WO2023133907A1 - 一种隐私保护生物认证方法和装置、电子设备 - Google Patents

一种隐私保护生物认证方法和装置、电子设备 Download PDF

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WO2023133907A1
WO2023133907A1 PCT/CN2022/072506 CN2022072506W WO2023133907A1 WO 2023133907 A1 WO2023133907 A1 WO 2023133907A1 CN 2022072506 W CN2022072506 W CN 2022072506W WO 2023133907 A1 WO2023133907 A1 WO 2023133907A1
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private key
data
client
okvs
biological
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PCT/CN2022/072506
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English (en)
French (fr)
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张秉晟
王志高
任奎
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浙江大学
浙江大学杭州国际科创中心
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Publication of WO2023133907A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023133907A1/zh
Priority to US18/605,868 priority Critical patent/US20240223377A1/en

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of privacy protection identity authentication, in particular to a privacy protection biometric authentication method and device, and electronic equipment.
  • the fuzzy vault technique has two distinct disadvantages. The first one is that the amount of data storage is relatively bloated, because of the security requirements of fuzzy vault technology, in order to protect a biological information (such as fingerprint information), it is necessary to generate nearly 100 times false points to confuse. The second is that if the same person uses his own bio to encrypt to form two independent fuzzy vaults, then these two fuzzy vaults can unlock each other, because the overlapping points between them must contain a large number of real points, enough Reach the threshold of unlocking, which becomes a huge security risk.
  • the purpose of the embodiment of the present application is to provide a privacy protection biometric authentication method and device, and electronic equipment to solve the problem of large data storage in the related art, and the two systems whose biological information of the same person is encrypted using fuzzy vault technology can unlock each other technical problems.
  • a privacy protection biometric authentication method applied to a client including:
  • the OKVS technology is used to restore the private key
  • the signature is sent to the server, so that the server verifies the user according to the public key and the signature.
  • a corresponding biometric data template is constructed, including:
  • a corresponding biometric template is constructed.
  • a secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology to generate encrypted biological data, including:
  • the private key is shared as a secret share of a corresponding number of private keys
  • the encrypted biometric data is generated using OKVS technology.
  • the OKVS technology is used to restore the private key, including:
  • the private keys are recovered according to the secret shares of the plurality of private keys.
  • a privacy protection biometric authentication device applied to a client including:
  • the first building block is to construct a corresponding biological data template according to the biological information data set input by the user during registration;
  • the first generation module generates a pair of public key and private key by using asymmetric cryptography technology
  • the second generation module generates encrypted biological data using a secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology according to the biological data template and the private key;
  • the first sending module sends the public key and encrypted biological data to the server
  • the recovery module utilizes OKVS technology to recover the private key according to the biometric data and the encrypted biometric data input by the user during verification;
  • the second sending module sends the signature to the server, so that the server verifies the user according to the public key and the signature.
  • a privacy protection biometric authentication method applied to a server including:
  • the biological data template is constructed by the client according to the biological information data set input by the user during registration;
  • the user is authenticated.
  • the private key is divided into a corresponding number of secret shares of the private key
  • the encrypted biometric data is generated using OKVS technology.
  • a privacy protection biometric authentication device applied to a server including:
  • the first receiving module receives the public key sent by the client, and the public key is generated by the client using asymmetric cryptography;
  • the acquisition module acquires encrypted biological data, which is sent by the client or generated by the server using a secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology according to the biological data template and private key, wherein the private key is used by the client using an asymmetric Generated by cryptographic technology, the biological data template is constructed by the client according to the biological information data set entered by the user during registration;
  • a storage module storing the public key and encrypted biological data
  • the second receiving module receives the signature sent by the client, wherein the signature is constructed by the client according to the restored private key and the corresponding public key, and the restored private key is constructed by the client according to the biological data input by the user during verification , using the OKVS technology to recover the private key to obtain;
  • the verification module verifies the user according to the public key and the signature.
  • an electronic device including:
  • processors one or more processors
  • memory for storing one or more programs
  • the one or more processors When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the method according to any one of the first aspect or the third aspect.
  • a computer-readable storage medium on which computer instructions are stored, and when the instructions are executed by a processor, the method described in any one of the first aspect or the third aspect is implemented. step.
  • this application uses the secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology to encrypt the biological data template to generate encrypted biological data, so that even if the data is leaked, the privacy of the user will not be exposed; at the same time, by using the OKVS technology, the user with the privacy protection function
  • the amount of storage required for encrypting biological data is greatly reduced; according to the restored private key and the corresponding public key, a signature is constructed so that the user's real biological information is only stored on the local client, ensuring the authenticity between the client and the untrusted server.
  • Safe communication the present invention also has the advantages of simple and convenient use, high efficiency and safety, privacy protection and remote use.
  • Fig. 1 is a flow chart of a biometric authentication method for privacy protection (applied to a client) according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 2 is a flowchart of step S11 shown according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 3 is a flow chart of step S13 according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 4 is a flow chart of step S15 shown according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 5 is a block diagram of a privacy protection biometric authentication device (applied to a client) according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 6 is a flow chart of a biometric authentication method for privacy protection (applied to a server) according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 7 is a block diagram of a privacy protection biometric authentication device (applied to a server) according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 8 is an interactive diagram showing a biometric authentication method for privacy protection according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • first, second, third, etc. may be used in this application to describe various information, the information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish information of the same type from one another. For example, without departing from the scope of the present application, first information may also be called second information, and similarly, second information may also be called first information. Depending on the context, the word “if” as used herein may be interpreted as “at” or “when” or “in response to a determination.”
  • OKVS is a cryptographic protocol.
  • KVS Key-Value Store
  • a KVS protocol includes two algorithms, the Encode algorithm and the Decode algorithm.
  • the input of the Encode algorithm is a set of key-value pairs ⁇ (k I , v i ) ⁇ , and a data structure S that stores key-value information is output; or there is a probability of 2 - ⁇ failure, and the output is a termination symbol ⁇ , where ⁇ is a variable Adjustment parameters.
  • the Decode algorithm is to input a data structure S storing key-value information and a key k i , and output the corresponding value v i .
  • OKVS adds security requirements on the basis of KVS. Generally speaking, if the value of v is random, then we will not be able to distinguish the data structure S formed by two keys of the same number k. Below we give the detailed security definition of OKVS:
  • Linear OKVS is a classification of the OKVS protocol, which means that the Decode algorithm can be written as the inner product of the value of key k after some mapping d and S. as follows
  • 3H-GCT is a hash form, which contains three different hash functions, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , assuming that this hash table is represented as T, we use T i to represent it in the hash table T.
  • the ith element of if any value k is inserted into 3H-GCT, then it will be expressed as
  • the construction of OKVS of 3H-GCT is a kind of linear OKVS, the hash table T is used as the encrypted data structure S in OKVS, and one is in the position H 1 (k), H 2 (k), H 3 (k) The upper value is 1, and the other positions are 0, and the binary vector whose length is equal to the length of S is used as the mapping d(k) of k.
  • network platform B Assuming that user A needs to use the service provided by network platform B, A needs to register account information on the platform and log in to enjoy the service. Both user A and network platform B hope to use a privacy-protecting and convenient identity authentication method. User A hopes to use biometric information instead of traditional password keys for identity authentication, and hopes that his account passwords can be encrypted, protected and stored securely, and not leaked to the server. In order to achieve the above requirements, user A and network platform B can use a privacy protection biometric authentication method shown below to complete identity authentication. In this embodiment, network platform B is the client.
  • Fig. 1 is a flow chart of a biometric authentication method for privacy protection according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in Fig. 1, the method is applied to a client and may include the following steps:
  • Step S11 Construct a corresponding biological data template according to the biological information data set input by the user during registration
  • Step S12 Using asymmetric cryptography technology to generate a pair of public key and private key;
  • Step S13 According to the biological data template and the private key, use the secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology to generate encrypted biological data;
  • Step S14 Send the public key and encrypted biometric data to the server
  • Step S15 According to the biometric data and the encrypted biometric data input by the user during verification, the OKVS technology is used to restore the private key;
  • Step S16 Construct a signature according to the restored private key and the corresponding public key
  • Step S17 Send the signature to the server, so that the server verifies the user according to the public key and the signature.
  • this application uses the secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology to encrypt the biological data template to generate encrypted biological data, so that even if the data is leaked, the privacy of the user will not be exposed; at the same time, by using the OKVS technology, the user with the privacy protection function
  • the amount of storage required for encrypting biological data is greatly reduced; according to the restored private key and the corresponding public key, a signature is constructed so that the user's real biological information is only stored on the local client, ensuring the authenticity between the client and the untrusted server.
  • Safe communication the present invention also has the advantages of simple and convenient use, high efficiency and safety, privacy protection and remote use.
  • OKVS technology can greatly reduce the amount of storage after data encryption
  • the secret sharing technology Because of the perfect privacy of the secret sharing technology, it is very difficult for attackers to restore the user's biological information data, thus ensuring the overall security.
  • a corresponding biological data template is constructed according to the biological information data set input by the user during registration
  • biometric authentication is actually a process of pattern recognition, which uses certain characteristics that are common but different in each natural person to verify the identity of the person and determine whether the user is the one he claims. people. Commonly used biometrics include fingerprints, faces, irises, voiceprints, etc. In addition, there are some less mature identification methods, such as gait recognition, finger vein recognition, etc.
  • the steps of biometric authentication mainly include the collection, extraction, quantification, and comparison of biometric features, and the final effect of the entire processing process only needs to match a part of the biometric data to determine the identity. As shown in Figure 2, this step includes the following sub-steps:
  • Step S21 Preprocessing the biological information dataset
  • the collected fingerprints and face images are screened, grouped, and labeled, and then the image is enhanced by means such as Gabor filtering algorithm to make it clear, and the image Do some cropping and rotation to make them align.
  • the operation of this step is to reduce the interference of different factors in the process of biological information collection, so that the subsequent feature extraction can be more accurate.
  • Step S22 according to the type of biological information in the biological information data set, perform feature extraction on the preprocessed biological information feature set to obtain biological feature data;
  • the face image is input into the trained deep neural network, and a feature vector with a fixed length is output as the extracted feature; points and their coordinates.
  • Step S23 quantifying the biometric information according to the type of the biometric data
  • the human face is used as the biological feature
  • the feature vector generated by the deep neural network generally belongs to the range of real numbers; first, the data range in the feature vector needs to be divided into different intervals according to the probability density of the data, The number of intervals is generally 2 x (x is the controllable precision), and then the value of the eigenvector falling into the interval is converted into the index (integer) of the corresponding interval, and then the corresponding integer is encoded according to some encoding methods (such as binary reflection Gray code, binary representation of an integer, etc.) encodes an integer as binary data.
  • some encoding methods such as binary reflection Gray code, binary representation of an integer, etc.
  • the fingerprint is used as the biometric feature, and the coordinates of the fingerprint are originally in the unit of pixel length, but the value generated in this way is too large, and the authentication error is relatively large, so it needs to be quantized into a fixed-length Bit string, the normal distribution curve of the fingerprint coordinates is divided into 2 b blocks according to the probability, then each block can be represented by a binary string of b bits.
  • step S24 a corresponding biometric template is constructed according to the quantified biometric data.
  • the above-mentioned quantized feature vectors are used as the final features, and the value of each feature vector is a feature point; taking fingerprints as an example, several points with similar distances are used as a cluster, and the clusters are combined The quantized coordinates of all points in are used as the final features.
  • the biological characteristics obtained after the above quantification process can be used as a characteristic template for subsequent encryption and authentication stages.
  • step S12 a pair of public key and private key is generated by using asymmetric cryptography technology
  • step S13 according to the biological data template and the private key, use the secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology to generate encrypted biological data;
  • this step includes the following sub-steps:
  • Step S31 According to the number of feature points in the biometric data template, divide the private key into a corresponding number of secret shares of the private key;
  • the private key sk is shared in (t, n) secrets to obtain the secret shares of n private keys.
  • Step S32 According to the biological data template and the secret share of the corresponding private key, use OKVS technology to generate encrypted biological data.
  • an OKVS technique is randomly selected, the biological data is used as the key, and the secret share of the private key is used as the value to encrypt, and then the encrypted biological data S is obtained.
  • t is the threshold of biometric unlocking, and the closer t is to n, the closer the biometric data required for authentication is to all the biometric data entered during re-registration.
  • step S14 the public key and encrypted biometric data are sent to the server
  • step S15 according to the biological data and the encrypted biological data input by the user during verification, the OKVS technology is used to recover the private key;
  • this step includes the following sub-steps:
  • Step S41 Construct a verification template according to the biological data input by the user during verification
  • the process of constructing the verification template is the same as the process of constructing the corresponding biological data template in step S11.
  • Step S42 according to the verification template, use the OKVS technology to decrypt the encrypted biological data to obtain a number of secret shares of private keys, wherein the number of secret shares of the private keys is greater than a predetermined number;
  • the Decode algorithm to be used depends on the Encode algorithm used in step S32 to generate encrypted biological data S, and then the user can The secret share of the private key of t′ shares can be obtained, and the predetermined number t is the threshold value of bio-unlocking. If the number of secret shares of the private key is less than the predetermined number, that is, t′ ⁇ t, you can choose to stop the decryption process or restart Enter decrypted data, such as fingerprints, the user can re-input a larger fingerprint area to the sensor to reach the unlocking threshold.
  • Step S43 Restoring the private keys according to the secret shares of the several private keys.
  • any t shares of the private key secret shares of the t′ private key are recovered using the Rec algorithm of secret sharing, and the private key is obtained,
  • the secret shares of the private key obtained by the user may have wrong values.
  • the user obtains t′ secret shares of the private key, among which there are t′r shares of correct values and t′w shares of wrong values.
  • the user can find the correct value through brute force search and recover the private key sk′; if t′ r -t′ w ⁇ t, the user can use the Berlekamp–Welch algorithm in Find out the correct secret share value in O(t') time, and recover the private key sk'.
  • step S16 a signature is constructed according to the restored private key and the corresponding public key
  • the client can use the signature technology of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to construct signature c. If there is a need for security, we can use the post-quantum safe NTRU signature algorithm.
  • step S17 the signature is sent to the server, so that the server verifies the user according to the public key and the signature.
  • the client generates a signature c and sends it to the server.
  • the present application also provides embodiments of a privacy-protecting biometric authentication device.
  • Fig. 5 is a block diagram of a biometric authentication device for privacy protection according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • the device is applied to the client and may include:
  • the first construction module 21 according to the biological information data set input when the user registers, constructs the corresponding biological data template
  • the first generation module 22 generates a pair of public key and private key by using asymmetric cryptography technology
  • the second generating module 23 utilizes a secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology to generate encrypted biological data;
  • the first sending module 24 sends the public key and encrypted biometric data to the server;
  • Restoration module 25 according to the input biometric data and described encrypted biometric data when verifying by user, utilize OKVS technology to restore described private key;
  • the second construction module 26 constructs a signature according to the restored private key and the corresponding public key
  • the second sending module 27 is configured to send the signature to the server, so that the server verifies the user according to the public key and the signature.
  • Fig. 6 is a flow chart of a biometric authentication method for privacy protection according to an exemplary embodiment. As shown in Fig. 6, the method is applied to a server and may include the following steps:
  • Step S51 receiving the public key sent by the client, the public key is generated by the client using asymmetric cryptography;
  • the public and private keys are generated in this way to comply with the algorithm used by the authentication process.
  • Step S52 Obtain encrypted biological data, which is sent by the client or generated by the server using secret sharing technology and OKVS technology based on the biological data template and private key, wherein the private key is used by the client using asymmetric Generated by cryptographic technology, the biological data template is constructed by the client according to the biological information data set entered by the user during registration;
  • Step S53 storing the public key and encrypted biological data
  • the public key and encrypted biometric data are placed on the server, so that the privacy of the user's biometric data will not be revealed, and the user can be easily verified.
  • Step S54 Receive the signature sent by the client, wherein the signature is constructed by the client based on the recovered private key and the corresponding public key, and the recovered private key is used by the client based on the biometric data input by the user for verification.
  • OKVS technology recovers the private key to obtain;
  • biometric data feature template use the same OKVS technology used in encryption, and use the Decode algorithm to obtain the secret share of the private key sk.
  • the private key is recovered through the Rec algorithm of secret sharing. If obtained If the secret share of the private key sk is less than t shares, the client fails to decrypt, and the user can re-enter more biometric information (such as fingerprints), or terminate the decryption process.
  • Step S55 Verify the user according to the public key and the signature.
  • the present application also provides embodiments of a privacy-protecting biometric authentication device.
  • Fig. 7 is a block diagram of a biometric authentication device for privacy protection according to an exemplary embodiment.
  • the device is applied to a server and may include:
  • the first receiving module 31 receives the public key sent by the client, and the public key is generated by the client using asymmetric cryptography;
  • the obtaining module 32 is used to obtain encrypted biological data, which is sent by the client or generated by the server using the secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology according to the biological data template and private key, wherein the private key is obtained by the client using non- Generated by symmetric cryptography technology, the biological data template is constructed by the client according to the biological information data set entered by the user during registration;
  • a storage module 33 which stores the public key and encrypted biological data
  • the second receiving module 34 receives the signature sent by the client, wherein the signature is constructed by the client according to the restored private key and the corresponding public key, and the restored private key is constructed by the client according to the biometric inputted by the user during verification.
  • the data is obtained by recovering the private key using OKVS technology;
  • the verification module 35 verifies the user according to the public key and the signature.
  • the process of a privacy protection biometric authentication method provided by this application includes:
  • Step S61 The client constructs a corresponding biological data template according to the biological information data set input by the user during registration;
  • Step S62 The client generates a pair of public key pk and private key sk by using asymmetric cryptography technology
  • Step S63 The client generates encrypted biological data S by using the secret sharing scheme and OKVS technology according to the biological data template and the private key sk;
  • Step S64 the client sends the public key pk and encrypted biometric data S to the server;
  • Step S65 the server stores the public key pk and encrypted biological data S;
  • Step S66 The client uses OKVS technology to restore the private key according to the biometric data input by the user during verification and the encrypted biometric data S;
  • Step S67 The client constructs a signature c according to the recovered private key sk' and the corresponding public key pk;
  • Step S68 the client sends the signature c to the server
  • Step S69 The server verifies the user according to the public key pk and the signature c.
  • step S61-step S69 has been described in detail above, and will not be repeated here.
  • the device embodiment since it basically corresponds to the method embodiment, for related parts, please refer to the part description of the method embodiment.
  • the device embodiments described above are only illustrative, and the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in One place, or it can be distributed to multiple network elements. Part or all of the modules can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this application. It can be understood and implemented by those skilled in the art without creative effort.
  • the present application also provides an electronic device, including: one or more processors; a memory for storing one or more programs; when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors , so that the one or more processors implement the privacy-preserving biometric authentication method as described above.
  • the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which computer instructions are stored, which is characterized in that, when the instructions are executed by a processor, the above-mentioned privacy protection biometric authentication method is implemented.

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Abstract

一种隐私保护生物认证方法和装置、电子设备，该方法包括：根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板（S11）；利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥和私钥（S12）；根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据（S13）；将所述公钥和加密生物数据发送到服务器（S14）；根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复（S15）；根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名（S16）；将所述签名发送到服务器，以使得服务器根据所述公钥和签名对用户进行验证（S17）。该方法解决了相关技术中存在的数据存储量大、同一个人的生物信息使用模糊金库技术加密的两个系统可以相互解锁的技术问题。

Description

一种隐私保护生物认证方法和装置、电子设备 技术领域
本申请涉及隐私保护身份认证领域，尤其涉及一种隐私保护生物认证方法和装置、电子设备。
背景技术
在当前社会中，信息安全越来越重要。常常使用密码学方式实现一个系统，但是这个系统的一个安全性挑战就是维护密钥的保密性。有效的解决方案是使用用户的生物信息(如指纹)作为认证来获取密钥，因为生物信息往往具有唯一性。但是一个生物认证系统本身很容易受到攻击。因为认证的需要，其常常需要将用户的生物信息数据存储在服务器的数据库中，该服务器一旦受到攻击，用户的所有保密信息将会泄漏。而后，为了解决这一问题，人们采用了很多的隐私保护生物认证技术，其中最经典的就是模糊金库技术。自基于模糊金库技术的生物识别系统在2007年被提出的后，其后的十几年间隐私保护的生物认证方法大多是在其基础上进行改进。
在实现本发明的过程中，发明人发现现有技术中至少存在如下问题：
模糊金库技术有两个明显的缺点。第一个是数据存储量比较臃余，因为模糊金库技术的安全性要求，为了保护一个生物信息(如指纹信息)，必须生成接近100倍的假的点来混淆。第二个是如果同一个人用自己的生物去加密形成了两个独立的模糊金库，那么这两个模糊金库就可以互相解锁，因为它们之间的重合点中必定包含了大量的真实点，足以达到解锁的门槛，这将成为一个巨大的安全隐患。
发明内容
本申请实施例的目的是提供一种隐私保护生物认证方法和装置、电子设备，以解决相关技术中存在的数据存储量大、同一个人的生物信息使用模糊金库技术加密的两个系统可以相互解锁的技术问题。
根据本申请实施例的第一方面，提供一种隐私保护生物认证方法，应用于客户端，包括：
根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板；
利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥和私钥；
根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据；
将所述公钥和加密生物数据发送到服务器；
根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复；
根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名；
将所述签名发送到服务器，以使得服务器根据所述公钥和签名对用户进行验证。
进一步地，根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板，包括：
对所述生物信息数据集进行预处理；
根据所述生物信息数据集中生物信息的类型，对预处理后的生物信息特征集进行特征提取，得到生物特征数据；
根据所述生物特征数据对应的种类，对所述生物特征信息进行量化；
根据量化后的生物特征数据，构建出相应的生物特征模板。
进一步地，根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS 技术生成加密生物数据，包括：
根据所述生物数据模板中特征点的数量，将所述私钥分享为对应数量的私钥的秘密份额；
根据所述生物数据模板和对应的私钥的秘密份额，利用OKVS技术生成加密生物数据。
进一步地，根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复，包括：
根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，构建验证模板；
根据所述验证模板，利用OKVS技术对所述加密生物数据进行解密，得到若干私钥的秘密份额，其中所述私钥的秘密份额的数量大于预定数量；
根据所述若干私钥的秘密份额，对所述私钥进行恢复。
根据本申请实施例的第二方面，提供一种隐私保护生物认证装置，应用于客户端，包括：
第一构建模块，根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板；
第一生成模块，利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥和私钥；
第二生成模块，根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据；
第一发送模块，将所述公钥和加密生物数据发送到服务器；
恢复模块，根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复；
构建模块，根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名；
第二发送模块，将所述签名发送到服务器，以使得服务器根据所述公钥和签名对用户进行验证。
根据本申请实施例的第三方面，提供一种隐私保护生物认证方法，应用于服务器，包括：
接收客户端发送的公钥，所述公钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成；
获取加密生物数据，所述加密生物数据由客户端发送得到或由服务器根据生物数据模板和私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成得到，其中所述私钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成，所述生物数据模板由客户端根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集构建；
对所述公钥和加密生物数据进行存储；
接收客户端发送的签名，其中所述签名由客户端根据恢复后的私钥和对应的公钥构建，所述恢复后的私钥由客户端根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复得到；
根据所述公钥和签名，对用户进行验证。
进一步地，根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用OKVS技术生成加密生物数据，包括：
根据所述生物数据模板中特征点的数量，将所述私钥分割为对应数量的私钥的秘密份额；
根据所述生物数据模板和对应的私钥的秘密份额，利用OKVS技术生成加密生物数据。
根据本申请实施例的第四方面，提供一种隐私保护生物认证装置，应用于服务器，包括：
第一接收模块，接收客户端发送的公钥，所述公钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成；
获取模块，获取加密生物数据，所述加密生物数据由客户端发送得到或由服务器根据生物数据模板和私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成得到，其中所述私钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成，所述生物数据模板由客户 端根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集构建；
存储模块，对所述公钥和加密生物数据进行存储；
第二接收模块，接收客户端发送的签名，其中所述签名由客户端根据恢复后的私钥和对应的公钥构建，所述恢复后的私钥由客户端根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复得到；
验证模块，根据所述公钥和签名，对用户进行验证。
根据本申请实施例的第五方面，提供一种电子设备，包括：
一个或多个处理器；
存储器，用于存储一个或多个程序；
当所述一个或多个程序被所述一个或多个处理器执行，使得所述一个或多个处理器实现如第一方面或第三方面中任一项所述的方法。
根据本申请实施例的第六方面，提供一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机指令，该指令被处理器执行时实现如第一方面或第三方面中任一项所述方法的步骤。
本申请的实施例提供的技术方案可以包括以下有益效果：
由上述实施例可知，本申请利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术对生物数据模板加密，生成加密生物数据，使得数据即使泄露也不会暴露用户的隐私；同时通过使用OKVS技术，使得具有隐私保护功能的加密生物数据所需要的存储量大大减少；根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名，使得用户真实生物信息只留存在本地客户端，保证了客户端与不可信服务器之间的安全通信；本发明还具有使用简便、高效安全、隐私保护且可以远程使用的优点。
应当理解的是，以上的一般描述和后文的细节描述仅是示例性和解释性的，并不能限制本申请。
附图说明
此处的附图被并入说明书中并构成本说明书的一部分，示出了符合本申请的实施例，并与说明书一起用于解释本申请的原理。
图1是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证方法(应用于客户端)的流程图。
图2是根据一示例性实施例示出的步骤S11的流程图。
图3是根据一示例性实施例示出的步骤S13的流程图。
图4是根据一示例性实施例示出的步骤S15的流程图。
图5是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证装置(应用于客户端)的框图。
图6是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证方法(应用于服务器)的流程图。
图7是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证装置(应用于服务器)的框图。
图8是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证方法的交互图。
具体实施方式
这里将详细地对示例性实施例进行说明，其示例表示在附图中。下面的描述涉及附图时，除非另有表示，不同附图中的相同数字表示相同或相似的要素。以下示例性实施例中所描述的实施方式并不代表与本申请相一致的所有实施方式。相反，它们仅是与如所附权利要求书中所详述的、本申请的一些方面相一致的装置和方法的例子。
在本申请使用的术语是仅仅出于描述特定实施例的目的，而非旨在限制本申请。在本申请和所附权利要求书中所使用的单数形式的“一种”、“所述”和“该”也旨在包括多数形式，除非上下文清楚地表示其他含义。还应当理解，本文中 使用的术语“和/或”是指并包含一个或多个相关联的列出项目的任何或所有可能组合。
应当理解，尽管在本申请可能采用术语第一、第二、第三等来描述各种信息，但这些信息不应限于这些术语。这些术语仅用来将同一类型的信息彼此区分开。例如，在不脱离本申请范围的情况下，第一信息也可以被称为第二信息，类似地，第二信息也可以被称为第一信息。取决于语境，如在此所使用的词语“如果”可以被解释成为“在……时”或“当……时”或“响应于确定”。
首先对OKVS技术进行解释：
OKVS(Oblivious Key-Value Store)是一种密码学协议。首先我们需要了解KVS(Key-Value Store)协议，一个KVS协议包含两个算法，Encode算法和Decode算法。其中Encode算法的输入是键值对的集合{(k I,v i)}，输出一个存储了键值信息的数据结构S；或者有概率2 -λ失败，输出终止符号⊥，其中λ为可调节参数。Decode算法是输入存储键值信息的数据结构S和一个键k i，输出对应的值v i。
S|⊥←Encode({(k 1,v 1,),(k 2,v 2)…(k n,v n)})
v i←Decode(S,k i)
OKVS是在KVS的基础上添加了安全性要求，通俗的讲如果值v的取值随机，那么我们将无法区分两个相同数量的健k所形成的数据结构S。下面我们给出OKVS的详细安全性定义:
如果我们说一个KVS是OKVS，对于所有不相同的
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000001
和不相同的
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000002
(其中k i的上标仅用于区分两组k i间不同)，如果Encode算法不失败，那么
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000003
和
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000004
是不可区分的。程序R的定义如下：
R(k 1,k 2,k 3,…,k n):
for i∈[n]:do v i←V
return Encode({k 1,v 1},{k 2,v 2},…,{k n,v n})
线性OKVS是OKVS协议的一种分类，它指的是Decode算法可以写成键k 经过某些映射d之后的值与S的内积。如下
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000005
线性OKVS中键k、值v和数据结构S的关系也可以写成下列形式
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000006
此处我们简单列出几种OKVS技术的具体实现
例1：多项式：
一种最自然而简单的想法就是使用多项式P，使多项式P满足P(k i)＝v i，其中多项式P的系数就是OKVS的数据结构S。解密的时候我们只需要将
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000007
与S做内积，就可以解密得到v i。通过描述我们可以知道基于多项式的OKVS技术是一种线性OKVS技术。
例2：密集矩阵：
如果有一个m行n列的随机矩阵，且满足m≥n+λ-1，那么这个矩阵出现线性相关的概率小于2 -λ。基于此，我们有一种构造OKVS的方法是将d(k i)映射为域F m中的随机向量d(k i)，然后求解下列线性方程组
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000008
得到OKVS的数据结构S。
例3：3H-GCT(3-Hash Garbled Cuckoo Table)
3H-GCT是一种哈希形式，其包含三个不同的哈希函数，H 1,H 2,H 3，假设这个哈希表我们表示为T，我们用T i表示在哈希表T中的第i个元素，那么任意一个值k如果插入3H-GCT中，那么它将会被表示为
Figure PCTCN2022072506-appb-000009
3H-GCT的OKVS的构造是一种linear的OKVS，将哈希表T作为OKVS中的加密的数据结构S，将一个在位置H 1(k),H 2(k),H 3(k)上值为1，其余位置值为0，长度等于S长度的二进制向量作为k的映射d(k)。
假设用户A需要使用网络平台B提供的服务，则A需要在该平台注册账户信息，并登陆才可以享受服务。用户A和网络平台B都希望使用一种具有隐私保护性质的，便捷的身份认证方法。用户A希望使用生物信息来代替传统的口令密钥用于身份认证，并且希望自己的账户密码都能够得到加密保护与安全存储，并且不泄露给服务器。为了实现以上要求，用户A和网络平台B可以使用下面展示的一种隐私保护生物认证方法来完成身份认证，本实施例中网络平台B为客户端。
图1是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证方法的流程图，如图1所示，该方法应用于客户端中，可以包括以下步骤：
步骤S11：根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板；
步骤S12：利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥和私钥；
步骤S13：根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据；
步骤S14：将所述公钥和加密生物数据发送到服务器；
步骤S15：根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复；
步骤S16：根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名；
步骤S17：将所述签名发送到服务器，以使得服务器根据所述公钥和签名对用户进行验证。
由上述实施例可知，本申请利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术对生物数据模板加密，生成加密生物数据，使得数据即使泄露也不会暴露用户的隐私；同时通过使用OKVS技术，使得具有隐私保护功能的加密生物数据所需要的存储量大大减少；根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名，使得用户真实生物信息只留存在本地客户端，保证了客户端与不可信服务器之间的安全通信；本发明还具有使用简便、高效安全、隐私保护且可以远程使用的优点。
具体地，因为OKVS技术可以大大的减少数据加密之后的存储量，所以我们使用OKVS来加密生物数据。但是由于OKVS的安全性要求和避免同一个人的生物数据加密形成的两份验证数据可以相互解锁，所以我们采用秘密分享技术。因为秘密分享技术的完美隐私性，攻击者非常难以还原用户的生物信息数据，因此保证了整体的安全性。同时由于秘密分享本身的特性使得我们可以任意选择秘密份额的值，只要它满足正确性的要求。这样使得即使同一个人的生物信息加密出来的数据也不相同，使得我们无法通过同一个人的生物信息的两份加密数据来还原用户的生物信息。
在步骤S11的具体实施中，根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板；
具体地，生物认证的本质实际上就是一个模式识别的过程，它利用每个自然人身上普遍存在却又形态各异的某些特征，来对人的身份进行验证，确定用户是否为自己声称的那个人。常用的生物特征有指纹、人脸、虹膜、声纹等，除此之外还有一些不太成熟的识别方法，如步态识别、指静脉识别等。生物认证的步骤主要包括生物特征的采集、提取、量化、比对等，其中整个处理过程的最终效果只要达到能匹配一部分生物数据就可以确定身份即可。如图2所示，此步骤包括以下子步骤：
步骤S21：对所述生物信息数据集进行预处理；
具体地，以指纹，人脸为例，将采集到的指纹、人脸图片进行筛选，分组，打上标签，然后通过如Gabor滤波算法等方式对图像进行增强，使其变得清晰，并且对图像进行一定的裁剪与旋转，使它们能够对齐。这一步的操作是为了减少生物信息采集过程中，受到的不同因素的干扰，使得后续的特征提取能够更加准确。
步骤S22，根据所述生物信息数据集中生物信息的类型，对预处理后的生物信息特征集进行特征提取，得到生物特征数据；
具体地，以人脸为例，将人脸图像输入训练好的深度神经网络，输出一个 固定长度的特征向量，作为提取的特征；以指纹为例，寻找指纹中的端点、分叉点作为特征点，将它们的坐标表示出来。
步骤S23，根据所述生物特征数据对应的种类，对所述生物特征信息进行量化；
具体地，对不同种类的生物特征，需要根据它的分布特点、比对方式等来对其进行分别量化，以便提高认证的精度。
在一实施例中，以人脸为生物特征，一般由深度神经网络产生出来的特征向量是属于实数范围；首先需要将特征向量中的数据范围根据其数据的概率密度来划分为不同的区间，区间数量一般为2 x(x为可控制精度)，然后将落入区间内的特征向量的值转化为对应的区间的索引(整数)，然后将对应的整数根据一些编码方法(例如二进制反射格雷码、整数的二进制表示等)将整数编码为二进制数据。
在另一实施例中，以指纹为为生物特征，指纹的坐标原本以像素长度为单位，但这样产生的数值过大，带来的认证误差也比较大，因此需要将其量化为固定长度的比特串，将指纹坐标的正态分布曲线根据概率均分成2 b块，那么每一块就可以用b个比特的二进制串来表示。
步骤S24，根据量化后的生物特征数据，构建出相应的生物特征模板。
具体地，以人脸为例，将上述量化后的特征向量作为最终特征，其中每一个特征向量的值就是特征点；以指纹为例，将距离相近的数个点作为一个簇，联合这个簇中所有点量化后的坐标，作为最终特征。通过上述量化过程后得到的生物特征才可以作为特征模板，供后续加密与认证阶段使用。
在步骤S12的具体实施中，利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥和私钥；
具体地，输入公共参数g，生成一对公私钥，pk为公钥，sk为私钥，满足pk＝g sk。
在步骤S13的具体实施中，根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据；
具体地，如图3所示，此步骤包括以下子步骤：
步骤S31：根据所述生物数据模板中特征点的数量，将所述私钥分割为对应数量的私钥的秘密份额；
具体地，假设所述生物数据模板中有n个特征点，则将私钥sk进行(t,n)的秘密分享，得到n个私钥的秘密份额。
步骤S32：根据所述生物数据模板和对应的私钥的秘密份额，利用OKVS技术生成加密生物数据。
具体地，随机选取一种OKVS技术，将生物数据作为键，私钥的秘密份额作为值进行加密，然后得到加密生物数据S。在具体实施中，t为生物解锁的阈值，t越接近n，认证时所需要的生物数据越接近再注册时候所录入的全部生物数据。
在步骤S14的具体实施中，将所述公钥和加密生物数据发送到服务器；
具体地，为了保证在不可信的服务器上完成我们的加密生物数据的验证过程，我们将加密生物数据和公钥通过信道传输到服务器上，无论攻击者截获数据或者是在服务器上获得数据，因为OKVS技术和公钥密码学的安全性，攻击者都给不可能辨别用户的生物信息。
在步骤S15的具体实施中，根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复；
具体地，如图4所示，此步骤包括以下子步骤：
步骤S41：根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，构建验证模板；
具体地，构建验证模板的过程与步骤S11中构建相应的生物数据模板的过程相同。
步骤S42：根据所述验证模板，利用OKVS技术对所述加密生物数据进行解密，得到若干私钥的秘密份额，其中所述私钥的秘密份额的数量大于预定数量；
具体地，将服务器上加密生物数据S和用户的验证模板(作为键k)放入 Decode算法中，具体使用什么Decode算法要根据步骤S32中使用了什么Encode算法生成加密生物数据S，然后用户就可以获得t′份的的私钥的秘密份额，预定数量t为生物解锁的阈值，若所诉私钥的秘密份额的数量小于预定数量，即t′<t，则可选择停止解密过程或者重新输入解密数据，如指纹来说，用户可重新向传感器输入更大的指纹面积，以达到解锁的门限。
步骤S43：根据所述若干私钥的秘密份额，对所述私钥进行恢复。
具体地，若获得的私钥的秘密份额的数量t′≥t，将所述t′份私钥的私钥的秘密份额中任意t份使用秘密分享的Rec算法，对私钥进行恢复，得到恢复后的私钥sk′。用户得到的私钥的秘密份额可能存在错误的值，假设用户得到t′份私钥的秘密份额，其中有t′ r份正确值，有t′ w份错误值。若t′ r+1≥t，则用户可以通过暴力搜索的方式找到其中正确的值，并恢复私钥sk′；若t′ r-t′ w≥t，则用户可以通过Berlekamp–Welch算法在O(t′)的时间内找出正确的秘密份额值，并恢复私钥sk′。
在步骤S16的具体实施中，根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名；
具体地，当用户在客户端身份认证成功取得sk′后，需要进行登录操作，客户端可以利用非交互式零知识证明的签名技术构建签名c，如果有安全性需要我们可以使用后量子安全的NTRU签名算法。在本实施例中，使用常用的Schnorr签名技术来构建签名，客户端与服务器共同商定一段文本Msg，文本Msg是公开的。然后客户端从服务器上取下该用户对应的公钥pk，并在域中随机取一个数w，计算A＝g w。计算e＝Hash(pk,A,Msg)，构造一个z＝w+e·sk ′。我们所构建的签名为c＝(A,z)。
在步骤S17的具体实施中，将所述签名发送到服务器，以使得服务器根据所述公钥和签名对用户进行验证。
具体地，客户端生成签名c，发送给服务器，服务器使用用户的公钥pk，然后重新计算e＝Hash(pk,A,Msg)，验证pk e·A＝g z，是否成立，如果成立，则验证成功，服务器向用户提供服务，若失败则拒绝用户请求。
与前述的隐私保护生物认证方法的实施例相对应，本申请还提供了隐私保护生物认证装置的实施例。
图5是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证装置框图。参照图5，该装置应用于客户端，可以包括：
第一构建模块21，根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板；
第一生成模块22，利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥和私钥；
第二生成模块23，根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据；
第一发送模块24，将所述公钥和加密生物数据发送到服务器；
恢复模块25，根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复；
第二构建模块26，根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名；
第二发送模块27，将所述签名发送到服务器，以使得服务器根据所述公钥和签名对用户进行验证。
图6是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证方法的流程图，如图6所示，该方法应用于服务器中，可以包括以下步骤：
步骤S51：接收客户端发送的公钥，所述公钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成；
具体地，客户端根据输入的公共参数g，生成一对公私钥，pk为公钥，sk为私钥，满足pk＝g sk。这样生成公钥和私钥是为了符合验证过程使用的算法。
步骤S52：获取加密生物数据，所述加密生物数据由客户端发送得到或由服务器根据生物数据模板和私钥，利用秘密共享技术和OKVS技术生成得到，其中所述私钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成，所述生物数据模板由客户端根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集构建；
具体地，我们将私钥的秘密份额作为值，将生物数据特征模板作为键；选 择一种OKVS技术执行其Encode算法，我们将会得到加密生物数据S。这样的好处是S不会泄露用户的生物数据。
步骤S53：对所述公钥和加密生物数据进行存储；
具体地，将公钥和加密生物数据放置与服务器上，这样做既不会泄露用户的生物数据的隐私性，也使得用户可以方便验证。
步骤S54：接收客户端发送的签名，其中所述签名由客户端根据恢复后的私钥和对应的公钥构建，所述恢复后的私钥由客户端根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复得到；
具体地，将生物数据特征模板作为键，使用加密时相同的OKVS技术，使用Decode算法获得私钥sk的秘密份额，当份额大于等于t份时候，通过秘密分享的Rec算法恢复私钥，如果获得的私钥sk的秘密份额小于t份，客户端解密失败，用户可以重新输入更多的生物信息(如指纹)，或者终止解密过程。
步骤S55：根据所述公钥和签名，对用户进行验证。
具体地，客户端生成签名c＝(A,z)，发送给服务器，服务器从区块链中取下该用户的公钥h，然后重新计算e＝Hash(h,A,Msg)，验证h e·A＝g z，是否成立，如果成立，则验证成功，服务器向用户提供服务，若失败则拒绝用户请求。
与前述的隐私保护生物认证方法的实施例相对应，本申请还提供了隐私保护生物认证装置的实施例。
图7是根据一示例性实施例示出的一种隐私保护生物认证装置框图。参照图7，该装置应用于服务器，可以包括：
第一接收模块31，接收客户端发送的公钥，所述公钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成；
获取模块32，获取加密生物数据，所述加密生物数据由客户端发送得到或由服务器根据生物数据模板和私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成得到，其中所述私钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成，所述生物数据模板由客户端根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集构建；
存储模块33，对所述公钥和加密生物数据进行存储；
第二接收模块34，接收客户端发送的签名，其中所述签名由客户端根据恢复后的私钥和对应的公钥构建，所述恢复后的私钥由客户端根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复得到；
验证模块35，根据所述公钥和签名，对用户进行验证。
如图8所示，本申请提供的一种隐私保护生物认证方法的过程包括：
步骤S61：客户端根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板；
步骤S62：客户端利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥pk和私钥sk；
步骤S63：客户端根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥sk，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据S；
步骤S64：客户端将所述公钥pk和加密生物数据S发送到服务器；
步骤S65：服务器对所述公钥pk和加密生物数据S进行存储；
步骤S66：客户端根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据S，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复；
步骤S67：客户端根据恢复后的私钥sk′和与对应的公钥pk，构建签名c；
步骤S68：客户端将所述签名c发送到服务器；
步骤S69：服务器根据所述公钥pk和签名c，对用户进行验证。
其中，步骤S61-步骤S69的具体实施已在上文详细阐述，此处不作赘述。
关于上述实施例中的装置，其中各个模块执行操作的具体方式已经在有关该方法的实施例中进行了详细描述，此处将不做详细阐述说明。
对于装置实施例而言，由于其基本对应于方法实施例，所以相关之处参见方法实施例的部分说明即可。以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，其中所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可 以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部模块来实现本申请方案的目的。本领域普通技术人员在不付出创造性劳动的情况下，即可以理解并实施。
相应的，本申请还提供一种电子设备，包括：一个或多个处理器；存储器，用于存储一个或多个程序；当所述一个或多个程序被所述一个或多个处理器执行，使得所述一个或多个处理器实现如上述的隐私保护生物认证方法。
相应的，本申请还提供一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机指令，其特征在于，该指令被处理器执行时实现如上述的隐私保护生物认证方法。
本领域技术人员在考虑说明书及实践这里公开的内容后，将容易想到本申请的其它实施方案。本申请旨在涵盖本申请的任何变型、用途或者适应性变化，这些变型、用途或者适应性变化遵循本申请的一般性原理并包括本申请未公开的本技术领域中的公知常识或惯用技术手段。说明书和实施例仅被视为示例性的，本申请的真正范围和精神由下面的权利要求指出。
应当理解的是，本申请并不局限于上面已经描述并在附图中示出的精确结构，并且可以在不脱离其范围进行各种修改和改变。本申请的范围仅由所附的权利要求来限制。

Claims (10)

  1. 一种隐私保护生物认证方法，其特征在于，应用于客户端，包括：
    根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板；
    利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥和私钥；
    根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据；
    将所述公钥和加密生物数据发送到服务器；
    根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复；
    根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名；
    将所述签名发送到服务器，以使得服务器根据所述公钥和签名对用户进行验证。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板，包括：
    对所述生物信息数据集进行预处理；
    根据所述生物信息数据集中生物信息的类型，对预处理后的生物信息特征集进行特征提取，得到生物特征数据；
    根据所述生物特征数据对应的种类，对所述生物特征信息进行量化；
    根据量化后的生物特征数据，构建出相应的生物特征模板。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据，包括：
    根据所述生物数据模板中特征点的数量，将所述私钥分享为对应数量的私钥的秘密份额；
    根据所述生物数据模板和对应的私钥的秘密份额，利用OKVS技术生成加密生物数据。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复，包括：
    根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，构建验证模板；
    根据所述验证模板，利用OKVS技术对所述加密生物数据进行解密，得到若干私钥的秘密份额，其中所述私钥的秘密份额的数量大于预定数量；
    根据所述若干私钥的秘密份额，对所述私钥进行恢复。
  5. 一种隐私保护生物认证装置，其特征在于，应用于客户端，包括：
    第一构建模块，根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集，构建相应的生物数据模板；
    第一生成模块，利用非对称密码学技术，生成一对公钥和私钥；
    第二生成模块，根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成加密生物数据；
    第一发送模块，将所述公钥和加密生物数据发送到服务器；
    恢复模块，根据用户验证时输入的生物数据和所述加密生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复；
    构建模块，根据恢复后的私钥和与对应的公钥，构建签名；
    第二发送模块，将所述签名发送到服务器，以使得服务器根据所述公钥和签名对用户进行验证。
  6. 一种隐私保护生物认证方法，其特征在于，应用于服务器，包括：
    接收客户端发送的公钥，所述公钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成；
    获取加密生物数据，所述加密生物数据由客户端发送得到或由服务器根据生物数据模板和私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成得到，其中所述私钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成，所述生物数据模板由客户端根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集构建；
    对所述公钥和加密生物数据进行存储；
    接收客户端发送的签名，其中所述签名由客户端根据恢复后的私钥和对应的公钥构建，所述恢复后的私钥由客户端根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复得到；
    根据所述公钥和签名，对用户进行验证。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的方法，其特征在于，根据所述生物数据模板和所述私钥，利用OKVS技术生成加密生物数据，包括：
    根据所述生物数据模板中特征点的数量，将所述私钥分割为对应数量的私钥的秘密份额；
    根据所述生物数据模板和对应的私钥的秘密份额，利用OKVS技术生成加密生物数据。
  8. 一种隐私保护生物认证装置，其特征在于，应用于服务器，包括：
    第一接收模块，接收客户端发送的公钥，所述公钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成；
    获取模块，获取加密生物数据，所述加密生物数据由客户端发送得到或由服务器根据生物数据模板和私钥，利用秘密共享方案和OKVS技术生成得到，其中所述私钥由客户端利用非对称密码学技术生成，所述生物数据模板由客户端根据用户注册时输入的生物信息数据集构建；
    存储模块，对所述公钥和加密生物数据进行存储；
    第二接收模块，接收客户端发送的签名，其中所述签名由客户端根据恢复后的私钥和对应的公钥构建，所述恢复后的私钥由客户端根据用户验证时输入的生物数据，利用OKVS技术对所述私钥进行恢复得到；
    验证模块，根据所述公钥和签名，对用户进行验证。
  9. 一种电子设备，其特征在于，包括：
    一个或多个处理器；
    存储器，用于存储一个或多个程序；
    当所述一个或多个程序被所述一个或多个处理器执行，使得所述一个或多个处理器实现如权利要求1-4或权利要求6-7中任一项所述的方法。
  10. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机指令，其特征在于，该指令被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1-4或权利要求6-7中任一项所述方法的步骤。
PCT/CN2022/072506 2022-01-13 2022-01-18 一种隐私保护生物认证方法和装置、电子设备 WO2023133907A1 (zh)

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