WO2023207110A1 - 一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法及系统 - Google Patents

一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法及系统 Download PDF

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WO2023207110A1
WO2023207110A1 PCT/CN2022/137316 CN2022137316W WO2023207110A1 WO 2023207110 A1 WO2023207110 A1 WO 2023207110A1 CN 2022137316 W CN2022137316 W CN 2022137316W WO 2023207110 A1 WO2023207110 A1 WO 2023207110A1
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array antenna
satellite
signal
navigation
spoofing
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PCT/CN2022/137316
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English (en)
French (fr)
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姜梁
余威
汪弋
樊鹏辉
吴国强
韩松
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航天时代飞鸿技术有限公司
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Publication of WO2023207110A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023207110A1/zh

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    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13Receivers
    • G01S19/21Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
    • G01S19/215Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/38Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
    • G01S19/39Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/42Determining position
    • G01S19/48Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions derived from the satellite radio beacon positioning system and position solutions derived from a further system
    • G01S19/49Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions derived from the satellite radio beacon positioning system and position solutions derived from a further system whereby the further system is an inertial position system, e.g. loosely-coupled

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the technical field of integrated navigation, and in particular to an array antenna-based method for resisting satellite navigation deception based on integrated navigation.
  • the integrated navigation system realizes the complementarity between single navigation systems by fusing multiple sensor data. It has the characteristics of high positioning accuracy and strong stability, so it is widely used in both military and civilian fields. At the same time, as an important part of the integrated navigation system, the satellite navigation system also has shortcomings such as weak signal strength and is extremely susceptible to interference and deception. If corresponding measures are not taken, it will bring great hidden dangers to various fields of our country's military and civilians. Therefore, satellite Signal anti-spoofing technology is very important.
  • the present invention provides an array antenna-based anti-satellite navigation deception method and system based on integrated navigation, which uses a combination of software and hardware to improve the robustness of the integrated navigation system and can solve the problem that satellite navigation receiver terminals are susceptible to external deception interference. .
  • the present invention provides an array antenna-based anti-satellite navigation deception method based on integrated navigation, which is characterized in that the steps of the method include:
  • step S4 includes: using the signal obtained after forming a null area in the direction of the real signal source, using the phase comparison method to measure the origin of the spoofing signal. wave direction.
  • an implementation method is further provided, and the magnetic intensity measurement device is specifically a magnetometer.
  • step S1 includes:
  • the content of correcting the posture in step S13 includes: correcting the horizontal misalignment angle according to the horizontal specific force, and correcting the azimuth misalignment based on the magnetic flux information. Corner correction.
  • an implementation method in which the azimuth misalignment angle is corrected based on the magnetic flux information. Specifically, the azimuth angle is replaced by the magnetic heading.
  • the content of calculating the projection of the true direction vector of the visible satellite in the geographical system in step S2 is specifically: according to the current carrier position output by the integrated navigation system. information, the current time maintained by the local clock and the pre-loaded satellite almanac to determine the currently visible satellite number; then the satellite position information calculated from the almanac is used to calculate the projection of the true direction vector of all currently visible satellites in the geographical system.
  • the specific content of determining the direction of the spoofing signal in step S4 includes: selecting a real signal, and performing a nulling operation in the direction of its source. According to The information obtained by the nulling operation is used to determine the direction of the spoofing signal by using the phase comparison method.
  • an implementation method is further provided, and the selected real signal is the satellite signal of the current epoch.
  • step S5 includes: the altitude angle and azimuth angle of the satellite signal of the current epoch in step S3 and the altitude of the spoofing signal in step S4. Angle and azimuth angle, shape the array antenna pattern.
  • Step S6 includes: imposing zero point constraints on the array pattern, forcing the array pattern to always form a null in a certain fixed incoming wave direction, Achieve suppression of deception signals;
  • the present invention provides an array antenna-based anti-satellite navigation spoofing system based on integrated navigation, characterized in that the system includes an inertial measurement unit, a magnetic intensity measurement device and a processing module, and the inertial measurement unit and the magnetic Strong measurement equipment is connected to the processing module;
  • the processing module includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor.
  • the processor executes the computer program, the steps of any of the above methods are implemented.
  • the present invention adopts a combination of software and hardware, and combines various resources to improve performance based on the traditional anti-spoofing of array antennas, and can Make full use of data from other airborne sensors and the maneuvering characteristics of the carrier itself to identify possible deception signals; at the algorithm level, the tightly coupled algorithm of Kalman filtering and sequential filtering technology are used to make it easier for the system to eliminate currently being deceived. satellite channels;
  • the method of the present invention makes full use of the trustworthy data provided by other sensors in the integrated navigation system to assist the satellite receiver in detecting and eliminating deceptive signals, and has high practical value. .
  • Figure 1 is a flow chart of an array antenna based on integrated navigation provided by an embodiment of the present invention to resist satellite navigation spoofing;
  • Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of phase difference measurement under two-dimensional plane conditions for an array antenna based on integrated navigation provided by an embodiment of the present invention to resist satellite navigation spoofing;
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of phase difference measurement under three-dimensional plane conditions for an array antenna based on integrated navigation provided by an embodiment of the present invention to resist satellite navigation spoofing;
  • Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of an array antenna adaptive filtering model of an array antenna anti-satellite navigation deception method based on integrated navigation provided by an embodiment of the present invention
  • Figure 5 is a structural diagram of a uniformly distributed square grid array antenna of an array antenna anti-satellite navigation deception method based on integrated navigation provided by an embodiment of the present invention
  • Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of array antenna signal incidence of an array antenna anti-satellite navigation spoofing method based on integrated navigation provided by an embodiment of the present invention
  • Figure 7 is a zero-point shaping flow chart of an array antenna based on integrated navigation provided by an embodiment of the present invention to resist satellite navigation spoofing.
  • Satellite signal spoofing technology is mainly divided into two types: forwarding type and generation type; according to the implementation method of spoofing, it can be divided into single antenna spoofing and multi-antenna spoofing.
  • the anti-spoofing technology of satellite signals includes the detection and elimination of spoofing interference signals.
  • the present invention proposes an array antenna-based anti-satellite navigation deception method based on integrated navigation. This method includes two parts: detection of deceptive interference signals and elimination of deceptive interference signals.
  • array antennas and airspace filtering technology are used to detect the direction of the deception signal; from the perspective of navigation and positioning, airborne sensor data is considered Estimating the correct direction of the satellite signal and adjusting the beam pointing achieves anti-satellite navigation spoofing effect at two levels.
  • the integrated navigation-based array antenna anti-satellite navigation deception method is shown in Figure 1.
  • the steps include:
  • Step 1 Fusion of the angular rate and specific force information output by the IMU and the magnetic flux information output by the magnetometer to calculate the current attitude of the carrier. details as follows:
  • the IMU is based on Newton's principle of inertia, and the angular rate and specific force information it outputs cannot be interfered with.
  • the magnetic flux measured by the magnetometer comes from the earth's magnetic field and is generally difficult to be interfered with. Therefore, maneuver judgment can be made based on the accelerometer output.
  • the attitude reference technology is used to correct the carrier's attitude, so that the attitude of the integrated navigation system can be kept stable and available for a long time, providing the carrier with Attitude reference with certain accuracy.
  • IMU is an inertial measurement unit, which mainly includes a gyroscope and an accelerometer.
  • the modulus value of is related to the local gravity magnitude g, if the criteria are met ( ⁇ 1 is the preset acceleration threshold), it can be initially considered that there is no acceleration maneuver.
  • ⁇ 1 is the preset acceleration threshold
  • the average value of the accelerometer over a period of time is used instead of the instantaneous value for judgment. and then in the guidelines On the basis of , then calculate the modulus of acceleration horizontally Make further judgment:
  • C 3 is the posture array The third row of vectors. It can be seen that the two unit vectors and The angle between them is the projection ⁇ b of the horizontal misalignment angle in the b system.
  • the quaternion attitude update algorithm that combines the misalignment angle calculation value ⁇ b with the gyroscope angle increment output is as follows:
  • ; ⁇ [0,1] is the misalignment angle correction coefficient.
  • is the stronger the ability to resist short-term acceleration interference, but the slower the recovery will be after the misalignment angle error occurs.
  • the geomagnetic field vector H can be treated as a constant vector to establish a magnetic field coordinate system (ox m y m z m system, abbreviated as m system).
  • m system a magnetic field coordinate system
  • the output of the magnetometer is according to Substitute the pitch angle ⁇ and roll angle ⁇ output by the integrated navigation system into the direction cosine matrix Later, available
  • Step 2 Determine the currently visible satellite number based on the current carrier position information output by the inertial/terrain matching/geomagnetic/barometric altimeter integrated navigation system, the current time maintained by the local clock, and the preloaded satellite almanac. Then, the projection of the true direction vectors of all currently visible satellites in the geographical system is calculated based on the satellite position information calculated from the almanac. Finally, according to the attitude information of the current carrier calculated in step 1, the direction vector is projected into the array antenna coordinate system, and the altitude angle and azimuth angle of the visible satellite relative to the array antenna coordinate system are calculated. details as follows:
  • the inertial navigation system relies on inertial information and can provide reliable position information without relying on any external information.
  • the barometric altimeter obtains the current altitude by measuring changes in external air pressure and cannot be deceived or deceived. interference.
  • the terrain matching system can also obtain the current position by matching the current terrain, thereby correcting the position divergence caused by the long-term operation of the inertial navigation system. Therefore, for the integrated navigation system, the location information of the current carrier is a known quantity.
  • the high-precision clock mounted on the integrated navigation system can also maintain accurate UTC time for a long time; the satellite almanac is valid for up to half a year and can be pre-loaded into the integrated navigation system before the receiver is used.
  • the Kepler equation can be used to calculate the visible satellite number of the current receiver position and its position in the ECEF coordinate system, thereby eliminating the spoofing signals of invisible satellites.
  • [ ⁇ e ⁇ n ⁇ u] T is the vector between the currently tracking satellite and the carrier in the geographical coordinate system with the carrier position as the origin
  • [ ⁇ x ⁇ y ⁇ z] T is the observation vector from the carrier to the satellite in ECEF
  • S is the transformation matrix between the ECEF coordinate system and the geographical system.
  • [X Y Z] T is the position of the satellite in the ECEF coordinate system, which is calculated by the satellite receiver based on the almanac.
  • [x y z] T is the position of the carrier in the ECEF coordinate system, output by the integrated navigation system.
  • L and ⁇ are the latitude and longitude of the carrier respectively.
  • the array antenna coordinate system is defined as a rectangular coordinate system.
  • the origin is the geometric center of the array antenna.
  • the X-axis direction points to the right side of the array antenna, the Y-axis direction points to the forward direction of the array antenna, and the Z-axis direction points to the sky direction of the array antenna.
  • the horizontal plane of the array antenna is an elevation angle of 0 degrees, and the zenith direction of the array antenna is an elevation angle of +90 degrees.
  • attitude transfer matrix from the airspace coordinate system (p system) to the geographical coordinate system (n system) is Suppose the pitch angle, roll angle and yaw angle (north to east is positive) are [ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ] T , and the sequence of three rotations from the p system to the n system is: yaw-pitch-roll. At this time there is
  • They are altitude angle and azimuth angle respectively. Among them ⁇ (0, ⁇ /2),
  • Step 3 Use digital frequency storage technology to sample and downconvert the satellite signal of the current epoch and store it in the integrated navigation system; use the direction zeroing technology of the array antenna to continuously adjust the zero point direction to detect whether there is a spoofing signal entering. details as follows:
  • the digital frequency storage technology stores the digital signals obtained by high-speed A/D signal sampling in the device, which can realize the storage and reproduction capabilities of radio frequency and microwave signals in the integrated navigation system.
  • the spatial filter refers to the weighted addition of the signals received by each channel of the array and then outputs it.
  • N non-directional array element antennas form a uniform linear array, and the spacing between adjacent array elements is d.
  • the N ⁇ 1 vector W represents the weighted vector, that is
  • a( ⁇ ) is the N-dimensional direction vector of the array antenna:
  • is the wavelength of the satellite signal
  • is the angle between the signal direction and the normal direction of the array
  • the nulling technique is the simplest spatial filtering technique, and its initial antenna pattern is determined by the beam vector.
  • the adaptive algorithm corrects the weighted value of the antenna to minimize the weighted signal output power, thus forming a null in the direction of the interfering signal.
  • null formation is to make the total contribution of the signal energy received by each array element antenna in the specified direction close to zero.
  • a constraint must be put forward. Make the power of the antenna pattern in this specified space area small enough, while keeping the power of the antenna pattern as consistent as possible with the original antenna pattern in other directions. Therefore, the problem of finding the zero-sag formation in a specific direction boils down to the optimization problem of minimizing the weight change of the zero-sag power constraint in the specified direction.
  • W 0 is the initial weight vector of the array, and Chebyshev amplitude weighting is used in this article; W is the optimization weight vector to be found; the constant ⁇ controls the null depth in the direction of null formation; Q is an N ⁇ N dimension Hermitian matrix, whose value is
  • ⁇ m is the center of the direction area where the zero depression is to be formed, and ⁇ m is the width of m zero depressions.
  • diag( ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 2 ,... ⁇ 1 )
  • is the unitary matrix composed of the eigenvectors of Q
  • is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of Q.
  • the above-mentioned minimization optimization problem is to find a weight vector W that is closest to the initial weight vector W 0 under the constraint that the power integral that needs to form the zero-sag direction area is less than a certain constant ⁇ . Since the larger eigenvalue of matrix Q is related to the number of nulls M, choosing an appropriate n such that M ⁇ n ⁇ N can ensure that the array has an approximately zero response in the spatial region. By replacing the constraints on a set of eigenvectors of the matrix Q so that the array has zero response within a certain width of concern, the optimization problem is transformed into
  • e i is the i-th eigenvalue of Q. Since W is a real number, the weight W can be obtained through the Lagrange multiplier method.
  • Step 3.1 Process the signal in the device through a spatial filter to weight the satellite signal, thereby forming a null in the desired direction to shield the signal in that direction to detect whether there is a spoofing signal.
  • step 2 According to the current carrier attitude information calculated in step 1, obtain the attitude transfer matrix projected from the array antenna coordinate system to the geographical coordinate system. After transforming the areas with different azimuth angles and height angles in the geographical coordinate system into the antenna coordinate system, Use the method in (1) to perform null scanning in all directions of space. If the signal of the satellite can still be received after forming a null area in the height angle and azimuth direction calculated in step 2, it means that there is a signal in other directions. Spoofing signals come in.
  • the array antenna needs to control the antenna to point in the direction with the strongest satellite signal based on the integrated navigation information to form a null, and always maintain the accurate pointing of the null area to the satellite when the carrier is moving, this is the most critical indicator of this method.
  • the antenna cannot accurately point to the theoretical position, causing the antenna to deviate from the satellite, causing the null zone to fail. Therefore, in actual operations, the cone scanning tracking method can be used to continuously adjust the zero-sag area to align with the satellite.
  • the principle of the antenna cone scanning tracking method is as follows: Assume that the antenna is deviated from the central axis OO' by a small angle ⁇ and rotates around the axis at a constant speed. OS' is the antenna beam axis, T is the trajectory of the antenna's circular motion, and S is the actual direction of the satellite. . If the antenna is not corrected, during a scanning period, the size of ⁇ and the received satellite signal strength are constantly changing. According to the changes in ⁇ and satellite signal strength, the position of the satellite is determined and the antenna is controlled to make adjustments. When the antenna is pointed at the satellite, the axis OS and the axis OO' coincide with each other. At this time, ⁇ no longer changes and the satellite signal strength is the strongest.
  • the signal level strength received by the antenna at the maximum gain (within the half-power beam width) satisfies the following formula:
  • P 0 is the maximum signal level received at the maximum gain of the antenna
  • ⁇ 1/2 is the half-power beam width
  • is the angle of the antenna away from the maximum gain
  • P( ⁇ ) is the signal level of the antenna at ⁇ Strength
  • a is a constant coefficient, related to the antenna diameter and the frequency of the received signal.
  • is the wavelength of the signal received by the antenna
  • f is the frequency of the satellite signal
  • D is the diameter of the antenna
  • c is the propagation speed of electromagnetic waves in space.
  • b is the slope between the array antenna output voltage and the signal level
  • Pm is the minimum level that the receiver can detect.
  • U is the voltage output by the antenna when it deviates from the maximum gain point ⁇ ;
  • Um is the maximum voltage output by the antenna at the maximum gain of the antenna;
  • other parameters are existing fixed parameters. From this, it can be seen that the voltage at the maximum gain of the antenna is Flat fading is related only to the angle at which the antenna is pointed away from the point of maximum gain.
  • the cone scanning of the array antenna can be decomposed into the azimuth direction and the high and low angle directions, so that the antenna makes cosine motion in the azimuth direction and sinusoidal motion in the high and low angle directions.
  • the combined zero-sag area pointing of the two is circular motion.
  • n 1,2,3...N
  • N is the number of points dividing the circle; PAZ and PEL are the centers of the circular motion, and PAZ (n) and PAZ(n) are any points on the circular motion of the antenna during the cone scanning process.
  • S point be the satellite position
  • O be the current antenna pointing position
  • be the circumferential scanning radius
  • U is the angle between the antenna's deviation from the satellite position and the horizontal direction
  • Um is any point of the beam on the circular trajectory T, and the signal level at that point is U AGC ; is the angle between it and the horizontal direction when it moves
  • AZ is the horizontal direction
  • EL is the direction perpendicular to the horizontal; in the triangle ⁇ SOU M , it can be obtained from the cosine theorem
  • This equation only has one maximum value and one minimum value in one scanning period; and the maximum value and the minimum value appear at the two intersections of the line connecting the center of the circle and the satellite position and the circle; based on this, new tracking adjustments can be derived method:
  • the adjustment amount of the antenna in the azimuth angle can be obtained as
  • the minimum level measured by the receiver in a scanning period is used to determine whether the satellite is within the circular scanning range or outside the circular scanning range.
  • the voltage output by the receiver is:
  • the cone scanning tracking method can be used in actual operations to continuously adjust the zero-sag area to align with the satellite to ensure that the signal is stable and blocked, so that subsequent steps can continue to process and judge the signal.
  • Step 4 If spoofing signals are detected in other directions in step 3, use the signal obtained after forming a null area in the direction of the real signal source, and use the phase comparison method to measure the direction of the spoofing signal. details as follows:
  • the nulling technology is used to form a nulling in the direction of the real satellite signal to shield the signal in that direction, and to shield the possible interference caused by the real signal to the spoofing signal.
  • the detection of the wave direction of the spoofing signal can be achieved by relying on the array antenna attitude measurement method.
  • the array antenna attitude measurement method is implemented through carrier phase differential measurement. For the convenience of explanation, let’s start with the two-dimensional plane situation. The principle of direction finding through phase difference measurement under the two-dimensional plane condition is shown in Figure 2.
  • the direction finding baseline is formed between antenna units A and B, and the straight-line distance is d. Since the distance between the satellite and the receiver is much greater than d, it can be considered as the intersection between the direction of the navigation signal and the normal direction of the baseline.
  • the angles are all ⁇ . If the signal wavelength is ⁇ , and a vertical line is drawn from antenna unit B, the phase difference ⁇ between the same signals arriving at antenna units A and B is expressed by the following formula:
  • the value range of the phase difference ⁇ is [- ⁇ , ⁇ ). If d>> ⁇ /2, then there is a phase ambiguity problem in the above equation, that is, multiple different ⁇ values have a corresponding relationship with the same ⁇ value, resulting in measurement results. The result is ambiguous. Therefore, after obtaining the phase difference measurement value, the method for calculating the direction of the incoming wave is as follows:
  • the short baseline recursive long baseline method can be used: According to the above equation, if d ⁇ /2, it is obvious that
  • N k is the phase ambiguity corresponding to the baseline length from the first antenna to the k+1th antenna.
  • Dk is the baseline length from the first antenna to the k+1th antenna, and ⁇ k is the phase difference between the same signal received by the first antenna and the k+1th antenna.
  • ⁇ k is the phase measurement error of the signal received by the first antenna and the k+1th antenna.
  • the projection of the unit sight vector on the X-axis and Y-axis can be obtained respectively through the two-dimensional direction finding principle, and then the azimuth angle of the satellite signal can be obtained according to the trigonometric function relationship. and high and low angles.
  • Step 5 Compare the altitude angle and azimuth angle of the real signal and the spoofed signal calculated in steps 3 and 4, and shape the array antenna pattern. details as follows:
  • the receiver Since navigation satellites are constantly moving according to the constellation diagram, their positions will continue to change; in order to achieve position resolution, the receiver needs to stably track at least 4 or more navigation satellite signals. Therefore, the satellite navigation array antenna needs to form multiple beam pointings. Each beam points to a navigation satellite. At the same time, it can track the changes in the satellite's orientation in real time and adjust the beam pointing to change with the satellite position to improve the reception of satellite signals by the ground navigation receiver. Effect.
  • the adaptive beamformer is the main physical hardware that constitutes spatial adaptive filtering.
  • the topology of the planar array antenna is one of the key technologies for adaptive beamformer signal processing; the antenna array equivalent area, array spacing and array boundary distribution determine the characteristics of array digital beamforming; different array topologies have different spatial Angular resolution and symmetry.
  • Common planar arrays currently include square arrays, circular arrays, and hexagonal arrays.
  • a uniform linear array is used as an example to study the working principle of the adaptive beamformer.
  • the model is shown in Figure 4. Assume that each array element is isotropic, the array element spacing is d, and each array element is followed by a receiving unit.
  • the spatial incident signal s(t) enters the antenna array at an angle of ⁇ and is received.
  • x 1 (t), x 2 (t),..., x N (t) are the output signals of N array element channels
  • w 1 , w 2 , ,..., w N are respectively the weighted values of the N array element channel outputs
  • the weighted sum is the output y(t) of the array antenna.
  • the signals x 1 (t), x 2 (t),..., x N (t) received by the array have phase delays with each other.
  • N ⁇ 1 vectors X(t) and a( ⁇ ) represent the signal received by the array and the delay phase of each array element respectively.
  • a( ⁇ ) is also called the steering vector of the array. That is:
  • M spatial incident signals s 1 (t), s 2 (t), ..., s M (t) enter the antenna at angles ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 2 , ..., ⁇ M respectively. array and received, order
  • the matrix A composed of M steering vectors a 1 (t), a 2 (t),..., a M (t) is called the flow matrix of the array. At this time there is also
  • the incident signal contains multiple signals, including desired signals that are expected to be received, and interference signals that are not expected to be received
  • the numbers of the desired signals and interference signals can be confirmed in advance, for example, if the desired signals are known in advance
  • the number of is M
  • the number of interference signals is P
  • the above formula can be expressed as:
  • B is the popularity matrix composed of the steering vectors a M+1 (t), a M+2 (t), ..., a M+P (t) of P interference signals
  • J(t) is the P interference signals s M+1 (t), s M+2 (t),..., s M+P (t) matrix.
  • the adaptive filter weights and adds the signals received by each channel of the array and outputs them.
  • N ⁇ 1 vector W represent the weighted vector, that is
  • the pattern is defined as the array response of a given array weight vector to signals at different angles, which measures the amplification factor of the array to incident signals from all directions in space.
  • the topology selected in this method is a square array antenna.
  • the uniformly distributed square lattice structure is shown in Figure 5, and the array units are evenly distributed along the X-axis and Y-axis at equal intervals.
  • the array antenna has a total of K units, the spacing between units is d, the geometric center of the array is the reference origin, and the array units are all isotropic.
  • the spatial coordinate system of the array antenna is defined as a spherical coordinate system with the origin at the geometric center of the array antenna.
  • the X-axis direction points to the right side of the array antenna
  • the Y-axis direction points to the forward direction of the array antenna
  • the Z-axis direction points to the sky direction of the array antenna.
  • the direction cosine is only related to the angle of the incident signal, and its altitude angle and azimuth angle are defined as Then the direction cosine is
  • the delay ⁇ mk for array element k to receive the m-th satellite signal can be expressed as a function of direction cosine
  • the delay of the array unit receiving the signal can be approximately expressed as the phase of the carrier:
  • the beam pattern can be calculated based on the calculated altitude angle and azimuth angle, and spoofing signals from other directions can be suppressed.
  • Step 6 Adjust the beam direction according to the antenna pattern calculated in step 5 to suppress the entry of spoofing signals. details as follows:
  • step 4 For spoofing interference using a single antenna transmission mode, all interfering satellite signals calculated in step 4 come from the same direction; and for spoofing interference using multiple antenna transmission modes, the satellite signal source directions are also calculated from step 3. There are differences. Therefore, this method can effectively detect the situation where a single antenna emits a spoofing signal, and use optimal beamforming technology to form a null point to suppress it.
  • the null beam constraint conditions are predetermined and fixed constraints, and the null beam direction is calculated in step 4.
  • the implementation steps of the zero-point beam constraint algorithm are:
  • the virtual correlation matrices composed of each steering vector need to be summed.
  • the number of beam directions must be smaller than the number of antenna array elements.
  • the virtual correlation matrix can be loaded with an identity matrix.
  • the zero-point shaping constraint implementation block diagram is shown in Figure 7.
  • the interference received by the auxiliary antenna unit undergoes delay matching, amplitude weighting and phase weighting, and is combined and canceled with the signal received by the reference antenna unit.
  • the delay matching and amplitude and phase weighting coefficients By adjusting the delay matching and amplitude and phase weighting coefficients, the deception signals can be canceled out to ensure the normal operation of the receiver.
  • the present invention utilizes the redundant information of the integrated navigation system and combines the array antenna hardware to implement an anti-satellite navigation deception method from the perspective of algorithm improvement of the receiver signal processing layer and navigation positioning layer.
  • the method of the invention can realize the detection and elimination of deceptive interference signals, improves the adaptability of the navigation system to complex environments, and has broad application prospects.
  • the computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device.
  • the computer instructions may be stored in or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another, e.g., the computer instructions may be transferred from a website, computer, server, or data center Transmission to another website, computer, server or data center by wired (such as coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL) or wireless (such as infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means).
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center integrated with one or more available media.
  • the available media may be magnetic media (eg, floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), optical media (eg, DVD), or semiconductor media (eg, Solid State Disk (SSD)), etc.

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Abstract

一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法及系统,属于组合导航技术领域,能够提高系统鲁棒性,解决卫星导航接收机终端易受外界欺骗干扰的问题;该方法包括:S1、根据惯性测量单元输出的角速率、比力信息和磁通量信息解算当前载体姿态;S2、计算当前可见卫星真实方向矢量在地理系中投影,再根据载体姿态投影到阵列天线坐标系内并计算可见卫星相对于阵列天线坐标系的高度角和方位角;S3、采用数字储频技术将当前历元的卫星信号采样并下变频后存储,利用阵列天线方向调零技术不断调整零点方向,检测是否有欺骗信号进入;S4、确定欺骗信号的来波方向;S5、对阵列天线方向图赋形;S6、调整波束指向抑制欺骗信号进入。

Description

一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法及系统 技术领域
本发明涉及组合导航技术领域,尤其涉及一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法。
背景技术
组合导航系统通过融合多种传感器数据实现单一导航系统间的互补,具有定位精度高,稳定性强等特点,因此在军事领域及民用领域都被广泛应用。与此同时,作为组合导航系统重要组成部分的卫星导航系统同样存在信号强度弱,极易受到干扰和欺骗等缺点,若不采取相应措施,会给我国军民各领域带来极大隐患,因此卫星信号的反欺骗技术十分重要。
因此,有必要研究一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法及系统来应对现有技术的不足,以解决或减轻上述一个或多个问题。
发明内容
有鉴于此,本发明提供了一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法及系统,利用软硬件结合提高组合导航系统鲁棒性,能够解决卫星导航接收机终端易受外界欺骗干扰的问题。
一方面,本发明提供一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,所述方法的步骤包括:
S1、根据惯性测量单元输出的角速率和比力信息,和/或磁强测量设备输出的磁通量信息,解算出当前的载体姿态;
S2、计算当前所有可见卫星在地理系中的真实方向矢量,再根据S1得到的载体姿态将该真实方向矢量投影到阵列天线坐标系内,并以此计算 可见卫星相对于阵列天线坐标系的高度角和方位角;
S3、采用数字储频技术将当前历元的卫星信号采样并下变频后存储,利用阵列天线的方向调零技术不断调整零点方向,检测是否有欺骗信号进入;若无,本次抗欺骗操作结束,否则进入下一步;
S4、确定欺骗信号的来波方向;
S5、对阵列天线方向图赋形;
S6、根据S5得到的天线方向图调整波束指向,抑制欺骗信号进入。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,步骤S4的内容包括:利用在真实信号来源方向形成零陷区域后得到的信号,使用比相法测量欺骗信号的来波方向。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,磁强测量设备具体为磁强计。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,步骤S1的内容包括:
S11、判断是否满足准则
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000001
其中,
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000002
为惯性测量单元中加速度计输出的加速度,g为当地重力,β 1为预设的加速度阈值;若满足,则判断载体处于低加速度机动状态,以该状态解算载体姿态;否则进入下一步;
S12、判断水平加速度是否满足准则f H<β 2,其中,f H为水平加速度模值,β 2为预设的水平加速度阈值;若满足,则判断载体处于低加速度机动状态,以该状态解算载体姿态;否则进入下一步;
S13、结合惯性测量单元中陀螺仪的输出判断载体是否存在持续转弯或盘旋运动,若不存在转弯或盘旋,则认为失准角误差大,需要对姿态进行修正。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式, 步骤S13中对姿态进行修正的内容包括:根据水平比力对水平失准角进行修正,根据磁通量信息对方位失准角进行修正。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,根据磁通量信息对方位失准角进行修正具体为:用磁航向代替方位角。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,步骤S2中计算可见卫星的真实方向矢量在地理系中的投影的内容具体为:根据组合导航系统输出的当前载体位置信息、本地时钟维持的当前时间和预先加载的卫星历书确定当前可见卫星号;再由历书解算出的卫星位置信息计算当前所有可见卫星的真实方向矢量在地理系中的投影。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,步骤S4中确定欺骗信号来波方向的具体内容包括:选定一个真实信号,在其来源方向进行零陷操作,根据零陷操作得到的信息并利用比相法确定欺骗信号的来波方向。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,选定的真实信号为当前历元的卫星信号。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,步骤S5的内容包括:根据步骤S3中当前历元的卫星信号的高度角和方位角以及步骤S4中欺骗信号的高度角和方位角,对阵列天线方向图赋形。
如上所述的方面和任一可能的实现方式,进一步提供一种实现方式,步骤S6内容包括:对阵列方向图施加零点约束条件,迫使阵列方向图始终在某一固定来波方向形成零陷,实现对欺骗信号的抑制;
具体步骤包括:
S61、根据欺骗信号的来波方向计算干扰的阵列导向矢量;
S62、将阵列导向矢量构造成虚拟相关矩阵;若存在多个来波方向,需将每个阵列导向矢量构成的虚拟相关矩阵求和;
S63、计算零点约束的静态方向系数;
S64、将该静态方向系数作为约束条件施加到阵列方向图中。
另一方面,本发明提供一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗系统,其特征在于,所述系统包括惯性测量单元、磁强测量设备和处理模块,所述惯性测量单元和所述磁强测量设备均与所述处理模块连接;
所述处理模块包括存储器、处理器以及存储在所述存储器中并可在所述处理器上运行的计算机程序,所述处理器执行所述计算机程序时实现如上任一所述方法的步骤。
与现有技术相比,上述技术方案中的一个技术方案具有如下优点或有益效果:本发明采用软、硬件结合的方式,在传统使用阵列天线抗欺骗的基础上结合各种资源提高性能,能够充分利用机载其他传感器的数据以及载体本身的机动特性识别可能存在的欺骗信号;在算法层面使用卡尔曼滤波的紧耦合算法,并采用序贯滤波技术,使得系统更方便地剔除当前遭受欺骗的卫星通道;
上述技术方案中的另一个技术方案具有如下优点或有益效果:本发明的方法充分利用了组合导航系统中其他传感器提供的可信赖数据辅助卫星接收机检测和剔除欺骗信号,具有较高的实用价值。
当然,实施本发明的任一产品并不一定需要同时达到以上所述的所有技术效果。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例的技术方案,下面将对实施例中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍,显而易见地,下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例,对于本领域普通技术人员来讲,在不付出创造性劳动的前提下,还可以根据这些附图获得其它的附图。
图1是本发明一个实施例提供的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导 航欺骗方法的流程图;
图2是本发明一个实施例提供的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法的二维平面条件下相位差测量示意图;
图3是本发明一个实施例提供的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法的三维平面条件下相位差测量示意图;
图4是本发明一个实施例提供的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法的阵列天线自适应滤波模型示意图;
图5是本发明一个实施例提供的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法的均匀分布的方形格状阵列天线结构图;
图6是本发明一个实施例提供的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法的阵列天线信号入射示意图;
图7是本发明一个实施例提供的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法的零点赋形流程图。
具体实施方式
为了更好的理解本发明的技术方案,下面结合附图对本发明实施例进行详细描述。
应当明确,所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例,而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例,本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其它实施例,都属于本发明保护的范围。
卫星信号的欺骗技术主要分为转发式和产生式两种;根据欺骗的实施方式又可分为单天线欺骗和多天线欺骗。而卫星信号的反欺骗技术则包括对欺骗干扰信号的检测和消除两方面。为解决卫星导航接收机终端极易受到外界欺骗干扰的现状,本发明提出一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法。该方法包括欺骗性干扰信号的检测和欺骗性干扰信号的剔除两部分,从接收机信号处理角度出发利用阵列天线和空域滤波技术检测 欺骗信号来波方向;从导航定位层考虑利用机载传感器数据估计卫星信号的正确方向并调整波束指向,从而在两级实现抗卫星导航欺骗效果。
根据本发明一个具体实施方式,该基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法如图1所示,步骤包括:
步骤1:融合IMU输出的角速率和比力信息,以及磁强计输出的磁通量信息解算载体当前的姿态。具体如下:
IMU依据牛顿惯性原理,其输出的角速率和比力信息无法被干扰;而磁强计测量的磁通量来自地球磁场,一般情况下也难以被干扰。因此可根据加速度计输出作机动判别,当载体处于悬停、匀速或低加速度状态时,使用航姿参考技术对载体姿态进行修正,就可以长时间保持组合导航系统的姿态稳定可用,为载体提供具有一定精度的姿态参考。IMU即为惯性测量单元,主要包括陀螺仪和加速度计。
首先比较加速度计输出的比力
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000003
的模值与当地重力大小g,如果满足准则
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000004
1为预设的加速度阈值),可初步认为不存在加速度机动。为了降低加速度计测量噪声的影响,一般在运载体平稳运动情况下,使用加速度计在一段时间内的平均值替代瞬时值进行判断。然后在准则
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000005
的基础上,再对水平计算加速度的模值
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000006
作进一步判断:
(1)当f H<β 22为预设的水平加速度阈值)时,可判断为没有加速度机动,利用比力
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000007
求解或估计失准角φ b
(2)当f H≥β 2时,则可能存在两种情况:一是计算姿态阵中的失准角φ b比较大,二是运载体确实存在较大的水平加速度机动。进一步判断条件f H≥β 2是否只是在短时间内出现,若是,则认为是存在短时的大加速度机动,此时仅使用陀螺仪输出维持姿态;如果该条件连续出现时间较长,大于预设时间阈值,则需要再结合陀螺仪输出检查载体是否存在持续转弯或 盘旋运动,如果存在转弯或盘旋,则不做进一步处理;如果不存在转弯或盘旋,则认为其根源在于失准角误差较大,需要对姿态进行快速修正。
在低加速度机动条件下,将惯导比力方程及其误差方程分别近似如下:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000008
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000009
在速度平稳情况下,加速度与加速度误差含义一致,令上式之间相等,得
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000010
低机动时,式等号右边的
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000011
可近似为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000012
改写成分量形式后,有
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000013
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000014
其中,
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000015
g n=[0 0 -g] T;φ=[φ E φ N φ U] T。上式表明,水平比力只提供水平失准角修正信息,而不能用于计算方位失准φ U,但方位角能够通过磁强计给出的磁航向近似代替。不妨先假设方位修正量φ U=0,因而有
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000016
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000017
其中,
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000018
为低机动时的比力模值;e 3=[0 0 1] T为天向z轴单位矢量。
将式子两边同时左乘
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000019
并记
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000020
可得
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000021
其中,C 3为姿态阵
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000022
的第三行向量。由此可见,两单位矢量
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000023
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000024
之间的夹角即为水平失准角在b系的投影φ b
将失准角计算值φ b与陀螺仪角增量输出相结合后的四元数姿态更新算法如下:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000025
其中
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000026
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000027
是在时间段[t m-1,t m]内的陀螺仪角增量输出;Δθ′ m表示经过失准角修正后的角增量并且有模值Δθ′ m=|Δθ′ m|;α∈[0,1]是失准角修正系数,α越小则抗短时加速度干扰的能力就越强,但在出现失准角误差后也会恢复得越慢。利用上述姿态更新算法,既可快速响应和跟踪运载体的角运动变化,又能不断修正失准角,从而实现较高精度的水平姿态导航,可以得到较为准确的俯仰角θ和横滚角γ。
而在一小范围区域内,可将地磁场矢量H当作常矢量看待,建立磁场坐标系(ox my mz m系,简记为m系)。当磁场坐标系与地理系重合时,磁强计三轴的输出为M n=[M N 0 M D] T,而在载体系下,磁强计的输出为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000028
根据
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000029
将组合导航系统输出的俯仰角θ和横滚角γ代入方向余弦阵
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000030
后,可得
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000031
从而得到地磁场矢量在X轴和Y轴上的分量为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000032
从而得到磁航向为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000033
步骤2:根据惯性/地形匹配/地磁/气压高度计组合导航系统输出的当前载体位置信息、本地时钟维持的当前时间和预先加载的卫星历书确定当前可见卫星号。再由历书解算出的卫星位置信息计算当前所有可见卫星的真实方向矢量在地理系中的投影。最后根据步骤1计算得到的当前载体的姿态信息,将该方向矢量投影到阵列天线坐标系内,并以此计算可见卫星相对于阵列天线坐标系的高度角和方位角。具体如下:
对于组合导航系统而言,其中的惯性导航系统依靠惯性信息工作,不依赖于任何外界信息即可提供可靠的位置信息;而气压高度计通过测量外部气压的变化来得到当前高度,同样无法被欺骗或干扰。此外,地形匹配系统也能够通过匹配当前地形得到当前位置,从而修正惯性导航系统长时间工作产生的位置发散。因此,对于组合导航系统而言,当前载体的位置信息是已知量。而组合导航系统上搭载的高精度时钟同样能够在较长时间内维持精确的UTC时间;卫星历书的有效期长达半年,可在接收机使用前预先加载到组合导航系统中。综上所述,通过开普勒方程即可计算得到当前接收机所处位置的可见卫星号及其在ECEF坐标系中的位置,从而剔除掉不可见卫星的欺骗信号。
对于所有可见卫星的真实方向矢量,首先计算每个卫星通道当前正在 跟踪的卫星与载体之间的矢量在ECEF坐标系中的投影;其次利用ECEF坐标系到地理系之间的转换矩阵将该矢量投影到地理系中。计算方法如下:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000034
其中,[Δe Δn Δu] T为当前正在跟踪的卫星与载体之间的矢量在以载体位置为原点的地理坐标系中的向量,[Δx Δy Δz] T为载体到该卫星的观测向量在ECEF坐标系中的投影,S为ECEF坐标系到地理系之间的转换矩阵。
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000035
[X Y Z] T为卫星在ECEF坐标系中的位置,由卫星接收机根据历书计算得到。[x y z] T为载体在ECEF坐标系中位置,由组合导航系统输出。L,λ分别为载体的纬度、经度。
而阵列天线坐标系定义为直角坐标系,原点为阵列天线的几何中心,X轴方向指向阵列天线的右侧,Y轴方向指向阵列天线的前向,Z轴方向指向阵列天线的天向。阵列天线的水平面为0度仰角,阵列天线的天顶方向为+90度仰角。假设从空域坐标系(p系)到地理坐标系(n系)的姿态转移矩阵为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000036
设俯仰角,滚转角以及偏航角(北偏东为正)为[θ γ ψ] T,从p系至n系的三次旋转顺序为:偏航-俯仰-滚转。此时有
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000037
那么可以得到可见卫星相对于阵列天线坐标系的坐标[X P Y P Z P] T为:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000038
根据高度角、方位角计算公式有:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000039
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000040
θ、
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000041
分别为高度角,方位角。其中θ∈(0,π/2),
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000042
步骤3:采用数字储频技术,将当前历元的卫星信号采样并下变频后存储在组合导航系统中;利用阵列天线的方向调零技术不断调整零点方向,检测是否有欺骗信号进入。具体如下:
(1)由于在同一历元内的卫星信号数量多,零点构成方向广泛,因此在单一历元时间内很难完成欺骗信号检测,且对处理器的负担过重。而数字储频技术将高速A/D信号采样得到的数字信号存储在器件中,能够实现组合导航系统对射频和微波信号的存储和再现能力。
空域滤波器是指将阵列各个通道接收到的信号加权相加后输出。设由N个无方向性的阵元天线组成均匀线性阵列,相邻阵元间的间距为d,假设N×1向量W表示加权矢量,即
W=[w 1 ... w N] T
那么输出信号可表示为
G(θ)=W H·a(θ)
a(θ)是阵列天线的N维方向向量:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000043
其中,
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000044
其中λ为卫星信号波长,θ为信号方向与阵列法向之间的夹角。
零陷技术是最简单的空域滤波技术,其初始天线方向图由波束矢量决 定。自适应算法修正天线的加权值使加权后的信号输出功率最小,这样就可以在干扰信号的方向上形成一个零陷。实际上,零陷形成就是使各阵元天线接收到的信号能量在指定方向的贡献总和接近零,而为了实现这个目的,就必须提出一个约束条件。使得天线方向图在这个指定空间区域上的功率足够小,而在其他方向上尽可能地与原始天线方向图保持一致。因此,求特定方向的零陷形成问题归结为在指定方向零陷功率约束的权值变化量极小化优化问题。
对于阵列天线的输出信号G(θ)采用增益平方|G(θ)| 2=W Ha(θ)Wa(θ) H进行约束,使其小于一个给定常数ε,则上述极小化优化问题可表示如下:
obj:min f(W)=||W-W 0|| 2
S.T.W HQW≤ε
式中,W 0是阵列的初始权向量,本文中采用切比雪夫幅度加权;W是待求的优化权向量;常数ε控制在零陷形成方向的零陷深度;Q是一个N×N维Hermitian矩阵,其值为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000045
式中,θ m是要形成零陷的方向区域中心,Δθ m是m个零陷宽度。
对Q进行特征值分解,可表示为
Q=ΓΛΓ H
Λ=diag(λ 12,...λ 1)
式中,Γ为Q的特征向量构成的酉矩阵,Λ是Q的特征值对角阵。
上述最小化优化问题,是在需要形成零陷方向区域的功率积分小于某个常数ε的约束条件下,找到一个权向量W,使其最接近初始权向量W 0。由于矩阵Q较大的特征值与零陷的个数M有关,因此选择一个合适的n使得M≤n≤N,即可保证阵列在空间区域上有近似零响应。通过对矩阵Q的一组特征向量的约束代替,使阵列在所关心的一定宽度内有零响应,则 优化问题转为
obj:min f(W)=||W-W 0|| 2
S.T.W He i=0,i=1,2,3...n M≤n≤N
式中,e i是Q的第i个特征值。由于W为实数,因此可通过拉格朗日乘数法求解得到权值W。
步骤3.1通过空域滤波器处理存在器件中的信号实现卫星信号的加权,从而在期望方向上形成一个零陷屏蔽该方向上的信号,以检测是否存在欺骗信号。
(2)根据步骤1计算出的当前载体姿态信息得到从阵列天线坐标系投影到地理坐标系的姿态转移矩阵,将地理坐标系中不同方位角和高低角的区域变换到天线坐标系中后,利用(1)中的方法对空间各个方向进行零陷扫描,若在步骤2所计算得到的高低角和方位角方向形成零陷区域以后仍能够收到该颗卫星的信号,说明在其它方向存在欺骗信号进入。
(3)由于阵列天线需要根据组合导航信息控制天线指向卫星信号最强的方向形成零陷,并在载体运动时始终保持零陷区域对卫星的准确指向,这是该方法最关键的指标。在跟踪过程中由于传感器及执行机构的精度等因素导致天线并不能准确指向理论位置,使得天线指向偏离卫星,导致零陷区域失效。因此,在实际操作中可以利用圆锥扫描跟踪方式,可以不断调整零陷区域指向对准卫星。
天线圆锥扫描跟踪方式原理如下:假设天线偏开中心轴线OO'较小角度ε,并以恒定速度绕轴线旋转,OS'为天线波束轴,T为天线做圆周运动的轨迹,S为卫星实际方向。若天线没有指正,此时在一个扫描周期内,θ的大小和接收到的卫星信号强度在不断变化,根据θ和卫星信号强度变化情况来确定卫星所在位置,控制天线做出调整。当天线指向对准卫星后,轴线OS和轴线OO'重合,此时θ不再变化且卫星信号强度最强。
天线在最大增益处(半功率波束宽度内)接收到的信号电平强度满足下式:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000046
其中P 0为在天线最大增益处接收到的最大信号电平,θ 1/2为半功率波束宽度,θ为天线偏离最大增益处的角度,P(θ)为天线在θ处的信号电平强度,a为常系数,与天线口径及接收信号频率相关。半功率波束宽度为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000047
其中λ为天线接收信号波长,f为卫星信号频率,D为天线口径,c为电磁波在空间中传播速度。
设阵列天线输出的电压与接收到的信号功率之间的关系为
U=b·(P (θ)-P m)
其中b为阵列天线输出电压与信号电平间的斜率,Pm为接收机能检测到的最小电平。
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000048
可得
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000049
其中U为在天线在偏离最大增益点θ处输出的电压大小;Um为在天线增益最大处天线输出的最大电压;其他参数为既有固定参数,由此可以看出在天线最大增益处的电平衰落仅与天线指向偏离最大增益处的角度相关。
阵列天线的圆锥扫描可分解为方位角方向和高低角方向,使天线在方位角方向做余弦运动,在高低角方向做正弦运动,二者合成后的零陷区域指向即为圆周运动。方位角方向和高低角方向的运动方程如下所示:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000050
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000051
n=1,2,3...N
其中N为划分圆的点数;P AZ、P EL为圆周运动的圆心,P AZ(n)、P AZ(n)为圆锥扫描过程中天线作圆周运动上的任意一点。
令S点为卫星位置;O为当前天线指向位置,O点与卫星的偏差角为θ;ε为圆周扫描半径;
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000052
为天线偏离卫星位置与水平方向之间的夹角;Um是波束在圆周轨迹T上的任意一点,在该点的信号电平大小为U AGC
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000053
为其运动时与水平方向的夹角;AZ为水平方向,EL为与水平直的方向;在三角形ΔSOU M中,由余弦定理可得
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000054
结合圆锥扫描的基本原理可以得到波束在圆周运动轨迹上任意一点的信号电平方程:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000055
该方程在一个扫描周期内仅出现一个最大值以及一个最小值;且最大值和最小值出现在圆周中心和卫星位置的连线与圆周的两个交点上;据此可推导出新的跟踪调整方法:
设在扫描过程中离卫星方向最近的点接收机测得的电压值为U max,最远的点接收机测得的电压值为U min;可得天线在方位角上的调整量为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000056
代入θ和
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000057
后,有
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000058
通过在一个扫描周期内接收机测到的最小电平的大小来判断卫星落在圆扫范围内还是圆扫范围外。当卫星刚好在圆扫轨迹上时,接收机输出 的电压大小为:
U th=b·(P (2·ε)-P m)。
综上所述,可得天线在方位角方向上的调整公式为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000059
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000060
同理,可得俯仰角方向的调整量为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000061
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000062
利用上述技术,即可在实际操作中利用圆锥扫描跟踪方式,不断调整零陷区域指向对准卫星保证信号稳定被屏蔽掉,方便后续步骤继续处理判断信号。
步骤4:若步骤3中检测到其他方向存在欺骗信号,则利用在真实信号来源方向形成零陷区域后得到的信号,使用比相法测量欺骗信号的来波方向。具体如下:
首先进行根据组合导航信息以及卫星的位置速度信息等,利用零陷技术在真实卫星信号来波方向上形成一个零陷屏蔽该方向上的信号,屏蔽真是信号对于欺骗信号可能造成的干扰。
其次检测欺骗信号来波方向。欺骗信号来波方向检测可依靠阵列天线测姿方法实现。阵列天线测姿方法通过载波相位差分测量来实现。为解释方便起见,先从二维平面情况开始分析,在二维平面条件下通过相位差测量来实现测向的原理如图2所示。
图2中天线单元A、B之间构成测向基线,其直线距离为d,由于卫星到接收机之间的距离远大于d,因此可认为导航信号来波方向与基线 法向之间的夹角均为θ。若信号波长为λ,从天线单元B处作垂线,则到达天线单元A、B的同一路信号之间相位差φ如下式所表达:
φ=2πd·sin θ/λ。
相位差φ的取值范围为[-π,π),若d>>λ/2,那么上式就存在相位模糊度问题,即多个不同的θ值与同一个φ值产生对应关系造成测向结果模糊。因此获得相位差测量值后,计算来波方向的方法如下:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000063
为了进一步求解上式,可以利用短基线递推长基线方法:根据上式可知,若d<±λ/2,很明显有|2πd·sin θ/λ|<π,也就保证了不存在相位模糊度问题。考虑到测量噪声的存在,基线长度应该更小一些。一般载波相位测量噪声的峰峰值为0.1周,信号波长为20cm左右,因此可将短基线长度设定为6cm。此时根据上式可计算出来波方向的误差约为19.5°。而由同一条直线上的n+1个天线可构建n条基线,当基线长度超过24cm时,来波方向的误差约为4.8°,可满足角度判别需要。总结上述可得到如下模糊度递推关系式:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000064
式中,N k为第一个天线到第k+1个天线的基线长度所对应的相位模糊度。D k为第一个天线到第k+1个天线的基线长度,φ k为第一个天线与第k+1个天线接收到的同一路信号之间的相位差。
因此,若相位模糊度N k-1已知,为求得N k,需要有以下条件成立:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000065
Δφ k为第一个天线与第k+1个天线接收到信号的相位测量误差。最终得到
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000066
将上述方法推广到三维情况:在平台上布置相互垂直的2条基线来实施测量,如图3所示。图3中,AB和CD分别是相互垂直的两条基线,卫星信号到达天线的视线矢量MA,MB,MC,MD可近似认为是相互平行的。MA、MB和AB是共面的(MC、MD和CD同理),问题简化成了上文中的二维测向情况。在步骤3定义的天线阵列坐标系中,通过二维测向原理即可分别求出单位视线矢量在X轴和Y轴上的投影,再根据三角函数关系式即可求得卫星信号的方位角和高低角。
步骤5:比较步骤3和步骤4计算得到的真实信号和欺骗信号的高度角和方位角,对阵列天线方向图赋形。具体如下:
由于导航卫星按照星座图而不断移动的,其位置会不停发生变化;而为了实现位置解算,接收机至少需要稳定跟踪4颗或以上的导航卫星信号。因此卫星导航阵列天线需要形成多波束指向,每个波束均指向一颗导航卫星,同时能够实时跟踪卫星的方位变化,调整波束指向随卫星位置而变化,以提升地面导航接收机对卫星信号的接收效果。
自适应波束形成器是构成空域自适应滤波的主要物理硬件。平面阵列天线的拓扑结构是自适应波束形成器处理信号的关键技术之一;天线阵列等效面积、阵列间隔和阵列边界分布决定了阵列数字波束成形的特征;不同的阵列拓扑结构具有不同的空间角度分辨率和对称性。目前常见的平面阵列有方形阵列、圆形阵列和六角阵列等。
不失一般性,以均匀直线阵为例研究自适应波束形成器的工作原理,其模型如附图4所示。假设各阵元均各向同性,阵元间距为d,各阵元后接有接收单元。空间入射信号s(t)以θ角度进入天线阵并被接收,x 1(t)、x 2(t)、……、x N(t)为N个阵元通道的输出信号,w 1、w 2、、……、w N分别是对N个阵元通道输出的加权值,加权求和后即为阵列天线的输出y(t)。
由于阵元空间位置的不同,入射信号到达个阵元的时间不同,阵列接收到的信号x 1(t)、x 2(t)、……、x N(t)彼此存在相位延迟,令x 2(t)与x 1(t)相比延迟相位为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000067
x 3(t)与x 2(t)相比也有相位延迟
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000068
……依次类推,其中延迟相位角β为
β=2πd·sin θ/λ
其中λ为入射信号的波长,d为阵元间距。那么阵列接收到的信号x 1(t)、x 2(t)、……、x N(t)与入射信号s(t)的关系如下:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000069
令N×1向量X(t)和a(θ)分别表示阵列接收到的信号和各阵元的延迟相位,a(θ)又被称作阵列的导向矢量。也即:
X(t)=[x 1(t)、x 2(t)、……、x N(t)] T
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000070
在多个入射信号的情况下,M个空间入射信号s 1(t)、s 2(t)、……、s M(t)分别以角度θ 1、θ 2、……、θ M进入天线阵并被接收,令
S(t)=[s 1(t)、s 2(t)、……、s M(t)] T
A=[a 1(t)、a 2(t)、……、a M(t)] T
其中M个导向矢量a 1(t)、a 2(t)、……、a M(t)构成的矩阵A被称作阵列的流型矩阵。此时也就有
X(t)=A·S(t)
进一步的,如果入射信号中包含的多个信号,既有希望接收的期望信号,也有不希望接收的干扰信号,在事先能分别确认期望信号和干扰信号的数量时,例如,如果事先知道期望信号的数量是M,干扰信号的数量是P,那么上式就可以表达为:
X(t)=A·S(t)+B·J(t)
B是P个干扰信号的导向矢量a M+1(t)、a M+2(t)、……、a M+P(t)构成的流行矩阵,J(t)是P个干扰信号s M+1(t)、s M+2(t)、……、s M+P(t)构成的矩阵。
自适应滤波器将阵列各个通道接收到的信号加权相加后输出。令N×1向量W表示加权矢量,亦即
W=[w 1、w 2、……、w N] T
那么则阵列输出信号y(t)可改写为
y(t)=W H·X(t)
只要寻求合适的加权矢量(最优权矢量),使得输出信号中尽可能多地含有期望信号成分,就可以最大限度地降低干扰信号和噪声信号的成分,效果可以通过方向图来衡量。方向图的定义为给定阵列权矢量对不同角度信号的阵列响应,衡量了阵列对空间中各方向入射信号的放大倍数。
F(θ)=W H·a(θ)
将上述的一维阵列情形推广到多维情况。首先本方法选用的拓扑结构为方形的阵列天线。均匀分布的方形格状结构如附图5所示,阵列单元沿X轴和Y轴等间距的均匀分布。不失一般性,设定阵列天线一共有K单元,单元之间间距为d,阵列的几何中心为参考原点,阵列单元均为各向同性。定义阵列天线空域坐标系是原点在阵列天线的几何中心的球坐标系,X轴方向指向阵列天线的右侧,Y轴方向指向阵列天线的前向,Z轴方向指向阵列天线的天向。则对于行序号为m、列序号为n的第k单元天线,设其在阵列天线空域坐标系的坐标为(r k θ k 0),那么它在阵列分布平面上的极坐标如图6所示,可表示为:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000071
对于入射的第m个卫星信号,其方向余弦仅与入射信号角度相关,定义其高度角和方位角为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000072
那么方向余弦为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000073
综上可得,阵元k接收到第m个卫星信号的延时τ mk可表示为方向余弦的函数
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000074
因此,对于窄带入射信号,阵列单元接收信号的延时可近似表示为载波的相位:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000075
定义
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000076
为信号m的导向矢量,则
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000077
维数为K:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000078
再定义阵列权系数矩阵为W,复权系数ω mn为其中第m行n列元素。且有
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000079
综上,天线阵列的合成的波束方向图函数为
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000080
由此即可根据计算求得的高度角和方位角计算出波束方向图,并抑制来自其他方向的欺骗信号。
步骤6:根据步骤5计算得到的天线方向图调整波束指向,抑制欺骗信号进入。具体如下:
对于采用单一天线发射模式的欺骗干扰,由步骤4计算得出的所有干扰卫星信号均来源于同一方向;而对于采用多天线发射模式的欺骗干扰,其卫星信号来源方向也与步骤3计算得出的存在差异。因此,通过该方法可有效检测单一天线发射欺骗信号的情况,并利用最优波束形成技术构成零陷点予以抑制。
对阵列方向图施加零点约束条件,迫使阵列方向图始终在某一固定来波方向形成零陷。零点波束约束条件为预知固定的约束条件,零陷方向由步骤4计算得到。零点波束约束算法实现步骤为:
1)根据步骤4得到的欺骗信号来波方向计算干扰的阵列导向矢量。计算公式如下:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000081
2)将导向矢量构造虚拟相关矩阵,计算公式如下:
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000082
若存在多个波束指向,需将每个导向矢量构成的虚拟相关矩阵求和。波束指向的数量必须小于天线阵列单元数量。
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000083
为了避免矩阵求逆出现病态,可以对虚拟相关矩阵加载一个单位阵。
R′ b=R b+δI
3)计算零点约束的静态方向系数,利用该方向系数求出零点约束矩阵滤波器,使得干扰经过延时匹配、幅度加权和相位加权后与参考天线单元接收的信号进行合成对消,从而达到消除欺骗信号的目的。
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000084
其中
Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-000085
为K*1维的常数矢量,第一个元素为1,其他元素为0。零点赋形约束实现框图如图7所示。辅助天线单元接收的干扰经过延时匹配、幅度加权和相位加权,与参考天线单元接收的信号进行合成对消。通过调整延时匹配和幅度、相位加权权系数,实现欺骗信号的相互抵消,从而保证接收机的正常工作。
本发明利用组合导航系统的冗余信息并结合阵列天线硬件,从接收机信号处理层和导航定位层算法改善角度出发实现了抗卫星导航欺骗方法。本发明方法可实现对欺骗性干扰信号的检测和剔除,提高了导航系统对复杂环境的适应性,应用前景广阔。
以上对本申请实施例所提供的一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法及系统,进行了详细介绍。以上实施例的说明只是用于帮助理解本申请的方法及其核心思想;同时,对于本领域的一般技术人员,依据本申请的思想,在具体实施方式及应用范围上均会有改变之处,综上所述,本说明书内容不应理解为对本申请的限制。
还需要说明的是,术语“包括”、“包含”或者其任何其他变体意在涵盖非排他性的包含,从而使得包括一系列要素的商品或者系统不仅包括那些要素,而且还包括没有明确列出的其他要素,或者是还包括为这种商品或者系统所固有的要素。在没有更多限制的情况下,由语句“包括一个……”限定的要素,并不排除在包括所述要素的商品或者系统中还存在另外的相同要素。“大致”是指在可接收的误差范围内,本领域技术人员能够在一定误差范围内解决所述技术问题,基本达到所述技术效果。
在本发明实施例中使用的术语是仅仅出于描述特定实施例的目的,而非旨在限制本发明。在本发明实施例和所附权利要求书中所使用的单数形式的“一种”、“所述”和“该”也旨在包括多数形式,除非上下文清楚 地表示其他含义。在上述实施例中,可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现,所述计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载或执行所述计算机程序指令时,全部或部分地产生按照本发明实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、或者其他可编程装置。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中,或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输,例如,所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(DSL)或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输)。所述计算机可读取存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质,(例如,软盘、硬盘、磁带)、光介质(例如,DVD)、或者半导体介质(例如固态硬盘Solid State Disk(SSD))等。

Claims (10)

  1. 一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,所述方法的步骤包括:
    S1、根据惯性测量单元输出的角速率和比力信息,和/或磁强测量设备输出的磁通量信息,解算出当前的载体姿态;
    S2、计算当前所有可见卫星在地理系中的真实方向矢量,再根据S1得到的载体姿态将该真实方向矢量投影到阵列天线坐标系内,并以此计算可见卫星相对于阵列天线坐标系的高度角和方位角;
    S3、采用数字储频技术将当前历元的卫星信号采样并下变频后存储,利用阵列天线的方向调零技术不断调整零点方向,检测是否有欺骗信号进入;若无,本次抗欺骗操作结束,否则进入下一步;
    S4、确定欺骗信号的来波方向;
    S5、对阵列天线方向图赋形;
    S6、根据S5得到的天线方向图调整波束指向,抑制欺骗信号进入。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,步骤S4的内容包括:利用在真实信号来源方向形成零陷区域后得到的信号,使用比相法测量欺骗信号的来波方向。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,步骤S1的内容包括:
    S11、判断是否满足准则
    Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-100001
    其中,
    Figure PCTCN2022137316-appb-100002
    为惯性测量单元中加速度计输出的加速度,g为当地重力,β 1为预设的加速度阈值;若满足,则判断载体处于低加速度机动状态,以该状态解算载体姿态;否则进入下一步;
    S12、判断水平加速度是否满足准则f H<β 2,其中,f H为水平加速度模值,β 2为预设的水平加速度阈值;若满足,则判断载体处于低加速度机动状态,以该状态解算载体姿态;否则进入下一步;
    S13、结合惯性测量单元中陀螺仪的输出判断载体是否存在持续转弯或 盘旋运动,若不存在转弯或盘旋,则认为失准角误差大,需要对姿态进行修正。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,步骤S13中对姿态进行修正的内容包括:根据水平比力对水平失准角进行修正,根据磁通量信息对方位失准角进行修正。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,根据磁通量信息对方位失准角进行修正具体为:用磁航向代替方位角。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,步骤S2中计算可见卫星的真实方向矢量在地理系中的投影的内容具体为:根据组合导航系统输出的当前载体位置信息、本地时钟维持的当前时间和预先加载的卫星历书确定当前可见卫星号;再由历书解算出的卫星位置信息计算当前所有可见卫星的真实方向矢量在地理系中的投影。
  7. 根据权利要求1所述的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,步骤S4中确定欺骗信号来波方向的具体内容包括:选定一个真实信号,在其来源方向进行零陷操作,根据零陷操作得到的信息并利用比相法确定欺骗信号的来波方向。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,选定的真实信号为当前历元的卫星信号。
  9. 根据权利要求1所述的基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗方法,其特征在于,步骤S5的内容包括:根据步骤S3中当前历元的卫星信号的高度角和方位角以及步骤S4中欺骗信号的高度角和方位角,对阵列天线方向图赋形。
  10. 一种基于组合导航的阵列天线抗卫星导航欺骗系统,其特征在于, 所述系统包括惯性测量单元、磁强测量设备和处理模块,所述惯性测量单元和所述磁强测量设备均与所述处理模块连接;
    所述处理模块包括存储器、处理器以及存储在所述存储器中并可在所述处理器上运行的计算机程序,所述处理器执行所述计算机程序时实现如权利要求1-9任一所述方法的步骤。
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