses the network.
  • the first operator will ask the first user whether to authorize the first operator's network equipment to obtain the first encryption method and the first public key, the first user can choose to authorize.
  • the authorization method may be that the first user authorizes the first operator's network device to acquire the first encryption method and the first public key at a certain time point before calling the second user.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device obtains the first The user's physiological feature information, the first user's physiological feature information includes the first user's voiceprint information and/or the first user's face information; the first operator's network device authenticates whether the first user is credible , including: the first operator network device encrypts the physiological characteristic information of the first user based on a second encryption method and a second public key to generate second encrypted information; the first operator network device sends a third-party certification authority Send the first user's identification information and the second encrypted information, the second encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to verify whether the first user is credible, and the first user's identification information is used to identify the first user
  • the first operator's network equipment receives second information from the third-party certification authority, the second information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible; the first operator's network equipment authenticates the first user according to the second information Whether
  • the network device of the first operator can call the authentication service of the third-party authentication agency to authenticate the first user according to the second encrypted information determined by itself, without the need for the first terminal device to obtain and encrypt the physiological characteristic information of the first user, which simplifies Operation of the first terminal device.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device receiving a second authentication result and a second signature from the first terminal device, the second authentication result It is used to indicate whether the first user is trustworthy, and the second signature is used to verify the second authentication result; the first operator's network device authenticating whether the first user is trustworthy includes: the first operator's network device verifying The second signature, when the verification is passed, verifies whether the first user is credible according to the second authentication result.
  • the first operator's network device can verify whether the first user is authentic according to the second authentication result reported by the first terminal device, and the first operator's network device verifies the second signature.
  • the first user can be authenticated without invoking a third-party authentication agency to implement authentication, which further simplifies the operation of the first operator's network equipment.
  • the first operator network device verifies the second signature, and determines that the first user is untrustworthy when the verification fails.
  • the second signature is a signature generated by signing the second authentication result based on the private key of the first SIM card; the first operator network device verifies the second signature Two signatures, including: the first operator network device verifies the second signature based on the first SIM card public key, wherein the first SIM card private key and the first SIM card public key are the first SIM card public-private key pair , the first SIM card is set in the first terminal device, the private key of the first SIM card is stored in the first SIM card, and the public key of the first SIM card is stored in the network device of the first operator.
  • the method further includes: The first operator's network equipment acquires the historical call data of the first user, and the historical call data of the first user is used to indicate the calling habits of the first user, including at least one of the following: the time when the first user initiates a call point distribution data, the frequency data of the second user’s connected call when the first user initiates a call, the ringing duration data of the second terminal device when the first user initiates a call, the distribution data of the first user’s call duration, the The geographic distribution data of calls initiated by the first user, the ratio of the second user being called for the first time, and the distribution data of the number of the second user; the network equipment of the first operator according to the preset strategy and the first user’s
  • the historical call data determines whether the call initiated by the first user is credible; whether the first operator's network device authenticates the first user is credible, including: whether
  • the network device of the first operator may authenticate whether the first user is authentic according to the calling habit of the first user.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device determining a third public-private key pair, where the third public-private key pair includes the third private key and the third public key key; the first operator network device saves the third private key.
  • the first operator The network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second terminal device used by the second user, or to the second operator's network device, specifically: the first operator's network device sends the second terminal device The first authentication result and the first signature; the method further includes: the first operator network device sends the third public key to the second terminal device, and the third public key is used by the second terminal device to verify the first signature.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device authenticates whether the second user is authentic, and obtains a third authentication result; the first operator network device Sign the third authentication result to generate a third signature; the first operator network device sends the third authentication result and the third signature to the first terminal device; the first operator network device sends the first The terminal device sends the third public key, and the third public key is used by the first terminal device to verify the third signature.
  • the network device of the first operator also needs to verify the second user, so as to be able to determine whether the communication parties are trustworthy.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device receiving a second message from the second terminal device, the second message including third encrypted information , the third encrypted information is the encrypted physiological characteristic information of the second user, and the physiological characteristic information of the second user includes at least one of the following: fingerprint information of the second user, voiceprint information of the second user, The second user's face information, the second user's iris information, and the second user's palmprint information; the first operator's network device authenticates whether the second user is credible, including: the first operator's network The device sends the second user's identification information and the third encrypted information to a third-party certification body, the third encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to verify whether the second user is trustworthy, and the second user's identification information is used to to identify the second user; the first operator network equipment receives third information from the third-party certification authority, the third information is used to indicate whether the second user is credible; the first operator network equipment according to the The third information authenticates whether the second
  • the network device of the first operator may call the authentication service of the third-party certification authority to authenticate the second user according to the third encrypted information reported by the second terminal device. It is not necessary for the network device of the first operator to directly authenticate the second user, but The authentication is performed by a third-party certification body, and the first operator's network device can verify whether the second user is credible through the feedback information of the third-party certification body, which simplifies the operation of the first operator's network device, and the physiological characteristics of the first user The information can be authenticated without being stored in the first operator's network equipment, thereby avoiding privacy trust issues caused by users storing sensitive information in the operator's network equipment.
  • the second message includes at least one of the following: signaling message, video data and audio data, when the second message is the video data and/or the audio When receiving data, the second message periodically carries the third encrypted information.
  • the foregoing second message may specifically be different messages or data, which increases the flexibility of the solution.
  • the third encrypted information can be periodically carried in the second message, that is, whether the second user can be periodically authenticated, increasing the reliability.
  • the method before the first operator network device receives the second message from the second terminal device, the method further includes: the first operator network device from The third-party certification authority obtains the third encryption method and the fifth public key; the first operator network device sends the third encryption method and the fifth public key to the second terminal device, where the fifth public key is The public key in the fifth public-private key pair determined by the third-party certification authority, the fifth public-private key pair also includes the fifth private key, the third encryption method and the fifth public key are used to encrypt the second terminal device
  • the physiological characteristic information of the second user obtains the third encrypted information, and the fifth private key is stored in the third-party certification body for verifying the third encrypted information.
  • the second user may authorize the network device of the first operator to acquire the third encryption method and the fifth public key before communication.
  • the authorization method can be that the second user authorizes when the second user accesses the network.
  • the first operator will ask the first user whether to authorize the first operator's network equipment to obtain the third encryption method and the fifth public key, the second user can choose to authorize.
  • the authorization method may be that the second user authorizes the first operator's network device to obtain the third encryption method and the fifth public key at a certain time point before calling the second user.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device obtains the second user The user's physiological feature information, the second user's physiological feature information includes the second user's voiceprint information and/or the second user's face information; the first operator's network device authenticates whether the second user is credible , including: the first operator network device encrypts the physiological characteristic information of the second user based on the fourth encryption method and the sixth public key to generate fourth encrypted information; the first operator network device sends a third-party certification authority Send the second user's identification information and the fourth encrypted information, the fourth encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to verify whether the second user is credible, and the second user's identification information is used to identify the second user ; The first operator network equipment receives fourth information from the third-party certification authority, the fourth information is used to indicate whether the two users are trustworthy; the first operator network equipment authenticates the second user according to the fourth information Whether the user is
  • the network device of the first operator can call the authentication service of the third-party authentication agency to authenticate the second user according to the fourth encrypted information determined by itself, without the need for the second terminal device to obtain and encrypt the physiological characteristic information of the second user, which simplifies Operation of the second terminal device.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device receiving a fifth authentication result and a seventh signature from the second terminal device, the fifth authentication result
  • the seventh signature determined for the second terminal device is used to indicate whether the second user is credible, and the seventh signature is used to verify the fourth authentication result;
  • the first operator network device verifies whether the second user is credible, including: The first operator network device verifies the seventh signature, and verifies whether the second user is authentic according to the fifth verification result when the verification is passed.
  • the first operator's network device can verify whether the second user is authentic according to the fifth authentication result reported by the second terminal device, and the first operator's network device verifies the seventh signature.
  • the second user can be authenticated without invoking a third-party authentication agency to implement authentication, which further simplifies the operation of the network equipment of the first operator.
  • the first operator network device verifies the seventh signature, and determines that the second user is untrustworthy when the verification fails.
  • the seventh signature is a signature generated by signing the fifth authentication result based on the private key of the second SIM card; the first operator network device verifies the seventh signature Seven signatures, including: the first operator network device verifies the seventh signature based on the second SIM card public key, wherein the second SIM card private key and the second SIM card public key are a second SIM card public-private key pair , the second SIM card is set in the second terminal device, the private key of the second SIM card is stored in the second SIM card, and the public key of the second SIM card is stored in the network device of the first operator.
  • the method further includes: The first operator's network equipment obtains the historical call data of the second user, and the historical call data of the second user is used to indicate the calling habits of the second user equipment, including at least one of the following: Time point distribution data, frequency data of the first user connecting the call when the second user initiates a call, ringing duration data of the first terminal device when the second user initiates a call, distribution data of the second user's call duration, The geographical location distribution data of calls initiated by the second user, the ratio of the first call by the first user, and the distribution data of the number of the first user; the network equipment of the first operator according to the preset strategy and the second user The historical call data determines whether the call initiated by the second user is authentic; whether the first operator's network equipment authenticates the second user is authentic, including: whether the first operator's network equipment is authentic according to the call initiated by the second
  • the network device of the first operator may authenticate whether the second user is authentic according to the calling habit of the second user.
  • the first operator The network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second terminal device used by the second user, or to the second operator's network device, specifically: the first operator's network device sends the second operator's network The device sends the first signature and the first authentication result; the method further includes: the first operator network device sends the third public key to the second operator network device, and the third public key is used by the second operator The operator's network equipment verifies the first signature; wherein, the first authentication result and the fourth private key are used by the second operator's network equipment to generate a fourth signature, and the fourth signature is used to send to the second terminal equipment to indicate The second terminal device verifies the first authentication result, the fourth private key is stored in the second operator's network device, and the fourth private key and the fourth public key are a fourth public-private key pair.
  • the method further includes: the first operator network device receiving the fourth public key from the second operator network device; the first operator network The device receives a fifth signature and a fourth authentication result from the network device of the second operator, the fifth signature is a signature generated by signing the fourth authentication result based on the fourth private key, and the fourth authentication result is used to indicate Whether the second user is credible; the first operator network device verifies the fifth signature based on the fourth public key; after the verification is successful, the first operator network device verifies the fourth authentication result based on the third private key Signing is performed to generate a sixth signature; the first operator network device sends the fourth authentication result and the sixth signature to the first terminal device.
  • the third public key and the fourth public key may be exchanged between the first operator network device and the second operator network device before communication.
  • the second aspect provides an authentication method, and the authentication method may be executed by a terminal device, or may also be executed by a chip or a circuit provided in the terminal device, which is not limited in this application.
  • Methods of this certification include:
  • the terminal device receives the encryption method and public key from the operator's network device; the terminal device encrypts the user's physiological feature information based on the encryption method and the public key, and generates encrypted information.
  • the user's physiological feature information includes at least one of the following: The user's fingerprint information, user's voiceprint information, user's face information, user's iris information and user's palmprint information; the terminal device sends encrypted information to the operator's network equipment.
  • the user who sends the message from the network device, the public key is the public key in the public-private key pair determined by the third-party certification authority, and the public-private key pair also includes the private key, which is stored in the third-party certification authority to verify the encryption information.
  • the operator's network equipment can call the authentication service of the third-party certification authority to authenticate the user according to the encrypted information reported by the terminal equipment. There is no need for the operator's network equipment to directly authenticate the user. Instead, the third-party certification authority performs the authentication, and the operator's network equipment passes the third-party authentication. The agency's feedback information only needs to verify whether the user is credible, which simplifies the operation of the operator's network equipment.
  • the terminal device may be the first terminal device or the second terminal device, and the operator network device may be the first operator network device.
  • the terminal device may be the first terminal device, and the operator's network device may be the first operator's network device; or the terminal device may be the second terminal
  • the carrier network device may be a second carrier network device.
  • the third aspect provides an authentication method, which may be executed by a terminal device, or may also be executed by a chip or a circuit provided in the terminal device, which is not limited in this application.
  • Methods of this certification include:
  • the terminal device authenticates whether the user is credible, and obtains an authentication result; the terminal device signs the authentication result based on the SIM private key to generate a signature; the terminal device sends the authentication result and the signature to the operator's network device.
  • the operator's network equipment can call the authentication service of the third-party certification authority to authenticate the user according to the encrypted information reported by the terminal equipment. There is no need for the operator's network equipment to directly authenticate the user. Instead, the third-party certification authority performs the authentication, and the operator's network equipment passes the third-party authentication. The agency's feedback information only needs to verify whether the user is credible, which simplifies the operation of the operator's network equipment.
  • the terminal device may be the first terminal device or the second terminal device, and the operator network device may be the first operator network device.
  • the terminal device may be the first terminal device, and the operator's network device may be the first operator's network device; or the terminal device may be the second terminal
  • the carrier network device may be a second carrier network device.
  • an authentication method is provided.
  • the authentication method may be executed by a third-party authentication organization, or may also be executed by a chip or circuit provided in the third-party authentication organization, which is not limited in this application.
  • Methods of this certification include:
  • the third-party authentication organization manages the user's identification information and the user's physiological feature information.
  • the user's identification information is used to identify the user.
  • the user's physiological feature information includes at least one of the following: the user's fingerprint information, the user's voice fingerprint information, the user's face information, the user's iris information, and the user's palmprint information;
  • the third-party certification body determines the public key and encryption method for encrypting the user's physiological feature information;
  • the third-party certification body provides the operator with The encryption method and the public key are sent by the operator’s network equipment;
  • the third-party certification authority receives the user’s identification information and encrypted information from the operator’s network equipment, and the encrypted information is the encrypted physiological feature information of the user;
  • the third-party The certification authority determines the user based on the user's identification information, verifies the encrypted information based on the private key, and determines whether the user is trustworthy according to the verification result.
  • the public key and the private key are a pair of public-private key pairs; the third-party authentication The institution sends information indicating whether the user is credible to the operator's network equipment, where the user is a user who uses a terminal device to send a message to the operator's network equipment.
  • the operator's network equipment can call the authentication service of the third-party certification authority to authenticate the user according to the encrypted information reported by the terminal equipment. There is no need for the operator's network equipment to directly authenticate the user. Instead, the third-party certification authority performs the authentication, and the operator's network equipment passes the third-party authentication. The agency's feedback information only needs to verify whether the user is credible, which simplifies the operation of the operator's network equipment.
  • the encrypted information is determined by the operator's network device, or the encrypted information is determined by the terminal device.
  • an authenticated device in a fifth aspect, includes:
  • An authentication unit configured to authenticate whether the first user is credible, and obtain a first authentication result, the first user is a user who uses the first terminal device to send a message to the device; a processing unit, configured to sign the first authentication result , to generate a first signature; a sending unit, configured to send the first authentication result and the first signature to a second terminal device used by a second user, or to a second operator network device, wherein the second operator network
  • the device is an operator network device that provides services to the second user, and the second user is a user called by the first user.
  • the apparatus further includes: a receiving unit, configured to receive a first message from the first terminal device, where the first message includes first encrypted information, the The first encrypted information is the encrypted physiological characteristic information of the first user, and the physiological characteristic information of the first user includes at least one of the following: fingerprint information of the first user, voiceprint information of the first user, A user's face information, the first user's iris information and the first user's palmprint information; the sending unit is also used to send the first user's identification information and the first encrypted information to a third-party authentication agency, The first encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to verify whether the first user is credible, and the identification information of the first user is used to identify the first user; the receiving unit is also used to receive information from the third-party certification body First information, where the first information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible; the authenticating unit authenticating whether the first user is credible includes: the authenticating unit authenticating whether the first user is credible according to the first information.
  • the first message includes at least one of the following: signaling message, video data and audio data, when the first message is the video data and/or the audio When receiving data, the first message periodically carries the first encrypted information.
  • the receiving unit before the receiving unit receives the first message from the first terminal device, the receiving unit is further configured to acquire the first encryption method from the third-party certification authority and the first public key; the sending unit is also used to send the first encryption method and the first public key to the first terminal device, wherein the first public key is the first public-private key determined by the third-party certification authority
  • the public key in the pair, the first public-private key pair also includes the first private key, the first encryption method and the first public key are used by the first terminal device to encrypt the physiological characteristic information of the first user to obtain the second Encrypted information, the first private key is stored in the third-party certification body for verifying the first encrypted information.
  • the device before the authenticating unit authenticates whether the first user is authentic, the device further includes: an acquiring unit, configured to acquire the physiological feature information of the first user, The physiological characteristic information of the first user includes the voiceprint information of the first user and/or the face information of the first user; Encrypt the physiological feature information to generate second encrypted information; the sending unit is also used to send the first user’s identification information and the second encrypted information to a third-party authentication agency, and the second encrypted information is used for the third-party authentication
  • the institution authenticates whether the first user is credible, and the identification information of the first user is used to identify the first user; the receiving unit is also used to receive second information from the third-party authentication agency, and the second information is used to indicate Whether the first user is credible; whether the authentication unit authenticates the first user is credible, including: the authentication unit verifies whether the first user is credible according to the second information; wherein, the second public key is the third party The public key in the second public-private key pair determined by the certification authority,
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a second authentication result and a second signature from the first terminal device, where the second authentication result is used to indicate that the first Whether the user is credible, the second signature is used to verify the second authentication result; the authentication unit verifies whether the first user is credible, including: the authentication unit verifies the second signature, and when the verification is passed, according to the second authentication result Authenticate whether the first user is authentic.
  • the second signature is a signature generated by signing the second authentication result based on the private key of the first SIM card; the authentication unit verifies the second signature, including : the authentication unit verifies the second signature based on the first SIM card public key, wherein the first SIM card private key and the first SIM card public key are a first SIM card public-private key pair, and the first SIM card is set in the In the first terminal device, the private key of the first SIM card is stored in the first SIM card, and the public key of the first SIM card is stored in the device.
  • the device when the first user is the calling user, before the authentication unit authenticates whether the first user is authentic, the device further includes: an acquisition unit configured to In order to obtain the historical call data of the first user, the historical call data of the first user is used to indicate the calling habits of the first user, including at least one of the following: distribution data of the time point when the first user initiates a call, the second When a user initiates a call, the frequency data of the second user’s connected call, when the first user initiates a call, the data of the ringing duration of the second terminal device, the distribution data of the first user’s call duration, and the data of the first user’s call geographic location distribution data, the ratio of the second user being called for the first time, and the attribution distribution data of the second user number; the processing unit is also used to determine the first Whether the call initiated by the user is authentic; the authenticating unit authenticating whether the first user is authentic includes: the authenticating unit authenticating whether the first user is authentic according to
  • the processing unit is further configured to determine a third public-private key pair, where the third public-private key pair includes a third private key and a third public key; the device saves the third private key.
  • the sending unit when the first operator and the second operator to which the first user and the second user respectively belong are the same operator, the sending unit sends the The second terminal device used by the second user, or send the first authentication result and the first signature to the second operator's network device, specifically: the sending unit sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second terminal device A signature; the sending unit is further configured to send the third public key to the second terminal device, and the third public key is used by the second terminal device to verify the first signature.
  • the authentication unit is also used to authenticate whether the second user is credible, and obtains a third authentication result; the processing unit is also used to authenticate the third user The result is signed to generate a third signature; the sending unit is also used to send the third authentication result and the third signature to the first terminal device; the sending unit is also used to send the first terminal device to the first terminal device Three public keys, where the third public key is used by the first terminal device to verify the third signature.
  • the apparatus further includes: a receiving unit, configured to receive a second message from the second terminal device, where the second message includes third encrypted information, the The third encrypted information is the encrypted physiological characteristic information of the second user, and the physiological characteristic information of the second user includes at least one of the following: fingerprint information of the second user, voiceprint information of the second user, The face information of the second user, the iris information of the second user, and the palmprint information of the second user; the sending unit is also used to send the identification information of the second user and the third encrypted information to a third-party certification body, The third encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to verify whether the second user is credible, and the identification information of the second user is used to identify the second user; the receiving unit is also used to receive the information from the third-party certification body The third information, where the third information is used to indicate whether the second user is credible; the authenticating unit verifies whether the second user is credible, including: the authenticating unit verifies whether the second user is credible according
  • the second message includes at least one of the following: signaling message, video data and audio data, when the second message is the video data and/or the audio When receiving data, the second message periodically carries the third encrypted information.
  • the receiving unit before the receiving unit receives the second message from the second terminal device, the receiving unit is further configured to acquire the third encryption method from the third-party certification authority and the fifth public key; the sending unit is also used to send the third encryption method and the fifth public key to the second terminal device, wherein the fifth public key is the fifth public-private key determined by the third-party certification authority
  • the public key in the pair, the fifth public-private key pair also includes a fifth private key, the third encryption method and the fifth public key are used by the second terminal device to encrypt the physiological characteristic information of the second user to obtain the first third encrypted information, and the fifth private key is stored in the third-party certification body for verifying the third encrypted information.
  • the device before the authentication unit authenticates whether the second user is authentic, the device further includes: an acquisition unit, configured to acquire the physiological characteristic information of the second user, The physiological characteristic information of the second user includes the voiceprint information of the second user and/or the face information of the second user; Encrypt the physiological feature information to generate fourth encrypted information; the sending unit is also used to send the identification information of the second user and the fourth encrypted information to a third-party authentication agency, and the fourth encrypted information is used for the third-party authentication
  • the institution authenticates whether the second user is credible, and the identification information of the second user is used to identify the second user; the receiving unit is also used to receive fourth information from the third-party certification agency, and the fourth information is used to indicate Whether the second user is credible; whether the authentication unit authenticates the second user is credible, including: the authentication unit verifies whether the second user is credible according to the fourth information; wherein, the sixth public key is the third-party authentication The public key in the sixth public-private key pair determined by the institution, the
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a fifth authentication result and a seventh signature from the second terminal device, the fifth authentication result being the second terminal device's Determined to indicate whether the second user is credible, the seventh signature is used to verify the fourth authentication result; the authentication unit verifies whether the second user is credible, including: the authentication unit verifies the seventh signature, verifies When passing, whether the second user is authentic is authenticated according to the fifth authentication result.
  • the seventh signature is a signature generated by signing the fifth authentication result based on the private key of the second SIM card; the authentication unit verifies the seventh signature, including : the authentication unit verifies the seventh signature based on the second SIM card public key, wherein the second SIM card private key and the second SIM card public key are a second SIM card public-private key pair, and the second SIM card is set in the In the second terminal device, the private key of the second SIM card is stored in the second SIM card, and the public key of the second SIM card is stored in the device.
  • the device when the second user is the calling user, before the authentication unit authenticates whether the second user is authentic, the device further includes: an acquisition unit configured to In order to obtain the historical call data of the second user, the historical call data of the second user is used to indicate the calling habits of the second user equipment, including at least one of the following: time point distribution data of the second user initiating calls, the When the second user initiates a call, the frequency data of the first user's connected call, when the second user initiates a call, the ringing duration data of the first terminal device, the second user's call duration distribution data, and the second user initiates a call geographical distribution data of the first user, the ratio of the first user calling for the first time, and the attribution distribution data of the first user number; the processing unit is also used to determine the second Whether the call initiated by the user is authentic; the authenticating unit authenticating whether the second user is authentic includes: the authenticating unit authenticating whether the first user is authentic according to whether the call initiated by the second
  • the sending unit sends the The second terminal device used by the second user, or send the first authentication result and the first signature to the second operator's network device, specifically: the sending unit sends the first signature and the second operator's network device The first authentication result; the sending unit is further configured to send the third public key to the second operator's network device, and the third public key is used by the second operator's network device to verify the first signature; wherein, the first The authentication result and the fourth private key are used by the second operator's network device to generate a fourth signature, and the fourth signature is used to send to the second terminal device to instruct the second terminal device to verify the first authentication result, the fourth signature
  • the four private keys are stored in the network equipment of the second operator, and the fourth private key and the fourth public key are a fourth public-private key pair.
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive the fourth public key from the second operator's network device; the receiving unit is also configured to receive the fourth public key from the second operator's network device;
  • the fifth signature of the network device and the fourth authentication result, the fifth signature is a signature generated by signing the fourth authentication result based on the fourth private key, and the fourth authentication result is used to indicate whether the second user is credible ;
  • the processing unit verifies the fifth signature based on the fourth public key; after the verification is successful, the processing unit signs the fourth authentication result based on the third private key to generate a sixth signature; the sending unit sends a signature to the first The terminal device sends the fourth authentication result and the sixth signature.
  • a sixth aspect provides an authenticated device, the authenticated device comprising:
  • the receiving unit is used to receive the encryption method and public key from the operator's network equipment; the processing unit is used to encrypt the user's physiological characteristic information based on the encryption method and the public key, and generate encrypted information.
  • the user's physiological characteristic information includes At least one of the following: the user's fingerprint information, the user's voiceprint information, the user's face information, the user's iris information, and the user's palmprint information; the sending unit is used to send encrypted information to the operator's network equipment, wherein the user For users who use the device to send messages to the operator’s network equipment, the public key is the public key in the public-private key pair determined by the third-party certification authority.
  • the public-private key pair also includes a private key, which is stored in the third-party certification authority. Institutions are used to verify this encrypted message.
  • a seventh aspect provides an authenticated device, the authenticated device comprising:
  • the authentication unit is used to verify whether the user is credible and obtains the authentication result; the processing unit is used to sign the authentication result based on the SIM private key and generate a signature; the sending unit is used to send the authentication result and the authentication result to the operator network equipment. sign.
  • an authenticated device is provided, and the authenticated device includes:
  • a management unit configured to manage the user's identification information and the user's physiological feature information, the user's identification information is used to identify the user, and the user's physiological feature information includes at least one of the following: the user's fingerprint information, the user's voiceprint information, the user's face information, the user's iris information and the user's palmprint information;
  • the processing unit is used to determine the public key and encryption method for encrypting the user's physiological feature information;
  • the sending unit is used to send The operator network equipment sends the encryption method and the public key;
  • the receiving unit is used to receive the identification information and encrypted information of the user from the operator network equipment, and the encrypted information is the encrypted physiological characteristic information of the user;
  • the processing The unit is also used to determine the user based on the user's identification information, verify the encrypted information based on the private key, and determine whether the user is credible according to the verification result.
  • the public key and the private key are a pair of public-private key pairs; the sending The unit is further configured to send information indicating whether the user is credible to the operator network equipment, where the user is a user who uses a terminal device to send a message to the operator network equipment.
  • the encrypted information is determined by the operator's network device, or the encrypted information is determined by the terminal device.
  • an authentication device configured to implement the functions of the first operator's network device in the method described in the first aspect.
  • the authentication apparatus may further include a memory, the memory is coupled to the processor, and the processor is configured to implement the function of the first operator's network device in the method described in the first aspect.
  • the memory is used to store program instructions and data.
  • the memory is coupled with the processor, and the processor can call and execute the program instructions stored in the memory, so as to implement the functions of the first operator's network device in the method described in the first aspect above.
  • the authentication device may further include a communication interface, where the communication interface is used for the authentication device to communicate with other devices.
  • the communication interface may be a transceiver, an input/output interface, or a circuit.
  • the authentication device includes: a processor and a communication interface
  • the processor is configured to run a computer program, so that the authenticated device implements any one of the methods described in the first aspect above;
  • the processor communicates with the outside through the communication interface.
  • the external may be an object other than the processor, or an object other than the device.
  • the authentication device is a chip or a chip system.
  • the communication interface may be an input/output interface, an interface circuit, an output circuit, an input circuit, pins or related circuits on the chip or the chip system.
  • the processor may also be embodied as a processing circuit or logic circuit.
  • an authentication device configured to implement the functions of the terminal device in the methods described in the second aspect and the third aspect.
  • the authentication apparatus may further include a memory, the memory is coupled to the processor, and the processor is configured to implement functions of the terminal device in the methods described in the second aspect and the third aspect above.
  • the memory is used to store program instructions and data.
  • the memory is coupled with the processor, and the processor can call and execute program instructions stored in the memory, so as to realize the functions of the terminal device in the methods described in the second aspect and the third aspect above.
  • the authentication device may further include a communication interface, where the communication interface is used for the authentication device to communicate with other devices.
  • the communication interface may be a transceiver, an input/output interface, or a circuit.
  • the authentication device includes: a processor and a communication interface
  • the processor communicates with the outside through the communication interface
  • the processor is configured to run a computer program, so that the authenticated device implements any one of the methods described in the second aspect and the third aspect above.
  • the external may be an object other than the processor, or an object other than the device.
  • the authentication device is a chip or a chip system.
  • the communication interface may be an input/output interface, interface circuit, output circuit, input circuit, pin or related circuit on the chip or chip system.
  • the processor may also be embodied as a processing circuit or logic circuit.
  • an authentication device configured to realize the functions of the third-party authentication agency in the method described in the fourth aspect.
  • the authentication device may further include a memory, the memory is coupled with the processor, and the processor is configured to implement the function of the third-party certification authority in the method described in the fourth aspect.
  • the memory is used to store program instructions and data.
  • the memory is coupled with the processor, and the processor can call and execute the program instructions stored in the memory, so as to realize the functions of the third-party certification authority in the method described in the fourth aspect above.
  • the authentication device may further include a communication interface, where the communication interface is used for the authentication device to communicate with other devices.
  • the communication interface may be a transceiver, an input/output interface, or a circuit.
  • the authentication device includes: a processor and a communication interface
  • the processor communicates with the outside through the communication interface
  • the processor is configured to run a computer program, so that the authenticated device implements any method described in the fourth aspect above.
  • the external may be an object other than the processor, or an object other than the device.
  • the authentication device is a chip or a chip system.
  • the communication interface may be an input/output interface, interface circuit, output circuit, input circuit, pin or related circuit on the chip or chip system.
  • the processor may also be embodied as a processing circuit or logic circuit.
  • the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, where instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer-readable storage medium is run on a computer, it causes the computer to execute the method of the above aspects.
  • the present application provides a computer program product including instructions, which, when run on a computer, cause the computer to execute the method of the above aspects.
  • a communication system including the authentication device in the fifth aspect to the authentication device in the eighth aspect.
  • a fifteenth aspect provides a chip or a chip system
  • the chip or chip system includes at least one processor and a communication interface
  • the communication interface and the at least one processor are interconnected through lines
  • the at least one processor is used to run computer programs or instructions, to perform the method in any possible implementation manner of the first aspect to the fourth aspect.
  • the communication interface in the chip may be an input/output interface, a pin or a circuit, and the like.
  • the chip or the chip system described above in the present application further includes at least one memory, and instructions are stored in the at least one memory.
  • the memory may be a storage unit inside the chip, such as a register, a cache, etc., or a storage unit of the chip (eg, a read-only memory, a random access memory, etc.).
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic block diagram of a network architecture applicable to an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a communication method.
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic flowchart of another communication method.
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic flowchart of an authentication method provided by the present application.
  • Fig. 5 is a schematic flowchart of an authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 7 is a schematic flowchart of another authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 8 is a schematic flowchart of another authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 9 is a schematic flowchart of another authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic flow chart of a call flow provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of another call flow provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 12 is a schematic flowchart of another call flow provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic diagram of an authentication device 1300 provided by this application.
  • Fig. 14 is a schematic structural diagram of an operator network device 1400 applicable to the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of an operator network device 1500 applicable to the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic diagram of an authentication device 1600 provided by this application.
  • Fig. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device 1700 applicable to this embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 18 is a schematic diagram of an authentication device 1800 provided by this application.
  • Fig. 19 is a schematic structural diagram of a third-party certification authority 1900 applicable to the embodiment of the present application.
  • the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as: the fifth generation (5th generation, 5G) system or new radio (new radio, NR), long term evolution (long term evolution, LTE) system, LTE frequency Division duplex (frequency division duplex, FDD) system, LTE time division duplex (time division duplex, TDD), etc.
  • 5G fifth generation
  • NR new radio
  • long term evolution long term evolution
  • LTE frequency Division duplex frequency division duplex
  • FDD frequency division duplex
  • TDD time division duplex
  • the technical solution provided by this application can also be applied to future communication systems, such as the sixth generation mobile communication system.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application can also be applied to device to device (device to device, D2D) communication, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, machine to machine (machine to machine, M2M) communication, machine Type communication (machine type communication, MTC), and Internet of things (internet of things, IoT) communication system or other communication systems.
  • D2D device to device
  • V2X vehicle-to-everything
  • M2M machine to machine
  • MTC machine Type communication
  • IoT Internet of things
  • FIG. 1 a communication system applicable to the embodiment of the present application is briefly introduced first with reference to FIG. 1 .
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic block diagram of a network architecture applicable to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the network architecture may include but not limited to the following devices (or called functional network elements, nodes, network elements, etc.):
  • User equipment user equipment, UE #A, UE #B and operator network equipment.
  • both UE#A and UE#B above can be called user equipment, the difference is that one of UE#A and UE#B is the calling UE, and the other UE is the called UE. Specifically, in the embodiment of the present application, there is no restriction on which of the two UEs is the calling UE and which is the called UE.
  • the user equipment involved in the embodiments of the present application may include various handheld devices, vehicle-mounted devices, wearable devices, computing devices or other processing devices connected to wireless modems, as well as various forms of terminals, mobile stations (mobile station, MS), terminal (terminal) or soft terminal, etc.
  • terminals mobile stations (mobile station, MS), terminal (terminal) or soft terminal, etc.
  • water meters electricity meters, sensors, etc.
  • the user equipment in this embodiment of the present application may refer to an access terminal, a subscriber unit, a user station, a mobile station, a mobile station, a relay station, a remote station, a remote terminal, a mobile device, a user terminal (user terminal), a terminal device (terminal equipment), wireless communication equipment, user agent or user device.
  • the user equipment can also be a cellular phone, a cordless phone, a session initiation protocol (SIP) phone, a wireless local loop (WLL) station, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a wireless communication Functional handheld devices, computing devices or other processing devices connected to wireless modems, vehicle-mounted devices, wearable devices, user equipment in 5G networks or users in future evolved public land mobile networks (PLMN) Devices or user equipment in the future Internet of Vehicles, etc., are not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • SIP session initiation protocol
  • WLL wireless local loop
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • PLMN public land mobile networks
  • wearable devices can also be referred to as wearable smart devices, which is a general term for intelligently designing daily wear and developing wearable devices by applying wearable technology, such as glasses, Gloves, watches, clothing and shoes, etc.
  • a wearable device is a portable device that is worn directly on the body or integrated into the user's clothing or accessories. Wearable devices are not only a hardware device, but also achieve powerful functions through software support, data interaction, and cloud interaction.
  • Generalized wearable smart devices include full-featured, large-sized, complete or partial functions without relying on smart phones, such as smart watches or smart glasses, etc., and only focus on a certain type of application functions, and need to cooperate with other devices such as smart phones Use, such as various smart bracelets and smart jewelry for physical sign monitoring.
  • the user equipment can also be the user equipment in the Internet of Things (Internet of Things, IoT) system.
  • IoT Internet of Things
  • the IOT technology can achieve massive connections, deep coverage, and terminal power saving through, for example, narrow band (NB) technology.
  • the user equipment may also include sensors such as smart printers, train detectors, and gas stations, and its main functions include collecting data (part of user equipment), receiving control information and downlink data of access network equipment, and Send electromagnetic waves to transmit uplink data to access network equipment.
  • the user equipment involved in this embodiment of the present application is a trusted user equipment, that is, the user equipment is produced by a trusted device manufacturer and has passed the certification of a trusted device certification authority.
  • CSCF call session control function
  • CSCF session control function
  • IMS IP multimedia subsystem
  • CSCF network elements can be further divided into proxy-call session control function network elements (proxy-call session control function, P-CSCF), interrogating-call session control function network elements (interrogating-call session control function, I-CSCF) and service call control function network elements element (serving-call session control function, S-CSCF).
  • P-CSCF proxy-call session control function
  • I-CSCF interrogating-call session control function
  • S-CSCF service call control function network elements element
  • the CSCF may be referred to as a call control server for short.
  • P-CSCF can be located in the access network where the UE is currently located, as the first contact network element for the UE to access the IMS network, and forward the UE's initial session initiation protocol (session initiation protocol, SIP) message to the IMS core network, and Forward the received SIP message to UE.
  • SIP session initiation protocol
  • S-CSCF As the core call control entity, it completes basic call control functions. Among them, SIP messages need to be processed by it, including routing, application server (application server, AS) service triggering, redirection and other main control functions. It should be noted that the operator network device involved in the embodiment of the present application is located in the communication network of the trusted communication operator, and is used to authenticate whether the user identities of the communication parties (the calling user equipment and the called user equipment) are credible equipment.
  • Operator network equipment and user equipment can be deployed on land, including indoors or outdoors, hand-held or vehicle-mounted; they can also be deployed on water; they can also be deployed on airplanes, balloons or satellites in the air. In the embodiment of the present application, there is no limitation on the scenarios where the operator's network equipment and the user equipment are located.
  • the operator's network equipment or user equipment includes a hardware layer, an operating system layer running on the hardware layer, and an application layer running on the operating system layer.
  • the hardware layer includes hardware such as a central processing unit (CPU), a memory management unit (MMU), and memory (also called main memory).
  • the operating system may be any one or more computer operating systems that implement business processing through processes, for example, Linux operating system, Unix operating system, Android operating system, iOS operating system, or windows operating system.
  • the application layer includes applications such as browsers, address books, word processing software, and instant messaging software.
  • various aspects or features of the present application may be implemented as a method, apparatus, or article of manufacture using standard programming and/or engineering techniques.
  • article of manufacture covers a computer program accessible from any computer readable device, carrier or media.
  • computer-readable media may include, but are not limited to: magnetic storage devices (e.g., hard disk, floppy disk, or tape, etc.), optical disks (e.g., compact disc (compact disc, CD), digital versatile disc (digital versatile disc, DVD) etc.), smart cards and flash memory devices (for example, erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), card, stick or key drive, etc.).
  • magnetic storage devices e.g., hard disk, floppy disk, or tape, etc.
  • optical disks e.g., compact disc (compact disc, CD), digital versatile disc (digital versatile disc, DVD) etc.
  • smart cards and flash memory devices for example, erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), card, stick or key drive, etc.
  • various storage media described herein can represent one or more devices and/or other machine-readable media for storing information.
  • the term "machine-readable storage medium” may include, but is not limited to, wireless channels and various other media capable of storing, containing and/or carrying instructions and/or data.
  • FIG. 1 is only a simplified schematic diagram for easy understanding, and the communication system may also include other devices, which are not shown in FIG. 1 .
  • the communication system may further include core network equipment, and the operator network equipment may be connected to the core network equipment in a wireless or wired manner.
  • the core network equipment and the operator network equipment can be independent and different physical equipment, or the functions of the core network equipment and the logical functions of the operator network equipment can be integrated on the same physical equipment, or they can be integrated on one physical equipment Part of the functions of the core network equipment and part of the functions of the operator's network equipment.
  • AI face changing is to replace the face in the video with the appearance of another person through AI algorithm image processing (Photoshop, PS).
  • Photoshop PS
  • an AI face-swapping application has caused a great uproar. Just upload photos to ZAO, and you can PS the specified face in the video into a corresponding face. It can be said to be easy to operate and the effect is clear.
  • the simulated voice is difficult to distinguish between real and fake.
  • the free transformation of voice is not so far away for us.
  • the website modulate.ai provides AI voice-changing services, and even the voices of celebrities can be perfectly imitated.
  • the voice-changing technology used by modulate.ai is similar to DeepFakes.
  • Telecom fraud refers to the crime of fabricating false information, setting up scams, implementing remote and non-contact fraud on the victim through telephone, network and text messages, and inducing the victim to make money or transfer money.
  • Various legal guises and forms are used to achieve the purpose of deception.
  • a key is a parameter that is entered in an algorithm that converts plaintext to ciphertext or ciphertext to plaintext.
  • the public key is the non-secret half of the key pair used with the private key algorithm.
  • Public keys are often used to encrypt session keys, verify digital signatures, or encrypt data that can be decrypted with the corresponding private key.
  • the public key and the private key are a key pair obtained through an algorithm (that is, a public key and a private key). One of them is disclosed to the outside world and is called the public key; the other is kept by itself and is called the private key.
  • the key pair obtained by this algorithm can be guaranteed to be unique in the world.
  • this key pair if one of the keys is used to encrypt a piece of data, the other key must be used to decrypt it. If the data is encrypted with the public key, it must be decrypted with the private key, and if it is encrypted with the private key, it must also be decrypted with the public key, otherwise the decryption will not succeed.
  • Private key encryption algorithms use a single private key to encrypt and decrypt data. Since any party with the key can use the key to decrypt data, the key must be protected from unauthorized agents. Private key encryption is also known as symmetric encryption because the same key is used for both encryption and decryption.
  • the signature involved in the embodiment of this application can be understood as a digital signature (or public key digital signature) is a digital string that only the sender of the information can generate and cannot be forged by others. A valid proof of the authenticity of the sent message. It is a method for authenticating digital information similar to an ordinary physical signature written on paper, but implemented using techniques from the field of public key cryptography. A set of digital signatures usually defines two complementary operations, one for signing and the other for verification. Digital signature is the application of asymmetric key encryption technology and digital abstract technology.
  • Session initiation protocol (session initiation protocol, SIP).
  • SIP is an application layer signaling control protocol.
  • a session used to create, modify and release one or more participants. These sessions can be Internet multimedia conferencing, IP telephony or multimedia distribution. Participants in a session can communicate via multicast, mesh unicast, or a mixture of the two.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a communication method, including the following steps:
  • the S220 Receive a first comparison result sent by the SIM card.
  • the first comparison result is obtained by comparing the fingerprint information provided by the SIM card with the pre-stored fingerprint information by the background system of the operator.
  • the second comparison result is obtained by comparing the received SIM card ID with the queried SIM card ID corresponding to the application program ID by the operator's background system. .
  • step S250 it is determined that the real-name verification is successful; if not, step S260 is performed, and it is determined that the real-name verification fails.
  • the prerequisite for the smooth progress of the method flow shown in Figure 2 is that the operator needs to collect and store the user's fingerprint data, and the fingerprint data is very sensitive personal privacy information, and the user may not be willing to hand over the fingerprint data to the operator for storage and use.
  • Another communication method can ensure that the communication content is credible through trusted authentication, which mainly involves device trustworthiness and user trustworthiness.
  • device trustworthiness involves three-party roles: trusted device certification authority, trusted device certificate center, and trusted device manufacturer; user trustworthiness also involves three-party roles: trusted user certificate center, trusted user identity authentication authority, and trusted communication service provider.
  • the responsibilities of the parties involved in device trust include:
  • the user device After the certification of the trusted device certification body, the user device is used to sign the specific device hardware information provided by the trusted device manufacturer with K1, and a unique trusted device digital certificate is generated for each device.
  • trusted authority certification and trusted device certificate center may be one institution or different institutions.
  • the responsibilities of the parties involved in user trustworthiness include:
  • a user can have multiple identity credentials, such as password credential 1, password credential 2, fingerprint credential, voiceprint credential, retinal credential, etc.
  • identity credentials such as password credential 1, password credential 2, fingerprint credential, voiceprint credential, retinal credential, etc.
  • password credential 1 password credential 2
  • password credential 2 fingerprint credential 2
  • voiceprint credential voiceprint credential
  • retinal credential etc.
  • the untrustworthiness of a certain identity certificate does not affect the trustworthiness of other identity certificates.
  • K9 identity certificate verification information (password, fingerprint, voiceprint, retina feature), ID number, etc.)
  • Trusted user certificate center which generates the private digital certificate of the user's identity by the trusted user certificate center;
  • the above-mentioned trusted user identity authentication institution, trusted user certificate center, and trusted communication service provider may be the same institution, three institutions, or two institutions.
  • a telecom operator (China Mobile or China Unicom) simultaneously acts as a trusted user identity authentication authority, a trusted user certificate center, and a trusted communication service provider.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of another communication method, including the following steps:
  • the calling user uses a trusted device (such as the calling user equipment shown in FIG. 3 ) to initiate a call.
  • a trusted device such as the calling user equipment shown in FIG. 3
  • the trusted device determines that its own trusted chain has not been breached (for example, it has not been rooted, the chip has not been physically attacked, the operating system/basic software has not been tampered with, and the collected content has not passed uncontrollable software processing, etc.), and then judge whether the user identity is credible:
  • the identity credential in the user's private information After the verification is successful, use the identity credential in the user's private information to verify whether the information matches the information input by the calling user or collected by the terminal. If it matches, the user's identity is considered to be credible and a trusted call is allowed.
  • the user identity verification can also be verified before initiating a trusted call.
  • the user identity can be verified by password, fingerprint and other information when the mobile phone is turned on and unlocked, the user identity can be considered authentic when the call is initiated.
  • Trusted parameters include:
  • Device trusted certificate a certificate signed by K1 including device model, device number, K4 and other information;
  • the signature content can include at least one of the following parameters:
  • message digest is the verification value of the content of the call request message, which can verify whether the message itself has been tampered with; device model and/or device number identification User device firmware information; user name and/or identity credential ID to identify the identity of the user who initiated the call; time stamp to identify the signing time.
  • Public and trusted certificate of user identity a certificate signed by K5 including user name, identity credential ID, K8 and other information;
  • the signature content can include at least one of the following parameters:
  • the steps are:
  • the trusted signature of the caller is transparently transmitted
  • the called user uses a trusted device (the called user device as shown in Figure 3) to receive a trusted call request, and when it is determined that the trusted chain of itself has not been broken, the steps are performed:
  • the called user equipment performs authenticity verification of the identity of the calling user and verification of the authenticity of the calling device on the trusted signature in the request. If the authentication is passed, it prompts that the calling user is credible.
  • the trusted verification of the identity of the calling user includes:
  • Use K8 to verify the user's trusted signature in the trusted parameters, and confirm that the call request has not been tampered with or repeated attacks based on the message digest, device model, device number, time stamp and other information in the signature.
  • Use K4 to verify the trusted signature of the device in the trusted parameters, and confirm that the call request has not been tampered with or repeated attacks based on the message digest, user name, identity certificate ID, time stamp and other information in the signature.
  • K2 and K6 there are many ways for the called party to obtain K2 and K6.
  • the system preset method another example, the mainstream certificate center setting method in the industry; another example, setting it as the public key method, etc.
  • the called user uses a trusted device to answer the call and perform the following steps:
  • the called user equipment sends a response message to the operator network equipment.
  • the operator network device sends a response message to the calling user equipment.
  • the trusted device When the called user uses the trusted device to send a response message, similar to the calling party, the trusted device adds the called trusted parameter to the response message after determining that its own trusted chain has not been breached and the called user's identity is trusted.
  • the trusted signature of the called user uses the K7' signature
  • the trusted signature of the called device uses the K3' signature.
  • the calling user equipment performs authentic verification of the identity of the called user and authentic verification of the called device on the trusted signature in the response.
  • the trusted signature of the called user and the trusted signature of the called device can be verified by using the verification mechanism referring to the called party to verify the calling party, and if the verification is successful, it will prompt that the called user is trustworthy.
  • the calling party sends communication content (audio, video) to the called party
  • the trusted device determines that its own trusted chain has not been breached and the user's identity is trusted, it adds calling trusted parameters to the collected communication content and sends it out.
  • the trusted signature in the communication content is verified for the authenticity of the calling identity and the trusted verification of the calling terminal. If the verification is passed, the user is prompted that the communication content is credible.
  • the signature mechanism and verification mechanism for the called party to send trusted communication content to the calling party are similar to the above-mentioned communication content sent by the calling party to the called party, and will not be repeated here.
  • the trusted authentication process is mainly completed on the user equipment side, which has high requirements on the user equipment.
  • the method for providing authentication in this embodiment of the present application may be applied to various communication systems, for example, the communication system shown in FIG. 1 .
  • the embodiments shown below do not specifically limit the specific structure of the execution subject of the method provided by the embodiment of the present application, as long as the program that records the code of the method provided by the embodiment of the present application can be run to provide the method according to the embodiment of the present application.
  • the execution subject of the method provided in the embodiment of the present application may be a user equipment or an operator network equipment, or a functional module in the user equipment or the operator network equipment that can call a program and execute the program.
  • enabling can include direct enabling and indirect enabling.
  • enabling can include direct enabling and indirect enabling.
  • the information enabled by the information is called the information to be enabled.
  • the information to be enabled can be directly enabled.
  • the to-be-enabled information may also be indirectly enabled by enabling other information, where there is an association relationship between the other information and the to-be-enabled information.
  • specific information can also be enabled by means of a pre-agreed (for example, protocol-specified) arrangement order of each information, thereby reducing the enabling overhead to a certain extent.
  • common parts of each information can be identified and enabled uniformly, so as to reduce the enabling overhead caused by enabling the same information separately.
  • preset may include pre-definition, for example, protocol definition.
  • pre-defined can be realized by pre-saving corresponding codes, tables or other methods that can be used to indicate relevant information in devices (for example, including terminal devices or network devices). limited.
  • the "storage" mentioned in the embodiment of the present application may refer to saving in one or more memories.
  • the one or more memories may be provided independently, or may be integrated in an encoder or decoder, a processor, or a communication device.
  • a part of the one or more memories may also be provided separately, and a part may be integrated in a decoder, a processor, or a communication device.
  • the type of the storage may be any form of storage medium, which is not limited in this application.
  • the "protocol” involved in the embodiment of this application may refer to a standard protocol in the communication field, for example, it may include 5G protocol, new radio (new radio, NR) protocol and related protocols applied in future communication systems. Applications are not limited to this.
  • the authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application is described in detail by taking the interaction between the terminal device and the operator's network device as an example.
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic flowchart of an authentication method provided by the present application. Including all or part of the following steps:
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates whether the first user is authentic, and obtains a first authentication result.
  • the first user is a user who uses a first terminal device to send a message to the first operator's network device
  • the first user is a user of a first terminal device (such as a smart phone), and the first terminal device A message may be sent to the first operator network device.
  • a first terminal device such as a smart phone
  • the first operator network equipment includes operator network equipment that provides services for the first user.
  • the network equipment of the first operator is the access network equipment set by China Mobile
  • the first user is a user who has joined the network of China Mobile
  • the network equipment of the first operator is the access network equipment set by China Unicom
  • the first The user is a user who has subscribed to China Unicom.
  • the first operator's network equipment includes a CSCF network element.
  • a CSCF network element may be an S-CSCF network element.
  • the operator network equipment involved in the embodiment of the present application may be a network equipment set by a trusted communication service provider, for example, it may be a network equipment set by China Mobile; for another example, it may be a network equipment set by China Unicom; for another example, it may be It is the network equipment set up by China Telecom; or it can also be the network equipment set up by other trusted communication service providers.
  • the "user" referred to in the embodiment of the present application refers to a user of a terminal device, for example, may be a user of a smart phone or a user of other terminal devices.
  • Whether the operator's network device authenticates whether the user is credible can be understood as: the operator's network device judges whether the user of the current terminal device (ie, the user) is consistent with the account holder of the terminal device. If they are consistent, it proves that the user is the account holder and the authentication user is credible; if not, it proves that the user is not the account holder and the authentication user is not credible.
  • the account holder of the terminal device is the phone number holder of the smart phone.
  • the first operator network device can obtain a first authentication result by authenticating whether the first user is authentic, and the first authentication result may be that the first user is authentic, or may be that the first user is not authentic.
  • the network device of the first operator may authenticate the authenticity of the first user in various ways. The different authentication methods will be described in detail below in conjunction with FIGS. 5-9 , and details will not be repeated here.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 4 also includes:
  • the first operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a first signature.
  • the first operator's network device signing the first authentication result includes:
  • the first operator's network equipment calculates a hash value for the message to be sent (the message includes the first authentication result and the authentication time) to obtain a digest of the message;
  • the first operator's network device encrypts the abstract by using the third private key stored by the first operator's network device to generate the first signature.
  • the manner in which the first operator's network device signs the first authentication result and generates the first signature is just an example, and does not constitute any limitation to the protection scope of the present application.
  • the network equipment of the first operator signs the first authentication result there is no limitation on how the network equipment of the first operator signs the first authentication result, and the specific implementation of generating the first signature can be referred to the description in the current technology related to the signature technology. to elaborate.
  • the first operator network device sends the generated first signature and the message to be sent (including at least the first authentication result) to the receiving end, and the method flow shown in FIG. 4 also includes:
  • the first operator network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature.
  • the first operator and the second operator that the first user and the second user that the first user needs to call respectively access the network are the same operator, then the network equipment of the first operator sends the second user
  • the used second terminal device sends the first authentication result and the first signature.
  • the first operator and the second operator who are connected to the network by the first user and the second user that the first user needs to call are different operators, then the network equipment of the first operator sends a call to the second
  • the operator network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature, where the second operator network device is an operator network device that provides services to the second user.
  • the network equipment of the first operator also needs to authenticate the second user, for the first operator and the second operator are the same
  • the operator, the first operator, and the second operator are different operators, and the network equipment of the first operator authenticates the second user in different authentication methods.
  • the different authentication methods will be described in detail below in conjunction with Figures 5-9 , I won’t go into details here.
  • the network device of the first operator may authenticate whether the first user is reliable through the following methods.
  • Method 1 The network device of the first operator invokes the authentication service of the third-party authentication agency to authenticate whether the first user is authentic, and the authentication service of the third-party authentication agency performs authentication based on the information collected by the first terminal device.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of an authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
  • the first terminal device acquires the physiological characteristic information of the first user.
  • the terminal device involved in the embodiment of the present application is a trusted terminal, that is, a terminal device produced by a trusted device manufacturer and certified by a trusted device certification authority, such as a smart phone, AR glasses, and the like.
  • the specific production method and authentication method are not limited in the embodiment of this application.
  • the embodiment of the present application mainly involves the authentication of the user using the terminal device.
  • the physiological characteristic information of the first user is used to represent the physiological characteristics of the first user, including but not limited to:
  • the fingerprint information of the first user The fingerprint information of the first user, the voiceprint information of the first user, the face information of the first user, the iris information of the first user, the palmprint information of the first user, and the like.
  • the acquisition of the first user's physiological feature information by the first terminal device may be:
  • the fingerprint information collection module (eg, fingerprint recognition module) of the first terminal device collects the fingerprint information of the first user.
  • the acquisition of the first user's physiological feature information by the first terminal device may be:
  • the voiceprint information collection module (eg, voiceprint recognition module) of the first terminal device collects the voiceprint information of the first user.
  • the acquisition of the first user's physiological feature information by the first terminal device may be:
  • the face information collection module (for example, camera module) of the first terminal device collects the face information of the first user.
  • the acquisition of the first user's physiological feature information by the first terminal device may be:
  • the iris information collection module (for example, camera module) of the first terminal device collects the iris information of the first user.
  • the technical means used by the first terminal device to acquire the physiological feature information of the first user in the embodiment of the present application, and it may be through existing technical means or future technical means.
  • the first terminal device after the first terminal device obtains the physiological characteristic information of the first user, it needs to encrypt the physiological characteristic information of the first user to generate the first encrypted information.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 5 also includes:
  • the first terminal device encrypts the physiological feature information of the first user based on the first encryption method and the first public key, to generate first encrypted information.
  • the first public key is the public key in the first public-private key pair determined by the third-party certification authority, and the first public-private key pair also includes the first private key, and the first private key is stored in the third-party The certification authority is used to verify the first encrypted information.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 5 also includes :
  • the first terminal device sends a first message to the first operator's network device, or in other words, the first operator's network device receives the first message from the first terminal device.
  • the first message includes first encrypted information.
  • the first message includes any one of signaling message, video data and audio data.
  • the first encrypted information may be periodically carried in the first message.
  • the network equipment of the first operator after receiving the first encrypted information, the network equipment of the first operator does not need to process the first encrypted information, but transparently transmits the first encrypted information to a third-party certification body for decryption by the third-party certification body, as shown in Figure 5
  • the method flow shown also includes:
  • the first operator's network device sends the first user's identification information and the first encrypted information to a third-party certification authority, or the third-party certification authority receives the first user from the first operator's network equipment The identification information and the first encrypted information.
  • the first encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to authenticate whether the first user is credible, and the identification information of the first user is used to identify the first user.
  • the third-party certification authority manages the identification information of the first user and the physiological characteristic information of the first user, and specifies the first public key and the first public key for encrypting the physiological characteristic information of the first user.
  • the third-party certification body only manages the relevant information of the first user (for example, the identification information of the first user and the physiological characteristic information of the first user), there is no need to apply to the third-party certification body Send the identification information of the first user. That is to say, after the third-party certification authority receives the first encrypted information, it can determine to use the first private key to decrypt it, without first identifying the first user through the first user's identification information, and then confirming that the first user is designated as the first user. of the first private key.
  • the method flow shown in Figure 5 also includes:
  • the third-party certification authority determines the first user based on the identification information of the first user, verifies the first encrypted information based on the first private key, and determines whether the first user is credible according to the verification result .
  • the third-party certification agency decrypts the first encrypted information to obtain the physiological feature information of the first user, and compares it with the physiological feature information of the first user locally managed by the third-party certification agency. If the comparison results are consistent, it proves that the first user is credible. ; Otherwise, prove that the first user is untrustworthy.
  • the third-party certification body needs to send the certification result to the network device of the first operator, and the method flow shown in FIG. 5 also includes:
  • the third-party certification authority sends the first information to the first operator's network device, or the first operator's network device receives the first information from the third-party certification authority.
  • the first information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible.
  • the network device of the first operator in the above S410 authenticates whether the first user is credible, and the result of the first authentication can be understood as:
  • the first operator network device authenticates whether the first user is authentic according to the first information, and obtains a first authentication result.
  • the first operator network device authenticates the first user is trustworthy, and the first authentication result is that the first user is trustworthy; or, when the first information indicates that the first user is not trustworthy, The network device of the first operator authenticates that the first user is untrustworthy, and the first authentication result is that the first user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a first signature.
  • the follow-up process includes the following two possibilities:
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 5 also includes:
  • the first operator network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the first signature.
  • the verification method includes: the second terminal device first uses the third public key to decrypt the digest ciphertext to obtain digest #1; then calculates the digest of the received message to obtain digest #2; compares digest #1 with digest # 2: If they are consistent, the trusted endorsement of the first operator’s network equipment is considered to be trustworthy, and a prompt is displayed; letter.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 5 also includes:
  • the first operator's network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second operator's network device.
  • the second operator's network device verifies the first signature.
  • the verification method includes: the second operator's network device first uses the third public key to decrypt the digest ciphertext to obtain digest #1; then calculates the digest of the received message to obtain digest #2; compares digest #1 with Abstract #2: If they are consistent, the trusted endorsement of the first operator's network equipment is considered to be trustworthy, and the prompt is credible; if not, the trusted endorsement of the first operator's network equipment is considered untrustworthy, The hint is not credible.
  • the second operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a fourth signature.
  • the second operator's network device signs the first authentication result based on the fourth private key to generate a fourth signature.
  • the second operator's network device sends the first authentication result and the fourth signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the fourth signature.
  • the verification method includes: the second terminal device first decrypts the digest ciphertext using the fourth public key to obtain digest #1; then calculates the digest of the received message to obtain digest #2; compares digest #1 with digest # 2: If they are consistent, the trusted endorsement of the first operator’s network equipment is considered to be trustworthy, and a prompt is displayed; letter.
  • the second terminal device acquires the physiological feature information of the second user.
  • the acquisition of the physiological characteristic information of the second user by the second terminal device is similar to the acquisition of the physiological characteristic information of the first user by the first terminal device, and reference may be made to the description of S510 above, which will not be repeated here.
  • the second terminal device encrypts the physiological characteristic information of the second user based on the third encryption method and the fifth public key, to generate third encrypted information.
  • the fifth public key is the public key in the fifth public-private key pair determined by the third-party certification authority, the fifth public-private key pair also includes the fifth private key, the third encryption method and the The fifth public key is used by the second terminal device to encrypt the physiological characteristic information of the second user to obtain the third encrypted information, and the fifth private key is stored in the third-party certification body for verifying the The third encrypted information.
  • the first operator and the second operator are the same operator and the first operator and the second operator are different operators, including the following two possibilities:
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 5 also includes:
  • the second terminal device sends the second message to the first operator's network device, or the first operator's network device receives the second message from the second terminal device.
  • the second message includes third encrypted information.
  • the first operator's network device sends the identification information of the second user and the third encrypted information to a third-party certification authority, or the third-party certification authority receives the second user from the first operator's network equipment The identification information and the third encrypted information.
  • the third encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to authenticate whether the second user is authentic, and the identification information of the second user is used to identify the second user.
  • the third-party certification authority determines the second user based on the identification information of the second user, verifies the third encrypted information based on the fifth private key, and determines whether the second user is credible according to the verification result .
  • the manner in which the third-party certification body authenticates the second user is similar to the manner in which the third-party certification body authenticates the first user, and reference may be made to the description of S550 above, which will not be repeated here.
  • the third-party certification body sends third information to the first operator's network device, or the first operator's network device receives the third information from the third-party certification body.
  • the second information is used to indicate whether the second user is credible.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates whether the second user is authentic according to the third information, and obtains a third authentication result.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates the second user is trustworthy, and the third authentication result shows that the second user is trustworthy; or, when the third information indicates that the second user is not trustworthy, The network device of the first operator authenticates that the second user is untrustworthy, and the third authentication result shows that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device signs the third authentication result to generate a third signature.
  • the first operator's network device signing the third authentication result includes:
  • the first operator's network equipment calculates a hash value for the message to be sent (the message includes the third authentication result and authentication time), and obtains a digest of the message;
  • the first operator's network device encrypts the abstract using the third private key stored by the first operator's network device to generate a third signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the third authentication result and the third signature to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device verifies the third signature.
  • the verification method includes: the first terminal device first uses the third public key to decrypt the digest ciphertext to obtain digest #1; then calculates the digest of the received message to obtain digest #2; compares digest #1 with digest # 2: If they are consistent, the trusted endorsement of the first operator’s network equipment is considered to be trustworthy, and a prompt is displayed; letter.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 5 also includes:
  • the second terminal device sends a third message to the second operator's network device, or in other words, the second operator's network device receives the third message from the second terminal device.
  • the third message includes third encrypted information.
  • the second operator's network device sends the identification information of the second user and the third encrypted information to a third-party certification authority, or the third-party certification authority receives the second user from the second operator's network equipment The identification information and the third encrypted information.
  • the third encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to authenticate whether the second user is authentic, and the identification information of the second user is used to identify the second user.
  • the third-party certification authority determines the second user based on the identification information of the second user, verifies the third encrypted information based on the fourth private key, and determines whether the second user is credible according to the verification result .
  • the manner in which the third-party certification body authenticates the second user is similar to the manner in which the third-party certification body authenticates the first user, and reference may be made to the description of S550 above, which will not be repeated here.
  • the third-party certification authority sends fifth information to the second operator's network device, or the second operator's network device receives fifth information from the third-party certification authority.
  • the fifth information is used to indicate whether the second user is trustworthy.
  • the second operator's network device authenticates whether the second user is authentic according to the fifth information, and obtains a fourth authentication result.
  • the network device of the second operator authenticates the second user is trustworthy, and the fourth authentication result is that the second user is trustworthy; or, when the fifth information indicates that the second user is not trustworthy, The second operator's network device authenticates that the second user is untrustworthy, and the fourth authentication result is that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the second operator's network device signs the fourth authentication result to generate a fifth signature.
  • the second operator's network device signing the fourth authentication result includes:
  • the second operator's network equipment calculates a hash value for the message to be sent (the message includes the fourth authentication result and authentication time), and obtains a digest of the message;
  • the second operator's network device encrypts the digest by using the fourth private key saved by the second operator's network device to generate a fifth signature.
  • the second operator's network device sends the fourth authentication result and the fifth signature to the first operator's network device.
  • the first operator's network device verifies the fifth signature.
  • the verification method includes: the first operator's network device first uses the fourth public key to decrypt the digest ciphertext to obtain digest #1; then calculates the digest of the received message to obtain digest #2; compares digest #1 with Abstract #2: If they are consistent, it is determined that the trusted endorsement of the second operator's network equipment is trustworthy. At this time, it prompts that it is credible; The hint is not credible.
  • the first operator's network device signs the fourth authentication result to generate a sixth signature.
  • the first operator's network device signing the fourth authentication result includes:
  • the first operator's network device calculates a hash value for the message to be sent (the message includes the fourth authentication result and authentication time), to obtain a digest of the message;
  • the first operator's network device encrypts the abstract by using the third private key stored by the first operator's network device to generate a sixth signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the fourth authentication result and the sixth signature to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device verifies the sixth signature.
  • the verification method includes: the first terminal device first uses the third public key to decrypt the digest ciphertext to obtain digest #1; then calculates the digest of the received message to obtain digest #2; compares digest #1 with digest # 2: If they are consistent, the trusted endorsement of the first operator’s network equipment is considered to be trustworthy, and a prompt is displayed; letter.
  • process of key distribution in this embodiment of the application can be completed before the communication, or can also be completed before the key needs to be used, and there is no limitation on the time point of key distribution.
  • FIG. 6 indicates the key distribution process of the third-party certification authority, including the following steps:
  • the user may be the above-mentioned first user or second user, or other users.
  • the first user registers the first user's identification information (or called the first user's basic information, such as name, ID number, etc.) and the first user's physiological characteristic information (for example, voiceprint, fingerprint, face and iris of the first user).
  • the first user's identification information or called the first user's basic information, such as name, ID number, etc.
  • the first user's physiological characteristic information for example, voiceprint, fingerprint, face and iris of the first user.
  • the second user registers the second user's identification information (or called the second user's basic information, such as name, ID number, etc.) and the second user's physiological characteristic information (such as, second user's voiceprint, fingerprint, face and iris, etc.).
  • the second user's identification information or called the second user's basic information, such as name, ID number, etc.
  • the second user's physiological characteristic information such as, second user's voiceprint, fingerprint, face and iris, etc.
  • the basic information of the user there is no limitation on the information that can be used as the basic information of the user.
  • the above-mentioned name, ID number, etc. are just examples, and do not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of the application.
  • the basic information of the user is also It can be information such as residential address, work unit, birthday, place of household registration, etc.;
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the information that can be used as the user's physiological feature information.
  • the above-mentioned voiceprint, fingerprint, face and iris are just examples, and do not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of the present application.
  • the user's physiological feature information can also be palm prints.
  • the third-party certification authority can assign the encryption method, decryption method and key (including private key and public key) of the user's physiological characteristic information to the user.
  • the method flow shown in Figure 5 also includes :
  • the third-party authentication institution assigns an encryption method, a decryption method, and a key to the user.
  • the third-party certification body manages the basic information and physiological feature information of the first user. And specify the encryption method, decryption method and key (including the first private key and the first public key) of the physiological characteristic information required for user identity authentication for the first user.
  • the first public key needs to be written into the first terminal device used by the first user through the network device of the first operator, and the first private key is stored by a third-party certification body.
  • the third-party certification body manages the basic information and physiological feature information of the second user. And specify the encryption method, decryption method and key (including the fifth private key and the fifth public key) of the physiological characteristic information required for user identity authentication for the second user.
  • the fifth public key needs to be written into the second terminal device used by the second user through the network device of the first operator or the network device of the second operator, and the fifth private key is stored by a third-party certification authority.
  • the third-party certification body there is no limitation on the specific phenotype of the third-party certification body, and it may be any third-party certification body that can authenticate the identity of the user, for example, it may be the Public Security Bureau; for example, it may be a file storage unit.
  • the third-party certification authority of the present application can manage information and distribute encryption methods, decryption methods, and keys for one or more users, and the processing methods of other users can refer to the first user, which will not be repeated here.
  • the prerequisite for the user to be served by the operator's network equipment is that the user has opened an account with the operator to which the operator's network equipment belongs and has access to the network.
  • the user's access to the operator to which the operator's network equipment belongs can be understood as the user registering the user's basic information with the operator and using the network managed by the operator.
  • the user will authorize the operator's network equipment to obtain the encryption method and public key required for user identity authentication, and the method flow shown in (a) in Figure 6 also includes:
  • the user authorizes the operator's network device to obtain the encryption method and the public key.
  • the authorization method may be that the user authorizes when the user logs in to the network. For example, when the user logs in to the network, the operator will ask the user whether to authorize the operator's network equipment to obtain the encryption method and public key, and the user can choose to authorize.
  • the authorization method may be that the user authorizes the operator's network equipment to acquire the encryption method and the public key at a certain point in time before calling other users.
  • the operator's network device can obtain the encryption method and public key from a third-party certification authority according to the user's authorization, and the method flow shown in (a) in Figure 6 also includes:
  • the operator network device obtains the encryption method and the public key from the third-party certification authority.
  • the method flow shown in Figure 6 also includes:
  • the operator network device sends the encryption method and the public key to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device can obtain the encryption method and the public key used to encrypt the user's physiological feature information.
  • the operator's network device can locally distribute a pair of public and private keys for trusted endorsement, where the public key is sent to the terminal device managed by the operator's network device, and the operator to which the interrupting device of the terminal device managed by the operator's network device belongs.
  • the private key is saved by the operator network equipment. The key distribution of the operator's network equipment will be described below in conjunction with (b) in FIG. 6 .
  • the first operator's network device determines a third public-private key pair.
  • the third public-private key pair includes a third public key and a third private key.
  • the third private key is stored in the network equipment of the first operator.
  • the key of the network device of the first operator includes the following two possibilities:
  • the method flow shown in (b) in FIG. 6 also includes:
  • the first operator network device sends the third public key to the first terminal device and the second terminal device respectively.
  • the method flow shown in (b) in FIG. 6 also includes:
  • the second operator's network device determines a fourth public-private key pair.
  • the fourth public-private key pair includes a fourth public key and a fourth private key.
  • the fourth private key is stored in the network equipment of the second operator.
  • the first operator network device sends the third public key to the first terminal device and the second operator network device respectively.
  • the second operator's network device sends the fourth public key to the second terminal device and the first operator's network device respectively.
  • Method 2 The network equipment of the first operator invokes the authentication service of the third-party certification authority to authenticate whether the first user is authentic, and the certification service of the third-party certification authority conducts authentication based on the information collected by the network equipment of the first operator.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of another authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
  • the network device of the first operator acquires the physiological characteristic information of the first user.
  • the physiological feature information of the first user includes voiceprint information of the first user and/or face information of the first user.
  • the acquisition of the first user's physiological feature information by the first operator's network equipment may be:
  • the voiceprint information collection module eg, voiceprint recognition module
  • the voiceprint information collection module eg, voiceprint recognition module
  • the acquisition of the first user's physiological feature information by the first operator's network equipment may be:
  • the face information collection module eg, camera module
  • the network equipment of the first operator collects the face information of the first user.
  • the network device of the first operator encrypts the physiological feature information of the first user based on a second encryption method and a second public key, to generate second encrypted information.
  • the second public key is a public key in a second public-private key pair negotiated and determined between the third-party certification authority and the network device of the first operator, and the second public-private key pair also includes a second private key key, the second encryption method is determined through negotiation between the network device of the first operator and the third-party certification authority, and the second private key is used to verify the second encrypted information.
  • the second public-private key pair is determined by a third-party certification authority, and then issued to the network device of the first operator.
  • the method for the third-party certification body to determine the second public-private key pair is similar to the method for the third-party certification body to determine the first public-private key pair in the first method above, and will not be repeated here.
  • the first operator's network device sends the first user's identification information and the second encrypted information to a third-party certification body, or the third-party certification body receives the first user's second encrypted information from the first operator's network device. A user's identification information and the second encrypted information.
  • the second encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to authenticate whether the first user is credible, and the identification information of the first user is used to identify the first user.
  • the third-party certification authority determines the first user based on the identification information of the first user, verifies the second encrypted information based on the second private key, and determines whether the first user is credible according to the verification result .
  • the third-party certification agency decrypts the second encrypted information to obtain the physiological feature information of the first user, and compares it with the physiological feature information of the first user locally managed by the third-party certification agency. If the comparison results are consistent, it proves that the first user is credible ; Otherwise, prove that the first user is untrustworthy.
  • the third-party certification body needs to send the certification result to the network device of the first operator, and the method flow shown in FIG. 7 also includes:
  • the third-party certification authority sends second information to the first operator's network device, or the first operator's network device receives the second information from the third-party certification authority.
  • the second information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible.
  • the network equipment of the first operator authenticates whether the first user is credible, and the obtained first authentication result can be understood as:
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates whether the first user is authentic according to the second information, and obtains a first authentication result.
  • the first operator network device authenticates the first user is trustworthy, and the first authentication result is that the first user is trustworthy; or, when the second information indicates that the first user is not trustworthy, The network device of the first operator authenticates that the first user is untrustworthy, and the first authentication result is that the first user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a first signature.
  • the follow-up process includes the following two possibilities:
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 7 also includes:
  • the first operator network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the first signature.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 7 also includes:
  • the first operator's network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second operator's network device.
  • the second operator's network device verifies the first signature.
  • the second operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a fourth signature.
  • the second operator network device sends the first authentication result and the fourth signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the fourth signature.
  • the second user needs to be authenticated, and the first operator and the second operator are the same operator and the first operator and the second operator
  • the operators are different operators, including two possibilities:
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 7 also includes:
  • the network device of the first operator acquires the physiological characteristic information of the second user.
  • the physiological feature information of the second user includes voiceprint information of the second user and/or face information of the second user.
  • the acquisition of the physiological characteristic information of the second user by the network equipment of the first operator may be:
  • the voiceprint information collection module eg, voiceprint recognition module
  • the voiceprint information collection module eg, voiceprint recognition module
  • the acquisition of the physiological characteristic information of the second user by the network equipment of the first operator may be:
  • the facial information collection module eg, camera module
  • the network equipment of the first operator collects the facial information of the second user.
  • the network device of the first operator encrypts the physiological feature information of the second user based on the fourth encryption method and the sixth public key, to generate fourth encrypted information.
  • the sixth public key is a public key in a sixth public-private key pair negotiated and determined between the third-party certification authority and the network device of the first operator, and the sixth public-private key pair also includes a sixth private key pair.
  • the fourth encryption method is determined through negotiation between the network device of the first operator and the third-party certification authority, and the sixth private key is used to verify the fourth encrypted information.
  • the sixth public-private key pair is determined by a third-party certification body, and then issued to the network device of the first operator.
  • the method for the third-party certification body to determine the sixth public-private key pair is similar to the method for the third-party certification body to determine the fifth public-private key pair in Method 1 above, and will not be repeated here.
  • the first operator's network device sends the second user's identification information and the fourth encrypted information to a third-party certification authority, or the third-party certification authority receives the first operator's network equipment from the first operator's network equipment. Two user identification information and the fourth encrypted information.
  • the fourth encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to authenticate whether the first user is credible, and the identification information of the first user is used to identify the first user.
  • the third-party certification authority determines the second user based on the identification information of the second user, verifies the fourth encrypted information based on the sixth private key, and determines whether the second user is credible according to the verification result .
  • the third-party authentication agency decrypts the fourth encrypted information to obtain the physiological feature information of the second user, and compares it with the physiological feature information of the second user locally managed by the third-party authentication agency. If the comparison results are consistent, it proves that the second user is credible. ; Otherwise, prove that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the third-party certification body needs to send the certification result to the network device of the first operator, and the method flow shown in FIG. 7 also includes:
  • the third-party certification body sends fourth information to the first operator's network device, or the first operator's network device receives fourth information from the third-party certification body.
  • the fourth information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates whether the second user is authentic according to the fourth information, and obtains a third authentication result.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates the second user is trustworthy, and the third authentication result shows that the second user is trustworthy; or, when the fourth information indicates that the second user is not trustworthy, The network device of the first operator authenticates that the second user is untrustworthy, and the third authentication result shows that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device signs the third authentication result to generate a third signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the third authentication result and the third signature to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device verifies the third signature.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 7 also includes:
  • the network device of the second operator acquires the physiological characteristic information of the second user.
  • the physiological feature information of the second user includes voiceprint information of the second user and/or face information of the second user.
  • the acquisition of the second user's physiological characteristic information by the network equipment of the second operator may be:
  • the voiceprint information collection module eg, voiceprint recognition module
  • the voiceprint information collection module eg, voiceprint recognition module
  • the acquisition of the second user's physiological characteristic information by the network equipment of the second operator may be:
  • the face information collection module eg, camera module
  • the network equipment of the second operator collects the face information of the second user.
  • the network device of the second operator encrypts the physiological feature information of the second user based on the fifth encryption method and the seventh public key, to generate fifth encrypted information.
  • the seventh public key is a public key in a seventh public-private key pair negotiated and determined between the third-party certification authority and the network device of the second operator, and the seventh public-private key pair also includes a seventh private key pair.
  • the fifth encryption method is determined through negotiation between the network device of the first operator and the third-party certification authority, and the seventh private key is used to verify the fifth encrypted information.
  • the seventh public-private key pair is determined by a third-party certification authority, and then delivered to the second operator's network device.
  • the method for the third-party certification body to determine the seventh public-private key pair is similar to the method for the third-party certification body to determine the fifth public-private key pair in Method 1 above, and will not be repeated here.
  • the second operator's network device sends the second user's identification information and the fifth encrypted information to a third-party certification authority, or the third-party certification authority receives the second operator's network equipment from the second operator's network equipment. Two user identification information and the fifth encrypted information.
  • the fifth encrypted information is used by the third-party certification body to authenticate whether the first user is credible, and the identification information of the first user is used to identify the first user.
  • the third-party certification authority determines the second user based on the identification information of the second user, verifies the fifth encrypted information based on the seventh private key, and determines whether the second user is credible according to the verification result .
  • the third-party certification body decrypts the fifth encrypted information to obtain the physiological feature information of the second user, and compares it with the physiological feature information of the second user locally managed by the third-party certification body. If the comparison results are consistent, it proves that the second user is credible. ; Otherwise, prove that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the third-party certification body needs to send the certification result to the network device of the first operator, and the method flow shown in FIG. 7 also includes:
  • the third-party certification body sends sixth information to the first operator's network device, or the first operator's network device receives the sixth information from the third-party certification body.
  • the sixth information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible.
  • the second operator's network device authenticates whether the second user is authentic according to the sixth information, and obtains a fourth authentication result.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates the second user is trustworthy, and the fourth authentication result is that the second user is trustworthy; or, when the sixth information indicates that the second user is not trustworthy, The first operator's network device authenticates that the second user is untrustworthy, and the fourth authentication result is that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the second operator's network device signs the fourth authentication result to generate a fifth signature.
  • the second operator's network device sends the fourth authentication result and the fifth signature to the first operator's network device.
  • the first operator's network device verifies the fifth signature.
  • the network device of the first operator generates a sixth signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the fourth authentication result and the sixth signature to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device verifies the sixth signature.
  • the operator's network equipment obtains the user's physiological characteristic information, and the encryption method and public key for encrypting the user's physiological characteristic information do not need to be distributed to the terminal device , in the second method, the terminal device does not need to intervene in the authentication, which simplifies the operation of the terminal device.
  • Method 3 The terminal device performs trusted authentication on the user and reports the authentication result to the operator, and the operator verifies the authentication result of the trusted terminal.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart of another authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
  • the first terminal device authenticates the first user, and obtains a second authentication result.
  • the first terminal device may determine whether the first user can unlock the first terminal device, if the first user can be considered credible; otherwise, The first user is deemed not to be trusted.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 8 also includes:
  • the first terminal device signs the second authentication result to generate a second signature.
  • the first terminal device signs the second authentication result based on the private key of the first SIM card to generate a second signature.
  • the signature method includes: calculating a digest (also called a hash value) of the message to be sent (including the authentication result and authentication time), then encrypting the digest with the private key of the first SIM card, and finally combining the encrypted digest with the message to be sent
  • the sending message (including the authentication result and the authentication time) is sent to the network device of the first operator together.
  • the first terminal device needs to send the second authentication result and the second signature to the first operator network device, and the method flow shown in FIG. 8 also includes:
  • the first terminal device sends the second authentication result and the second signature to the first operator's network device, or the first operator's network device receives the second authentication result and the second signature from the first terminal device .
  • the second authentication result is determined by the first terminal device to indicate whether the first user is trustworthy, and the second signature is used to verify the second authentication result.
  • the first operator network device verifies the received second authentication result, and the method flow shown in FIG. 8 also includes:
  • the network device of the first operator verifies the second signature.
  • the network equipment of the first operator authenticates whether the first user is credible, and the obtained first authentication result can be understood as:
  • the network device of the first operator verifies whether the first user is authentic according to the second verification result, and obtains the first verification result.
  • the first operator network device When the second authentication result indicates that the first user is credible, the first operator network device authenticates the first user is credible, and the first authentication result is that the first user is credible; or, when the second authentication result indicates that the first user is not credible.
  • the first operator's network device When , the first operator's network device authenticates that the first user is untrustworthy, and the first authentication result is that the first user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a first signature.
  • the follow-up process includes the following two possibilities:
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 8 further includes:
  • the first operator network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the first signature.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 8 also includes:
  • the first operator's network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second operator's network device.
  • the second operator's network device verifies the first signature.
  • the second operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a fourth signature.
  • the second operator network device sends the first authentication result and the fourth signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the fourth signature.
  • the second terminal device authenticates the second user, and obtains a fifth authentication result.
  • the second terminal device may determine whether the second user can unlock the second terminal device, if the second user can be considered credible; otherwise, The second user is deemed not to be trusted.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 8 further includes:
  • the second terminal device signs the fifth authentication result to generate a seventh signature.
  • the second terminal device signs the fifth authentication result based on the private key of the second SIM card to generate a seventh signature.
  • the signature method includes: calculating a digest (also called a hash value) of the message to be sent (including the fifth authentication result and authentication time), encrypting the digest with the private key of the second SIM card, and finally encrypting the encrypted digest It is sent to the network device of the first operator or the network device of the second operator together with the message to be sent (including the authentication result and the authentication time).
  • a digest also called a hash value
  • the follow-up process includes the following two possibilities:
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 8 further includes:
  • the second terminal device sends the fifth authentication result and the seventh signature to the first operator's network device, or the first operator's network device receives the fifth authentication result and the seventh signature from the second terminal device .
  • the fifth authentication result is determined by the second terminal device to indicate whether the second user is trustworthy, and the seventh signature is used to verify the fifth authentication result.
  • the network device of the first operator verifies the received fifth authentication result, and the method flow shown in FIG. 8 also includes:
  • the network device of the first operator verifies the seventh signature.
  • the network device of the first operator verifies whether the second user is authentic according to the fifth verification result, and obtains a third verification result.
  • the first operator network device authenticates the second user is credible, and the third authentication result indicates that the second user is credible; or, when the fifth authentication result indicates that the second user is not credible
  • the first operator's network device authenticates that the second user is untrustworthy, and the third authentication result shows that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device signs the third authentication result to generate a third signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the third authentication result and the third signature to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device verifies the third signature.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 8 also includes:
  • the second terminal device sends the fifth authentication result and the seventh signature to the second operator's network device, or the second operator's network device receives the fifth authentication result and the seventh signature from the second terminal device .
  • the fifth authentication result is determined by the second terminal device to indicate whether the second user is trustworthy, and the seventh signature is used to verify the fifth authentication result.
  • the network device of the second operator verifies the received fifth authentication result, and the method flow shown in FIG. 8 also includes:
  • the network device of the second operator verifies the seventh signature.
  • the network device of the second operator verifies whether the second user is authentic according to the fifth verification result, and obtains a fourth verification result.
  • the network device of the second operator authenticates the second user is credible, and the fourth authentication result indicates that the second user is credible; or, when the fifth authentication result indicates that the second user is not credible , the second operator's network device authenticates that the second user is untrustworthy, and the fourth authentication result is that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the second operator's network device signs the fourth authentication result to generate a fifth signature.
  • the second operator's network device sends the fourth authentication result and the fifth signature to the first operator's network device.
  • the first operator network device verifies the fifth signature.
  • the network device of the first operator generates a sixth signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the fourth authentication result and the sixth signature to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device verifies the sixth signature.
  • Mode 4 When the first user is the calling user, the network equipment of the first operator confirms whether the calling user is credible through situational awareness (that is, analyzing the calling behavior of the calling user in a recent period).
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart of another authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
  • the network device of the first operator acquires the call history data of the first user.
  • the network equipment of the first operator may obtain the above-mentioned historical call data of the first user through the historical call data storage unit.
  • the historical call data of the first user is used to indicate the calling habits of the first user, including at least one of the following:
  • the network device of the first operator determines whether the call initiated by the first user is authentic according to a preset policy and historical call data of the first user.
  • the preset strategy may be that the time point when the first user initiates a call is from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and if the historical call data of the first user satisfies the preset strategy, it is determined that the first user is credible ; Otherwise, it is determined that the first user is not trusted.
  • the preset policy may be that when the first user initiates a call, the frequency of the second user connecting the call is not less than 50%, and if the historical call data of the first user satisfies the preset policy, it is determined that the call can be Authenticated; otherwise, determine that the call is not authentic.
  • the network equipment of the first operator authenticates whether the first user is credible, and the obtained first authentication result can be understood as:
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates whether the first user is authentic according to whether the call is authentic, and obtains a first authentication result.
  • the first operator's network equipment When the call is authentic, the first operator's network equipment authenticates the first user as authentic, and the first authentication result is that the first user is authentic; or, when the call is not authentic, the first operator's network equipment authenticates the first user as untrustworthy , the first authentication result is that the first user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a first signature.
  • the follow-up process includes the following two possibilities:
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 8 further includes:
  • the first operator network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the first signature.
  • the method flow shown in FIG. 8 also includes:
  • the first operator's network device sends the first authentication result and the first signature to the second operator's network device.
  • the second operator's network device verifies the first signature.
  • the second operator's network device signs the first authentication result to generate a fourth signature.
  • the second operator's network device sends the first authentication result and the fourth signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the fourth signature.
  • the second user When the second user is the calling user, the second user may also be authenticated in the above-mentioned way, and the authentication method is similar, and will not be repeated here.
  • the first user is the calling user
  • the second user is the called user
  • the first operator and the second operator are the same operator as an example to briefly introduce the How the authentication method is applied in trusted communication.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic flow chart of a call flow provided by an embodiment of the present application. Include the following steps:
  • the first user sends a first session initiation protocol invite (session initiation protocol invite, SIP invite) message to the network device of the first operator through the first terminal device.
  • a first session initiation protocol invite session initiation protocol invite, SIP invite
  • the first SIP invite message (a specific implementation of the above-mentioned first message) includes encrypted physiological characteristic parameters of the first user (the above-mentioned first encrypted information).
  • the encryption method and key (the above-mentioned first encryption method and first public key) of the physiological characteristic parameters are specified and distributed by a third-party certification body.
  • the network device of the first operator sends a first request message to a third-party certification authority.
  • the first operator's network equipment receives the first SIP Invite message, finds out the basic information of the first user, calls the interface opened by the third-party certification body to authenticate the caller (transfers the basic information of the first user to the third-party certification body, encrypts After the physiological characteristic parameters of the first user).
  • the first request message includes identification information of the first user and first encrypted information.
  • a third-party authentication institution authenticates the first user.
  • the third-party certification agency decrypts the first encrypted information based on the first private key to obtain the physiological feature information of the first user, and compares it with the physiological feature information of the first user locally managed by the third-party certification agency. If the comparison results are consistent, it proves that The first user is trustworthy; otherwise, it is proved that the first user is not trustworthy.
  • the first private key and the first public key are the keys included in the first public-private key pair specified by the third-party certification authority for the physiological characteristic parameters of the first user, and the first public key is used to encrypt the physiological characteristics of the first user parameters, the first private key is used to decrypt the physiological characteristic parameters of the first user.
  • the third-party certification authority sends a first response message to the network device of the first operator.
  • the third-party authentication institution feeds back the authentication result to the network device of the first operator, and the first response message includes first information, where the first information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible. For example, the first user is trusted and authenticated.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates the first user according to the first information, and obtains a first authentication result.
  • the first operator network device authenticates the first user is trustworthy, and the first authentication result is that the first user is trustworthy; or, when the first information indicates that the first user is not trustworthy, The network device of the first operator authenticates that the first user is untrustworthy, and the first authentication result is that the first user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device performs a trusted endorsement signature on the first authentication result to generate a first signature.
  • the first operator's network device first calculates the digest (also called hash value) of the second SIP Invite message (the second SIP Invite message contains the first authentication result), and then uses the third private key to encrypt the digest to obtain the first authentication result. sign.
  • the digest also called hash value
  • the third private key is a key determined by the network equipment of the first operator and used for encrypting the first authentication result.
  • the third private key is the private key in the third public-private key pair, and the third public-private key pair also includes the third public key, and the third public key is sent to the terminal equipment served by the network equipment of the first operator (such as The first terminal device and the second terminal device) are used for the terminal device to verify the signature received from the network device of the first operator.
  • the first operator's network equipment needs to forward the second SIP Invite message together with the first signature to the second terminal equipment (the terminal equipment used by the called party), and the method flow shown in Figure 10 also includes:
  • the first operator network device sends the second SIP Invite message and the first signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second SIP Invite message includes the first authentication result.
  • the second user needs to be addressed.
  • the second terminal device After the second terminal device receives the second SIP Invite message and the first signature, it verifies the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network device, and the method flow shown in FIG. 10 also includes:
  • the second terminal device verifies the first signature.
  • the verification method is specifically: the second terminal device first uses the third public key to decrypt the digest ciphertext to obtain digest #1; then calculates the digest of the second SIP Invite message to obtain digest #2; compares digest #1 with Abstract #2: If consistent, the trusted endorsement of the first operator's network equipment is deemed authentic, and at this time, the second user is prompted that the call is authentic; if not consistent, the first operator's network equipment is deemed authentic The endorsement is not credible, and at this time, the second user is prompted that the call is not credible.
  • the second terminal device sends a SIP 180 Ring message to the first terminal device through the network device of the first operator, where the SIP 180 Ring message is used to instruct the second terminal device to ring.
  • the prompt tone is received by the first terminal device.
  • the second terminal device When the second terminal device determines that the call is authentic, the second terminal device will send a SIP 200 OK message to the first terminal device through the first operator network device, indicating that the first terminal device can initiate a call.
  • the second user sends the first SIP 200 OK message to the network device of the first operator through the second terminal device.
  • the first SIP 200 OK message (a specific implementation of the above-mentioned second message) includes the encrypted second user's physiological characteristic parameters (the above-mentioned third encrypted information).
  • the encryption method and key (the third encryption method and the fourth public key mentioned above) of the physiological characteristic parameters are specified and distributed by a third-party certification body.
  • the network device of the first operator sends a second request message to the third-party certification authority.
  • the first operator's network device receives the first SIP 200 OK message, finds out the basic information of the second user, calls the interface opened by the third-party certification body to authenticate the called party (passes the basic information of the second user to the third-party certification body, The encrypted physiological characteristic parameters of the second user).
  • the second request message includes identification information of the second user and third encrypted information.
  • a third-party authentication institution authenticates the second user.
  • the third-party certification agency decrypts the third encrypted information based on the fourth private key to obtain the physiological feature information of the second user, and compares it with the physiological feature information of the second user locally managed by the third-party certification agency. If the comparison results are consistent, it proves that The second user is credible; otherwise, prove that the second user is not credible.
  • the fourth private key and the fourth public key are the keys included in the fourth public-private key pair specified by the third-party certification authority for the second user's physiological characteristic parameters, and the fourth public key is used to encrypt the second user's physiological characteristic parameters, and the fourth private key is used to decrypt the physiological characteristic parameters of the second user.
  • the third-party certification authority sends a second response message to the network device of the first operator.
  • the third-party authentication institution feeds back the authentication result to the network device of the first operator, and the second response message includes third information, where the third information is used to indicate whether the second user is credible. For example, the second user is trusted and authenticated.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates the second user according to the third information, and obtains a third authentication result.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates the second user is trustworthy, and the third authentication result shows that the second user is trustworthy; or, when the third information indicates that the second user is not trustworthy, The network device of the first operator authenticates that the second user is untrustworthy, and the third authentication result shows that the second user is untrustworthy.
  • the first operator's network device performs a trusted endorsement signature on the third authentication result to generate a third signature.
  • the first operator's network device first calculates the digest (also called hash value) of the second SIP 200 OK message (the second SIP 200 OK message contains the third authentication result), and then uses the third private key to encrypt the digest to obtain The third signature.
  • the digest also called hash value
  • the third private key is a key determined by the network equipment of the first operator for encrypting the third authentication result.
  • the third private key is the private key in the third public-private key pair, and the third public-private key pair also includes the third public key, and the third public key is sent to the terminal equipment served by the network equipment of the first operator (such as The first terminal device and the second terminal device) are used for the terminal device to verify the signature received from the network device of the first operator.
  • the first operator's network equipment needs to forward the second SIP 200 OK message together with the third signature to the first terminal equipment (the terminal equipment used by the called party), and the method flow shown in Figure 10 also includes:
  • the first operator's network device sends the second SIP 200 OK message and the third signature to the first terminal device.
  • the third authentication result is included in the second SIP 200 OK message.
  • the first terminal device After the first terminal device receives the second SIP 200 OK message and the third signature, it verifies the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network device, and the method flow shown in Figure 10 also includes:
  • the first terminal device verifies the third signature.
  • the verification method is as follows: the first terminal device first uses the third public key to decrypt the digest ciphertext to obtain digest #1; then calculates the digest of the second SIP 200 OK message to obtain digest #2; compares digest #1 Summary #2: If they are consistent, the trusted endorsement of the first operator’s network equipment is deemed authentic, and the first user is prompted that the call is authentic; if not, the first operator’s network equipment is deemed authentic. The letter endorsement is not credible, and at this time, the first user is prompted that the call is not credible.
  • a call may be initiated to the second user through the network equipment of the first operator, and the method flow shown in FIG. 10 also includes:
  • the first terminal device sends the audio/video data to the second terminal device through the first operator's network device.
  • the encrypted physiological characteristic parameters of the first user of the calling party may be periodically carried in the audio/video data.
  • the encryption method and key (the above-mentioned first encryption method and first public key) of the physiological characteristic parameters are specified and distributed by a third-party certification body.
  • the first operator’s network equipment receives the caller’s audio/video data, if the data carries the encrypted physiological characteristic parameters of the first user, it can refer to the above method to perform credible verification of the caller’s identity, which will not be repeated here repeat.
  • the trusted terminal used by the second user After the second terminal device receives the audio/video data and the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network equipment, it verifies the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network equipment, and after passing the verification , prompting the second user: the content of the call is credible.
  • the second terminal device when it sends the called audio/video data to the second user, it can also periodically carry the encrypted physiological characteristic parameters of the second user, such as fingerprints, faces, irises, etc.
  • the encryption method and key of the physiological characteristic parameters are specified and distributed by the third-party certification agency.
  • the called party When the network equipment of the first operator receives the audio/video data of the called party, if the data carries the encrypted physiological characteristic parameters of the second user, the called party’s identity can be trusted by referring to the above method, which will not be repeated here. .
  • Trusted terminal used by the first user After receiving the audio/video data and the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network equipment, the first terminal equipment verifies the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network equipment. , prompting the first user: the content of the call is credible.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of another call flow provided by the embodiment of the present application. Include the following steps:
  • the first terminal device sends audio/video data to the second terminal device through the first operator network device.
  • the network device of the first operator acquires the physiological feature parameters of the first user from the audio/video data.
  • the first operator network device encrypts the physiological feature information of the first user based on the second encryption method and the second public key, to generate second encrypted information.
  • the second public key is a public key in a second public-private key pair determined by the third-party certification authority and the network device of the first operator, and the second public-private key pair also includes a second private key , the second encryption method is determined by the first operator network device and the third-party certification authority, and the second private key is used to verify the second encrypted information.
  • the network device of the first operator sends a third request message to the third-party certification authority.
  • the network equipment of the first operator receives the audio/video data sent by the calling party, finds out the basic information of the first user, calls the interface opened by the third-party certification body to authenticate the calling party (transfers the basic information of the first user to the third-party certification body) information, encrypted physiological characteristic parameters of the first user).
  • the third request message includes identification information of the first user and second encrypted information.
  • a third-party authentication institution authenticates the first user.
  • the third-party certification agency decrypts the second encrypted information based on the second private key to obtain the physiological feature information of the first user, and compares it with the physiological feature information of the first user locally managed by the third-party certification agency. If the comparison results are consistent, it proves that The first user is trustworthy; otherwise, it is proved that the first user is not trustworthy.
  • the third-party certification authority sends a third response message to the network device of the first operator.
  • the third-party authentication institution feeds back the authentication result to the network device of the first operator, and the third response message includes second information, and the second information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible. For example, the first user is trusted and authenticated.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates the first user according to the second information, and obtains a first authentication result.
  • the first operator's network device performs a trusted endorsement signature on the first authentication result to generate a first signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the audio/video data and the first signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the first signature.
  • the second user sends audio/video data to the network device of the first operator through the second terminal device.
  • the network device of the first operator acquires the physiological feature parameters of the second user from the audio/video data.
  • the first operator network device encrypts the physiological feature information of the second user based on the fourth encryption method and the sixth public key, to generate fourth encrypted information.
  • the sixth public key is a public key in a sixth public-private key pair determined by the third-party certification authority and the first operator network device, and the sixth public-private key pair also includes a sixth private key , the fourth encryption method is known to the first operator network device and the third-party certification authority, and the sixth private key is used to verify the fourth encrypted information.
  • the network device of the first operator sends a fourth request message to the third-party certification authority.
  • the network device of the first operator receives the audio/video data sent by the called party, finds out the basic information of the second user, calls the interface opened by the third-party certification body to authenticate the called party (transfers the basic information of the second user to the third-party certification body) information, encrypted physiological characteristic parameters of the second user).
  • the fourth request message includes identification information of the second user and fourth encrypted information.
  • a third-party authentication institution authenticates the second user.
  • the third-party certification agency decrypts the fourth encrypted information based on the fifth private key to obtain the physiological feature information of the second user, and compares it with the physiological feature information of the second user locally managed by the third-party certification agency. If the comparison results are consistent, it proves that The second user is credible; otherwise, prove that the second user is not credible.
  • the third-party certification authority sends a fourth response message to the network device of the first operator.
  • the third-party authentication institution feeds back the authentication result to the network device of the first operator, and the fourth response message includes fourth information, where the fourth information is used to indicate whether the first user is credible. For example, the first user is trusted and authenticated.
  • the network device of the first operator authenticates the second user according to the fourth information, and obtains a third authentication result.
  • the first operator's network device performs a trusted endorsement signature on the third authentication result to generate a third signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the audio/video data and the third signature to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device verifies the third signature.
  • the call flow shown in Figure 11 also uses the authentication service of the third-party certification authority to authenticate the user by the network equipment of the first operator, but there are the following differences:
  • Fig. 12 is a schematic flowchart of another call flow provided by the embodiment of the present application. Include the following steps:
  • the first terminal device authenticates whether the first user is authentic, and obtains a second authentication result.
  • the first terminal device signs the second authentication result to generate a second signature.
  • the first terminal device sends a third SIP invite message to the network device of the first operator.
  • the third SIP invite message carries the second authentication result and the second signature.
  • the first operator network device verifies the second signature.
  • the network device of the first operator verifies whether the first user is authentic according to the verification result, and obtains a first verification result.
  • the first operator's network device performs a trusted endorsement signature on the first authentication result to generate a first signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the fourth SIP Invite message and the first signature to the second terminal device.
  • the second terminal device verifies the first signature.
  • the second terminal device sends a SIP 180 Ring message to the first terminal device through the network device of the first operator, where the SIP 180 Ring message is used to instruct the second terminal device to ring.
  • the second terminal device authenticates whether the second user is authentic, and obtains a fifth authentication result.
  • the second terminal device signs the fifth authentication result to generate a seventh signature.
  • the second user sends a third SIP 200 OK message to the network device of the first operator through the second terminal device.
  • the fifth authentication result and the seventh signature are carried in the third SIP 200 OK message.
  • the network device of the first operator verifies the seventh signature.
  • the network device of the first operator verifies whether the second user is authentic according to the verification result, and obtains a third verification result.
  • the first operator's network device performs a trusted endorsement signature on the third authentication result to generate a third signature.
  • the first operator network device sends the fourth SIP 200 OK message and the third signature to the first terminal device.
  • the first terminal device verifies the third signature.
  • a call may be initiated to the second user through the network equipment of the first operator, and the method flow shown in FIG. 12 also includes:
  • the first terminal device can periodically authenticate whether the first user is credible before sending audio/video data, and send the authentication result and signature together with the audio/video data to the operator provider, the specific authentication process and signature method can refer to the above-mentioned trusted verification of calling identity, and will not be repeated here.
  • the trusted terminal used by the second user After the second terminal device receives the audio/video data and the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network equipment, it verifies the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network equipment, and after passing the verification , prompting the second user: the content of the call is credible.
  • the second terminal device when the second terminal device sends the called audio/video data to the second user, it can also periodically authenticate whether the second user is credible, and send the authentication result and signature together with the audio/video data to the operator.
  • the specific authentication process and signature method please refer to the above-mentioned trusted verification of the called identity, so I won’t go into details here.
  • Trusted terminal used by the first user After receiving the audio/video data and the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network equipment, the first terminal equipment verifies the trusted endorsement signature of the first operator's network equipment. , prompting the first user: the content of the call is credible.
  • Mode 4 is different from the above modes 1 to 3 in that the caller is authenticated, which will not be described in conjunction with specific embodiments here, and the implementation may refer to the above-mentioned FIG. 9 .
  • serial numbers of the above-mentioned processes do not mean the order of execution, and the execution order of each process should be determined by its functions and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation to the implementation process of the embodiment of the present application . And it may not be necessary to perform all the operations in the above method embodiments.
  • terminal device and/or operator network device in the above method embodiments may perform some or all of the steps in the embodiments, these steps or operations are only examples, and the embodiments of the present application may also include performing other operations or various operations deformation.
  • the method implemented by the operator network equipment can also be implemented by components (such as chips or circuits) that can be used in the operator network equipment, and the method implemented by the terminal equipment can also be implemented by Component implementations available for end devices.
  • the authentication method in the embodiment of the present application is described in detail above with reference to FIG. 4 to FIG. 12 , and the device for providing authentication in the embodiment of the present application is described in detail below in conjunction with FIG. 13 to FIG. 18 .
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic diagram of an authentication device 1300 provided in this application. As shown in FIG. 13 , the device 1300 includes an authentication unit 1310 , a processing unit 1320 and a sending unit 1330 .
  • An authentication unit 1310 configured to authenticate whether the user is credible, and obtain an authentication result, the user is a user who uses the first terminal device to send a message to the device;
  • a processing unit 1320 configured to sign the authentication result
  • a sending unit 1330 configured to send the authentication result and the signature.
  • Apparatus 1300 corresponds to the operator network equipment in the method embodiment.
  • Apparatus 1300 may be the operator's network equipment in the method embodiment, or a chip or a functional module inside the operator's network equipment in the method embodiment.
  • the corresponding units of the apparatus 1300 are configured to perform corresponding steps performed by the operator network equipment in the method embodiments shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 12 .
  • the authentication unit 1310 in the apparatus 1300 executes the steps of operator network device authentication in the method embodiment.
  • the processing unit 1320 in the apparatus 1300 is configured to execute steps related to processing corresponding to operator network equipment in the method embodiment.
  • the sending unit 1330 in the apparatus 1300 is configured to execute the step of sending by the operator's network equipment.
  • the processing unit 1320 may be at least one processor.
  • the sending unit 1330 may be a transmitter or an interface circuit.
  • the device 1300 may also include a storage unit, which is used to store data and/or signaling, and the authentication unit 1310, the processing unit 1320, and the sending unit 1330 may interact or be coupled with the storage unit, such as reading or calling storing data and/or signaling in the unit, so that the methods of the foregoing embodiments are executed.
  • a storage unit which is used to store data and/or signaling
  • the authentication unit 1310, the processing unit 1320, and the sending unit 1330 may interact or be coupled with the storage unit, such as reading or calling storing data and/or signaling in the unit, so that the methods of the foregoing embodiments are executed.
  • Each of the above units can exist independently, or can be fully or partially integrated.
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic structural diagram of an operator network device 1400 applicable to the embodiment of the present application, which can be used to implement the above functions of the operator network device.
  • the carrier network device 1400 includes a processor 1401, a memory 1402, and a transceiver 1403, wherein the memory 1402 stores instructions or programs, and the processor 1402 and the transceiver 1403 are used to execute or call the instructions or programs stored in the memory 1402 to
  • the operator network device 1400 is made to implement the function of the operator network device in the above authentication method.
  • the transceiver 1403 may be used to execute the operations performed by the sending unit 1330 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 13
  • the processor 1402 may be used to execute the The operations performed by the processing unit 1320.
  • FIG. 14 only shows a memory and a processor. In an actual user equipment, there may be multiple processors and memories.
  • a storage may also be called a storage medium or a storage device, etc., which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of an operator network device 1500 applicable to the embodiment of the present application, which can be used to implement the above functions of the operator network device.
  • the carrier network device 1500 includes but not limited to the following modules:
  • An authentication module 1510 a third-party communication module 1520 , a database module 1530 , a cache module 1540 , a policy module 1550 , and a physiological characteristic parameter extraction module 1560 .
  • Authentication module 1510 used for the scheduling, control, execution, etc. of the trusted authentication process
  • Third-party communication module 1520 for the above-mentioned authentication method 1 and method 2, it is used to communicate with a third-party authentication institution;
  • Database module 1530 used to store information such as the calling behavior of the calling user (such as calling location, etc.), basic information of the user, and the public key matched with the user identity certificate;
  • Cache module 1540 used for high-speed access and temporary storage. It can be used to improve authentication performance, and the cache module can temporarily store information such as the user's call behavior (such as call location, etc.), user basic information, and the public key matching the user's identity certificate;
  • Policy module 1550 for the above authentication method 4, it is used to determine whether the calling behavior of the user is normal and credible;
  • Physiological feature parameter extraction module 1560 for the above authentication method 2, this module is used to extract physiological feature parameters.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic diagram of an authentication device 1600 provided by the present application.
  • an apparatus 1600 includes a receiving unit 1610 , a processing unit 1620 and a sending unit 1630 .
  • An authentication unit 1610 configured to receive an encryption method and a public key from an operator network device
  • the processing unit 1620 is configured to encrypt the user's physiological feature information based on the encryption method and the public key to generate encrypted information.
  • the user's physiological feature information includes at least one of the following: user's fingerprint information, user's voiceprint information, user The user's face information, the user's iris information and the user's palmprint information;
  • the sending unit 1630 is configured to send encrypted information to the operator's network equipment, wherein the user is a user who uses the device to send a message to the operator's network equipment, and the public key is a public key in a public-private key pair determined by a third-party certification authority.
  • the public-private key pair also includes a private key, which is stored in the third-party certification body and used to verify the encrypted information.
  • the device 1600 also includes an authentication unit 1640, configured to authenticate whether the user is credible, and obtain an authentication result;
  • the processing unit 1620 is configured to sign the authentication result based on the SIM private key, and generate a signature
  • the sending unit 1630 is configured to send the authentication result and the signature to the operator network equipment.
  • Apparatus 1600 corresponds to the terminal device in the method embodiment.
  • Apparatus 1600 may be a terminal device in the method embodiment, or a chip or a functional module inside the terminal device in the method embodiment.
  • the corresponding units of the apparatus 1600 are configured to perform corresponding steps performed by the terminal device in the method embodiments shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 12 .
  • the receiving unit 1610 in the apparatus 1600 executes the step of receiving by the terminal device in the method embodiment.
  • the processing unit 1620 in the apparatus 1600 is configured to execute steps corresponding to processing of the terminal device in the method embodiment.
  • the sending unit 1630 in the apparatus 1600 is configured to execute the step of sending by the terminal device.
  • the processing unit 1620 may be at least one processor.
  • the sending unit 1630 may be a transmitter or an interface circuit.
  • the device 1600 may also include a storage unit, which is used to store data and/or signaling, and the receiving unit 1610, the processing unit 1620, and the sending unit 1630 may interact or be coupled with the storage unit, such as reading or calling storing data and/or signaling in the unit, so that the methods of the foregoing embodiments are executed.
  • a storage unit which is used to store data and/or signaling
  • the receiving unit 1610, the processing unit 1620, and the sending unit 1630 may interact or be coupled with the storage unit, such as reading or calling storing data and/or signaling in the unit, so that the methods of the foregoing embodiments are executed.
  • Each of the above units can exist independently, or can be fully or partially integrated.
  • FIG. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device 1700 applicable to the embodiment of the present application, which can be used to realize the functions of the above-mentioned terminal device.
  • the terminal device 1700 includes a processor 1701, a memory 1702 and a transceiver 1703, wherein the memory 1702 stores instructions or programs, and the processor 1702 and the transceiver 1703 are used to execute or call the instructions or programs stored in the memory 1702, so that the terminal The device 1700 implements the functions of the terminal device in the above authentication method.
  • the transceiver 1703 may be used to execute the operations performed by the sending unit 1630 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 16
  • the processor 1702 may be used to execute the The operations performed by the processing unit 1620.
  • FIG. 17 only shows a memory and a processor. In an actual user equipment, there may be multiple processors and memories.
  • a storage may also be called a storage medium or a storage device, etc., which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 18 is a schematic diagram of an authentication device 1800 provided in this application.
  • an apparatus 1800 includes a management unit 1810 , a processing unit 1820 , a sending unit 1830 and a receiving unit 1840 .
  • the management unit 1810 is configured to manage the user's identification information and the user's physiological feature information, the user's identification information is used to identify the user, and the user's physiological feature information includes at least one of the following: the user's fingerprint information, the user's The voiceprint information of the user, the user's face information, the user's iris information and the user's palmprint information;
  • a processing unit 1820 configured to determine a public key and an encryption method for encrypting the user's physiological characteristic information
  • a sending unit 1830 configured to send the encryption method and the public key to the operator network equipment
  • the receiving unit 1840 is configured to receive the identification information and encrypted information of the user from the network equipment of the operator, where the encrypted information is the encrypted physiological characteristic information of the user;
  • the processing unit 1820 is also used to determine the user based on the user's identification information, verify the encrypted information based on the private key, and determine whether the user is credible according to the verification result.
  • the public key and the private key are a public-private key pair ;
  • the sending unit 1830 is further configured to send information indicating whether the user is credible to the operator network device, where the user is a user who uses a terminal device to send a message to the operator network device.
  • Apparatus 1800 corresponds to the third-party certification authority in the method embodiment.
  • the apparatus 1800 may be the third-party certification body in the method embodiment, or a chip or a functional module inside the third-party certification body in the method embodiment.
  • the corresponding units of the apparatus 1800 are used to execute the corresponding steps performed by the third-party certification authority in the method embodiments shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 12 .
  • the management unit 1810 in the apparatus 1800 executes the steps managed by the third-party certification authority in the method embodiment.
  • the processing unit 1820 in the apparatus 1800 is configured to execute steps related to processing corresponding to the third-party certification authority in the method embodiment.
  • the sending unit 1830 in the apparatus 1800 is configured to execute the step of sending by the third-party certification authority.
  • the processing unit 1820 may be at least one processor.
  • the sending unit 1830 may be a transmitter or an interface circuit.
  • the device 1800 may also include a storage unit, which is used to store data and/or signaling, and the management unit 1810, the processing unit 1820, and the sending unit 1830 may interact or be coupled with the storage unit, such as reading or calling storing data and/or signaling in the unit, so that the methods of the foregoing embodiments are executed.
  • a storage unit which is used to store data and/or signaling
  • the management unit 1810, the processing unit 1820, and the sending unit 1830 may interact or be coupled with the storage unit, such as reading or calling storing data and/or signaling in the unit, so that the methods of the foregoing embodiments are executed.
  • Each of the above units can exist independently, or can be fully or partially integrated.
  • FIG. 19 is a schematic structural diagram of a third-party certification authority 1900 applicable to the embodiment of the present application, which can be used to realize the above-mentioned functions of the third-party certification authority.
  • the third-party certification authority 1900 includes a processor 1901, a memory 1902 and a transceiver 1903, wherein the memory 1902 stores instructions or programs, and the processor 1902 and the transceiver 1903 are used to execute or call the instructions or programs stored in the memory 1902 to
  • the third-party certification body 1900 is made to implement the functions of the third-party certification body in the authentication method described above.
  • the transceiver 1903 can be used to execute the operations performed by the sending unit 1830 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 18
  • the processor 1902 can be used to execute the The operation performed by the processing unit 1820.
  • FIG. 19 only shows a memory and a processor. In an actual user equipment, there may be multiple processors and memories.
  • a storage may also be called a storage medium or a storage device, etc., which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a communication system, which includes the foregoing operator network equipment and terminal equipment.
  • the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, where instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the instructions are run on the computer, the computer executes the terminal device in the above methods as shown in Figures 4 to 12 steps performed.
  • the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, where instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the instructions are run on a computer, the computer executes the operator in the above-mentioned methods as shown in Figures 4 to 12 Steps performed by network devices.
  • the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, where instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the instructions are run on the computer, the computer executes the third-party The various steps performed by the certification body.
  • the present application also provides a computer program product containing instructions.
  • the computer program product When the computer program product is run on a computer, the computer is made to execute various steps performed by the terminal device in the methods shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 12 .
  • the present application also provides a computer program product containing instructions.
  • the computer program product When the computer program product is run on a computer, the computer is made to execute various steps performed by the operator's network equipment in the methods shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 12 .
  • the present application also provides a computer program product containing instructions.
  • the computer program product When the computer program product is run on a computer, the computer is made to execute various steps performed by the third-party certification authority in the methods shown in FIGS. 4 to 12 .
  • the present application also provides a chip, including a processor.
  • the processor is used to read and execute the computer program stored in the memory, so as to execute the corresponding operations and/or processes executed by the terminal device in the authentication method provided in this application.
  • the chip further includes a memory, the memory is connected to the processor through a circuit or wires, and the processor is used to read and execute the computer program in the memory.
  • the chip further includes a communication interface, and the processor is connected to the communication interface.
  • the communication interface is used to receive processed data and/or information, and the processor obtains the data and/or information from the communication interface, and processes the data and/or information.
  • the communication interface may be an input/output interface, interface circuit, output circuit, input circuit, pin or related circuit on the chip.
  • the processor may also be embodied as a processing circuit or logic circuit.
  • the present application also provides a chip, including a processor.
  • the processor is used to read and run the computer program stored in the memory, so as to execute the corresponding operations and/or processes executed by the operator's network equipment in the authentication method provided in this application.
  • the chip further includes a memory, the memory is connected to the processor through a circuit or wires, and the processor is used to read and execute the computer program in the memory.
  • the chip further includes a communication interface, and the processor is connected to the communication interface.
  • the communication interface is used to receive processed data and/or information, and the processor acquires the data and/or information from the communication interface and processes the data and/or information.
  • the communication interface may be an input/output interface, interface circuit, output circuit, input circuit, pin or related circuit on the chip.
  • the processor may also be embodied as a processing circuit or logic circuit.
  • the present application also provides a chip, including a processor.
  • the processor is used to read and run the computer program stored in the memory, so as to execute the corresponding operations and/or processes performed by the third-party certification authority in the certification method provided by the present application.
  • the chip further includes a memory, the memory is connected to the processor through a circuit or wires, and the processor is used to read and execute the computer program in the memory.
  • the chip further includes a communication interface, and the processor is connected to the communication interface.
  • the communication interface is used to receive processed data and/or information, and the processor acquires the data and/or information from the communication interface and processes the data and/or information.
  • the communication interface may be an input/output interface, interface circuit, output circuit, input circuit, pin or related circuit on the chip.
  • the processor may also be embodied as a processing circuit or logic circuit.
  • the above-mentioned chip can also be replaced by a system-on-a-chip, which will not be repeated here.
  • the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are only illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.
  • multiple units or components can be combined or May be integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored, or not implemented.
  • the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Part or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.
  • each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, each unit may exist separately physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the functions described above are realized in the form of software function units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), magnetic disk or optical disc and other media that can store program codes. .

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Abstract

本申请提供了一种认证的方法和装置，该认证的方法包括：第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果，该第一用户为使用第一终端设备向该第一运营商网络设备发送消息的用户；该第一运营商网络设备对该第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名；该第一运营商网络设备向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名，其中，该第二运营商网络设备为给该第二用户提供服务的运营商网络设备，该第二用户为该第一用户呼叫的用户。通过认证用户是否可信，保障端到端通信过程中通信内容是真实不被篡改的，能够避免或减少电信诈骗。

Description

认证的方法和装置
本申请要求于2021年06月30日提交中国专利局、申请号为202110736210.7、申请名称为“认证的方法和装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及通信领域，并且更具体地，涉及一种认证的方法和装置。
背景技术
人工智能(artificial intelligence，AI)换脸、变声等技术的出现，为犯罪分子提供了新的电信诈骗途径。因此，为了避免或减少电信诈骗，如何保证端到端通信过程中通信内容是真实的且没有被篡改过的成为亟待解决的问题。
发明内容
本申请提供一种认证的方法，能够保证端到端通信过程中通信内容是真实不被篡改。
第一方面，提供了一种认证的方法，该认证的方法可以由第一运营商网络设备执行，或者，也可以由设置于第一运营商网络设备中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。
该认证的方法包括：
第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果，该第一用户为使用第一终端设备向该第一运营商网络设备发送消息的用户；该第一运营商网络设备对该第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名；该第一运营商网络设备向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名，其中，该第二运营商网络设备为给该第二用户提供服务的运营商网络设备，该第二用户为该第一用户呼叫的用户。
本申请实施例提供的认证的方法，第一运营商网络设备对第一用户进行认证，并对认证得到的第一认证结果进行签名生成第一签名，然后向第一用户呼叫的第二用户使用的第二终端设备发送该第一认证结果和第一签名，或者向为给第二用户提供服务的第二运营商网络设备发送该第一认证结果和第一签名，通过认证用户是否可信，保障端到端通信过程中通信内容是真实不被篡改的，能够避免或减少电信诈骗。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第一终端设备的第一消息，该第一消息中包括第一加密信息，该第一加密信息为加密后的该第一用户的生理特征信息，该第一用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：该第一用户的指纹信息、该第一用户的声纹信息、该第一用户的人脸信息、该第一用户的虹膜信息和该第一用户的掌纹信息；该第一运营商网络设备认证该第一用户是否可信，包括：该第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送该第一用户的标识信息和该第一加密信 息，该第一加密信息用于该第三方认证机构认证该第一用户是否可信，该第一用户的标识信息用于标识该第一用户；该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第三方认证机构的第一信息，该第一信息用于指示该第一用户是否可信；该第一运营商网络设备根据该第一信息认证该第一用户是否可信。
作为一个示例，第一运营商网络设备可以根据第一终端设备上报的第一加密信息调用第三方认证机构的认证服务认证第一用户，无需第一运营商网络设备直接认证第一用户，而是由第三方认证机构执行认证，第一运营商网络设备通过第三方认证机构的反馈信息认证第一用户是否可信即可，简化了第一运营商网络设备的操作，并且第一用户的生理特征信息无需存储在第一运营商网络设备即可以完成认证，从而避免用户将敏感信息存储在运营商网络设备带来隐私信任问题。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该第一消息包括以下至少一种：信令消息、视频数据和音频数据，当该第一消息为该视频数据和/或该音频数据时，该第一消息中周期性地携带该第一加密信息。
上述第一消息具体可以是不同的消息或数据，增加了方案的灵活性。
并且，当第一消息为该视频数据和/或该音频数据时，该第一消息中可以周期性地携带该第一加密信息，即可以周期性地认证第一用户是否可信，增加方案的可靠性。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，在该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第一终端设备的第一消息之前，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备从该第三方认证机构获取第一加密方法和第一公钥；该第一运营商网络设备向该第一终端设备发送该第一加密方法和该第一公钥，其中，该第一公钥为该第三方认证机构确定的第一公私钥对中的公钥，该第一公私钥对中还包括第一私钥，该第一加密方法和该第一公钥用于该第一终端设备加密该第一用户的生理特征信息得到该第一加密信息，该第一私钥保存在该第三方认证机构中用于验证该第一加密信息。
示例性地，第一用户可以在通信之前授权第一运营商网络设备获取第一加密方法和第一公钥。
例如，如果第一用户是新用户，授权方式可以是第一用户在入网时进行授权，例如，第一用户入网时第一运营商会询问第一用户是否授权第一运营商网络设备获取第一加密方法和第一公钥，第一用户可以选择授权。
还例如，如果第一用户是老用户，授权方式可以是第一用户在呼叫第二用户之前的某个时间点授权第一运营商网络设备获取第一加密方法和第一公钥。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，在该第一运营商网络设备认证该第一用户是否可信之前，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备获取该第一用户的生理特征信息，该第一用户的生理特征信息包括该第一用户的声纹信息和/或该第一用户的人脸信息；该第一运营商网络设备认证该第一用户是否可信，包括：该第一运营商网络设备基于第二加密方法和第二公钥对该第一用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第二加密信息；该第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送该第一用户的标识信息和该第二加密信息，该第二加密信息用于该第三方认证机构认证该第一用户是否可信，该第一用户的标识信息用于标识该第一用户；该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第三方认证机构的第二信息，该第二信息用于指示该第一用户是否可信；该第一运营商网络设备根据该第二信息认证该第一用户 是否可信；其中，该第二公钥为该第三方认证机构确定的第二公私钥对中的公钥，该第二公私钥对中还包括第二私钥，该第二加密方法为该第三方认证机构确定的，该第二私钥用于验证该第二加密信息。
作为一个示例，第一运营商网络设备可以根据自身确定的第二加密信息调用第三方认证机构的认证服务认证第一用户，无需第一终端设备获取第一用户的生理特征信息并加密，简化了第一终端设备的操作。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第一终端设备的第二认证结果和第二签名，该第二认证结果用于指示该第一用户是否可信，该第二签名用于验证该第二认证结果；该第一运营商网络设备认证该第一用户是否可信，包括：该第一运营商网络设备验证该第二签名，验证通过时根据该第二认证结果认证该第一用户是否可信。
作为一个示例，第一运营商网络设备可以根据第一终端设备上报的第二认证结果认证该第一用户是否可信，第一运营商网络设备通过验证第二签名，验证通过时根据该第二认证结果即能够实现认证第一用户，无需调用第三方认证机构实现认证，进一步简化了第一运营商网络设备的操作。
可选地，第一运营商网络设备验证该第二签名，验证失败时确定第一用户是不可信。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该第二签名为基于第一SIM卡私钥对该第二认证结果进行签名生成的签名；该第一运营商网络设备验证该第二签名，包括：该第一运营商网络设备基于第一SIM卡公钥验证该第二签名，其中，该第一SIM卡私钥和该第一SIM卡公钥为第一SIM卡公私钥对，第一SIM卡设置在该第一终端设备中，该第一SIM卡私钥保存在该第一SIM卡中，该第一SIM卡公钥保存在该第一运营商网络设备中。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，当该第一用户为主叫用户时，在该第一运营商网络设备认证该第一用户是否可信之前，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备获取该第一用户的历史呼叫数据，该第一用户的历史呼叫数据用于指示该第一用户的呼叫习惯，包括以下至少一项：该第一用户发起呼叫的时间点分布数据、该第一用户发起呼叫时该第二用户接通呼叫的频率数据、该第一用户发起呼叫时该第二终端设备振铃时长数据、该第一用户的通话时长分布数据、该第一用户发起呼叫的地理位置分布数据、该第二用户为首次被呼叫的比率、该第二用户号码归属地分布数据；该第一运营商网络设备根据预设的策略和该第一用户的历史呼叫数据确定该第一用户发起的呼叫是否可信；该第一运营商网络设备认证该第一用户是否可信，包括：该第一运营商网络设备根据该第一用户发起的呼叫是否可信认证该第一用户是否可信。
作为一个示例，第一运营商网络设备可以根据第一用户的呼叫习惯认证该第一用户是否可信。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备确定第三公私钥对，该第三公私钥对包括第三私钥和第三公钥；该第一运营商网络设备保存该第三私钥。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，当该第一用户和该第二用户分别所属的第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，该第一运营商网络设备向第二用户使用的 第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名，具体为：该第一运营商网络设备向该第二终端设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名；该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备向该第二终端设备发送该第三公钥，该第三公钥用于该第二终端设备验证该第一签名。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备认证该第二用户是否可信，得到第三认证结果；该第一运营商网络设备对该第三认证结果进行签名，生成第三签名；该第一运营商网络设备向该第一终端设备发送该第三认证结果和该第三签名；该第一运营商网络设备向该第一终端设备发送该第三公钥，该第三公钥用于该第一终端设备验证该第三签名。
进一步地，第一运营商网络设备还需要验证第二用户，能够确定通信双方是否可信。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第二终端设备的第二消息，该第二消息中包括第三加密信息，该第三加密信息为加密后的该第二用户的生理特征信息，该第二用户的生理特征信包括以下至少一项：该第二用户的指纹信息、该第二用户的声纹信息、该第二用户的人脸信息、该第二用户的虹膜信息和该第二用户的掌纹信息；该第一运营商网络设备认证该第二用户是否可信，包括：该第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送该第二用户的标识信息和该第三加密信息，该第三加密信息用于该第三方认证机构认证该第二用户是否可信，该第二用户的标识信息用于标识该第二用户；该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第三方认证机构的第三信息，该第三信息用于指示该第二用户是否可信；该第一运营商网络设备根据该第三信息认证该第二用户是否可信。
作为一个示例，第一运营商网络设备可以根据第二终端设备上报的第三加密信息调用第三方认证机构的认证服务认证第二用户，无需第一运营商网络设备直接认证第二用户，而是由第三方认证机构执行认证，第一运营商网络设备通过第三方认证机构的反馈信息认证第二用户是否可信即可，简化了第一运营商网络设备的操作，并且第一用户的生理特征信息无需存储在第一运营商网络设备即可以完成认证，从而避免用户将敏感信息存储在运营商网络设备带来隐私信任问题。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该第二消息包括以下至少一种：信令消息、视频数据和音频数据，当该第二消息为该视频数据和/或该音频数据时，该第二消息中周期性地携带该第三加密信息。
上述第二消息具体可以是不同的消息或数据，增加了方案的灵活性。
并且，当第二消息为该视频数据和/或该音频数据时，该第二消息中可以周期性地携带该第三加密信息，即可以周期性地认证第二用户是否可信，增加方案的可靠性。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，在该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第二终端设备的第二消息之前，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备从该第三方认证机构获取第三加密方法和第五公钥；该第一运营商网络设备向该第二终端设备发送该第三加密方法和该第五公钥，其中，该第五公钥为该第三方认证机构确定的第五公私钥对中的公钥，该第五公私钥对中还包括第五私钥，该第三加密方法和该第五公钥用于该第二终端设备加密该第二用户的生理特征信息得到该第三加密信息，该第五私钥保存在该第三方认证机构中用于验证该第三加密信息。
示例性地，第二用户可以在通信之前授权第一运营商网络设备获取第三加密方法和第五公钥。
例如，如果第二用户是新用户，授权方式可以是第二用户在入网时进行授权，例如，第二用户入网时第一运营商会询问第一用户是否授权第一运营商网络设备获取第三加密方法和第五公钥，第二用户可以选择授权。
还例如，如果第二用户是老用户，授权方式可以是第二用户在呼叫第二用户之前的某个时间点授权第一运营商网络设备获取第三加密方法和第五公钥。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，在该第一运营商网络设备认证该第二用户是否可信之前，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备获取该第二用户的生理特征信息，该第二用户的生理特征信息包括该第二用户的声纹信息和/或该第二用户的人脸信息；该第一运营商网络设备认证该第二用户是否可信，包括：该第一运营商网络设备基于第四加密方法和第六公钥对该第二用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第四加密信息；该第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送该第二用户的标识信息和该第四加密信息，该第四加密信息用于该第三方认证机构认证该第二用户是否可信，该第二用户的标识信息用于标识该第二用户；该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第三方认证机构的第四信息，该第四信息用于指示该二用户是否可信；该第一运营商网络设备根据该第四信息认证该第二用户是否可信；其中，该第六公钥为该第三方认证机构确定的第六公私钥对中的公钥，该第六公私钥对中还包括第六私钥，该第四加密方法为该第三方认证机构确定的，该第六私钥用于验证该第四加密信息。
作为一个示例，第一运营商网络设备可以根据自身确定的第四加密信息调用第三方认证机构的认证服务认证第二用户，无需第二终端设备获取第二用户的生理特征信息并加密，简化了第二终端设备的操作。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第二终端设备的第五认证结果和第七签名，该第五认证结果为该第二终端设备确定的用于指示该第二用户是否可信，该第七签名用于验证该第四认证结果；该第一运营商网络设备认证该第二用户是否可信，包括：该第一运营商网络设备验证该第七签名，验证通过时根据该第五认证结果认证该第二用户是否可信。
作为一个示例，第一运营商网络设备可以根据第二终端设备上报的第五认证结果认证该第二用户是否可信，第一运营商网络设备通过验证第七签名，验证通过时根据该第五认证结果即能够实现认证第二用户，无需调用第三方认证机构实现认证，进一步简化了第一运营商网络设备的操作。
可选地，第一运营商网络设备验证该第七签名，验证失败时确定第二用户是不可信。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该第七签名为基于第二SIM卡私钥对该第五认证结果进行签名生成的签名；该第一运营商网络设备验证该第七签名，包括：该第一运营商网络设备基于第二SIM卡公钥验证该第七签名，其中，该第二SIM卡私钥和该第二SIM卡公钥为第二SIM卡公私钥对，第二SIM卡设置在该第二终端设备中，该第二SIM卡私钥保存在该第二SIM卡中，该第二SIM卡公钥保存在该第一运营商网络设备中。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，当该第二用户为主叫用户时，在该第 一运营商网络设备认证该第二用户是否可信之前，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备获取该第二用户的历史呼叫数据，该第二用户的历史呼叫数据用于指示该第二用户设备的呼叫习惯，包括以下至少一项：该第二用户发起呼叫的时间点分布数据、该第二用户发起呼叫时该第一用户接通呼叫的频率数据、该第二用户发起呼叫时该第一终端设备振铃时长数据、该第二用户的通话时长分布数据、该第二用户发起呼叫的地理位置分布数据、该第一用户为首次呼叫的比率、该第一用户号码归属地分布数据；该第一运营商网络设备根据预设的策略和该第二用户的历史呼叫数据确定该第二用户发起的呼叫是否可信；该第一运营商网络设备认证该第二用户是否可信，包括：该第一运营商网络设备根据该第二用户发起的呼叫是否可信认证该第一用户是否可信。
作为一个示例，第一运营商网络设备可以根据第二用户的呼叫习惯认证该第二用户是否可信。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，当该第一用户和该第二用户分别所属的第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商时，该第一运营商网络设备向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名，具体为：该第一运营商网络设备向该第二运营商网络设备发送该第一签名和该第一认证结果；该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备向第二运营商网络设备发送该第三公钥，该第三公钥用于该第二运营商网络设备验证该第一签名；其中，该第一认证结果和该第四私钥用于该第二运营商网络设备生成第四签名，该第四签名用于发送给该第二终端设备指示该第二终端设备验证该第一认证结果，该第四私钥保存在该第二运营商网络设备中，该第四私钥和第四公钥为第四公私钥对。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的某些实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第一运营商网络设备接收来自该第二运营商网络设备的该第四公钥；该第一运营商网络设备接收来自第二运营商网络设备的第五签名和第四认证结果，该第五签名为基于该第四私钥对该第四认证结果进行签名生成的签名，该第四认证结果用于指示该第二用户是否可信；该第一运营商网络设备基于该第四公钥验证该第五签名；验证成功后，该第一运营商网络设备基于该第三私钥对该第四认证结果进行签名，生成第六签名；该第一运营商网络设备向该第一终端设备发送该第四认证结果和该第六签名。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备和第二运营商网络设备之间可以在通信之前交互第三公钥和第四公钥。
可以理解为：本申请实施例中涉及的密钥和加密方法的分发可以在通信之前完成。
第二方面提供了一种认证的方法，该认证的方法可以由终端设备执行，或者，也可以由设置于终端设备中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。
该认证的方法包括：
终端设备接收来自运营商网络设备的加密方法和公钥；该终端设备基于该加密方法和该公钥对用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成加密信息，用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：用户的指纹信息、用户的声纹信息、用户的人脸信息、用户的虹膜信息和用户的掌纹信息；终端设备向运营商网络设备发送加密信息，其中，用户为使用该终端设备向运营商网络设备发送消息的用户，公钥为第三方认证机构确定的公私钥对中的公钥，该公私钥对中还包括私钥，该私钥保存在该第三方认证机构中用于验证该加密信息。
运营商网络设备可以根据终端设备上报的加密信息调用第三方认证机构的认证服务认证用户，无需运营商网络设备直接认证用户，而是由第三方认证机构执行认证，运营商网络设备通过第三方认证机构的反馈信息认证用户是否可信即可，简化了运营商网络设备的操作。
示例性地，当通信的双方所入网的运营商相同的情况下，该终端设备可以是第一终端设备或第二终端设备，运营商网络设备可以是第一运营商网络设备。
示例性地，当通信的双方所入网的运营商不同的情况下，该终端设备可以是第一终端设备，运营商网络设备可以是第一运营商网络设备；或者该终端设备可以是第二终端设备，运营商网络设备可以是第二运营商网络设备。
第三方面提供了一种认证的方法，该认证的方法可以由终端设备执行，或者，也可以由设置于终端设备中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。
该认证的方法包括：
终端设备认证用户是否可信，得到认证结果；该终端设备基于SIM私钥对该认证结果进行签名，生成签名；该终端设备向运营商网络设备发送该认证结果和该签名。
运营商网络设备可以根据终端设备上报的加密信息调用第三方认证机构的认证服务认证用户，无需运营商网络设备直接认证用户，而是由第三方认证机构执行认证，运营商网络设备通过第三方认证机构的反馈信息认证用户是否可信即可，简化了运营商网络设备的操作。
示例性地，当通信的双方所入网的运营商相同的情况下，该终端设备可以是第一终端设备或第二终端设备，运营商网络设备可以是第一运营商网络设备。
示例性地，当通信的双方所入网的运营商不同的情况下，该终端设备可以是第一终端设备，运营商网络设备可以是第一运营商网络设备；或者该终端设备可以是第二终端设备，运营商网络设备可以是第二运营商网络设备。
第四方面，提供了一种认证的方法，该认证的方法可以由第三方认证机构执行，或者，也可以由设置于第三方认证机构中的芯片或电路执行，本申请对此不作限定。
该认证的方法包括：
第三方认证机构管理用户的标识信息和该用户的生理特征信息，该用户的标识信息用于标识该用户，该用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：该用户的指纹信息、该用户的声纹信息、该用户的人脸信息、该用户的虹膜信息和该用户的掌纹信息；该第三方认证机构确定加密该用户的生理特征信息的公钥和加密方法；该第三方认证机构向运营商网络设备发送该加密方法和该公钥；该第三方认证机构接收来自运营商网络设备的该用户的标识信息和加密信息，该加密信息为加密后的该用户的生理特征信息；该第三方认证机构基于该用户的标识信息确定该用户，并基于私钥验证该加密信息，根据该验证结果确定该用户是否可信，该公钥和该私钥为一对公私钥对；该第三方认证机构向运营商网络设备发送指示该用户是否可信的信息，其中，该用户为使用终端设备向该运营商网络设备发送消息的用户。
运营商网络设备可以根据终端设备上报的加密信息调用第三方认证机构的认证服务认证用户，无需运营商网络设备直接认证用户，而是由第三方认证机构执行认证，运营商网络设备通过第三方认证机构的反馈信息认证用户是否可信即可，简化了运营商网络设备 的操作。
结合第四方面，在第四方面的某些实现方式中，该加密信息为运营商网络设备确定的，或者该加密信息为终端设备确定的。
第五方面，提供了一种认证的装置，该认证的装置包括：
认证单元，用于认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果，该第一用户为使用第一终端设备向该装置发送消息的用户；处理单元，用于对该第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名；发送单元，用于向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名，其中，该第二运营商网络设备为给该第二用户提供服务的运营商网络设备，该第二用户为该第一用户呼叫的用户。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该装置还包括：接收单元，用于接收来自该第一终端设备的第一消息，该第一消息中包括第一加密信息，该第一加密信息为加密后的该第一用户的生理特征信息，该第一用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：该第一用户的指纹信息、该第一用户的声纹信息、该第一用户的人脸信息、该第一用户的虹膜信息和该第一用户的掌纹信息；该发送单元还用于向第三方认证机构发送该第一用户的标识信息和该第一加密信息，该第一加密信息用于该第三方认证机构认证该第一用户是否可信，该第一用户的标识信息用于标识该第一用户；该接收单元还用于接收来自该第三方认证机构的第一信息，该第一信息用于指示该第一用户是否可信；该认证单元认证该第一用户是否可信，包括：该认证单元根据该第一信息认证该第一用户是否可信。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该第一消息包括以下至少一种：信令消息、视频数据和音频数据，当该第一消息为该视频数据和/或该音频数据时，该第一消息中周期性地携带该第一加密信息。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，在该接收单元接收来自该第一终端设备的第一消息之前，该接收单元还用于从该第三方认证机构获取第一加密方法和第一公钥；该发送单元还用于向该第一终端设备发送该第一加密方法和该第一公钥，其中，该第一公钥为该第三方认证机构确定的第一公私钥对中的公钥，该第一公私钥对中还包括第一私钥，该第一加密方法和该第一公钥用于该第一终端设备加密该第一用户的生理特征信息得到该第一加密信息，该第一私钥保存在该第三方认证机构中用于验证该第一加密信息。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，在该认证单元认证该第一用户是否可信之前，该装置还包括：获取单元，用于获取该第一用户的生理特征信息，该第一用户的生理特征信息包括该第一用户的声纹信息和/或该第一用户的人脸信息；该处理单元还用于基于第二加密方法和第二公钥对该第一用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第二加密信息；该发送单元还用于向第三方认证机构发送该第一用户的标识信息和该第二加密信息，该第二加密信息用于该第三方认证机构认证该第一用户是否可信，该第一用户的标识信息用于标识该第一用户；该接收单元还用于接收来自该第三方认证机构的第二信息，该第二信息用于指示该第一用户是否可信；该认证单元认证该第一用户是否可信，包括：该认证单元根据该第二信息认证该第一用户是否可信；其中，该第二公钥为该第三方认证机构确定的第二公私钥对中的公钥，该第二公私钥对中还包括第二私钥，该第二加密方法为该第三方认证机构确定的，该第二私钥用于验证该第二加密信息。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该接收单元还用于接收来自该第一终 端设备的第二认证结果和第二签名，该第二认证结果用于指示该第一用户是否可信，该第二签名用于验证该第二认证结果；该认证单元认证该第一用户是否可信，包括：该认证单元验证该第二签名，验证通过时根据该第二认证结果认证该第一用户是否可信。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该第二签名为基于第一SIM卡私钥对该第二认证结果进行签名生成的签名；该认证单元验证该第二签名，包括：该认证单元基于第一SIM卡公钥验证该第二签名，其中，该第一SIM卡私钥和该第一SIM卡公钥为第一SIM卡公私钥对，第一SIM卡设置在该第一终端设备中，该第一SIM卡私钥保存在该第一SIM卡中，该第一SIM卡公钥保存在该装置中。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，当该第一用户为主叫用户时，在该认证单元认证该第一用户是否可信之前，该装置还包括：获取单元，用于获取该第一用户的历史呼叫数据，该第一用户的历史呼叫数据用于指示该第一用户的呼叫习惯，包括以下至少一项：该第一用户发起呼叫的时间点分布数据、该第一用户发起呼叫时该第二用户接通呼叫的频率数据、该第一用户发起呼叫时该第二终端设备振铃时长数据、该第一用户的通话时长分布数据、该第一用户发起呼叫的地理位置分布数据、该第二用户为首次被呼叫的比率、该第二用户号码归属地分布数据；该处理单元还用于根据预设的策略和该第一用户的历史呼叫数据确定该第一用户发起的呼叫是否可信；该认证单元认证该第一用户是否可信，包括：该认证单元根据该第一用户发起的呼叫是否可信认证该第一用户是否可信。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该处理单元还用于确定第三公私钥对，该第三公私钥对包括第三私钥和第三公钥；该装置保存该第三私钥。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，当该第一用户和该第二用户分别所属的第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，该发送单元向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名，具体为：该发送单元向该第二终端设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名；该发送单元还用于向该第二终端设备发送该第三公钥，该第三公钥用于该第二终端设备验证该第一签名。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该认证单元，还用于认证该第二用户是否可信，得到第三认证结果；该处理单元，还用于对该第三认证结果进行签名，生成第三签名；该发送单元，还用于向该第一终端设备发送该第三认证结果和该第三签名；该发送单元，还用于向该第一终端设备发送该第三公钥，该第三公钥用于该第一终端设备验证该第三签名。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该装置还包括：接收单元，用于接收来自该第二终端设备的第二消息，该第二消息中包括第三加密信息，该第三加密信息为加密后的该第二用户的生理特征信息，该第二用户的生理特征信包括以下至少一项：该第二用户的指纹信息、该第二用户的声纹信息、该第二用户的人脸信息、该第二用户的虹膜信息和该第二用户的掌纹信息；该发送单元还用于向第三方认证机构发送该第二用户的标识信息和该第三加密信息，该第三加密信息用于该第三方认证机构认证该第二用户是否可信，该第二用户的标识信息用于标识该第二用户；该接收单元还用于接收来自该第三方认证机构的第三信息，该第三信息用于指示该第二用户是否可信；该认证单元认证该第二用户是否可信，包括：该认证单元根据该第三信息认证该第二用户是否可信。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该第二消息包括以下至少一种：信令 消息、视频数据和音频数据，当该第二消息为该视频数据和/或该音频数据时，该第二消息中周期性地携带该第三加密信息。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，在该接收单元接收来自该第二终端设备的第二消息之前，该接收单元还用于从该第三方认证机构获取第三加密方法和第五公钥；该发送单元还用于向该第二终端设备发送该第三加密方法和该第五公钥，其中，该第五公钥为该第三方认证机构确定的第五公私钥对中的公钥，该第五公私钥对中还包括第五私钥，该第三加密方法和该第五公钥用于该第二终端设备加密该第二用户的生理特征信息得到该第三加密信息，该第五私钥保存在该第三方认证机构中用于验证该第三加密信息。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，在该认证单元认证该第二用户是否可信之前，该装置还包括：获取单元，用于获取该第二用户的生理特征信息，该第二用户的生理特征信息包括该第二用户的声纹信息和/或该第二用户的人脸信息；该处理单元还用于基于第四加密方法和第六公钥对该第二用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第四加密信息；该发送单元还用于向第三方认证机构发送该第二用户的标识信息和该第四加密信息，该第四加密信息用于该第三方认证机构认证该第二用户是否可信，该第二用户的标识信息用于标识该第二用户；该接收单元还用于接收来自该第三方认证机构的第四信息，该第四信息用于指示该二用户是否可信；该认证单元认证该第二用户是否可信，包括：该认证单元根据该第四信息认证该第二用户是否可信；其中，该第六公钥为该第三方认证机构确定的第六公私钥对中的公钥，该第六公私钥对中还包括第六私钥，该第四加密方法为该第三方认证机构确定的，该第六私钥用于验证该第四加密信息。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该接收单元还用于接收来自该第二终端设备的第五认证结果和第七签名，该第五认证结果为该第二终端设备确定的用于指示该第二用户是否可信，该第七签名用于验证该第四认证结果；该认证单元认证该第二用户是否可信，包括：该认证单元验证该第七签名，验证通过时根据该第五认证结果认证该第二用户是否可信。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该第七签名为基于第二SIM卡私钥对该第五认证结果进行签名生成的签名；该认证单元验证该第七签名，包括：该认证单元基于第二SIM卡公钥验证该第七签名，其中，该第二SIM卡私钥和该第二SIM卡公钥为第二SIM卡公私钥对，第二SIM卡设置在该第二终端设备中，该第二SIM卡私钥保存在该第二SIM卡中，该第二SIM卡公钥保存在该装置中。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，当该第二用户为主叫用户时，在该认证单元认证该第二用户是否可信之前，该装置还包括：获取单元，用于获取该第二用户的历史呼叫数据，该第二用户的历史呼叫数据用于指示该第二用户设备的呼叫习惯，包括以下至少一项：该第二用户发起呼叫的时间点分布数据、该第二用户发起呼叫时该第一用户接通呼叫的频率数据、该第二用户发起呼叫时该第一终端设备振铃时长数据、该第二用户的通话时长分布数据、该第二用户发起呼叫的地理位置分布数据、该第一用户为首次呼叫的比率、该第一用户号码归属地分布数据；该处理单元还用于根据预设的策略和该第二用户的历史呼叫数据确定该第二用户发起的呼叫是否可信；该认证单元认证该第二用户是否可信，包括：该认证单元根据该第二用户发起的呼叫是否可信认证该第一用户是否可信。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，当该第一用户和该第二用户分别所属 的第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商时，该发送单元向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送该第一认证结果和该第一签名，具体为：该发送单元向该第二运营商网络设备发送该第一签名和该第一认证结果；该发送单元还用于向第二运营商网络设备发送该第三公钥，该第三公钥用于该第二运营商网络设备验证该第一签名；其中，该第一认证结果和该第四私钥用于该第二运营商网络设备生成第四签名，该第四签名用于发送给该第二终端设备指示该第二终端设备验证该第一认证结果，该第四私钥保存在该第二运营商网络设备中，该第四私钥和第四公钥为第四公私钥对。
结合第五方面，在第五方面的某些实现方式中，该接收单元还用于接收来自该第二运营商网络设备的该第四公钥；该接收单元还用于接收来自第二运营商网络设备的第五签名和第四认证结果，该第五签名为基于该第四私钥对该第四认证结果进行签名生成的签名，该第四认证结果用于指示该第二用户是否可信；该处理单元基于该第四公钥验证该第五签名；验证成功后，该处理单元基于该第三私钥对该第四认证结果进行签名，生成第六签名；该发送单元向该第一终端设备发送该第四认证结果和该第六签名。
第六方面提供了一种认证的装置，该认证的装置包括：
接收单元，用于接收来自运营商网络设备的加密方法和公钥；处理单元，用于基于该加密方法和该公钥对用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成加密信息，用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：用户的指纹信息、用户的声纹信息、用户的人脸信息、用户的虹膜信息和用户的掌纹信息；发送单元，用于向运营商网络设备发送加密信息，其中，用户为使用该装置向运营商网络设备发送消息的用户，公钥为第三方认证机构确定的公私钥对中的公钥，该公私钥对中还包括私钥，该私钥保存在该第三方认证机构中用于验证该一加密信息。
第七方面提供了一种认证的装置，该认证的装置包括：
认证单元，用于认证用户是否可信，得到认证结果；处理单元，用于基于SIM私钥对该认证结果进行签名，生成签名；发送单元，用于向运营商网络设备发送该认证结果和该签名。
第八方面，提供了一种认证的装置，该认证的装置包括：
管理单元，用于管理用户的标识信息和该用户的生理特征信息，该用户的标识信息用于标识该用户，该用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：该用户的指纹信息、该用户的声纹信息、该用户的人脸信息、该用户的虹膜信息和该用户的掌纹信息；处理单元，用于确定加密该用户的生理特征信息的公钥和加密方法；发送单元，用于向运营商网络设备发送该加密方法和该公钥；接收单元，用于接收来自运营商网络设备的该用户的标识信息和加密信息，该加密信息为加密后的该用户的生理特征信息；该处理单元还用于基于该用户的标识信息确定该用户，并基于私钥验证该加密信息，根据该验证结果确定该用户是否可信，该公钥和该私钥为一对公私钥对；该发送单元还用于向运营商网络设备发送指示该用户是否可信的信息，其中，该用户为使用终端设备向该运营商网络设备发送消息的用户。
结合第八方面，在第八方面的某些实现方式中，该加密信息为运营商网络设备确定的，或者该加密信息为终端设备确定的。
第九方面，提供一种认证的装置，该认证的装置包括处理器，用于实现上述第一方面描述的方法中第一运营商网络设备的功能。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该认证的装置还可以包括存储器，该存储器与该处理器耦合，该处理器用于实现上述第一方面描述的方法中第一运营商网络设备的功能。
在一种可能的实现中，该存储器用于存储程序指令和数据。该存储器与该处理器耦合，该处理器可以调用并执行该存储器中存储的程序指令，用于实现上述第一方面描述的方法中第一运营商网络设备的功能。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该认证的装置还可以包括通信接口，该通信接口用于该认证的装置与其它设备进行通信。该通信接口可以为收发器、输入/输出接口、或电路等。
在一种可能的设计中，该认证的装置包括：处理器和通信接口，
该处理器用于运行计算机程序，以使得该认证的装置实现上述第一方面描述的任一种方法；
该处理器利用该通信接口与外部通信。
可以理解，该外部可以是处理器以外的对象，或者是该装置以外的对象。
在另一种可能的设计中，该认证的装置为芯片或芯片系统。该通信接口可以是该芯片或芯片系统上输入/输出接口、接口电路、输出电路、输入电路、管脚或相关电路等。该处理器也可以体现为处理电路或逻辑电路。
第十方面，提供一种认证的装置，该认证的装置包括处理器，用于实现上述第二方面和第三方面描述的方法中终端设备的功能。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该认证的装置还可以包括存储器，该存储器与该处理器耦合，该处理器用于实现上述第二方面和第三方面描述的方法中终端设备的功能。
在一种可能的实现中，该存储器用于存储程序指令和数据。该存储器与该处理器耦合，该处理器可以调用并执行该存储器中存储的程序指令，用于实现上述第二方面和第三方面描述的方法中终端设备的功能。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该认证的装置还可以包括通信接口，该通信接口用于该认证的装置与其它设备进行通信。该通信接口可以为收发器、输入/输出接口、或电路等。
在一种可能的设计中，该认证的装置包括：处理器和通信接口，
该处理器利用该通信接口与外部通信；
该处理器用于运行计算机程序，以使得该认证的装置实现上述第二方面和第三方面描述的任一种方法。
可以理解，该外部可以是处理器以外的对象，或者是该装置以外的对象。
在另一种可能的设计中，该认证的装置为芯片或芯片系统。该通信接口可以是该芯片或芯片系统上的输入/输出接口、接口电路、输出电路、输入电路、管脚或相关电路等。该处理器也可以体现为处理电路或逻辑电路。
第十一方面，提供一种认证的装置，该认证的装置包括处理器，用于实现上述第四方面描述的方法中第三方认证机构的功能。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该认证的装置还可以包括存储器，该存储器与该处理器耦合，该处理器用于实现上述第四方面描述的方法中第三方认证机构的功能。
在一种可能的实现中，该存储器用于存储程序指令和数据。该存储器与该处理器耦合，该处理器可以调用并执行该存储器中存储的程序指令，用于实现上述第四方面描述的方法中第三方认证机构的功能。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该认证的装置还可以包括通信接口，该通信接口用于该认证的装置与其它设备进行通信。该通信接口可以为收发器、输入/输出接口、或电路等。
在一种可能的设计中，该认证的装置包括：处理器和通信接口，
该处理器利用该通信接口与外部通信；
该处理器用于运行计算机程序，以使得该认证的装置实现上述第四方面描述的任一种方法。
可以理解，该外部可以是处理器以外的对象，或者是该装置以外的对象。
在另一种可能的设计中，该认证的装置为芯片或芯片系统。该通信接口可以是该芯片或芯片系统上的输入/输出接口、接口电路、输出电路、输入电路、管脚或相关电路等。该处理器也可以体现为处理电路或逻辑电路。
第十二方面，本申请提供一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述各方面该的方法。
第十三方面，本申请提供一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述各方面该的方法。
第十四方面，提供了一种通信系统，包括第五方面所示的认证的装置至第八方面所示的认证的装置。
第十五方面，提供了一种芯片或者芯片系统，该芯片或者芯片系统包括至少一个处理器和通信接口，通信接口和至少一个处理器通过线路互联，至少一个处理器用于运行计算机程序或指令，以进行第一方面至第四方面中任一种可能实现方式中的方法。其中，芯片中的通信接口可以为输入/输出接口、管脚或电路等。
在一种可能的实现中，本申请中上述描述的芯片或者芯片系统还包括至少一个存储器，该至少一个存储器中存储有指令。该存储器可以为芯片内部的存储单元，例如，寄存器、缓存等，也可以是该芯片的存储单元(例如，只读存储器、随机存取存储器等)。
附图说明
图1示出了本申请实施例适用的网络架构的一种示意图框图。
图2是一种通信方法的示意性流程图。
图3是另一种通信方法的示意性流程图。
图4是本申请提供的一种认证的方法的示意性流程图。
图5是本申请实施例提供的一种认证方式的示意性流程图。
图6中的(a)和(b)是本申请提供的密钥分发流程。
图7是本申请实施例提供的另一种认证方式的示意性流程图。
图8是本申请实施例提供的又一种认证方式的示意性流程图。
图9是本申请实施例提供的又一种认证方式的示意性流程图。
图10是本申请实施例提供的一种呼叫流程示意性流程图。
图11是本申请实施例提供的另一种呼叫流程示意性流程图。
图12是本申请实施例提供的又一种呼叫流程示意性流程图。
图13是本申请提供的认证的装置1300的示意图。
图14是适用于本申请实施例的运营商网络设备1400的结构示意图。
图15是适用于本申请实施例的运营商网络设备1500的结构示意图。
图16是本申请提供的认证的装置1600的示意图。
图17是适用于本申请实施例的终端设备1700的结构示意图。
图18是本申请提供的认证的装置1800的示意图。
图19是适用于本申请实施例的第三方认证机构1900的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合附图，对本申请中的技术方案进行描述。
本申请实施例的技术方案可以应用于各种通信系统，例如：第五代(5th generation，5G)系统或新无线(new radio，NR)、长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)系统、LTE频分双工(frequency division duplex，FDD)系统、LTE时分双工(time division duplex，TDD)等。本申请提供的技术方案还可以应用于未来的通信系统，如第六代移动通信系统。本申请实施例的技术方案还可以应用于设备到设备(device to device，D2D)通信，车辆外联(vehicle-to-everything，V2X)通信，机器到机器(machine to machine，M2M)通信，机器类型通信(machine type communication，MTC)，以及物联网(internet of things，IoT)通信系统或者其他通信系统。
为便于理解本申请实施例，首先结合图1简单介绍本申请实施例适用的通信系统。
作为示例性说明，图1示出了本申请实施例适用的网络架构的一种示意图框图。如图1所示，该网络架构可以包括但不限于以下设备(或者称为功能网元、节点、网元等)：
用户设备(user equipment，UE)#A、UE#B和运营商网络设备。
下面对图1中示出的各设备进行简单介绍：
1、用户设备：上述的UE#A和UE#B均可以称为用户设备，不同的是：UE#A和UE#B中一个UE为主叫UE，另一个UE为被叫UE。具体地，本申请实施例中对于两个UE中哪一个为主叫UE，哪一个为被叫UE不做限制。
本申请实施例中涉及的用户设备可以包括各种具有无线通信功能的手持设备、车载设备、可穿戴设备、计算设备或连接到无线调制解调器的其它处理设备，以及各种形式的终端、移动台(mobile station，MS)、终端(terminal)或软终端等等。例如，水表、电表、传感器等。
示例性地，本申请实施例中的用户设备可以指接入终端、用户单元、用户站、移动站、移动台、中继站、远方站、远程终端、移动设备、用户终端(user terminal)、终端设备(terminal equipment)、无线通信设备、用户代理或用户装置。用户设备还可以是蜂窝电话、无绳电话、会话启动协议(session initiation protocol，SIP)电话、无线本地环路(wireless local loop，WLL)站、个人数字助理(personal digital assistant，PDA)、具有无线通信功能的手持设备、计算设备或连接到无线调制解调器的其它处理设备、车载设备、可穿戴设备，5G网络中的用户设备或者未来演进的公用陆地移动通信网络(public land mobile network，PLMN)中的用户设备或者未来车联网中的用户设备等，本申请实施例对此并不限定。
作为示例而非限定，在本申请实施例中，可穿戴设备也可以称为穿戴式智能设备，是应用穿戴式技术对日常穿戴进行智能化设计、开发出可以穿戴的设备的总称，如眼镜、手 套、手表、服饰及鞋等。可穿戴设备即直接穿在身上，或是整合到用户的衣服或配件的一种便携式设备。可穿戴设备不仅仅是一种硬件设备，更是通过软件支持以及数据交互、云端交互来实现强大的功能。广义穿戴式智能设备包括功能全、尺寸大、可不依赖智能手机实现完整或者部分的功能，例如：智能手表或智能眼镜等，以及只专注于某一类应用功能，需要和其它设备如智能手机配合使用，如各类进行体征监测的智能手环、智能首饰等。
此外，在本申请实施例中，用户设备还可以是物联网(internet of Things，IoT)系统中的用户设备，IoT是未来信息技术发展的重要组成部分，其主要技术特点是将物品通过通信技术与网络连接，从而实现人机互连，物物互连的智能化网络。在本申请实施例中，IOT技术可以通过例如窄带(narrow band，NB)技术，做到海量连接，深度覆盖，终端省电。此外，在本申请实施例中，用户设备还可以包括智能打印机、火车探测器、加油站等传感器，主要功能包括收集数据(部分用户设备)、接收接入网设备的控制信息与下行数据，并发送电磁波，向接入网设备传输上行数据。
需要注意的是，本申请实施例中涉及的用户设备为可信用户设备，即该用户设备为可信设备制造商生产，且通过了可信设备认证机构认证的用户设备。
2、运营商网络设备：可以理解为呼叫会话控制功能(call session control function，CSCF)网元，CSCF网元是IMS中的会话控制功能体。CSCF在IP多媒体子系统(IP multimedia subsystem，IMS)网络系统中实现了多媒体呼叫中主要的软交换控制功能。CSCF网元又可以分为代理呼叫控制功能网元(proxy-call session control function，P-CSCF)、查询呼叫控制功能网元(interrogating-call session control function，I-CSCF)和服务呼叫控制功能网元(serving-call session control function，S-CSCF)。CSCF可以简称为呼叫控制服务器。
P-CSCF：可处于UE当前所在的接入网内，作为UE接入IMS网络的第一个联系网元，把UE的初始会话协议(session initiation protocol，SIP)消息转发到IMS核心网，并且将收到的SIP消息转发给UE。
S-CSCF：作为核心的呼叫控制实体，完成基本的呼叫控制功能，其中，SIP消息需要经过它的处理，包括路由、应用服务器(application server，AS)业务触发、重走向等主要控制功能。需要注意的是，本申请实施例中涉及的运营商网络设备位于可信通信运营商的通信网络中，用于认证通信双方(主叫用户设备和被叫用户设备)的用户身份是否可信的设备。
运营商网络设备和用户设备可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以部署在水面上；还可以部署在空中的飞机、气球或者卫星上。本申请实施例中对运营商网络设备和用户设备所处的场景不做限定。
在本申请实施例中，运营商网络设备或用户设备包括硬件层、运行在硬件层之上的操作系统层，以及运行在操作系统层上的应用层。该硬件层包括中央处理器(central processing unit，CPU)、内存管理单元(memory management unit，MMU)和内存(也称为主存)等硬件。该操作系统可以是任意一种或多种通过进程(process)实现业务处理的计算机操作系统，例如，Linux操作系统、Unix操作系统、Android操作系统、iOS操作系统或windows操作系统等。该应用层包含浏览器、通讯录、文字处理软件、即时通信软件等应用。
另外，本申请的各个方面或特征可以实现成方法、装置或使用标准编程和/或工程技 术的制品。本申请中使用的术语“制品”涵盖可从任何计算机可读器件、载体或介质访问的计算机程序。例如，计算机可读介质可以包括，但不限于：磁存储器件(例如，硬盘、软盘或磁带等)，光盘(例如，压缩盘(compact disc，CD)、数字通用盘(digital versatile disc，DVD)等)，智能卡和闪存器件(例如，可擦写可编程只读存储器(erasable programmable read-only memory，EPROM)、卡、棒或钥匙驱动器等)。另外，本文描述的各种存储介质可代表用于存储信息的一个或多个设备和/或其它机器可读介质。术语“机器可读存储介质”可包括但不限于，无线信道和能够存储、包含和/或承载指令和/或数据的各种其它介质。
应理解，图1仅为便于理解而示例的简化示意图，该通信系统中还可以包括其他设备，图1中未予以画出。
示例性地，通信系统中还可以包括核心网设备，运营商网络设备可以通过无线或有线方式与核心网设备连接。核心网设备与运营商网络设备可以是独立的不同的物理设备，也可以是将核心网设备的功能与运营商网络设备的逻辑功能集成在同一个物理设备上，还可以是一个物理设备上集成了部分核心网设备的功能和部分的运营商网络设备的功能。
为便于理解本申请实施例，下面对本申请实施例中涉及的几个基本概念做简单说明。
1、AI换脸。
AI换脸在于可以将视频中的人脸，通过AI算法图像处理(Photoshop，PS)换成另一个人的相貌。近几年，AI换脸应用ZAO的出现，引起了轩然大波，只需要把照片上传到ZAO当中，就能够将视频中指定的人脸PS成相应的脸，可谓是操作简单、效果明了。
2、AI变声。
使用神经网络机器学习算法来训练模型，所拟真出来的声音真假难辨。声音的自由变换对于我们来说并不是那么遥远，例如modulate.ai这个网站，就提供了AI变声服务，甚至连名人的声音都能完美模仿，modulate.ai所使用的变声技术和DeepFakes类似。另外还有lyrebird.ai这个网站，也提供了类似的服务，而且所提供的模仿对象更加丰富，据悉多达上千种。
3、电信诈骗。
电信诈骗是指通过电话、网络和短信方式，编造虚假信息，设置骗局，对受害人实施远程、非接触式诈骗，诱使受害人打款或转账的犯罪行为，通常以冒充他人及仿冒、伪造各种合法外衣和形式的方式达到欺骗的目的。
4、密钥。
密钥是一种参数，它是在明文转换为密文或将密文转换为明文的算法中输入的参数。
5、公钥和私钥。
公钥是与私钥算法一起使用的密钥对的非秘密一半。公钥通常用于加密会话密钥、验证数字签名，或加密可以用相应的私钥解密的数据。公钥和私钥是通过一种算法得到的一个密钥对(即一个公钥和一个私钥)，其中的一个向外界公开，称为公钥；另个自己保留，称为私钥。通过这种算法得到的密钥对能保证在世界范围内是唯一的。使用这个密钥对的时候,如果用其中一个密钥加密一段数据，必须用另一个密钥解密。如用公钥加密数据就必须用私钥解密，如果用私钥加密也必须用公钥解密，否则解密将不会成功。
私钥加密算法使用单个私钥来加密和解密数据。由于具有密钥的任意一方都可以使用该密钥解密数据，因此必须保护密钥不被未经授权的代理得到。私钥加密又称为对称加密， 因为同一密钥既用于加密又用于解密。
6、签名。
本申请实施例中涉及的签名可以理解为，数字签名(或者称公钥数字签名)是只有信息的发送者才能产生的别人无法伪造的一段数字串，这段数字串同时也是对信息的发送者发送信息真实性的一个有效证明。它是一种类似写在纸上的普通的物理签名，但是使用了公钥加密领域的技术来实现的，用于鉴别数字信息的方法。一套数字签名通常定义两种互补的运算，一个用于签名，另一个用于验证。数字签名是非对称密钥加密技术与数字摘要技术的应用。
7、会话初始协议(session initiation protocol，SIP)。
SIP是一个应用层的信令控制协议。用于创建、修改和释放一个或多个参与者的会话。这些会话可以是Internet多媒体会议、IP电话或多媒体分发。会话的参与者可以通过组播(multicast)、网状单播(unicast)或两者的混合体进行通信。
由上述基本概念中介绍的AI换脸、AI变声以及电信诈骗可知，AI换脸、AI变声等技术的出现，为犯罪分子提供了新的电信诈骗途径。因此，如何实现可信通信，即通过端到端配合，从通信内容采集、通信内容传输到通信内容呈现等过程中，都能保证通信内容是真实的且没有被篡改过，这对于避免或减少电信诈骗具有重要积极的作用。
一种通信方法通过实名验证能够保证通信内容是可信的，下面结合图2简单介绍该通信方法。图2是一种通信方法的示意性流程图，包括以下步骤：
S210，向SIM卡发送应用程序的实名验证请求，所述实名验证请求包括应用程序标识。
S220，接收SIM卡发送的第一对比结果，该第一对比结果为运营商后台系统将SIM卡提供的指纹信息和预先保存的指纹信息进行对比而得出的。
S230，接收运营商后台系统发送的第二对比结果，该第二对比结果为运营商后台系统将接收到的SIM卡标识和查询出的与应用程序标识对应的SIM卡标识进行对比而得出的。
S240，查询所述第一对比结果和所述第二对比结果是否均为一致。
若是执行步骤S250，确定出实名验证成功；若否执行步骤S260，确定出实名验证失败。
图2所示的方法流程能够顺利进行的前提是运营商需要采集并存储用户的指纹数据，而指纹数据是非常敏感的个人隐私信息，用户不一定愿意将指纹数据交由运营商存储与使用。
另一种通信方法通过可信认证能够保证通信内容是可信的，主要涉及到设备可信和用户可信。
其中，设备可信涉及三方角色：可信设备认证机构、可信设备证书中心、可信设备制造商；用户可信也涉及三方角色：可信用户证书中心、可信用户身份认证机构、可信通信服务商。
设备可信所涉及的各方角色的职责包括：
1、可信设备认证机构职责：
1)认证可信设备制造商制造的设备(如手机、IOT终端)是否可信，包括但不限于终端硬件从芯片、驱动、操作系统、基础软件是否支持可信启动，通信信息(音频、视频、 温度、速度等)采集、处理、发送、呈现阶段支持防篡改等。认证通过后发布将相应硬件纳入可信设备型号列表；
2)关注业界安全动态，刷新可信设备型号列表。
例如，2年前生产的设备被黑客破解，已无法保证可信通信时，需要从可信设备型号列表中删除该款设备；
3)提供可信设备型号是否可信查询接口。
2、可信设备证书中心的职责：
1)生成并管理可信设备数字证书密钥：密钥K1&公钥K2；
2)对可信设备认证机构认证通过对用户设备，使用K1签名可信设备制造商提供的具体设备硬件信息，为每台设备都生成一个独一无二的可信设备数字证书。
3、可信设备制造商的职责：
1)生产可信用户设备并通过可信设备认证机构认证；
2)生产每台可信设备时，都分配一组密钥：密钥K3&公钥K4，其中K3写到终端固件中并限制只有终端的底层可信系统软件可读；
3)将媒体可信设备的设备型号、设备号、MAC地址等硬件信息和K4提交给可信设备证书中心，由可信设备证书中心生成该设备的数字证书，并写到用户设备固件中
其中，上述的可信权威机构认证、可信设备证书中心可以是一家机构，也可以是不同机构。
用户可信所涉及的各方角色的职责包括：
1、可信用户证书中心的职责：
1)生成并管理可信用户凭证数字证书密钥：密钥K5&公钥K6；
2)使用K5签名可信用户认证机构认证提供的具体用户信息，为每个用户身份生成一个独一无二的可信用户数字证书。
2、可信用户身份认证机构的职责：
1)支持用户注册、添加可信身份凭证，对用户进行身份验证(例如实名验证)，在身份验证通过后，收集该身份凭证对应的校验信息。如密码、指纹、声纹、视网膜特征等；
其中，一个用户可以有多个身份凭证，如密码凭证1、密码凭证2、指纹凭证、声纹凭证、视网膜凭证等。某个身份凭证不可信不影响其余身份凭证是否可信。
2)针对每个用户身份凭证，生成一组密码，包括：
身份凭证公开信息密码：密钥K7&公钥K8；
身份凭证隐私信息密码：密钥K9&公钥K10；
3)将用户姓名、身份凭证ID、性别等公开信息和K8提交给可信用户证书中心，由可信用户证书中心生成该用户身份的公开数字证书；
4)将用户姓名、身份凭证ID、性别等公开信息和K9签名后的用户隐私信息(如身份凭证的校验信息(密码、指纹、声纹、视网膜特征)、身份证号等)提交给可信用户证书中心，由可信用户证书中心生成该用户身份的私密数字证书；
5)定期对用户进行可信验证、接收用户身份凭证撤销申请，并刷新用户身份可信状态。避免用户身份凭证泄露后被第三方冒用(如密码泄漏)；
6)提供用户身份可信状态查询接口。
3、可信通信服务商的职责：
1)提供用户开户、签约、通信业务开通功能；
2)根据用户授权，从可信用户身份认证机构获得用户身份的公开数字证书和私密数字证书、K10、K7，并发放到用户的用户设备上(如写在手机SIM卡中或加密保存在用户手机上)；
3)生成并管理通信服务商可信背书密钥：密钥K11&公钥K12。
示例性地，上述的可信用户身份认证机构、可信用户证书中心、可信通信服务商三者可以是同一家机构，也可以是三家机构，也可以是两家机构。
例如，政府机关作为可信用户身份认证机构；第三方证书中心作为可信用户证书中心；电信运营商(移动或联通)或OTT厂商(微信或支付宝)作为可信通信服务商。
还例如，电信运营商(移动或联通)同时作为可信用户身份认证机构、可信用户证书中心、可信通信服务商。
下面结合图3简单介绍该通信方法。图3是另一种通信方法的示意性流程图，包括以下步骤：
S310，主叫用户使用可信设备(如图3中所示的主叫用户设备)发起呼叫。
具体地，可信设备发起呼叫时，可信设备在确定自身可信链未被攻破(如未被root、芯片未被物理攻击、操作系统/基础软件未被篡改、采集内容未经过不可控软件处理等)时，再判断用户身份是否可信：
使用K6校验用户身份的私密数字证书，校验成功后，获得用K9加密的用户隐私信息；
再用K10校验证书中用K9加密的用户隐私信息。
校验成功后，使用用户隐私信息中的身份凭证校验信息与呼叫用户输入/终端收集到的信息是否匹配，如果匹配则认为用户身份可信，允许发起可信呼叫。
示例性地，用户身份验证也可以在发起可信呼叫前验证，如手机开机、解锁时通过密码、指纹等信息验证用户身份后，即可认为发起呼叫时用户身份可信。
如果主叫用户使用的可信，且用户身份可信，则在发起的呼叫请求中添加主叫可信参数。可信参数包括：
设备可信证书：使用K1签名的包括带设备型号、设备号、K4等信息的证书；
设备可信签名：使用K3签名，签名内容可包括如下至参数的少一项：
消息摘要、设备型号、设备号、用户姓名、身份凭证ID和时间戳，其中，消息摘要为呼叫请求消息内容的校验值，可校验消息本身是否被篡改；设备型号和/或设备号标识用户设备固件信息；用户姓名和/或身份凭证ID标识发起呼叫的用户身份；时间戳标识签名时间。
用户身份公开可信证书：使用K5签名的包括带用户姓名、身份凭证ID、K8等信息的证书；
用户可信签名：使用K7签名，签名内容可包括如下参数的至少一项：
消息摘要、设备型号、设备号、用户姓名、身份凭证ID和时间戳。
可信主体(通信网络)收到主叫呼叫请求后，执行步骤：
S320，寻址被叫用户设备。
S321，对被叫用户设备发起呼叫请求。
在发起呼叫请求时，透传主叫的可信签名
被叫用户使用可信设备(如图3中所示的被叫用户设备)收到可信呼叫请求，在确定自身可信链未被攻破时，执行步骤：
S330，验证主叫。
具体地，被叫用户设备对请求中的可信签名进行主叫用户身份可信验证和主叫设备可信验证。如果验证通过，提示主叫用户可信。
具体地，主叫用户身份可信验证包括：
使用K6校验可信参数中的用户身份公开可信证书，校验通过后，提取证书中的K8；
使用K8校验可信参数中的用户可信签名，根据签名中的消息摘要、设备型号、设备号、时间戳等信息，确认呼叫请求未被篡改和重复攻击。
主叫设备可信验证：
使用K2校验可信参数中的设备可信证书，校验通过后，提取证书中的K4；
使用K4校验可信参数中的设备可信签名，根据签名中的消息摘要、用户姓名、身份凭证ID、时间戳等信息，确认呼叫请求未被篡改和重复攻击。
其中，被叫获得K2、K6的方法很多。如，系统预置方式；还如，业界主流证书中心设置方式；又如，设置为公钥方式等。
被叫用户使用可信设备接听呼叫，并执行步骤：
S340，被叫用户设备向运营商网络设备发送响应消息。
S341，运营商网络设备向主叫用户设备发送响应消息。
被叫用户使用可信设备发送响应消息时，与主叫类似，可信设备在确定自身可信链未被攻破且判断被叫用户身份可信后，在响应消息中添加被叫可信参数。其中被叫用户可信签名使用K7’签名，被叫设备可信签名使用K3’签名。
主叫用户使用可信设备收到响应消息后，并执行步骤：
S350，验证被叫。
具体地，主叫用户设备对响应中的可信签名进行被叫用户身份可信验证和被叫设备可信验证。
如果验证通过，提示被叫用户可信。
具体地，可以使用参考被叫验证主叫的验证机制对被叫用户可信签名和被叫设备可信签名进行校验，验证通过则提示被叫用户可信。
呼叫接续过程完成后，执行步骤：
S360，主叫向被叫发送通信内容。
主叫向被叫发送通信内容(音频、视频)时，可信设备在确定自身可信链未被攻破、用户身份可信时，对采集到的通信内容添加主叫可信参数并发送出去。
被叫使用可信设备收到可信通信内容时，在确定自身可信链未被攻破时，对通信内容中的可信签名进行主叫身份可信验证和主叫终端可信验证。如果验证通过，提示用户通信内容可信。
被叫向主叫发送可信通信内容的签名机制、校验机制与上述的主叫向被叫发送通信内容类似，不在赘述。
图3所示的通信方法中可信认证过程主要在用户设备侧完成，对用户设备要求高。
由上述可以图2以及图3所示的通信方法虽然能够保证消息的可靠性，避免或者减少电信诈骗，但是存在一些缺陷(如需要存储敏感身份信息；还如用户设备需要较高的配置)，本申请提供另一种认证的方法，也能够避免或者减少电信诈骗。
应理解，本申请实施例提供认证的方法可以应用于各种通信系统中，例如，图1中所示的通信系统中。
下文示出的实施例并未对本申请实施例提供的方法的执行主体的具体结构特别限定，只要能够通过运行记录有本申请实施例的提供的方法的代码的程序，以根据本申请实施例提供的方法进行通信即可，例如，本申请实施例提供的方法的执行主体可以是用户设备或运营商网络设备，或者，是用户设备或运营商网络设备中能够调用程序并执行程序的功能模块。
为了便于理解本申请实施例，做出以下几点说明。
第一，在本申请中，“用于指示”可以理解为“使能”，“使能”可以包括直接使能和间接使能。当描述某一信息使能A时，可以包括该信息直接使能A或间接使能A，而并不代表该信息中一定携带有A。
将信息所使能的信息称为待使能信息，则具体实现过程中，对待使能信息进行使能的方式有很多种，例如但不限于，可以直接使能待使能信息，如待使能信息本身或者该待使能信息的索引等。也可以通过使能其他信息来间接使能待使能信息，其中该其他信息与待使能信息之间存在关联关系。还可以仅仅使能待使能信息的一部分，而待使能信息的其他部分则是已知的或者提前约定的。例如，还可以借助预先约定(例如协议规定)的各个信息的排列顺序来实现对特定信息的使能，从而在一定程度上降低使能开销。同时，还可以识别各个信息的通用部分并统一使能，以降低单独使能同样的信息而带来的使能开销。
第二，在本申请中示出的第一、第二以及各种数字编号(例如，“#1”、“#2”等)仅为描述方便，用于区分的对象，并不用来限制本申请实施例的范围。例如，区分不同的信息等。而不是用于描述特定的顺序或先后次序。应该理解这样描述的对象在适当情况下可以互换，以便能够描述本申请的实施例以外的方案。
第三，在本申请中，“预设”可包括预先定义，例如，协议定义。其中，“预先定义”可以通过在设备(例如，包括终端设备或网络设备)中预先保存相应的代码、表格或其他可用于指示相关信息的方式来实现，本申请对于其具体的实现方式不做限定。
第四，本申请实施例中涉及的“保存”，可以是指的保存在一个或者多个存储器中。所述一个或者多个存储器，可以是单独的设置，也可以是集成在编码器或者译码器，处理器、或通信装置中。所述一个或者多个存储器，也可以是一部分单独设置，一部分集成在译码器、处理器、或通信装置中。存储器的类型可以是任意形式的存储介质，本申请并不对此限定。
第五，本申请实施例中涉及的“协议”可以是指通信领域的标准协议，例如可以包括5G协议、新空口(new radio，NR)协议以及应用于未来的通信系统中的相关协议，本申请对此不做限定。
以下，不失一般性，以终端设备和运营商网络设备之间的交互为例详细说明本申请实施例提供的认证的方法。
图4是本申请提供的一种认证的方法的示意性流程图。包括以下全部或者部分步骤：
S410，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果。
具体地，第一用户为使用第一终端设备向该第一运营商网络设备发送消息的用户，例如，第一用户为第一终端设备(如，智能手机)的使用者，该第一终端设备可以向第一运营商网络设备发送消息。
第一运营商网络设备包括为第一用户提供服务的运营商网络设备。例如，第一运营商网络设备为中国移动设置的接入网设备，第一用户为入网了中国移动的用户；还例如，第一运营商网络设备为中国联通设置的接入网设备，第一用户为入网了中国联通的用户。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备包括CSCF网元。例如，可以是S-CSCF网元。
本申请实施例中涉及的运营商网络设备可以是可信通讯服务商设置的网络设备，例如，可以是中国移动设置的网络设备；还例如，可以是中国联通设置的网络设备；又例如，可以是中国电信设置的网络设备；或者还可以是其他可信的通讯服务商设置的网络设备。
应理解，本申请实施例中对于运营商网络设备的具体设置不做限制，可以是可信通讯服务商设置的任意能够为移动终端提供服务的网络设备。这里不一一举例说明。
另外，本申请实施例中涉及的“用户”指代终端设备的使用者，例如，可以是智能手机的使用者或者其他终端设备的使用者。
运营商网络设备认证用户是否可信可以理解为：运营商网络设备判断当前终端设备的使用者(即用户)与该终端设备开户者是否一致。如果是一致的，证明该用户即为开户者认证用户可信；如果不一致，证明该用户不是开户者认证用户不可信。
示例性地，终端设备为智能手机的情况下，终端设备开户者为智能手机电话号码开户者。
具体地，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信能够得到第一认证结果，该第一认证结果可以是第一用户可信，或者可以是第一用户不可信。
本申请实施例中，第一运营商网络设备可以通过多种方式认证第一用户是否可信，下文将结合图5-图9进行详细说明不同的认证方式，这里不赘述。
进一步地，第一运营商网络设备得到第一认证结果之后，需要对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名，图4所示的方法流程还包括：
S420，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名包括：
首先，第一运营商网络设备对待发送的消息(该消息中包括第一认证结果、认证时间)计算哈希值，得到该消息的摘要；
然后，第一运营商网络设备使用第一运营商网络设备保存的第三私钥对该摘要进行加密，生成第一签名。
应理解，上述的第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名的方式，只是举例，对本申请的保护范围不构成任何的限定。本申请实施例中对于第一运营商网络设备如何对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名的具体实现方式不做限制，可以参考目前与签名技术相关的技术中的描述，本申请中不进行详述。
进一步地，第一运营商网络设备将生成的第一签名和待发送的消息(至少包括第一认证结果)发送给接收端，图4所示的方法流程还包括：
S430，第一运营商网络设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
作为一种可能的实现方式，第一用户和第一用户需要呼叫的第二用户分别入网的第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商，则第一运营商网络设备向第二用户使用的第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，第一用户和第一用户需要呼叫的第二用户分别入网的第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，则第一运营商网络设备向第二运营商网络设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名，其中，第二运营商网络设备为给所述第二用户提供服务的运营商网络设备。
需要说明的是，为了保证通信的第一用户和第二用户均为可信用户，第一运营商网络设备还需要对第二用户进行认证，针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，第一运营商网络设备对第二用户进行认证的认证方式不同，下面将结合图5-图9进行详细说明不同的认证方式，这里先不赘述。
本申请实施例中第一运营商网络设备可以通过以下几种方式认证第一用户是否可靠。
方式一、第一运营商网络设备调用第三方认证机构的认证服务来认证第一用户是否可信，且第三方认证机构认证服务基于第一终端设备采集的信息进行认证。
为了便于理解，下面结合图5进行说明，图5是本申请实施例提供的一种认证方式的示意性流程图，包括以下步骤：
S510，第一终端设备获取第一用户的生理特征信息。
本申请实施例中涉及的终端设备为可信终端，即为由可信设备制造商生产、且通过了可信设备认证机构认证的终端设备，如智能手机，AR眼镜等。具体生产方式和认证方式本申请实施例中不做限定。本申请实施例中主要涉及使用终端设备的用户的认证。
本申请实施例中第一用户的生理特征信息用于表示该第一用户的生理特征，包括但不限于：
所述第一用户的指纹信息、所述第一用户的声纹信息、所述第一用户的人脸信息、所述第一用户的虹膜信息和所述第一用户的掌纹信息等。
示例性地，第一终端设备获取第一用户的生理特征信息可以是：
第一终端设备的指纹信息采集模块(如，指纹识别模块)采集该第一用户的指纹信息。
示例性地，第一终端设备获取第一用户的生理特征信息可以是：
第一终端设备的声纹信息采集模块(如，声纹识别模块)采集该第一用户的声纹信息。
示例性地，第一终端设备获取第一用户的生理特征信息可以是：
第一终端设备的人脸信息采集模块(如，摄像模块)采集该第一用户的人脸信息。
示例性地，第一终端设备获取第一用户的生理特征信息可以是：
第一终端设备的虹膜信息采集模块(如，摄像模块)采集该第一用户的虹膜信息。
应理解，本申请实施例中对于第一终端设备通过何种技术手段获取到第一用户的生理特征信息的不做限制，可以是通过目前已有的技术手段或者还可以通过未来技术手段。
具体地，本申请实施例中第一终端设备获取到第一用户的生理特征信息之后，需要对该第一用户的生理特征信息的进行加密，生成第一加密信息，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S520，第一终端设备基于第一加密方法和第一公钥对该第一用户的生理特征信息的进行加密，生成第一加密信息。
其中，第一公钥为第三方认证机构确定的第一公私钥对中的公钥，所述第一公私钥对中还包括第一私钥，所述第一私钥保存在所述第三方认证机构中用于验证所述第一加密信息。
为了便于理解，下文将结合图6说明密钥的分发过程，这里仅涉及密钥的用法。
进一步地，第一终端设备需要将第一加密信息通过第一运营商网络设备发送给第三方认证机构，由第三方认证机构认证该第一用户是否可信，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S530，第一终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第一消息，或者说第一运营商网络设备接收来自第一终端设备的第一消息。
具体地，该第一消息中包括第一加密信息。
示例性地，第一消息包信令消息、视频数据和音频数据中的任意一种。
当所述第一消息为所述视频数据和/或所述音频数据时，所述第一消息中可以周期性地携带所述第一加密信息。
方式一中，第一运营商网络设备接收到第一加密信息之后无需处理该第一加密信息，而是将该第一加密信息透传给第三方认证机构，由第三方认证机构解密，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S540，第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送所述第一用户的标识信息和所述第一加密信息，或者说第三方认证机构接收来自第一运营商网络设备的所述第一用户的标识信息和所述第一加密信息。
其中，所述第一加密信息用于所述第三方认证机构认证所述第一用户是否可信，所述第一用户的标识信息用于标识所述第一用户。
应理解，本申请实施例中第三方认证机构管理第一用户的标识信息和所述第一用户的生理特征信息，并且指定加密所述第一用户的生理特征信息的第一公钥和第一加密方法，以及解密所述第一用户的生理特征信息的第一私钥，其中，第一公钥下发到第一终端设备，第一私钥保存在第三方认证机构。
需要说明的是，当第三方认证机构中仅管理第一用户的相关信息(如，第一用户的标识信息和所述第一用户的生理特征信息)的情况下，可以无需向第三方认证机构发送所述第一用户的标识信息。也就是说第三方认证机构接收到第一加密信息之后，能够确定用第一私钥进行解密，而不需要先通过第一用户的标识信息确定出第一用户，再确定出为第一用户指定的第一私钥。
图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S550，第三方认证机构基于所述第一用户的标识信息确定所述第一用户，并基于第一私钥验证所述第一加密信息，根据所述验证结果确定所述第一用户是否可信。
本申请实施例中对于第三方认证机构如何解密该第一加密信息不做限定，可以参考目前公私钥对技术中对于加密和解密的描述。
具体地，第三方认证机构解密第一加密信息获取第一用户的生理特征信息，与第三方认证机构本地管理的第一用户的生理特征信息进行对比，如果对比结果一致，证明第一用户可信；否则，证明第一用户不可信。
进一步地，第三方认证机构需要将认证结果发送给第一运营商网络设备，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S560，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第一信息，或者说第一运营商网络设备接收来自第三方认证机构的第一信息。
其中，第一信息用于指示所述第一用户是否可信。
图5所示的方式一下，上述S410中第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果可以理解为：
S570，第一运营商网络设备根据第一信息认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果。
当第一信息指示第一用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户可信，第一认证结果为第一用户可信；或者，当第一信息指示第一用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户不可信，第一认证结果为第一用户不可信。
S580，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名。
参考上述S420的描述，这里不再赘述。
针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，后续流程包括以下两种可能：
可能一：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S590，第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
S591，第二终端设备验证第一签名。
示例性地，验证方法包括：第二终端设备先使用第三公钥对摘要密文进行解密得到摘要#1；再计算接收到的消息的摘要，得到摘要#2；比较摘要#1与摘要#2：若一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是可信的，此时提示可信；若不一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是不可信的，此时提示不可信。
可能二：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为不同运营商时，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S592，第一运营商网络设备向第二运营商网络设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
S593，第二运营商网络设备验证第一签名。
示例性地，验证方法包括：第二运营商网络设备先使用第三公钥对摘要密文进行解密得到摘要#1；再计算接收到的消息的摘要，得到摘要#2；比较摘要#1与摘要#2：若一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是可信的，此时提示可信；若不一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是不可信的，此时提示不可信。
S594，第二运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第四签名。
具体地，第二运营商网络设备基于第四私钥对所述第一认证结果进行签名，生成第四签名。
S595，第二运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第四签名。
S596，第二终端设备验证第四签名。
示例性地，验证方法包括：第二终端设备先使用第四公钥对摘要密文进行解密得到摘要#1；再计算接收到的消息的摘要，得到摘要#2；比较摘要#1与摘要#2：若一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是可信的，此时提示可信；若不一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是不可信的，此时提示不可信。
为了保证通信的第一用户和第二用户均为可信用户，还需要对第二用户进行认证，图 5所示的流程还包括：
S511，第二终端设备获取第二用户的生理特征信息。
第二终端设备获取第二用户的生理特征信息，与第一终端设备获取第一用户的生理特征信息类似，可以参考上述S510的描述，这里不再赘述。
S512，第二终端设备基于第三加密方法和第五公钥对该第二用户的生理特征信息的进行加密，生成第三加密信息。
其中，所述第五公钥为所述第三方认证机构确定的第五公私钥对中的公钥，所述第五公私钥对中还包括第五私钥，所述第三加密方法和所述第五公钥用于所述第二终端设备加密所述第二用户的生理特征信息得到所述第三加密信息，所述第五私钥保存在所述第三方认证机构中用于验证所述第三加密信息。
针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，包括以下两种可能：
可能一：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S513，第二终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第二消息，或者说第一运营商网络设备接收来自第二终端设备的第二消息。
具体地，该第二消息中包括第三加密信息。
S514，第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送所述第二用户的标识信息和所述第三加密信息，或者说第三方认证机构接收来自第一运营商网络设备的所述第二用户的标识信息和所述第三加密信息。
其中，所述第三加密信息用于所述第三方认证机构认证所述第二用户是否可信，所述第二用户的标识信息用于标识所述第二用户。
可以参考上述S540的描述，这里不再赘述。
S515，第三方认证机构基于所述第二用户的标识信息确定所述第二用户，并基于第五私钥验证所述第三加密信息，根据所述验证结果确定所述第二用户是否可信。
第三方认证机构认证第二用户的方式与第三方认证机构认证第一用户的方式类似，可以参考上述S550的描述，这里不再赘述。
S516，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第三信息，或者说第一运营商网络设备接收来自第三方认证机构的第三信息。
第二信息用于指示第二用户是否可信。
S517，第一运营商网络设备根据第三信息认证第二用户是否可信，得到第三认证结果。
当第三信息指示第二用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户可信，第三认证结果为第二用户可信；或者，当第三信息指示第二用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户不可信，第三认证结果为第二用户不可信。
S518，第一运营商网络设备对第三认证结果进行签名，生成第三签名。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备对第三认证结果进行签名包括：
第一运营商网络设备对待发送的消息(该消息中包括第三认证结果、认证时间)计算哈希值，得到该消息的摘要；
第一运营商网络设备使用第一运营商网络设备保存的第三私钥对该摘要进行加密，生 成第三签名。
S519，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送第三认证结果和第三签名。
S521，第一终端设备验证第三签名。
示例性地，验证方法包括：第一终端设备先使用第三公钥对摘要密文进行解密得到摘要#1；再计算接收到的消息的摘要，得到摘要#2；比较摘要#1与摘要#2：若一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是可信的，此时提示可信；若不一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是不可信的，此时提示不可信。
可能二：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为不同运营商时，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S522，第二终端设备向第二运营商网络设备发送第三消息，或者说第二运营商网络设备接收来自第二终端设备的第三消息。
具体地，该第三消息中包括第三加密信息。
S523，第二运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送所述第二用户的标识信息和所述第三加密信息，或者说第三方认证机构接收来自第二运营商网络设备的所述第二用户的标识信息和所述第三加密信息。
其中，所述第三加密信息用于所述第三方认证机构认证所述第二用户是否可信，所述第二用户的标识信息用于标识所述第二用户。
S524，第三方认证机构基于所述第二用户的标识信息确定所述第二用户，并基于第四私钥验证所述第三加密信息，根据所述验证结果确定所述第二用户是否可信。
第三方认证机构认证第二用户的方式与第三方认证机构认证第一用户的方式类似，可以参考上述S550的描述，这里不再赘述。
S525，第三方认证机构向第二运营商网络设备发送第五信息，或者说第二运营商网络设备接收来自第三方认证机构的第五信息。
第五信息用于指示第二用户是否可信。
S526，第二运营商网络设备根据第五信息认证第二用户是否可信，得到第四认证结果。
当第五信息指示第二用户可信时，第二运营商网络设备认证第二用户可信，第四认证结果为第二用户可信；或者，当第五信息指示第二用户不可信时，第二运营商网络设备认证第二用户不可信，第四认证结果为第二用户不可信。
S527，第二运营商网络设备对第四认证结果进行签名，生成第五签名。
示例性地，第二运营商网络设备对第四认证结果进行签名包括：
第二运营商网络设备对待发送的消息(该消息中包括第四认证结果、认证时间)计算哈希值，得到该消息的摘要；
第二运营商网络设备使用第二运营商网络设备保存的第四私钥对该摘要进行加密，生成第五签名。
S528，第二运营商网络设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第四认证结果和第五签名。
S529，第一运营商网络设备验证第五签名。
示例性地，验证方法包括：第一运营商网络设备先使用第四公钥对摘要密文进行解密得到摘要#1；再计算接收到的消息的摘要，得到摘要#2；比较摘要#1与摘要#2：若一致则认定第二运营商网络设备的可信背书是可信的，此时提示可信；若不一致则认定第二运 营商网络设备的可信背书是不可信的，此时提示不可信。
S531，第一运营商网络设备对第四认证结果进行签名，生成第六签名。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备对第四认证结果进行签名包括：
首先，第一运营商网络设备对待发送的消息(该消息中包括第四认证结果、认证时间)计算哈希值，得到该消息的摘要；
然后，第一运营商网络设备使用第一运营商网络设备保存的第三私钥对该摘要进行加密，生成第六签名。
S532，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送第四认证结果和第六签名。
S533，第一终端设备验证第六签名。
示例性地，验证方法包括：第一终端设备先使用第三公钥对摘要密文进行解密得到摘要#1；再计算接收到的消息的摘要，得到摘要#2；比较摘要#1与摘要#2：若一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是可信的，此时提示可信；若不一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是不可信的，此时提示不可信。
由图5所示的流程可知，该认证方式可行的前提是终端设备获知了用户的生理特征信息的加密方法和公钥，以及当跨运营商的情况下，不同的运营商网络设备之间进行了密钥的交互，下面将结合图6说明密钥的分发过程，图6中的(a)和(b)是本申请提供的密钥分发流程。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中密钥分发的流程可以在通信之前完成，或者还可以在需要使用密钥之前完成，对于密钥分发的时间点不做限制。
其中，图6中的(a)指示第三方认证机构的密钥分发流程，包括以下步骤：
S610，用户在第三方认证机构登记信息。
用户可以是上述的第一用户或第二用户，或者其他的用户。
示例性地，第一用户向第三方认证机构登记第一用户的标识信息(或者称为第一用户的基本信息，例如，姓名、身份证号等)和第一用户的生理特征信息(例如，第一用户的声纹、指纹、人脸和虹膜等)。
示例性地，第二用户向第三方认证机构登记第二用户的标识信息(或者称为第二用户的基本信息，例如，姓名、身份证号等)和第二用户的生理特征信息(例如，第二用户的声纹、指纹、人脸和虹膜等)。
应理解，本申请实施例中对于可以作为用户的基本信息的信息不做限定，上述的姓名、身份证号等只是举例，对本申请的保护范围不构成任何的限定，例如，用户的基本信息还可以是住址、工作单位、生日、户口所在地等信息；
同理，本申请实施例中对于可以作为用户的生理特征信息的信息不做限定，上述的声纹、指纹、人脸和虹膜等也只是举例，对本申请的保护范围不构成任何的限定，例如，用户的生理特征信息还可以是掌纹。
进一步地，第三方认证机构接收到用户的登记信息之后，可以为用户分配其生理特征信息的加密方式、解密方式以及密钥(包括私钥和公钥)，图5所示的方法流程还包括：
S620，第三方认证机构为用户分配加密方式、解密方式以及密钥。
示例性地，第三方认证机构管理第一用户的基本信息与生理特征信息。并为第一用户指定用户身份认证时所需的生理特征信息的加密方式、解密方式以及密钥(包括第一私钥 和第一公钥)。
其中，第一公钥需要通过第一运营商网络设备写入第一用户使用的第一终端设备，第一私钥由第三方认证机构保存。
示例性地，第三方认证机构管理第二用户的基本信息与生理特征信息。并为第二用户指定用户身份认证时所需的生理特征信息的加密方式、解密方式以及密钥(包括第五私钥和第五公钥)。
其中，第五公钥需要通过第一运营商网络设备或第二运营商网络设备写入第二用户使用的第二终端设备，第五私钥由第三方认证机构保存。
本申请实施例中对于第三方认证机构具体表型形式不做限定，可以是能够对用户身份进行认证的任意第三方认证机构，例如，可以是公安局；还例如，可以是档案保管单位。
另外，本申请实施例中对于第三方认证机构为用户分配加密方法和密钥的方式不做限定，可以参考目前相关技术中的描述，例如，目前密钥学中关于加密，公私钥对的文献中记载了如何对信息进行加密、解密，以及如何分发密钥，本申请实施例中不做限定。
应理解，本申请第三方认证机构可以为一个或者多个用户管理信息和分配加密方式、解密方式以及密钥，其他用户的处理方式可以参考第一用户，这里不再赘述。
S630，用户入网运营商网络设备所属的运营商。
可以理解用户由运营商网络设备服务的前提是：用户在营商网络设备所属的运营商进行了开户，入网。
具体地，用户入网运营商网络设备所属的运营商可以理解为用户在运营商登记了用户的基本信息，并使用运营商管理的网络。
应理解，本申请实施例中对于用户如何入网不做限制，可以参考目前相关技术中的描述。
本申请实施例中，用户会授权运营商网络设备获取用户身份认证时所需的加密方法和公钥，图6中的(a)所示的方法流程还包括：
S631，用户授权运营商网络设备获取加密方法和公钥。
示例性地，如果用户是新用户，授权方式可以是用户在入网时进行授权，例如，用户入网时运营商会询问用户是否授权运营商网络设备获取加密方法和公钥，用户可以选择授权。
示例性地，如果用户是老用户，授权方式可以是用户在呼叫其他用户之前的某个时间点授权运营商网络设备获取加密方法和公钥。
具体地，运营商网络设备可以根据用户的授权从第三方认证机构获取加密方法和公钥，图6中的(a)所示的方法流程还包括：
S640，运营商网络设备从第三方认证机构获取加密方法和公钥。
运营商网络设备为了将获取的加密方法和公钥下发给终端设备，图6所示的方法流程还包括：
S650，运营商网络设备向终端设备发送加密方法和公钥。
根据图6中的(a)所示的流程可知终端设备能够获得用于加密用户的生理特征信息的加密方法和公钥。
运营商网络设备本地可以分配一对公私密钥用于可信背书，其中，公钥发送给运营商 网络设备管理的终端设备，以及该运营商网络设备管理的终端设备呼叫的中断设备所属的运营商网络设备，私钥由运营商网络设备保存。下面结合图6中的(b)说明运营商网络设备的密钥分发。
图6中的(b)指示运营商网络设备的密钥分发流程，包括以下步骤：
S611，第一运营商网络设备确定第三公私钥对。
该第三公私钥对包括第三公钥和第三私钥。其中，第三私钥保存在第一运营商网络设备中。
针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，第一运营商网络设备的密钥包括以下两种可能：
可能一：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，图6中的(b)所示的方法流程还包括：
S612，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备和第二终端设备分别发送第三公钥。
可能二：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商时，图6中的(b)所示的方法流程还包括：
S613，第二运营商网络设备确定第四公私钥对。
该第四公私钥对包括第四公钥和第四私钥。其中，第四私钥保存在第二运营商网络设备中。
S614，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备和第二运营商网络设备分别发送第三公钥。
S615，第二运营商网络设备向第二终端设备和第一运营商网络设备分别发送第四公钥。
方式二：第一运营商网络设备调用第三方认证机构的认证服务来认证第一用户是否可信，且第三方认证机构认证服务基于第一运营商网络设备采集的信息进行认证。
为了便于理解，下面结合图7进行说明，图7是本申请实施例提供的另一种认证方式的示意性流程图，包括以下步骤：
S710，所述第一运营商网络设备获取所述第一用户的生理特征信息。
所述第一用户的生理特征信息包括所述第一用户的声纹信息和/或所述第一用户的人脸信息。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备获取所述第一用户的生理特征信息可以是：
在呼叫过程中，第一运营商网络设备的声纹信息采集模块(如，声纹识别模块)采集该第一用户的声纹信息。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备获取所述第一用户的生理特征信息可以是：
在呼叫过程中，第一运营商网络设备的人脸信息采集模块(如，摄像模块)采集该第一用户的人脸信息。
该实施例中对于第一运营商网络设备获取所述第一用户的生理特征信息的具体方式不做限制。
S720，所述第一运营商网络设备基于第二加密方法和第二公钥对所述第一用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第二加密信息。
其中，所述第二公钥为所述第三方认证机构和所述第一运营商网络设备协商确定的第 二公私钥对中的公钥，所述第二公私钥对中还包括第二私钥，所述第二加密方法为所述第一运营商网络设备和所述第三方认证机构协商确定的，所述第二私钥用于验证所述第二加密信息。
或者，该第二公私钥对为第三方认证机构确定的，然后下发给了第一运营商网络设备。第三方认证机构确定该第二公私钥对的方法与上述的方式一中第三方认证机构确定第一公私钥对的方法类似，这里不再赘述。
S730，所述第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送所述第一用户的标识信息和所述第二加密信息，或者说第三方认证机构接收来自第一运营商网络设备的所述第一用户的标识信息和所述第二加密信息。
其中，所述第二加密信息用于所述第三方认证机构认证所述第一用户是否可信，所述第一用户的标识信息用于标识所述第一用户。
S740，第三方认证机构基于所述第一用户的标识信息确定所述第一用户，并基于第二私钥验证所述第二加密信息，根据所述验证结果确定所述第一用户是否可信。
本申请实施例中对于第三方认证机构如何解密该第二加密信息不做限定，可以参考目前公私钥对技术中对于加密和解密的描述。
具体地，第三方认证机构解密第二加密信息获取第一用户的生理特征信息，与第三方认证机构本地管理的第一用户的生理特征信息进行对比，如果对比结果一致，证明第一用户可信；否则，证明第一用户不可信。
进一步地，第三方认证机构需要将认证结果发送给第一运营商网络设备，图7所示的方法流程还包括：
S750，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第二信息，或者说第一运营商网络设备接收来自第三方认证机构的第二信息。
其中，第二信息用于指示所述第一用户是否可信。
图7所示的方式二下，上述S410中第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果可以理解为：
S760，第一运营商网络设备根据第二信息认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果。
当第二信息指示第一用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户可信，第一认证结果为第一用户可信；或者，当第二信息指示第一用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户不可信，第一认证结果为第一用户不可信。
S770，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名。
参考上述S420的描述，这里不再赘述。
针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，后续流程包括以下两种可能：
可能一：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，图7所示的方法流程还包括：
S780，第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
S781，第二终端设备验证第一签名。
参考上述S591的描述，这里不再赘述。
可能二：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为不同运营商时，图7所示的方法流程还包括：
S782，第一运营商网络设备向第二运营商网络设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
S783，第二运营商网络设备验证第一签名。
参考上述S593的描述，这里不再赘述。
S784，第二运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第四签名。
参考上述S594的描述，这里不再赘述。
S785，第二运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第四签名。
S786，第二终端设备验证第四签名。
参考上述S596的描述，这里不再赘述。
为了保证通信的第一用户和第二用户均为可信用户，还需要对第二用户进行认证，针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，包括两种可能：
可能一：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，图7所示的方法流程还包括：
S711，所述第一运营商网络设备获取所述第二用户的生理特征信息。
所述第二用户的生理特征信息包括所述第二用户的声纹信息和/或所述第二用户的人脸信息。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备获取所述第二用户的生理特征信息可以是：
在呼叫过程中，第一运营商网络设备的声纹信息采集模块(如，声纹识别模块)采集该第二用户的声纹信息。
示例性地，第一运营商网络设备获取所述第二用户的生理特征信息可以是：
在呼叫过程中，第一运营商网络设备的人脸信息采集模块(如，摄像模块)采集该第二用户的人脸信息。
该实施例中对于第一运营商网络设备获取所述第二用户的生理特征信息的具体方式不做限制。
S712，所述第一运营商网络设备基于第四加密方法和第六公钥对所述第二用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第四加密信息。
其中，所述第六公钥为所述第三方认证机构和所述第一运营商网络设备协商确定的第六公私钥对中的公钥，所述第六公私钥对中还包括第六私钥，所述第四加密方法为所述第一运营商网络设备和所述第三方认证机构协商确定的，所述第六私钥用于验证所述第四加密信息。
或者，该第六公私钥对为第三方认证机构确定的，然后下发给了第一运营商网络设备。第三方认证机构确定该第六公私钥对的方法与上述的方式一中第三方认证机构确定第五公私钥对的方法类似，这里不再赘述。
S713，所述第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送所述第二用户的标识信息和所述第四加密信息，或者说第三方认证机构接收来自第一运营商网络设备的所述第二用户的标识信息和所述第四加密信息。
其中，所述第四加密信息用于所述第三方认证机构认证所述第一用户是否可信，所述第一用户的标识信息用于标识所述第一用户。
S714，第三方认证机构基于所述第二用户的标识信息确定所述第二用户，并基于第六私钥验证所述第四加密信息，根据所述验证结果确定所述第二用户是否可信。
本申请实施例中对于第三方认证机构如何解密该第四加密信息不做限定，可以参考目前公私钥对技术中对于加密和解密的描述。
具体地，第三方认证机构解密第四加密信息获取第二用户的生理特征信息，与第三方认证机构本地管理的第二用户的生理特征信息进行对比，如果对比结果一致，证明第二用户可信；否则，证明第二用户不可信。
进一步地，第三方认证机构需要将认证结果发送给第一运营商网络设备，图7所示的方法流程还包括：
S715，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第四信息，或者说第一运营商网络设备接收来自第三方认证机构的第四信息。
其中，第四信息用于指示所述第一用户是否可信。
S716，第一运营商网络设备根据第四信息认证第二用户是否可信，得到第三认证结果。
当第四信息指示第二用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户可信，第三认证结果为第二用户可信；或者，当第四信息指示第二用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户不可信，第三认证结果为第二用户不可信。
S717，第一运营商网络设备对第三认证结果进行签名，生成第三签名。
参考上述S518的描述，这里不再赘述。
S718，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送第三认证结果和第三签名。
S719，第一终端设备验证第三签名。
参考上述S521的描述，这里不再赘述。
可能二：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为不同运营商时，图7所示的方法流程还包括：
S721，所述第二运营商网络设备获取所述第二用户的生理特征信息。
所述第二用户的生理特征信息包括所述第二用户的声纹信息和/或所述第二用户的人脸信息。
示例性地，第二运营商网络设备获取所述第二用户的生理特征信息可以是：
在呼叫过程中，第二运营商网络设备的声纹信息采集模块(如，声纹识别模块)采集该第二用户的声纹信息。
示例性地，第二运营商网络设备获取所述第二用户的生理特征信息可以是：
在呼叫过程中，第二运营商网络设备的人脸信息采集模块(如，摄像模块)采集该第二用户的人脸信息。
该实施例中对于第二运营商网络设备获取所述第二用户的生理特征信息的具体方式不做限制。
S722，所述第二运营商网络设备基于第五加密方法和第七公钥对所述第二用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第五加密信息。
其中，所述第七公钥为所述第三方认证机构和所述第二运营商网络设备协商确定的第七公私钥对中的公钥，所述第七公私钥对中还包括第七私钥，所述第五加密方法为所述第一运营商网络设备和所述第三方认证机构协商确定的，所述第七私钥用于验证所述第五加 密信息。
或者，该第七公私钥对为第三方认证机构确定的，然后下发给了第二运营商网络设备。第三方认证机构确定该第七公私钥对的方法与上述的方式一中第三方认证机构确定第五公私钥对的方法类似，这里不再赘述。
S723，所述第二运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送所述第二用户的标识信息和所述第五加密信息，或者说第三方认证机构接收来自第二运营商网络设备的所述第二用户的标识信息和所述第五加密信息。
其中，所述第五加密信息用于所述第三方认证机构认证所述第一用户是否可信，所述第一用户的标识信息用于标识所述第一用户。
S724，第三方认证机构基于所述第二用户的标识信息确定所述第二用户，并基于第七私钥验证所述第五加密信息，根据所述验证结果确定所述第二用户是否可信。
本申请实施例中对于第三方认证机构如何解密该第五加密信息不做限定，可以参考目前公私钥对技术中对于加密和解密的描述。
具体地，第三方认证机构解密第五加密信息获取第二用户的生理特征信息，与第三方认证机构本地管理的第二用户的生理特征信息进行对比，如果对比结果一致，证明第二用户可信；否则，证明第二用户不可信。
进一步地，第三方认证机构需要将认证结果发送给第一运营商网络设备，图7所示的方法流程还包括：
S725，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第六信息，或者说第一运营商网络设备接收来自第三方认证机构的第六信息。
其中，第六信息用于指示所述第一用户是否可信。
S726，第二运营商网络设备根据第六信息认证第二用户是否可信，得到第四认证结果。
当第六信息指示第二用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户可信，第四认证结果为第二用户可信；或者，当第六信息指示第二用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户不可信，第四认证结果为第二用户不可信。
S727，第二运营商网络设备对第四认证结果进行签名，生成第五签名。
参考上述S525的描述，这里不再赘述。
S728，第二运营商网络设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第四认证结果和第五签名。
S729，第一运营商网络设备验证第五签名。
参考上述S529的描述，这里不再赘述。
S731，第一运营商网络设备生成第六签名。
参考上述S531的描述，这里不再赘述。
S732，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送第四认证结果和第六签名。
参考上述S532的描述，这里不再赘述。
S733，第一终端设备验证第六签名。
参考上述S533的描述，这里不再赘述。
与图5所示的方式一不同的是，图7所示的方式二中由运营商网络设备获取用户的生理特征信息，并且加密用户的生理特征信息的加密方法和公钥无需分发给终端设备，方式二中无需终端设备介入认证，简化了终端设备的操作。
方式三、终端设备对用户进行可信认证并将认证结果上报至运营商，运营商对可信终端的认证结果进行验证。
为了便于理解，下面结合图8进行说明，图8是本申请实施例提供的又一种认证方式的示意性流程图，包括以下步骤：
S810，第一终端设备认证所述第一用户，得到第二认证结果。
本申请实施例中对于第一终端设备如何认证第一用户不做限定，例如，可以是第一终端设备确定第一用户是否可以解锁第一终端设备，如果可以认为第一用户可信；否则，认为第一用户不可信。
该实施例中第一终端设备得到第二认证结果之后，对该第二认证结果进行签名，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S820，第一终端设备对所述第二认证结果进行签名，生成第二签名。
具体地，第一终端设备基于第一SIM卡私钥对所述第二认证结果进行签名生成第二签名。
示例性地，签名方法包括：计算待发送消息(包含认证结果、认证时间)的摘要(也称哈希值)，再使用第一SIM卡私钥将摘要加密，最后将加密过的摘要与待发送消息(包含认证结果、认证时间)一起发给第一运营商网络设备。
进一步地，第一终端设备需要将第二认证结果和第二签名发送给第一运营商网络设备，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S830，第一终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第二认证结果和第二签名，或者说所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自所述第一终端设备的第二认证结果和第二签名。
其中，所述第二认证结果为所述第一终端设备确定的用于指示所述第一用户是否可信，所述第二签名用于验证所述第二认证结果。
进一步地，第一运营商网络设备对接收到的第二认证结果进行验证，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S840，所述第一运营商网络设备验证所述第二签名。
图8所示的方式三下，上述S410中第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果可以理解为：
S850，第二签名验证通过时，第一运营商网络设备根据第二认证结果认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果。
当第二认证结果指示第一用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户可信，第一认证结果为第一用户可信；或者，当第二认证结果指示第一用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户不可信，第一认证结果为第一用户不可信。
S860，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名。
参考上述S420的描述，这里不再赘述。
针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，后续流程包括以下两种可能：
可能一：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S870，第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
S880，第二终端设备验证第一签名。
参考上述S591的描述，这里不再赘述。
可能二：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为不同运营商时，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S890，第一运营商网络设备向第二运营商网络设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
S891，第二运营商网络设备验证第一签名。
参考上述S593的描述，这里不再赘述。
S892，第二运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第四签名。
参考上述S594的描述，这里不再赘述。
S893，第二运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第四签名。
S894，第二终端设备验证第四签名。
参考上述S596的描述，这里不再赘述。
为了保证通信的第一用户和第二用户均为可信用户，还需要对第二用户进行认证，图8所示的流程还包括：
S811，第二终端设备认证所述第二用户，得到第五认证结果。
本申请实施例中对于第二终端设备如何认证第二用户不做限定，例如，可以是第二终端设备确定第二用户是否可以解锁第二终端设备，如果可以认为第额用户可信；否则，认为第二用户不可信。
该实施例中第二终端设备得到第五认证结果之后，对该第五认证结果进行签名，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S812，第二终端设备对所述第五认证结果进行签名，生成第七签名。
具体地，第二终端设备基于第二SIM卡私钥对所述第五认证结果进行签名生成第七签名。
示例性地，签名方法包括：计算待发送消息(包含第五认证结果、认证时间)的摘要(也称哈希值)，再使用第二SIM卡私钥将摘要加密，最后将加密过的摘要与待发送消息(包含认证结果、认证时间)一起发给第一运营商网络设备或第二运营商网络设备。
针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，后续流程包括以下两种可能：
可能一：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S813，第二终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第五认证结果和第七签名，或者说所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自所述第二终端设备的第五认证结果和第七签名。
其中，所述第五认证结果为所述第二终端设备确定的用于指示所述第二用户是否可信，所述第七签名用于验证所述第五认证结果。
进一步地，第一运营商网络设备对接收到的第五认证结果进行验证，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S814，所述第一运营商网络设备验证所述第七签名。
S815，第七签名验证通过时，第一运营商网络设备根据第五认证结果认证第二用户是否可信，得到第三认证结果。
当第五认证结果指示第二用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户可信，第三认证结果为第二用户可信；或者，当第五认证结果指示第二用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户不可信，第三认证结果为第二用户不可信。
S816，第一运营商网络设备对第三认证结果进行签名，生成第三签名。
参考上述S518的描述，这里不再赘述。
S817，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送第三认证结果和第三签名。
S818，第一终端设备验证第三签名。
参考上述S521的描述，这里不再赘述。
可能二：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为不同运营商时，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S819，第二终端设备向第二运营商网络设备发送第五认证结果和第七签名，或者说所述第二运营商网络设备接收来自所述第二终端设备的第五认证结果和第七签名。
其中，所述第五认证结果为所述第二终端设备确定的用于指示所述第二用户是否可信，所述第七签名用于验证所述第五认证结果。
进一步地，第二运营商网络设备对接收到的第五认证结果进行验证，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S821，所述第二运营商网络设备验证所述第七签名。
S822，第七签名验证通过时，第二运营商网络设备根据第五认证结果认证第二用户是否可信，得到第四认证结果。
当第五认证结果指示第二用户可信时，第二运营商网络设备认证第二用户可信，第四认证结果为第二用户可信；或者，当第五认证结果指示第二用户不可信时，第二运营商网络设备认证第二用户不可信，第四认证结果为第二用户不可信。
S823，第二运营商网络设备对第四认证结果进行签名，生成第五签名。
参考上述S525的描述，这里不再赘述。
S824，第二运营商网络设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第四认证结果和第五签名。
S825，第一运营商网络设备验证第五签名。
参考上述S529的描述，这里不再赘述。
S826，第一运营商网络设备生成第六签名。
参考上述S531的描述，这里不再赘述。
S827，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送第四认证结果和第六签名。
参考上述S532的描述，这里不再赘述。
S828，第一终端设备验证第六签名。
参考上述S533的描述，这里不再赘述。
方式四、当第一用户为主叫用户时，第一运营商网络设备通过态势感知(即分析主叫用户最近一段时间的呼叫行为)来确认主叫用户是否可信。
为了便于理解，下面结合图9进行说明，图9是本申请实施例提供的又一种认证方式的示意性流程图，包括以下步骤：
S910，第一运营商网络设备获取所述第一用户的历史呼叫数据。
本申请实施例中对于第一运营商网络设备如何获取所述第一用户的历史呼叫数据不 做限定。示例性地，第一运营商网络设备可以通过历史呼叫数据储存单元获取上述的第一用户的历史呼叫数据。
其中，所述第一用户的历史呼叫数据用于指示所述第一用户的呼叫习惯，包括以下至少一项：
所述第一用户发起呼叫的时间点分布数据、所述第一用户发起呼叫时所述第二用户接通呼叫的频率数据、所述第一用户发起呼叫时所述第二终端设备振铃时长数据、所述第一用户的通话时长分布数据、所述第一用户发起呼叫的地理位置分布数据、所述第二用户为首次呼叫的比率、所述第二用户号码归属地分布数据。
S920，第一运营商网络设备根据预设的策略和所述第一用户的历史呼叫数据确定所述第一用户发起的呼叫是否可信。
示例性地，预设的策略可以是第一用户发起呼叫的时间点为早8:00至晚6:00，如果第一用户的历史呼叫数据满足该预设的策略，确定第一用户可信；否则，确定第一用户不可信。
示例性地，预设的策略可以是第一用户发起呼叫时所述第二用户接通呼叫的频率为不小于50％，如果第一用户的历史呼叫数据满足该预设的策略，确定呼叫可信；否则，确定呼叫不可信。
图9所示的方式四下，上述S410中第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果可以理解为：
S930，第一运营商网络设备根据呼叫是否可信认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果。
当呼叫可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户可信，第一认证结果为第一用户可信；或者，当呼叫不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户不可信，第一认证结果为第一用户不可信。
S940，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名。
参考上述S420的描述，这里不再赘述。
针对第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商和第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商，后续流程包括以下两种可能：
可能一：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S950，第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
S960，第二终端设备验证第一签名。
参考上述S591的描述，这里不再赘述。
可能二：
当第一运营商和第二运营商为不同运营商时，图8所示的方法流程还包括：
S970，第一运营商网络设备向第二运营商网络设备发送第一认证结果和第一签名。
S981，第二运营商网络设备验证第一签名。
参考上述S593的描述，这里不再赘述。
S990，第二运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行签名，生成第四签名。
参考上述S594的描述，这里不再赘述。
S991，第二运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第一认证结果和第四签名。
S992，第二终端设备验证第四签名。
参考上述S596的描述，这里不再赘述。
当第二用户为主叫用户时，也可以通过上述的方式对第二用户进行认证，认证方式类似，这里不再赘述。
为了便于理解，下面结合几个具体的例子以第一用户为主叫用户，第二用户为被叫用户，第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商为例，简单介绍本申请提供的认证的方法如何应用在可信通信中。
对应于上述的认证方式一，结合图10详细说明如何进行可信通信。
图10是本申请实施例提供的一种呼叫流程示意性流程图。包括以下步骤：
S1010，第一用户通过第一终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第一会话启动协议邀请(session initiation protocol invite，SIP invite)消息。
该第一SIP invite消息(上述的第一消息的一种具体实现)中包括携带了加密过的第一用户的生理特征参数(上述的第一加密信息)。生理特征参数的加密方法和密钥(上述的第一加密方法和第一公钥)由第三方认证机构指定、分配。
S1011，第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送第一请求消息。
第一运营商网络设备收到第一SIP Invite消息，查找出第一用户的基本信息，调用第三方认证机构开放的接口对主叫进行认证(向第三方认证机构传递第一用户基本信息、加密后第一用户的生理特征参数)。
第一请求消息中包括第一用户的标识信息和第一加密信息。
S1012，第三方认证机构认证第一用户。
具体地，第三方认证机构基于第一私钥解密第一加密信息获取第一用户的生理特征信息，与第三方认证机构本地管理的第一用户的生理特征信息进行对比，如果对比结果一致，证明第一用户可信；否则，证明第一用户不可信。
其中，第一私钥和第一公钥为第三方认证机构为第一用户的生理特征参数指定的第一公私钥对中包括的密钥，第一公钥用于加密第一用户的生理特征参数，第一私钥用于解密第一用户的生理特征参数。
S1013，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第一响应消息。
第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备反馈认证结果，第一响应消息中包括第一信息，第一信息用于指示第一用户是否可信。例如，第一用户可信、认证通过。
S1014，第一运营商网络设备根据第一信息认证第一用户，得到第一认证结果。
当第一信息指示第一用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户可信，第一认证结果为第一用户可信；或者，当第一信息指示第一用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户不可信，第一认证结果为第一用户不可信。
S1015，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行可信背书签名，生成第一签名。
第一运营商网络设备先计算第二SIP Invite消息(该第二SIP Invite消息中包含了第一认证结果)的摘要(也称哈希值)，再使用第三私钥将摘要加密得到第一签名。
其中，第三私钥为第一运营商网络设备确定的用于加密第一认证结果的密钥。具体地，第三私钥为第三公私钥对中的私钥，第三公私钥对中还包括第三公钥，该第三公钥发送给 第一运营商网络设备服务的终端设备(如第一终端设备和第二终端设备)，用于终端设备验证从第一运营商网络设备接收到的签名。
最后第一运营商网络设备需要将第二SIP Invite消息与第一签名一起转发给第二终端设备(被叫使用的终端设备)，图10所示的方法流程还包括：
S1016，第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第二SIP Invite消息和第一签名。
该第二SIP Invite消息中包含了第一认证结果。
需要说明的是，在第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第二SIP Invite消息和第一签名之前，需要寻址第二用户。
本申请实施例中对于具体的寻址方式不做限定，可以参考目前相关技术中的描述。例如，根据接收到的第一SIP Invite消息中的目的地址确定需要将第二SIP Invite消息发送给第二终端设备。
第二终端设备接收到第二SIP Invite消息和第一签名之后，对第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名进行验证，图10所示的方法流程还包括：
S1017，第二终端设备验证第一签名。
示例性地，验证方法具体为：第二终端设备先使用第三公钥对摘要密文进行解密得到摘要#1；再计算第二SIP Invite消息的摘要，得到摘要#2；比较摘要#1与摘要#2：若一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是可信的，此时提示第二用户该次呼叫是可信的；若不一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是不可信的，此时提示第二用户该次呼叫是不可信的。
S1018，第二终端设备通过第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送SIP 180 Ring消息，该SIP 180 Ring消息用于指示第二终端设备响铃。
例如，第一用户发起的呼叫接通之前，通过第一终端设备接收到的提示音。
在第二终端设备确定该次呼叫是可信的情况下，第二终端设备会通过第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送SIP 200 OK消息，指示第一终端设备可以发起呼叫。
S1019，第二用户通过第二终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第一SIP 200 OK消息。
该第一SIP 200 OK消息(上述的第二消息的一种具体实现)中包括携带了加密过的第二用户的生理特征参数(上述的第三加密信息)。生理特征参数的加密方法和密钥(上述的第三加密方法和第四公钥)由第三方认证机构指定、分配。
S1020，第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送第二请求消息。
第一运营商网络设备收到第一SIP 200 OK消息，查找出第二用户的基本信息，调用第三方认证机构开放的接口对被叫进行认证(向第三方认证机构传递第二用户基本信息、加密后第二用户的生理特征参数)。
第二请求消息中包括第二用户的标识信息和第三加密信息。
S1021，第三方认证机构认证第二用户。
具体地，第三方认证机构基于第四私钥解密第三加密信息获取第二用户的生理特征信息，与第三方认证机构本地管理的第二用户的生理特征信息进行对比，如果对比结果一致，证明第二用户可信；否则，证明第二用户不可信。
其中，第四私钥和第四公钥为第三方认证机构为第二用户的生理特征参数指定的第四公私钥对中包括的密钥，第四公钥用于加密第二用户的生理特征参数，第四私钥用于解密 第二用户的生理特征参数。
S1022，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第二响应消息。
第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备反馈认证结果，第二响应消息中包括第三信息，第三信息用于指示第二用户是否可信。例如，第二用户可信、认证通过。
S1023，第一运营商网络设备根据第三信息认证第二用户，得到第三认证结果。
当第三信息指示第二用户可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户可信，第三认证结果为第二用户可信；或者，当第三信息指示第二用户不可信时，第一运营商网络设备认证第二用户不可信，第三认证结果为第二用户不可信。
S1024，第一运营商网络设备对第三认证结果进行可信背书签名，生成第三签名。
第一运营商网络设备先计算第二SIP 200 OK消息(该第二SIP 200 OK消息中包含了第三认证结果)的摘要(也称哈希值)，再使用第三私钥将摘要加密得到第三签名。
其中，第三私钥为第一运营商网络设备确定的用于加密第三认证结果的密钥。具体地，第三私钥为第三公私钥对中的私钥，第三公私钥对中还包括第三公钥，该第三公钥发送给第一运营商网络设备服务的终端设备(如第一终端设备和第二终端设备)，用于终端设备验证从第一运营商网络设备接收到的签名。
最后第一运营商网络设备需要将第二SIP 200 OK消息与第三签名一起转发给第一终端设备(被叫使用的终端设备)，图10所示的方法流程还包括：
S1025，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送第二SIP 200 OK消息和第三签名。
该第二SIP 200 OK消息中包含了第三认证结果。
第一终端设备接收到第二SIP 200 OK消息和第三签名之后，对第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名进行验证，图10所示的方法流程还包括：
S1026，第一终端设备验证第三签名。
示例性地，验证方法具体为：第一终端设备先使用第三公钥对摘要密文进行解密得到摘要#1；再计算第二SIP 200 OK消息的摘要，得到摘要#2；比较摘要#1与摘要#2：若一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是可信的，此时提示第一用户该次呼叫是可信的；若不一致则认定第一运营商网络设备的可信背书是不可信的，此时提示第一用户该次呼叫是不可信的。
在第一用户确定该次呼叫是可信的情况下，可以通过第一运营商网络设备向第二用户发起呼叫，图10所示的方法流程还包括：
S1027，第一终端设备通过第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送音频/视频数据。
可选地，为了实时监测通讯是否可信，可以在音频/视频数据中周期性的携带上主叫的加密过的第一用户的生理特征参数。(上述的第一加密信息)。生理特征参数的加密方法和密钥(上述的第一加密方法和第一公钥)由第三方认证机构指定、分配。
第一运营商网络设备收到主叫的音频/视频数据时，如果数据中携带了加密过的第一用户的生理特征参数，则可以参考上述方法对主叫身份进行可信验证，这里不再赘述。
第二用户使用的可信终端第二终端设备收到音频/视频数据和第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名后，对第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名进行验证，验证通过后，提示第二用户：呼叫的内容是可信的。
同理，第二终端设备在向第二用户发送被叫的音频/视频数据时，也可以周期性的携 带上加密过第二用户的生理特征参数，如指纹、人脸、虹膜等。生理特征参数的加密方法、密钥由第三方认证机构指定、分配。
第一运营商网络设备收到被叫的音频/视频数据时，如果数据中携带了加密过第二用户的生理特征参数，则可以参考上述方法对被叫身份进行可信验证，这里不再赘述。
第一用户使用的可信终端第一终端设备收到音频/视频数据和第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名后，对第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名进行验证，验证通过后，提示第一用户：呼叫的内容是可信的。
对应于上述的认证方式二，结合图11详细说明如何进行可信通信。
图11是本申请实施例提供的另一种呼叫流程示意性流程图。包括以下步骤：
S1110，第一终端设备通过第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送音频/视频数据。
S1111，第一运营商网络设备从音频/视频数据中获取第一用户的生理特征参数。
S1112，第一运营商网络设备基于第二加密方法和第二公钥对所述第一用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第二加密信息。
其中，所述第二公钥为所述第三方认证机构和所述第一运营商网络设备确定的第二公私钥对中的公钥，所述第二公私钥对中还包括第二私钥，所述第二加密方法为所述第一运营商网络设备和所述第三方认证机构确定的，所述第二私钥用于验证所述第二加密信息。
S1113，第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送第三请求消息。
第一运营商网络设备收到主叫发送的音频/视频数据，查找出第一用户的基本信息，调用第三方认证机构开放的接口对主叫进行认证(向第三方认证机构传递第一用户基本信息、加密后第一用户的生理特征参数)。
第三请求消息中包括第一用户的标识信息和第二加密信息。
S1114，第三方认证机构认证第一用户。
具体地，第三方认证机构基于第二私钥解密第二加密信息获取第一用户的生理特征信息，与第三方认证机构本地管理的第一用户的生理特征信息进行对比，如果对比结果一致，证明第一用户可信；否则，证明第一用户不可信。
S1115，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第三响应消息。
第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备反馈认证结果，第三响应消息中包括第二信息，第二信息用于指示第一用户是否可信。例如，第一用户可信、认证通过。
S1116，第一运营商网络设备根据第二信息认证第一用户，得到第一认证结果。
可以参考S760的描述，这里不再赘述。
S1117，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行可信背书签名，生成第一签名。
可以参考S770的描述，这里不再赘述。
S1118，第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送音频/视频数据和第一签名。
可以参考S780的描述，这里不再赘述。
S1119，第二终端设备验证第一签名。
可以参考S781的描述，这里不再赘述。
S1120，第二用户通过第二终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送音频/视频数据。
S1121，第一运营商网络设备从音频/视频数据中获取第二用户的生理特征参数。
S1122，第一运营商网络设备基于第四加密方法和第六公钥对所述第二用户的生理特 征信息进行加密，生成第四加密信息。
其中，所述第六公钥为所述第三方认证机构和所述第一运营商网络设备确定的第六公私钥对中的公钥，所述第六公私钥对中还包括第六私钥，所述第四加密方法为所述第一运营商网络设备和所述第三方认证机构已知的，所述第六私钥用于验证所述第四加密信息。
S1123，第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送第四请求消息。
第一运营商网络设备收到被叫发送的音频/视频数据，查找出第二用户的基本信息，调用第三方认证机构开放的接口对被叫进行认证(向第三方认证机构传递第二用户基本信息、加密后第二用户的生理特征参数)。
第四请求消息中包括第二用户的标识信息和第四加密信息。
S1124，第三方认证机构认证第二用户。
具体地，第三方认证机构基于第五私钥解密第四加密信息获取第二用户的生理特征信息，与第三方认证机构本地管理的第二用户的生理特征信息进行对比，如果对比结果一致，证明第二用户可信；否则，证明第二用户不可信。
S1125，第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备发送第四响应消息。
第三方认证机构向第一运营商网络设备反馈认证结果，第四响应消息中包括第四信息，第四信息用于指示第一用户是否可信。例如，第一用户可信、认证通过。
S1126，第一运营商网络设备根据第四信息认证第二用户，得到第三认证结果。
可以参考S1023的描述，这里不再赘述。
S1127，第一运营商网络设备对第三认证结果进行可信背书签名，生成第三签名。
可以参考S1024的描述，这里不再赘述。
S1128，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送音频/视频数据和第三签名。
可以参考S1025的描述，这里不再赘述。
S1129，第一终端设备验证第三签名。
可以参考S1026的描述，这里不再赘述。
与图10所示的呼叫流程相比，图11所示的呼叫流程也是由第一运营商网络设备调用第三方认证机构的认证服务对用户进行认证，但有如下差异：
1)用户的生理特征参数由第一运营商网络设备在用户呼叫过程中提取，不需要终端设备额外采集；
2)由于用户的生理特征参数是在呼叫接通后提取的，因此认证发生在呼叫接通后，而图11所示的呼叫流程中的认证在呼叫接通前、后均可进行。
对应于上述的认证方式三，结合图12详细说明如何进行可信通信。
图12是本申请实施例提供的又一种呼叫流程示意性流程图。包括以下步骤：
S1210，第一终端设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第二认证结果。
可以参考上述S810的描述这里不再赘述。
S1211，第一终端设备对所述第二认证结果进行签名，生成第二签名。
可以参考上述S820的描述这里不再赘述。
S1212，第一终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第三SIP invite消息。
第三SIP invite消息中携带了第二认证结果和第二签名。
S1213，第一运营商网络设备验证第二签名。
可以参考上述S840的描述这里不再赘述。
S1214，第一运营商网络设备根据验证结果认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果。
可以参考上述S850的描述这里不再赘述。
S1215，第一运营商网络设备对第一认证结果进行可信背书签名，生成第一签名。
可以参考上述S860的描述这里不再赘述。
S1216，第一运营商网络设备向第二终端设备发送第四SIP Invite消息和第一签名。
可以参考上述S870的描述这里不再赘述。
S1217，第二终端设备验证第一签名。
可以参考上述S880的描述这里不再赘述。
S1218，第二终端设备通过第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送SIP 180 Ring消息，该SIP 180 Ring消息用于指示第二终端设备响铃。
可以参考上述S1018的描述这里不再赘述。
S1219，第二终端设备认证第二用户是否可信，得到第五认证结果。
可以参考上述S811的描述这里不再赘述。
S1220，第二终端设备对所述第五认证结果进行签名，生成第七签名。
可以参考上述S812的描述这里不再赘述。
S1221，第二用户通过第二终端设备向第一运营商网络设备发送第三SIP 200 OK消息。
第三SIP 200 OK消息中携带了第五认证结果和第七签名。
S1222，第一运营商网络设备验证第七签名。
可以参考上述S814的描述这里不再赘述。
S1223，第一运营商网络设备根据验证结果认证第二用户是否可信，得到第三认证结果。
可以参考上述S815的描述这里不再赘述。
S1224，第一运营商网络设备对第三认证结果进行可信背书签名，生成第三签名。
可以参考上述S816的描述这里不再赘述。
S1225，第一运营商网络设备向第一终端设备发送第四SIP 200 OK消息和第三签名。
可以参考上述S1025的描述这里不再赘述。
S1226，第一终端设备验证第三签名。
可以参考上述S818的描述这里不再赘述。
在第一用户确定该次呼叫是可信的情况下，可以通过第一运营商网络设备向第二用户发起呼叫，图12所示的方法流程还包括：
可选地，为了实时监测通讯是否可信，第一终端设备可以在发送音频/视频数据前周期性的认证第一用户是否可信，并将认证结果、签名同音频/视频数据一起发送到运营商，具体认证过程、签名方法可以参考上述对主叫身份进行可信验证，这里不再赘述。
第二用户使用的可信终端第二终端设备收到音频/视频数据和第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名后，对第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名进行验证，验证通过后，提示第二用户：呼叫的内容是可信的。
同理，第二终端设备在向第二用户发送被叫的音频/视频数据千，也可以周期性的认证第二用户是否可信，并将认证结果、签名同音频/视频数据一起发送到运营商，具体认证过程、签名方法可以参考上述对被叫身份进行可信验证，这里不再赘述。
第一用户使用的可信终端第一终端设备收到音频/视频数据和第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名后，对第一运营商网络设备的可信背书签名进行验证，验证通过后，提示第一用户：呼叫的内容是可信的。
方式四与上述的方式一至方式三不同在于是对主叫进行认证，这里不再结合具体实施例进行说明，实现方式可以参考上述的图9。
上述方法实施例中，上述各过程的序列号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后，各过程的执行顺序应以其功能和内在逻辑确定，而不应对本申请实施例的实施过程构成任何限定。并且有可能并非要执行上述方法实施例中的全部操作。
应理解，上述方法实施例中终端设备和/或运营商网络设备可以执行施例中的部分或全部步骤，这些步骤或操作仅是示例，本申请实施例还可以包括执行其它操作或者各种操作的变形。
可以理解的是，上述方法实施例中，由运营商网络设备实现的方法，也可以由可用于运营商网络设备的部件(例如芯片或者电路等)实现，由终端设备实现的方法，也可以由可用于终端设备的部件实现。
还应理解，在本申请的各个实施例中，如果没有特殊说明以及逻辑冲突，不同的实施例之间的术语和/或描述可以具有一致性、且可以相互引用，不同的实施例中的技术特征根据其内在的逻辑关系可以组合形成新的实施例。
上面结合图4至图12详细介绍了本申请实施例中的认证的方法，下面结合图13-图18详细介绍本申请实施例提供认证的装置。
参见图13，图13是本申请提供的认证的装置1300的示意图。如图13所示，装置1300包括认证单元1310、处理单元1320和发送单元1330。
认证单元1310，用于认证用户是否可信，得到认证结果，该用户为使用第一终端设备向该装置发送消息的用户；
处理单元1320，用于对该认证结果进行签名；
发送单元1330，用于发送该认证结果和该签名。
装置1300和方法实施例中的运营商网络设备对应。装置1300可以是方法实施例中的运营商网络设备，或者方法实施例中的运营商网络设备元内部的芯片或功能模块。装置1300的相应单元用于执行图4至图12所示的方法实施例中由运营商网络设备执行的相应步骤。
其中，装置1300中的认证单元1310执行方法实施例中运营商网络设备认证的步骤。装置1300中的处理单元1320用于执行方法实施例中运营商网络设备对应与处理相关的步骤。装置1300中的发送单元1330，用于执行运营商网络设备发送的步骤。
其中，处理单元1320可以是至少一个处理器。发送单元1330可以是发射器或者接口电路。
可选的，装置1300还可以包括除存储单元，该存储单元用于存储数据和/或信令，认证单元1310、处理单元1320、发送单元1330可以与存储单元交互或者耦合，例如读取或 者调用存储单元中的数据和/或信令，以使得上述实施例的方法被执行。
以上各个单元可以独立存在，也可以全部或者部分集成。
参见图14，图14是适用于本申请实施例的运营商网络设备1400的结构示意图，可以用于实现上述运营商网络设备的功能。
该运营商网络设备1400包括处理器1401，存储器1402与收发器1403，其中，存储器1402中存储指令或程序，处理器1402和收发器1403用于执行或调用存储器1402中存储的指令或程序，以使得运营商网络设备1400实现上述认证的方法中的运营商网络设备的功能。存储器1402中存储的指令或程序被执行时，收发器1403可以用于执行图13所示的实施例中的发送单元1330执行的操作，处理器1402可以用于执行图13所示的实施例中的处理单元1320执行的操作。
本领域技术人员可以理解，为了便于说明，图14仅示出了一个存储器和处理器。在实际的用户设备中，可以存在多个处理器和存储器。存储器也可以称为存储介质或者存储设备等，本申请实施例对此不做限制。
参见图15，图15是适用于本申请实施例的运营商网络设备1500的结构示意图，可以用于实现上述运营商网络设备的功能。
该运营商网络设备1500包括但不限于以下模块：
认证模块1510、第三方通讯模块1520、数据库模块1530、缓存模块1540、策略模块1550、生理特征参数提取模块1560。
1)认证模块1510：用于可信认证过程的调度、控制、执行等；
2)第三方通讯模块1520：针对上述的认证方式一和方式二，用于与第三方认证机构进行通信；
3)数据库模块1530：用于存储主叫用户的呼叫行为(如呼叫位置等)、用户基本信息、与用户身份证书匹配的公钥等信息；
4)缓存模块1540：用于高速访问、临时存储。可以用于提升认证性能，缓存模块中可以临时存储用户的呼叫行为(如呼叫位置等)、用户基本信息、与用户身份证书匹配的公钥等信息；
5)策略模块1550：针对上述的认证方式四，用于决策用户的呼叫行为是否正常、可信；
6)生理特征参数提取模块1560：针对上述的认证方式二，该模块用于提取生理特征参数。
参见图16，图16是本申请提供的认证的装置1600的示意图。如图16所示，装置1600包括接收单元1610、处理单元1620和发送单元1630。
认证单元1610，用于接收来自运营商网络设备的加密方法和公钥；
处理单元1620，用于基于该加密方法和该公钥对用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成加密信息，用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：用户的指纹信息、用户的声纹信息、用户的人脸信息、用户的虹膜信息和用户的掌纹信息；
发送单元1630，用于向运营商网络设备发送加密信息，其中，用户为使用该装置向运营商网络设备发送消息的用户，公钥为第三方认证机构确定的公私钥对中的公钥，该公私钥对中还包括私钥，该私钥保存在该第三方认证机构中用于验证该一加密信息。
或者，
装置1600还包括认证单元1640，用于认证用户是否可信，得到认证结果；
处理单元1620，用于基于SIM私钥对该认证结果进行签名，生成签名；
发送单元1630，用于向运营商网络设备发送该认证结果和该签名。
装置1600和方法实施例中的终端设备对应。装置1600可以是方法实施例中的终端设备，或者方法实施例中的终端设备元内部的芯片或功能模块。装置1600的相应单元用于执行图4至图12所示的方法实施例中由终端设备执行的相应步骤。
其中，装置1600中的接收单元1610执行方法实施例中终端设备接收的步骤。装置1600中的处理单元1620用于执行方法实施例中终端设备对应与处理相关的步骤。装置1600中的发送单元1630，用于执行终端设备发送的步骤。
其中，处理单元1620可以是至少一个处理器。发送单元1630可以是发射器或者接口电路。
可选的，装置1600还可以包括除存储单元，该存储单元用于存储数据和/或信令，接收单元1610、处理单元1620、发送单元1630可以与存储单元交互或者耦合，例如读取或者调用存储单元中的数据和/或信令，以使得上述实施例的方法被执行。
以上各个单元可以独立存在，也可以全部或者部分集成。
参见图17，图17是适用于本申请实施例的终端设备1700的结构示意图，可以用于实现上述终端设备的功能。
该终端设备1700包括处理器1701，存储器1702与收发器1703，其中，存储器1702中存储指令或程序，处理器1702和收发器1703用于执行或调用存储器1702中存储的指令或程序，以使得终端设备1700实现上述认证的方法中的终端设备的功能。存储器1702中存储的指令或程序被执行时，收发器1703可以用于执行图16所示的实施例中的发送单元1630执行的操作，处理器1702可以用于执行图16所示的实施例中的处理单元1620执行的操作。
本领域技术人员可以理解，为了便于说明，图17仅示出了一个存储器和处理器。在实际的用户设备中，可以存在多个处理器和存储器。存储器也可以称为存储介质或者存储设备等，本申请实施例对此不做限制。
参见图18，图18是本申请提供的认证的装置1800的示意图。如图18所示，装置1800包括管理单元1810、处理单元1820、发送单元1830和接收单元1840。
管理单元1810，用于管理用户的标识信息和该用户的生理特征信息，该用户的标识信息用于标识该用户，该用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：该用户的指纹信息、该用户的声纹信息、该用户的人脸信息、该用户的虹膜信息和该用户的掌纹信息；
处理单元1820，用于确定加密该用户的生理特征信息的公钥和加密方法；
发送单元1830，用于向运营商网络设备发送该加密方法和该公钥；
接收单元1840，用于接收来自运营商网络设备的该用户的标识信息和加密信息，该加密信息为加密后的该用户的生理特征信息；
该处理单元1820还用于基于该用户的标识信息确定该用户，并基于私钥验证该加密信息，根据该验证结果确定该用户是否可信，该公钥和该私钥为一对公私钥对；
该发送单元1830还用于向运营商网络设备发送指示该用户是否可信的信息，其中， 该用户为使用终端设备向该运营商网络设备发送消息的用户。
装置1800和方法实施例中的第三方认证机构对应。装置1800可以是方法实施例中的第三方认证机构，或者方法实施例中的第三方认证机构元内部的芯片或功能模块。装置1800的相应单元用于执行图4至图12所示的方法实施例中由第三方认证机构执行的相应步骤。
其中，装置1800中的管理单元1810执行方法实施例中第三方认证机构管理的步骤。装置1800中的处理单元1820用于执行方法实施例中第三方认证机构对应与处理相关的步骤。装置1800中的发送单元1830，用于执行第三方认证机构发送的步骤。
其中，处理单元1820可以是至少一个处理器。发送单元1830可以是发射器或者接口电路。
可选的，装置1800还可以包括除存储单元，该存储单元用于存储数据和/或信令，管理单元1810、处理单元1820、发送单元1830可以与存储单元交互或者耦合，例如读取或者调用存储单元中的数据和/或信令，以使得上述实施例的方法被执行。
以上各个单元可以独立存在，也可以全部或者部分集成。
参见图19，图19是适用于本申请实施例的第三方认证机构1900的结构示意图，可以用于实现上述第三方认证机构的功能。
该第三方认证机构1900包括处理器1901，存储器1902与收发器1903，其中，存储器1902中存储指令或程序，处理器1902和收发器1903用于执行或调用存储器1902中存储的指令或程序，以使得第三方认证机构1900实现上述认证的方法中的第三方认证机构的功能。存储器1902中存储的指令或程序被执行时，收发器1903可以用于执行图18所示的实施例中的发送单元1830执行的操作，处理器1902可以用于执行图18所示的实施例中的处理单元1820执行的操作。
本领域技术人员可以理解，为了便于说明，图19仅示出了一个存储器和处理器。在实际的用户设备中，可以存在多个处理器和存储器。存储器也可以称为存储介质或者存储设备等，本申请实施例对此不做限制。
本申请实施例还提供一种通信系统，其包括前述的运营商网络设备和终端设备。
本申请还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当该指令在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述如图4至图12所示的方法中终端设备执行的各个步骤。
本申请还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当该指令在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述如图4至图12所示的方法中运营商网络设备执行的各个步骤。
本申请还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当该指令在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述如图4至图12所示的方法中第三方认证机构执行的各个步骤。
本申请还提供了一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当该计算机程序产品在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如图4至图12所示的方法中终端设备执行的各个步骤。
本申请还提供了一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当该计算机程序产品在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如图4至图12所示的方法中运营商网络设备执行的各个步骤。
本申请还提供了一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当该计算机程序产品在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如图4至图12所示的方法中第三方认证机构执行的各个步骤。
本申请还提供一种芯片，包括处理器。该处理器用于读取并运行存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行本申请提供的认证的方法中由终端设备执行的相应操作和/或流程。在一种可能的实现方式中，该芯片还包括存储器，该存储器与该处理器通过电路或电线与存储器连接，处理器用于读取并执行该存储器中的计算机程序。进一步在一种可能的实现方式中，该芯片还包括通信接口，处理器与该通信接口连接。通信接口用于接收处理的数据和/或信息，处理器从该通信接口获取该数据和/或信息，并对该数据和/或信息进行处理。该通信接口可以是该芯片上的输入/输出接口、接口电路、输出电路、输入电路、管脚或相关电路等。该处理器也可以体现为处理电路或逻辑电路。
本申请还提供一种芯片，包括处理器。该处理器用于读取并运行存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行本申请提供的认证的方法中由运营商网络设备执行的相应操作和/或流程。在一种可能的实现方式中，该芯片还包括存储器，该存储器与该处理器通过电路或电线与存储器连接，处理器用于读取并执行该存储器中的计算机程序。进一步在一种可能的实现方式中，该芯片还包括通信接口，处理器与该通信接口连接。通信接口用于接收处理的数据和/或信息，处理器从该通信接口获取该数据和/或信息，并对该数据和/或信息进行处理。该通信接口可以是该芯片上的输入/输出接口、接口电路、输出电路、输入电路、管脚或相关电路等。所述处理器也可以体现为处理电路或逻辑电路。
本申请还提供一种芯片，包括处理器。该处理器用于读取并运行存储器中存储的计算机程序，以执行本申请提供的认证的方法中由第三方认证机构执行的相应操作和/或流程。在一种可能的实现方式中，该芯片还包括存储器，该存储器与该处理器通过电路或电线与存储器连接，处理器用于读取并执行该存储器中的计算机程序。进一步在一种可能的实现方式中，该芯片还包括通信接口，处理器与该通信接口连接。通信接口用于接收处理的数据和/或信息，处理器从该通信接口获取该数据和/或信息，并对该数据和/或信息进行处理。该通信接口可以是该芯片上的输入/输出接口、接口电路、输出电路、输入电路、管脚或相关电路等。该处理器也可以体现为处理电路或逻辑电路。
上述的芯片也可以替换为芯片系统，这里不再赘述。
本申请中的术语“包括”和“具有”以及他们的任何变形，意图在于覆盖不排他的包含，例如，包含了一系列步骤或单元的过程、方法、系统、产品或设备不必限于清楚地列出的那些步骤或单元，而是可包括没有清楚地列出的或对于这些过程、方法、产品或设备固有的其它步骤或单元。
本领域普通技术人员可以意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，能够以电子硬件、或者计算机软件和电子硬件的结合来实现。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统、装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的系统、装置和方法，可以通 过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。
所述功能如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(Read-Only Memory，ROM)、随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (23)

  1. 一种认证的方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第一运营商网络设备认证第一用户是否可信，得到第一认证结果，所述第一用户为使用第一终端设备向所述第一运营商网络设备发送消息的用户；
    所述第一运营商网络设备对所述第一认证结果进行签名，生成第一签名；
    所述第一运营商网络设备向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送所述第一认证结果和所述第一签名，
    其中，所述第二运营商网络设备为给所述第二用户提供服务的运营商网络设备，所述第二用户为所述第一用户呼叫的用户。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自所述第一终端设备的第一消息，所述第一消息中包括第一加密信息，所述第一加密信息为加密后的所述第一用户的生理特征信息，所述第一用户的生理特征信息包括以下至少一项：
    所述第一用户的指纹信息、所述第一用户的声纹信息、所述第一用户的人脸信息、所述第一用户的虹膜信息和所述第一用户的掌纹信息；
    所述第一运营商网络设备认证所述第一用户是否可信，包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送所述第一用户的标识信息和所述第一加密信息，所述第一加密信息用于所述第三方认证机构认证所述第一用户是否可信，所述第一用户的标识信息用于标识所述第一用户；
    所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自所述第三方认证机构的第一信息，所述第一信息用于指示所述第一用户是否可信；
    所述第一运营商网络设备根据所述第一信息认证所述第一用户是否可信。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息包括以下至少一种：
    信令消息、视频数据和音频数据，
    当所述第一消息为所述视频数据和/或所述音频数据时，所述第一消息中周期性地携带所述第一加密信息。
  4. 根据权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自所述第一终端设备的第一消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备从所述第三方认证机构获取第一加密方法和第一公钥；
    所述第一运营商网络设备向所述第一终端设备发送所述第一加密方法和所述第一公钥，
    其中，所述第一公钥为所述第三方认证机构确定的第一公私钥对中的公钥，所述第一公私钥对中还包括第一私钥，所述第一加密方法和所述第一公钥用于所述第一终端设备加密所述第一用户的生理特征信息得到所述第一加密信息，所述第一私钥保存在所述第三方认证机构中用于验证所述第一加密信息。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第一运营商网络设备认证所述第一用户是否可信之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备获取所述第一用户的生理特征信息，所述第一用户的生理特征信息包括所述第一用户的声纹信息和/或所述第一用户的人脸信息；
    所述第一运营商网络设备认证所述第一用户是否可信，包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备基于第二加密方法和第二公钥对所述第一用户的生理特征信息进行加密，生成第二加密信息；
    所述第一运营商网络设备向第三方认证机构发送所述第一用户的标识信息和所述第二加密信息，所述第二加密信息用于所述第三方认证机构认证所述第一用户是否可信，所述第一用户的标识信息用于标识所述第一用户；
    所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自所述第三方认证机构的第二信息，所述第二信息用于指示所述第一用户是否可信；
    所述第一运营商网络设备根据所述第二信息认证所述第一用户是否可信；
    其中，所述第二公钥为所述第三方认证机构确定的第二公私钥对中的公钥，所述第二公私钥对中还包括第二私钥，所述第二加密方法为所述第三方认证机构确定的，所述第二私钥用于验证所述第二加密信息。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自所述第一终端设备的第二认证结果和第二签名，所述第二认证结果用于指示所述第一用户是否可信，所述第二签名用于验证所述第二认证结果；
    所述第一运营商网络设备认证所述第一用户是否可信，包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备验证所述第二签名，验证通过时根据所述第二认证结果认证所述第一用户是否可信。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二签名为基于第一SIM卡私钥对所述第二认证结果进行签名生成的签名；
    所述第一运营商网络设备验证所述第二签名，包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备基于第一SIM卡公钥验证所述第二签名，
    其中，所述第一SIM卡私钥和所述第一SIM卡公钥为第一SIM卡公私钥对，第一SIM卡设置在所述第一终端设备中，所述第一SIM卡私钥保存在所述第一SIM卡中，所述第一SIM卡公钥保存在所述第一运营商网络设备中。
  8. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，当所述第一用户为主叫用户时，在所述第一运营商网络设备认证所述第一用户是否可信之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备获取所述第一用户的历史呼叫数据，所述第一用户的历史呼叫数据用于指示所述第一用户的呼叫习惯，包括以下至少一项：
    所述第一用户发起呼叫的时间点分布数据、所述第一用户发起呼叫时所述第二用户接通呼叫的频率数据、所述第一用户发起呼叫时所述第二终端设备振铃时长数据、所述第一用户的通话时长分布数据、所述第一用户发起呼叫的地理位置分布数据、所述第二用户为首次被呼叫的比率、所述第二用户号码归属地分布数据；
    所述第一运营商网络设备根据预设的策略和所述第一用户的历史呼叫数据确定所述第一用户发起的呼叫是否可信；
    所述第一运营商网络设备认证所述第一用户是否可信，包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备根据所述第一用户发起的呼叫是否可信认证所述第一用户是否可信。
  9. 根据权利要求1-8中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备确定第三公私钥对，所述第三公私钥对包括第三私钥和第三公钥；
    所述第一运营商网络设备保存所述第三私钥。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，
    当所述第一用户和所述第二用户分别所属的第一运营商和第二运营商为同一个运营商时，
    所述第一运营商网络设备向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送所述第一认证结果和所述第一签名，具体为：
    所述第一运营商网络设备向所述第二终端设备发送所述第一认证结果和所述第一签名；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备向所述第二终端设备发送所述第三公钥，所述第三公钥用于所述第二终端设备验证所述第一签名。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备认证所述第二用户是否可信，得到第三认证结果；
    所述第一运营商网络设备对所述第三认证结果进行签名，生成第三签名；
    所述第一运营商网络设备向所述第一终端设备发送所述第三认证结果和所述第三签名；
    所述第一运营商网络设备向所述第一终端设备发送所述第三公钥，所述第三公钥用于所述第一终端设备验证所述第三签名。
  12. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，
    当所述第一用户和所述第二用户分别所属的第一运营商和第二运营商为不同的运营商时，
    所述第一运营商网络设备向第二用户使用的第二终端设备，或者向第二运营商网络设备发送所述第一认证结果和所述第一签名，具体为：
    所述第一运营商网络设备向所述第二运营商网络设备发送所述第一签名和所述第一认证结果；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备向第二运营商网络设备发送所述第三公钥，所述第三公钥用于所述第二运营商网络设备验证所述第一签名；
    其中，所述第一认证结果和第四私钥用于所述第二运营商网络设备生成第四签名，所述第四签名用于发送给所述第二终端设备指示所述第二终端设备验证所述第一认证结果，所述第四私钥保存在所述第二运营商网络设备中，所述第四私钥和第四公钥为第四公私钥对。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自所述第二运营商网络设备的所述第四公钥；
    所述第一运营商网络设备接收来自第二运营商网络设备的第五签名和第四认证结果，所述第五签名为基于所述第四私钥对所述第四认证结果进行签名生成的签名，所述第四认证结果用于指示所述第二用户是否可信；
    所述第一运营商网络设备基于所述第四公钥验证所述第五签名；
    验证成功后，所述第一运营商网络设备基于所述第三私钥对所述第四认证结果进行签名，生成第六签名；
    所述第一运营商网络设备向所述第一终端设备发送所述第四认证结果和所述第六签名。
  14. 一种用于认证的方法，其特征在于，包括:
    第二用户使用的第二终端设备接收来自第一运营商网络设备的第一认证结果和第一签名，其中，所述第一认证结果为对第一用户进行认证的认证结果，所述第一签名为所述第一认证结果进行签名得到的签名，所述第二用户为所述第一用户呼叫的用户，所述第一运营商网络设备为给所述第一用户提供服务的运营商网络设备；
    所述第二终端设备验证所述第一签名。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二终端设备接收来自第一运营商网络设备的第三公钥；
    所述第二终端设备验证所述第一签名，包括:
    所述第二终端设备根据所述第三公钥验证所述第一签名。
  16. 根据权利要求14或15所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二终端设备接收来自第二运营商网络设备的第四签名，其中，所述第二运营商网络设备为给所述第二用户提供服务的运营商网络设备，所述第四签名基于所述所述第一认证结果和第四私钥生成，所述第四私钥保存在所述第二运营商网络设备中；
    所述第二终端根据所述第四签名验证所述第一认证结果。
  17. 一种用于认证的装置，其特征在于，包括用于执行如权利要求1至13中任一项所述方法的各个步骤的模块。
  18. 一种用于认证的装置，其特征在于，包括用于执行如权利要求14至16中任一项所述方法的各个步骤的模块。
  19. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，所述计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序，当所述计算机程序运行时，使得装置执行如权利要求1至16中任意一项所述的方法。
  20. 一种芯片系统，其特征在于，包括：处理器，用于从存储器中调用并运行计算机程序，使得安装有所述芯片系统的通信装置执行如权利要求1至16中任意一项所述的方法。
  21. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    存储器，用于存储计算机程序；
    处理器，用于执行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以使得所述通信装置执行权利要求1至13中任一项所述的方法。
  22. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    存储器，用于存储计算机程序；
    处理器，用于执行所述存储器中存储的计算机程序，以使得所述通信装置执行权利要求14至16中任一项所述的方法。
  23. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，所述通信系统包括至少一个如权利要求17中所述的用于认证的装置和至少一个如权利要求18中所述的用于认证的装置。
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