WO2023207462A1 - 一种安全验证方法及装置 - Google Patents

一种安全验证方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023207462A1
WO2023207462A1 PCT/CN2023/083977 CN2023083977W WO2023207462A1 WO 2023207462 A1 WO2023207462 A1 WO 2023207462A1 CN 2023083977 W CN2023083977 W CN 2023083977W WO 2023207462 A1 WO2023207462 A1 WO 2023207462A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
value
terminal device
response value
command
verification
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PCT/CN2023/083977
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
张正
李飞
宗在峰
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华为技术有限公司
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Publication of WO2023207462A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023207462A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
    • H04W12/47—Security arrangements using identity modules using near field communication [NFC] or radio frequency identification [RFID] modules

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular, to a security verification method and device.
  • RFID tags also known as electronic tags
  • readers are integrated into base stations, and enterprises complete tag connection management, reader connection management, and tag positioning functions through the 5G core network (5G core, 5GC) and network capability opening and other capabilities.
  • 5G core 5G core
  • 5GC 5G core network
  • the reader/writer since the reader/writer is integrated in the base station, the communication distance between the tag and the reader/writer becomes longer, which may lead to communication security issues. For example: tags are illegally inactivated, tags are illegally written with information, reported data is eavesdropped, reported data is tampered with, counterfeit tags report data, etc.
  • the embodiments of this application provide a security verification method and device. It can ensure the security of communication between terminal equipment and network equipment.
  • embodiments of this application provide a security verification method, including:
  • the numerical value and the security key are used to determine a first response value; and a first request is sent, where the first request includes the first response value, and the first response value is used by the verification function to verify the terminal device.
  • the terminal device determines the first response value according to the first value included in the received first command (such as a selection command, a query command, a query repeat command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command) of the network device, and sends the first response value It provides a verification function so that the verification function can verify the terminal equipment, prevent illegal terminal equipment from accessing the network, prevent the data reported by the terminal equipment from being eavesdropped, tampered with the reported data, or counterfeit the terminal equipment to report data, thereby ensuring the communication between the terminal equipment and the network equipment. communication security. For example, a malicious third party eavesdrops on the communication between the reader and the tag, and fakes the tag to report data to the reader.
  • the terminal device By verifying the terminal device, it is possible to prevent the data reported by the tag from being tampered with, avoid counterfeit tags reporting data, and ensure the security of communication between the reader and the tag. Since the first value generated by the network device is sent to the terminal device through the first command, the number of interactions between the terminal device and the network device can be reduced and signaling overhead can be saved.
  • the first request also includes a second value
  • the second value is used by the verification function to determine a second response value
  • a first response message is received, and the first response message includes the the second response value; and verify the network device according to the second response value.
  • the terminal device verifies the network device by receiving the second response value determined by the verification function.
  • a third response value is determined based on the second value and the security key; Whether the second response value and the third response value are the same; when the second response value and the third response value are the same, it is determined that the network device passes the verification. By judging whether the second response value calculated by the verification function is the same as the third response value calculated by the terminal device, the network device is verified to ensure the accuracy of the verification.
  • the first response message further includes an electronic product code EPC, where the EPC is used to identify the terminal device.
  • the network device is verified by verifying the first response value in the first response message to ensure the authenticity of the EPC sent by the network device.
  • the first verification result is sent to the verification function through the access and mobility management function AMF or the tag management function TMF, and the first verification result is the verification result of the network device.
  • the first request also includes an electronic product code EPC, where the EPC is used to identify the terminal device; and/or the verification function includes an application function or authentication, authorization and accounting. fee function.
  • EPC electronic product code
  • the verification function includes an application function or authentication, authorization and accounting. fee function.
  • the first command is one of a selection command, a query command, a repeat query command, an adjustment query command, or a confirmation command.
  • the Select command includes the following parameters:
  • Target indicates whether to change the label's SL (selected flag) or inventory (inventoried) flag. In the case of changing the inventory flag, indicate which session (session).
  • Action indicating whether eligible tags declare SL or undeclared SL, or set their inventory flag to A or B.
  • MemBank indicates whether the Mask is applied to EPC, TID or user area.
  • Pointer and Length indicate the storage range.
  • Truncate indicating whether the tag's reply is truncated.
  • the query command includes the following parameters:
  • Session select a section (Session) for a certain inventory cycle.
  • Target select whether the inventoried flag of the tag participating in the inventory cycle is A or B.
  • the QueryRep command includes the following parameters:
  • Session confirm the session value of this inventory cycle.
  • the query adjustment (QueryAdjust) command includes the following parameters:
  • Session confirm the session value of this inventory cycle.
  • UpDn determines whether the tag adjusts the Q value (such as the number of time slots in the inventory cycle) and how to adjust the Q value.
  • the confirmation (ACK) command includes the following parameters:
  • RN16 16-bit random number or pseudo-random number.
  • embodiments of this application provide a security verification method, including:
  • the verification function receives a first request, the first request includes a first response value, the first response value is determined based on the security key and a first value included in a first command of the network device, the first command is One of a selection command, a query command, a repeat query command, a query adjustment command or a confirmation command; the verification function verifies the terminal device according to the first response value.
  • the terminal device determines the first response value according to the first value included in the received first command (such as a selection command, a query command, a query repeat command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command) of the network device, and sends the first response value to
  • the verification function enables the verification function to verify the terminal device. This prevents illegal terminal devices from accessing the network, and prevents data reported by terminal devices from being eavesdropped, tampered with, or counterfeit terminal devices reporting data, thereby ensuring communication security between terminal devices and network devices. For example, a malicious third party eavesdrops on the communication between the reader and the tag, and fakes the tag to report data to the reader.
  • the terminal device By verifying the terminal device, it is possible to prevent the data reported by the tag from being tampered with, avoid counterfeit tags reporting data, and ensure the security of communication between the reader and the tag. Since the first value generated by the network device is sent to the terminal device through the first command, the number of interactions between the terminal device and the network device can be reduced and signaling overhead can be saved.
  • the verification function determines a third value, and determines a fourth response value based on the third value and the security key; the verification function determines the first response value and the fourth response value. Whether the response values are the same; when the first response value and the fourth response value are the same, the verification function determines that the terminal device passes the verification.
  • the terminal device By judging whether the fourth response value calculated by the verification function is the same as the first response value calculated by the terminal device, the terminal device is verified to ensure the accuracy of the verification.
  • the first request also includes a second value; the verification function determines a second response value based on the second value and the security key; the verification function sends a first response message, so The first response message includes the second response value, and the second response value is used by the terminal device to verify the network device.
  • the verification function sends the second response value to the terminal device, so that the terminal device verifies the network device based on the second response value, preventing malicious network devices from sending inventory instructions and obtaining the EPC information of the terminal device through random access commands, resulting in valuable Item tag information leaked. For example, prevent tags from being illegally inactivated or illegally written information. Realize two-way authentication between terminal equipment and network equipment, thereby ensuring the security of communication between terminal equipment and network equipment.
  • the verification function receives a first verification result sent by the terminal device through the access and mobility management function AMF or tag management function TMF, and the first verification result is the network device. verification results.
  • the verification function sends a second response message to the access and mobility management function AMF or tag management function TMF, the second response message includes a derived key, and the derived key is Generated according to at least one of the first value and the second value, the security key and the electronic product code EPC, the EPC is used to identify the terminal device.
  • AMF or TMF ensures the security of communications by using derived keys to encrypt or protect the integrity of signaling.
  • the second response message further includes a second verification result
  • the second verification result is the verification result of the terminal device.
  • embodiments of this application provide a security verification method, including:
  • the access and mobility management function AMF or tag management function TMF determines a first value; sends a second command to the network device, where the second command includes the first value, and the second command is an inventory command.
  • the inventory command is used to send the first value to the network device, so that the network device issues the first command to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device determines the first response value according to the first value in the first command, thereby reducing the interaction between the terminal device and the network device.
  • the interactive process reduces signaling overhead.
  • the access and mobility management function AMF or tag management function TMF receives a second request sent by the verification function, where the second request includes the first value;
  • the first value is generated by the AMF or the TMF.
  • the AMF or the TMF receives a second response message sent by the verification function, the second response message includes a derived key, and the derived key is based on the first value and At least one of the second values One item, and the generation of the security key and the electronic product code EPC, the EPC being used to identify the terminal device. Encrypt or integrity protect signaling through derived keys to improve communication security.
  • the second response message further includes a second verification result
  • the second verification result is the verification result of the terminal device.
  • embodiments of the present application provide a security verification system, including:
  • the access and mobility management function AMF or the tag management function TMF determines a first value; sends a second command to the network device, the second command includes the first value, and the second command is an inventory command;
  • the verification function receives a first request, the first request includes a first response value, the first response value is determined based on the security key and a first value included in a first command of the network device, the first command is One of a selection command, a query command, a repeat query command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command; and verifying the terminal device according to the first response value.
  • the verification function verifies the terminal device by receiving the first response value determined by the terminal device, thereby ensuring the security of communication between the terminal device and the network device. Since the first value generated by the network device is sent to the terminal device through the first command, the number of interactions between the terminal device and the network device can be reduced and signaling overhead can be saved.
  • the network device sends a first command to the terminal device, where the first command includes the first value.
  • embodiments of the present application provide a security verification method, including:
  • the terminal device After receiving an access command from the network device, the terminal device generates a first value, and the access command is one of Write, Kill, and Lock; the terminal device sends the first value; the terminal device verifies The function receives a first response value, the first response value is calculated according to the first numerical value; the terminal device verifies the network device according to the first response value.
  • the terminal device After receiving the access command, the terminal device initiates verification of the network device, and executes the access command after passing the verification, thereby preventing the malicious base station from initiating read, write, inactivation and other commands to the terminal device, thereby ensuring the communication between the terminal device and the network device. Communication security.
  • the terminal device receives a second value from the verification function; the terminal device calculates a second response value based on the second value and the security key; the terminal device sends the The second response value is used by the verification function to verify the terminal device.
  • the terminal device calculates the second response value and sends the second response value to the verification function, so that the verification function verifies the terminal device, thereby ensuring communication security between the terminal device and the network device.
  • the terminal device determines a third response value based on the first value and the security key; the terminal device determines whether the first response value and the third response value are the same. ; When the first response value is the same as the third response value, the terminal device determines that the network device passes the verification.
  • the network device is verified to ensure the accuracy of the verification.
  • the first value is included in the first request
  • the first response value is included in the first response message
  • the first response message and/or the first request also Includes an electronic product code EPC, which is used to identify the terminal device.
  • the verification function includes an application function or an authentication, authorization and accounting function.
  • a security verification device which includes:
  • a receiving module configured to receive a first command sent by the network device, where the first command includes a first value, and the first command is one of a selection command, a query command, a repeat query command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command;
  • a processing module configured to determine a first response value based on the first value and the security key
  • a sending module configured to send a first request, where the first request includes the first response value, and the first response value is used by a verification function to verify the terminal device.
  • each module may refer to the corresponding description of the method embodiment described in the first aspect to execute the methods and functions performed by the above terminal device.
  • the operations and beneficial effects performed by the security verification device can be referred to the method and beneficial effects described in the first aspect above, and repeated details will not be repeated.
  • a security verification device which includes:
  • a receiving module configured to receive a first request, the first request including a first response value, the first response value being determined based on the security key and the first value included in the first command of the network device, the first response value being One command is one of a selection command, a query command, a repeat query command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command;
  • a processing module configured to verify the terminal device according to the first response value.
  • each module may refer to the corresponding description of the method embodiment described in the second aspect to perform the methods and functions performed by the above verification function.
  • embodiments of the present application provide a security verification device, including:
  • a processing module for determining the first value
  • a sending module configured to send a second command to the network device, where the second command includes the first value, and the second command is an inventory command.
  • each module can correspond to the corresponding description with reference to the method embodiment described in the third aspect, and execute the methods and functions performed by the above-mentioned AMF or TMF.
  • embodiments of the present application provide a security verification device, including:
  • a processing module configured to generate a first value after receiving an access command from the network device, where the access command is one of Write, Kill, and Lock;
  • a sending module used to send the first value
  • a receiving module configured to receive a first response value from the verification function, where the first response value is calculated based on the first numerical value; the terminal device verifies the network device based on the first response value.
  • each module can correspond to the corresponding description with reference to the method embodiment described in the fifth aspect, and execute the methods and functions performed by the above terminal device.
  • the present application provides a security verification device, which may be a terminal device, a device in the terminal device, or a device that can be used in conjunction with the terminal device.
  • the device may also be a verification function, a device in the verification function, or a device that can be used in conjunction with the verification function.
  • the device may also be an AMF or TMF, a device in the AMF or TMF, or a device that can be used in conjunction with the AMF or TMF.
  • the security verification device can also be a chip system.
  • the security verification device can perform the above method.
  • the function of the security verification device can be implemented by hardware, or can be implemented by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions.
  • the module can be software and/or hardware.
  • the present application provides a security verification device.
  • the security verification device includes a processor and a memory.
  • the processor calls the computer program in the memory, as in the first aspect, the second aspect, and the third aspect, The method described in any one of the aspects and the fifth aspect is executed.
  • the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the computer-readable storage medium is used to store a computer program.
  • any of the first to fifth aspects are implemented.
  • the method or system described in one item is implemented.
  • the present application provides a computer program product including a computer program.
  • the computer program When the computer program is executed, the method or system as described in any one of the first to fifth aspects is implemented.
  • inventions of the present application provide a communication system.
  • the communication system generally includes at least one terminal device and at least one verification function.
  • the terminal device is used to perform the steps in the above first and fifth aspects.
  • the verification function is used to perform the steps in the second aspect above.
  • inventions of the present application provide a communication system.
  • the communication system generally includes at least one verification function and at least one AMF or TMF.
  • the verification function is used to perform the steps in the second aspect.
  • the AMF or TMF TMF is used to perform the steps in the third aspect above.
  • inventions of the present application provide a communication system.
  • the communication system generally includes at least one terminal device, at least one verification function, and at least one AMF or TMF.
  • the terminal device is used to perform the above-mentioned first and third aspects.
  • the verification function is used to perform the steps in the above-mentioned second aspect, and the AMF or TMF is used to perform the steps in the above-mentioned third aspect.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a 5G system
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an RFID business process
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the business process of tags after a reader is integrated into the base station
  • Figure 4a is a schematic flow chart of a security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 4b is a schematic flow chart of another security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 5 is a schematic flow chart of another security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 6 is a schematic flow chart of another security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 7 is a schematic flow chart of another security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a security verification device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 9 is a schematic structural diagram of another security verification device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a verification function provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a 5G system.
  • the 5G system includes two parts: access network and core network.
  • the access network is used to implement wireless access-related functions.
  • the core network mainly includes the following key logical network elements: access and mobility management function (AMF) entities, session management function (SMF) entities, user plane function (user plane function, UPF) entity, policy control function (policy) control function (PCF) entity, unified data management (UDM) entity and application function entity (Application Function, AF).
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • SMF session management function
  • UPF user plane function
  • PCF unified data management
  • Application Function Application Function
  • the core network can also include tag management function (TMF), authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) entities, and network capability exposure function (NEF) entities.
  • TMF tag management function
  • AAA authentication, authorization and accounting
  • NEF network capability exposure function
  • UE can be an electronic device, such as a mobile phone, an Internet of Things terminal device, etc.
  • Wireless access network (radio access network, (R)AN) equipment provides wireless access equipment for UE, including but not limited to 5G base station (next generation node B, gNB), wireless-fidelity (wireless-fidelity, WiFi) access Access point (AP), global interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) base station (BS), etc.
  • 5G base station node B, gNB
  • wireless-fidelity wireless-fidelity, WiFi
  • AP access Access point
  • WiMAX global interoperability for microwave access
  • the AMF entity is mainly responsible for mobility management in mobile networks, such as user location update, user registration network, user switching, etc.
  • the SMF entity is mainly responsible for session management in mobile networks, such as session establishment, modification, and release. Specific functions include assigning IP addresses to users, selecting UPFs that provide packet forwarding functions, etc.
  • the PCF entity is mainly responsible for providing policies to AMF and SMF, such as quality of service (QoS) policies, slice selection policies, etc.
  • QoS quality of service
  • UDM entities are used to store user data, such as contract information and authentication/authorization information.
  • the AF entity is mainly responsible for providing services to the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) network, such as affecting service routing, interacting with PCF for policy control, etc.
  • 3GPP 3rd generation partnership project
  • the UPF entity is mainly responsible for processing user messages, such as forwarding and accounting.
  • the NEF entity is mainly used to expose the capabilities of each 3GPP network element to other network elements and provide corresponding security guarantees to ensure the security of external applications to the 3GPP network.
  • Data network is mainly responsible for providing data transmission services to users, such as IP multi-media service (IMS), Internet, etc.
  • IMS IP multi-media service
  • the UE accesses the DN by establishing a session between UE-RAN-UPF-DN.
  • messages can be exchanged between various network functions and entities in Figure 1 through different interfaces.
  • the UE and the AMF entity can interact through the N1 interface, and the interaction message is called N1Message.
  • Some interfaces are implemented in the form of service interfaces.
  • the UE, RAN equipment, UPF entities and DN in Figure 1 can be called network functions and entities on the data plane, used to carry business data.
  • User layer data traffic can be transmitted through the PDU Session established between the UE and the DN, and passed through There are two network functional entities: RAN equipment and UPF entity.
  • control plane network functions and entities which are used to carry signaling messages and are mainly responsible for authentication and authentication, registration management, session management, mobility management, policy control and other functions to achieve Reliability and stability of user layer data traffic transmission.
  • Radio frequency identification is a non-contact automatic identification technology that uses wireless radio frequency for non-contact two-way data communication to read and write tags, thereby completing the process of reader and tag. Data communication between them achieves the purpose of target identification and data exchange.
  • RFID Radio frequency identification
  • the induced current obtained from the antenna is converted into the power supply of the chip through the boost circuit.
  • the energy obtained from the induced current is converted into a data signal through the radio frequency front-end circuit. into the logic control circuit for processing.
  • the reply information is sent from the memory of the tag, sent back to the radio frequency front-end circuit through the logic control circuit, and finally sent back to the reader through the antenna.
  • Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of an RFID business process.
  • the specific process includes:
  • the enterprise prints the label and writes the electronic product code (EPC).
  • EPC electronic product code
  • the reader/writer sends a Select command to select a tag group for inventory and access. Before taking inventory, the reader uses one or more Select commands to select a specific tag group.
  • the reader/writer starts an inventory cycle by sending a query (Query) command.
  • Query query
  • QueryRep query repeat
  • SQLAdjust query adjustment
  • the selected tag returns an RN16 to the reader.
  • RN16 can represent a 16-bit random number.
  • the reader/writer sends an ACK command to the tag, and the ACK command carries RN16.
  • the ACK command is used to confirm the RN16 of the label reply.
  • S207 The reader/writer sends an access command to the tag to perform operations such as reading and writing.
  • the access command can include: Req_RN: request a new RN16; Read: read data; Write: write data; Kill: inactivate tag (requires kill password); Lock: lock operation (locked area cannot be read/written) ;Access: Move the label to the Secured state, that is, you can perform the Lock operation (requires access password); BlockWrite: Multi-word write operation; BlockErase: Multi-word erase operation.
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the business process of a tag after a reader is integrated into the base station. It mainly includes the following steps:
  • S301 The enterprise prints a label, writes the EPC in the label (tag), and stores the EPC in the verification function. Among them, EPC is used to identify the attached items.
  • the verification function sends an inventory request to AMF/TMF through NEF or proxy.
  • the inventory request includes parameters such as instruction type, label identification, and label type.
  • the verification function can be AF or AAA.
  • AMF/TMF determines the inventory base station among multiple base stations based on the parameters in the inventory request.
  • AMF/TMF sends an inventory command to the base station.
  • This base station is the inventory base station determined in S303.
  • S305 The base station sends a Select command to select a tag group for inventory and access.
  • S306-S308 the base station and the tag perform a random access process.
  • the random access process is the same as S203-S205 in the RFID business process in Figure 2.
  • S203-S205 please refer to S203-S205, which will not be described again here.
  • the tag when the tag receives the ACK command sent by the base station, it indicates that the random access is successful.
  • the registration request includes parameter EPC.
  • the base station will send a registration request to the AMF/TMF.
  • the registration request includes parameter EPC.
  • AMF/TMF sends a registration response to the tag through the base station.
  • the AMF/TMF sends an access command to the tag through the base station.
  • the tag sends an access command response to the AMF/TMF.
  • AMF/TMF sends the label inventory results to the verification function through NEF or proxy.
  • the AMF/TMF sends indication information, which is used to instruct the base station to inventory the next tag.
  • S317 Repeat S305-S316 to execute the inventory process of the next tag.
  • S318 The base station sends an inventory end command to the AMF/TMF.
  • AMF/TMF sends the inventory results of all tags to the verification function through NEF or proxy.
  • Each of the above network elements can perform some or all of the above steps, for example, S312-S317 are optional.
  • tags are illegally inactivated, tags are illegally written with information, reported data is eavesdropped, reported data is tampered with, counterfeit tags report data, etc.
  • the existing RFID authentication method is mainly in the form of password.
  • the tag verifies the kill password issued by the reader. After the verification is passed, the tag performs the inactivation operation.
  • the tag secures (Secured) state transition the tag verifies the access password (access password) issued by the reader. After the verification is passed, the tag will transition to the Secured state.
  • the authentication method only supports authentication of the reader before the Kill and Access operations. After integrating the reader/writer into the base station, an effective authentication process is also required for commands such as Read and Write. In addition, after the reader is integrated into the base station, the original authentication method will also be attacked. For example: If a malicious third party eavesdrops on the communication between the base station and the tag, it may obtain RN16 and the kill password or access password after XOR operation with the random number. Therefore, a malicious third party can obtain the corresponding password and initiate a Kill or Access command on the tag, thereby maliciously reading or modifying the tag.
  • Figure 4a is a schematic flow chart of a security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the steps in the embodiment of this application mainly include:
  • the terminal device receives a first command sent by the network device.
  • the first command includes a first value.
  • the first command is one of a selection command, a query command, a query repeat command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command.
  • the first value is generated by the network device.
  • Network devices can be base stations, TMF/AMF or authentication functions.
  • the authentication function can be AF or AAA.
  • the first value may be a random number RAND1 or a counter Count1.
  • the terminal device may be a tag, a UE, or a chip in the UE.
  • S402a The terminal device determines a first response value based on the first value and the security key.
  • first response value can be calculated according to the first numerical value and the security key in other ways.
  • the first response value or other response values calculated by other methods are within the scope of protection of this application.
  • S403a The terminal device sends a first request, where the first request includes the first response value, and the first response value is used by the verification function to verify the terminal device.
  • the terminal device sends the first request to the verification function through the base station or TMF/AMF.
  • the verification function After receiving the first request, the verification function determines the third value, and determines the fourth response value based on the third value and the security key.
  • the third value and the first value are both generated by the network device, and are initially the same random number or counter. However, it may be tampered with after transmission, so the third value may be the same as the first value in the first command received by the terminal device, or may be different from the first value in the first command received by the terminal device.
  • K is the security key
  • RAND1 and Count1 are the third values
  • MAC is any message authentication code algorithm.
  • the verification function determines whether the first response value and the fourth response value are the same; when the first response value and the fourth response value are the same, it is determined that the terminal device passes the verification, indicating that the terminal device is Safe, when the first response value and the fourth response value are different, it is determined that the terminal device has not passed the verification, indicating that there is a security problem in the terminal device.
  • the first request may be an enterprise authentication request.
  • Figure 4b is a schematic flow chart of a security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the steps in the embodiment of this application mainly include:
  • the enterprise prints the label, writes the EPC and the security key K in the terminal device, and stores the EPC and the security key K in the verification function.
  • the terminal device may be a tag, a UE, or a chip in the UE.
  • the authentication function can be AF or AAA.
  • the security key K is the same in the terminal device and the authentication function.
  • EPC is used to identify terminal equipment.
  • the verification function sends an inventory request to TMF/AMF through NEF or proxy.
  • the inventory request may include the first value.
  • the first value can be generated by the verification function.
  • the first value can be a random number RAND1 or a counter Count1.
  • the counter Count1 is stored by the verification function, and the counter is incremented by 1 each time Count1 is issued.
  • TMF/AMF determines the inventory base station according to the inventory request.
  • TMF/AMF sends an inventory command to the base station.
  • the base station is the inventory base station determined in S403.
  • the inventory command includes a first value, and the first value may be a random number RAND1 or a counter Count1.
  • the first value may be obtained by TMF/AMF from the inventory request sent by the verification function, or may be generated locally by TMF/AMF.
  • S405 The base station sends a select command to the terminal device to select one or more terminal devices for inventory and access.
  • the Select command includes a first value, and the first value may be a random number RAND1 or a counter Count1.
  • the first value may be obtained by the base station from an inventory command sent by the TMF/AMF, or may be generated locally by the base station.
  • the Select command can include the following parameters:
  • Target indicates whether to change the label's SL (selected flag) or inventory (inventoried) flag. In the case of changing the inventory flag, indicate which session (session).
  • Action indicating whether eligible tags declare SL or undeclared SL, or set their inventory flag to A or B.
  • MemBank indicates whether the Mask (mask) is applied to EPC, TID (Tag Identifier) or user area.
  • Pointer and Length indicate the storage range.
  • Truncate indicating whether the tag's reply is truncated.
  • S406-S408 A random access process is performed between the base station and the terminal device.
  • the random access process is the same as S203-S205 in the RFID business process in Figure 2. You can refer to S203-S205. No further details will be given here.
  • the terminal device when the terminal device receives the ACK command sent by the base station, it means that the random access of the terminal device is successful.
  • the first value may be included in the query (Query) command, query repeat (QueryRep) command, and query adjustment (QueryAdjust) during the random access process. ) command or an acknowledgment (ACK) command.
  • the first value may be a random number RAND1 or a counter Count1.
  • the QueryRep command includes the following parameters: Session, confirm the session value of this inventory cycle.
  • the query adjustment (QueryAdjust) command includes the following parameters: Session, confirm the session value of this inventory cycle. UpDn, determines whether the tag adjusts the Q value (such as the number of time slots in the inventory cycle) and how to adjust the Q value.
  • the confirmation (ACK) command includes the following parameters: RN16, a 16-bit random or pseudo-random number.
  • S409 The terminal device determines the first response value based on the first value and the security key.
  • first response value can be calculated according to the first numerical value and the security key in other ways.
  • the first response value or other response values calculated by other methods are within the scope of protection of this application.
  • S410 The terminal device sends a registration request to the base station.
  • the registration request may include the first response value RES1.
  • the registration request may include an EPC.
  • the registration request may also include a second value, and the second value is a random number RAND2 or a counter Count2 generated by the terminal device.
  • the terminal device can choose one of the following two methods to generate counter Count2:
  • the terminal device adds 1 to Count 1 to generate Count2.
  • the terminal device stores Count2 locally, and each time Count2 is sent out, the locally stored Count2 is incremented by 1.
  • the base station sends a registration request to the AMF/TMF.
  • the registration request includes a first response value RES1.
  • the registration request may also include a second numerical value.
  • the registration request may also include EPC.
  • TMF/AMF sends the first request to the verification function.
  • the terminal device sends the first request to the verification function through TMF/AMF (or NEF/proxy).
  • the first request includes a first response value RES1.
  • the first request may also include a second value.
  • the registration request may also include EPC.
  • the first request may be an enterprise authentication request.
  • TMF/AMF can send the first request to UDM/AUSF.
  • the first request includes a first response value RES1.
  • the first request may also include a second value.
  • the first request may also include EPC.
  • UDM/AUSF After receiving the first request, UDM/AUSF verifies the terminal device. That is, the verification process can be completed through UDM/AUSF. In this case, the interaction process between AF/AAA and TMF/AMF in Figure 4b can be modified as Interaction between UDM/AUSF and TMF/AMF.
  • UDM/AUSF pre-configures the EPC of the terminal device, the security key K, and the counter Count1 (the configuration and maintenance of the counter Count1 is optional).
  • the verification function verifies the terminal device according to the first response value.
  • the verification function determines the third value, and determines the fourth response value based on the third value and the security key.
  • the third value and the first value are both generated by the network device, and are initially the same random number or counter. However, it may be tampered with after transmission, so the third value may be the same as the first value in the first command received by the terminal device, or may be different from the first value in the first command received by the terminal device.
  • the verification function determines whether the first response value and the fourth response value are the same; when the first response value and the fourth response value are the same, it is determined that the terminal device passes the verification, indicating that the terminal device is Safe, when the first response value and the fourth response value are different, it is determined that the terminal device has not passed the verification, indicating that there is a security problem in the terminal device.
  • the third value may be generated by the verification function. If the third value is not generated by the verification function (for example, generated by TMF/AMF or the base station), the third value may be sent by the terminal device to the verification function.
  • the verification function may determine the second response value based on the second value in the received first request and the security key.
  • the second value in the first request received by the verification function may or may not be the same as the second value in the registration request sent by the terminal device.
  • the second value is a random number RAND2 or a counter Count2 generated by the terminal device. If the counter Count 2 in S410 is generated by adding 1 to Count 1, the verification function adds 1 to the locally maintained Count1.
  • the verification function may generate and determine the derived key Ktmf based on at least one of the first value and the second value, the security key and the electronic product code EPC.
  • the derived key Ktmf can be used for signaling encryption or integrity protection.
  • the verification function can send a first response message to the terminal device through TMF/AMF or the base station.
  • the first response message includes the second response value.
  • the first response message may also include EPC.
  • the first response message may be a tag authentication response.
  • S415 The terminal device verifies the network device according to the second response value.
  • the terminal device may determine the third response value based on the second value and the security key.
  • the second value is a random number RAND2 or a counter Count2 generated by the terminal device, which is the same as the second value in the registration request sent by the terminal device in S410.
  • the network device can be a base station, TMF/AMF or verification function, etc.
  • S416 The terminal device sends the first verification result to the verification function through the AMF entity or TMF entity.
  • the first verification result is a verification result of the network device, and the first verification result includes whether the network device passes the verification or the network device fails the verification.
  • the first verification result is the label authentication result.
  • S417 The verification function sends a second response message to the AMF entity or TMF entity.
  • the second response message may include a second verification result
  • the second verification result is a verification result of the terminal device.
  • the second verification result includes that the terminal device passes the verification or the terminal device fails the verification.
  • the second response message includes a derived key, the derived key is based on at least one of the first value and the second value, the security key and the electronic product code EPC. Generated, the EPC is used to identify the terminal device.
  • the verification function in S413 does not generate a derived key after verifying the terminal device, the derived key can be generated in this step.
  • the verification function may send a second response message to the AMF entity or the TMF entity.
  • the second response message may be an enterprise authentication response.
  • AMF/TMF sends a registration response to the terminal device through the base station.
  • S419 The AMF/TMF sends an access command to the terminal device through the base station.
  • the access command can include: Req_RN: request a new RN16; Read: read data; Write: write data; Kill: inactivate tag (requires kill password); Lock: lock operation (locked area cannot be read/written) ;Access: Move the label to the Secured state, that is, you can perform the Lock operation (requires access password); BlockWrite: Multi-word write operation; BlockErase: Multi-word erase operation.
  • S420 The terminal device sends an access command response to the AMF/TMF.
  • the terminal device determines the first response value according to the first value included in the first command (such as a selection command, a query command, a query repeat command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command) received from the network device, and sends the first response value to the verification function, so that the verification function verifies the terminal device. Furthermore, the verification function determines the second response value according to the second value generated by the terminal device, and sends the second response value to the terminal device, so that the terminal device verifies the network device. Realize two-way authentication between terminal equipment and network equipment, thereby ensuring the security of communication between terminal equipment and network equipment. Since the first value generated by the network device is sent to the terminal device through the first command to calculate the first response value, the number of interactions between the terminal device and the network device can be reduced and signaling overhead can be saved.
  • the first value generated by the network device is sent to the terminal device through the first command to calculate the first response value, the number of interactions between the terminal device and the network device can be reduced and signaling overhead can be saved.
  • the terminal device is first authenticated, and then the network device is authenticated.
  • the network device is first verified, and then the terminal device is verified.
  • the terminal device in this embodiment can initiate a verification process according to the locally configured security policy.
  • Figure 5 is a schematic flow chart of a security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the steps in the embodiment of this application mainly include:
  • the enterprise prints the label, writes the EPC, security key K and security policy in the terminal device, and stores the EPC and security key K in the verification function.
  • the terminal device may be a tag, a UE, or a chip in the UE.
  • the authentication function can be AF or AAA.
  • the security key K is the same in the terminal device and the authentication function.
  • EPC is used to identify terminal equipment.
  • the security policy is used to indicate the execution conditions of two-way verification. That is, the terminal device initiates the verification process when it determines that the execution conditions are met.
  • the verification function sends an inventory request to AMF/TMF through NEF or proxy.
  • the inventory request includes parameters such as instruction type, label identification, and label type.
  • AMF/TMF determines the inventory base station among multiple base stations based on the parameters in the inventory request.
  • AMF/TMF sends an inventory command to the base station.
  • This base station is the inventory base station determined in S503.
  • S505 The base station sends a Select command to select one or more terminal devices for inventory and access.
  • S506-S508 A random access process is performed between the base station and the terminal device.
  • the random access process is the same as S203-S205 in the RFID business process in Figure 2. You can refer to S203-S205. No further details will be given here.
  • the terminal device when the terminal device receives the ACK command sent by the base station, it means that the random access of the terminal device is successful.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the base station.
  • the registration request includes parameter EPC.
  • S510 The base station sends a registration request to the AMF/TMF.
  • the registration request includes parameter EPC.
  • AMF/TMF sends a registration response to the terminal device through the base station.
  • the AMF/TMF sends an access command to the terminal device through the base station.
  • the access command can include: Req_RN: request a new RN16; Read: read data; Write: write data; Kill: inactivate tag (requires kill password); Lock: lock operation (locked area cannot be read/written) ;Access: Move the label to the Secured state, that is, you can perform the Lock operation (requires access password); BlockWrite: Multi-word write operation; BlockErase: Multi-word erase operation.
  • S513 The terminal device initiates a verification process according to the locally configured security policy.
  • the terminal device after receiving the access command, the terminal device initiates a verification process according to the access command.
  • the terminal device sends the first request to the TMF/AMF.
  • the first request may include a first numerical value.
  • the first request may also include EPC.
  • the first value may be a random number RAND1 or a counter Count1 generated by the terminal device.
  • the terminal device locally maintains the counter Count1
  • the locally maintained Count1 is incremented by 1 each time the terminal device sends the counter Count1.
  • the first request may be an authentication request response.
  • AMF/TMF sends the first request to the verification function through NEF or proxy.
  • the first request may include a first numerical value.
  • the first request may also include EPC.
  • the first value may include a random number RAND1 or a counter Count1 generated by the terminal device.
  • the first request may be an enterprise authentication request.
  • TMF/AMF can send the first request to UDM/AUSF.
  • the first request includes a first numerical value.
  • the first request may also include EPC.
  • the interaction process between AF/AAA and TMF/AMF in Figure 5 can be modified to the interaction between UDM/AUSF and TMF/AMF.
  • UDM/AUSF pre-configures the EPC of the terminal device, the security key K, and the counter Count2 (the configuration and maintenance of the counter Count2 is optional). That is, the verification process is completed through UDM/AUSF.
  • the verification function determines the first response value based on the first value in the received first request and the security key.
  • the first value in the first request received by the verification function may be the same as the first value in the first request sent by the terminal device, or may be different.
  • first response value can be calculated according to the first numerical value and the security key in other ways.
  • the first response value or other response values calculated by other methods are within the scope of protection of this application.
  • S517 The verification function sends a first response message to the terminal device.
  • the first response message includes a first response value.
  • the first response message includes the second value.
  • the second value may be a random number RAND2 or a counter Count 2 generated by a network device (such as a base station, TMF/AMF or authentication function).
  • a network device such as a base station, TMF/AMF or authentication function.
  • the verification function can also obtain the second value from the TMF/AMF or the base station.
  • the first response message may also include EPC.
  • the first response message may be a tag authentication response.
  • S518 The terminal device verifies the network device according to the first response value.
  • the terminal device may determine the third response value based on the first value and the security key.
  • the first value is a random number RAND1 or a counter Count1 generated by the terminal device, which is the same as the first value in the first request sent by the terminal device in S514.
  • the first response value and the third response value are different, it is determined that the network device has failed the verification, indicating that the network device has a communication security problem.
  • the second response value may be determined based on the second value in the received first response message and the security key.
  • the second value is a random number RAND2 or a counter Count2 generated by the network device.
  • the second value in the first response message received by the terminal device may be the same as the second value in the first response message sent by the verification function, or may be different.
  • S519 The terminal device sends a second request to the verification function.
  • the terminal device sends a second request to the verification function through TMF/AMF (or through NEF or proxy).
  • the second request may include a second response value.
  • the second request may also include EPC.
  • the second request may be a tag authentication request.
  • S520 The verification function verifies the terminal device according to the second response value.
  • the verification function determines the fourth response value based on the second value and the security key.
  • the second value may be a random number RAND2 or a counter Count 2, which is the same as the second value in the first response message sent by the verification function in S517.
  • K is the security key
  • MAC is any message authentication code algorithm.
  • the verification function determines whether the second response value and the fourth response value are the same; when the second response value is the same as the fourth response value, it is determined that the terminal device passes the verification, indicating that the terminal device is Safe, when the second response value and the fourth response value are different, it is determined that the terminal device has failed the verification, indicating that there is a security problem in the terminal device.
  • the verification function may generate and determine the derived key Ktmf based on at least one of the first value and the second value, the security key and the electronic product code EPC.
  • the derived key Ktmf can be used for signaling encryption and/or integrity protection.
  • the verification function sends a second response message to TMF/AMF through NEF or proxy.
  • the second response message may include a verification result
  • the verification result includes that the terminal device passes the verification or the terminal device The device failed verification.
  • the verification function may send a second response message to the AMF entity or TMF entity.
  • the second response message may include the derived key Ktmf.
  • the second response message may be an enterprise authentication response.
  • S522 The terminal device sends an access command response to the TMF/AMF through the base station.
  • the terminal device after receiving the access command, the terminal device initiates a verification process according to the security policy.
  • the verification function determines the first response value according to the first value generated by the terminal device, and sends the first response value to the terminal device, so that the terminal device verifies the network device.
  • the terminal device determines the second response value according to the second value generated by the network device, and sends the second response value to the network device, so that the network device verifies the terminal device. Realize two-way authentication between terminal equipment and network equipment, thereby ensuring the security of communication between terminal equipment and network equipment.
  • two-way authentication between the terminal device and the network device is implemented.
  • the embodiment shown in FIG. 6 below only performs one-way authentication on the network device.
  • the terminal device in this embodiment can determine whether to perform one-way verification of the network device according to the access command.
  • Figure 6 is a schematic flow chart of a security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the steps in the embodiment of this application mainly include:
  • the enterprise prints the label, writes the EPC and the security key K in the terminal device, and stores the EPC and the security key K in the verification function.
  • the terminal device may be a tag, a UE, or a chip in the UE.
  • the authentication function can be AF or AAA.
  • the security key K is the same in the terminal device and the authentication function.
  • EPC is used to identify terminal equipment.
  • S602-S612 are the same as S502-S512 in Figure 5.
  • S502-S512 in Figure 5 please refer to 502-S512 in Figure 5, which will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device generates the first value.
  • the terminal device can determine whether to perform one-way verification of the network device based on the access command. After determining to perform one-way authentication of the network device, a first value is generated.
  • the methods for the terminal device to determine whether to perform one-way verification of the network device include:
  • the terminal device As long as the terminal device receives the access command, it starts to perform one-way verification of the network device.
  • the terminal device starts to perform one-way verification of the network device only after receiving the specified access command.
  • the specified access command may include Write, Kill, Lock and other commands.
  • the above judgment method can be written to the terminal device when printing labels.
  • the first value may be a random number RAND or a counter Count generated by the terminal device.
  • the terminal device locally maintains the counter Count
  • the locally maintained Count is incremented by 1 each time the terminal device sends the counter Count.
  • the terminal device sends the first request to the TMF/AMF.
  • the first request may include a first value.
  • the first request may include an EPC, where the EPC is used to identify the terminal device.
  • the first request may be an authentication request.
  • TMF/AMF sends a second request to the verification function through NEF or proxy.
  • the second request may include the first value.
  • the second request may also include EPC.
  • the second request may be an enterprise authentication request.
  • TMF/AMF can send a second request to UDM/AUSF.
  • the second request includes the A value.
  • the second request may also include EPC.
  • the interaction process between AF/AAA and TMF/AMF in Figure 6 can be modified to the interaction between UDM/AUSF and TMF/AMF.
  • UDM/AUSF pre-configures the EPC of the terminal device, the security key K, and the counter Count (the configuration and maintenance of the counter Count is optional). That is, the verification process is completed through UDM/AUSF.
  • the verification function determines the first response value based on the first value in the received second request and the security key.
  • the first value is a random number RAND or a counter Count generated by the terminal device.
  • K is the security key
  • MAC is any message authentication code algorithm.
  • the first value in the second request received by the verification function may be the same as the first value in the first request sent by the terminal device, or may be different.
  • first response value can be calculated according to the first numerical value and the security key in other ways.
  • the first response value or other response values calculated by other methods are within the scope of protection of this application.
  • the verification function may generate and determine the derived key Ktmf based on the first value, the security key and the electronic product code EPC.
  • the derived key Ktmf can be used for signaling encryption and/or integrity protection.
  • the verification function sends the first response message to AMF/TMF through NEF or proxy.
  • the first response message may include a first response value.
  • the first response message may include the derived key Ktmf.
  • AMF/TMF After AMF/TMF receives the derived key Ktmf, it can use the derived key Ktmf for signaling encryption or integrity protection.
  • the first response message may include EPC.
  • S618 AMF/TMF sends a second response message to the terminal device.
  • the second response message may include the first response value.
  • the second response message may include EPC.
  • S619 The terminal device verifies the network device according to the first response value.
  • the terminal device may determine the second response value based on the first value and the security key.
  • the first value is a random number RAND or a counter Count generated by the terminal device, which is the same as the first value in the first request sent by the terminal device in S614.
  • the network device can be a base station, TMF/AMF or verification function, etc.
  • S620 The terminal device sends an access command response to the TMF/AMF through the base station.
  • the terminal device may return an access command response to the TMF/AMF.
  • the terminal device may return a rejection message to the TMF/AMF or not return an access command response.
  • the terminal device initiates verification of the network device after receiving the access command, and executes the access command after passing the verification, thereby preventing the malicious base station from initiating read, write, inactivation and other commands to the terminal device, thus ensuring the terminal Communication security between devices and network devices.
  • Figure 7 is a schematic flow chart of a security verification method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the steps in the embodiment of this application mainly include:
  • the enterprise prints the label, writes the EPC and the security key K in the terminal device, and stores the EPC and the security key K in the verification function.
  • the terminal device may be a tag, a UE, or a chip in the UE.
  • the authentication function can be AF or AAA.
  • the security key K is the same in the terminal device and the authentication function.
  • EPC is used to identify terminal equipment.
  • S702-S710 are the same as S502-S510 in Figure 5.
  • S502-S510 in Figure 5.
  • 502-S510 in Figure 5, which will not be described again here.
  • AMF/TMF sends the first request to the verification function.
  • the first request may include the EPC.
  • the first request may be an enterprise authentication request.
  • the verification function sends a first response message to the terminal device.
  • the verification function sends the first response message to the terminal device through TMF/AMF (or through NEF or proxy).
  • the first response message includes a first numerical value.
  • the first value is a random number RAND or a counter Count generated by a network device (such as a base station, TMF/AMF or verification function).
  • a network device such as a base station, TMF/AMF or verification function.
  • the verification function can also obtain the first value from the TMF/AMF or the base station.
  • the first response message may include EPC.
  • the first response message may be a tag authentication response.
  • the terminal device determines the first response value based on the first value and the security key in the received first response message.
  • the first value is a random number RAND or a counter Count generated by the network device.
  • K is the security key
  • MAC is any message authentication code algorithm.
  • the first value in the first response message received by the terminal device may be the same as the first value in the first response message sent by the verification function, or may be different.
  • first response value can be calculated according to the first numerical value and the security key in other ways.
  • the first response value or other response values calculated by other methods are within the scope of protection of this application.
  • the terminal device sends a second request to the verification function.
  • the terminal device sends the second request to AF/AAA through TMF/AMF (or through NEF or proxy).
  • the second request may include the first response value.
  • the second request may include EPC.
  • the second request may be a tag authentication request.
  • S715 The verification function verifies the terminal device according to the first response value.
  • the verification function may determine the second response value based on the first value and the security key.
  • the first value is a random number RAND or a counter Count generated by the network device, which is the same as the first value in the first response message sent by the verification function in S712.
  • the verification function may generate and determine the derived key Ktmf based on the first value, the security key and the electronic product code EPC.
  • the derived key Ktmf can be used for signaling encryption and/or integrity protection.
  • S716 The verification function sends a second response message to the TMF/AMF.
  • the verification function sends a second response message to TMF/AMF through NEF or proxy.
  • the second response message includes a verification result
  • the verification result includes that the terminal device passes the verification or the terminal device fails the verification.
  • a second response message is sent to the TMF/AMF, where the second response message includes the derived key Ktmf.
  • AMF/TMF receives the derived key Ktmf, it can use the derived key Ktmf for signaling encryption or integrity protection.
  • the second response message may be an enterprise authentication response.
  • AMF/TMF sends a registration response to the terminal device through the base station.
  • the AMF/TMF sends an access command to the terminal device through the base station.
  • S719 The terminal device sends an access command response to the AMF/TMF.
  • the network device performs one-way verification on the terminal device, thereby ensuring the authenticity of the EPC and subsequent data uploaded by the terminal device, and preventing pseudo terminal devices from uploading false EPCs and false data. This ensures the security of communication between terminal equipment and network equipment.
  • the terminal device, base station, TMF/AMF and/or verification function may perform some or all of the steps in each embodiment.
  • S418-S420 in the embodiment shown in Figure 4b are optional.
  • These steps or operations are only examples, and embodiments of the present application may also perform other operations or variations of various operations.
  • various steps may be performed in a different order presented in each embodiment, and it is possible that not all operations in the embodiments of the present application are performed.
  • the size of the serial number of each step does not mean the order of execution.
  • the execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiment of the present application.
  • the verification function may be AF or AAA, and the verification function may also be UDM.
  • the methods and operations implemented by the terminal device can also be implemented by components (such as chips or circuits) that can be used in the terminal device, and the methods and operations implemented by the verification function can also be implemented by Can be used to verify the implementation of functional components (such as chips or circuits).
  • each network element such as a transmitting end device or a receiving end device, includes a corresponding hardware structure and/or software module for performing each function.
  • a network element such as a transmitting end device or a receiving end device
  • each network element includes a corresponding hardware structure and/or software module for performing each function.
  • the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software with the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein. Whether a function is performed by hardware or computer software driving the hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality using different methods for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
  • Embodiments of the present application can divide the terminal device or the verification function into functional modules according to the above method examples.
  • each functional module can be divided corresponding to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module.
  • the above integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or software function modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiment of the present application is schematic and is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods. The following is an example of dividing each functional module using corresponding functions.
  • the security verification device may include a receiving module 801, a processing module 802 and a sending module 803.
  • the receiving module 801 and the sending module 803 can communicate with the outside, and the processing module 802 is used to perform processing, such as determining the first response value, etc.
  • the receiving module 801 and the sending module 803 may also be called a communication interface, a transceiver unit or a transceiver module.
  • the receiving module 801, the processing module 802 and the sending module 803 can be used to perform the actions performed by the terminal device in the above method embodiment.
  • the receiving module 801 and the sending module 803 may also be called a transceiving module or a transceiving unit (including a receiving unit and/or a sending unit), and are respectively used to perform the steps of receiving and sending by the terminal device in the above method embodiment.
  • the security verification device may implement steps or processes corresponding to those executed by the terminal device in the above method embodiment.
  • it may be a terminal device, or a chip or circuit configured in the terminal device.
  • the receiving module 801 and the sending module 803 are used to perform the transceiver-related operations of the terminal device in the above method embodiment, and the processing module 802 is used to perform the processing-related operations of the terminal device in the above method embodiment.
  • the receiving module 801 is configured to receive a first command sent by a network device.
  • the first command includes a first value.
  • the first command is a selection command, a query command, a repeat query command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command. one of;
  • the processing module 802 is used to determine the first response value according to the first value and the security key
  • Sending module 803 is configured to send a first request, where the first request includes the first response value, and the first response value is used by a verification function to verify the terminal device.
  • each module can also refer to the corresponding descriptions of the method embodiments shown in Figures 4a to 7 to perform the methods and functions performed by the terminal device in the above embodiments.
  • the security verification device may include a receiving module 901, a processing module 902 and a sending module 903.
  • the receiving module 901 and the sending module 903 can communicate with the outside.
  • the receiving module 901 and the sending module 903 may also be called a communication interface, a transceiver unit or a transceiver module.
  • the processing module 902 is used for processing, such as verifying the terminal device.
  • the receiving module 901, the processing module 902 and the sending module 903 can be used to perform the actions performed by the verification function in the above method embodiment.
  • the receiving module 901 and the sending module 903 may also be called a transceiver module or a transceiver unit (including a receiving unit and/or a sending unit), and are respectively used to perform the steps of receiving and sending the verification function in the above method embodiment.
  • the security verification device can implement steps or processes corresponding to the verification function execution in the above method embodiment, for example, it can be a verification function, or a chip or circuit configured in the verification function.
  • the receiving module 901 and the sending module 903 are used to perform the sending and receiving related operations of the verification function in the above method embodiment.
  • the processing module 902 is used to perform processing related operations of the verification function in the above method embodiment.
  • the receiving module 901 is configured to receive a first request, where the first request includes a first response value, and the first response value is determined based on the security key and the first value included in the first command of the network device,
  • the first command is one of a selection command, a query command, a repeat query command, a query adjustment command, or a confirmation command;
  • the processing module 902 is configured to verify the terminal device according to the first response value.
  • each module can also refer to the corresponding descriptions of the method embodiments shown in Figures 4a to 7 to perform the methods and functions performed by the verification function in the above embodiments.
  • Figure 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the terminal device can be applied in the system as shown in Figure 1 to perform the functions of the terminal device in the above method embodiment, or to implement the steps or processes performed by the terminal device in the above method embodiment.
  • the terminal device includes a processor 1001 and a transceiver 1002.
  • the terminal device also includes a memory 1003.
  • the processor 1001, the transceiver 1002 and the memory 1003 can communicate with each other through internal connection channels and transmit control and/or data signals.
  • the memory 1003 is used to store computer programs, and the processor 1001 is used to retrieve data from the memory 1003.
  • the computer program is called and run to control the transceiver 1002 to send and receive signals.
  • the terminal device may also include an antenna for sending the uplink data or uplink control signaling output by the transceiver 1002 through wireless signals.
  • the above-mentioned processor 1001 may correspond to the processing module in FIG. 8 , and the above-mentioned processor 1001 and the memory 1003 may be combined into a processing device.
  • the processor 1001 is used to execute the program code stored in the memory 1003 to implement the above functions.
  • the memory 1003 can also be integrated in the processor 1001 or independent of the processor 1001 .
  • the above-mentioned transceiver 1002 may correspond to the receiving module and the transmitting module in FIG. 8, and may also be called a transceiver unit or a transceiver module.
  • the transceiver 1002 may include a receiver (or receiver, receiving circuit) and a transmitter (or transmitter, transmitting circuit). Among them, the receiver is used to receive signals, and the transmitter is used to transmit signals.
  • terminal device shown in Figure 10 can implement various processes involving the terminal device in the method embodiments shown in Figures 4a-7.
  • the operations and/or functions of each module in the terminal device are respectively to implement the corresponding processes in the above method embodiments.
  • the above-mentioned processor 1001 can be used to perform the actions implemented internally by the terminal device described in the previous method embodiment, and the transceiver 1002 can be used to perform the actions sent by the terminal device to or received from the verification function described in the previous method embodiment. action.
  • the transceiver 1002 can be used to perform the actions sent by the terminal device to or received from the verification function described in the previous method embodiment. action.
  • the processor 1001 may be a central processing unit, a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor, an application-specific integrated circuit, a field programmable gate array or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components, or any combination thereof. It may implement or execute the various illustrative logical blocks, modules, and circuits described in connection with this disclosure.
  • the processor 1001 may also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of a digital signal processor and a microprocessor, and so on.
  • the communication bus 1004 may be a peripheral component interconnection standard PCI bus or an extended industry standard architecture EISA bus, or the like. The bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc.
  • the communication bus 1004 is used to implement connection communication between these components.
  • the transceiver 1002 is used to communicate signaling or data with other node devices.
  • the memory 1003 may include volatile memory, such as nonvolatile dynamic random access memory (NVRAM), phase change random access memory (phase change RAM, PRAM), magnetoresistive random access memory (magetoresistive RAM, MRAM), etc., may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device, electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory devices, such as reverse or flash memory (NOR flash memory) or NAND flash memory (NAND flash memory), semiconductor devices, such as solid state disk (SSD), etc.
  • the memory 1003 may optionally be at least one storage device located far away from the aforementioned processor 1001.
  • the memory 1003 may optionally also store a set of computer program codes or configuration information.
  • the processor 1001 can also execute programs stored in the memory 1003.
  • the processor can cooperate with the memory and the transceiver to perform any method and function of the terminal device in the above application embodiments.
  • FIG 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a verification function provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • This verification function can be applied to the system as shown in Figure 1 to perform the verification function in the above method embodiment, or to implement the verification function in the above method embodiment. The steps or processes to be performed.
  • the verification function includes a processor 1101 and a transceiver 1102.
  • the verification function also includes memory 1103.
  • the processor 1101, the transceiver 1102 and the memory 1103 can communicate with each other through internal connection channels and transmit control and/or data signals.
  • the memory 1103 is used to store computer programs, and the processor 1101 is used to retrieve data from the memory 1103.
  • the computer program is called and run to control the transceiver 1102 to send and receive signals.
  • the verification function may also include an antenna for sending uplink data or uplink control signaling output by the transceiver 1102 through wireless signals.
  • the above-mentioned processor 1101 may correspond to the processing module in Figure 9.
  • the above-mentioned processor 1101 and the memory 1103 may be combined into one processing device.
  • the processor 1101 is used to execute the program code stored in the memory 1103 to implement the above functions.
  • the memory 1103 may also be integrated in the processor 1101 or independent of the processor 1101.
  • the above-mentioned transceiver 1102 may correspond to the sending module and the receiving module in Figure 9, and may also be called a transceiver unit or a transceiver module.
  • the transceiver 1102 may include a receiver (or receiver, receiving circuit) and a transmitter (or transmitter, transmitting circuit). Among them, the receiver is used to receive signals, and the transmitter is used to transmit signals.
  • the verification function shown in Figure 11 can implement various processes related to the verification function in the method embodiments shown in Figures 4a to 7.
  • the operations and/or functions of each module in the verification function are respectively to implement the corresponding processes in the above method embodiments.
  • the above-mentioned processor 1101 can be used to perform the actions implemented by the verification function described in the previous method embodiment, and the transceiver 1102 can be used to perform the verification function described in the previous method embodiment. Send to or receive from the terminal device. action.
  • the transceiver 1102 can be used to perform the verification function described in the previous method embodiment. Send to or receive from the terminal device. action.
  • the processor 1101 may be the various types of processors mentioned above.
  • the communication bus 1104 may be a peripheral component interconnection standard PCI bus or an extended industry standard architecture EISA bus, or the like. The bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc. For ease of presentation, only one thick line is used in Figure 11, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
  • the communication bus 1104 is used to implement connection communication between these components. Among them, the transceiver 1102 of the device in the embodiment of this application is used to communicate signaling or data with other devices.
  • the memory 1103 may be the various types of memory mentioned above.
  • the memory 1103 may optionally be at least one storage device located remotely from the aforementioned processor 1101. A set of computer program codes or configuration information is stored in the memory 1103, and the processor 1101 executes the program in the memory 1103.
  • the processor can cooperate with the memory and the transceiver to perform any method and function of the verification function in the above application embodiments.
  • Embodiments of the present application also provide a chip system.
  • the chip system includes a processor for supporting terminal equipment or verification functions to implement the functions involved in any of the above embodiments, such as generating or processing the information involved in the above methods. First response value.
  • the chip system may also include a memory that is used for program instructions and data necessary for terminal equipment or verification functions.
  • the chip system may be composed of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices. Among them, the input and output of the chip system respectively correspond to the receiving and sending operations of the terminal device or verification function of the method embodiment.
  • An embodiment of the present application also provides a processing device, including a processor and an interface.
  • the processor may be used to execute the method in the above method embodiment.
  • the above processing device may be a chip.
  • the processing device can be a field programmable gate array (FPGA), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a system on chip (SoC), or It can be a central processor unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), a digital signal processor (DSP), or a microcontroller unit , MCU), can also be programmable Controller (programmable logic device, PLD) or other integrated chip.
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • SoC system on chip
  • CPU central processor unit
  • NP network processor
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • MCU microcontroller unit
  • PLD programmable Controller
  • each step of the above method can be completed by instructions in the form of hardware integrated logic circuits or software in the processor.
  • the steps of the methods disclosed in conjunction with the embodiments of the present application can be directly implemented by a hardware processor for execution, or can be executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor.
  • the software module can be located in random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory or electrically erasable programmable memory, registers and other mature storage media in this field.
  • the storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and completes the steps of the above method in combination with its hardware. To avoid repetition, it will not be described in detail here.
  • the present application also provides a computer program product.
  • the computer program product includes: a computer program.
  • the computer program When the computer program is run on a computer, it causes the computer to execute the implementation shown in Figures 4a-7. method in any of the examples.
  • the present application also provides a computer-readable medium.
  • the computer-readable medium stores a computer program.
  • the computer program When the computer program is run on a computer, it causes the computer to execute the steps shown in Figures 4a-7. The method of any one of the embodiments is shown.
  • the present application also provides a communication system, which includes the aforementioned one or more terminal devices and one or more verification functions.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions.
  • the computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device.
  • the computer instructions may be stored in or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another, e.g., the computer instructions may be transferred from a website, computer, server, or data center Transmission to another website, computer, server or data center through wired (such as coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (such as infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, data center, etc. that contains one or more available media integrated.
  • the usable media may be magnetic media (e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, tapes), optical media (e.g., high-density digital video discs (DVD)), or semiconductor media (e.g., solid state disks, SSD)) etc.
  • magnetic media e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, tapes
  • optical media e.g., high-density digital video discs (DVD)
  • DVD digital video discs
  • semiconductor media e.g., solid state disks, SSD
  • the verification function in each of the above device embodiments corresponds to the verification function or terminal equipment in the terminal equipment and method embodiments, and the corresponding steps are performed by corresponding modules or units, such as the receiving module and the sending module (transceiver) performing the method embodiments.
  • the steps of receiving or sending, other steps except sending and receiving may be executed by the processing module (processor).
  • the processing module processor
  • the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are only illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.
  • multiple units or components may be combined or can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored, or not implemented.
  • the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between each other shown or discussed may be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of the devices or units may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the existing technology or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product.
  • the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including A number of instructions are used to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server server, or verification function, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of this application.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program code. .

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种安全验证方法及装置。该方法包括：接收网络设备发送的第一命令，所述第一命令包括第一数值，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值；发送第一请求，所述第一请求包括所述第一响应值，所述第一响应值用于验证功能对所述终端设备进行验证。采用本申请实施例，可以保障通信安全。

Description

一种安全验证方法及装置
本申请要求于2022年4月26日提交中国专利局、申请号为202210446683.8、申请名称为“一种安全验证方法及装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及一种安全验证方法及装置。
背景技术
传统的无源射频识别(radio frequency identification，RFID)标签(也称电子标签)和读写器收发一体，具有部署成本高，盘点效率低等缺点。在第五代移动通信技术(5th generation，5G)场景中，将读写器集成在基站中，企业通过5G核心网(5G core，5GC)完成标签连接管理、读写器连接管理、标签定位功能和网络能力开放等能力。但是，由于读写器集成在基站中，标签与读写器的通信距离变远，可能导致通信安全问题。例如：标签被非法灭活、标签被非法写入信息、上报数据被窃听、上报数据被篡改、仿冒标签上报数据等。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证方法及装置。可以保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。
第一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证方法，包括：
接收网络设备发送的第一命令，所述第一命令包括第一数值，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值；发送第一请求，所述第一请求包括所述第一响应值，所述第一响应值用于验证功能对所述终端设备进行验证。
终端设备根据接收到的网络设备的第一命令(例如选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令)中包括的第一数值确定第一响应值，并将第一响应值发送给验证功能，使得验证功能对终端设备进行验证，避免非法的终端设备接入网络，避免终端设备上报数据被窃听、上报数据被篡改、或仿冒终端设备上报数据，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。例如，恶意第三方通过窃听读写器与标签之间的通信，仿冒标签向读写器上报数据。通过对终端设备进行验证，可以避免标签上报的数据被篡改，避免仿冒标签上报数据，保障读写器与标签之间的通信安全。由于网络设备生成的第一数值是通过第一命令发送给终端设备的，因此可以减少终端设备与网络设备之间的交互次数，节省信令开销。
在一种可能的设计中，所述第一请求还包括第二数值，所述第二数值用于所述验证功能确定第二响应值；接收第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括所述第二响应值；根据所述第二响应值，对所述网络设备进行验证。终端设备通过接收验证功能确定的第二响应值，对网络设备进行验证。避免恶意的网络设备发送盘点指令，通过随机接入命令获得终端设备的EPC信息，导致贵重物品标签信息泄露。例如，避免标签被非法灭活或被非法写入信息。从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。
在另一种可能的设计中，根据所述第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第三响应值；确定所 述第二响应值与所述第三响应值是否相同；当所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值相同时，确定所述网络设备通过验证。通过判断验证功能计算的第二响应值与终端设备计算的第三响应值是否相同，对网络设备进行验证，保障验证的准确性。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述第一响应消息还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。通过对第一响应消息中第一响应值对网络设备进行验证，保障网络设备发送的EPC的真实性。
在另一种可能的设计中，通过接入和移动性管理功能AMF或标签管理功能TMF向所述验证功能发送第一验证结果，所述第一验证结果为所述网络设备的验证结果。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述第一请求中还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备；和/或，所述验证功能包括应用功能或认证、授权和计费功能。通过对第一请求中第一响应值，对终端设备进行验证，保障终端设备发送的EPC的真实性。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个。
其中，选择(Select)命令包括以下参数：
Target，指示是改变标签的SL(选中标志)还是盘存(inventoried)标志，在改变盘存标志情况下，指明是哪一个节(session)。
Action，指示符合条件的标签是申明SL还是未申明SL，或者置它们的盘存标志到A或B。
MemBank，指示Mask是应用到EPC、TID还是用户区。
Pointer和Length，指示存贮范围。
Truncate，指示标签的回复是否截短。
其中，查询(Query)命令包括以下参数：
DR，设置T＝>R(标签到读写器)链路频率。
M，设置T＝>R数据速率以及调制格式。
TRext，选择T＝>R帧头是否加入引导信号。
Sel，选择哪些标签对Query响应。
Session，为某个盘存周期选择一个节(Session)。
Target，选择参与盘存周期标签的inventoried标志是A还是B。
Q，设置盘存周期的时隙数目。
其中，查询重复(QueryRep)命令包括以下参数：
Session，确认本盘存周期的节(Session)值。
其中，查询调整(QueryAdjust)命令包括以下参数：
Session，确认本盘存周期的节(Session)值。
UpDn，决定标签是否调节Q值(如盘存周期中的时隙数目)和如何调节Q值。
其中，确认(ACK)命令包括以下参数：
RN16，16位随机数或伪随机数。
第二方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证方法，包括：
验证功能接收第一请求，所述第一请求包括第一响应值，所述第一响应值为根据安全密钥和网络设备的第一命令中包括的第一数值确定，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；所述验证功能根据所述第一响应值，对终端设备进行验证。
终端设备根据接收的网络设备的第一命令(例如选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令)中包括的第一数值确定第一响应值，并将第一响应值发送给验证功能，使得验证功能对终端设备进行验证。避免非法的终端设备接入网络，以及避免终端设备上报数据被窃听、上报数据被篡改、或仿冒终端设备上报数据，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。例如，恶意第三方通过窃听读写器与标签之间的通信，仿冒标签向读写器上报数据。通过对终端设备进行验证，可以避免标签上报的数据被篡改，避免仿冒标签上报数据，保障读写器与标签之间的通信安全。由于网络设备生成的第一数值是通过第一命令发送给终端设备的，因此可以减少终端设备与网络设备之间的交互次数，节省信令开销。
在一种可能的设计中，验证功能确定第三数值，根据所述第三数值和所述安全密钥，确定第四响应值；所述验证功能确定所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值是否相同；当所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值相同时，所述验证功能确定所述终端设备通过验证。
通过判断验证功能计算的第四响应值与终端设备计算的第一响应值是否相同，对终端设备进行验证，保障验证的准确性。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述第一请求还包括第二数值；验证功能根据所述第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第二响应值；验证功能发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括所述第二响应值，所述第二响应值用于所述终端设备对所述网络设备进行验证。验证功能通过将第二响应值发送给终端设备，使得终端设备根据第二响应值对网络设备进行验证，避免恶意的网络设备发送盘点指令，通过随机接入命令获得终端设备的EPC信息，导致贵重物品标签信息泄露。例如，避免标签被非法灭活或被非法写入信息。实现终端设备与网络设备之间的双向验证，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述验证功能接收所述终端设备通过接入和移动性管理功能AMF或标签管理功能TMF发送的第一验证结果，所述第一验证结果为所述网络设备的验证结果。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述验证功能向接入和移动性管理功能AMF或标签管理功能TMF发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息包括衍生密钥，所述衍生密钥为根据所述第一数值和所述第二数值中的至少一项，以及所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。AMF或TMF通过使用衍生密钥对信令进行加密或完整性保护，保障通信的安全。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述第二响应消息还包括第二验证结果，所述第二验证结果为所述终端设备的验证结果。
第三方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证方法，包括：
接入和移动性管理功能AMF或标签管理功能TMF确定第一数值；向网络设备发送第二命令，所述第二命令包括所述第一数值，所述第二命令为盘点命令。
通过盘点命令向网络设备发送第一数值，使得网络设备向终端设备下发第一命令，这样终端设备根据第一命令中的第一数值确定第一响应值，从而减少了终端设备与网络设备的交互流程，减少了信令开销。
在另一种可能的设计中，接入和移动性管理功能AMF或标签管理功能TMF接收验证功能发送的第二请求，所述第二请求包括第一数值；或
所述第一数值是由所述AMF或所述TMF生成。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述AMF或所述TMF接收验证功能发送的第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息包括衍生密钥，所述衍生密钥为根据所述第一数值和所述第二数值中的至少 一项，以及所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。通过衍生密钥对信令进行加密或完整性保护，提高通信的安全性。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述第二响应消息还包括第二验证结果，所述第二验证结果为所述终端设备的验证结果。
第四方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证系统，包括：
接入和移动性管理功能AMF或标签管理功能TMF确定第一数值；向网络设备发送第二命令，所述第二命令包括所述第一数值，所述第二命令为盘点命令；
验证功能接收第一请求，所述第一请求包括第一响应值，所述第一响应值为根据安全密钥和网络设备的第一命令中包括的第一数值确定，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；根据所述第一响应值，对终端设备进行验证。
验证功能通过接收终端设备确定的第一响应值对终端设备进行验证，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。由于网络设备生成的第一数值是通过第一命令发送给终端设备的，因此可以减少终端设备与网络设备之间的交互次数，节省信令开销。
在一种可能的设计中，网络设备向终端设备发送第一命令，所述第一命令包括所述第一数值。
第五方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证方法，包括：
终端设备在接收到网络设备的接入命令后，生成第一数值，所述接入命令为Write，Kill,Lock中的一个；所述终端设备发送所述第一数值；所述终端设备从验证功能接收第一响应值，所述第一响应值根据所述第一数值计算得到；所述终端设备根据所述第一响应值对所述网络设备进行验证。
终端设备接收到接入命令后对网络设备发起验证，验证通过后执行接入命令，从而防止恶意基站发起对终端设备的读、写、灭活等命令，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述终端设备从所述验证功能接收第二数值；所述终端设备根据所述第二数值和安全密钥计算第二响应值；所述终端设备发送所述第二响应值，所述第二响应值用于所述验证功能对所述终端设备进行验证。终端设备通过计算第二响应值，并将第二响应值发送给验证功能，使得验证功能对终端设备进行验证，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述终端设备根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第三响应值；所述终端设备确定所述第一响应值与所述第三响应值是否相同；当所述第一响应值与所述第三响应值相同时，所述终端设备确定所述网络设备通过验证。
通过判断验证功能计算的第一响应值与终端设备计算的第三响应值是否相同，对网络设备进行验证，保障验证的准确性。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述第一数值包括在第一请求中，所述第一响应值包括在第一响应消息中，所述第一响应消息和/或所述第一请求还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述验证功能包括应用功能或认证、授权和计费功能。
第六方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证装置，所述装置包括：
接收模块，用于接收网络设备发送的第一命令，所述第一命令包括第一数值，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；
处理模块，用于根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值；
发送模块，用于发送第一请求，所述第一请求包括所述第一响应值，所述第一响应值用于验证功能对所述终端设备进行验证。
各个模块的实现可以对应参照第一方面所述的方法实施例的相应描述，执行上述终端设备所执行的方法和功能。
该安全验证装置执行的操作及有益效果可以参见上述第一方面所述的方法以及有益效果，重复之处不再赘述。
第七方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证装置，所述装置包括：
接收模块，用于接收第一请求，所述第一请求包括第一响应值，所述第一响应值为根据安全密钥和网络设备的第一命令中包括的第一数值确定，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；
处理模块，用于根据所述第一响应值，对所述终端设备进行验证。
各个模块的实现可以对应参照第二方面所述的方法实施例的相应描述，执行上述验证功能所执行的方法和功能。
该安全验证装置执行的操作及有益效果可以参见上述第二方面所述的方法以及有益效果，重复之处不再赘述。
第八方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证装置，包括：
处理模块，用于确定第一数值；
发送模块，用于向网络设备发送第二命令，所述第二命令包括所述第一数值，所述第二命令为盘点命令。
各个模块的实现可以对应参照第三方面所述的方法实施例的相应描述，执行上述AMF或TMF所执行的方法和功能。
该安全验证装置执行的操作及有益效果可以参见上述第三方面所述的方法以及有益效果，重复之处不再赘述。
第九方面，本申请实施例提供了一种安全验证装置，包括：
处理模块，用于在收到网络设备的接入命令后，生成第一数值，所述接入命令为Write，Kill,Lock中的一个；
发送模块，用于发送所述第一数值；
接收模块，用于从验证功能接收第一响应值，所述第一响应值根据所述第一数值计算得到；所述终端设备根据所述第一响应值对所述网络设备进行验证。
各个模块的实现可以对应参照第五方面所述的方法实施例的相应描述，执行上述终端设备所执行的方法和功能。
该安全验证装置执行的操作及有益效果可以参见上述第五方面所述的方法以及有益效果，重复之处不再赘述。
第十方面，本申请提供了一种安全验证装置，该装置可以是终端设备，也可以是终端设备中的装置，或者是能够和终端设备匹配使用的装置。该装置也可以是验证功能，也可以是验证功能中的装置，或者是能够和验证功能匹配使用的装置。该装置也可以是AMF或TMF，也可以是AMF或TMF中的装置，或者是能够和AMF或TMF匹配使用的装置。其中，该安全验证装置还可以为芯片系统。该安全验证装置可执行上述的方法。该安全验证装置的功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。该模块可以是软件和/或硬件。该安全验证装置执行的操作及有益效 果可以参见上述第一方面和第五方面所述的方法以及有益效果，重复之处不再赘述。
第十一方面，本申请提供了一种安全验证装置，所述安全验证装置包括处理器和存储器，当所述处理器调用存储器中的计算机程序时，如第一方面、第二方面、第三方面和第五方面中任意一项所述的方法被执行。
第十二方面，本申请提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质用于存储计算机程序，当所述计算机程序被执行时，使得如第一方面至第五方面中任意一项所述的方法或系统被实现。
第十三方面，本申请提供一种包括计算机程序的计算机程序产品，当所述计算机程序被执行时，使得如第一方面至第五方面中任意一项所述的方法或系统被实现。
第十四方面，本申请实施例提供了一种通信系统，该通信通统包括至少一个终端设备和至少一个验证功能，该终端设备用于执行上述第一方面和第五方面中的步骤，该验证功能用于执行上述第二方面中的步骤。
第十五方面，本申请实施例提供了一种通信系统，该通信通统包括至少一个验证功能、和至少一个AMF或TMF，该验证功能用于执行上述第二方面中的步骤，该AMF或TMF用于执行上述第三方面中的步骤。
第十六方面，本申请实施例提供了一种通信系统，该通信通统包括至少一个终端设备、至少一个验证功能、和至少一个AMF或TMF，该终端设备用于执行上述第一方面和第五方面中的步骤，该验证功能用于执行上述第二方面中的步骤，所述AMF或TMF用于执行上述第三方面中的步骤。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本申请实施例或背景技术中的技术方案，下面将对本申请实施例或背景技术中所需要使用的附图进行说明。
图1是一种5G系统的架构示意图；
图2是一种RFID业务流程的示意图；
图3是一种读写器集成在基站后标签的业务流程的示意图；
图4a是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证方法的流程示意图；
图4b是本申请实施例提供的另一种安全验证方法的流程示意图；
图5是本申请实施例提供的另一种安全验证方法的流程示意图；
图6是本申请实施例提供的另一种安全验证方法的流程示意图；
图7是本申请实施例提供的另一种安全验证方法的流程示意图；
图8是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证装置的结构示意图；
图9是本申请实施例提供的另一种安全验证装置的结构示意图；
图10是本申请实施例提供的一种终端设备的结构示意图；
图11是本申请实施例提供的一种验证功能的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
图1是一种5G系统的架构示意图。该5G系统包括接入网和核心网两部分。接入网用于实现无线接入有关的功能。核心网主要包括以下几个关键逻辑网元：接入和移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)实体、会话管理功能(session management function，SMF)实体、用户面功能(user plane function，UPF)实体、策略控制功能(policy  control function，PCF)实体、统一数据管理(unified data management，UDM)实体和应用功能实体(Application Function，AF)。
可选的，核心网还可以包括标签管理功能(tag management function，TMF)，认证、授权和计费(Authentication Authorization and Accounting，AAA)实体，网络能力开放功能(network exposure function，NEF)实体。
下面对图1中所涉及的各个网元进行介绍：
UE可以是电子设备，如手机、物联网终端设备等。
无线接入网络(radio access network，(R)AN)设备为UE提供无线接入的设备，包括但不限于5G基站(next generation node B，gNB)、无线保真(wireless-fidelity，WiFi)接入点(access point，AP)、全球微波互联接入(worldwide interoperability for microwave access，WiMAX)基站(base station，BS)等。
AMF实体主要负责移动网络中的移动性管理，如用户位置更新、用户注册网络、用户切换等。
SMF实体主要负责移动网络中的会话管理，如会话建立、修改、释放。具体功能如为用户分配IP地址、选择提供报文转发功能的UPF等。
PCF实体主要负责向AMF、SMF提供策略，如服务质量(quality of service，QoS)策略、切片选择策略等。
UDM实体用于存储用户数据，如签约信息、鉴权/授权信息。
AF实体主要负责向第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)网络提供业务，如影响业务路由、与PCF之间交互以进行策略控制等。
UPF实体主要负责对用户报文进行处理，如转发、计费等。
NEF实体主要用于将3GPP的各个网元的能力暴露给其它网元，提供相应的安全保障来保证外部应用到3GPP网络的安全。
数据网络(data network，DN)主要负责为用户提供数据传输服务，如IP多媒体业务(IP multi-media service,IMS)、因特网(internet)等。UE通过建立UE-RAN-UPF-DN之间的会话(session)，来访问DN。
需要说明的是，图1中各个网络功能和实体之间可以通过不同接口来交互消息。例如，UE和AMF实体之间可以通过N1接口进行交互，交互消息称为N1Message。部分接口采用服务化接口的方式实现。图1中的UE、RAN设备、UPF实体和DN可以称为数据面的网络功能和实体，用于承载业务数据，用户层数据流量可以通过UE和DN之间建立的PDU Session进行传输，并经过RAN设备和UPF实体两个网络功能实体。其他的网络功能和实体可以统称为控制面的网络功能和实体，用于承载信令消息，主要负责认证和鉴权、注册管理、会话管理、移动性管理以及策略控制等功能等等，从而实现用户层数据流量传输的可靠性和稳定性。
射频识别(radio frequency identification，RFID)是一种非接触式的自动识别技术，通过无线射频方式进行非接触双向数据通信，对标签进行读写，从而完成读写器(Reader)与标签(Tag)之间的数据通信，实现识别目标和数据交换的目的。在通常情况下，标签进入读写器发射的电磁场后，从天线获得的感应电流，经升压电路后转化为芯片的电源，同时将感应电流所获得的能量通过射频前端电路变为数据信号送入逻辑控制电路进行处理。在回复的信息时，从标签的存储器中发出，经逻辑控制电路送回射频前端电路，最后通过天线发送回读写器。
如图2所示，图2是一种RFID业务流程的示意图。具体过程包括：
S201，企业打印标签，写入产品电子代码(Electronic product code，EPC)，EPC用于标识所附着的物品。
S202，读写器发送选择Select命令，选择一个标签群进行盘存和访问。在盘存之前，读写器使用一个或多个Select命令选择一个特定的标签群。
S203，读写器通过发送查询(Query)命令开始一个盘存周期。或者，通过查询重复(QueryRep)命令和查询调整(QueryAdjust)命令开始下一个标签的盘存周期。
S204，被选定的标签向读写器返回一个RN16。
其中，RN16可以表示16比特的随机数。
S205，读写器向标签发送ACK命令，ACK命令携带RN16。ACK命令用于确认标签回复的RN16。
S206，标签在接收到ACK命令之后，响应产品电子代码EPC，将EPC发送给读写器。
S207，读写器向标签发送接入命令，以便执行读写等操作。
S208，标签向读写器发送接入命令响应。
其中，接入命令可以包括：Req_RN：请求新的RN16；Read：读取数据；Write：写入数据；Kill：灭活标签(需要kill password)；Lock：锁定操作(锁定区域不能读/写)；Access：使标签转入安全(Secured)状态，即可以执行Lock操作(需要access password)；BlockWrite：多字的写入操作；BlockErase：多字的擦除操作。
在5G场景下，将读写器集成在基站中，企业通过5GC完成标签连接管理、读写器连接管理、标签定位功能和网络能力开放等能力。如图3所示，图3是一种读写器集成在基站后标签的业务流程的示意图。主要包括如下步骤：
S301，企业打印标签，在标签(tag)中写入EPC，在验证功能中存储EPC。其中，EPC用于标识所附着的物品。
S302，验证功能通过NEF或proxy向AMF/TMF发送盘点请求，所述盘点请求包含指令类型、标签标识、标签类型等参数。其中，验证功能可以为AF或AAA。
S303，AMF/TMF根据盘点请求中的参数，确定多个基站中的盘点基站。
S304，AMF/TMF向基站发送盘点命令。该基站为S303确定的盘点基站。
S305，基站发送Select命令，选择一个标签群进行盘存和访问。
S306-S308，基站和标签执行随机接入过程，随机接入过程与图2中RFID业务流程中的S203-S205相同，具体可以参考S203-S205，此处不再赘述。
其中，当标签接收到基站发送的ACK命令时，表示随机接入成功。
S309，接入成功的标签向基站发送注册请求。
其中，所述注册请求包含参数EPC。
S310，基站将向AMF/TMF发送注册请求。
其中，所述注册请求包含参数EPC。
S311，标签和企业通过5GC进行认证流程。
S312，AMF/TMF通过基站向标签发送注册响应。
S313，AMF/TMF通过基站向标签发送接入命令。
S314，标签向AMF/TMF发送接入命令响应。
S315，AMF/TMF通过NEF或proxy向验证功能发送标签的盘点结果。
S316，AMF/TMF发送指示信息，所述指示信息用于指示基站盘点下一个标签。
S317，重复执行S305-S316，执行下一个标签的盘点流程。
S318，基站向AMF/TMF发送盘点结束命令。
S319，AMF/TMF通过NEF或proxy向验证功能发送所有标签的盘点结果。
其中，上述各个网元可以执行上述部分或全部步骤，例如S312-S317是可选的。
由于读写器集成在基站中，标签与读写器的通信距离变远，可能导致通信安全问题。例如：标签被非法灭活、标签被非法写入信息、上报数据被窃听、上报数据被篡改、仿冒标签上报数据等。
现有RFID的认证方式主要通过口令(password)的形式。例如：灭活操作前，标签验证读写器发出的kill password，验证通过后标签执行灭活操作。同样地，在标签安全(Secured)状态转换前，标签验证读写器发出的接入口令(access password)，验证通过后标签将转换到Secured状态。
由于原来的读写器与标签之间的通信距离很近，不需要额外的认证过程。因此RFID在随机接入过程中，没有相应的认证流程。但是，将读写器集成在基站之后，基站与标签之间无法相互认证。如果恶意的基站发送盘点命令，通过随机接入命令获取标签的EPC信息，可能造成贵重物品标签信息泄露。或者，如果恶意的标签响应基站的随机接入命令，上传虚假数据，则可能影响盘点结果和数据真实性。
现有RFID在接入命令的执行过程中，认证方式只支持在Kill和Access操作前对读写器进行认证。将读写器集成在基站之后，对于Read、Write等命令也需要有效的认证过程。此外，将读写器集成在基站之后，原有的认证方式也会受到攻击。例如：如果恶意第三方窃听基站与标签之间的通信，可能获取RN16以及与随机数异或操作后的kill password或access password。因此，恶意第三方即可获得相应的password并对标签发起Kill或Access命令，从而对标签进行恶意的读取或修改。
为了解决上述技术问题，本申请实施例提供了如下解决方案。
如图4a所示，图4a是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证方法的流程示意图。本申请实施例中的步骤主要包括：
S401a，终端设备接收网络设备发送的第一命令，所述第一命令包括第一数值，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个。
其中，第一数值是由网络设备生成的。网络设备可以为基站、TMF/AMF或验证功能。验证功能可以为AF或AAA。
其中，所述第一数值可以为随机数RAND1或计数器Count1。
其中，终端设备可以为标签、UE或者UE中的芯片。
S402a，终端设备根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值。
其中，第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，RAND1)。或者，第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，Count 1)。K为安全密钥，可以预先将安全密钥写入终端设备和验证功能中。MAC是任意一个消息认证码算法。
需要说明的是，可以通过其他方式，根据第一数值和安全密钥计算第一响应值。通过其他方式计算的第一响应值或其他响应值都在本申请保护的范围内。
S403a，终端设备发送第一请求，所述第一请求包括所述第一响应值，所述第一响应值用于验证功能对所述终端设备进行验证。
可选的，终端设备通过基站、或TMF/AMF向验证功能发送第一请求。
验证功能接收到第一请求之后，确定第三数值，根据第三数值和安全密钥，确定第四响应值。其中，第三数值和第一数值都是由网络设备生成的，最初是同一个随机数或计数器。但是经过传输后，可能被篡改，因此第三数值可能与终端设备接收到第一命令中的第一数值相同，也可能与终端设备接收到第一命令中的第一数值不相同。第四响应值RES4＝MAC(K，RAND1)，或者，第四响应值RES4＝MAC(K，Count 1)。K为安全密钥，RAND1和Count1为第三数值，MAC是任意一个消息认证码算法。然后，验证功能确定所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值是否相同；当所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值相同时，确定所述终端设备通过验证，说明终端设备是安全的，当所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值不相同时，确定所述终端设备未通过验证，说明终端设备存在安全问题。
其中，所述第一请求可以为企业认证请求。
本实施例的具体实现方式可以参考下面如图4b所示的实施例。此处不再赘述。
如图4b所示，图4b是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证方法的流程示意图。本申请实施例中的步骤主要包括：
S401，企业打印标签，在终端设备中写入EPC以及安全密钥K，在验证功能中存储EPC以及安全密钥K。
其中，终端设备可以为标签、UE或者UE中的芯片。验证功能可以为AF或AAA。终端设备和验证功能中的安全密钥K相同。
其中，EPC用于标识终端设备。
S402，验证功能通过NEF或proxy向TMF/AMF发送盘点请求。
可选的，盘点请求可以包括第一数值。第一数值可以由验证功能生成。第一数值可以为随机数RAND1或计数器Count1。其中，计数器Count1由验证功能存储，且每次发出Count1后计数器加1。
S403，TMF/AMF根据盘点请求确定盘点基站。
S404，TMF/AMF向基站发送盘点命令。其中，该基站为S403确定的盘点基站。
可选的，盘点命令中包含第一数值，所述第一数值可以为随机数RAND1或计数器Count1。
其中，第一数值可以是TMF/AMF从验证功能发送的盘点请求中获取，也可以是由TMF/AMF本地生成。
S405，基站向终端设备发送选择(Select)命令，选择一个或多个终端设备进行盘存和访问。
可选的，Select命令中包含第一数值，所述第一数值可以为随机数RAND1或计数器Count1。
其中，第一数值可以是基站从TMF/AMF发送的盘点命令中获取，也可以是由基站本地生成。
其中，选择(Select)命令可以包括以下参数：
Target，指示是改变标签的SL(选中标志)还是盘存(inventoried)标志，在改变盘存标志情况下，指明是哪一个节(session)。
Action，指示符合条件的标签是申明SL还是未申明SL，或者置它们的盘存标志到A或B。
MemBank，指示Mask(掩码)是应用到EPC、TID(标签标识符)还是用户区。
Pointer和Length，指示存贮范围。
Truncate，指示标签的回复是否截短。
S406-S408，基站与终端设备之间执行随机接入过程，随机接入过程与图2中RFID业务流程中的S203-S205相同，可以参考S203-S205。此处不再赘述。
其中，当终端设备接收到基站发送的ACK命令时，表示终端设备随机接入成功。
需要说明的是，若S405中基站发送的选择命令中不包括第一数值，则第一数值可以包含于随机接入过程中的查询(Query)命令、查询重复(QueryRep)命令、查询调整(QueryAdjust)命令或确认(ACK)命令中的一个。
其中，所述第一数值可以为随机数RAND1或计数器Count1。
其中，查询(Query)命令包括以下参数：DR，设置T＝>R(标签到读写器)链路频率。M，设置T＝>R数据速率以及调制格式。TRext，选择T＝>R帧头是否加入引导信号。Sel，选择哪些标签对Query响应。Session，为某个盘存周期选择一个节(Session)。Target，选择参与盘存周期标签的inventoried标志是A还是B。Q，设置盘存周期的时隙数目。
其中，查询重复(QueryRep)命令包括以下参数：Session，确认本盘存周期的节(Session)值。
其中，查询调整(QueryAdjust)命令包括以下参数：Session，确认本盘存周期的节(Session)值。UpDn，决定标签是否调节Q值(如盘存周期中的时隙数目)和如何调节Q值。
其中，确认(ACK)命令包括以下参数：RN16，16位随机或伪随机数。
S409，终端设备根据第一数值和所述安全密钥，确定第一响应值。
其中，第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，RAND1)。或者，第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，Count 1)。K为安全密钥，MAC是任意一个消息认证码算法。
需要说明的是，可以通过其他方式，根据第一数值和安全密钥计算第一响应值。通过其他方式计算的第一响应值或其他响应值都在本申请保护的范围内。
S410，终端设备向基站发送注册请求。
其中，注册请求可以包括第一响应值RES1。可选的，注册请求可以包括EPC。
可选的，注册请求还可以包括第二数值，第二数值为终端设备生成的随机数RAND2或计数器Count2。终端设备可以选择以下两种方式中的一种方式生成计数器Count2：
第一种方式，终端设备在Count 1的基础上加1生成Count2。
第二种方式，终端设备本地存储Count2，每次发出Count2后本地存储的Count2加1。
S411，基站向AMF/TMF发送注册请求。
其中，所述注册请求包括第一响应值RES1。
可选的，所述注册请求还可以包括第二数值。可选的，所述注册请求还可以包括EPC。
S412，TMF/AMF向验证功能发送第一请求。
可选的，终端设备通过TMF/AMF(或者NEF/proxy)向验证功能发送第一请求。
其中，所述第一请求中包括第一响应值RES1。可选的，第一请求还可以包括第二数值。可选的，所述注册请求还可以包括EPC。
其中，所述第一请求可以为企业认证请求。
可选的，TMF/AMF可以向UDM/AUSF发送第一请求。其中，所述第一请求中包含第一响应值RES1。
可选的，所述第一请求还可以包括第二数值。可选的，所述第一请求还可以包括EPC。
UDM/AUSF接收到第一请求之后，对终端设备进行验证。也即可以通过UDM/AUSF完成验证流程。在这种情况下，图4b中AF/AAA与TMF/AMF的交互过程可以修改为 UDM/AUSF与TMF/AMF的交互。UDM/AUSF预先配置终端设备的EPC、安全密钥K以及计数器Count1(计数器Count1的配置和维护是可选的)。
S413，验证功能根据第一响应值，对终端设备进行验证。
具体的，验证功能接收到第一请求之后，确定第三数值，根据第三数值和安全密钥，确定第四响应值。其中，第三数值和第一数值都是由网络设备生成的，最初是同一个随机数或计数器。但是经过传输后，可能被篡改，因此第三数值可能与终端设备接收到第一命令中的第一数值相同，也可能与终端设备接收到第一命令中的第一数值不相同。第四响应值RES4＝MAC(K，RAND1)，或者，第四响应值RES4＝MAC(K，Count 1)。K为安全密钥，RAND1和Count 1为第三数值，MAC是任意一个消息认证码算法。然后，验证功能确定所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值是否相同；当所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值相同时，确定所述终端设备通过验证，说明终端设备是安全的，当所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值不相同时，确定所述终端设备未通过验证，说明终端设备存在安全问题。
需要说明的是，所述第三数值可以是由验证功能生成，如果第三数值不是由验证功能生成的(例如TMF/AMF或基站生成)，第三数值可以由终端设备发送给验证功能。
可选的，当验证功能确定终端设备通过验证时，验证功能可以根据接收到的第一请求中的第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第二响应值。其中，第二响应值RES2＝MAC(K，RAND2)，或者，第二响应值RES2＝MAC(K，Count2)。
需要说明的是，由于终端设备与网络设备之间存在通信距离，在传输过程中数据有可能被篡改。验证功能接收到的第一请求中第二数值与终端设备发送的注册请求中的第二数值可能相同，也有可能不相同。
其中，第二数值为终端设备生成的随机数RAND2或计数器Count2。如果S410中的计数器Count 2是在Count 1的基础上加1生成，则验证功能将本地维护的Count1加1。
可选的，验证功能可以根据所述第一数值和所述第二数值中的至少一项、以及所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成确定衍生密钥Ktmf。其中，所述衍生密钥Ktmf可以用于信令加密或完整性保护。
S414，验证功能发送第一响应消息。
可选的，验证功能可以通过TMF/AMF或基站向终端设备发送第一响应消息。
其中，第一响应消息包括所述第二响应值。可选的，第一响应消息还可以包括EPC。
其中，第一响应消息可以为标签认证响应。
S415，终端设备根据第二响应值，对网络设备进行验证。
具体的，终端设备可以根据第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第三响应值。其中，该第二数值为终端设备生成的随机数RAND2或计数器Count2，与S410中终端设备发送的注册请求中的第二数值相同。第三响应值RES3＝MAC(K，RAND2)，或者，第三响应值RES3＝MAC(K，Count2)。然后，确定所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值是否相同；当所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值相同时，确定所述网络设备通过验证，说明网络设备是安全的，当所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值不相同时，确定所述网络设备未通过验证，说明网络设备存在通信安全问题。
其中，网络设备可以是基站、TMF/AMF或验证功能等。
S416，终端设备通过AMF实体或TMF实体向验证功能发送第一验证结果。
其中，所述第一验证结果为所述网络设备的验证结果，第一验证结果包括网络设备通过验证或网络设备未通过验证。
其中，第一验证结果为标签认证结果。
S417，验证功能向AMF实体或TMF实体发送第二响应消息。
其中，所述第二响应消息可以包括第二验证结果，所述第二验证结果为所述终端设备的验证结果。第二验证结果包括终端设备通过验证或终端设备未通过验证。
可选的，所述第二响应消息包括衍生密钥，所述衍生密钥为根据所述第一数值和所述第二数值中的至少一项，以及所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
如果S413中验证功能对终端设备进行验证后没有生成衍生密钥，则可以在此步骤生成衍生密钥。
可选的，如果确定终端设备通过验证、和/或确定网络设备通过验证时，验证功能可以向AMF实体或TMF实体发送第二响应消息。
其中，第二响应消息可以为企业认证响应。
S418，AMF/TMF通过基站向终端设备发送注册响应。
S419，AMF/TMF通过基站向终端设备发送接入命令。
其中，接入命令可以包括：Req_RN：请求新的RN16；Read：读取数据；Write：写入数据；Kill：灭活标签(需要kill password)；Lock：锁定操作(锁定区域不能读/写)；Access：使标签转入安全(Secured)状态，即可以执行Lock操作(需要access password)；BlockWrite：多字的写入操作；BlockErase：多字的擦除操作。
S420，终端设备向AMF/TMF发送接入命令响应。
在本申请实施例中，终端设备根据接收到的网络设备的第一命令(例如选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令)中包括的第一数值确定第一响应值，并将第一响应值发送给验证功能，使得验证功能对终端设备进行验证。并且，验证功能根据终端设备生成的第二数值确定第二响应值，并将第二响应值发送给终端设备，使得终端设备对网络设备进行验证。实现终端设备与网络设备之间的双向验证，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。由于网络设备生成的第一数值是通过第一命令发送给终端设备计算第一响应值，因此可以减少终端设备与网络设备之间的交互次数，节省信令开销。
图4b所示的实施例中先对终端设备进行验证，然后对网络设备进行验证。下面图5所示的实施例中先对网络设备进行验证，然后对终端设备进行验证。并且，该实施例中的终端设备可以根据本地配置的安全策略发起验证流程。
如图5所示，图5是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证方法的流程示意图。本申请实施例中的步骤主要包括：
S501，企业打印标签，在终端设备中写入EPC、安全密钥K和安全策略，在验证功能中存储EPC以及安全密钥K。
其中，终端设备可以为标签、UE或者UE中的芯片。验证功能可以为AF或AAA。终端设备和验证功能中的安全密钥K相同。
其中，EPC用于标识终端设备。
其中，安全策略用于指示双向验证的执行条件。也即终端设备在确定满足执行条件时，发起验证流程。
S502，验证功能通过NEF或proxy向AMF/TMF发送盘点请求，所述盘点请求包含指令类型、标签标识、标签类型等参数。
S503，AMF/TMF根据盘点请求中的参数，确定多个基站中的盘点基站。
S504，AMF/TMF向基站发送盘点命令。该基站为S503确定的盘点基站。
S505，基站发送Select命令，选择一个或多个终端设备进行盘存和访问。
S506-S508，基站与终端设备之间执行随机接入过程，随机接入过程与图2中RFID业务流程中的S203-S205相同，可以参考S203-S205。此处不再赘述。
其中，当终端设备接收到基站发送的ACK命令时，表示终端设备随机接入成功。
S509，终端设备向基站发送注册请求。
其中，所述注册请求包含参数EPC。
S510，基站向AMF/TMF发送注册请求。
其中，所述注册请求包含参数EPC。
S511，AMF/TMF通过基站向终端设备发送注册响应。
S512，AMF/TMF通过基站向终端设备发送接入命令。
其中，接入命令可以包括：Req_RN：请求新的RN16；Read：读取数据；Write：写入数据；Kill：灭活标签(需要kill password)；Lock：锁定操作(锁定区域不能读/写)；Access：使标签转入安全(Secured)状态，即可以执行Lock操作(需要access password)；BlockWrite：多字的写入操作；BlockErase：多字的擦除操作。
S513，终端设备根据本地配置的安全策略发起验证流程。
可选的，终端设备接收到接入命令后，根据接入命令发起验证流程。
S514，终端设备向TMF/AMF发送第一请求。
其中，所述第一请求可以包括第一数值。可选的，第一请求还可以包括EPC。
其中，第一数值可以为终端设备生成的随机数RAND1或计数器Count1。当终端设备本地维护计数器Count1时，在终端设备每次发出计数器Count1之后将本地维护的Count1加1。
其中，所述第一请求可以为认证请求响应。
S515，AMF/TMF通过NEF或proxy向验证功能发送第一请求。
其中，所述第一请求可以包括第一数值。可选的，第一请求还可以包括EPC。第一数值可以包括终端设备生成的随机数RAND1或计数器Count1。
其中，所述第一请求可以为企业认证请求。
可选的，TMF/AMF可以向UDM/AUSF发送第一请求。其中，所述第一请求中包括第一数值。可选的，所述第一请求还可以包括EPC。在这种情况下，图5中AF/AAA与TMF/AMF的交互过程可以修改为UDM/AUSF与TMF/AMF的交互。UDM/AUSF预先配置终端设备的EPC、安全密钥K以及计数器Count2(计数器Count2的配置和维护是可选的)。也即通过UDM/AUSF完成验证流程。
S516，验证功能根据接收到的第一请求中的第一数值和所述安全密钥，确定第一响应值。
其中，第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，RAND1)。或者，第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，Count 1)。K为安全密钥，RAND1为第一数值，MAC是任意一个消息认证码算法。
需要说明的是，由于终端设备与网络设备之间存在通信距离，在传输过程中数据有可能被篡改。验证功能接收到的第一请求中第一数值与终端设备发送的第一请求中的第一数值可能相同，也有可能不相同。
需要说明的是，可以通过其他方式，根据第一数值和安全密钥计算第一响应值。通过其他方式计算的第一响应值或其他响应值都在本申请保护的范围内。
S517，验证功能向终端设备第一响应消息。
其中，第一响应消息包括第一响应值。
可选的，第一响应消息包括第二数值。第二数值可以为网络设备(例如基站、TMF/AMF或验证功能)生成的随机数RAND2或计数器Count 2。当验证功能本地维护计数器Count2，验证功能在每次发出计数器Count2之后将本地维护的Count2加1。
其中，如果第二数值不是由验证功能生成的，例如第二数值是由TMF/AMF或基站生成，验证功能也可以从TMF/AMF或基站获取第二数值。
可选的，第一响应消息还可以包括EPC。
其中，第一响应消息可以为标签认证响应。
S518，终端设备根据第一响应值，对网络设备进行验证。
具体的，终端设备可以根据第一数值和所述安全密钥，确定第三响应值。其中，该第一数值为终端设备生成的随机数RAND1或计数器Count1，与S514中终端设备发送的第一请求中的第一数值相同。第三响应值RES3＝MAC(K，RAND1)，或者，第三响应值RES3＝MAC(K，Count1)。然后，确定所述第一响应值与所述第三响应值是否相同；当所述第一响应值与所述第三响应值相同时，确定所述网络设备通过验证，说明网络设备是安全的，当所述第一响应值与所述第三响应值不相同时，确定所述网络设备未通过验证，说明网络设备存在通信安全问题。
可选的，当终端设备确定网络设备通过验证时，可以根据接收到的第一响应消息中的第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第二响应值。其中，第二数值为网络设备生成的随机数RAND2或计数器Count2。第二响应值RES2＝MAC(K，RAND2)，或者，第二响应值RES2＝MAC(K，Count2)。
需要说明的是，由于终端设备与网络设备之间存在通信距离，在传输过程中数据有可能被篡改。终端设备接收到的第一响应消息中第二数值与验证功能发送的第一响应消息中的第二数值可能相同，也有可能不相同。
S519，终端设备向验证功能发送第二请求。
可选的，终端设备通过TMF/AMF(或通过NEF或proxy)向验证功能发送第二请求。
其中，第二请求可以包括第二响应值。可选的，第二请求还可以包括EPC。
其中，第二请求可以为标签认证请求。
S520，验证功能根据第二响应值，对终端设备进行验证。
具体的，验证功能根据第二数值和安全密钥，确定第四响应值。其中，该第二数值可以为随机数RAND2或计数器Count 2，与S517中验证功能发送的第一响应消息中第二数值相同。第四响应值RES4＝MAC(K，RAND2)，或者，第四响应值RES4＝MAC(K，Count2)。K为安全密钥，MAC是任意一个消息认证码算法。然后，验证功能确定所述第二响应值与所述第四响应值是否相同；当所述第二响应值与所述第四响应值相同时，确定所述终端设备通过验证，说明终端设备是安全的，当所述第二响应值与所述第四响应值不相同时，确定所述终端设备未通过验证，说明终端设备存在安全问题。
可选的，验证功能可以根据所述第一数值和所述第二数值中的至少一项、以及所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成确定衍生密钥Ktmf。其中，所述衍生密钥Ktmf可以用于信令加密和/或完整性保护。
S521，验证功能通过NEF或proxy向TMF/AMF发送第二响应消息。
其中，第二响应消息可以包括验证结果，所述验证结果包括终端设备通过验证或终端设 备未通过验证。
可选的，当验证功能确定终端设备通过验证时，验证功能可以向AMF实体或TMF实体发送第二响应消息。其中，第二响应消息可以包括衍生密钥Ktmf。
其中，第二响应消息可以为企业认证响应。
S522，终端设备通过基站向TMF/AMF发送接入命令响应。
在本申请实施例中，终端设备在接收到接入命令之后，根据安全策略发起验证流程。验证功能根据终端设备生成的第一数值确定第一响应值，并将第一响应值发送给终端设备，使得终端设备对网络设备进行验证。并且，终端设备根据网络设备生成的第二数值确定第二响应值，并将第二响应值发送给网络设备，使得网络设备对终端设备进行验证。实现终端设备与网络设备之间的双向验证，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。
上述实施例中实现了终端设备与网络设备的双向验证，下面图6所示的实施例仅对网络设备进行单向验证。并且，该实施例中的终端设备可以根据接入命令判断是否执行对网络设备的单向验证。
如图6所示，图6是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证方法的流程示意图。本申请实施例中的步骤主要包括：
S601，企业打印标签，在终端设备中写入EPC和安全密钥K，在验证功能中存储EPC以及安全密钥K。
其中，终端设备可以为标签、UE或者UE中的芯片。验证功能可以为AF或AAA。终端设备和验证功能中的安全密钥K相同。
其中，EPC用于标识终端设备。
S602-S612，与图5中S502-S512相同，具体实现方式可以参考图5中的502-S512，此处不再赘述。
S613，终端设备生成第一数值。
可选的，终端设备可以根据接入命令判断是否执行对网络设备的单向验证。在确定执行对网络设备的单向验证之后，生成第一数值。
进一步的，终端设备判断是否执行对网络设备的单向验证的方式包括：
第一种方式，终端设备只要接收到接入命令，开始执行对网络设备的单向验证。
第二种方式，终端设备只有在接收到指定的接入命令之后，开始执行对网络设备的单向验证。所述指定的接入命令可以包括Write、Kill、Lock等命令。
以上判断方式可以在打印标签时写入终端设备。
其中，第一数值可以为终端设备生成的随机数RAND或计数器Count。当终端设备本地维护计数器Count时，在终端设备每次发出计数器Count之后将本地维护的Count加1。
S614，终端设备向TMF/AMF发送第一请求。
其中，第一请求可以包括第一数值。
可选的，第一请求可以包括EPC，所述EPC用于标识终端设备。
其中，第一请求可以为认证请求。
S615，TMF/AMF通过NEF或proxy向验证功能发送第二请求。
其中，所述第二请求可以包括第一数值。可选的，第二请求还可以包括EPC。
其中，所述第二请求可以为企业认证请求。
可选的，TMF/AMF可以向UDM/AUSF发送第二请求。其中，所述第二请求中包括第 一数值。可选的，所述第二请求还可以包括EPC。在这种情况下，图6中AF/AAA与TMF/AMF的交互过程可以修改为UDM/AUSF与TMF/AMF的交互。UDM/AUSF预先配置终端设备的EPC、安全密钥K以及计数器Count(计数器Count的配置和维护是可选的)。也即通过UDM/AUSF完成验证流程。
S616，验证功能根据接收到的第二请求中的第一数值和所述安全密钥，确定第一响应值。
其中，第一数值为终端设备生成的随机数RAND或计数器Count。第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，RAND)，或者，第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，Count)。K为安全密钥，MAC是任意一个消息认证码算法。
需要说明的是，由于终端设备与网络设备之间存在通信距离，在传输过程中数据有可能被篡改。验证功能接收到的第二请求中第一数值与终端设备发送的第一请求中的第一数值可能相同，也有可能不相同。
需要说明的是，可以通过其他方式，根据第一数值和安全密钥计算第一响应值。通过其他方式计算的第一响应值或其他响应值都在本申请保护的范围内。
可选的，验证功能可以根据所述第一数值、所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成确定衍生密钥Ktmf。其中，所述衍生密钥Ktmf可以用于信令加密和/或完整性保护。
S617，验证功能通过NEF或proxy向AMF/TMF发送第一响应消息。
其中，第一响应消息可以包括第一响应值。
可选的，第一响应消息可以包括衍生密钥Ktmf。AMF/TMF接收到衍生密钥Ktmf之后，可以使用衍生密钥Ktmf进行信令加密或完整性保护。
可选的，第一响应消息可以包括EPC。
S618，AMF/TMF向终端设备发送第二响应消息。
其中，第二响应消息可以包括第一响应值。
可选的，第二响应消息可以包括EPC。
S619，终端设备根据第一响应值，对网络设备进行验证。
具体的，终端设备可以根据第一数值和所述安全密钥，确定第二响应值。其中，该第一数值为终端设备生成的随机数RAND或计数器Count，与S614中终端设备发送的第一请求中的第一数值相同。第二响应值RES2＝MAC(K，RAND)，或者，第二响应值RES2＝MAC(K，Count)。然后，确定所述第一响应值与所述第二响应值是否相同；当所述第一响应值与所述第二响应值相同时，确定所述网络设备通过验证，说明网络设备是安全的，当所述第一响应值与所述第二响应值不相同时，确定所述网络设备未通过验证，确定所述网络设备未通过验证，说明网络设备存在通信安全问题。
其中，网络设备可以是基站、TMF/AMF或验证功能等。
S620，终端设备通过基站向TMF/AMF发送接入命令响应。
具体的，当确定网络设备通过验证时，终端设备可以向TMF/AMF返回接入命令响应。当确定网络设备未通过验证时，终端设备可以向TMF/AMF返回拒绝消息或不返回接入命令响应。
在本申请实施例中，终端设备接收到接入命令后对网络设备发起验证，验证通过后执行接入命令，从而防止恶意基站发起对终端设备的读、写、灭活等命令，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。
图6所示的实施例中仅对网络设备进行单向验证，而图7所示的实施例仅对终端设备进 行单向验证。并且，该实施例是在终端设备发出注册请求之后发起对终端设备的验证过程。
如图7所示，图7是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证方法的流程示意图。本申请实施例中的步骤主要包括：
S701，企业打印标签，在终端设备中写入EPC和安全密钥K，在验证功能中存储EPC以及安全密钥K。
其中，终端设备可以为标签、UE或者UE中的芯片。验证功能可以为AF或AAA。终端设备和验证功能中的安全密钥K相同。
其中，EPC用于标识终端设备。
S702-S710，与图5中S502-S510相同，具体实现方式可以参考图5中的502-S510，此处不再赘述。
S711，AMF/TMF向验证功能发送第一请求。
其中，第一请求可以包括所述EPC。
其中，所述第一请求可以为企业认证请求。
S712，验证功能向终端设备发送第一响应消息。
可选的，验证功能通过TMF/AMF(或通过NEF或proxy)向终端设备发送第一响应消息。
其中，所述第一响应消息包括第一数值。所述第一数值为网络设备(例如基站、TMF/AMF或验证功能)生成的随机数RAND或计数器Count。当验证功能本地维护计数器Count，验证功能在每次发出计数器Count之后将本地维护的Count加1。
其中，如果第一数值不是由验证功能生成的，例如第一值是由TMF/AMF或基站生成，验证功能也可以从TMF/AMF或基站获取第一数值。
可选的，第一响应消息可以包括EPC。
其中，第一响应消息可以为标签认证响应。
S713，终端设备根据接收到的第一响应消息中的第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值。
其中，第一数值为网络设备生成的随机数RAND或计数器Count。第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，RAND)，或者，第一响应值RES1＝MAC(K，Count)。K为安全密钥，MAC是任意一个消息认证码算法。
需要说明的是，由于终端设备与网络设备之间存在通信距离，在传输过程中数据有可能被篡改。终端设备接收到的第一响应消息中第一数值与验证功能发送的第一响应消息中的第一数值可能相同，也有可能不相同。
需要说明的是，可以通过其他方式，根据第一数值和安全密钥计算第一响应值。通过其他方式计算的第一响应值或其他响应值都在本申请保护的范围内。
S714，终端设备向验证功能发送第二请求。
可选的，终端设备通过TMF/AMF(或通过NEF或proxy)向AF/AAA发送第二请求。
其中，第二请求可以包括第一响应值。
可选的，第二请求可以包括EPC。
其中，所述第二请求可以为标签认证请求。
S715，验证功能根据第一响应值，对终端设备进行验证。
具体的，验证功能可以根据第一数值和所述安全密钥，确定第二响应值。其中，该第一数值为网络设备生成的随机数RAND或计数器Count，与S712中验证功能发送的第一响应消息中的第一数值相同。第二响应值RES2＝MAC(K，RAND)，或者，第二响应值RES2＝ MAC(K，Count)。然后，确定所述第一响应值与所述第二响应值是否相同；当所述第一响应值与所述第二响应值相同时，确定所述终端设备通过验证，说明终端设备是安全的，当所述第一响应值与所述第二响应值不相同时，确定所述终端设备未通过验证，确定所述终端设备未通过验证，说明终端设备存在通信安全问题。
可选的，验证功能可以根据所述第一数值、所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成确定衍生密钥Ktmf。其中，所述衍生密钥Ktmf可以用于信令加密和/或完整性保护。
S716，验证功能向TMF/AMF发送第二响应消息。
可选的，验证功能通过NEF或proxy向TMF/AMF发送第二响应消息。
其中，第二响应消息包括验证结果，所述验证结果包括终端设备通过验证或终端设备未通过验证。
可选的，当验证功能确定终端设备验证通过时，向TMF/AMF发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息包括衍生密钥Ktmf。AMF/TMF接收到衍生密钥Ktmf之后，可以使用衍生密钥Ktmf进行信令加密或完整性保护。
其中，第二响应消息可以为企业认证响应。
S717，AMF/TMF通过基站向终端设备发送注册响应。
S718，AMF/TMF通过基站向终端设备发送接入命令。
S719，终端设备向AMF/TMF发送接入命令响应。
在本申请实施例中，在终端设备发出注册请求之后，网络设备对终端设备执行单向验证，从而保证终端设备上传的EPC以及后续数据的真实性，防止伪终端设备上传虚假EPC以及虚假数据，从而保障终端设备与网络设备之间的通信安全。
在上文实施例中，终端设备、基站、TMF/AMF和/或验证功能可以执行各实施例中的部分或全部步骤。例如，图4b所示的实施例中的S418-S420是可选的。这些步骤或操作仅是示例，本申请实施例还可以执行其它操作或者各种操作的变形。此外，各个步骤可以按照各实施例呈现的不同的顺序来执行，并且有可能并非要执行本申请实施例中的全部操作。且，各步骤的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后，各过程的执行顺序应以其功能和内在逻辑确定，而不应对本申请实施例的实施过程构成任何限定。
上述各实施例中，验证功能可以是AF或者AAA，该验证功能还可以是UDM。
可以理解的是，上述各个方法实施例中，由终端设备实现的方法和操作，也可以由可用于终端设备的部件(例如芯片或者电路)实现，由验证功能实现的方法和操作，也可以由可用于验证功能的部件(例如芯片或者电路)实现。
上述主要从各个交互的角度对本申请实施例提供的方案进行了介绍。可以理解的是，各个网元，例如发射端设备或者接收端设备，为了实现上述功能，其包含了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。本领域技术人员应该可以意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
本申请实施例可以根据上述方法示例对终端设备或者验证功能进行功能模块的划分，例如，可以对应各个功能划分各个功能模块，也可以将两个或两个以上的功能集成在一个处理模块中。上述集成的模块既可以使用硬件的形式实现，也可以使用软件功能模块的形式实现。 需要说明的是，本申请实施例中对模块的划分是示意性的，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。下面以使用对应各个功能划分各个功能模块为例进行说明。
以上，结合图4a-图7详细说明了本申请实施例提供的方法。以下，结合图8至图9详细说明本申请实施例提供的安全验证装置。应理解，装置实施例的描述与方法实施例的描述相互对应，因此，未详细描述的内容可以参见上文方法实施例，为了简洁，这里不再赘述。
请参见图8，图8是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证装置的结构示意图。该安全验证装置可以包括接收模块801、处理模块802和发送模块803。接收模块801和发送模块803可以与外部进行通信，处理模块802用于进行处理，如确定第一响应值等。接收模块801和发送模块803还可以称为通信接口、收发单元或收发模块。该接收模块801、处理模块802和发送模块803可以用于执行上文方法实施例中终端设备所执行的动作。
例如：接收模块801和发送模块803也可以称为收发模块或收发单元(包括接收单元和/或发送单元)，分别用于执行上文方法实施例中终端设备接收和发送的步骤。
在一种可能的设计中，该安全验证装置可实现对应于上文方法实施例中的终端设备执行的步骤或者流程，例如，可以为终端设备，或者配置于终端设备中的芯片或电路。接收模块801和发送模块803用于执行上文方法实施例中终端设备的收发相关操作，处理模块802用于执行上文方法实施例中终端设备的处理相关操作。
比如，接收模块801，用于接收网络设备发送的第一命令，所述第一命令包括第一数值，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；
处理模块802，用于根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值；
发送模块803，用于发送第一请求，所述第一请求包括所述第一响应值，所述第一响应值用于验证功能对所述终端设备进行验证。
需要说明的是，各个模块的实现还可以对应参照图4a-图7所示的方法实施例的相应描述，执行上述实施例中终端设备所执行的方法和功能。
请参见图9，图9是本申请实施例提供的一种安全验证装置的结构示意图。该安全验证装置可以包括接收模块901、处理模块902和发送模块903。接收模块901和发送模块903可以与外部进行通信。接收模块901和发送模块903还可以称为通信接口、收发单元或收发模块。处理模块902用于进行处理，如对终端设备进行验证等。该接收模块901、处理模块902和发送模块903可以用于执行上文方法实施例中验证功能所执行的动作。
例如：接收模块901和发送模块903也可以称为收发模块或收发单元(包括接收单元和/或发送单元)，分别用于执行上文方法实施例中验证功能接收和发送的步骤。
在一种可能的设计中，该安全验证装置可实现对应于上文方法实施例中的验证功能执行的步骤或者流程，例如，可以为验证功能，或者配置于验证功能中的芯片或电路。接收模块901和发送模块903用于执行上文方法实施例中验证功能的收发相关操作。处理模块902用于执行上文方法实施例中验证功能的处理相关操作。
比如，接收模块901，用于接收第一请求，所述第一请求包括第一响应值，所述第一响应值为根据安全密钥和网络设备的第一命令中包括的第一数值确定，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；
处理模块902，用于根据所述第一响应值，对所述终端设备进行验证。
需要说明的是，各个模块的实现还可以对应参照图4a-图7所示的方法实施例的相应描述，执行上述实施例中验证功能所执行的方法和功能。
图10是本申请实施例提供的一种终端设备的结构示意图。该终端设备可应用于如图1所示的系统中，执行上述方法实施例中终端设备的功能，或者实现上述方法实施例中终端设备执行的步骤或者流程。
如图10所示，该终端设备包括处理器1001和收发器1002。可选地，该终端设备还包括存储器1003。其中，处理器1001、收发器1002和存储器1003之间可以通过内部连接通路互相通信，传递控制和/或数据信号，该存储器1003用于存储计算机程序，该处理器1001用于从该存储器1003中调用并运行该计算机程序，以控制该收发器1002收发信号。可选地，终端设备还可以包括天线，用于将收发器1002输出的上行数据或上行控制信令通过无线信号发送出去。
上述处理器1001可以与图8中的处理模块对应，上述处理器1001可以和存储器1003可以合成一个处理装置，处理器1001用于执行存储器1003中存储的程序代码来实现上述功能。具体实现时，该存储器1003也可以集成在处理器1001中，或者独立于处理器1001。
上述收发器1002可以与图8中的接收模块和发送模块对应，也可以称为收发单元或收发模块。收发器1002可以包括接收器(或称接收机、接收电路)和发射器(或称发射机、发射电路)。其中，接收器用于接收信号，发射器用于发射信号。
应理解，图10所示的终端设备能够实现图4a-图7所示方法实施例中涉及终端设备的各个过程。终端设备中的各个模块的操作和/或功能，分别为了实现上述方法实施例中的相应流程。具体可参见上述方法实施例中的描述，为避免重复，此处适当省略详述描述。
上述处理器1001可以用于执行前面方法实施例中描述的由终端设备内部实现的动作，而收发器1002可以用于执行前面方法实施例中描述的终端设备向验证功能发送或从验证功能接收的动作。具体请见前面方法实施例中的描述，此处不再赘述。
其中，处理器1001可以是中央处理器单元，通用处理器，数字信号处理器，专用集成电路，现场可编程门阵列或者其他可编程逻辑器件、晶体管逻辑器件、硬件部件或者其任意组合。其可以实现或执行结合本申请公开内容所描述的各种示例性的逻辑方框，模块和电路。处理器1001也可以是实现计算功能的组合，例如包含一个或多个微处理器组合，数字信号处理器和微处理器的组合等等。通信总线1004可以是外设部件互连标准PCI总线或扩展工业标准结构EISA总线等。所述总线可以分为地址总线、数据总线、控制总线等。为便于表示，图10中仅用一条粗线表示，但并不表示仅有一根总线或一种类型的总线。通信总线1004用于实现这些组件之间的连接通信。其中，本申请实施例中收发器1002用于与其他节点设备进行信令或数据的通信。存储器1003可以包括易失性存储器，例如非挥发性动态随机存取内存(nonvolatile random access memory，NVRAM)、相变化随机存取内存(phase change RAM，PRAM)、磁阻式随机存取内存(magetoresistive RAM，MRAM)等，还可以包括非易失性存储器，例如至少一个磁盘存储器件、电子可擦除可编程只读存储器(electrically erasable programmable read-only memory，EEPROM)、闪存器件，例如反或闪存(NOR flash memory)或是反及闪存(NAND flash memory)、半导体器件，例如固态硬盘(solid state disk，SSD)等。存储器1003可选的还可以是至少一个位于远离前述处理器1001的存储装置。存储器1003中可选的还可以存储一组计算机程序代码或配置信息。可选的，处理器1001还可以执行存储器1003中所存储的程序。处理器可以与存储器和收发器相配合，执行上述申请实施例中终端设备的任意一种方法和功能。
图11是本申请实施例提供的一种验证功能的结构示意图。该验证功能可应用于如图1所示的系统中，执行上述方法实施例中验证功能的功能，或者实现上述方法实施例中验证功能 执行的步骤或者流程。
如图11所示，该验证功能包括处理器1101和收发器1102。可选地，该验证功能还包括存储器1103。其中，处理器1101、收发器1102和存储器1103之间可以通过内部连接通路互相通信，传递控制和/或数据信号，该存储器1103用于存储计算机程序，该处理器1101用于从该存储器1103中调用并运行该计算机程序，以控制该收发器1102收发信号。可选地，验证功能还可以包括天线，用于将收发器1102输出的上行数据或上行控制信令通过无线信号发送出去。
上述处理器1101可以与图9中的处理模块对应，上述处理器1101和存储器1103可以合成一个处理装置，处理器1101用于执行存储器1103中存储的程序代码来实现上述功能。具体实现时，该存储器1103也可以集成在处理器1101中，或者独立于处理器1101。
上述收发器1102可以与图9中的发送模块和接收模块对应，也可以称为收发单元或收发模块。收发器1102可以包括接收器(或称接收机、接收电路)和发射器(或称发射机、发射电路)。其中，接收器用于接收信号，发射器用于发射信号。
应理解，图11所示的验证功能能够实现图4a-图7所示方法实施例中涉及验证功能的各个过程。验证功能中的各个模块的操作和/或功能，分别为了实现上述方法实施例中的相应流程。具体可参见上述方法实施例中的描述，为避免重复，此处适当省略详述描述。
上述处理器1101可以用于执行前面方法实施例中描述的由验证功能内部实现的动作，而收发器1102可以用于执行前面方法实施例中描述的验证功能向终端设备发送或从终端设备接收的动作。具体请见前面方法实施例中的描述，此处不再赘述。
其中，处理器1101可以是前文提及的各种类型的处理器。通信总线1104可以是外设部件互连标准PCI总线或扩展工业标准结构EISA总线等。所述总线可以分为地址总线、数据总线、控制总线等。为便于表示，图11中仅用一条粗线表示，但并不表示仅有一根总线或一种类型的总线。通信总线1104用于实现这些组件之间的连接通信。其中，本申请实施例中设备的收发器1102用于与其他设备进行信令或数据的通信。存储器1103可以是前文提及的各种类型的存储器。存储器1103可选的还可以是至少一个位于远离前述处理器1101的存储装置。存储器1103中存储一组计算机程序代码或配置信息，且处理器1101执行存储器1103中程序。处理器可以与存储器和收发器相配合，执行上述申请实施例中验证功能的任意一种方法和功能。
本申请实施例还提供了一种芯片系统，该芯片系统包括处理器，用于支持终端设备或验证功能以实现上述任一实施例中所涉及的功能，例如生成或处理上述方法中所涉及的第一响应值。在一种可能的设计中，所述芯片系统还可以包括存储器，所述存储器，用于终端设备或验证功能必要的程序指令和数据。该芯片系统，可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。其中，芯片系统的输入和输出，分别对应方法实施例终端设备或验证功能的接收与发送操作。
本申请实施例还提供了一种处理装置，包括处理器和接口。所述处理器可用于执行上述方法实施例中的方法。
应理解，上述处理装置可以是一个芯片。例如，该处理装置可以是现场可编程门阵列(field programmable gate array，FPGA)，可以是专用集成芯片(application specific integrated circuit，ASIC)，还可以是系统芯片(system on chip，SoC)，还可以是中央处理器(central processor unit，CPU)，还可以是网络处理器(network processor，NP)，还可以是数字信号处理电路(digital signal processor，DSP)，还可以是微控制器(micro controller unit，MCU)，还可以是可编程 控制器(programmable logic device，PLD)或其他集成芯片。
在实现过程中，上述方法的各步骤可以通过处理器中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤可以直接体现为硬件处理器执行完成，或者用处理器中的硬件及软件模块组合执行完成。软件模块可以位于随机存储器，闪存、只读存储器，可编程只读存储器或者电可擦写可编程存储器、寄存器等本领域成熟的存储介质中。该存储介质位于存储器，处理器读取存储器中的信息，结合其硬件完成上述方法的步骤。为避免重复，这里不再详细描述。
根据本申请实施例提供的方法，本申请还提供一种计算机程序产品，该计算机程序产品包括：计算机程序，当该计算机程序在计算机上运行时，使得该计算机执行图4a-图7所示实施例中任意一个实施例的方法。
根据本申请实施例提供的方法，本申请还提供一种计算机可读介质，该计算机可读介质存储有计算机程序，当该计算机程序在计算机上运行时，使得该计算机执行图4a-图7所示实施例中任意一个实施例的方法。
根据本申请实施例提供的方法，本申请还提供一种通信系统，其包括前述的一个或多个终端设备以及一个或多个验证功能。
在上述实施例中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现。所述计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行所述计算机指令时，全部或部分地产生按照本申请实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、或者其他可编程装置。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(digital subscriber line，DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)、光介质(例如，高密度数字视频光盘(digital video disc，DVD))、或者半导体介质(例如，固态硬盘(solid state disc，SSD))等。
上述各个装置实施例中验证功能与终端设备和方法实施例中的验证功能或终端设备对应，由相应的模块或单元执行相应的步骤，例如接收模块和发送模块(收发器)执行方法实施例中接收或发送的步骤，除发送、接收外的其它步骤可以由处理模块(处理器)执行。具体模块的功能可以参考相应的方法实施例。其中，处理器可以为一个或多个。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的系统、装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述功能如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服 务器，或者验证功能等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (36)

  1. 一种安全验证方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    接收网络设备发送的第一命令，所述第一命令包括第一数值，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；
    根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值；
    发送第一请求，所述第一请求包括所述第一响应值，所述第一响应值用于验证功能对终端设备进行验证。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一请求还包括第二数值，所述第二数值用于所述验证功能确定第二响应值；所述方法还包括：
    接收第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括所述第二响应值；
    根据所述第二响应值，对所述网络设备进行验证。
  3. 如权利要求2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述根据所述第二响应值，对所述网络设备进行验证包括：
    根据所述第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第三响应值；
    确定所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值是否相同；
    当所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值相同时，确定所述网络设备通过验证。
  4. 如权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一响应消息还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
  5. 如权利要求1-4任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一请求中还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备；和/或
    所述验证功能包括应用功能或认证、授权和计费功能。
  6. 如权利要求1-5任一项所述的方法，所述验证功能包括统一数据管理功能。
  7. 一种安全验证方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    验证功能接收第一请求，所述第一请求包括第一响应值，所述第一响应值为根据安全密钥和网络设备的第一命令中包括的第一数值确定，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；
    所述验证功能根据所述第一响应值，对终端设备进行验证。
  8. 如权利要求7所述的方法，其特征在于，所述验证功能根据所述第一响应值，对终端设备进行验证包括：
    所述验证功能确定第三数值，根据所述第三数值和所述安全密钥，确定第四响应值；
    所述验证功能确定所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值是否相同；
    当所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值相同时，所述验证功能确定所述终端设备通过验证。
  9. 如权利要求7或8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一请求还包括第二数值；所述方法还包括：
    所述验证功能根据所述第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第二响应值；
    所述验证功能发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括所述第二响应值，所述第二响应值用于所述终端设备对所述网络设备进行验证。
  10. 如权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述验证功能向接入和移动性管理功能AMF或标签管理功能TMF发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息包括衍生密钥，所述衍生密钥为根据所述第一数值和所述第二数值中的至少一项、以及所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
  11. 如权利要求9或10所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一响应消息还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
  12. 如权利要求7-11任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一请求中还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备；和/或
    所述验证功能包括应用功能或认证、授权和计费功能。
  13. 如权利要求7-12任一项所述的方法，所述验证功能包括统一数据管理功能。
  14. 一种安全验证装置，其特征在于，所述装置包括：
    接收模块，用于接收网络设备发送的第一命令，所述第一命令包括第一数值，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；
    处理模块，用于根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值；
    发送模块，用于发送第一请求，所述第一请求包括所述第一响应值，所述第一响应值用于验证功能对终端设备进行验证。
  15. 如权利要求14所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一请求还包括第二数值，所述第二数值用于所述验证功能确定第二响应值；
    所述接收模块，还用于接收第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括所述第二响应值；
    所述处理模块，还用于根据所述第二响应值，对所述网络设备进行验证。
  16. 如权利要求15所述的装置，其特征在于，
    所述处理模块，还用于根据所述第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第三响应值；确定所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值是否相同；当所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值相同时，确定所述网络设备通过验证。
  17. 如权利要求15或16所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一响应消息还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
  18. 如权利要求14-17任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一请求中还包括产品电 子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备；和/或
    所述验证功能包括应用功能或认证、授权和计费功能。
  19. 如权利要求14-18任一项所述的装置，所述验证功能包括统一数据管理功能。
  20. 一种安全验证装置，其特征在于，所述装置包括：
    接收模块，用于接收第一请求，所述第一请求包括第一响应值，所述第一响应值为根据安全密钥和网络设备的第一命令中包括的第一数值确定，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；
    处理模块，用于根据所述第一响应值，对终端设备进行验证。
  21. 如权利要求20所述的装置，其特征在于，
    所述处理模块，还用于确定第三数值，根据所述第三数值和所述安全密钥，确定第四响应值；确定所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值是否相同；当所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值相同时，确定所述终端设备通过验证。
  22. 如权利要求20或21所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一请求还包括第二数值；
    所述处理模块，还用于根据所述第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第二响应值；
    所述发送模块，还用于发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括所述第二响应值，所述第二响应值用于所述终端设备对所述网络设备进行验证。
  23. 如权利要求22所述的装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送模块，还用于向接入和移动性管理功能AMF或标签管理功能TMF发送第二响应消息，所述第二响应消息包括衍生密钥，所述衍生密钥为根据所述第一数值和所述第二数值中的至少一项、以及所述安全密钥和产品电子代码EPC生成，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
  24. 如权利要求22或23所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一响应消息还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
  25. 如权利要求20-24任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一请求中还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备；和/或
    所述安全验证装置包括应用功能或认证、授权和计费功能。
  26. 如权利要求20-25任一项所述的装置，所述安全验证装置包括统一数据管理功能。
  27. 一种安全验证方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    终端设备接收网络设备发送的第一命令，所述第一命令包括第一数值，所述第一命令为选择命令、查询命令、查询重复命令、查询调整命令或确认命令中的一个；根据所述第一数值和安全密钥，确定第一响应值；发送第一请求，所述第一请求包括所述第一响应值；
    验证功能接收所述第一请求；根据所述第一响应值，对所述终端设备进行验证。
  28. 如权利要求27所述的方法，其特征在于，所述根据所述第一响应值，对所述终端设备进行验证包括：
    所述验证功能确定第三数值，根据所述第三数值和所述安全密钥，确定第四响应值；
    所述验证功能确定所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值是否相同；
    当所述第一响应值与所述第四响应值相同时，所述验证功能确定所述终端设备通过验证。
  29. 如权利要求27或28所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一请求还包括第二数值；所述方法还包括：
    所述验证功能根据所述第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第二响应值；发送第一响应消息，所述第一响应消息包括所述第二响应值；
    所述终端设备接收所述第一响应消息；根据所述第二响应值，对所述网络设备进行验证。
  30. 如权利要求29所述的方法，其特征在于，所述根据所述第二响应值，对所述网络设备进行验证包括：
    所述终端设备根据所述第二数值和所述安全密钥，确定第三响应值；
    所述终端设备确定所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值是否相同；
    当所述第二响应值与所述第三响应值相同时，所述终端设备确定所述网络设备通过验证。
  31. 如权利要求29或30所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一响应消息还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备。
  32. 如权利要求27-31任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一请求中还包括产品电子代码EPC，所述EPC用于标识所述终端设备；和/或
    所述验证功能包括应用功能或认证、授权和计费功能。
  33. 如权利要求27-32任一项所述的方法，所述验证功能包括统一数据管理功能。
  34. 一种安全验证系统，其特征在于，所述系统包括终端设备和验证功能，所述终端设备包括如权利要求14-19任一项所述的装置，所述验证功能包括如权利要求20-26任一项所述的装置。
  35. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，用于存储计算机程序，当所述计算机程序在计算机上运行时，使所述计算机执行权利要求1-13中任一项所述的方法。
  36. 一种计算机程序产品，其特征在于，所述计算机程序产品包括计算机程序，当所述计算机程序在计算机上运行时，使所述计算机执行权利要求1-6中任一项或权利要求7-13中任一项所述的方法。
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Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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US20100001840A1 (en) * 2008-07-07 2010-01-07 You Sung Kang Method and system for authenticating rfid tag
US20100283614A1 (en) * 2007-12-28 2010-11-11 Andrea Soppera Radio frequency identification devices and reader systems
CN102629332A (zh) * 2012-02-20 2012-08-08 江苏凯路威电子科技有限公司 一种rfid防伪方法
CN102904723A (zh) * 2012-09-26 2013-01-30 南京三宝科技股份有限公司 一种rfid系统的隐私保护方法
CN106951934A (zh) * 2017-03-10 2017-07-14 中国电力科学研究院 检测低压电流互感器检定流水线上的电子标签的系统和方法

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20100283614A1 (en) * 2007-12-28 2010-11-11 Andrea Soppera Radio frequency identification devices and reader systems
US20100001840A1 (en) * 2008-07-07 2010-01-07 You Sung Kang Method and system for authenticating rfid tag
CN102629332A (zh) * 2012-02-20 2012-08-08 江苏凯路威电子科技有限公司 一种rfid防伪方法
CN102904723A (zh) * 2012-09-26 2013-01-30 南京三宝科技股份有限公司 一种rfid系统的隐私保护方法
CN106951934A (zh) * 2017-03-10 2017-07-14 中国电力科学研究院 检测低压电流互感器检定流水线上的电子标签的系统和方法

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