WO2023160701A1 - Procédé de communication entre des composants et dispositif informatique - Google Patents

Procédé de communication entre des composants et dispositif informatique Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2023160701A1
WO2023160701A1 PCT/CN2023/078424 CN2023078424W WO2023160701A1 WO 2023160701 A1 WO2023160701 A1 WO 2023160701A1 CN 2023078424 W CN2023078424 W CN 2023078424W WO 2023160701 A1 WO2023160701 A1 WO 2023160701A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
component
request
access
management module
access credential
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2023/078424
Other languages
English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
吴玲玲
李小川
张超
李宏
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Publication of WO2023160701A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023160701A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
    • G06F9/54—Interprogram communication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of computer technology, in particular to a component communication method and computing equipment.
  • fully componentized server architecture the traditional motherboard is split into basic boards, expansion boards and expansion components.
  • fully componentized servers have the convenience of easy expansion and maintenance of components, and at the same time, there is a risk that components may be counterfeited and tampered with.
  • components can be connected through high-speed interconnection buses such as memory interconnection (Compute Express Link, CXL) or unified bus (unified bus, UB or Ubus), and components can directly access their respective memory Data, and therefore, cross-component memory access brings security challenges to both computing components and memory expansion components. Once a counterfeit and tampered component is connected to a computing device, it may lead to hijacking of component capabilities, abuse, and memory data leakage. , there are many security risks.
  • memory interconnection Computer Express Link, CXL
  • unified bus unified bus
  • the present application provides a component communication method and a computing device, which are used to improve the security of bus communication between components in the computing device and reduce the risk of data leakage.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a computing device, the computing device at least includes a first component, a second component, and a management module;
  • the first component Before accessing the second component, the first component is used to send a request (denoted as the first request) to the management module; the management module is used to receive the first request of the first component and pass the access verification of the first component After that, send the access credential of the second component to the first component; the first component is also used to send a request to the second component based on the access credential of the second component (denoted as the second request), and the second request is used to request access to the second component Two components.
  • the management module is used to receive the first request of the first component and pass the access verification of the first component After that, send the access credential of the second component to the first component; the first component is also used to send a request to the second component based on the access credential of the second component (denoted as the second request), and the second request is used to request access to the second component Two components.
  • the first component sends the first request to the management module before accessing the second component; the management module sends the access credential of the second component to the first component after the access authority verification of the first component is passed; the first The component sends a second request to the second component based on the access credential, and the second request is used to request access to the second component.
  • the risks of component counterfeiting, data tampering, information leakage and illegal access between components in the multi-vendor component mode can be effectively reduced, and the security and reliability of communication between components on the bus are guaranteed.
  • the second component is configured to send a registration request to the management module, where the registration request is used to request registration of the accessible resources of the second component; the management module is configured to generate and store the second component Access credentials for accessible resources.
  • the management module of the components is set in the computing device, and the management module is responsible for the access credentials of each component The generation and management of the system, so as to realize the communication between the components based on the access credentials, so as to ensure the security of the bus communication between the components.
  • the access credential of the second component is generated by the management module according to the memory measurement value of the second component.
  • the memory measurement value of the component is used to generate the access credential of the component, which effectively reduces the risk of counterfeiting that the component may face.
  • the first component when the first component sends the second request to the second component based on the access credential of the second component, it is specifically used to: encrypt the access credential with a data key to obtain the encrypted access credential Credentials; wherein, the second request includes encrypted access credentials; the data key is received by the first component from the management module.
  • the first component uses the data key to encrypt the access credentials of the second component, and sends the encrypted access credentials to the second component through the second request.
  • the security of data communication can be enhanced.
  • two-layer security protection is realized, which effectively reduces the risk of the access credentials of the second component being leaked.
  • the second component is further configured to: receive and store the access credentials sent by the management module; after receiving the second request sent by the first component, the second component is further configured to: use the data The key decrypts the encrypted access credential to obtain the decrypted access credential; the data key is received by the second component from the management module; if the decrypted access credential is the same as the If the access credentials are the same, the second component is further configured to respond to the second request; or, if they are different, the second component is further configured to discard the second request.
  • the management module is a baseboard management controller (Baseboard Management Controller, BMC).
  • BMC Baseboard Management Controller
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a component communication method, which can be executed by a computer, wherein the computer includes at least a motherboard management controller (Baseboard Management Controller, BMC), a first component, and a second component.
  • BMC Motherboard Management Controller
  • the first component is configured to send a first request to the management module before accessing the second component; the first component sends a first request to the management module before accessing the second component; The first request is used to request to obtain the access credentials of the second component; after the access authority verification of the first component is passed, the management module sends the access credentials of the second component to the first component; the first component sends the second component based on the access credentials The component sends a second request, where the second request is used to request access to the second component.
  • BMC Board Management Controller
  • the method further includes: the management module receives a registration request sent by the second component, and the registration request is used to request to register the accessible resources of the second component; the management module generates and stores the second Access credentials for the component's accessible resources.
  • the access credential of the second component is generated by the management module using the memory measurement value of the second component.
  • the management module is a BMC.
  • the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the computer-readable storage medium When the computer-readable storage medium is executed by a computing device, the computing device executes the aforementioned first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect. Methods.
  • the program is stored in the storage medium.
  • the storage medium includes but not limited to volatile memory, such as random access memory, and nonvolatile memory, such as flash memory, hard disk drive (hard disk drive, HDD), and solid state drive (solid state drive, SSD).
  • the present application provides a computer program product
  • the computing device program product includes computer instructions, and when executed by the computing device, the computing device executes the aforementioned first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect method provided in .
  • the computer program product may be a software installation package, and if the method provided in the aforementioned first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect needs to be used, the computer program product may be downloaded and installed on the computing device execute the computer program product.
  • the present application further provides a chip, which is configured to implement the method described in the above first aspect and each possible implementation manner of the first aspect by executing a software program.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a computing device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a component communication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Baseboard Management Controller as a platform management system, its hardware is usually the first power-on component on the motherboard of a computing device, and has a series of monitoring and control functions. Specifically, The BMC is connected to various sensors, and these sensors are distributed on several components of the computing device. The BMC manages various components of the computer through these sensors, such as enabling components to be powered on and off.
  • the computing device involved in this application may be an independent physical machine, such as a server, a desktop computer, a notebook computer, and the like.
  • the computing device can be deployed on the user side as user equipment. It can also be deployed on the server side, which can be an independent server, or a server cluster or distributed system composed of multiple physical servers.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a computing device 10 provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the traditional motherboard is split into a basic computing unit (Basic Computing Unit, BCU) 100, an expansion board 200 (Extension Unit, EXU) 200 and several extension components, and the basic computing unit 100 cooperates with the expansion board 200.
  • BCU Basic Computing Unit
  • EXU Extension Unit
  • the specifications and forms of motherboards required for different scenarios are supported.
  • the same computing device 10 may include one base board 100 and one expansion board 200, or the same computing device 10 may also include multiple base boards 100 and one expansion board 200, or the same computing device 10 may also include a A base board 100 and a plurality of expansion boards 200 .
  • the same computing device 10 may also include multiple base boards 100 and multiple expansion boards 200 .
  • the base board 100 includes a CPU 1011 , a double data rate (DDR) 1012 and related power supply 1013 , providing general computing capability and peripheral storage, input/output (IO), acceleration and other expansion interfaces.
  • Basic board 100 supports Kunpeng And so on different series of CPU.
  • the base board 100 supports heterogeneous processors, that is, the base board 100 can support different types of processors, for example, the base board 100 supports one or more CPUs 1011 (only one is shown in FIG.
  • the base board 100 may also include other components, such as a BIOS chip 1014 .
  • the embodiment of the present application provides at least six different types of basic boards 100 , respectively aiming at different computing performance and memory configurations.
  • these six types of base plates 100 are called A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, and C2 respectively.
  • P is used to represent the number of processors
  • P is an integer greater than 0
  • DPC represents each channel dual in-line memory module per channel (DIMM) Per Channel).
  • the base board 100 of A1 form supports one processor, and each channel inserts one DIMM (abbreviated as 1P1DPC);
  • the base board 100 of A2 form supports one processor, and each channel inserts one or two DIMMs (abbreviated as 1P2DPC).
  • the basic board 100 of B1 form supports two processors, and each channel inserts one DIMM (abbreviated as 2P1DPC), or, one processor, each channel inserts one or two DIMMs (abbreviated as 1P2DPC or 1P1DPC) ;
  • the basic board 100 of B2 form supports two processors, and each channel inserts one or two DIMMs (abbreviated as 2P2DPC or 2P1DPC), or one processor, and each channel inserts one or two DIMMs (abbreviated as 1P2DPC or 2P1DPC).
  • the basic board 100 of C1 form supports four processors, and each channel inserts one DIMM (abbreviated as 4P1DPC), or, two processors, each channel inserts one or two DIMMs (abbreviated as 2P2DPC or 2P1DPC );
  • the basic board 100 of C2 form supports four processors, and each channel inserts one or two DIMMs (abbreviated as 4P2DPC or 4P1DPC), or two processors, and each channel inserts one or two DIMMs (abbreviated as 2P2DPC or 2P1DPC).
  • the package size of the CPU, the number of memory channels and the number of DIMMs may change, but the standard size and mounting holes of the motherboard will remain unchanged, so as to ensure that the basic board 100 can be compatible and evolved across generations and series when it is updated.
  • the basic board 100 in B2 form supports 2P2DPC (2P32DIMM) when each CPU currently has 8 channels of DDR. After the number of CPU memory channels is increased to 12, 2P2DPC (2P48DIMM) will not be realized.
  • the B2 form can support 2P1DPC (2P24DIMM), and 2P2DPC (2P48DIMM) can be realized with other forms such as C1, because the position of the mounting hole and the size of the base plate 100 are standard, and it can be replaced and installed directly.
  • the expansion board 200 includes a motherboard management controller (Baseboard Management Controller, BMC) chip 2011 (abbreviated as BMC2011), a management system (not shown in FIG. PCH) 2012), is the management extension of the basic board 100, and as the management center of the entire system, it provides management functions such as equipment, security, energy efficiency, and reliability.
  • BMC2011 may also be called a baseboard management controller, and is used to provide management functions and power supply for the base board 100 and various expansion components.
  • the basic board 100 communicates with components through high-speed buses such as PCIe, memory interconnection (Compute Express Link, CXL), or unified bus (UB or Ubus), and connects with the expansion board 200 through a management interface.
  • high-speed buses such as PCIe, memory interconnection (Compute Express Link, CXL), or unified bus (UB or Ubus)
  • the specific connection methods of the base board 100 and the components, and the base board 100 and the expansion board 200 include: a soft connection method using cables to realize the above connection, or a hard connection method using connectors to realize the above connection.
  • Components are a general term for a class of electronic devices or electronic devices. According to their functions, components can be divided into computing components 4011, storage components (STorage Unit, STU) 4012, IO components (Input Output Unit, IOU) 4013, acceleration components (ACceleration Unit, ACU) 4014, memory expansion unit (Memory Expansion Unit, MEU) 4015 and cooling unit 4016.
  • the computing component 4011 such as CPU1011 and memory (such as DDR1012), etc. can be located in the base board 100, optionally, the computing component 4011 can also be used as an expansion component, connected with the base board 100; BMC2011, etc. can be located in the expansion board 200.
  • Each component is introduced as follows:
  • the storage component 4012 includes a hard disk backplane, an expansion board (Expander), a PCIe switch (switch), etc., For system storage expansion, it supports mechanical hard disk (hard disk drive, HDD) / solid-state drive (solid-state drive, SSD) / non-volatile high-speed transmission bus (Non-Volatile Memory express, NVMe) / storage class memory (Storage Class Memory, SCM) and other media and forms.
  • HDD hard disk drive
  • SSD solid-state drive
  • NVMe non-volatile high-speed transmission bus
  • SCM Storage Class Memory
  • the IO component 4013 includes components such as a Riser to realize the expansion of the system IO, and supports PCIe standard cards and Open Compute Project (Open Compute Project, OCP) cards.
  • components such as a Riser to realize the expansion of the system IO, and supports PCIe standard cards and Open Compute Project (Open Compute Project, OCP) cards.
  • OCP Open Compute Project
  • the acceleration component 4014 includes a carrier board, an accelerator card interconnection switch (switch), etc., and provides system acceleration component expansion and interconnection functions.
  • the memory expansion component 4015 includes a carrier board, a memory expansion chip, a dual in-line memory module (DIMM), an SCM medium, etc., and provides the function of expanding the memory bandwidth and memory capacity of the system.
  • DIMM dual in-line memory module
  • SCM medium etc.
  • the heat dissipation component 4016 is used to dissipate heat from the computing device or the hardware in the computing device, including a combination of several heat dissipation methods such as air cooling, liquid cooling, or a combination of the two. It should be understood that the structure, type and quantity of the heat dissipation components do not constitute a limitation on the technical solution to be protected in this application.
  • the components listed above are only examples of some components.
  • the components may also include power supply components. Some components may be located on the base board, and certain components may be located on the expansion board, and components that do not belong to the base board nor to the expansion board are called expansion components in this embodiment. In a word, any electronic device or electronic equipment that can be connected to the base board or the expansion board falls within the scope of components protected by the present application.
  • the position of each component shown in FIG. 1 is only an example, and the deployment form and connection method in the actual product of this application are not limited.
  • the architecture of the computing device 10 shown in FIG. 1 is only an example. In practical applications, the computing device 10 may include more or fewer components than in FIG. Peripherals (mouse, keyboard), etc.
  • the computing device 10 may not include the storage component 4012 and the like. This application does not specifically limit it.
  • the socket (Socket) of the processor for example, central processing unit (CPU)
  • CPU central processing unit
  • the main board provided by this application can set external interfaces in a standardized way, and perform various external expansions with soft connections such as cables, which can shield processor-related power supply, differences between different processors and components, and the interconnection between components. .
  • the changes of memory and other components are only included in the motherboard, and the function of cross-generation compatibility of the motherboard is realized.
  • the supporting complete machine and components do not need to be replaced, so the supporting components have a longer life cycle.
  • the latest components can be replaced at any time without changing the chassis or increasing the workload of hardware development, and the fastest use of the latest computing power in the industry.
  • the upgrade of the processor or the replacement of different processor manufacturers only needs to simply replace the basic board, which subverts the original development model and derives a new industrial model.
  • the above design splits the traditional motherboard into basic boards, expansion boards and expansion components.
  • the functions on the traditional motherboard are discrete into independent components.
  • the components can be independently produced, sold and installed, etc., providing computing equipment expansion , component maintenance and other flexibility and convenience.
  • CXL high-speed interconnection bus
  • the basic board and the components, and between the components can directly access each other or each other. memory data.
  • Cross-component memory access brings security challenges to both computing components and memory expansion components. Once a counterfeit and tampered component is connected to a computing device, it may lead to component capability hijacking, abuse, and memory data leakage. There are many security risks. .
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a communication method.
  • the management module verifies the access rights of the components, and the access is allowed only after the verification is passed.
  • This method can effectively reduce many The risk of component counterfeiting, data tampering, information leakage and illegal access between components in the vendor component mode ensures cross- Secure bus communication between components.
  • the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application will be described in detail.
  • the method may be performed by computing device 10 in FIG. 1 .
  • the method is executed by two components (respectively denoted as the first component and the second component) and the management module in the computing device 10 as an example to illustrate, wherein the management module can be a software module or a hardware module , or a combination of software modules and hardware modules.
  • the management module may be an independent component in the computing device 10, or an existing component, such as BMC, or other components, which are not specifically limited.
  • BMC existing component
  • the following uses the BMC having the function of the management module as an example for introduction. It should be understood that the BMC in the following can be replaced by the management module.
  • Fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart corresponding to the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Fig. 2, the method includes the following steps:
  • step 200 the BMC sends a data key (denoted as Tkey) to the first component and the second component respectively.
  • Tkey a data key
  • the first component and the second component receive and save the data key.
  • FIG. 2 takes the first component and the second component as examples, and only shows the process of the BMC distributing data keys to the first component and the second component, and other components are not shown.
  • the first component may be the base board 100
  • the second component may be any component in the computing device 10 other than the base board 100, such as an IO component, or a memory expansion component, or an acceleration component, or a storage component wait.
  • the first component may also be one of the IO components in the computing device 10, and the second component may be another IO component of the computing device 10, or the first component may be an IO component, and the second component may be a memory expansion Components, etc., are not specifically limited.
  • the communication method provided by the embodiment of the present application may also be applied to communication between components, for example, the first component is the CPU 1011 of the base board 100 , the second component is the DDR 1012 of the base board 100 , and so on.
  • BMC may also have other functions, which are not specifically limited.
  • BMC is also used to generate and manage component access credentials, which will be introduced below.
  • step 201 the second component sends a registration request to the BMC, where the registration request is used for requesting to register a resource of the second component that can be accessed remotely.
  • the registration request carries the identity information of the second component, and the identity information of the second component includes but is not limited to one or more of the following: the component identification (unique device secret, UDS) of the second component, the memory of the second component metric. Among them, the component identifier is used to uniquely identify a component.
  • the component identification unique device secret, UDS
  • UDS unique device secret
  • the memory measurement value may be generated based on the code segment of the second component, specifically, it may be generated based on one or more dynamic code segments of the second component, or may be generated based on one or more static code segments of the second component, It may also be generated based on at least one dynamic code segment and at least one static code segment of the second component.
  • the memory metric value may be the code segment used to generate the memory metric value itself, or may be a hash value obtained from the code segment used to generate the memory metric value, and is not specifically limited.
  • Step 202 based on the identity information of the second component, the BMC generates and saves the access credential of the second component (denoted as Ukey_2).
  • the BMC uses the memory value measurement of the second component to participate in the generation of the access credentials of the second component, which can effectively reduce the risk of counterfeiting that the second component may face.
  • step 203 the BMC sends the access credential of the second component to the second component.
  • the second component receives and saves the access credential.
  • Step 204 the first component sends a request (denoted as the first request) to the BMC before accessing the second component, the first Request is used to request access credentials for the second component.
  • the BMC receives the first request sent by the first component.
  • the first request includes, but is not limited to: the component identifier of the first component, and the component identifier of the second component.
  • the component identifier of the second component may be preset in the first component, broadcast by the second component, or obtained in other ways, which is not specifically limited.
  • step 205 the BMC verifies the access authority of the first component, and if the verification fails, then executes step 206; if the authentication passes, executes step 207.
  • the BMC judges whether the first component has access rights to the second component based on the mutual access policy.
  • the BMC stores mutual access policies between components in the computing device 10 .
  • the mutual access policy includes, but is not limited to: a component identifier of a component, and an access list of the component.
  • One or more components that can access the component are recorded in the access list, in other words, the components recorded in the access list have access rights.
  • the mutual access policy may also include other information, such as the access credentials of the component, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the mutual access policy stored in the BMC is shown in Table 1 below. It should be understood that Table 1 only shows some components in the mutual access policy.
  • UDS_1 represents the component identifier of the first component
  • UDS_2 represents the component identifier of the second component
  • UDS_3 represents the component identifier of the third component
  • Ukey_2 represents the access credential of the second component.
  • the access list of the second component includes the first component and the third component, that is to say, both the first component and the third component can access the second component, that is, they have access to the second component Access rights, in other words, components of computing device 10 other than the first component and the third component cannot access the second component.
  • the mutual access policy in the BMC can be preset in the BMC or generated by the BMC.
  • the registration request sent by the second component can also carry the access list of the second component. access policy, or can be configured by the user. If it is a user device, the computing device 10 may provide a corresponding configuration interface for the user to configure the mutual access policy.
  • step 205 if the access list of the second component includes the component identifier of the first component, the BMC determines that the first component has access rights to the second component. Alternatively, if the BMC cannot identify the component identifier of the first component, or the access list of the second component does not include the component identifier of the first component, then it is determined that the first component does not have access authority to the second component. Optionally, if the BMC cannot recognize the component identification of the first component, the first component may be a component that has been counterfeited or tampered with or is incompatible with the BMC, and the BMC may perform further processing, such as sending an alarm to the first component, and will Power off the first component, etc.
  • Step 206 the BMC rejects the first request of the first component.
  • the BMC does not respond to the first request of the first component, or the BMC sends indication information to the first component, where the indication information is used to indicate that the first request of the first component is rejected, etc., which are not specifically limited.
  • step 207 the BMC sends the access credential of the second component to the first component.
  • the first component receives the access credential of the second component sent by the BMC.
  • the BMC may directly send the access credential to the first component.
  • the BMC may also use a data key (Tkey) to encrypt the access credential, and send the encrypted access credential to the first component.
  • Tkey data key
  • the first component receives the encrypted access credentials sent by the BMC, it can use the Tkey decrypts the received data to obtain the access credentials of the second component.
  • Step 208 the first component sends a request (denoted as a second request) to the second component based on the access credential of the second component.
  • the second request is used to request access to the second component.
  • the second component receives the second request sent by the first component.
  • the second request may be a read data request for requesting to obtain data of the second component, or may also be a write data request for requesting to write data to be written into the second component.
  • the second request includes the access credential of the second component or the access credential encrypted using Tkey, and may also include other information, such as the component identifier of the first component, and if the second request is a write data request, the second The second request may also include the data to be written or the data to be written encrypted with the Tkey.
  • step 209 the second component verifies the access authority of the first component, and if the verification is passed, execute step 210; otherwise, execute step 211.
  • the second component verifies the access credential carried in the second request. It should be understood that, if the encrypted access credential is carried in the second request, the second component first uses Tkey to decrypt, To obtain the decrypted access credentials, after that, the second component compares the access credentials carried in the second request with the access credentials of the second component itself saved by the second component, and if they are consistent, then the verification is passed; if not, then Authentication failed.
  • Step 210 the second component responds to the second request.
  • the second component writes the data to be written carried in the second request into the second component.
  • the second component first uses the Tkey to decrypt to obtain the decrypted data to be written.
  • the second component obtains the data requested by the second request, and sends the obtained data, or encrypts the obtained data using Tkey, to the first a component.
  • the way the second component responds to the first component can be the same as the way the first component accesses the second component, that is, the second component first obtains the access credentials of the first component from the BMC, and then based on the access credentials of the first component Send data to the first component, if the second request is a read data request, the second component will use the access credentials of the first component (or access credentials encrypted with Tkey) and the data requested by the second request (or use Tkey encrypted data) is sent to the first component. Or, since the second component is the party requested to interact, the second component can also directly respond to the first component. For example, if the second request is a read data request, the second component directly sends the data requested by the second request. to the first component.
  • the way the second component accesses the first component is the same as the way the first component accesses the second component, that is, access based on the accessed component is required Credentials for communication.
  • the first component can use the data key to encrypt data, and communicate with the second component based on the access credentials of the second component, so as to realize double-layer security protection.
  • the second component responds to the request of the first component after the access right verification of the first component is passed. Effectively reduce the risk of component counterfeiting, data tampering, information leakage, and illegal access between components in the multi-vendor component mode, ensuring the security and reliability of communication between components on the bus.
  • Step 211 the second component does not respond to the second request.
  • the second component does not respond to the second request of the first component, for example, the second request may be discarded.
  • the BMC may periodically update the data key (Tkey), and synchronize the updated data key to each component.
  • the application can also periodically update the access credentials of the components. This process can be actively initiated by the components.
  • the second component sends an update request (or called a new registration request) to the BMC.
  • the update request carries the information used to generate the access credential of the second component (such as the identity information of the second component), and the BMC generates a new access credential (denoted as Ukey_2') of the second component based on the information carried in the update request, and generates
  • Ukey_2' new access credential
  • the BMC sends the new access credential to the second component, and the second component receives and saves the new access credential, that is, replaces the original access credential with the new access credential (such as Ukey_2').
  • Credentials (Ukey_2). It should be noted that the information used to generate access credentials carried by the second component in two adjacent update requests is different, so that Ukey_2' is different from Ukey_2.
  • BMC realizes the dynamic management of data keys and component access credentials by dynamically updating data keys and component access credentials, enhances the reliability of data keys and component access credentials, and reduces the risk of both being leaked. risk.
  • the above describes a complete method flow for the first component to access the second component. If after that, the first component accesses the second component again, in one implementation, the first component may not obtain the second component repeatedly Instead, directly use the access credentials of the second component obtained last time, and communicate with the second component based on the access credentials. If after the communication fails, if the second component fails to respond to or rejects the access request of the first component one or more times, the first component will reacquire the new access credential of the second component, and then, based on the new access credential Communicate with the second component.
  • the first component reacquires the access credentials of the second component before each access to the second component, and communicates with the second component based on the reacquired access credentials, which can ensure that the first component uses is the latest access credential for the second component.
  • the first component periodically obtains the access credentials of the second component.
  • the second component may not be obtained access credentials.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer storage medium, the computer storage medium stores computer instructions, and when the computer instructions are run on the computer, the computer executes the steps of the above-mentioned related methods to realize the computing device 10 in the above-mentioned embodiments.
  • the execution method refer to the description of each step in FIG. 2 , which will not be repeated here.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product.
  • the computer program product When the computer program product is run on a computer, it causes the computer to execute the above-mentioned related steps, so as to realize the method performed by the computing device 10 in the above-mentioned embodiment. See the steps in FIG. 2 description, which will not be repeated here.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a device, which may specifically be a chip, a component or a module, and the device may include a connected processor and a power supply circuit; wherein the power supply circuit is used to provide power for the operation of the processor, when When the device is running, the processor can execute computer-executed instructions, so that the chip executes the methods executed by the computing device 10 in the above-mentioned method embodiments. See the description of each step in FIG. 2 , and details will not be repeated here.
  • the computer storage media, computer program products or chips provided in the embodiments of the present application are all used to implement the method performed by the computing device 10 provided above, and the beneficial effects that can be achieved can refer to the corresponding The beneficial effects in the method will not be repeated here.
  • the computer-executed instructions in the embodiments of the present application may also be referred to as application program codes, which is not specifically limited in the embodiments of the present application.
  • all or part of them may be implemented by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof.
  • software When implemented using software, it may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on the computer, the processes or functions according to the embodiments of the present application will be generated in whole or in part.
  • the computer can be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable devices.
  • the computer instructions may be stored in or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from a website, computer, server or data center Transmission to another website site, computer, server, or data center by wired (eg, coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (eg, infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.).
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer, or a data storage device including a server, a data center, and the like integrated with one or more available media.
  • the available medium may be a magnetic medium (such as a floppy disk, a hard disk, or a magnetic tape), an optical medium (such as a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (such as a solid state disk (Solid State Disk, SSD)), etc.
  • a magnetic medium such as a floppy disk, a hard disk, or a magnetic tape
  • an optical medium such as a DVD
  • a semiconductor medium such as a solid state disk (Solid State Disk, SSD)
  • the various illustrative logic units and circuits described in the embodiments of this application can be processed by a general-purpose processor, digital signal Processors, Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to implement or operate the described functions.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, and optionally, the general-purpose processor may also be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller or state machine.
  • a processor may also be implemented by a combination of computing devices, such as a digital signal processor and a microprocessor, multiple microprocessors, one or more microprocessors combined with a digital signal processor core, or any other similar configuration to accomplish.
  • the steps of the method or algorithm described in the embodiments of the present application may be directly embedded in hardware, a software unit executed by a processor, or a combination of both.
  • the software unit may be stored in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM or any other storage medium in the art.
  • the storage medium can be connected to the processor, so that the processor can read information from the storage medium, and can write information to the storage medium.
  • the storage medium can also be integrated into the processor.
  • the processor and storage medium can be provided in an ASIC.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

La présente demande concerne un procédé de communication entre des composants, et un dispositif informatique. Le dispositif informatique comprend au moins un premier composant, un second composant et un module de gestion ; avant l'accès au second composant, le premier composant envoie une première demande au module de gestion ; après que l'autorisation d'accès du premier composant a été vérifiée avec succès, le module de gestion envoie un certificat d'accès du second composant au premier composant ; le premier composant envoie une seconde demande au second composant sur la base du certificat d'accès, la seconde demande étant utilisée pour demander l'accès au second composant. Dans la présente demande, le module de gestion pour les composants est disposé dans le dispositif informatique, le module de gestion est responsable de la génération et de la gestion de certificats d'accès des composants, et les composants communiquent les uns avec les autres sur la base des certificats d'accès, ce qui permet de réduire efficacement le risque de contrefaçon de composants, d'altération de données, de fuite d'informations et d'accès illégal entre les composants dans un mode de composants multiconstructeurs, et assure la sécurité de la communication par bus entre les composants.
PCT/CN2023/078424 2022-02-28 2023-02-27 Procédé de communication entre des composants et dispositif informatique WO2023160701A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202210188431.X 2022-02-28
CN202210188431.XA CN116701006A (zh) 2022-02-28 2022-02-28 一种组件通信方法及计算设备

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2023160701A1 true WO2023160701A1 (fr) 2023-08-31

Family

ID=83225963

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CN2023/078424 WO2023160701A1 (fr) 2022-02-28 2023-02-27 Procédé de communication entre des composants et dispositif informatique

Country Status (2)

Country Link
CN (2) CN116701006A (fr)
WO (1) WO2023160701A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116701006A (zh) * 2022-02-28 2023-09-05 华为技术有限公司 一种组件通信方法及计算设备

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20060136717A1 (en) * 2004-12-20 2006-06-22 Mark Buer System and method for authentication via a proximate device
US20190097994A1 (en) * 2017-09-27 2019-03-28 Oracle International Corporation Maintaining session stickiness across authentication and authorization channels for access management
CN110443049A (zh) * 2019-07-17 2019-11-12 南方电网科学研究院有限责任公司 一种安全数据存储管理的方法、系统及安全存储管理模块
CN114039792A (zh) * 2021-11-19 2022-02-11 度小满科技(北京)有限公司 一种数据访问权限控制方法、装置、设备及可读存储介质
CN115061826A (zh) * 2022-02-28 2022-09-16 华为技术有限公司 一种组件通信方法及计算设备

Family Cites Families (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN103795692B (zh) * 2012-10-31 2017-11-21 中国电信股份有限公司 开放授权方法、系统与认证授权服务器
CN104618096B (zh) * 2014-12-30 2018-10-30 华为技术有限公司 保护密钥授权数据的方法、设备和tpm密钥管理中心
CN104836664B (zh) * 2015-03-27 2019-05-14 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 一种执行业务处理的方法、装置和系统
CN106714075B (zh) * 2015-08-10 2020-06-26 华为技术有限公司 一种处理授权的方法和设备
US10972449B1 (en) * 2018-06-28 2021-04-06 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Communication with components of secure environment
WO2020102974A1 (fr) * 2018-11-20 2020-05-28 深圳市欢太科技有限公司 Procédé d'accès à des données, système d'accès à des données et terminal mobile
CN110266657A (zh) * 2019-05-30 2019-09-20 浙江大华技术股份有限公司 认证处理方法及装置、资源访问方法及装置、存储介质
US11334501B2 (en) * 2020-01-28 2022-05-17 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp Access permissions for memory regions
CN111399980A (zh) * 2020-03-16 2020-07-10 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 容器编排器的安全认证方法、装置及系统
CN113395289A (zh) * 2021-06-30 2021-09-14 北京奇艺世纪科技有限公司 一种认证方法、装置、电子设备及存储介质

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20060136717A1 (en) * 2004-12-20 2006-06-22 Mark Buer System and method for authentication via a proximate device
US20190097994A1 (en) * 2017-09-27 2019-03-28 Oracle International Corporation Maintaining session stickiness across authentication and authorization channels for access management
CN110443049A (zh) * 2019-07-17 2019-11-12 南方电网科学研究院有限责任公司 一种安全数据存储管理的方法、系统及安全存储管理模块
CN114039792A (zh) * 2021-11-19 2022-02-11 度小满科技(北京)有限公司 一种数据访问权限控制方法、装置、设备及可读存储介质
CN115061826A (zh) * 2022-02-28 2022-09-16 华为技术有限公司 一种组件通信方法及计算设备

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN115061826A (zh) 2022-09-16
CN116701006A (zh) 2023-09-05
CN115061826B (zh) 2024-02-13

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US20220091998A1 (en) Technologies for secure device configuration and management
EP3582129B1 (fr) Technologies d'attestation de matériel et de logiciel sécurisés pour une e/s fiable
US11487852B2 (en) Blockchain-based license management
JP6620595B2 (ja) 情報処理システム、情報処理装置、管理装置、処理プログラム、及び処理方法
US11171774B2 (en) System for synchronizing a cryptographic key state through a blockchain
US11252193B2 (en) Attestation service for enforcing payload security policies in a data center
US11902112B2 (en) Provisioning persistent, dynamic and secure cloud services
US11599378B2 (en) Data encryption key management system
US11868474B2 (en) Securing node groups
WO2023160701A1 (fr) Procédé de communication entre des composants et dispositif informatique
US11416615B2 (en) Configuring trusted remote management communications using UEFI
WO2023160705A1 (fr) Procédé et appareil d'authentification de composant
CN116702149A (zh) 一种可信度量方法、服务器以及芯片
US20230126468A1 (en) Information handling system bus out of band message access control
TW202217619A (zh) 分散式密鑰管理系統
US20240236056A1 (en) Authenticating work order requests in a multiple node environment
US20240073007A1 (en) Enforcing access control for embedded controller resources and interfaces
US12026561B2 (en) Dynamic authentication and authorization of a containerized process
US20230325225A1 (en) Confidential compute architecture integrated with direct swap caching
US20220066845A1 (en) Dynamic authenticatication an authorization of a containerized process
US20230344648A1 (en) Chained cryptographically signed certificates to convey and delegate trust and authority in a multiple node environment
US11651110B2 (en) Hardware device mutual authentication system and method for a baseboard management controller (BMC)
EP4191456A1 (fr) Unité de surveillance de performance d'un processeur empêchant la falsification d'une configuration de compteur et permettant un échantillonnage de données vérifiable
US20240137209A1 (en) Systems and methods for secure secret provisioning of remote access controllers
US20240235818A9 (en) Systems and methods for secure secret provisioning of remote access controllers

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 23759322

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1