WO2023082903A1 - 一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法及区块链 - Google Patents
一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法及区块链 Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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Definitions
- the invention relates to the blockchain field in the financial technology (Fintech) field, in particular to a method for detecting malicious nodes in the blockchain and the blockchain.
- the sending node tampers with the ciphertext message that should have been sent and tampers with the wrong ciphertext message
- the sending node is a malicious node, or the receiving node may receive the correct ciphertext message, but declare that it is the wrong ciphertext message Message, that is, to falsely accuse the sending node, and the receiving node is a malicious node.
- the only way to locate the malicious node is to require the sending node to sign the plaintext data and then require the sending node to decrypt the ciphertext message through other non-technical means offline . Therefore, the current location of malicious nodes is relatively limited, which is an urgent problem to be solved.
- the invention provides a method for detecting malicious nodes in a block chain and the block chain, which solves the problem of relatively large limitations in locating malicious nodes in the prior art.
- the present invention provides a method for detecting malicious nodes in a blockchain, including:
- the notary node obtains the authenticated verification message, the first verification message from the first sending node, the second verification message from the second sending node and the third verification message from the receiving node, the notary node, the first sending node , the second sending node and the receiving node are both nodes in the blockchain;
- the authenticated verification message represents an authenticated ciphertext message, and the first verification message is used to verify the first sending node A declared ciphertext message, the second verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the second sending node, and the third verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the receiving node;
- the notary node determines the receiving node, the first sending node and the second verification message according to the authenticated verification message, the first verification message, the second verification message and the third verification message Two malicious nodes in the sending node.
- the notary node respectively obtains the corresponding verification message and the authenticated verification message from the first sending node, the second sending node, and the receiving node, then the authenticated verification message, the The first verification message, the second verification message, and the third verification message, and verify the consistency relationship between the ciphertext message declared by each node and the authenticated ciphertext message, so that the receiving node, A malicious node in the first sending node and the second sending node.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to a first preset method, or is the result obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset method and then obtained according to the first preset method.
- the authenticated upgrade message obtained in two preset ways, the first preset way and the second preset way are both one-way operation ways.
- the first preset method and the second preset method are both one-way calculation methods, it can be based on non-tamperable modification, according to the first preset method and the second preset method The corresponding relationship of the method is verified, so that the ciphertext message is verified at more levels, and the reliability of the malicious node detection method is improved.
- both the first preset method and the second preset method are the same hash operation.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset method, the first verification message includes the first ciphertext message, and the second verification message includes the first ciphertext message. an auxiliary message, the third verification message comprising a second ciphertext message and a second auxiliary message;
- the first ciphertext message is a ciphertext message declared by the first sending node
- the first auxiliary message is a ciphertext message declared by the second sending node based on the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset
- the second ciphertext message is the ciphertext message received by the receiving node statement
- the second auxiliary message is the ciphertext message received by the receiving node statement based on the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first predetermined obtained by way of setting;
- the notary node determines the receiving node, the first sending node and the second verification message according to the authenticated verification message, the first verification message, the second verification message and the third verification message 2.
- Malicious nodes among sending nodes including:
- the first condition is that the first ciphertext message is different from the second ciphertext message, or the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the second ciphertext message If the first auxiliary message is different, and the first auxiliary message is the same as the second auxiliary message, and the first auxiliary message is the same as the authenticated verification message, then the notary node determines that the first sending the node is malicious; or,
- the second condition is that the first auxiliary message is different from the second auxiliary message, or the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the first auxiliary message
- An auxiliary message is different, and the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is the same as the second auxiliary message, and the first ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method
- the message is the same as the authenticated verification message, then the notary node determines that the second sending node is a malicious node; or,
- the notary node determines that the receiving node is a malicious node.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained according to the second preset method after the authenticated ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method, and the first verification message includes the third an auxiliary message, the second verification message includes a first upgrade message, and the third verification message includes a fourth auxiliary message and a second upgrade message;
- the third auxiliary message is obtained by the first sending node statement based on the first ciphertext message in the first preset manner, and the first upgrade message is obtained by the second sending node statement based on the authenticated
- the ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method and then obtained according to the second preset method
- the fourth auxiliary message is that the receiving node declares that the second ciphertext message received according to the first preset method Obtained in a preset manner, the second upgrade message is obtained in accordance with the second preset manner after the receiving node declares that the message is obtained in the first preset manner based on the authenticated ciphertext message;
- the notary node determines the receiving node, the first sending node and the second verification message according to the authenticated verification message, the first verification message, the second verification message and the third verification message 2.
- Malicious nodes among sending nodes including:
- the third condition is that the third auxiliary message is different from the fourth auxiliary message, or the third auxiliary message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the first
- the upgrade messages are different, and the first upgrade message is the same as the second upgrade message, and the first upgrade message is the same as the authenticated verification message, then the notary node determines that the first sending node is malicious node; or,
- the fourth condition is that the first upgrade message is different from the second upgrade message, or the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is different from the first upgrade message.
- the upgrade messages are different, and the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is the same as the second upgrade message, and the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is the same as If the authenticated verification messages are the same, the notary node determines that the second sending node is a malicious node; or,
- the notary node determines that the receiving node is a malicious node.
- the present invention provides a block chain, including: a notary node, a first sending node, a second sending node and a receiving node;
- the notary node is configured to acquire an authenticated verification message, a first verification message from a first sending node, a second verification message from a second sending node, and a third verification message from a receiving node, the authenticated verification message Characterizing an authenticated ciphertext message, the first verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the first sending node, and the second verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the second sending node, The third verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the receiving node;
- the notary node is configured to determine, according to the authenticated verification message, the first verification message, the second verification message and the third verification message, the receiving node, the first sending node and A malicious node in the second sending node.
- the receiving node is also used for:
- the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is the same as the first auxiliary message, send a litigation message to the notary node, where the litigation message is used to instruct the first sending
- the node and the second sending node contain a malicious node.
- the block chain also includes an audit node
- the notary node is further configured to send the authenticated verification message, the first verification message, the second verification message, and the third verification message to the audit node;
- the audit node is configured to determine, according to the authenticated verification message, the first verification message, the second verification message, and the third verification message, that the receiving node, the first sending node, and A malicious node in the second sending node.
- the present invention provides a malicious node detection device, including:
- An acquisition module configured to acquire an authenticated verification message, a first verification message from a first sending node, a second verification message from a second sending node, and a third verification message from a receiving node, the notary node, the first sending node
- the node, the second sending node and the receiving node are all nodes in the blockchain;
- the authenticated verification message represents an authenticated ciphertext message, and the first verification message is used to verify the first sending A ciphertext message declared by a node, the second verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the second sending node, and the third verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the receiving node;
- a detection module configured to determine the receiving node, the first sending node and the A malicious node in the second sending node.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to a first preset method, or is the result obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset method and then obtained according to the first preset method.
- the authenticated upgrade message obtained in two preset ways, the first preset way and the second preset way are both one-way operation ways.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset method, the first verification message includes the first ciphertext message, and the second verification message includes the first ciphertext message. an auxiliary message, the third verification message comprising a second ciphertext message and a second auxiliary message;
- the first ciphertext message is a ciphertext message declared by the first sending node
- the first auxiliary message is a ciphertext message declared by the second sending node based on the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset
- the second ciphertext message is the ciphertext message received by the receiving node statement
- the second auxiliary message is the ciphertext message received by the receiving node statement based on the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first predetermined obtained by way of setting;
- the detection module is specifically used for:
- the first condition is that the first ciphertext message is different from the second ciphertext message, or the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the second ciphertext message. If the first auxiliary message is different, and the first auxiliary message is the same as the second auxiliary message, and the first auxiliary message is the same as the authenticated verification message, then determine that the first sending node is a malicious node ;or,
- the second condition is that the first auxiliary message is different from the second auxiliary message, or the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the first auxiliary message
- An auxiliary message is different, and the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is the same as the second auxiliary message, and the first ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method If the message is the same as the authenticated verification message, it is determined that the second sending node is a malicious node; or,
- the receiving node is a malicious node.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained according to the second preset method after the authenticated ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method, and the first verification message includes the third an auxiliary message, the second verification message includes a first upgrade message, and the third verification message includes a fourth auxiliary message and a second upgrade message;
- the third auxiliary message is obtained by the first sending node statement based on the first ciphertext message in the first preset manner, and the first upgrade message is obtained by the second sending node statement based on the authenticated
- the ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method and then obtained according to the second preset method
- the fourth auxiliary message is that the receiving node declares that the second ciphertext message received according to the first preset method Obtained in a preset manner, the second upgrade message is obtained in accordance with the second preset manner after the receiving node declares that the message is obtained in the first preset manner based on the authenticated ciphertext message;
- the detection module is specifically used for:
- the third condition is that the third auxiliary message is different from the fourth auxiliary message, or the third auxiliary message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the first
- the upgrade messages are different, and the first upgrade message is the same as the second upgrade message, and the first upgrade message is the same as the authenticated verification message, then it is determined that the first sending node is a malicious node; or,
- the fourth condition is that the first upgrade message is different from the second upgrade message, or the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is different from the first upgrade message.
- the upgrade messages are different, and the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is the same as the second upgrade message, and the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is the same as If the authenticated verification messages are the same, it is determined that the second sending node is a malicious node; or,
- the receiving node is a malicious node.
- the present invention provides a computer device, including a program or an instruction, and when the program or instruction is executed, is used to execute the above-mentioned first aspect, the second aspect and each optional method.
- the present invention provides a storage medium, including a program or an instruction, and when the program or instruction is executed, is used to execute the above-mentioned first aspect, the second aspect and each optional method.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic flow diagram corresponding to a method for detecting malicious nodes in a block chain provided by an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a detection device for a malicious node in a blockchain provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
- Blockchain is a chain composed of a series of blocks. In addition to recording the data of this block, each block also records the hash (Hash) value of the previous block. In this way, a chain is formed.
- Hash hash
- a block consists of a block header and a block body, where the block header definition includes the block height h, the Hash of the previous block refers to important fields such as prevHash, and the block body mainly stores transaction data.
- a joint data computing network composed of multiple data supply institutions. Based on privacy computing technologies such as secure multi-party technology, each data supply organization deploys a computing node to synchronize the circulation of ciphertext messages across institutions. These computing nodes can Form a blockchain. In practical scenarios, due to common commercial interests, most members of the alliance have a high motivation to implement the ciphertext message circulation protocol honestly, but a few malicious nodes that may appear cannot be ruled out.
- Malicious node A computing node that does not abide by the ciphertext message circulation agreement agreed in the computing alliance and tampers with the ciphertext message data.
- Distributed ciphertext message synchronization the process of synchronizing a ciphertext message from one group of computing nodes to another group of computing nodes in a distributed manner.
- Anti-malicious tampering Effectively identify potential malicious nodes, so that all nodes that need to obtain corresponding messages can finally obtain consistent ciphertext messages. Unlike plaintext messages, nodes receiving ciphertext data cannot verify the correctness of ciphertext messages by decrypting them.
- Hash(X) The hash value of X.
- uid(P_x) The unique identifier of computing node P_x, used to confirm its attribution.
- the present invention provides a method for detecting malicious nodes.
- the method is applicable to a block chain provided by the present invention, and the block chain includes a notary node, a first sending node, a second sending node and a receiving node, and may also include an audit node.
- the malicious node detection method provided by the present invention, for the same ciphertext message, multiple sending nodes are combined without decrypting the ciphertext message, and it is also possible for the receiving node to immediately determine whether there is a malicious node (assuming that a synchronous operation is at most A malicious node appears), and determine which one is the malicious node.
- Step 101 the notary node acquires the authenticated verification message, the first verification message from the first sending node, the second verification message from the second sending node, and the third verification message from the receiving node.
- Step 102 The notary node determines the receiving node, the first sending node and the A malicious node in the second sending node.
- the authenticated verification message represents an authenticated ciphertext message
- the first verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the first sending node
- the second verification message is used to verify The ciphertext message declared by the second sending node
- the third verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the receiving node.
- the receiving node may perform the following steps:
- first auxiliary message is a statement for the second sending node based on the authenticated ciphertext message in accordance with Obtained in a first preset manner; if the first ciphertext message obtained in the first preset manner is the same as the first auxiliary message, send a lawsuit message to the notary node, and the lawsuit message It is used to indicate that the first sending node and the second sending node contain a malicious node.
- the ciphertext message to be synchronized is m
- the corresponding globally unique message identifier is id_m
- the hash value h_m Hash(m)
- the receiving computing node (ie receiving node) receiving the ciphertext message is P_r.
- the initialization process is as follows:
- ciphertext message m For the ciphertext message m, it is assumed that there is at least one computing node in the computing network (block chain) that has the ciphertext message m corresponding to the identifier id_m, and there are at least two computing nodes that have h_m, which can be obtained through the trusted distribution of the initialization process. Implementation; after initialization, it is assumed that there is at most one malicious node in any message synchronization process.
- the receiver computing node (receiving node) P_r searches based on the identifier id_m, and randomly selects a initiator computing node (first sending node) P_s0 with m; in the computing alliance network, the receiving node The party computing node P_r searches based on the identifier id_m, and randomly selects another collaborative computing node (second sending node) P_s1 that owns h_m.
- the sending computing node P_s0 sends id_m, m to the receiving computing node as P_r; the cooperative computing node P_s1 sends id_m, h_m to the receiving computing node as P_r.
- the receiver computing node P_r checks whether the Hash(m) is equal to h_m, if it is equal, the message synchronization ends; otherwise, it means that there is a malicious node in the sending computing node P_s0 or the collaborative computing node P_s1, and the malicious node detection process is carried out, that is, step 102 process.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to a first preset method, or the authenticated ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method.
- the result obtained by the method is then obtained according to the authenticated upgrade message obtained by the second preset method, and the first preset method and the second preset method are both one-way operation methods.
- the first preset method and the second preset method may specifically be the same hash operation.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset method, and the first verification message includes the first ciphertext message, the second verification message includes a first auxiliary message, and the third verification message includes a second ciphertext message and a second auxiliary message;
- the first ciphertext message is the cipher message sent by the first sending node
- the first auxiliary message is obtained by the second sending node according to the first preset method based on the certified ciphertext message;
- the second ciphertext message is obtained by the receiving node
- the received ciphertext message, the second auxiliary message is obtained by the receiving node statement based on the authenticated ciphertext message in the first preset manner.
- the notary node determines that the first sending node is a malicious node; or, if the second condition is met, the notary node determines that the second sending node is a malicious node; or, if both If neither the first condition nor the second condition is satisfied, the notary node determines that the receiving node is a malicious node.
- the first condition is that the first ciphertext message is different from the second ciphertext message, or the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the first auxiliary message , and the first auxiliary message is the same as the second auxiliary message, and the first auxiliary message is the same as the authenticated verification message, and the second condition is that the first auxiliary message is the same as the second
- the auxiliary message is different, or the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the first auxiliary message, and the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method
- the message is the same as the second auxiliary message, and the message obtained by the first ciphertext message according to the first preset method is the same as the authenticated verification message.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained according to the second preset method after the authenticated ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method, and the first verification
- the message includes a third auxiliary message, the second verification message includes a first upgrade message, and the third verification message includes a fourth auxiliary message and a second upgrade message;
- the third auxiliary message declares for the first sending node Based on the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method, the first upgrade message is after the second sending node declares that the message is obtained based on the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset method Obtained according to the second preset method, the fourth auxiliary message is obtained according to the first preset method from the second ciphertext message received by the receiving node, and the second upgrade message is The receiving node declares that it obtains the message according to the first preset method based on the authenticated ciphertext message and then obtains it according to the second preset method.
- step 102 An implementation of step 102 can also be as follows:
- the notary node determines that the first sending node is a malicious node; or, if the fourth condition is met, the notary node determines that the second sending node is a malicious node; or, if both If neither the third condition nor the fourth condition is satisfied, the notary node determines that the receiving node is a malicious node.
- the third condition is that the third auxiliary message is different from the fourth auxiliary message, or the information obtained by the third auxiliary message according to the first preset method is different from the first upgrade message, and the The first upgrade message is the same as the second upgrade message, and the first upgrade message is the same as the authenticated verification message, and the fourth condition is that the first upgrade message is different from the second upgrade message , or the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is different from the first upgrade message, and the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is different from the first upgrade message
- the two upgrade messages are the same, and the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is the same as the authenticated verification message.
- the receiver computing node P_r starts the litigation process, as follows:
- the receiving computing node P_r sends the second ciphertext message m_r and the second auxiliary message h_m_r to the notary node P_a.
- the node P_r may make a false accusation, so the m_r and h_m_r here are not necessarily equal to the values actually received by the node P_r.
- the subscript of _r is hereby added to show the difference.
- the notary node P_a checks the following judgment conditions:
- the notary node sends the authenticated verification message, the first verification message, the second verification message and the third verification message to the audit node; , the first verification message, the second verification message, and the third verification message, and determine a malicious node among the receiving node, the first sending node, and the second sending node.
- the above steps performed by the audit node can also be performed by an auditor outside the blockchain. Specifically, it can be as follows:
- the third-party audit does not need to obtain the original text m of the message, and can verify the malicious node at that time only from the stored evidence on the blockchain.
- Third-party audit retrieve past litigation records based on the identifier id_m, and obtain id_m, uid(P_s0), uid(P_s1), e_m_r, e_h_m_r, uid(P_r), e_m', e_h_m', uid(P_a), e_h_m; third party
- the audit checks the following judgment conditions:
- the present invention provides a detection device for malicious nodes, including:
- the acquiring module 201 is configured to acquire an authenticated verification message, a first verification message from a first sending node, a second verification message from a second sending node, and a third verification message from a receiving node, the notary node, the first The sending node, the second sending node and the receiving node are all nodes in the blockchain; the authenticated verification message represents an authenticated ciphertext message, and the first verification message is used to verify the first The ciphertext message declared by the sending node, the second verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the second sending node, and the third verification message is used to verify the ciphertext message declared by the receiving node;
- a detection module 202 configured to determine the receiving node, the first sending node and the The above-mentioned malicious node in the second sending node.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to a first preset method, or is the result obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset method and then obtained according to the first preset method.
- the authenticated upgrade message obtained in two preset ways, the first preset way and the second preset way are both one-way operation ways.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained from the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset method, the first verification message includes the first ciphertext message, and the second verification message includes the first ciphertext message. an auxiliary message, the third verification message comprising a second ciphertext message and a second auxiliary message;
- the first ciphertext message is a ciphertext message declared by the first sending node
- the first auxiliary message is a ciphertext message declared by the second sending node based on the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first preset
- the second ciphertext message is the ciphertext message received by the receiving node statement
- the second auxiliary message is the ciphertext message received by the receiving node statement based on the authenticated ciphertext message according to the first predetermined obtained by way of setting;
- the detection module 202 is specifically used for:
- the first condition is that the first ciphertext message is different from the second ciphertext message, or the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the second ciphertext message. If the first auxiliary message is different, and the first auxiliary message is the same as the second auxiliary message, and the first auxiliary message is the same as the authenticated verification message, then it is determined that the first sending node is a malicious node ;or,
- the second condition is that the first auxiliary message is different from the second auxiliary message, or the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the first auxiliary message
- An auxiliary message is different, and the first ciphertext message obtained according to the first preset method is the same as the second auxiliary message, and the first ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method If the message is the same as the authenticated verification message, it is determined that the second sending node is a malicious node; or,
- the receiving node is a malicious node.
- the authenticated verification message is obtained according to the second preset method after the authenticated ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method, and the first verification message includes the third an auxiliary message, the second verification message includes a first upgrade message, and the third verification message includes a fourth auxiliary message and a second upgrade message;
- the third auxiliary message is obtained by the first sending node statement based on the first ciphertext message in the first preset manner, and the first upgrade message is obtained by the second sending node statement based on the authenticated
- the ciphertext message is obtained according to the first preset method and then obtained according to the second preset method
- the fourth auxiliary message is that the receiving node declares that the second ciphertext message received according to the first preset method Obtained in a preset manner, the second upgrade message is obtained in accordance with the second preset manner after the receiving node declares that the message is obtained in the first preset manner based on the authenticated ciphertext message;
- the detection module 202 is specifically used for:
- the third condition is that the third auxiliary message is different from the fourth auxiliary message, or the third auxiliary message obtained according to the first preset method is different from the first
- the upgrade messages are different, and the first upgrade message is the same as the second upgrade message, and the first upgrade message is the same as the authenticated verification message, then it is determined that the first sending node is a malicious node; or,
- the fourth condition is that the first upgrade message is different from the second upgrade message, or the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is different from the first upgrade message.
- the upgrade messages are different, and the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is the same as the second upgrade message, and the third auxiliary message obtained according to the second preset method is the same as If the authenticated verification messages are the same, it is determined that the second sending node is a malicious node; or,
- the receiving node is a malicious node.
- an embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer device, including a program or an instruction.
- the program or instruction When the program or instruction is executed, the method for detecting a malicious node in the blockchain provided by the embodiment of the present invention and any An optional method is executed.
- an embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, including programs or instructions.
- programs or instructions When the programs or instructions are executed, the detection of malicious nodes in the block chain as provided by the embodiments of the present invention method and any optional methods are executed.
- the embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods or computer program products. Accordingly, the present invention can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
- a computer-usable storage media including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.
- These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to operate in a specific manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising instruction means, the instructions
- the device realizes the function specified in one or more procedures of the flowchart and/or one or more blocks of the block diagram.
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法及区块链,其中方法为:公证节点获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息,所述公证节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。上述方法应用于金融科技(Fintech)时,可以通过验证各节点声明的密文消息与已认证密文消息之间的一致性关系,从而可以确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
Description
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请要求在2021年11月10日提交中国专利局、申请号为202111323914.8、申请名称为“一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法及区块链”的中国专利申请的优先权,其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
本发明涉及金融科技(Fintech)领域中的区块链(Blockchain)领域,尤其涉及一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法及区块链。
随着计算机技术的发展,越来越多的技术应用在金融领域,传统金融业正在逐步向金融科技(Fintech)转变,但由于金融行业的安全性、实时性要求,也对技术提出的更高的要求。目前,基于区块链的不可篡改性,金融科技领域中常通过区块链进行交易。然而,在区块链的节点同步密文消息时,可能会出现恶意节点。
如若发送节点进行篡改作恶,将本应发送的密文消息篡改成错误的密文消息,发送节点便是恶意节点,也可能接收节点接收到了正确的密文消息,但却声明是错误的密文消息,即对发送节点进行诬告,接收节点便是恶意节点。若要定位出一次密文消息同步的过程的恶意节点,只能在线下通过其他非技术手段,要求发送节点对明文数据进行签名后,再要求发送节点对密文消息进行解密才能定位出恶意节点。因此目前定位出恶意节点的受限较大,这是一个亟待解决的问题。
发明内容
本发明提供一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法及区块链,解决了现有技术中定位出恶意节点的受限较大的问题。
第一方面,本发明提供一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法,包括:
公证节点获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息,所述公证节点、所述第一发送节点、所述第二发送节点和所述接收节点均为区块链中的节点;所述已认证验证消息表征了已认证密文消息,所述第一验证消息用于验证所述第一发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第二验证消息用于验证所述第二发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第三验证消息用于验证所述接收节点声明的密文消息;
所述公证节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
上述方式下,公证节点分别从所述第一发送节点、所述第二发送节点和所述接收节点获取相应的验证消息,以及已认证的验证消息,那么可以通过所述已认证验证消息、所述 第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,验证各节点声明的密文消息与已认证密文消息之间的一致性关系,从而可以确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照第一预设方式得到的,或者是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的结果再按照第二预设方式得到的已认证升级消息,所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式均为单向运算方式。
上述方式下,由于所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式均为单向运算方式,从而可以根据不可篡改性,依据根据所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式的对应关系进行验证,从而在更多的层面对密文消息进行验证,提升了恶意节点检测方法的可靠性。
可选的,所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式均为同一种哈希运算。
上述方式下,采用同一种哈希运算,可以使得恶意节点检测方法的运算更快,效率更高。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第一密文消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一辅助消息,所述第三验证消息包括第二密文消息和第二辅助消息;
所述第一密文消息为所述第一发送节点声明发送的密文消息,所述第一辅助消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;所述第二密文消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的密文消息,所述第二辅助消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;
所述公证节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点,包括:
若满足第一条件,所述第一条件为所述第一密文消息与所述第二密文消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则所述公证节点确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若满足第二条件,所述第二条件为所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则所述公证节点确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若既不满足所述第一条件又不满足所述第二条件,则所述公证节点确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
上述方式下,根据对比各节点声明的密文消息和辅助消息,可以相互印证各节点声明的密文消息和辅助消息是否一致,以及是否符合已认证验证消息的指示,从而可以简单高效地检测出恶意节点。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第三辅助消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一升级消息,所述第三验证消息包括第四辅助消息和第二升级消息;
所述第三辅助消息为所述第一发送节点声明基于第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方 式得到的,所述第一升级消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第四辅助消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的第二密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第二升级消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的;
所述公证节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点,包括:
若满足第三条件,所述第三条件为所述第三辅助消息与所述第四辅助消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第一升级消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则所述公证节点确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若满足第四条件,所述第四条件为所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则所述公证节点确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若既不满足所述第三条件又不满足所述第四条件,则所述公证节点确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
上述方式下,根据对比各节点声明的辅助消息和升级消息,可以相互印证各节点声明的辅助消息和升级消息是否一致,以及是否符合已认证验证消息的指示,从而可以简单高效地检测出恶意节点。
第二方面,本发明提供一种区块链,包括:公证节点、第一发送节点、第二发送节点和接收节点;
所述公证节点,用于获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息,所述已认证验证消息表征了已认证密文消息,所述第一验证消息用于验证所述第一发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第二验证消息用于验证所述第二发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第三验证消息用于验证所述接收节点声明的密文消息;
所述公证节点,用于根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
可选的,所述接收节点还用于:
获取来自所述第一发送节点的第一密文消息以及所述第二发送节点的第一辅助消息,所述第一辅助消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照第一预设方式得到的;
若所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息相同,则向所述公证节点发送诉讼消息,所述诉讼消息用于指示所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中含有恶意节点。
可选的,所述区块链还包括审计节点;
所述公证节点,还用于将所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息发送至所述审计节点;
所述审计节点,用于根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
第三方面,本发明提供一种恶意节点的检测装置,包括:
获取模块,用于获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息,公证节点、所述第一发送节点、所述第二发送节点和所述接收节点均为区块链中的节点;所述已认证验证消息表征了已认证密文消息,所述第一验证消息用于验证所述第一发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第二验证消息用于验证所述第二发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第三验证消息用于验证所述接收节点声明的密文消息;
检测模块,用于根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照第一预设方式得到的,或者是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的结果再按照第二预设方式得到的已认证升级消息,所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式均为单向运算方式。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第一密文消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一辅助消息,所述第三验证消息包括第二密文消息和第二辅助消息;
所述第一密文消息为所述第一发送节点声明发送的密文消息,所述第一辅助消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;所述第二密文消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的密文消息,所述第二辅助消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;
所述检测模块具体用于:
若满足第一条件,所述第一条件为所述第一密文消息与所述第二密文消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若满足第二条件,所述第二条件为所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若既不满足所述第一条件又不满足所述第二条件,则确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第三辅助消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一升级消息,所述第三验证消息包括第四辅助消息和第二升级消息;
所述第三辅助消息为所述第一发送节点声明基于第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方 式得到的,所述第一升级消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第四辅助消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的第二密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第二升级消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的;
所述检测模块具体用于:
若满足第三条件,所述第三条件为所述第三辅助消息与所述第四辅助消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第一升级消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若满足第四条件,所述第四条件为所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若既不满足所述第三条件又不满足所述第四条件,则确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
上述第二方面至第三方面及各个可选实施方式的有益效果,可以参考上述第一方面及第一方面各个可选方法的有益效果,这里不再赘述。
第四方面,本发明提供一种计算机设备,包括程序或指令,当所述程序或指令被执行时,用以执行上述第一方面、第二方面及各个可选的方法。
第五方面,本发明提供一种存储介质,包括程序或指令,当所述程序或指令被执行时,用以执行上述第一方面、第二方面及各个可选的方法。
本发明的这些方面或其他方面在以下实施例的描述中会更加简明易懂。
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例中的技术方案,下面将对实施例描述中所需要使用的附图作简要介绍,显而易见地,下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例,对于本领域的普通技术人员来讲,在不付出创造性劳动性的前提下,还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为本发明实施例提供的一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法对应的流程示意图;
图2为本发明实施例提供的一种区块链中恶意节点的检测装置的结构示意图。
为了使本发明的目的、技术方案和优点更加清楚,下面将结合附图对本发明作进一步地详细描述,显然,所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例,而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例,本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其它实施例,都属于本发明保护的范围。
下面首先列举本发明实施例中的名词。
区块链是由一系列区块组成的一条链,每个区块上除了记录本块的数据还会记录上一块的哈希(Hash)值,通过这种方式组成一条链。区块链的核心理念有两个,一个是密码 学技术,另一个是去中心化思想,基于这两个理念做到区块链上的历史信息无法被篡改。一个区块由块头和块体组成,其中块头定义包括该区块高度h,上一个区块的Hash指prevHash等重要字段,而块体主要存储交易数据。
计算联盟:由多个供数机构组成的一个联合数据计算网络,基于安全多方技术等隐私计算技术,每个供数机构部署一个计算节点,进行跨机构的密文消息流通同步,这些计算节点可以形成区块链。在实际场景中,出于共同的商业利益,联盟中的大多数成员有较高的动机,诚实地执行密文消息流通协议,但不排除可能出现的少数恶意节点。
恶意节点:不遵守计算联盟中约定密文消息流通协议,对密文消息数据进行篡改作恶的计算节点。
分布式密文消息同步:采用分布式方式将一个密文消息从一组计算节点同步到另一组计算节点的过程。
抗恶意篡改:有效判别出潜在的恶意节点,使得所有需要获得对应消息的节点最终都能获得一致的密文消息。有别于明文消息,接收密文数据的节点无法通过解密来核实密文消息的正确性。
Hash(X):X的哈希值。
uid(P_x):计算节点P_x的唯一标识符,用于确认其归属身份。
在金融机构(银行机构、保险机构或证券机构)在进行业务(如银行的贷款业务、存款业务等)运转过程中,可能需要同步密文消息,在区块链的节点同步密文消息时,可能会出现恶意节点。现有技术中,只能在线下通过其他非技术手段,要求发送节点对明文数据进行签名后,再要求发送节点对密文消息进行解密才能定位出恶意节点。这种情况不符合银行等金融机构的需求,无法保证金融机构各项业务的高效运转。
为此,如图1所示,本发明提供一种恶意节点的检测方法。该方法适用于本发明提供的一种区块链,该区块链包括公证节点、第一发送节点、第二发送节点和接收节点,还可以包括审计节点。本发明提供的恶意节点的检测方法中,对于同一份密文消息,联合多个发送节点,无需对密文消息进行解密,也能让接收节点,即时判断是否存在恶意节点(假定一次同步操作最多出现一个恶意节点),且判别哪一个是恶意节点。
该方法具体步骤如下:
步骤101:公证节点获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息。
步骤102:所述公证节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
步骤101~步骤102,所述已认证验证消息表征了已认证密文消息,所述第一验证消息用于验证所述第一发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第二验证消息用于验证所述第二发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第三验证消息用于验证所述接收节点声明的密文消息。
一种可能的实现方式中,步骤101之前,接收节点可以执行如下步骤:
获取来自所述第一发送节点的第一密文消息以及所述第二发送节点的第一辅助消息,所述第一辅助消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照第一预设方式得到的;若所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息相同, 则向所述公证节点发送诉讼消息,所述诉讼消息用于指示所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中含有恶意节点。
举例来说,待同步的密文消息为m,对应的全局唯一消息标识为id_m,哈希值h_m=Hash(m),接收密文消息的接收方计算节点(即接收节点)为P_r。
初始化流程如下:
对于密文消息m,假定计算网络(区块链)中至少存在一个计算节点拥有标识id_m对应的密文消息m,且存在至少两个拥有h_m的计算节点,可以通过初始化过程的可信分发来实现;在初始化之后,假定任一次消息同步流程中,最多只有一个恶意节点。
消息同步流程具体可以如下:
在计算联盟网络(区块链)中,接收方计算节点(接收节点)P_r基于标识id_m搜索,随机选取一个拥有m的发起方计算节点(第一发送节点)P_s0;在计算联盟网络中,接收方计算节点P_r基于标识id_m搜索,随机选取另一个拥有h_m的协同计算节点(第二发送节点)P_s1。
发送方计算节点P_s0将id_m,m发送给接收方计算节点为P_r;协同方计算节点P_s1将id_m,h_m发送给接收方计算节点为P_r。
接收方计算节点P_r检查Hash(m)是否等于h_m,如果相等,消息同步结束;否则,说明发送方计算节点P_s0或协同方计算节点P_s1中存在一个恶意节点,进行恶意节点检测流程,即步骤102的流程。
步骤102的一种可能的实现方式中,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照第一预设方式得到的,或者是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的结果再按照第二预设方式得到的已认证升级消息,所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式均为单向运算方式。其中,所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式具体可以为同一种哈希运算。
具体来说,步骤102的一种可能的情形中,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第一密文消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一辅助消息,所述第三验证消息包括第二密文消息和第二辅助消息;所述第一密文消息为所述第一发送节点声明发送的密文消息,所述第一辅助消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;所述第二密文消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的密文消息,所述第二辅助消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的。那么步骤102的一种实现方式可以如下:
若满足第一条件,则所述公证节点确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,若满足第二条件,则所述公证节点确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,若既不满足所述第一条件又不满足所述第二条件,则所述公证节点确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
所述第一条件为所述第一密文消息与所述第二密文消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,所述第二条件为所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同。
另一种可能的情形中,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设 方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第三辅助消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一升级消息,所述第三验证消息包括第四辅助消息和第二升级消息;所述第三辅助消息为所述第一发送节点声明基于第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第一升级消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第四辅助消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的第二密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第二升级消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的。
步骤102的一种实现方式还可以如下:
若满足第三条件,则所述公证节点确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,若满足第四条件,则所述公证节点确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,若既不满足所述第三条件又不满足所述第四条件,则所述公证节点确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
所述第三条件为所述第三辅助消息与所述第四辅助消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第一升级消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,所述第四条件为所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同。
举例来说,接收方计算节点P_r开始诉讼流程,具体如下:
接收方计算节点(接收节点)P_r,基于标识id_m搜索,从计算联盟网络(区块链)中随机选取一个不参与本次同步,且拥有已认证验证消息(h_m)的公证节点P_a,h_m=Hash(m),m为已认证密文消息。
接收方计算节点P_r将第二密文消息m_r和第二辅助消息h_m_r发送给公证节点P_a,注意节点P_r可能会进行诬告,所以这里的m_r和h_m_r,不一定等于节点P_r实际收到的值,特此加上_r的下标,以示区别。
接收方计算节点P_r计算第四辅助消息e_m_r=Hash(m_r),第二升级消息e_h_m_r=Hash(h_m_r),然后将id_m,uid(P_s0),uid(P_s1),e_m_r,e_h_m_r发送到区块链进行存证,便于后来第三方审计。
公证节点P_a计算已认证验证消息e_h_m=Hash(h_m),然后将id_m,uid(P_a),e_h_m发送到区块链进行存证,便于后来第三方审计。
公证节点P_a向发送方计算节点(第一发送节点)P_s0索要原密文消息,获得第一密文消息m';发送方计算节点P_s0计算e_m'=Hash(m'),然后将id_m,uid(P_s0),uid(P_r),e_m'发送到区块链进行存证,便于后来第三方审计。
公证节点P_a向发送方计算节点(第二发送节点)P_s1索要原哈希值,获得第一辅助消息h_m';发送方计算节点P_s1计算e_h_m'=Hash(h_m'),然后将id_m,uid(P_s1),uid(P_r),e_h_m'发送到区块链进行存证,便于后来第三方审计。
公证节点P_a检查如下判断条件:
如果(m'!=m_r或Hash(m')!=h_m'),且h_m'==h_m_r,且h_m'==h_m满足,说明P_s0是恶意节点;如果(h_m'!=h_m_r或Hash(m')!=h_m'),且Hash(m')==h_m_r,且Hash(m')== h_m满足,说明P_s1是恶意节点;否则,公证节点P_a没有发现任何异常,说明P_r对P_s0和P_s1进行了诬告,P_r自己才是恶意节点。
一种可能的实现方式中,当区块链包括审计节点时,还可以执行如下步骤:
所述公证节点将所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息发送至所述审计节点;所述审计节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
需要说明的是,上述审计节点执行的步骤还可以由区块链外部的审计方执行。具体来说可以如下:
第三方审计,无需获得消息原文m,仅从区块链上的存证消息,即可核实当时的恶意节点。第三方审计,基于标识id_m检索以往的诉讼记录,获得id_m,uid(P_s0),uid(P_s1),e_m_r,e_h_m_r,uid(P_r),e_m',e_h_m',uid(P_a),e_h_m;第三方审计检查如下判断条件:
如果(e_m'!=e_m_r或Hash(e_m')!=e_h_m'),且e_h_m'==e_h_m_r,且e_h_m'==e_h_m满足,说明P_s0是恶意节点;如果(e_h_m'!=e_h_m_r或Hash(e_m')!=e_h_m'),且Hash(e_m')==e_h_m_r,且Hash(e_m')==e_h_m满足,说明P_s1是恶意节点;否则,说明P_r对P_s0和P_s1进行了诬告,P_r自己才是恶意节点。
如图2所示,本发明提供一种恶意节点的检测装置,包括:
获取模块201,用于获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息,公证节点、所述第一发送节点、所述第二发送节点和所述接收节点均为区块链中的节点;所述已认证验证消息表征了已认证密文消息,所述第一验证消息用于验证所述第一发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第二验证消息用于验证所述第二发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第三验证消息用于验证所述接收节点声明的密文消息;
检测模块202,用于根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照第一预设方式得到的,或者是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的结果再按照第二预设方式得到的已认证升级消息,所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式均为单向运算方式。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第一密文消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一辅助消息,所述第三验证消息包括第二密文消息和第二辅助消息;
所述第一密文消息为所述第一发送节点声明发送的密文消息,所述第一辅助消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;所述第二密文消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的密文消息,所述第二辅助消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;
所述检测模块202具体用于:
若满足第一条件,所述第一条件为所述第一密文消息与所述第二密文消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述已认证验证消息相同, 则确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若满足第二条件,所述第二条件为所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若既不满足所述第一条件又不满足所述第二条件,则确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
可选的,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第三辅助消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一升级消息,所述第三验证消息包括第四辅助消息和第二升级消息;
所述第三辅助消息为所述第一发送节点声明基于第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第一升级消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第四辅助消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的第二密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第二升级消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的;
所述检测模块202具体用于:
若满足第三条件,所述第三条件为所述第三辅助消息与所述第四辅助消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第一升级消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若满足第四条件,所述第四条件为所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,
若既不满足所述第三条件又不满足所述第四条件,则确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
基于同一发明构思,本发明实施例还提供了一种计算机设备,包括程序或指令,当所述程序或指令被执行时,如本发明实施例提供的区块链中恶意节点的检测方法及任一可选方法被执行。
基于同一发明构思,本发明实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质,包括程序或指令,当所述程序或指令被执行时,如本发明实施例提供的区块链中恶意节点的检测方法及任一可选方法被执行。
本领域内的技术人员应明白,本发明的实施例可提供为方法、或计算机程序产品。因此,本发明可采用完全硬件实施例、完全软件实施例、或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式。而且,本发明可采用在一个或多个其中包含有计算机可用程序代码的计算机可用存储介质(包括但不限于磁盘存储器、CD-ROM、光学存储器等)上实施的计算机程序产品的形式。
本发明是参照根据本发明实施例的方法、设备(系统)、和计算机程序产品的流程图和/或方框图来描述的。应理解可由计算机程序指令实现流程图和/或方框图中的每一流 程和/或方框、以及流程图和/或方框图中的流程和/或方框的结合。可提供这些计算机程序指令到通用计算机、专用计算机、嵌入式处理机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器以产生一个机器,使得通过计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器执行的指令产生用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的装置。
这些计算机程序指令也可存储在能引导计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备以特定方式工作的计算机可读存储器中,使得存储在该计算机可读存储器中的指令产生包括指令装置的制造品,该指令装置实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能。
这些计算机程序指令也可装载到计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备上,使得在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行一系列操作步骤以产生计算机实现的处理,从而在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行的指令提供用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的步骤。
尽管已描述了本发明的优选实施例,但本领域内的技术人员一旦得知了基本创造性概念,则可对这些实施例作出另外的变更和修改。所以,所附权利要求意欲解释为包括优选实施例以及落入本发明范围的所有变更和修改。
显然,本领域的技术人员可以对本发明进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本发明的精神和范围。这样,倘若本发明的这些修改和变型属于本发明权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内,则本发明也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。
Claims (10)
- 一种区块链中恶意节点的检测方法,其特征在于,包括:公证节点获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息,所述公证节点、所述第一发送节点、所述第二发送节点和所述接收节点均为区块链中的节点;所述已认证验证消息表征了已认证密文消息,所述第一验证消息用于验证所述第一发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第二验证消息用于验证所述第二发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第三验证消息用于验证所述接收节点声明的密文消息;所述公证节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
- 如权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照第一预设方式得到的,或者是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的结果再按照第二预设方式得到的已认证升级消息,所述第一预设方式及所述第二预设方式均为单向运算方式。
- 如权利要求2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第一密文消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一辅助消息,所述第三验证消息包括第二密文消息和第二辅助消息;所述第一密文消息为所述第一发送节点声明发送的密文消息,所述第一辅助消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;所述第二密文消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的密文消息,所述第二辅助消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的;所述公证节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点,包括:若满足第一条件,所述第一条件为所述第一密文消息与所述第二密文消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一辅助消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则所述公证节点确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,若满足第二条件,所述第二条件为所述第一辅助消息与所述第二辅助消息不同,或者所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息不同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第二辅助消息相同,且所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则所述公证节点确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,若既不满足所述第一条件又不满足所述第二条件,则所述公证节点确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
- 如权利要求2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述已认证验证消息是所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第一验证消息包括第三辅助消息,所述第二验证消息包括第一升级消息,所述第三验证消息包括第四 辅助消息和第二升级消息;所述第三辅助消息为所述第一发送节点声明基于第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第一升级消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的,所述第四辅助消息为所述接收节点声明接收到的第二密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的,所述第二升级消息为所述接收节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到消息后再按照所述第二预设方式得到的;所述公证节点根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点,包括:若满足第三条件,所述第三条件为所述第三辅助消息与所述第四辅助消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第一升级消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则所述公证节点确定所述第一发送节点为恶意节点;或者,若满足第四条件,所述第四条件为所述第一升级消息与所述第二升级消息不同,或者所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第一升级消息不同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述第二升级消息相同,且所述第三辅助消息按照所述第二预设方式得到的消息与所述已认证验证消息相同,则所述公证节点确定所述第二发送节点为恶意节点;或者,若既不满足所述第三条件又不满足所述第四条件,则所述公证节点确定所述接收节点为恶意节点。
- 一种区块链,其特征在于,包括:公证节点、第一发送节点、第二发送节点和接收节点;所述公证节点,用于获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息;所述已认证验证消息表征了已认证密文消息,所述第一验证消息用于验证所述第一发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第二验证消息用于验证所述第二发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第三验证消息用于验证所述接收节点声明的密文消息;所述公证节点,用于根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
- 如权利要求5所述的区块链,其特征在于,所述接收节点还用于:获取来自所述第一发送节点的第一密文消息以及所述第二发送节点的第一辅助消息,所述第一辅助消息为所述第二发送节点声明基于所述已认证密文消息按照第一预设方式得到的;若所述第一密文消息按照所述第一预设方式得到的消息与所述第一辅助消息相同,则向所述公证节点发送诉讼消息,所述诉讼消息用于指示所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中含有恶意节点。
- 如权利要求5或6所述的区块链,其特征在于,还包括审计节点;所述公证节点,还用于将所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消 息和所述第三验证消息发送至所述审计节点;所述审计节点,用于根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
- 一种区块链中恶意节点的检测装置,其特征在于,包括:获取模块,用于获取已认证验证消息、来自第一发送节点的第一验证消息、来自第二发送节点的第二验证消息和来自接收节点的第三验证消息,公证节点、所述第一发送节点、所述第二发送节点和所述接收节点均为区块链中的节点;所述已认证验证消息表征了已认证密文消息,所述第一验证消息用于验证所述第一发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第二验证消息用于验证所述第二发送节点声明的密文消息,所述第三验证消息用于验证所述接收节点声明的密文消息;检测模块,用于根据所述已认证验证消息、所述第一验证消息、所述第二验证消息和所述第三验证消息,确定出所述接收节点、所述第一发送节点和所述第二发送节点中的恶意节点。
- 一种计算机设备,其特征在于,包括程序或指令,当所述程序或指令被处理器执行时,如权利要求1至4中任意一项所述的方法被执行。
- 一种计算机可读存储介质,其特征在于,包括程序或指令,当所述程序或指令被处理器执行时,如权利要求1至4中任意一项所述的方法被执行。
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