WO2023070560A1 - 信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质 - Google Patents
信息传输方法、装置、通信设备和存储介质 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2023070560A1 WO2023070560A1 PCT/CN2021/127588 CN2021127588W WO2023070560A1 WO 2023070560 A1 WO2023070560 A1 WO 2023070560A1 CN 2021127588 W CN2021127588 W CN 2021127588W WO 2023070560 A1 WO2023070560 A1 WO 2023070560A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
- H04W12/37—Managing security policies for mobile devices or for controlling mobile applications
Definitions
- the present application relates to the technical field of wireless communication but is not limited to the technical field of wireless communication, and in particular relates to an information transmission method, device, communication device and storage medium.
- the proximity communication service (ProSe, Proximity Service) for the fifth generation (5G, 5th Generation) cellular mobile communication includes: ProSe direct communication and ProSe indirect communication.
- a remote user equipment (UE, User Equipment) relays the UE through a UE to a network (U2N, UE-to-Network) to communicate with the network.
- U2N UE-to-Network
- the embodiments of the present disclosure provide an information transmission method, device, communication device, and storage medium.
- an information transmission method which is applied to a user equipment UE, and the method includes:
- PC5 security policy Acquire a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
- the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
- the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
- the method also includes:
- the PC5 communication is established.
- the method in response to the UE being a relay UE, the method further includes:
- the protocol data unit PDU session corresponding to the ProSe relay service is protected.
- the acquiring PC5 security policy includes:
- the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
- the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
- an information transmission method which is applied to a core network, and the method includes:
- PC5 security policy Configure a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
- the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
- the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
- the method also includes:
- the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
- the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
- an information transmission apparatus wherein, applied to a user equipment UE, the apparatus includes:
- the obtaining module is configured to obtain a PC5 security policy, wherein the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
- the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
- the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
- the device also includes:
- An establishment module configured to establish the PC5 communication based on the PC5 security policy.
- the apparatus in response to the UE being a relay UE, the apparatus further includes:
- the protection module is configured to protect the protocol data unit PDU session corresponding to the ProSe relay service based on the UP security policy provided by the network side.
- the acquisition module is specifically configured as:
- the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
- the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
- an information transmission device which is applied to a core network, and the device includes:
- a setting module configured to configure a PC5 security policy, wherein the PC5 security policy is used to protect PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
- the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
- the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
- the device also includes:
- the sending module is configured to send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE.
- the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
- the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
- a communication device including a processor, a memory, and an executable program stored on the memory and capable of being run by the processor, wherein the processor runs the executable program
- the steps of the information transmission method described in the first aspect or the second aspect are executed when the program is executed.
- a storage medium on which an executable program is stored, wherein, when the executable program is executed by a processor, the information transmission method as described in the first aspect or the second aspect is implemented. A step of.
- the UE obtains a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the remote UE and the relay UE can protect the PC5 connection security in the ProSe indirect communication based on the security policy, realize the security protection of the PC5 communication in the ProSe relay service, and meet the security requirements of the ProSe indirect communication. Improve communication security.
- Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a wireless communication system according to an exemplary embodiment
- Fig. 2 is a schematic flowchart of an information transmission method according to an exemplary embodiment
- Fig. 3 is a schematic flowchart of another information transmission method according to an exemplary embodiment
- Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of information interaction of an information transmission method according to an exemplary embodiment
- Fig. 5 is a block diagram of an information transmission device according to an exemplary embodiment
- Fig. 6 is a block diagram of another information transmission device according to an exemplary embodiment
- Fig. 7 is a block diagram showing an apparatus for information transmission according to an exemplary embodiment.
- first, second, third, etc. may use the terms first, second, third, etc. to describe various information, the information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish information of the same type from one another. For example, without departing from the scope of the embodiments of the present disclosure, first information may also be called second information, and similarly, second information may also be called first information. Depending on the context, the word “if” as used herein may be interpreted as “at” or "when” or "in response to a determination.”
- FIG. 1 shows a schematic structural diagram of a wireless communication system provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- the wireless communication system is a communication system based on cellular mobile communication technology, and the wireless communication system may include: several terminals 11 and several base stations 12 .
- the terminal 11 may be a device that provides voice and/or data connectivity to the user.
- the terminal 11 can communicate with one or more core networks via a radio access network (Radio Access Network, RAN), and the terminal 11 can be an Internet of Things terminal, such as a sensor device, a mobile phone (or called a "cellular" phone) and a
- the computer of the IoT terminal for example, may be a fixed, portable, pocket, hand-held, built-in computer or vehicle-mounted device.
- Station For example, Station (Station, STA), subscriber unit (subscriber unit), subscriber station (subscriber station), mobile station (mobile station), mobile station (mobile), remote station (remote station), access point, remote terminal ( remote terminal), an access terminal (access terminal), a user device (user terminal), a user agent (user agent), a user device (user device), or a user terminal (user equipment, UE).
- the terminal 11 may also be a device of an unmanned aerial vehicle.
- the terminal 11 may also be a vehicle-mounted device, for example, a trip computer with a wireless communication function, or a wireless communication device connected externally to the trip computer.
- the terminal 11 may also be a roadside device, for example, it may be a street lamp, a signal lamp, or other roadside devices with a wireless communication function.
- the base station 12 may be a network side device in a wireless communication system.
- the wireless communication system may be a fourth generation mobile communication technology (the 4th generation mobile communication, 4G) system, also known as a Long Term Evolution (LTE) system; or, the wireless communication system may also be a 5G system, Also known as new radio (NR) system or 5G NR system.
- the wireless communication system may also be a next-generation system of the 5G system.
- the access network in the 5G system can be called NG-RAN (New Generation-Radio Access Network, New Generation Radio Access Network).
- the MTC system the MTC system.
- the base station 12 may be an evolved base station (eNB) adopted in a 4G system.
- the base station 12 may also be a base station (gNB) adopting a centralized and distributed architecture in the 5G system.
- eNB evolved base station
- gNB base station
- the base station 12 adopts a centralized distributed architecture it generally includes a centralized unit (central unit, CU) and at least two distributed units (distributed unit, DU).
- the centralized unit is provided with a packet data convergence protocol (Packet Data Convergence Protocol, PDCP) layer, radio link layer control protocol (Radio Link Control, RLC) layer, media access control (Media Access Control, MAC) layer protocol stack;
- PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol
- RLC Radio Link Control
- MAC media access control
- a physical (Physical, PHY) layer protocol stack is set in the unit, and the embodiment of the present disclosure does not limit the specific implementation manner of the base station 12 .
- a wireless connection can be established between the base station 12 and the terminal 11 through a wireless air interface.
- the wireless air interface is a wireless air interface based on the fourth-generation mobile communication network technology (4G) standard; or, the wireless air interface is a wireless air interface based on the fifth-generation mobile communication network technology (5G) standard, such as
- the wireless air interface is a new air interface; alternatively, the wireless air interface may also be a wireless air interface based on a technical standard of a next-generation mobile communication network based on 5G.
- an E2E (End to End, end-to-end) connection can also be established between the terminals 11.
- V2V vehicle to vehicle, vehicle-to-vehicle
- V2I vehicle to Infrastructure, vehicle-to-roadside equipment
- V2P vehicle to pedestrian, vehicle-to-person communication in vehicle to everything (V2X) communication Wait for the scene.
- the above wireless communication system may further include a network management device 13 .
- the network management device 13 may be a core network device in the wireless communication system, for example, the network management device 13 may be a mobility management entity (Mobility Management Entity, MME).
- MME Mobility Management Entity
- the network management device can also be other core network devices, such as Serving GateWay (SGW), Public Data Network Gateway (Public Data Network GateWay, PGW), policy and charging rule functional unit (Policy and Charging Rules Function, PCRF) or Home Subscriber Server (Home Subscriber Server, HSS), etc.
- SGW Serving GateWay
- PGW Public Data Network Gateway
- PCRF Policy and Charging Rules Function
- HSS Home Subscriber Server
- Executors involved in the embodiments of the present disclosure include, but are not limited to: UEs such as mobile phone terminals supporting cellular mobile communications, base stations, and core networks.
- PC5 communication based on PC5 connection needs to be established between the remote UE and the U2N relay UE.
- PC5 connection security of PC5 communication in ProSe indirect communication it is mainly realized by generating a key. How to configure the activation and deactivation of PC5 connection security to meet the communication security requirements of ProSe indirect communication is an urgent problem to be solved.
- this exemplary embodiment provides an information transmission method, which can be applied to a UE in a cellular mobile communication system, including:
- Step 201 Obtain a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the method disclosed in this embodiment may be executed by a UE in cellular mobile communication, and the UE may include: a terminal such as a mobile phone for wireless communication using cellular mobile communication technology.
- PC5 communication is performed between the remote UE and the relay UE through the established PC5 connection; the relay UE and the network side of the cellular mobile communication can communicate through the air interface of the cellular mobile communication.
- the PC5 security policy can be used to configure the PC5 connection security (PC5 Connection Security) of the PC5 communication through the PC5 connection in the ProSe indirect communication.
- the PC5 connection security may be a security protection method adopted for the PC5 connection.
- the PC5 security policy may indicate whether PC5 communication is protected by using PC5 connection security.
- the PC5 security policy may indicate: PC5 connection security must be used, PC5 connection security is preferred, PC5 connection security does not need to be used, and the like.
- the PC5 connection security may include multiple security protection methods.
- the PC5 security policy may also indicate the specific protection mode of the PC5 connection security adopted.
- the specific protection methods for PC5 connection security may include at least one of the following: encryption protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data; integrity protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data, and the like.
- the encryption protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data can be the security protection that PC5 communication signaling and/or data adopt the modes such as key encryption and decryption to carry out.
- Integrity protection may be to use keys for integrity protection and verification of PC5 communication signaling and/or data.
- the UE When the UE performs the PC5 communication in the ProSe indirect communication, it can determine the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication according to the PC5 security policy, thereby improving the data communication security in the PC5 communication.
- the remote UE and the relay UE can protect the PC5 connection security in the ProSe indirect communication based on the security policy, realize the security protection of the PC5 communication in the ProSe relay service, meet the security requirements of the ProSe indirect communication, and improve communication security.
- the PC5 security policy is configured by the core network.
- the PC5 security policy can be configured by the PCF of the core network.
- the acquiring PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 security policy may be configured by the PCF of the core network.
- the PCF of the core network may send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE.
- the core network can send the instruction information of the PC5 security policy to the UE through the air interface of the cellular mobile communication.
- the core network may send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE through NAS signaling during the service authorization and provisioning process for the UE.
- service authorization and activation may include: authorization and activation of the ProSe relay service.
- the core network may respectively send PC5 security policy indication information to the remote UE and the relay UE through NAS signaling during the process of service authorization and provisioning for the remote UE and the relay UE respectively.
- the core network authorizes and activates services for the U2N relay UE; the PCF provides the relay UE with a PC5 security policy for ProSe indirect communication.
- the core network authorizes and activates services for the remote UE; the PCF provides the remote UE with the PC5 security policy of ProSe indirect communication.
- the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
- the PC5 security policies of different ProSe relay services may be the same or different.
- the PC5 security policies configured for the signaling plane and the data plane may be the same or different for the PC5 connection security.
- the PC5 security policy can configure different security for PC5 UP and PC5 CP.
- the ProSe relay service may be a service carried by the remote UE during data communication with the network side through the relay UE performing data relay.
- the instruction information of the PC5 security policy is sent through the core network to realize the security configuration of the PC5 communication corresponding to one or more ProSe relay services, meet the security requirements of the PC5 communication of each ProSe relay service, and improve the communication security.
- the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
- the Relay Service Code (RSC, Relay Service Code) can be provided by the PCF to the relay UE and the remote UE.
- An RSC can uniquely identify a ProSe relay service that the relay UE can provide to the remote UE.
- the RSC can also identify authorized users that the relay UE can provide services, and can be used to select relevant security policies or information, etc. For example, RSC is required for authentication and authorization between remote UEs and relay UEs.
- the PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
- the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the security requirements of the CP and the UP during data transmission may be the same or different.
- the PC5 CP security policy can be used to configure the PC5 communication security of the CP between the relay UE and the remote UE, that is, PC5 CP security.
- the PC5 UP security policy can be used to configure the PC5 communication security of UP between the relay UE and the remote UE, that is, PC5 UP security.
- the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
- PC5 communication For the ProSe indirect communication implemented by the relay UE, PC5 communication needs to be established to carry the signaling and user data between the remote UE and the relay UE.
- the PC5 CP security policy needs to meet the security requirements of the PC5 communication of the ProSe relay service running between the remote UE and the relay UE, and the PC5 CP security policy also needs to meet the network side NAS Signaling and AS signaling security requirements.
- the PC5 CP security of ProSe indirect communication configured by the PC5 CP security policy needs to be consistent with the security requirements of NAS signaling and AS signaling.
- the PC5 CP security policy for ProSe indirect communication can be configured to be consistent with the security requirements of NAS signaling and AS signaling defined in 3GPP TS 33.501, that is, PC5 CP security for ProSe indirect communication is required (REQUIRED) .
- the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
- the PC5 UP security policy needs to satisfy the ProSe service data exchanged between the remote UE and the relay UE.
- the PC5 UP security policy also needs to meet the connection service provided by the relay UE requested by the remote UE; further, the connection service provided by the relay UE is used to support the relay service provided by the network side to the remote UE through the relay UE. Therefore, the PC5 UP security configured by the PC5 UP security policy needs to meet the UP security requirements of the relay service provided by the network.
- the PC5 UP security policy can configure the PC5 UP security to be consistent with the network side UP security.
- Encryption and integrity protection requirements in UP security on the network side can have "required (REQUIRED)” or “preferred (PREFERRED)” or “not required (NOT NEEDED)” options.
- the method also includes:
- the PC5 communication is established.
- the remote UE can discover the relay UE and determine the ProSe relay service that the relay UE can provide.
- the remote UE selects the discovered relay UE and establishes a PC5 connection for ProSe indirect communication.
- the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication between the remote UE and the relay UE is configured by the PC5 security policy.
- the PC5 security policy may be sent by the PCF to the remote UE and the relay UE.
- the method in response to the UE being a relay UE, the method further includes:
- the protocol data unit PDU session corresponding to the ProSe relay service is protected.
- the relay UE can establish a PDU session for ProSe indirect communication.
- the UP security policy of the established PDU session can be provided by the network.
- the PDU session may be established before the remote UE requests to establish PC5 communication for ProSe indirect communication.
- Relay UE and 5G radio access network can activate UP security for PDU session based on UP security policy.
- the remote UE can request different ProSe relay services from the relay UE.
- the remote UE can request by sending the relay service code (RSC, Relay Service Code) of the ProSe relay service to the relay UE. If the relay UE does not currently establish a PDU session associated with the RSC, or the relay UE actively needs to establish a new If the PDU session is relayed, the relay UE can initiate a new PDU session establishment process before establishing the PC5 connection.
- the UP security policy of the new PDU session can also be provided by the network side.
- the network side may be a radio access network and/or a core network in a cellular mobile communication system.
- the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication between the remote UE and the relay UE may be determined based on the configuration of the PC5 security policy.
- the communication security between the relay UE and the network side can be determined based on the configuration of the security policy provided by the network side. In this way, the PC5 communication security in the ProSe indirect communication and the communication security between the relay UE and the network side are realized.
- this exemplary embodiment provides an information transmission method, which can be applied to the core network of a cellular mobile communication system, including:
- Step 301 Configure a PC5 security policy, wherein the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the method disclosed in this embodiment may be executed by the PCF in the core network or the like.
- the PC5 security policy can be configured by the PCF.
- PC5 communication is performed between the remote UE and the relay UE through the established PC5 connection; the relay UE and the network side of the cellular mobile communication can communicate through the air interface of the cellular mobile communication.
- the PC5 security policy can be used to configure the PC5 connection security (PC5 Connection Security) of the PC5 communication through the PC5 connection in the ProSe indirect communication.
- the PC5 connection security may be a security protection method adopted for the PC5 connection.
- the PC5 security policy may indicate whether PC5 communication is protected by using PC5 connection security.
- the PC5 security policy may indicate: PC5 connection security must be used, PC5 connection security is preferred, PC5 connection security does not need to be used, and the like.
- the PC5 connection security may include multiple security protection methods.
- the PC5 security policy may also indicate the specific protection mode of the PC5 connection security adopted.
- the specific protection methods for PC5 connection security may include at least one of the following: encryption protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data; integrity protection of PC5 communication signaling and/or data, and the like.
- the encryption protection of the PC5 communication signaling and/or data may be the security protection of the PC5 communication signaling and/or data by means of key encryption and decryption. Integrity protection may be to use keys for integrity protection and verification of PC5 communication signaling and/or data.
- the UE When the UE performs the PC5 communication in the ProSe indirect communication, it can determine the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication according to the PC5 security policy, thereby improving the data communication security in the PC5 communication.
- the remote UE and the relay UE can protect the PC5 connection security in the ProSe indirect communication based on the security policy, realize the security protection of the PC5 communication in the ProSe relay service, and meet the security requirements of the ProSe indirect communication. Improve communication security.
- the PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
- the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the security requirements of the CP and the UP during data transmission may be the same or different.
- the PC5 CP security policy can be used to configure the PC5 communication security of the CP between the relay UE and the remote UE, that is, PC5 CP security.
- the PC5 UP security policy can be used to configure the PC5 communication security of UP between the relay UE and the remote UE, that is, PC5 UP security.
- the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
- PC5 communication For the ProSe indirect communication implemented by the relay UE, PC5 communication needs to be established to carry the signaling and user data between the remote UE and the relay UE.
- the PC5 CP security policy needs to meet the security requirements of the PC5 communication of the ProSe relay service running between the remote UE and the relay UE, and the PC5 CP security policy also needs to meet the network side NAS Signaling and AS signaling security requirements.
- the PC5 CP security for ProSe indirect communication configured by the PC5 CP security policy needs to be consistent with the security requirements of NAS signaling and AS signaling.
- the PC5 CP security policy for ProSe indirect communication can configure PC5 CP security to be consistent with the security requirements of NAS signaling and AS signaling defined in 3GPP TS 33.501, that is, PC5 CP security for ProSe indirect communication is required (REQUIRED) .
- the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
- the PC5 UP security policy needs to satisfy the ProSe service data exchanged between the remote UE and the relay UE.
- the PC5 UP security policy also needs to meet the connection service provided by the relay UE requested by the remote UE; further, the connection service provided by the relay UE is used to support the relay service provided by the network side to the remote UE through the relay UE. Therefore, the PC5 UP security configured by the PC5 UP security policy needs to meet the UP security requirements of the relay service provided by the network.
- the PC5 UP security policy can configure the PC5 UP security to be consistent with the network side UP security.
- Encryption and integrity protection requirements in UP security on the network side can have "required (REQUIRED)” or “preferred (PREFERRED)” or “not required (NOT NEEDED)” options.
- the method also includes:
- the PC5 security policy may be configured by the PCF of the core network.
- the PCF of the core network may send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE.
- the core network can send the instruction information of the PC5 security policy to the UE through the air interface of the cellular mobile communication.
- the core network may send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE through NAS signaling during the service authorization and provisioning process for the UE.
- service authorization and activation may include: authorization and activation of the ProSe relay service.
- the core network may respectively send PC5 security policy indication information to the remote UE and the relay UE through NAS signaling during the process of service authorization and provisioning for the remote UE and the relay UE respectively.
- the core network authorizes and activates services for the U2N relay UE; the PCF provides the relay UE with a PC5 security policy for ProSe indirect communication.
- the core network authorizes and activates services for the remote UE; the PCF provides the remote UE with the PC5 security policy of ProSe indirect communication.
- the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
- the PC5 security policies of different ProSe relay services may be the same or different.
- the PC5 security policies configured for the signaling plane and the data plane may be the same or different for the PC5 connection security.
- the PC5 security policy can configure different security for PC5 UP and PC5 CP.
- the ProSe relay service may be a service carried by the remote UE during data communication with the network side through the relay UE performing data relay.
- the instruction information of the PC5 security policy is sent through the core network to realize the security configuration of the PC5 communication corresponding to one or more ProSe relay services, meet the security requirements of the PC5 communication of each ProSe relay service, and improve the communication security.
- the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
- the Relay Service Code (RSC, Relay Service Code) can be provided by the PCF to the relay UE and the remote UE.
- An RSC can uniquely identify a ProSe relay service that the relay UE can provide to the remote UE.
- the RSC can also identify authorized users that the relay UE can provide services, and can be used to select relevant security policies or information, etc. For example, RSC is required for authentication and authorization between remote UEs and relay UEs.
- the application steps of the PC5 security policy in the ProSe indirect communication process include:
- Step 401a the core network may provide the relay UE with the PC5 security policy during the process of service authorization and provisioning for the relay UE.
- Step 401b the core network may provide the remote UE with the PC5 security policy during the process of service authorization and provisioning for the remote UE.
- Step 402 the relay UE may establish a PDU session for ProSe indirect communication relay.
- the UP security policy of the established PDU session is provided by the network side.
- Step 403 the remote UE initiates a discovery process, and the remote UE can discover the relay UE and determine the ProSe relay service provided by the relay UE.
- Step 404a the remote UE selects the discovered relay UE and establishes a PC5 connection to perform ProSe indirect communication.
- the PC5 connection security of the PC5 communication between the remote UE and the relay UE is configured by the PC5 security policy.
- Step 404b Optionally, if the relay UE does not currently establish a PDU session associated with the RSC, or the relay UE actively needs to establish a new PDU session for relay, the relay UE can initiate a new PDU before completing the establishment of the PC5 connection Session establishment process.
- the UP security policy of the new PDU session can also be provided by the network side.
- Step 405 the relay UE sends a remote UE report (remote user ID, remote UE information) to the SMF, and the remote UE report is sent for the PDU session.
- a remote UE report remote user ID, remote UE information
- Step 406a The ProSe relay service traffic is transmitted through the PC5 connection with security protection.
- Step 406b The ProSe relay service flow relays the connection transmission between the UE and the network side, which has security protection.
- the embodiment of the present invention also provides an information transmission device, which is applied to a UE of cellular mobile wireless communication, as shown in FIG. 5 , wherein the device 100 includes:
- the obtaining module 110 is configured to obtain a PC5 security policy, where the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
- the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
- the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
- the device also includes:
- the establishment module 120 is configured to establish the PC5 communication based on the PC5 security policy.
- the apparatus in response to the UE being a relay UE, the apparatus further includes:
- the protection module 130 is configured to protect the protocol data unit PDU session corresponding to the ProSe relay service based on the UP security policy provided by the network side.
- the acquiring module 110 is specifically configured as:
- the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
- the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
- the embodiment of the present invention also provides an information transmission device, which is applied in the core network of cellular mobile wireless communication, as shown in FIG. 6, wherein the device 200 includes:
- the setting module 210 is configured to configure a PC5 security policy, wherein the PC5 security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 security policy includes:
- the PC5 control plane CP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the CP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE;
- the PC5 user plane UP security policy is used to protect the PC5 communication on the UP plane between the relay UE and the remote UE.
- the PC5 CP security policy meets the signaling security requirements of the non-access stratum NAS and the access stratum AS.
- the PC5 UP security policy is determined according to the UP security requirements of the ProSe relay service.
- the device also includes:
- the sending module 220 is configured to send the indication information of the PC5 security policy to the UE.
- the indication information of the security policy is used to indicate at least one ProSe relay service and the PC5 security policy corresponding to each ProSe relay service.
- the ProSe relay service is indicated by a ProSe relay service code, wherein the ProSe relay service codes of different ProSe relay services are different.
- the acquisition module 110, the establishment module 120, the protection module 130, the setting module 210 and the sending module 220 etc. may be controlled by one or more central processing units (CPU, Central Processing Unit), graphics processing units (GPU, Graphics Processing Unit), Baseband Processor (BP, Baseband Processor), Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC, Application Specific Integrated Circuit), DSP, Programmable Logic Device (PLD, Programmable Logic Device), Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD, Complex Programmable Logic Device), field-programmable gate array (FPGA, Field-Programmable Gate Array), general-purpose processor, controller, microcontroller (MCU, Micro Controller Unit), microprocessor (Microprocessor), or other electronic components Implementation for executing the aforementioned method.
- CPU Central Processing Unit
- GPU Graphics Processing Unit
- BP Baseband Processor
- ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
- DSP Programmable Logic Device
- PLD Programmable Logic Device
- CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device
- FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
- Fig. 7 is a block diagram of an apparatus 3000 for information transmission according to an exemplary embodiment.
- the apparatus 3000 may be a mobile phone, a computer, a digital broadcast terminal, a messaging device, a game console, a tablet device, a medical device, a fitness device, a personal digital assistant, and the like.
- device 3000 may include one or more of the following components: processing component 3002, memory 3004, power supply component 3006, multimedia component 3008, audio component 3010, input/output (I/O) interface 3012, sensor component 3014, and Communication component 3016.
- the processing component 3002 generally controls the overall operations of the device 3000, such as those associated with display, telephone calls, data communications, camera operations, and recording operations.
- the processing component 3002 may include one or more processors 3020 to execute instructions to complete all or part of the steps of the above method. Additionally, processing component 3002 may include one or more modules that facilitate interaction between processing component 3002 and other components. For example, processing component 3002 may include a multimedia module to facilitate interaction between multimedia component 3008 and processing component 3002 .
- the memory 3004 is configured to store various types of data to support operations at the device 3000 . Examples of such data include instructions for any application or method operating on device 3000, contact data, phonebook data, messages, pictures, videos, and the like.
- the memory 3004 can be realized by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or their combination, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM), Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM), Read Only Memory (ROM), Magnetic Memory, Flash Memory, Magnetic or Optical Disk.
- SRAM static random access memory
- EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
- EPROM erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
- PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
- ROM Read Only Memory
- Magnetic Memory Flash Memory
- Magnetic or Optical Disk Magnetic Disk
- Power component 3006 provides power to various components of device 3000 .
- Power components 3006 may include a power management system, one or more power supplies, and other components associated with generating, managing, and distributing power for device 3000 .
- the multimedia component 3008 includes a screen that provides an output interface between the device 3000 and the user.
- the screen may include a liquid crystal display (LCD) and a touch panel (TP). If the screen includes a touch panel, the screen may be implemented as a touch screen to receive input signals from a user.
- the touch panel includes one or more touch sensors to sense touches, swipes, and gestures on the touch panel. The touch sensor can sense not only the boundary of a touch or swipe action, but also detect the duration and pressure associated with the touch or swipe operation.
- the multimedia component 3008 includes a front camera and/or a rear camera. When the device 3000 is in an operation mode, such as a shooting mode or a video mode, the front camera and/or the rear camera can receive external multimedia data. Each front camera and rear camera can be a fixed optical lens system or have focal length and optical zoom capability.
- the audio component 3010 is configured to output and/or input audio signals.
- the audio component 3010 includes a microphone (MIC), which is configured to receive external audio signals when the device 3000 is in operation modes, such as call mode, recording mode and voice recognition mode. Received audio signals may be further stored in memory 3004 or sent via communication component 3016 .
- the audio component 3010 also includes a speaker for outputting audio signals.
- the I/O interface 3012 provides an interface between the processing component 3002 and a peripheral interface module, which may be a keyboard, a click wheel, a button, and the like. These buttons may include, but are not limited to: a home button, volume buttons, start button, and lock button.
- Sensor assembly 3014 includes one or more sensors for providing status assessments of various aspects of device 3000 .
- the sensor component 3014 can detect the open/closed state of the device 3000, the relative positioning of components such as the display and the keypad of the device 3000, the sensor component 3014 can also detect a change in the position of the device 3000 or a component of the device 3000, a user Presence or absence of contact with device 3000 , device 3000 orientation or acceleration/deceleration and temperature change of device 3000 .
- Sensor assembly 3014 may include a proximity sensor configured to detect the presence of nearby objects in the absence of any physical contact.
- the sensor assembly 3014 may also include an optical sensor, such as a CMOS or CCD image sensor, for use in imaging applications.
- the sensor component 3014 may also include an acceleration sensor, a gyroscope sensor, a magnetic sensor, a pressure sensor or a temperature sensor.
- the communication component 3016 is configured to facilitate wired or wireless communication between the apparatus 3000 and other devices.
- the device 3000 can access wireless networks based on communication standards, such as Wi-Fi, 2G or 3G, or a combination thereof.
- the communication component 3016 receives broadcast signals or broadcast related information from an external broadcast management system via a broadcast channel.
- the communication component 3016 also includes a near field communication (NFC) module to facilitate short-range communication.
- NFC near field communication
- the NFC module may be implemented based on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, Infrared Data Association (IrDA) technology, Ultra Wide Band (UWB) technology, Bluetooth (BT) technology, and other technologies.
- RFID Radio Frequency Identification
- IrDA Infrared Data Association
- UWB Ultra Wide Band
- Bluetooth Bluetooth
- apparatus 3000 may be programmed by one or more application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field programmable A gate array (FPGA), controller, microcontroller, microprocessor or other electronic component implementation for performing the methods described above.
- ASICs application specific integrated circuits
- DSPs digital signal processors
- DSPDs digital signal processing devices
- PLDs programmable logic devices
- FPGA field programmable A gate array
- controller microcontroller, microprocessor or other electronic component implementation for performing the methods described above.
- non-transitory computer-readable storage medium including instructions, such as the memory 3004 including instructions, which can be executed by the processor 3020 of the device 3000 to implement the above method.
- the non-transitory computer readable storage medium may be ROM, random access memory (RAM), CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, optical data storage device, and the like.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (34)
- 一种信息传输信息传输方法,其中,应用于用户设备UE,所述方法包括:获取PC5安全策略,其中,所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述PC5安全策略,包括:PC5控制面CP安全策略,用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信;和/或,PC5用户面UP安全策略,用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求2所述的方法,其中,所述PC5 CP安全策略,满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
- 根据权利要求2所述的方法,其中,所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据邻近通信服务ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述方法还包括:基于所述PC5安全策略,建立所述PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,响应于所述UE为中继UE,所述方法还包括:基于网络侧提供的UP安全策略,保护ProSe中继业务对应的协议数据单元PDU会话。
- 根据权利要求1至6任一项所述的方法,其中,所述获取PC5安全策略,包括:接收核心网发送的PC5安全策略的指示信息。
- 根据权利要求7所述的方法,其中,所述安全策略的指示信息,用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务,和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
- 根据权利要求8所述的方法,其中,所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的,其中,不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
- 一种信息传输方法,其中,应用于核心网,所述方法包括:配置PC5安全策略,其中,所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求10所述的方法,其中,所述PC5安全策略,包括:PC5控制面CP安全策略,用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信;和/或,PC5用户面UP安全策略,用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求11所述的方法,其中,所述PC5 CP安全策略,满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
- 根据权利要求11所述的方法,其中,所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据邻近通信服务ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
- 根据权利要求10至13任一项所述的方法,其中,所述方法还包括:向UE发送所述PC5安全策略的指示信息。
- 根据权利要求14所述的方法,其中,所述安全策略的指示信息,用 于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务,和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
- 根据权利要求15所述的方法,其中,所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的,其中,不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
- 一种信息传输装置,其中,应用于用户设备UE,所述装置包括:获取模块,配置为获取PC5安全策略,其中,所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求17所述的装置,其中,所述PC5安全策略,包括:PC5控制面CP安全策略,用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信;和/或,PC5用户面UP安全策略,用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求18所述的装置,其中,所述PC5 CP安全策略,满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
- 根据权利要求18所述的装置,其中,所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据邻近通信服务ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
- 根据权利要求17所述的装置,其中,所述装置还包括:建立模块,配置为基于所述PC5安全策略,建立所述PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求17所述的装置,其中,响应于所述UE为中继UE,所述装置还包括:保护模块,配置为基于网络侧提供的UP安全策略,保护ProSe中继业 务对应的协议数据单元PDU会话。
- 根据权利要求17至22任一项所述的装置,其中,所述获取模块,具体配置为:接收核心网发送的PC5安全策略的指示信息。
- 根据权利要求23所述的装置,其中,所述安全策略的指示信息,用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务,和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
- 根据权利要求24所述的装置,其中,所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的,其中,不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
- 一种信息传输装置,其中,应用于核心网,所述装置包括:设置模块,配置为配置PC5安全策略,其中,所述PC5安全策略用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间的PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求26所述的装置,其中,所述PC5安全策略,包括:PC5控制面CP安全策略,用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间CP面的PC5通信;和/或,PC5用户面UP安全策略,用于保护中继UE和远程UE之间UP面的PC5通信。
- 根据权利要求27所述的装置,其中,所述PC5 CP安全策略,满足非接入层NAS和接入层AS信令安全需求。
- 根据权利要求27所述的装置,其中,所述PC5 UP安全策略是根据邻近通信服务ProSe中继业务的UP安全需求确定的。
- 根据权利要求26至29任一项所述的装置,其中,所述装置还包括:发送模块,配置为向UE发送所述PC5安全策略的指示信息。
- 根据权利要求30所述的装置,其中,所述安全策略的指示信息,用于指示至少一个ProSe中继业务,和每个所述ProSe中继业务分别对应的所述PC5安全策略。
- 根据权利要求31所述的装置,其中,所述ProSe中继业务是通过ProSe中继业务代码指示的,其中,不同所述ProSe中继业务的ProSe中继业务代码不同。
- 一种通信设备装置,包括处理器、存储器及存储在存储器上并能够由所述处理器运行的可执行程序,其中,所述处理器运行所述可执行程序时执行如权利要求1至9任或10至16任一项所述信息传输方法的步骤。
- 一种存储介质,其上存储有可执行程序,其中,所述可执行程序被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1至9或10至16任一项所述信息传输方法的步骤。
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