WO2023165401A1 - 可信度量装置、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法 - Google Patents

可信度量装置、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023165401A1
WO2023165401A1 PCT/CN2023/077737 CN2023077737W WO2023165401A1 WO 2023165401 A1 WO2023165401 A1 WO 2023165401A1 CN 2023077737 W CN2023077737 W CN 2023077737W WO 2023165401 A1 WO2023165401 A1 WO 2023165401A1
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Prior art keywords
trusted
cache
target data
target
measurement
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PCT/CN2023/077737
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
李跃武
王宝生
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阿里巴巴（中国）有限公司
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Publication of WO2023165401A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023165401A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the technical field of cloud computing, and in particular to a trusted measurement device, equipment, system and trusted identity authentication method.
  • Cloud computing requires a large number of servers, which can be connected to the cloud network through dedicated network access devices. Specifically, these servers can be connected to network access devices, and the network access devices are interconnected with the cloud network.
  • the network access devices mainly implement the management and control, security, network and other related functions required for servers to access the cloud network.
  • the cloud network is a cloud-centric, application- and tenant-oriented virtualized network infrastructure that is on-demand, elastic, available anywhere, and measurable.
  • a trusted platform module Trusted Platform Module, TPM
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • Various aspects of the present application provide a trusted measurement device, equipment, system and trusted identity authentication method, which are used to provide trusted capabilities at a lower cost in the scenario of one-to-many connection servers, and effectively verify multiple servers credibility.
  • An embodiment of the present application provides a trusted measurement device, which at least includes: a processor, a trusted measurement main module, a trusted measurement interface module, and other general components;
  • the trusted measurement main module serves as the root of trust of the trusted measurement device, and uses Based on the chain of trust transfer process to complete the integrity measurement of processors and other general components;
  • the trusted measurement interface module includes multiple sets of bus interfaces and buffer spaces, and multiple sets of bus interfaces are used to connect multiple servers, responsible for sending and receiving between multiple servers and The target data required for trusted identity authentication between processors, and the target data is written to the cache empty In between;
  • the processor is configured to run a software simulation program adapted to the trusted measurement subject module under the condition that the integrity measurement is passed, so as to complete the trusted authentication of multiple servers based on the target data in the cache space.
  • An embodiment of the present application provides a network access device, including: a trusted measurement device, the trusted measurement device at least includes: a processor, a trusted measurement main module, a trusted measurement interface module and other general components; a trusted measurement main module As the root of trust of the trusted measurement device, it is used to complete the integrity measurement of the processor and other general components based on the chain of trust transfer process; the trusted measurement interface module includes multiple sets of bus interfaces and cache spaces, and multiple sets of bus interfaces are used for Connect multiple servers, responsible for sending and receiving the target data required for trusted identity authentication between multiple servers and the processor, and write the target data into the cache space; the processor is used to pass the integrity measurement, Run a software simulation program adapted to the trusted measurement subject module to complete the trusted authentication of multiple servers based on the target data in the cache space; and when multiple servers pass the trusted authentication, allow multiple The server is connected to the cloud network system where the network access device is interconnected.
  • An embodiment of the present application provides a cloud network system, including: a network access device and multiple servers to be connected to the cloud network system.
  • the network access device includes the trusted measurement device provided in the embodiment of the present application to measure the Trusted identity verification is performed on multiple servers, wherein the plurality of servers access the cloud network system through the network access device if they pass the trusted identity verification.
  • An embodiment of the present application provides a trusted identity authentication method, which is suitable for a network access device including a trusted measurement device.
  • the trusted measurement device includes at least a trusted measurement subject module and a trusted measurement interface module.
  • the method includes: according to the available The trusted root provided by the trust measurement main module completes the integrity measurement of the trusted measurement device or network access device based on the trust chain transfer process; receives the trusted identity verification request sent by the server interconnected through the trusted measurement interface module, and will The target data carried in the trusted identity verification request is written into the cache space; the software simulation program adapted to the trusted measurement subject module is run to complete the trusted identity verification of multiple servers based on the target data in the cache space; and In the case that multiple servers have passed the trusted identity verification, multiple servers are allowed to access the cloud network system where network access devices are interconnected.
  • the trusted measurement main module is used as the trusted root of the trusted measurement device to complete the integrity measurement of the trusted measurement device, and a trusted measurement interface module is added to provide Multiple sets of bus interfaces and cache space can realize the trusted measurement device to connect to multiple servers in a one-to-many manner, and use software to simulate the reliable
  • the credit measurement main module completes the trusted identity authentication of multiple servers connected to the device, realizes the provision of credible capabilities at a low cost in the scenario of one-to-many connection servers, and effectively verifies the credibility of multiple servers. Completed the unified management of trusted verification of multiple servers.
  • the trusted measurement device can realize that the network access device can provide low resource usage, low cost and effective trusted Metric scheme.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a scenario where multiple servers are connected to network access devices
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a trusted measurement device provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of storage states of a shared cache at different times provided by an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a network access device provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a cloud network system provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 6 is a flow chart of a trusted identity authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • the trusted measurement main body module 02 is used as the trusted root of the trusted measurement device 10 to complete the integrity measurement of the trusted measurement device 10, and the trusted measurement interface module 03 is added, through the trusted
  • the multiple sets of bus interfaces and cache space provided by the measurement interface module 03 can realize the trusted measurement device 10 to connect to multiple servers in a one-to-many manner, and process by means of a software simulation program that can run and adapt to the trusted measurement main module 02 Device 01, using software to simulate the trusted measurement main module 02 to complete the trusted identity authentication of multiple servers connected to the device, so as to provide trusted capabilities at a lower cost in the scenario of one-to-many connection servers, effectively Verify the credibility of multiple servers, and complete the unified management of trusted verification of multiple servers.
  • the trusted measurement device 10 can realize that the network access device 20 provides a low resource occupation, low cost and effective trusted measurement solution in the scenario of one-to-many connection to the server.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a trusted measurement device 10 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the trusted measurement device 10 at least includes: a processor 01, a trusted measurement main module 02, a trusted measurement interface module 03 and Other Common Parts 04.
  • the trusted measurement main module 02 is used as the trusted root of the trusted measurement device 10, and is used to complete the integrity measurement of the processor 01 and other general components 04 based on the chain of trust transfer process;
  • the trusted measurement interface module 03 includes multiple groups Bus interface and cache space, multiple sets of bus interfaces are used to connect multiple servers, responsible for sending and receiving target data required for trusted identity authentication between multiple servers and processor 01, mainly refers to receiving target data sent by multiple servers , and write the target data into the cache space;
  • the processor 01 is configured to run a software simulation program adapted to the trusted measurement main module 02 to complete the process based on the target data in the cache space when the integrity measurement is passed. Trusted authentication to multiple servers.
  • the trusted measurement subject module 02 can be any device with authenticity verification, for example including but not limited to: TPM (Trusted Platform Module, trusted platform module) chip or TPCM (Trusted Platform Control Module, trusted platform control module) chip.
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • TPCM Trusted Platform Control Module
  • the TPM chip or TPCM chip is a hardware core module integrated in the trusted measurement device 10 for establishing and guaranteeing the source of trust, providing functions such as integrity measurement, secure storage, trusted reporting, and cryptographic services for trusted computing.
  • RTM root of trust for measurement, root of trust for measurement
  • EMM extended measurement module
  • the code measurement execution component group realizes the integrity measurement and trust chain extension of the subsequent code execution.
  • other common components 04 in the trusted measurement device 10 include, but are not limited to: a memory chip (also called BIOS memory chip) carrying the basic input and output system BIOS, a random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), an input Output interface (I/O interface), etc.
  • BIOS storage chip may be a flash memory (FLSAH) chip, but is not limited thereto.
  • BIOS storage chip can be respectively connected with the processor and the trusted measurement main module through the system bus.
  • the system bus includes but is not limited to: SPI (serial peripheral interface, serial peripheral interface) bus, PCIE (peripheral component interconnect express, high-speed serial computer expansion bus standard) bus or Local Bus bus (also known as CPU bus).
  • the chain of trust refers to the trust transfer relationship established between components using the integrity measurement method during the startup and operation of the trusted measurement device 10 .
  • the transfer of the credit chain is a process of going through one level of authentication and one level of trust, so as to extend this trust to the entire trusted measurement device 10 .
  • the root of trust measurement RTM is used as the starting point; before a component needs to be loaded and operated, the integrity measurement of the component should be performed by the RTM or EMM, and then it is loaded and operated. It is worth noting that the credit chain transfer process can be designed according to the component loading sequence in the trusted measurement device 10 .
  • the credit chain transfer process may be, for example: first, the RTM in the trusted measurement main module 02 performs integrity measurement on the BIOS storage chip, and the BIOS storage chip passes the integrity measurement. Afterwards, the trust is passed from the RTM to the EMM in the BIOS memory chip, and the EMM in the BIOS memory chip performs integrity measurement on the processor 01 .
  • a trusted measurement interface module 03 is set in the trusted measurement device 10 as a multiple The bridge between one server and the trusted measurement device 10 is used to provide data transmission and storage services between multiple servers and the trusted measurement device 10, so that the same trusted measurement main module in the trusted measurement device 10 can 02 (such as TPM chip or TPCM chip) to perform trusted identity authentication on multiple servers.
  • the trusted measurement interface module 03 includes multiple sets of bus interfaces and buffer spaces, multiple sets of bus interfaces are used to connect multiple servers, and are responsible for sending and receiving target data required for trusted identity authentication between multiple servers and the processor 01, And write the target data into the cache space.
  • the target data sent by multiple servers may be received and written into the cache space for the processor 01 to read the target data from the cache space, or the target data sent by the processor 01 may also be received and Write the target data into the cache space, and then send the target data in the cache space to the corresponding server.
  • the bus interface includes, but not limited to, for example: a serial peripheral interface (serial peripheral interface, SPI), a serial communication interface (serial peripheral interface, SCI), and an I2C (Inter-IC) bus interface.
  • SPI serial peripheral interface
  • SCI serial peripheral interface
  • I2C Inter-IC
  • each server is connected to a set of bus interfaces through cables, multiple servers are respectively connected to their corresponding bus interfaces, and each server performs data interaction with the processor 01 through the bus interfaces.
  • the trusted measurement interface module 03 provides N groups of SPIs, namely SPI1, SPI2, SPI3...SPIN, etc., and the N servers are respectively server 1, server 2, server 3...server N, etc., SPI1 and server 1 Connect, SPI2 connects to server 2, SPI3 connects to server 3... SPIN connects to server N.
  • the cache space is a memory for high-speed data exchange and storage, and is used to cache target data required for trusted identity authentication between the server and the processor 01 .
  • the process of trusted identity authentication between the server and the processor 01 can be a process of using software to simulate the TPM chip or TPCM chip to measure the credibility of the device where it is located, and each server connected to the trusted measurement device 01 They are respectively used as devices where the TPM chip or the TPCM chip is located.
  • the target data required for trusted identity authentication between the server and the processor 01 includes but is not limited to firmware ( Firmware) checks the BIOS program data of the server, and the data interaction commands required in the process of trusted identity authentication, such as trusted measurement data such as TPM2_Startup, TPM2_GetCapability and TPM2_PcrExtend.
  • firmware Firmware
  • trusted measurement data such as TPM2_Startup, TPM2_GetCapability and TPM2_PcrExtend.
  • the process of the TPM chip or the TPCM chip performing trustworthiness measurement on the device where it is located can be referred to the specification about the TPM, and will not be repeated here.
  • the cache space may include: a shared cache, and a dedicated cache and registers corresponding to each set of bus interfaces; a dedicated cache corresponding to each set of bus interfaces, It is used to store at least part of the target data required for credible identity authentication between the connected server and the processor 01; the register corresponding to each group of bus interfaces is used for the case where the corresponding dedicated cache can only cache part of the target data Next, record the offset address of the remaining part of the target data in the shared cache; the shared cache is shared by multiple sets of bus interfaces, and is responsible for caching the rest of the target data when the dedicated cache corresponding to each set of bus interfaces can only cache part of the target data. target data.
  • the cache space includes: shared cache, SPI1 dedicated cache and SPI1 register corresponding to SPI1, SPI2 dedicated cache and SPI2 register corresponding to SPI2, SPI3 dedicated cache and SPI3 register corresponding to SPI3... and SPIN Corresponding SPIN-specific cache and SPIN registers.
  • the storage space required to be occupied by the target data transmitted by the server to the corresponding bus interface does not exceed the storage space provided by the corresponding dedicated cache, write the target data transmitted by the server into the corresponding dedicated cache.
  • the target data transmitted by the server to the corresponding bus interface needs to occupy more storage space than the storage space provided by the corresponding dedicated cache, at this time, part of the data in the target data transmitted by the server is written into the corresponding dedicated cache, and The remaining part of the transferred target data is written into the shared cache.
  • the data transmitted by the server is first written in the dedicated cache, and after the dedicated cache is full, the remaining part of the data transmitted by the server is written to the shared cache.
  • the offset address offset of the data in the shared cache refers to the offset of the physical address of the data in the shared cache relative to the base address (segment header address) of the shared cache.
  • the offset address offset and the base address of the shared cache can calculate the physical address of the data in the shared cache, and the corresponding data can be read from the shared cache according to the physical address of the data in the shared cache.
  • the storage space of the dedicated cache is generally 512 bytes, and SPI1 can receive data up to 4K Byte (byte).
  • SPI1 receives 1K Byte data
  • Write the remaining 512Byte data in the SPI1 register to offset the address offset in the shared cache.
  • the remaining 512Byte data can be read from the shared cache. After reading the remaining 512Byte data from the shared cache, clear the offset address offset of the remaining 512Byte data in the SPI1 register in the shared cache.
  • the shared cache is a ring cache.
  • the ring cache means that in the way of use, the shared cache can be used in a circular manner. Circular use of the shared cache refers to writing data from the base address of the shared cache, and continuing to write data from the base address of the shared cache after the storage space of the shared cache is fully occupied. At Time 0, the remaining data of SPI1, remaining data of SPI3, and remaining data of SPI6 are sequentially stored in the corresponding positions of the SPI1 offset address, SPI3 offset address, and SPI6 offset address in the shared cache.
  • SPI1 remaining data refers to the remaining part of the target data received through SPI1
  • SPI3 remaining data refers to the remaining part of the target data received through SPI3
  • SPI6 remaining data refers to the remaining part of the target data received through SPI6 part of the data.
  • SPI1 offset address is SPI1 The offset address corresponding to the remaining data
  • the SPI3 offset address is the offset address corresponding to the SPI3 remaining data
  • the SPI6 offset address is the offset address corresponding to the SPI6 remaining data.
  • the remaining data of SPI1 is cleared from the shared cache, and the remaining data of SPI2 is written into the shared cache. Since the offset address of the remaining data of SPI2 plus its own data length exceeds the size of the remaining storage space of the shared cache , Therefore, the excess part of the remaining data of SPI2 is stored from the base address of the shared cache. As shown in Figure 3, there are SPI2 remaining data at the head and tail of the shared buffer.
  • the processor 01 includes, but is not limited to: a central processing unit 01 (central processing unit, CPU), a micro control unit (Microcontroller Unit, MCU), and a digital processor 01 (Digital Signal Processor, DSP).
  • a central processing unit 01 central processing unit, CPU
  • a micro control unit Microcontroller Unit, MCU
  • a digital processor 01 Digital Signal Processor, DSP
  • a software simulation program adapted to the trusted measurement main module 02 is deployed in the processor 01.
  • the software simulation program is a trusted measurement main module in the form of software 02.
  • the software simulation program may be, for example, a Trusted Platform Module software simulator (Software TPM Emulator).
  • the processor 01 runs a software simulation program to simulate a TPM or TPCM chip in a software manner to complete trusted identity authentication for multiple servers accessed.
  • the trusted platform module software simulator when the processor 01 performs trusted identity authentication on any server, the trusted platform module software simulator is used as the root of trust.
  • the trusted platform module software simulator reads the firmware data of the server ( For example, BIOS program data), and measure the firmware data of the server to complete the credible measurement of the BIOS of the server; then, through the data interaction command, the BIOS of the server is then completed to the OS (Operation System, operating system) of the server Trust measurement, the server OS completes the trust measurement for the APP (Application, application) on the server, so as to establish a complete trust chain, the transfer process of the trust chain is: trusted platform module software simulator -> server BIOS->OS of the server->APP on the server.
  • TPM Transmission Protocol
  • the processor 01 when it confirms that it has passed the integrity measurement, it runs a software simulation program to obtain the target data of the server that requires credible identity verification from the cache space, and based on the obtained target data Trusted authentication. Since the processor 01 itself is trusted, the server that performs trusted identity verification through the processor 01 and passes the trusted identity verification is also trusted.
  • the processor 01 may use a polling or interrupt mechanism to determine whether to perform an operation of authentic identity authentication for the server.
  • the processor 01 periodically polls each dedicated cache, determines the target dedicated cache with target data written in each dedicated cache, and performs subsequent operations of trusted identity authentication.
  • the interrupt mechanism when there is target data written in any dedicated cache, an interrupt request can be sent to processor 01, and processor 01 determines the target dedicated cache with target data written in according to the interrupt request, and performs the follow-up of trusted identity authentication operate.
  • the processor 01 uses a polling or interrupt mechanism to determine whether all the target data can be read from the target-specific cache after determining the target-specific cache in which the target data is written. In the case that only part of the target data can be read from the target-specific cache, read the rest of the target data from the shared cache according to the offset address recorded in the target register corresponding to the target-specific cache; Two parts of target data to complete the trusted identity authentication of the target server corresponding to the target-specific cache. In the case that all target data can be read from the target-specific cache, based on all the read target data, the trusted identity authentication of the target server corresponding to the target-specific cache is completed.
  • the total length of all the target data may also be written in the dedicated cache.
  • the total length of the target data may reflect how much storage space the target data needs to occupy
  • the size of the dedicated cache refers to the size of the storage space that the dedicated cache can provide.
  • processor 01 determines whether all target data can be read from the target dedicated cache, it can read the total length of the target data from the target dedicated cache, and when the total length of the target data is greater than the size of the target dedicated cache In the case of , it is determined that only part of the target data can be read from the target-specific cache.
  • the processor 01 determines that the processing priority of the target-specific caches that can only read part of the target data is higher than that of the target-specific caches that can read all the target data. Process priority.
  • the processor 01 will sequentially perform data processing on each target dedicated cache according to the order of processing priority from high to low.
  • the target dedicated cache that can only read part of the target data is prioritized, and the remaining target data stored in the shared cache is also prioritized, thereby reducing the data overflow in the shared cache, so that the shared cache can provide more More free storage space improves the utilization rate of the shared cache, and also helps to improve the access efficiency of the cloud network system 30 in the scenario of multiple servers.
  • the trusted measurement device 10 uses the trusted measurement main module 02 as the trusted root of the trusted measurement device 10 to complete the integrity measurement of the trusted measurement device 10, and adds a trusted measurement interface module 03.
  • the trusted measurement device 10 can be connected to multiple servers in a one-to-many manner, and the The processor 01 of the software simulation program uses software to simulate the trusted measurement main module 02 to complete the trusted identity authentication of multiple servers connected to the device, so as to realize the provision of reliable services at a relatively low cost in the scenario of one-to-many connection servers. Trustworthiness, effectively verify the credibility of the server, and complete the unified management of multiple server trustworthiness verification.
  • the trusted measurement device 10 can implement the one-to-many connection server of the network access device 20 In the scenario, it provides a low resource usage, low cost and effective trusted measurement solution.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a network access device 20 provided in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the network access device 20 may be any device capable of providing cloud network access services, including but not limited to: modems, switches and routers.
  • the server needs to perform data communication with the computing nodes in the cloud network through the network access device 20, and the server The process of establishing a communication connection with a computing node in the cloud network through the network access device 20 is called a process of accessing the cloud network.
  • the network access device 20 Before the server accesses the cloud network, the network access device 20 needs to perform trusted identity verification on the server.
  • the server When the network access device 20 confirms that the server has passed the trusted identity authentication, the server establishes a data transmission channel with the computing nodes in the cloud network through the network access device 20, and performs data transmission based on the data transmission channel to realize the server's access to the cloud. network system 30 .
  • the network access device 20 includes: a trusted measurement device 10 , and performs trusted identity verification on the server through the trusted measurement device 10 .
  • the trusted metric device 10 includes at least: a processor 01 , a trusted metric main body module 02 , a trusted metric interface module 03 and other common components 04 .
  • the trusted measurement subject module 02 serves as the trusted root of the trusted measurement device 10, and is used to complete the integrity measurement of the processor 01 and other general components 04 based on the chain of trust transfer process;
  • the trusted measurement interface module 03 includes multiple sets of bus interfaces and buffer spaces, multiple sets of bus interfaces are used to connect multiple servers, and is responsible for sending and receiving target data required for trusted identity authentication between multiple servers and the processor 01, and will The target data is written into the cache space;
  • the processor 01 is configured to run a software simulation program adapted to the trusted measurement subject module 02 in the case of passing the integrity measurement, so as to complete the trusted identity verification of multiple servers based on the target data in the cache space; and In the case that multiple servers pass the trusted identity verification, multiple servers are allowed to access the cloud network system 30 interconnected by the network access devices 20 .
  • the cache space includes: a shared cache, and a dedicated cache and registers corresponding to each set of bus interfaces; a dedicated cache corresponding to each set of bus interfaces is used to store the trusted identity between the connected server and the processor 01 At least part of the target data required for authentication; the registers corresponding to each group of bus interfaces are used to record the offset address of the remaining part of the target data in the shared cache when the corresponding dedicated cache can only cache part of the target data; shared cache Shared by multiple groups of bus interfaces, it is responsible for caching the remaining part of the target data when the dedicated cache corresponding to each group of bus interfaces can only cache part of the target data.
  • the processor 01 is specifically configured to: use a polling or interrupt mechanism to determine the target-specific cache that has target data written into it; when only part of the target data can be read from the target-specific cache, The offset address recorded in the target register corresponding to the private cache, and the target number of the remaining part read from the shared cache According to the read two parts of the target data, the trusted identity authentication of the target server corresponding to the target dedicated cache is completed.
  • the processor 01 is also configured to: read the total length of the target data from the target dedicated cache, and determine that only Part of the target data was read.
  • the processor 01 is further configured to: in the case of multiple target-specific caches, determine that the processing priority of the target-specific caches that can only read part of the target data is higher than that of the target caches that can read all the target data The processing priority of the target private cache.
  • the shared cache is a ring cache.
  • other common components 04 include at least a memory chip carrying the basic input and output system BIOS, and the memory chip is respectively connected to the processor 01 and the trusted measurement main module 02 through the system bus; the trusted measurement main module 02 is a TPM chip or TPCM chip.
  • the network access device 20 uses the trusted measurement main module 02 as the trusted root of the trusted measurement device 10 to complete the integrity measurement of the trusted measurement device 10 and add a trusted measurement interface module 03.
  • the trusted measurement device 10 can be connected to multiple servers in a one-to-many manner, and the The processor 01 of the software simulation program uses software to simulate the trusted measurement main module 02 to complete the trusted identity authentication of multiple servers connected to the device, so as to realize the provision of reliable services at a relatively low cost in the scenario of one-to-many connection servers. Trustworthiness, effectively verifying the credibility of multiple servers.
  • the trusted measurement device 10 can realize that the network access device 20 provides a low resource occupation, low cost and effective trusted measurement solution in the scenario of one-to-many connection to the server.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a cloud network system 30 provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the cloud network system 30 includes: a network access device 20 and multiple servers to be connected to the cloud network system 30 .
  • the network access device 20 includes the trusted measurement apparatus 10 provided in any embodiment of the present application.
  • the server needs to perform data communication with the computing nodes in the cloud network through the network access device 20, and the server The process of establishing a communication connection with a computing node in the cloud network through the network access device 20 is called a process of accessing the cloud network.
  • the network access device 20 can perform trusted identity verification on the server through the trusted measurement device 10 .
  • the server accesses the cloud network system 30 through the network access device 20 if the server passes the trusted identity authentication.
  • the process for the server to access the cloud network system 30 through the network access device 20 includes: the server communicates with the cloud network system 30 through the network access device 20
  • the computing nodes of the computing nodes establish a data transmission channel, and perform data transmission based on the data transmission channel, so as to achieve the purpose of connecting the server to the cloud network system 30 .
  • the process of the network access device 20 performing trusted identity verification on the server through the trusted measurement device 10 may refer to the foregoing embodiments, and details are not repeated here.
  • Fig. 6 is a flow chart of a trusted identity authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application. The method is applicable to the network access device 20 shown in FIG. 4 including the trusted measurement apparatus 10 , and the trusted measurement apparatus 10 includes at least a trusted measurement main module 02 and a trusted measurement interface module 03 . As shown in Figure 6, the method includes:
  • the trusted measurement main module 02 complete the integrity measurement of the trusted measurement device 10 or the network access device 20 based on the chain of trust transfer process.
  • the server accesses the cloud network system 30 through the network access device 20 .
  • the server establishes a data transmission channel with computing nodes providing services in the cloud network system through the network access device 20, and performs data transmission based on the data transmission channel, so as to achieve the purpose of the server accessing the cloud network system 30.
  • the subject of execution of each step of the method provided in the foregoing embodiments may be the same device, or the method may also be executed by different devices.
  • the execution subject of steps 501 to 504 may be device A; for another example, the execution subject of steps 501 and 502 may be device A, and the execution subject of steps 503 and 504 may be device B; and so on.
  • the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. taste. Accordingly, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
  • computer-usable storage media including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.
  • These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to operate in a specific manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising instruction means, the instructions
  • the device realizes the function specified in one or more procedures of the flowchart and/or one or more blocks of the block diagram.
  • a computing device includes one or more processors 01 (CPUs), input/output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.
  • processors 01 CPUs
  • input/output interfaces network interfaces
  • memory volatile and non-volatile memory
  • Memory may include non-permanent storage in computer readable media, in the form of random access memory (RAM) and/or nonvolatile memory such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of computer readable media.
  • RAM random access memory
  • ROM read-only memory
  • flash RAM flash random access memory
  • Computer-readable media including both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, can be implemented by any method or technology for storage of information.
  • Information may be computer readable instructions, data structures, modules of a program, or other data.
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Abstract

本申请实施例提供一种可信度量装置、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法。在本申请实施例中，通过可信度量主体模块作为可信度量装置的可信根，以完成对可信度量装置的完整性度量，以及增设可信度量接口模块，通过可信度量接口模块提供的多组总线接口和缓存空间，可以实现可信度量装置以一对多方式连接多个服务器，以及借助能够运行与所述可信度量主体模块适配的软件模拟程序的处理器，采用软件方式模拟可信度量主体模块完成对接入该装置的多台服务器的可信身份认证，实现在一对多连接服务器的场景下以较低成本提供可信能力，有效地验证多个服务器的可信度，完成了对多个服务器可信验证的统一管理。

Description

可信度量装置、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法
本申请要求于2022年03月04日提交中国专利局、申请号为202210209833.3、申请名称为“可信度量装置、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及云计算技术领域，尤其涉及一种可信度量装置、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法。
背景技术
云计算需要大量服务器，这些服务器通过专用的网络接入设备可接入云网络。具体地，这些服务器可连接网络接入设备，网络接入设备与云网络互联，网络接入设备主要实现服务器接入云网络所需要的管控、安全、网络等相关功能。其中，云网络是以云为中心，面向应用和租户的虚拟化网络基础设施，具备按需、弹性、随处可获得、可计量的特征。
为了保证可信的服务器接入云网络，如图1所示，可在每台服务器上嵌入可信平台模块(Trusted Platform Module，TPM)芯片，采用TPM芯片度量与服务器的可信度，进而保证可信的服务器接入云网络。但是，目前这种保证可信的服务器接入云网络的实现方式，成本较高，且网络接入设备也很难完成对TPM芯片的统一管理。
发明内容
本申请的多个方面提供一种可信度量装置、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法，用以在一对多连接服务器的场景下以较低成本提供可信能力，有效地验证多个服务器的可信度。
本申请实施例提供一种可信度量装置，至少包括：处理器、可信度量主体模块、可信度量接口模块以及其它通用部件；可信度量主体模块作为可信度量装置的可信根，用于基于信任链传递流程完成对处理器和其它通用部件的完整性度量；可信度量接口模块包括多组总线接口和缓存空间，多组总线接口用于连接多台服务器，负责收发多台服务器与处理器之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，并将目标数据写入缓存空 间中；处理器，用于在通过完整性度量的情况下，运行与可信度量主体模块适配的软件模拟程序，以基于缓存空间中的目标数据完成对多台服务器的可信身份验证。
本申请实施例提供一种网络接入设备，包括：可信度量装置，可信度量装置至少包括：处理器、可信度量主体模块、可信度量接口模块以及其它通用部件；可信度量主体模块作为可信度量装置的可信根，用于基于信任链传递流程完成对处理器和其它通用部件的完整性度量；可信度量接口模块包括多组总线接口和缓存空间，多组总线接口用于连接多台服务器，负责收发多台服务器与处理器之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，并将目标数据写入缓存空间中；处理器，用于在通过完整性度量的情况下，运行与可信度量主体模块适配的软件模拟程序，以基于缓存空间中的目标数据完成对多台服务器的可信身份验证；并在多台服务器通过可信身份验证的情况下，允许多台服务器接入网络接入设备互联的云网络系统。
本申请实施例提供一种云网络系统，包括：网络接入设备和待接入云网络系统的多台服务器，网络接入设备包括本申请实施例提供的可信度量装置，以对所述多台服务器进行可信身份验证，其中，所述多台服务器在通过所述可信身份验证的情况下，通过所述网络接入设备接入所述云网络系统。
本申请实施例提供一种可信身份认证方法，适用于包括可信度量装置的网络接入设备，可信度量装置至少包括可信度量主体模块和可信度量接口模块，该方法包括：根据可信度量主体模块提供的可信根，基于信任链传递流程完成对可信度量装置或网络接入设备的完整性度量；接收通过可信度量接口模块互联的服务器发送的可信身份验证请求，将可信身份验证请求中携带的目标数据写入缓存空间中；运行与可信度量主体模块适配的软件模拟程序，以基于缓存空间中的目标数据完成对多台服务器的可信身份验证；以及在多台服务器通过可信身份验证的情况下，允许多台服务器接入网络接入设备互联的云网络系统。
在本申请实施例中，通过可信度量主体模块作为可信度量装置的可信根，以完成对可信度量装置的完整性度量，以及增设可信度量接口模块，通过可信度量接口模块提供的多组总线接口和缓存空间，可以实现可信度量装置以一对多方式连接多个服务器，以及借助能够运行与可信度量主体模块适配的软件模拟程序的处理器，采用软件方式模拟可信度量主体模块完成对接入该装置的多台服务器的可信身份认证，实现在一对多连接服务器的场景下以较低成本提供可信能力，有效地验证多个服务器的可信度，完成了对多个服务器可信验证的统一管理。进一步的，可信度量装置可以实现网络接入设备在一对多连接服务器的场景下，提供低资源占用率、低成本和有效的可信 度量方案。
附图说明
此处所说明的附图用来提供对本申请的进一步理解，构成本申请的一部分，本申请的示意性实施例及其说明用于解释本申请，并不构成对本申请的不当限定。在附图中：
图1为现有的多个服务器接入网络接入设备的场景示意图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种可信度量装置的结构示意图；
图3为本申请实施例提供的一种共享缓存在不同时刻的存储状态示意图；
图4为本申请实施例提供的一种网络接入设备的结构示意图；
图5为本申请实施例提供的一种云网络系统的结构示意图；
图6为本申请实施例提供的一种可信身份认证方法的流程图。
具体实施方式
为使本申请的目的、技术方案和优点更加清楚，下面将结合本申请具体实施例及相应的附图对本申请技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述。显然，所描述的实施例仅是本申请一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本申请中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本申请保护的范围。
针对目前保证可信的服务器接入云网络的实现方式，成本较高，且网络接入设备20也很难完成对TPM芯片的统一管理的技术问题，为此，本申请实施例一种可信度量装置10、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法。在本申请实施例中，通过可信度量主体模块02作为可信度量装置10的可信根，以完成对可信度量装置10的完整性度量，以及增设可信度量接口模块03，通过可信度量接口模块03提供的多组总线接口和缓存空间，可以实现可信度量装置10以一对多方式连接多个服务器，以及借助能够运行与可信度量主体模块02适配的软件模拟程序的处理器01，采用软件方式模拟可信度量主体模块02完成对接入该装置的多台服务器的可信身份认证，实现在一对多连接服务器的场景下以较低成本提供可信能力，有效地验证多个服务器的可信度，完成了对多个服务器可信验证的统一管理。进一步的，可信度量装置10可以实现网络接入设备20在一对多连接服务器的场景下，提供低资源占用率、低成本和有效的可信度量方案。
以下结合附图，详细说明本申请各实施例提供的技术方案。
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种可信度量装置10的结构示意图。如图2所示，该可信度量装置10至少包括：处理器01、可信度量主体模块02、可信度量接口模块03以及 其它通用部件04。其中，可信度量主体模块02作为可信度量装置10的可信根，用于基于信任链传递流程完成对处理器01和其它通用部件04的完整性度量；可信度量接口模块03包括多组总线接口和缓存空间，多组总线接口用于连接多台服务器，负责收发多台服务器与处理器01之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，主要是指接收多台服务器发送的目标数据，并将目标数据写入缓存空间中；处理器01，用于在通过完整性度量的情况下，运行与可信度量主体模块02适配的软件模拟程序，以基于缓存空间中的目标数据完成对多台服务器的可信身份验证。
具体而言，可信度量主体模块02可以是任意的具有可信性验证的设备，例如包括但不限于：TPM(Trusted Platform Module，可信平台模块)芯片或TPCM(Trusted Platform Control Module，可信平台控制模块)芯片。TPM芯片或TPCM芯片是集成在可信度量装置10中，用于建立和保障信任源点的硬件核心模块，为可信计算提供完整性度量、安全存储、可信报告以及密码服务等功能。
在本实施例中，可以在可信度量主体模块02设置RTM(root of trust for measurement，可信度量根)，其它通用部件04中设置包括EMM(extended measurement modul，扩展度量模块)计算机启动过程中的代码度量执行部件组，实现对后续执行代码的完整性度量和信任链扩展。其中，可信度量装置10中的其它通用部件04例如包括但不限于：承载基本输入输出系统BIOS的存储芯片(又称为BIOS存储芯片)、随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory,RAM)、输入输出接口(I/O接口)等。BIOS存储芯片可以是闪存(FLSAH)芯片，但不限于此。其中，BIOS存储芯片可通过系统总线分别与处理器和可信度量主体模块连接。系统总线包括但不限于：SPI(serial peripheral interface，串行外围设备接口)总线、PCIE(peripheral component interconnect express，高速串行计算机扩展总线标准)总线或者Local Bus总线(又称为CPU总线)。
信任链是指在可信度量装置10启动和运行过程中，使用完整性度量方法在部件之间所建立的信任传递关系。信用链传递是通过一级认证一级，达到一级信任一级的过程，以至把这种信任扩展到整个可信度量装置10。在信用链传递流程中，以可信度量根RTM为起点；当需要装载并运行一个部件前，应由RTM或者EMM对该部件进行完整性度量，然后再将其加载和运行。值得说明的是，可以根据可信度量装置10中的部件装载顺序设计信用链传递流程。以其它通用部件04仅仅包括BIOS存储芯片为例，信用链传递流程的例如可以是：首先由可信度量主体模块02中的RTM对BIOS存储芯片进行完整性度量，在BIOS存储芯片通过完整性度量之后，信任从RTM传给BIOS存储芯片中的EMM，BIOS存储芯片中的EMM对处理器01进行完整性度量。
在本实施例中，为了通过同一可信度量主体模块02(例如TPM芯片或TPCM芯片)对多台服务器进行可信身份认证，在可信度量装置10中设置可信度量接口模块03，作为多台服务器与可信度量装置10之间的桥梁，用于在多台服务器与可信度量装置10之间提供数据传输和存储服务，使得可以通过可信度量装置10中的同一可信度量主体模块02(例如TPM芯片或TPCM芯片)对多台服务器进行可信身份认证。其中，可信度量接口模块03包括多组总线接口和缓存空间，多组总线接口用于连接多台服务器，负责收发多台服务器与处理器01之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，并将目标数据写入缓存空间中。具体地，可以接收多台服务器发送的目标数据并将该目标数据写入缓存空间中，以供处理器01从缓存空间中读取目标数据，或者，也可以接收处理器01发送的目标数据并将目标数据写入缓存空间中，进而将缓存空间中的目标数据发送给对应的服务器。
其中，总线接口例如包括但不限于：串行外围设备接口(serial peripheral interface，SPI)、串行通信接口(serial peripheral interface，SCI)、I2C(Inter-IC)总线接口。
其中，每台服务器通过线缆连接一组总线接口，多台服务器分别与各自对应的总线接口连接，每台服务器通过总线接口与处理器01进行数据交互。参见图2，可信度量接口模块03提供N组SPI，分别为SPI1、SPI2、SPI3……SPIN等，N个服务器分别为服务器1、服务器2、服务器3……服务器N等，SPI1与服务器1连接，SPI2与服务器2连接，SPI3与服务器3连接……SPIN与服务器N连接。
在本实施例中，缓存空间是进行高速数据交换和存储的存储器，用于缓存服务器与处理器01之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据。其中，服务器与处理器01之间进行可信身份认证的过程可以是采用软件方式模拟TPM芯片或TPCM芯片对其所在设备进行可信度量的过程，将接入可信度量装置01的每台服务器分别作为是TPM芯片或TPCM芯片所在的设备。其中，服务器与处理器01之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，也就是模拟TPM芯片或TPCM芯片对其所在设备进行可信度量的过程需要交互的数据，例如包括但不限于固件(Firmware)校验时服务器的BIOS程序数据，以及在可信身份认证过程中需要的数据交互命令，例如TPM2_Startup,TPM2_GetCapability以及TPM2_PcrExtend等可信度量数据。其中，TPM芯片或TPCM芯片对其所在设备进行可信度量的过程可参见关于TPM的规范，在此不再赘述。
进一步可选的，为了便于管理和维护进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，缓存空间可以包括：共享缓存，以及每组总线接口对应的专用缓存和寄存器；每组总线接口对应的专用缓存，用于存储其所连接服务器与处理器01之间进行可信身份认证所需的至少部分目标数据；每组总线接口对应的寄存器，用于在对应专用缓存仅能缓存部分目标数据的情况 下，记录剩余部分的目标数据在共享缓存中的偏移地址；共享缓存被多组总线接口共享，负责在各组总线接口对应的专用缓存仅能缓存部分目标数据的情况下，缓存剩余部分的目标数据。
以图2为例，缓存空间中包括：共享缓存、与SPI1对应的SPI1专用缓存和SPI1寄存器、与SPI2对应的SPI2专用缓存和SPI2寄存器、与SPI3对应的SPI3专用缓存和SPI3寄存器……与SPIN对应的SPIN专用缓存和SPIN寄存器。
在服务器向对应的总线接口传输的目标数据需要占用的存储空间不超过对应的专用缓存提供的存储空间时，将服务器所传输的目标数据写入对应的专用缓存。在服务器向对应的总线接口传输的目标数据需要占用的存储空间超过对应的专用缓存提供的存储空间，这时，将服务器所传输的目标数据中的部分数据写入对应的专用缓存，将服务器所传输的目标数据中剩余的部分数据写入共享缓存。可选的，为了充分利用专用缓存，优先在专用缓存中写入服务器所传输的数据，在专用缓存写满后，再向共享缓存写入服务器所传输的数据中剩余的部分数据。
在本实施例中，数据在共享缓存中的偏移地址offset是指数据在共享缓存中的物理地址相对于共享缓存的基地址(段首地址)的偏移量，根据数据在共享缓存中的偏移地址offset和共享缓存的基地址可以计算出数据在共享缓存中的物理地址，根据数据在共享缓存中的物理地址可以从共享缓存中读取对应的数据。
举例来说，专用缓存的存储空间一般为512字节，SPI1最多可接收4K Byte(字节)大小的数据。在SPI1接收到1K Byte的数据时，将1K Byte的数据中的512Byte的数据写入至SPI1对应的SPI1专用缓存，以及将1K Byte的数据中剩余的512Byte的数据写入至共享缓存，同时，在SPI1寄存器中写入剩余的512Byte的数据在共享缓存中偏移地址offset。根据共享缓存的基地址和剩余的512Byte数据在共享缓存中偏移地址offset，可以从共享缓存中读取剩余的512Byte数据。在从共享缓存中读取剩余的512Byte数据后，将SPI1寄存器中的剩余的512Byte的数据在共享缓存中偏移地址offset清空。
进一步可选的，共享缓存为环形缓存。环形缓存是指在使用方式上，共享缓存可以循环使用。循环使用共享缓存是指从共享缓存的基地址开始写入数据，在共享缓存的存储空间全部占用后，接着从共享缓存的基地址开始继续写入数据。在Time 0时刻，SPI1剩余数据、SPI3剩余数据、SPI6剩余数据依次存放在共享缓存中的SPI1偏移地址、SPI3偏移地址、SPI6偏移地址各自对应的位置上。SPI1剩余数据是指通过SPI1接收的目标数据中的剩余的部分数据，SPI3剩余数据是指通过SPI3接收的目标数据中的剩余的部分数据，SPI6剩余数据是指通过SPI6接收的目标数据中的剩余的部分数据。SPI1偏移地址是SPI1 剩余数据对应的偏移地址，SPI3偏移地址是SPI3剩余数据对应的偏移地址，SPI6偏移地址是SPI6剩余数据对应的偏移地址。
在Time 1时刻，SPI1剩余数据从共享缓存中清空，SPI2剩余数据又被写入至共享缓存中，由于SPI2剩余数据的偏移地址加上自身的数据长度超出共享缓存的剩余的存储空间的大小，因此，SPI2剩余数据中超出的部分从共享缓存的基地址开始存储。如图3所示，在共享缓存的头部和尾部都是SPI2剩余数据。
在本实施例中，处理器01例如包括但不限于：中央处理器01(central processing unit，CPU)、微控制单元(Microcontroller Unit，MCU)、数字处理器01(Digital Signal Processor，DSP)。
在本实施例中，处理器01中部署有与可信度量主体模块02适配的软件模拟程序，相比于硬件的可信度量主体模块02，软件模拟程序是软件形式的可信度量主体模块02，该软件模拟程序例如可以是可信平台模块软件模拟器(Software TPM Emulator)。处理器01运行软件模拟程序以采用软件方式模拟TPM或TPCM芯片完成对接入的多台服务器的可信身份认证。
值得说明的是，处理器01在对任一台服务器进行可信身份认证时，以可信平台模块软件模拟器为可信根，首先，可信平台模块软件模拟器读取服务器的固件数据(例如BIOS程序数据)，并对服务器的固件数据进行度量，以完成对服务器的BIOS的可信度量；接着，通过数据交互命令，使得服务器的BIOS再对服务器的OS(Operation System，操作系统)完成可信度量，服务器的OS再对服务器上的APP(Application，应用)完成可信度量，从而建立一条完整可信链，可信链的传递过程是：可信平台模块软件模拟器->服务器的BIOS->服务器的OS->服务器上的APP。关于基于可信平台模块软件模拟器进行可信度量的更多介绍可以参见关于TPM的规范。
在本实施例中，处理器01在确认自身通过完整性度量的情况下，运行软件模拟程序从缓存空间中获取需要可信身份验证的服务器的目标数据，并基于所获取的目标数据对服务器进行可信身份验证。由于处理器01自身是可信的，因此通过处理器01进行可信身份验证并通过可信身份验证的服务器也是可信的。
实际应用中，处理器01可以采用轮询或中断机制，确定是否执行针对服务器的可信身份认证的操作。其中，在轮询机制下，处理器01周期性地轮询各个专用缓存，从各个专用缓存中确定有目标数据写入的目标专用缓存，并执行可信身份认证的后续操作。在中断机制下，在任一专用缓存有目标数据写入时，可以向处理器01发中断请求，处理器01根据中断请求确定有目标数据写入的目标专用缓存，并执行可信身份认证的后续操作。
实际应用中，处理器01采用轮询或中断机制，确定有目标数据写入的目标专用缓存后，确定从目标专用缓存中是否可以读取到全部的目标数据。在从目标专用缓存中仅能读取到部分目标数据的情况下，根据目标专用缓存对应的目标寄存器中记录的偏移地址，从共享缓存中读取剩余部分的目标数据；根据所读取的两部分目标数据，完成对目标专用缓存对应的目标服务器的可信身份认证。在从目标专用缓存中能读取到全部的目标数据的情况下，根据所读取的全部的目标数据，完成对目标专用缓存对应的目标服务器的可信身份认证。
进一步可选的，在将全部或部分的目标数据写入至专用缓存中，还可以在专用缓存中写入全部的目标数据的总长度。目标数据的总长度通过与专用缓存的大小进行比较，可以帮助确认服务器所传输的目标数据是仅仅保存在专用缓存中，还是同时在专用缓存和共享缓存中一并保存。其中，目标数据的总长度可以反映目标数据需要占用多大的存储空间，专用缓存的大小是指专用缓存可提供的存储空间的大小。于是，处理器01在确定从目标专用缓存中是否可以读取到全部的目标数据时，可以从目标专用缓存中读取目标数据的总长度，并在目标数据的总长度大于目标专用缓存的大小的情况下，确定从目标专用缓存中仅能读取到部分目标数据。
进一步可选的，处理器01在目标专用缓存为多个的情况下，确定仅能读取到部分目标数据的目标专用缓存的处理优先级高于能够读取到全部目标数据的目标专用缓存的处理优先级。相应地，处理器01会根据处理优先级由高到低的顺序，依次对各目标专用缓存进行数据处理。
值得注意的是，优先处理仅能读取到部分目标数据的目标专用缓存，随之共享缓存所存储剩余的目标数据也优先被处理，进而降低共享缓存中的数据溢出，使得共享缓存可以提供更多的空闲的存储空间，提高了共享缓存的利用率，也有助于提高多个服务器场景下接入云网络系统30的接入效率。
本申请实施例提供的可信度量装置10，通过可信度量主体模块02作为可信度量装置10的可信根，以完成对可信度量装置10的完整性度量，以及增设可信度量接口模块03，通过可信度量接口模块03提供的多组总线接口和缓存空间，可以实现可信度量装置10以一对多方式连接多个服务器，以及借助能够运行与可信度量主体模块02适配的软件模拟程序的处理器01，采用软件方式模拟可信度量主体模块02完成对接入该装置的多台服务器的可信身份认证，实现在一对多连接服务器的场景下以较低成本提供可信能力，有效地验证服务器的可信度，完成了对多个服务器可信验证的统一管理。进一步的，可信度量装置10可以实现网络接入设备20在一对多连接服务器 的场景下，提供低资源占用率、低成本和有效的可信度量方案。
图4为本申请实施例提供的一种网络接入设备20的结构示意图。该网络接入设备20可以是任意的能够提供云网络接入服务的设备，例如包括但不限于：调制解调器、交换机和路由器。在服务器与网络接入设备20之间的物理连接已建立的基础上，例如因为要使用云网络中的服务，服务器要通过网络接入设备20与云网络中的计算节点进行数据通信，将服务器通过网络接入设备20与云网络中的计算节点建立通信连接的过程称为接入云网络的过程。在服务器接入云网络之前，网络接入设备20需要对服务器进行可信身份验证。网络接入设备20确认服务器通过可信身份认证的情况下，服务器通过网络接入设备20与云网络中的计算节点建立数据传输通道，并基于数据传输通道进行数据传输，以实现服务器接入云网络系统30。
参见图4，该网络接入设备20包括：可信度量装置10，并通过可信度量装置10对服务器进行可信身份验证。具体地，可信度量装置10至少包括：处理器01、可信度量主体模块02、可信度量接口模块03以及其它通用部件04。
可信度量主体模块02作为可信度量装置10的可信根，用于基于信任链传递流程完成对处理器01和其它通用部件04的完整性度量；
可信度量接口模块03包括多组总线接口和缓存空间，多组总线接口用于连接多台服务器，负责收发多台服务器与处理器01之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，并将目标数据写入缓存空间中；
处理器01，用于在通过完整性度量的情况下，运行与可信度量主体模块02适配的软件模拟程序，以基于缓存空间中的目标数据完成对多台服务器的可信身份验证；并在多台服务器通过可信身份验证的情况下，允许多台服务器接入网络接入设备20互联的云网络系统30。
进一步可选的，缓存空间包括：共享缓存，以及每组总线接口对应的专用缓存和寄存器；每组总线接口对应的专用缓存，用于存储其所连接服务器与处理器01之间进行可信身份认证所需的至少部分目标数据；每组总线接口对应的寄存器，用于在对应专用缓存仅能缓存部分目标数据的情况下，记录剩余部分的目标数据在共享缓存中的偏移地址；共享缓存被多组总线接口共享，负责在各组总线接口对应的专用缓存仅能缓存部分目标数据的情况下，缓存剩余部分的目标数据。
进一步可选的，处理器01具体用于：采用轮询或中断机制，确定有目标数据写入的目标专用缓存；在从目标专用缓存中仅能读取到部分目标数据的情况下，根据目标专用缓存对应的目标寄存器中记录的偏移地址，从共享缓存中读取剩余部分的目标数 据；根据所读取的两部分目标数据，完成对目标专用缓存对应的目标服务器的可信身份认证。
进一步可选的，处理器01还用于：从目标专用缓存中读取目标数据的总长度，并在目标数据的总长度大于目标专用缓存的大小的情况下，确定从目标专用缓存中仅能读取到部分目标数据。
进一步可选的，处理器01还用于：在目标专用缓存为多个的情况下，确定仅能读取到部分目标数据的目标专用缓存的处理优先级高于能够读取到全部目标数据的目标专用缓存的处理优先级。
进一步可选的，共享缓存为环形缓存。
进一步可选的，其它通用部件04至少包括承载基本输入输出系统BIOS的存储芯片，存储芯片通过系统总线分别与处理器01和可信度量主体模块02连接；可信度量主体模块02为TPM芯片或TPCM芯片。
本申请实施例提供的网络接入设备20，通过可信度量主体模块02作为可信度量装置10的可信根，以完成对可信度量装置10的完整性度量，以及增设可信度量接口模块03，通过可信度量接口模块03提供的多组总线接口和缓存空间，可以实现可信度量装置10以一对多方式连接多个服务器，以及借助能够运行与可信度量主体模块02适配的软件模拟程序的处理器01，采用软件方式模拟可信度量主体模块02完成对接入该装置的多台服务器的可信身份认证，实现在一对多连接服务器的场景下以较低成本提供可信能力，有效地验证多个服务器的可信度。进一步的，可信度量装置10可以实现网络接入设备20在一对多连接服务器的场景下，提供低资源占用率、低成本和有效的可信度量方案。
图5为本申请实施例提供的一种云网络系统30的结构示意图。如图5所示，该云网络系统30，包括：网络接入设备20和待接入云网络系统30的多台服务器。其中，网络接入设备20包括本申请任意实施例提供的可信度量装置10。在服务器与网络接入设备20之间的物理连接已建立的基础上，例如因为要使用云网络中的服务，服务器要通过网络接入设备20与云网络中的计算节点进行数据通信，将服务器通过网络接入设备20与云网络中的计算节点建立通信连接的过程称为接入云网络的过程。在服务器接入云网络之前，网络接入设备20可通过可信度量装置10对服务器进行可信身份验证。网络接入设备20确认服务器通过可信身份认证的情况下，服务器在通过可信身份验证的情况下，通过网络接入设备20接入云网络系统30。具体地，服务器通过网络接入设备20接入云网络系统30的过程包括：服务器通过网络接入设备20与云网络中 的计算节点建立数据传输通道，并基于数据传输通道进行数据传输，以实现服务器接入云网络系统30的目的。网络接入设备20通过可信度量装置10对服务器进行可信身份验证的过程可参见前述实施例，在此不再赘述。
图6为本申请实施例提供的一种可信身份认证方法的流程图。该方法适用于图4所示的包括可信度量装置10的网络接入设备20，可信度量装置10至少包括可信度量主体模块02和可信度量接口模块03。如图6所示，该方法包括：
601、根据可信度量主体模块02提供的可信根，基于信任链传递流程完成对可信度量装置10或网络接入设备20的完整性度量。
602、接收通过可信度量接口模块03互联的服务器发送的可信身份验证请求，将可信身份验证请求中携带的目标数据写入缓存空间中。
603、运行与可信度量主体模块02适配的软件模拟程序，以基于缓存空间中的目标数据完成对多台服务器的可信身份验证。
604、在多台服务器通过可信身份验证的情况下，允许多台服务器接入网络接入设备20互联的云网络系统30。
在网络接入设备20确认服务器通过可信身份认证的情况下，服务器通过网络接入设备20接入云网络系统30。具体地，服务器通过网络接入设备20与云网络系统中提供服务的计算节点建立数据传输通道，并基于数据传输通道进行数据传输，以实现服务器接入云网络系统30的目的。
本申请实施例提供的可信身份认证方法，具体可参见上述可信度量装置10或者网络接入设备20的描述，此处不再赘述。
需要说明的是，上述实施例所提供方法的各步骤的执行主体均可以是同一设备，或者，该方法也由不同设备作为执行主体。比如，步骤501至步骤504的执行主体可以为设备A；又比如，步骤501和502的执行主体可以为设备A，步骤503和504的执行主体可以为设备B；等等。
另外，在上述实施例及附图中的描述的一些流程中，包含了按照特定顺序出现的多个操作，但是应该清楚了解，这些操作可以不按照其在本文中出现的顺序来执行或并行执行，操作的序号如501、502等，仅仅是用于区分开各个不同的操作，序号本身不代表任何的执行顺序。另外，这些流程可以包括更多或更少的操作，并且这些操作可以按顺序执行或并行执行。需要说明的是，本文中的“第一”、“第二”等描述，是用于区分不同的消息、设备、模块等，不代表先后顺序，也不限定“第一”和“第二”是不同的类型。
本领域内的技术人员应明白，本申请的实施例可提供为方法、系统、或计算机程序产 品。因此，本申请可采用完全硬件实施例、完全软件实施例、或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式。而且，本申请可采用在一个或多个其中包含有计算机可用程序代码的计算机可用存储介质(包括但不限于磁盘存储器、CD-ROM、光学存储器等)上实施的计算机程序产品的形式。
本申请是参照根据本申请实施例的方法、设备(系统)、和计算机程序产品的流程图和/或方框图来描述的。应理解可由计算机程序指令实现流程图和/或方框图中的每一流程和/或方框、以及流程图和/或方框图中的流程和/或方框的结合。可提供这些计算机程序指令到通用计算机、专用计算机、嵌入式处理机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器01以产生一个机器，使得通过计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器01执行的指令产生用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的装置。
这些计算机程序指令也可存储在能引导计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备以特定方式工作的计算机可读存储器中，使得存储在该计算机可读存储器中的指令产生包括指令装置的制造品，该指令装置实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能。
这些计算机程序指令也可装载到计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备上，使得在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行一系列操作步骤以产生计算机实现的处理，从而在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行的指令提供用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的步骤。
在一个典型的配置中，计算设备包括一个或多个处理器01(CPU)、输入/输出接口、网络接口和内存。
内存可能包括计算机可读介质中的非永久性存储器，随机存取存储器(RAM)和/或非易失性内存等形式，如只读存储器(ROM)或闪存(flash RAM)。内存是计算机可读介质的示例。
计算机可读介质包括永久性和非永久性、可移动和非可移动媒体可以由任何方法或技术来实现信息存储。信息可以是计算机可读指令、数据结构、程序的模块或其他数据。计算机的存储介质的例子包括，但不限于相变内存(PRAM)、静态随机存取存储器(SRAM)、动态随机存取存储器(DRAM)、其他类型的随机存取存储器(RAM)、只读存储器(ROM)、电可擦除可编程只读存储器(EEPROM)、快闪记忆体或其他内存技术、只读光盘只读存储器(CD-ROM)、数字多功能光盘(DVD)或其他光学存储、磁盒式磁带，磁带磁盘存储或其他磁性存储设备或任何其他非传输介质，可用于存储可以被计算设备访问的信息。按照 本文中的界定，计算机可读介质不包括暂存电脑可读媒体(transitory media)，如调制的数据信号和载波。
还需要说明的是，术语“包括”、“包含”或者其任何其他变体意在涵盖非排他性的包含，从而使得包括一系列要素的过程、方法、商品或者设备不仅包括那些要素，而且还包括没有明确列出的其他要素，或者是还包括为这种过程、方法、商品或者设备所固有的要素。在没有更多限制的情况下，由语句“包括一个……”限定的要素，并不排除在包括要素的过程、方法、商品或者设备中还存在另外的相同要素。
以上仅为本申请的实施例而已，并不用于限制本申请。对于本领域技术人员来说，本申请可以有各种更改和变化。凡在本申请的精神和原理之内所作的任何修改、等同替换、改进等，均应包含在本申请的权利要求范围之内。

Claims (13)

  1. 一种可信度量装置，其特征在于，至少包括：处理器、可信度量主体模块、可信度量接口模块以及其它通用部件；
    所述可信度量主体模块作为所述可信度量装置的可信根，用于基于信任链传递流程完成对所述处理器和其它通用部件的完整性度量；
    所述可信度量接口模块包括多组总线接口和缓存空间，所述多组总线接口用于连接多台服务器，负责收发所述多台服务器与所述处理器之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，并将所述目标数据写入所述缓存空间中；
    所述处理器，用于在通过完整性度量的情况下，运行与所述可信度量主体模块适配的软件模拟程序，以基于所述缓存空间中的目标数据完成对所述多台服务器的可信身份验证。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的装置，其特征在于，所述缓存空间包括：共享缓存，以及每组总线接口对应的专用缓存和寄存器；
    每组总线接口对应的专用缓存，用于存储其所连接服务器与所述处理器之间进行可信身份认证所需的至少部分目标数据；
    每组总线接口对应的寄存器，用于在对应专用缓存仅能缓存部分目标数据的情况下，记录剩余部分的目标数据在所述共享缓存中的偏移地址；
    所述共享缓存被所述多组总线接口共享，负责在各组总线接口对应的专用缓存仅能缓存部分目标数据的情况下，缓存剩余部分的目标数据。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理器具体用于：采用轮询或中断机制，确定有目标数据写入的目标专用缓存；在从所述目标专用缓存中仅能读取到部分目标数据的情况下，根据所述目标专用缓存对应的目标寄存器中记录的偏移地址，从所述共享缓存中读取剩余部分的目标数据；根据所读取的两部分目标数据，完成对所述目标专用缓存对应的目标服务器的可信身份认证。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理器还用于：从所述目标专用缓存中读取目标数据的总长度，并在目标数据的总长度大于所述目标专用缓存的大小的情况下，确定从所述目标专用缓存中仅能读取到部分目标数据。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理器还用于：在所述目标专用缓存为多个的情况下，确定仅能读取到部分目标数据的目标专用缓存的处理优先级高于能够读取到全部目标数据的目标专用缓存的处理优先级。
  6. 根据权利要求2所述的装置，其特征在于，所述共享缓存为环形缓存。
  7. 根据权利要求1-6任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述其它通用部件至少包括承载基本输入输出系统BIOS的存储芯片，所述存储芯片通过系统总线分别与所述处理器和所述可信度量主体模块连接；所述可信度量主体模块为TPM芯片或TPCM芯片。
  8. 一种网络接入设备，其特征在于，包括：可信度量装置，所述可信度量装置至少包括：处理器、可信度量主体模块、可信度量接口模块以及其它通用部件；
    所述可信度量主体模块作为所述可信度量装置的可信根，用于基于信任链传递流程完成对所述处理器和其它通用部件的完整性度量；
    所述可信度量接口模块包括多组总线接口和缓存空间，所述多组总线接口用于连接多台服务器，负责收发所述多台服务器与所述处理器之间进行可信身份认证所需的目标数据，并将所述目标数据写入所述缓存空间中；
    所述处理器，用于在通过完整性度量的情况下，运行与所述可信度量主体模块适配的软件模拟程序，以基于所述缓存空间中的目标数据完成对所述多台服务器的可信身份验证；并在所述多台服务器通过可信身份验证的情况下，允许所述多台服务器接入所述网络接入设备互联的云网络系统。
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的设备，其特征在于，所述缓存空间包括：共享缓存，以及每组总线接口对应的专用缓存和寄存器；
    每组总线接口对应的专用缓存，用于存储其所连接服务器与所述处理器之间进行可信身份认证所需的至少部分目标数据；
    每组总线接口对应的寄存器，用于在对应专用缓存仅能缓存部分目标数据的情况下，记录剩余部分的目标数据在所述共享缓存中的偏移地址；
    所述共享缓存被所述多组总线接口共享，负责在各组总线接口对应的专用缓存仅能缓存部分目标数据的情况下，缓存剩余部分的目标数据。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的设备，其特征在于，所述处理器具体用于：采用轮询或中断机制，确定有目标数据写入的目标专用缓存；在从所述目标专用缓存中仅能读取到部分目标数据的情况下，根据所述目标专用缓存对应的目标寄存器中记录的偏移地址，从所述共享缓存中读取剩余部分的目标数据；根据所读取的两部分目标数据，完成对所述目标专用缓存对应的目标服务器的可信身份认证。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的设备，其特征在于，所述处理器还用于：从所述目标专用缓存中读取目标数据的总长度，并在目标数据的总长度大于所述目标专用缓存的 大小的情况下，确定从所述目标专用缓存中仅能读取到部分目标数据。
  12. 一种云网络系统，其特征在于，包括：网络接入设备和待接入云网络系统的多台服务器，所述网络接入设备包括权利要求1-7任一项所述的可信度量装置，以对所述多台服务器进行可信身份验证，其中，所述多台服务器在通过所述可信身份验证的情况下，通过所述网络接入设备接入所述云网络系统。
  13. 一种可信身份认证方法，其特征在于，适用于包括可信度量装置的网络接入设备，所述可信度量装置至少包括可信度量主体模块和可信度量接口模块，所述方法包括：
    根据可信度量主体模块提供的可信根，基于信任链传递流程完成对所述可信度量装置或网络接入设备的完整性度量；
    接收通过可信度量接口模块互联的服务器发送的可信身份验证请求，将所述可信身份验证请求中携带的目标数据写入缓存空间中；
    运行与所述可信度量主体模块适配的软件模拟程序，以基于所述缓存空间中的目标数据完成对多台服务器的可信身份验证；以及
    在所述多台服务器通过可信身份验证的情况下，允许所述多台服务器接入网络接入设备互联的云网络系统。
PCT/CN2023/077737 2022-03-04 2023-02-22 可信度量装置、设备、系统及可信身份认证方法 WO2023165401A1 (zh)

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