WO2023213383A1 - Établissement de communications sécurisées sur un réseau - Google Patents

Établissement de communications sécurisées sur un réseau Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2023213383A1
WO2023213383A1 PCT/EP2022/061866 EP2022061866W WO2023213383A1 WO 2023213383 A1 WO2023213383 A1 WO 2023213383A1 EP 2022061866 W EP2022061866 W EP 2022061866W WO 2023213383 A1 WO2023213383 A1 WO 2023213383A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
network
information
secure communications
over
bluetooth
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2022/061866
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Patrik Salmela
Mohit SETHI
Original Assignee
Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) filed Critical Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ)
Priority to PCT/EP2022/061866 priority Critical patent/WO2023213383A1/fr
Publication of WO2023213383A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023213383A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/50—Secure pairing of devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels

Definitions

  • Examples of the present disclosure relate to establishing secure communications over a network, for example using a key based on information transmitted or received using Bluetooth.
  • Bluetooth is a popular low-power radio technology. There are two flavors of the Bluetooth currently used. One is Bluetooth classic, typically used for applications such as headphones and speakers), and known as BR/EDR. The other is Bluetooth Low Energy (LE), which is typically used for applications such as blood pressure monitors.
  • Bluetooth classic typically used for applications such as headphones and speakers
  • BR/EDR Bluetooth Low Energy
  • LE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • Bluetooth security is based on the Secure Simple Pairing (SSP)/Secure Connections protocol. This requires that two devices wishing to communicate securely first perform a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange followed by the SSP/SC authentication step.
  • SSP Secure Simple Pairing
  • DH Diffie-Hellman
  • Passkey Entry One device shows a PIN code which the user needs to input into the other device.
  • Out-of-Band Requires an out-of-band (OOB) channel such as one device scanning a quick response (QR) code shown on the other device or tapping the near field communication (NFC) interface.
  • OOB out-of-band
  • QR quick response
  • NFC near field communication
  • Figure 1 shows an example of the Bluetooth BR/EDR protocol stack and LE protocol stack. Pairing in BR/EDR is done in the controller by the Link Manager. Pairing in LE is performed by the SMP (Security Manager Protocol). An example of a pairing protocol using the Numeric Comparison authentication mode is shown in Figure 2.
  • the pairing process begins with the SMP Pairing request and response messages, where information about the I/O capabilities of each device, such as whether a display or keyboard are present, is indicated.
  • the SMP Pairing request and response also indicate if any out-of-band (OOB) authentication data about the other device is available, and whether man-in-the-middle attacker (MITM) protection and bonding is desired (these steps are not shown in Figure 2).
  • OOB out-of-band
  • MITM man-in-the-middle attacker
  • the SMP Public Key messages carry the public keys (Phase 1), referred to as PKa and PKb in Figure 2.
  • PKax and PKbx referred to in Figure 2 are certain parameters of the corresponding public key PKa and PKb respectively.
  • PKax and PKbx may refer to the x-coordinate of the corresponding public key PKa and PKb respectively.
  • the SMP Pairing random messages carry the random numbers (Phase 2), referred to as nonces, Na, Nb in Figure 2.
  • the SMP DHKey Check messages carry the check Ea and Eb. Va/Vb are the 6 digit codes used for human verification of successful pairing (as that is the type of authentication that the example is showing).
  • the pairing process begins with exchange of I/O capabilities with the LMP_IO_CAPABILITY_REQ and LMP_IO_CAPABILITY_RES messages.
  • the LMP_ENCAPSULATED_HEADER and LMP_ENCAPSULATED_PAYLOAD messages are used for carrying the public keys PKa and PKb referred to above.
  • the LMP_SIMPLE_PAIRING_NUMBER, LMP_SIMPLE_PAIRING_CONFIRM, LMP_ACCEPTED, LMP_DHKEY_CHECK messages are used for completing the authentication phases 1 and 2 referred to above.
  • the link key (in BR/EDR) and LTK (in LE) is calculated with functions f2 (in BR/EDR) and f5 (in LE).
  • Figure 2 shows the function f2 being used to compute the link key.
  • the devices can establish multiple local secure connections on the Bluetooth radio.
  • the devices use LMP authentication for confirming that the two devices still are in possession of the link key/LTK.
  • An example of the authentication procedure (for both devices) is shown in Figure 3.
  • the two devices each send a random number (in LMP_AU_RAND messages) and then receive the authentication response (in LMP_SRES messages).
  • the verifier checks the authentication response with locally computed values to confirm successful authentication.
  • the authentication procedure generates a new Authenticated Ciphering Offset (ACO) which is used for calculating the key for integrity protection and encryption of the Bluetooth communication channel (with the AES-CCM cipher).
  • ACO Authenticated Ciphering Offset
  • Example embodiments of this disclosure may allow devices to establish secure connections over a network using information that is exchanged using Bluetooth.
  • Example embodiments may also provide privacy protection while setting up remote connections
  • One aspect of the present disclosure provides a method performed by a first device of establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • the method comprises transmitting information to the second device using Bluetooth, and establishing secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information.
  • Another aspect of the present disclosure provides a method performed by a first device of establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • the method comprises receiving information from the second device using Bluetooth, and establishing secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information.
  • a further aspect of the present disclosure provides apparatus in a first device for establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • the apparatus comprises a processor and a memory.
  • the memory contains instructions executable by the processor such that the apparatus is operable to transmit information to the second device using Bluetooth, and establish secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information.
  • a still further aspect of the present disclosure provides apparatus in a first device for establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • the apparatus comprises a processor and a memory.
  • the memory contains instructions executable by the processor such that the apparatus is operable to receive information from the second device using Bluetooth, and establish secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information.
  • An additional aspect of the present disclosure provides apparatus in a first device for establishing secure communications with a second device over a network, the apparatus is configured to transmit information to the second device using Bluetooth, and establish secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information.
  • Another aspect of the present disclosure provides apparatus in a first device for establishing secure communications with a second device over a network. The apparatus is configured to receive information from the second device using Bluetooth, and establish secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information.
  • Figure 1 shows an example of the Bluetooth BR/EDR protocol stack and LE protocol stack
  • Figure 2 shows an example of a pairing protocol using the Numeric Comparison authentication mode
  • Figure 3 shows an example of an authentication procedure
  • Figure 4 is a flow chart of an example of a method performed by a first device of establishing secure communications with a second device over a network;
  • Figure 5 is a flow chart of another example of a method performed by a first device of establishing secure communications with a second device over a network;
  • Figure 6 shows an example of exchanging capability information
  • Figure 7 shows another example of exchanging capability information
  • Figure 8 shows an example of remote connection information exchange
  • FIG. 9 shows another example of remote connection information exchange
  • Figure 10 shows an example of TLS 1.3 PSK authentication
  • Figure 11 shows an example of issuing session ticket after authentication
  • Figure 12 is a schematic of an example of an apparatus 1200 in a first device for establishing secure communications with a second device over a network
  • Figure 13 is a schematic of an example of an apparatus 1300 in a first device for establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • Nodes that communicate using the air interface also have suitable radio communications circuitry.
  • the technology can additionally be considered to be embodied entirely within any form of computer-readable memory, such as solid-state memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk containing an appropriate set of computer instructions that would cause a processor to carry out the techniques described herein.
  • Hardware implementation may include or encompass, without limitation, digital signal processor (DSP) hardware, a reduced instruction set processor, hardware (e.g. digital or analogue) circuitry including but not limited to application specific integrated circuit(s) (ASIC) and/or field programmable gate array(s) (FPGA(s)), and (where appropriate) state machines capable of performing such functions.
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • the devices can in the future establish local connections over Bluetooth without requiring the user to complete the pairing process again. This is possible via the bonding mechanism and the LMP authentication protocol defined in the Bluetooth specification.
  • the devices use the link key (or LTK) established during pairing for authenticating future connections with the same device.
  • link key or LTK
  • Many Bluetooth devices may have the ability to access networks such as the Internet or other networks via Wi-Fi, Ethernet, or other technologies.
  • Such a mechanism can be useful in several deployment scenarios: for example, after returning a rental car, a user may realise that they have forgotten to delete the phone contacts, search history, and music playlists that were used in the rental car. There is currently no way for the user to establish a remote connection even if Bluetooth pairing with the rental car (or a device therein) was recently completed successfully.
  • devices may negotiate the capability of establishing remote connections (e.g. over non-Bluetooth networks) during the Bluetooth pairing process or over a Bluetooth connection after pairing, and/or may use information exchanged using Bluetooth during or after the pairing process for establishing secure remote connections over a network such as the Internet.
  • remote connections e.g. over non-Bluetooth networks
  • Example embodiments of this disclosure may allow devices to establish secure connections over a network using information that is exchanged using Bluetooth. This can be used in multiple deployment scenarios, such as for example deleting the search history, songs, playlists and contact information from a rental car after returning it, and/or playing music on Bluetooth-enabled speakers even when the user is not within Bluetooth range. Example embodiments may also provide privacy protection while setting up remote connections.
  • Figure 4 is a flow chart of an example of a method 400 performed by a first device of establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • the network may be for example an Internet network, a wireless network, Local Area Network (LAN), wireless LAN (WLAN), cellular or mobile communications network such as 4G or 5G network, any other type of network, or a combination of multiple networks e.g. a mobile communications network and the Internet.
  • LAN Local Area Network
  • WLAN wireless LAN
  • cellular or mobile communications network such as 4G or 5G network, any other type of network, or a combination of multiple networks e.g. a mobile communications network and the Internet.
  • the method 400 comprises, in step 402, transmitting information to the second device using Bluetooth, such as for example during a Bluetooth pairing procedure (e.g. such as described above) with the second device and/or over a Bluetooth connection, e.g. following pairing between the first and second devices.
  • a Bluetooth pairing procedure e.g. such as described above
  • the key may be exchanged in a secure manner that ensures that it cannot be easily determined by third party devices.
  • the information may be exchanged with the second device for example according to Bluetooth Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR) or Bluetooth Low Energy (LE).
  • the information may be exchanged with the second device for example according to a Link Manager Protocol (LMP) and/or in one or more Protocol Data Units (PDU) and/or Security Manager
  • SMP Session Protocol
  • Step 404 of the method 400 comprises establishing secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information. This may allow for example the two devices to establish secure connections over the network using information that is exchanged using Bluetooth.
  • the method 400 may further comprise receiving further information from the second device using Bluetooth, and wherein the key is further based on the further information. Therefore, for example, the key may be based on information from both the first and second devices.
  • Figure 5 is a flow chart of an example of a method 500 performed by a first device of establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • the network may be for example an Internet network, a wireless network, Local Area Network (LAN), wireless LAN (WLAN), cellular or mobile communications network such as 4G or 5G network, any other type of network, or a combination of multiple networks e.g. a mobile communications network and the Internet.
  • LAN Local Area Network
  • WLAN wireless LAN
  • cellular or mobile communications network such as 4G or 5G network, any other type of network, or a combination of multiple networks e.g. a mobile communications network and the Internet.
  • the method 500 comprises, in step 502, receiving information from the second device using Bluetooth, such as for example during a Bluetooth pairing procedure (e.g. such as described above) with the second device and/or over a Bluetooth connection, e.g. following pairing between the first and second devices.
  • a Bluetooth pairing procedure e.g. such as described above
  • the key may be exchanged in a secure manner that ensures that it cannot be easily determined by third party devices.
  • the information may be exchanged with the second device for example according to Bluetooth Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR) or Bluetooth Low Energy (LE).
  • BBR/EDR Bluetooth Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate
  • LE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • the information may be exchanged with the second device for example according to a Link Manager Protocol (LMP) and/or in one or more Protocol Data Units (PDU) and/or Security Manager Protocol (SMP) commands.
  • LMP Link Manager Protocol
  • PDU Protocol Data Units
  • SMP Security Manager Protocol
  • Step 504 of the method 500 comprises establishing secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information. This may allow for example the two devices to establish secure connections over the network using information that is exchanged using Bluetooth.
  • the method 500 may further comprise transmitting further information to the second device using Bluetooth, and wherein the key is further based on the further information. Therefore, for example, the key may be based on information from both the first and second devices.
  • the key is based on the information.
  • the key may also be based on other information, such as for example the Internet Protocol (IP) address and/or fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the first and/or second device.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • FQDN fully qualified domain name
  • this other information may additionally or alternatively be used to establish the secure communications.
  • the key based on the information can be used to establish secure communications.
  • the secure communications can be communications that cannot be eavesdropped by third parties (e.g. encrypted communications).
  • the secure communications can be communications where the sender and/or receiver are verified, e.g. authenticated.
  • Establishing the secure communications with the second device over the network using the key based on the information in step 404 of the method 400 or step 504 of the method 500 may in some examples comprise one or more of the following: sending communications encrypted using the key to the second device over the network; receiving encrypted communications from the second device and decrypting the encrypted communications using the key; and/or authenticating with the second device over the network using the key.
  • the key may be used for authentication, during which additional keys may be derived for establishing a secure connection or session between the first and second devices.
  • the method 400 or 500 may in some examples comprise, before establishing secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information in step 404 or 504, determining that the second device is capable of establishing secure communications over the network.
  • the message may in some examples include an indication of whether the first device can send a request for secure communications to the second device and/or can receive a request for secure communications from the second device.
  • the message sent to the second device may for example be sent according to a Link Manager Protocol (LMP) and/or comprises a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) or a Security Manager Protocol (SMP) command
  • LMP Link Manager Protocol
  • PDU Protocol Data Unit
  • SMP Security Manager Protocol
  • the message (including an indication of whether the second device is capable of establishing secure communications over the network) received from the second device may in some examples include an indication of whether the second device can send a request for secure communications to the first device and/or can receive a request for secure communications from the first device.
  • the message received from the second device may in some examples be received according to a Link Manager Protocol (LMP) and/or comprises a PDU or a SMP command.
  • LMP Link Manager Protocol
  • Determining that the second device is capable of establishing secure communications over the network may in some examples comprise determining one or more properties of secure communications between the first device and the second device over the network.
  • the properties may in some examples include a maximum number of connections between the first device and the second device over the network, and/or commands that can be performed by the first device and/or the second device over the network.
  • the method 400 or 500 may comprise exchanging, with the second device, address information of the first device on the network, and/or the second device on the network. This is so that for example one of the devices may be able to find the other device (e.g. send messages to it, such as a request to establish a secure connection).
  • the address information may comprise for example an internet protocol (IP) address, port number and/or Domain Name System (DNS) name of the first and/or second device.
  • IP internet protocol
  • DNS Domain Name System
  • Exchanging the address information of the first device and/or the second device may comprise for example exchanging the address information over a Bluetooth connection or during a Bluetooth pairing procedure with the second device, and/or according to a Link Manager Protocol (LMP) and/or in one or more Protocol Data Units (PDU) and/or Security Manager Protocol (SMP) commands.
  • LMP Link Manager Protocol
  • PDU Protocol Data Unit
  • SMP Security Manager Protocol
  • the method 400 or 500 may comprise exchanging, with the second device, identification information of the first device on the network and/or the second device on the network.
  • a device e.g. the first or second device
  • Exchanging the identification information of the first device and/or the second device may comprise for example exchanging the identification information over a Bluetooth connection or during a Bluetooth pairing procedure with the second device, for example according to a Link Manager Protocol (LMP) and/or in one or more Protocol Data Units (PDU) and/or Security Manager Protocol (SMP) commands.
  • LMP Link Manager Protocol
  • PDU Protocol Data Unit
  • SMP Security Manager Protocol
  • the first and second devices may begin the process of establishing secure communications by negotiating the capability of remote connection establishment over the Internet using Bluetooth or non-Bluetooth radio interfaces (such as Wi-Fi, Ethernet, Gateways, Routers) after pairing, or as part of pairing, for example secure connection over the network capability exchange could be done as part of or together with other capability exchange during the pairing procedure. That is, for example, the capability information may be exchanged as referred to above.
  • Bluetooth LE the negotiation can in some examples be performed with new SMP messages shown as SMP Remote connection capability request and response in Figure 6, which shows an example of exchanging capability information.
  • the two devices are referred to as Initiating Device A and Non Initiating Device B, or Initiating Link Manager (LM) and Non-initiating LM (also referred to in Figures 7 and 8 as LM), and either device can be the first device or second device referred to herein, where appropriate.
  • the reserved bonding flag values (10 and 11) in the existing SMP Pairing request and response messages could be used for negotiating the remote connection capability. It is also possible in some examples to use other parts of the SMP Pairing request/response messages, like the reserved bits in the 1 byte indicating IO capabilities or reserved bits in the 1 byte indicating authentication requirements.
  • LMP_REMOTE_CONN_CAP_REQ LMP_REMOTE_CONN_CAP_RES in Figure 7, which shows another example of exchanging capability information.
  • the reserved values in range 4-255 in the 1 byte IO_capabilities, reserved values in range 2-255 in the 1 byte OOB authentication data, or reserved values in range 0x06-0xFF in the 1 byte authentication requirements of the existing LMP_IO_CAPABILITY_REQ and LMP_IO_CAPABILITY_RES messages could be used in some examples.
  • the negotiation or capability exchange procedure can also in some examples be used to indicate if the device will only initiate remote connection requests, and/or if it is willing to receive remote connection requests.
  • the procedure can be used to determine whether one or both devices can send a request for secure communications device and/or can receive a request for secure communications. It is possible in some examples that only one device supports the option of the receiving remote connections while the other device only initiates remote connections.
  • one or both devices can indicate the IP address, port number, Domain Name System (DNS) name, and/or other information that should be used for setting up remote connections. If a device might receive incoming remote connections but is behind a gateway, for example, it can also use dynamic DNS to update its reachability information.
  • DNS Domain Name System
  • a device might receive incoming remote connections but is behind a gateway, for example, it can also use dynamic DNS to update its reachability information.
  • LMP_ENCAPSULATED_HEADER and LMP_ENCAPSULATE_PAYLOAD PDlls can be used for communicating this information, which may be referred to as address information on the network as indicated above, during pairing as shown in Figure 8, which shows an example of remote connection information exchange.
  • Remote Conn Info request and response can be used in some examples, as illustrated in Figure 9, which shows another example of remote connection information exchange. If the data is larger than the maximum transfer unit (MTU) (22 bytes without LE secure connections and 64 bytes with LE secure connections) in some examples, then multiple request and response messages can be used to fragment, transmit and reassemble the information.
  • MTU maximum transfer unit
  • the check value generation function f6 is updated to include the remote connection capability as well as the remote connection information sent.
  • the function can be updated as follows:
  • Ea f6(MACKey, Na, Nb, 0, lOcapA, A, B, RemoteConnCapA, RemoteConnlnfoA )
  • the check value generation function f3 is updated to include the remote connection capability as well as the remote connection information sent. For example, in numeric comparison association mode, the function is updated as follows:
  • Ea f3(MACKey, Na, Nb, 0, lOcapA, A, B, RemoteConnCapA, RemoteConnlnfoA)
  • Eb f3(MACKey, Na, Nb, 0, lOcapB, B, A, RemoteConnCapB, RemoteConnlnfoB)
  • the key based on the information transmitted in step 402 or received in step 404 may in some examples comprise a key based on one or more of the following: one or more nonce values exchanged during a Bluetooth pairing procedure with the second device; a key agreed between the first device and the second device during a Bluetooth pairing procedure; and/or at least part of a Bluetooth key for a Bluetooth connection between the first device and the second device.
  • establishing the secure communications with the second device over the network using the key based on the information in step 404 of the method 400 or step 504 of the method 500 comprises establishing the secure communications using Transport Layer Security (TLS), Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), IPsec, HTTP authentication and/or a Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocol.
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
  • IPsec IP Security
  • HTTP authentication HTTP authentication
  • VPN Virtual Private Network
  • establishing the secure communications with the second device over the network using the key based on the information in step 404 of the method 400 or step 504 of the method 500 may comprise receiving a secure connection request from the second device, wherein the secure connection request identifies the second device (and/or identifies the shared key to be used for secure communications with the second device), and/or sending a secure connection request to the second device, wherein the secure connection request identifies the first device (and/or identifies the shared key to be used for secure communications with the first device).
  • the network referred to above may be for example a non-Bluetooth network, or may in some examples include a plurality of networks and/or communication links, one or more of which may be a Bluetooth link and at least one of which may be a non-Bluetooth link or network.
  • first and second devices can directly use the link key (in BR/EDR) or the LTK (in LE) for secure connections or secure communications in some examples.
  • link key in BR/EDR
  • LTK in LE
  • the devices can generate and use a key (referred to in the examples below as remote_conn_key) from information exchanged during or after pairing.
  • a key referred to in the examples below as remote_conn_key
  • “btlk” is a string used for key generation. This may be any suitable string, so examples of alternatives may include “btak”, “btdk”, “btle”, “rconn” or any other suitable string of any suitable length.
  • the devices now have an authenticated shared secret (also called as a pre-shared key, PSK) which can be used for setting up secure remote connections or for secure communications.
  • PSK shared secret
  • the devices can in some examples use protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) with PSK authentication defined in RFC4279 (for TLS 1.2 and lower) and RFC8446 (for TLS 1.3 and higher) for setting up remote connections as shown in Figure 10, which shows an example of TLS 1.3 PSK authentication.
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • Figure 10 shows that devices can in some examples include the key_share extension for forward secrecy.
  • the device receiving incoming connections may act as a TLS server and the device initiating the remote connection acts as the TLS client.
  • the PSK identity used for identifying the client can be the Bluetooth MAC address of one or both the devices.
  • the use of Bluetooth MAC address during remote connection setup can leak privacy-sensitive information to passive observers.
  • the identification information referred to above for the first and second devices on the network referred to above may comprise Bluetooth identifiers. However, this may raise privacy issues.
  • the TLS server can in some examples issue new PSKs (also called session tickets) with new identification information via the NewSessionTicket message, as shown in Figure 11, which shows an example of issuing session ticket after authentication.
  • the session tickets can be used for subsequent remote connections or secure communications.
  • the devices can also use key derivation functions such as h6 or h7 to derive a random identifier which can be used use as the identity during secure communications.
  • key derivation functions such as h6 or h7 to derive a random identifier which can be used use as the identity during secure communications.
  • an external PSK importer diversification function can be used on some examples, such as for example one defined in “Importing External PSKs for TLS,” draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-06, 3 December 2020, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-06.
  • KDF key derivation function
  • FIG 12 is a schematic of an example of an apparatus 1200 in a first device for establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • the apparatus 1200 comprises processing circuitry 1202 (e.g. one or more processors) and a memory 1204 in communication with the processing circuitry 1202.
  • the memory 1204 contains instructions, such as computer program code 1210, executable by the processing circuitry 1202.
  • the apparatus 1200 also comprises an interface 1206 in communication with the processing circuitry 1202. Although the interface 1206, processing circuitry 1202 and memory 1204 are shown connected in series, these may alternatively be interconnected in any other way, for example via a bus.
  • the memory 1204 contains instructions executable by the processing circuitry 1202 such that the apparatus 1200 is operable/configured to transmit information to the second device using Bluetooth, and establish secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information.
  • the apparatus 1200 is operable/configured to carry out the method 400 described above with reference to Figure 4.
  • Figure 13 is a schematic of an example of an apparatus 1300 in a first device for establishing secure communications with a second device over a network.
  • the apparatus 1300 comprises processing circuitry 1302 (e.g. one or more processors) and a memory 1304 in communication with the processing circuitry 1302.
  • the memory 1304 contains instructions, such as computer program code 1310, executable by the processing circuitry 1302.
  • the apparatus 1300 also comprises an interface 1306 in communication with the processing circuitry 1302. Although the interface 1306, processing circuitry 1302 and memory 1304 are shown connected in series, these may alternatively be interconnected in any other way, for example via a bus.
  • the memory 1304 contains instructions executable by the processing circuitry 1302 such that the apparatus 1300 is operable/configured to receive information from the second device using Bluetooth, and establish secure communications with the second device over the network using a key based on the information.
  • the apparatus 1300 is operable/configured to carry out the method 500 described above with reference to Figure 5.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne des procédés et un appareil. Dans un aspect donné à titre d'exemple, l'invention concerne un procédé mis en oeuvre par un premier dispositif d'établissement de communications sécurisées avec un second dispositif sur un réseau. Le procédé consiste à transmettre des informations au second dispositif à l'aide de la technologie Bluetooth et à établir des communications sécurisées avec le second dispositif sur le réseau à l'aide d'une clé sur la base des informations. Selon un autre aspect donné à titre d'exemple, le procédé consiste à recevoir des informations en provenance du second dispositif à l'aide de la technologie Bluetooth et à établir des communications sécurisées avec le second dispositif sur le réseau à l'aide d'une clé sur la base des informations.
PCT/EP2022/061866 2022-05-03 2022-05-03 Établissement de communications sécurisées sur un réseau WO2023213383A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/EP2022/061866 WO2023213383A1 (fr) 2022-05-03 2022-05-03 Établissement de communications sécurisées sur un réseau

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/EP2022/061866 WO2023213383A1 (fr) 2022-05-03 2022-05-03 Établissement de communications sécurisées sur un réseau

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2023213383A1 true WO2023213383A1 (fr) 2023-11-09

Family

ID=81854823

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP2022/061866 WO2023213383A1 (fr) 2022-05-03 2022-05-03 Établissement de communications sécurisées sur un réseau

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2023213383A1 (fr)

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20080175379A1 (en) * 2007-01-23 2008-07-24 Broadcom Corporation Simple pairing to generate private keys for different protocol communications
US20100246824A1 (en) * 2009-03-31 2010-09-30 Qualcomm Incorporated Apparatus and method for virtual pairing using an existing wireless connection key
US20180007042A1 (en) * 2016-07-01 2018-01-04 Raz Weizman Single pairing for multiple technologies

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20080175379A1 (en) * 2007-01-23 2008-07-24 Broadcom Corporation Simple pairing to generate private keys for different protocol communications
US20100246824A1 (en) * 2009-03-31 2010-09-30 Qualcomm Incorporated Apparatus and method for virtual pairing using an existing wireless connection key
US20180007042A1 (en) * 2016-07-01 2018-01-04 Raz Weizman Single pairing for multiple technologies

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Tschofenig et al. Transport layer security (tls)/datagram transport layer security (dtls) profiles for the internet of things
US7707412B2 (en) Linked authentication protocols
JP5101620B2 (ja) アドホックワイヤレスネットワークにおける認証キー材料のセキュリティ処理のための、セキュリティ方法およびセキュリティシステム
JP4506856B2 (ja) 通信装置、及び通信方法
Shen et al. Secure device-to-device communications over WiFi direct
JP4613969B2 (ja) 通信装置、及び通信方法
US8001381B2 (en) Method and system for mutual authentication of nodes in a wireless communication network
JP5043114B2 (ja) Ｅａｐからのケルベロス・ブートストラッピング（ｂｋｅ）
JP5324665B2 (ja) ダイレクトリンク通信のための拡張されたセキュリティ
TWI388180B (zh) 通信系統中之金鑰產生
JP5120417B2 (ja) 通信装置、通信方法、及び通信システム
US9473941B1 (en) Method, apparatus, and computer program product for creating an authenticated relationship between wireless devices
US8959333B2 (en) Method and system for providing a mesh key
US20100211790A1 (en) Authentication
JP2011139457A (ja) 無線通信装置とサーバとの間でデータを安全にトランザクション処理する方法及びシステム
JP2009533932A (ja) キー導出におけるパラメータ結合に基づくチャネル結合機構
JP2009212732A5 (fr)
Gehrmann et al. Enhancements to Bluetooth baseband security
EP3811583B1 (fr) Systèmes et procédés sécurisés de résolution d'identité de dispositif audio à l'aide d'une application à distance
WO2007028328A1 (fr) Procede, systeme et dispositif de negociation a propos d'une cle de chiffrement partagee par equipement utilisateur et equipement externe
WO2018161862A1 (fr) Procédé, dispositif et système de génération de clé privée
WO2023083170A1 (fr) Procédé et appareil de génération de clé, dispositif terminal et serveur
Fossati RFC 7925: Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profiles for the Internet of Things
WO2014117524A1 (fr) Procédé permettant la transmission d'une clé maîtresse par paire dans un réseau local sans fil
WO2023213383A1 (fr) Établissement de communications sécurisées sur un réseau

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 22726755

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1